ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Second Semester, AY 2021-2022

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Module 3
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Learning Outcome
Prepare a summary of a decision promulgated by the Supreme Court on the quasi-judicial
power of administrative agencies.

Learning Objectives

At the end of the module, the learners are expected to:

1. Be able to define the quasi-judicial power of administrative agencies in general;
2. Know the extent of such power;
.
3. Discuss the conditions for the validity of the exercise of said power; and
4. Be aware of the basic precepts of administrative due process.

INTRODUCTION

This module gives a more detailed study on the quasi-judicial power of administrative
agencies, as well as the main conditions for the valid exercise of such power and how it
affects and safeguards the private individuals’ rights. A case will be the main subject of
module assessment.

I. Quasi-Judicial Power

The Quasi-Judicial Power pertains to the power of administrative agencies to determine

and resolve questions of fact to which the law is to be applied.

Quasi-judicial refers to the action, discretion of officers, who are required to investigate
facts, or ascertain the existence of such facts and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action.1

Administrative agencies are usually granted this power expressly in their charters and
governing statutes. These agencies are thus called to make a determination of facts, and
to interpret and apply the law to the set of facts as it may be found.

This function is essentially a judicial function, a power expressly vested in the Judiciary
by the concept of Separation of Powers, but however, the exercise of these agencies of

1 Cruz, C. L., Philippine Administrative Law (2007 Edition), p. 88

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this power is recognized insofar as it merely enables the agency to perform their
executive duties. Indeed, administrative officers should interpret and apply the law to
the facts as they see it, in order for these officials to discharge their function of
regulation.2

Nevertheless, this exercise of a function essentially judicial in nature, while entitled to

great weight and respect by the courts, cannot be held in higher regard by the Executive
nor can the agency’s decision/determination be imposed upon the Judiciary, in
deference to the Separation of Powers.

II. Conditions for Validity

The proper exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-judicial powers requires the
following:
1. Jurisdiction be properly acquired by the administrative body.
2. Due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

A. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is defined as the “competence of an office or body to act on a given matter

or decide a certain question.”3 This is the basic requirement for a decision rendered by
said officer to have any binding effect upon the parties.

Jurisdiction is granted by law or statute. It can never be left to the discretion or

agreement of the parties.

In the context of administrative law, jurisdiction is acquired by the agency only upon
the matters expressly granted by its governing statute, as well as any statute which adds
the same or transfers a specific matter from a different agency.

In the case of Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human Rights, the
Court has held that “The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention,
the Constitution would have expressly said so." Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.”4

It is to be noted that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies may be

limited in some, and instead broad in others. In any case, the grant of powers must
always be strictly construed against such grant as only encompassing those expressly
granted and necessarily implied.5

2 Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law (2007 Edition), p. 39

3 Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law (2007 Edition), p. 91
4 G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1992
5 Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law (2007 Edition), p. 94 – 99

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Illustrative Cases

Boiser v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-61438, June 24, 1983

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction or restraining order,
to set aside the July 26, 1982 resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals which enjoined the enforcement
of a March 2, 1979 restraining order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The resolution of the Court of
Appeals, in effect, allows the disconnection of telephone communications between Tagbilaran, Bohol and
Mandaue, Cebu thus cutting telephone communications with the rest of the country and the world, for the
duration of the restraining order.

The petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and other municipalities in the
province of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing business under the name and style of Premiere Automatic
Telephone Network. Sometime in August, 1965, the petitioner and private respondent Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a contract denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement"
whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities through the use
of the PLDT relay station in Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. The arrangement enabled subscribers of
Premiere in Bohol to make or receive long distance and overseas calls to and from any part of the Philippines
and other countries of the world. Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain
the facilities provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services and qualified radio operators,
and otherwise maintain the required standards in the operation of facilities under the agreement.

On February 27, 1979, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit
authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate
the connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone system in the province
of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation of the aforecited " Interconnecting
Agreement." To avert serious consequences to the public and private hours resulting from any disruption
of the petitioner's telephone network and, of course, to the long distance and overseas aspects of its
business, the petitioner was compelled to seek judicial relief. It instituted Civil Case No. 17867 with the
then Court of First Instance of Cebu now a Regional Trial Court, for injunction and damages.

On March 2, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Cebu is a temporary restraining order against respondent
PLDT and directed the preservation of the status quo between the parties.

On August 2, 1979, or five (5) months after the issuance of the temporary restraining order, the private
respondents filed a motion to dissolve or lift the restraining order. Thereafter, the petitioner and the private
respondents submitted the merits of the main case to a hearing and agreed to consider jointly in said trial
on the merits the motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order including the propriety of the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

The hearing on the merits progressed and petitioner was already in the process of winding up its evidence
in Civil Case No. 17867 before the Court of First Instance, Cebu when on July 20, 1982, or nearly three (3)
years after the filing of their motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order, the private respondents
elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by filing the petitioner for certiorari. CA-G.R. No.
14554-SP.

The petition filed with the Court of Appeals had for its object the setting aside of the CFI restraining order
which enjoined PLDT and the other respondents from disconnecting the Mandaue-Tagbilaran telephone
connections. The ground alleged in the petition was:
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE RESTRAINING
ORDER, DATED MARCH 2, 1979, CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUE OR SUBJECT-
MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR WHICH THE SAID ORDER WAS ISSUED
PROPERLY DEVOLVES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND NOT WITH THE REGULAR COURTS.
THE REGULAR COURTS.

As earlier mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals issued its July 26, 1982 resolution which reads:

Without necessarily giving the course to the petition, respondents are directed to file their Comments (not
a motion to dismiss), sufficient in form and substance to constitute an answer, within ten (10) days from
notice of this resolution.

Meanwhile, the respondents are restrained from enforcing the Order of March 2, 1979, until further orders
from Us.

The hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby set on August
10, 1982, ...

Subsequently, the hearing was re-set by the respondent Court of Appeals for September 6, 1982. The
petitioner countered by filing this petition.

The petitioner states that the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, should dismiss CA-G.R.
No. 14554-SP on the following grounds:
 That the respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction or has committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of CA-G.R. No. 14554-
SP; and
 That the petition CA-G.R. No. 14554-SP, before respondent Court of Appeals (now Intermediate
Appellate Court) is premature and has no legal and factual basis.

The jurisdictional issue raised by Premiere in this petition is tied up to the jurisdictional issue raised by
PLDT on its petition filed with the Court of Appeals.

According to PLDT, the principal issue in dispute is the propriety or validity of the "Circuit Authorization
Order" it issued to its own employees co- respondents Ramon Juezan and Wilson Morrell regarding the use
of its own relay station by petitioner Boiser. PLDT emphasizes, and this is the main thrust of its case both
here and below, that the order which cut off the Tagbilaran-Mandaue phone connections is an internal
transaction and business of PLDT, and that it relates to a purely technical matter pertaining basically to
the operation of the communications network of a public utility corporation. According to PLDT, the CFI of
Cebu has arrogated upon itself the authority of supervising or overseeing the operations of PLDT at its Cebu
relay station.

Respondent PLDT maintains that the National Telecommunications Commission is the body with
jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising from the operation of telephone systems or the
interconnection of communications facilities, not the Court of First Instance.

Petitioner Boiser or Premiere, in turn, contends in the petition before this Court that the CFI of Cebu acted
within its jurisdiction and there being no grave abuse of discretion, the challenge to its interlocutory order
should not have been entertained by the Court of Appeals.

In seeking the dissolution or lifting of the March 2, 1979 CFI restraining order, PLDT stated that the
disconnection it effected was authorized by:
(1) The interconnecting agreement between PLDT and Premiere Automatic Telephone Network, and
(2) The decision of the Board of Communications dated July 29,1977 in BOC Case No. 76-53.

Paragraph 13 of the Interconnecting and Operating Agreement between PLDT and Premiere provides:
Violation of any of the conditions or terms of this Agreement or of the Interconnecting and
traffic Agreement attached hereto shall constitute sufficient cause for the cancellation of
this Agreement and the severance of connection on May (30) days advance notice given in
writing by either party unless such violation creates manifest hazard to life, property or to
facilities of transmission and reception in which event severance may be made without
notice.

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Section 2 of the Interconnecting and traffic Agreement mentioned in the above Paragraph 13, in turn,
provides:

Sec. 2. If either company defaults in the payment of any amounts hereunder or violates
any other provision of this Agreement, and if such default or violation continues for thirty
(30) days after written notice thereof, the other company may terminate this Agreement
forthwith by written notice.

It may be noted that the above provision mentions a default or violation continuing for thirty days after
written notice and the termination of the agreement by another written notice.

There is nothing in the provision about the period when such written notice should be given by the party
wishing to terminate. Such period can be found in paragraph 13 of the Interconnecting Agreement quoted
earlier. Therefore, even granting that there was default on the part of the petitioner, the 30-day requisite
notice should have been followed. Whether or not the requirement was followed calls for the presentation
of evidence before the proper tribunal.

The second authority for disconnection cited by the private respondents is the decision in BOC Case No.
76-53. The decision deals with members of PAPTELCO, of which petitioner is one who have outstanding
accounts with PLDT. The BOC decision refers to outstanding accounts of PAPTELCO members representing
PLDT's unremitted shares for domestic long distance and overseas calls. 'me pertinent provision of the
decision is Sec. 3(f) which states that:
In addition to the penalty clause imposed under the preceding paragraph, if any
PAPTELCO member neglects or fails to comply with obligations under this
Agreement, its service may be disconnected by PLDT after sixty (60) days written
notice to said PAPTELCO member, unless its delinquency shall have been fully
paid or made current.

It appears clear from the aforecited provision that 60 days prior notice must be given before disconnection
may be effected.

There is, therefore, more than ample basis for the Cebu CFI, now Cebu Regional Trial Court, to assume
jurisdiction and to continue trying Civil Case No. 17867.

The case before the trial court is for injunction arising from breach of contract. Premiere asks for compliance
with the terms of the contract and for the payment of P100,000.00 exemplary and moral damages in
addition to attorney's fees.

PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by Presidential Decree No. 1 to the Board of
Communications, now National Telecommunications Commission. There is nothing in the Commission's
powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and exemplary
damages. The two authorities cited by the private respondents in the bid to dissolve the CFI restraining
order do not appear adequate to disregard the thirty (30) day prior notice provided by the Interconnecting
Agreement. But even if they were, this question is one which should be clarified in the civil case for breach
of contract.

Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order which does not merely involve "a purely
internal transaction of a telecommunications company" but one which would necessary affect rights
guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated.

We ruled in RCPI v. Board of Communications (80 SCRA 471):

We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service Commission
and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, 'being a creature of the legislature
and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by
necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute'. Filipino Bus Co. vs. Phil. Railway Co.,
57 Phil. 860.) The functions of the Public Service Commission are limited and administrative
in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication

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conferred upon it by Statute. (Batangas Laguna, Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Public Service
Commission, L-25994 and L-26004-26046, August 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 111.) As successor in
of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers,
jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service
Commission. ...

The Board of Communications has been renamed National Telecommunications Commission. The NTC has
no jurisdiction, and the PLDT has made no showing of any, not even by necessary implication, to decide an
issue involving breach of contract. And as we stated in RCPI v. Board of Communications, "if in the two cases
before us, complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Inocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's
breach of contractual obligation, ... the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible
recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of
Communications." Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. (Pimentel v. Comelec, 101
SCRA 769). It cannot be conferred by the will of the parties. (Salandanan v. Tizon, 62 SCRA 388). The
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint. (Lat v. PLDT, 67 SCRA 425.)

The petitioner alleges in its second ground for this petition that the case before the Court of Appeals is
premature and has no legal or factual basis.

The private respondents explain that they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals because the Cebu CFI
had taken an unreasonably long time to resolve the motion to lift its restraining order. PLDT argues that
further delays would be prejudicial and, therefore, the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals is
proper.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu issued its restraining order on March 2, 1979. The motion to lift the
order was filed five months later on August 2, 1979. The motion was properly filed with the trial court, but
the lack of urgency in its filing and the failure of the private respondents to immediately and vigorously
press for the lifting of the restraining order militate against a finding of grave abuse sufficient to justify a
writ of certiorari. The petitioners point out that from the filing of the motion to lift restraining order on
August 2, 1979 up to the filing of the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on July 20, 1982,
almost three years lapsed and in all that time, there was no request, motion, nor hint for the trial court to
resolve the pending motion to lift the restraining order.

As stated in Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation v. Court of Appeals (97 SCRA 297, 305):
Indeed, before a petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower
court, all available remedies must be exhausted. (Plaza v. Mencias, No. I,18253,
October 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 563.) Likewise, in a host of case (Aquino v. Estenzo, L-
20791, May 19, 1965, citing Herrera v. Barreto, 25 Phil. 345; Uy Chu v. Imperial, 44
Phil. 27; Amante v. Sison, 60 Phil. 949; Manzanares v. Court of First Instance, 61
Phil. 850; Vicencio v. Sison, 62 Phil. 300, 306; Manila Post Publishing Co. v. Sanchez,
81 Phil. 614; Alvarez v. Ibañez, 83 Phil. 104; Nicolas v. Castillo, 97 Phil. 336;
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, 100 Phil. 822; Ricafort v. Fernan, 101 Phil.
575; Cueto v. Ortiz, L-11555, May 31, 1960; Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa
sa San Miguel Brewery v. Enriquez, L-12999, July 26, 1960; Santos v. Cardeñola L-
18412, July 31, 1962; Sy It v. Tiangco, L-18376, Feb. 27,1962; Plaza v. Mencias, L-
18253, Oct. 31, 1962), We ruled that before a petition for certiorari in a higher court,
the attention of the lower court should first be called to its supposed error and its
correction should be sought. If this is not done, the petition for certiorari should be
denied. The reason for this rule is that issues which Courts of First Instance are
bound to decide should not summarily be taken from them and submitted to an
appellate court without first giving such lower courts the opportunity to dispose of
the same with due deliberation.

Quite the contrary, the private respondents submitted to a trial on the merits and formally agreed that, in
addition to the merits, the motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order and the propriety of the
writ of preliminary injunction would be considered and resolved in the trial of the case. The private
respondents agreed that evidence submitted during trial would include evidence on the pending motion. In

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fact, the petitioner was already in the process of winding up its evidence before the Court of First Instance
when the private respondents filed their petition with the Court of Appeals.

Private respondents' handling of their case dispels any suspicion of unreasonable delay on the part of the
Court of First Instance to resolve such motion.

The private respondents aver that there are special circumstances which warrant immediate and direct
action of an appellate court. The alleged circumstances include the failure of respondent PLDT to make full
use of its own relay station and the alleged refusal of the petitioner to pay for its use thereby grievously
affecting the expansion and modernization program of the respondent PLDT.

Special circumstances may indeed warrant immediate intervention of a higher court even while the lower
court is deliberating on the action to take on a pending matter. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768;
De Gala-Sison v. Maddela, 67 SCRA 478). The private respondents, however, have failed to make a showing
of such special or exceptional circumstances. We fail to see how closing one relay station serving the
province of Bohol would hasten PLDT's program of national expansion. There are various other legal
remedies, administrative and judicial, available to handle the alleged non-payment by Premiere of PLDT's
share in long distance and overseas calls. The case before the Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy for
enforcing collections from Premiere under the circumstances of this case. And more important, matters
dependent on the presentation of evidence are best handled at the trial court level.

The private respondents overlook the fact that telephone and telecommunications services are affected by
a high degree of public interest. It is not Premiere alone which win suffer from the appellate injunction but
the people of Bohol. And as far as we can gather from the records, the consumers have been paying for the
services given them. They are not at fault in this controversy between Premiere and PLDT.

In Republic Telephone Co. V. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (25 SCRA 80), we sustained the
"legalization" of unauthorized services maintained by PLDT for fifteen (15) years instead of ordering the
discontinuance of the telephone system found operating illegally. The reason — public interest would thus
be better served.

In Republic v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (26 SCRA 620) we restated the rule that the Republic,
acting for and in behalf of the Government Telephone System, and the PLDT cannot be coerced to enter into
an interconnecting contract, where the two could not agree on terms. We ruled, however, that while the
Republic may not compel PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require PLDT to permit interconnection with the Government Telephone
System, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to payment of just compensation. The
justification was, again, the general interest or public interest.

In Cababa v. Remigio (8 SCRA 50), we sustained the acts of the Public Service Commission under the
principle that while an already established public utility operator must be protected in his investments, the
first consideration is still the protection of public interests and convenience. The question which ultimately
determines issues raised by or against public utilities is what action is for the best interests of the public?
In the petition now before us, we do not grapple with such issues as legalization of illegal services or
compelling unwilling parties to enter into interconnection of services. We simply rule that pending final
determination of the case before the trial court, the appellate court should refrain from acting on the petition
now before it and from issuing orders that would punish the people of Bohol because Premiere and PLDT
cannot see eye to eye.

The basic policies for the telephone industry embodied in Presidential Decree No. 217 are premised on the
principle that telephone service is a crucial element in the conduct of business activity, efficient telephone
services contribute directly to national development, and telephone services must be made available at
reasonable cost to as many subscribers as possible. Both law and policy considerations can for the issuance
of the prayer for writs.

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WHEREFORE, the petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The questioned resolution of
the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and our restraining order issued on August 25, 1982 is made
PERMANENT. The Intermediate Appellate Court is directed to dismiss the petition in CA-G.R. No. 14554.

SO ORDERED

B. Observing Due Process

Administrative proceedings are summary in nature. There is an expectation of both

speedy and judicious resolution of disputes by the parties who invoke its jurisdiction on
a particular case, given their expertise in the field.

This quick disposition of cases may not be done at the expense of the observance of due
process. In administrative law, due process is the right to be notified and to be heard,
the opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek a reconsideration of the action
complained of. These are the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

It is not always necessary that there be “trial-type” hearings, or indeed even the
assistance of counsel. What is required, is that the party be given sufficient and proper
notice and at the very least presented the opportunity to be heard, the latter of which
can be fulfilled through the submission of position papers.

The requisites of administrative due process is laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v.
CIR,6 as thus:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit
evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;
6. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision.

Needless to say, the tribunal must be impartial.

If these twin requirements are not met, the administrative proceedings will, in general,
be void. However, the lack of notice and hearing did not invalidate the proceedings in
the following instances, such as but not limited to the following:
 Urgency of immediate action;
 Tentative nature of the administrative action;

6 Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940

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 Preventive suspension of public officials pending investigation of administrative
charges against the said official;
 Summary abatement of nuisance per se;
 Summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of delinquent
taxpayers.

III. Rules of Procedure

The grant of quasi-judicial power, by necessary implication, includes the power to adopt
the rules of procedure that shall be observed during the proceedings in the exercise of
said power.7

Of course, it may be the case that the statute itself provides, in general terms, the rules
that shall be observed in its adjudicatory functions, and sometimes providing as well for
the supplemental application of some standard rules of procedure (Rules of Court).

The sole requirement is that these rules must not violate any fundamental right or
encroach upon constitutional prerogatives, such as the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court.8 In a case, the Supreme Court struck down an administrative circular
which imposed a prerequisite upon lawyers appearing before the administrative agency
to first pass an examination on patent rules and practices administered by the said
agency for encroaching upon the exclusive power of the Supreme Court to regulate the
practice of law.9

IV. Subpoena Power

Administrative agencies are not, as a rule, granted the coercive power to compel
witnesses to testify, or to produce books, documents, or data by issuing a subpoena. It
must be expressly granted to the administrative agency by the statute.10 This holds true
even if the agency has the power to investigate.

If it is so necessary, the agency must seek the proper remedy through the regular courts.

V. Contempt Power

Like the power to issue subpoenas, the power to cite a party in contempt must first be
expressly granted to administrative agencies. This is because the power to cite in
contempt is inherently judicial, and not necessarily included in an administrative
agency’s quasi-judicial authority.

7 Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law (2007 Edition), p. 101

8 Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law (2007 Edition), p. 102
9 Philippine Lawyer’s Association v. Celedonio Agrava, G.R. No. L-12426, February 16, 1959
10 Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law (2007 Edition), p. 106

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Similar to the above, if it is so necessary, the administrative agency may go to the regular
courts to order the party to testify or produce said documents, under the authority of
the court. Should the party refuse to comply with the order, the agency may manifest
the party’s disobedience to the court, upon which the court may, in its discretion, cite
the party in contempt.

Illustrative Case

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Josefina Lubrica

G.R. No. 159145, April 29, 2005

TINGA, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710 granting herein respondent’s
petition for prohibition and its Resolution2 denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

This Court adopts the appellate court’s narration of facts.

On August 4, 2000, Federico Suntay, now deceased, filed a petition for fixing and payment of just
compensation under Presidential Decree No. 27 against the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR"), the
DAR Regional Director for Region IV and the Land Bank of the Philippines ("Land Bank").3 Docketed as
DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00, the case was filed before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator ("RARAD") and raffled to Adjudicator Conchita Miñas. Subject of the case was Suntay’s
landholdings covering a total area of 948.1911 hectares situated in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro and
embraced under Transfer Certificate of Title T-31. The DAR and Land Bank determined its value at Four
Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (₱4,251,141.68) or
Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and 50/100 (₱4,497.50) per hectare, which valuation
according to Suntay, was unconscionably low and tantamount to taking of property without due process of
law.4

After summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD rendered a Decision5 on January 24, 2001 in favor
of Suntay, ordering Land Bank to pay the former the amount of One Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Five
Hundred Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100 (₱157,541,951.30) as just
compensation for the taking of a total of 948.1911 hectares of Suntay’s properties. Land Bank sought
reconsideration of the RARAD decision for not being supported by clear and convincing evidence and for its
conclusions which are contrary to law. However, in an Order6 dated March 14, 2001, the RARAD denied
Land Bank’s motion. Land Bank received a copy of the order of denial on March 26, 2001.7

On April 20, 2001, Land Bank filed a petition for just compensation8 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro against Suntay, DAR, and RARAD. The petition, docketed as Agrarian Case
No. R-1241, prayed that just compensation for the taking of Suntay’s landholdings be declared in the
amount of Four Million Two Hundred Fifty One Thousand, One Hundred Forty-One Pesos (₱4,251,141.00).
Suntay moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of capacity to sue, lack of cause of action, and
res judicata. After Land Bank filed its comment on Suntay’s motion to dismiss, the RTC, sitting as a special
agrarian court, dismissed on August 6, 2001 Land Bank’s petition for failure to pay the docket fees within
the reglementary period.9 The special agrarian court also denied Land Bank’s Motion for Reconsideration
for being pro-forma.10 Thereafter, Land Bank appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals by
filing a Notice of Appeal with the special agrarian court.11

While the petition for just compensation was pending with the special agrarian court, upon motion of
Suntay, the RARAD issued an Order12 on May 22, 2001, declaring its January 24, 2001 Decision as final
and executory after noting that Land Bank’s petition for just compensation with the special agrarian court
was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period in violation of Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules
of Procedure.13 In its July 10, 2001 Order,14 the RARAD denied LBP’s motion for reconsideration of the

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order of finality. On July 18, 2001, the RARAD issued a Writ of Execution,15 directing the Regional Sheriff
of DARAB-Region IV to implement its January 24, 2001 Decision.

Thus, Land Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction16 before the DARAB on September 12, 2001 against Suntay and RARAD. The
petition, docketed as DSCA No. 0252, prayed for the nullification of the following issuances of the RARAD:
[1] the January 24, 2001 Decision directing Land Bank to pay Suntay just compensation in the amount of
₱157,541,951.30; [2] the Order dated May 22, 2001 declaring the finality of the aforesaid Decision; [3] the
July 10, 2001 Order denying Land Bank’s motion for reconsideration; and [4] the Writ of Execution dated
July 18, 2001. On September 12, 2001, the DARAB issued an Order17 enjoining the RARAD from
momentarily implementing its January 24, 2001 Decision and directing the parties to attend the hearing
for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing a preliminary/permanent injunction.

On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Prohibition,18 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66710. The petition, impleading DARAB
and Land Bank as respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB from further proceeding with DSCA No. 0252,
mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR,
does not grant DAR jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari. On the same day, the Court of
Appeals granted Lubrica’s prayer for a temporary restraining order.19 This notwithstanding, DARAB issued
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction20 on October 3, 2001, directing RARAD not to implement its January 24,
2001 Decision and the other orders in relation thereto, including the Writ of Execution.

On October 8, 2001, DARAB filed a Comment21 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, arguing that the writ of
certiorari/injunction was issued under its power of supervision over its subordinates/delegates like the
PARADs and RARADs to restrain the execution of a decision which had not yet attained finality. In an
omnibus motion filed on October 10, 2001, Lubrica sought to nullify the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issued by DARAB in DSCA No. 0252 and to cite the DARAB for contempt.22 Land Bank also filed its
Comment23 on October 15, 2001, raising the prematurity of Lubrica’s petition for prohibition. It contended
that the issue of whether or not DARAB can take cognizance of Land Bank’s petition for certiorari may be
elevated to the Office of the DAR Secretary, in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Land Bank also questioned Lubrica’s personality to file the petition for prohibition considering
that she never intervened in the proceedings before the RARAD.

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision24 on August 22, 2002. The appellate court ruled that
petitioner DARAB had no personality to file a comment on Lubrica’s petition for prohibition filed with the
Court of Appeals because DARAB was a mere formal party and could file a comment only when specifically
and expressly directed to do so. The appellate court also ruled that DARAB’s exercise of jurisdiction over
the petition for certiorari had no constitutional or statutory basis. It rejected DARAB’s contention that the
issuance of the writ of certiorari arose from its power of direct and functional supervision over the RARAD.
In sum, the Court of Appeals declared that DARAB was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of DSCA No.
0252 and issued a Writ of Prohibition, perpetually enjoining DARAB from proceeding with DSCA No. 0252
and ordering its dismissal.

Hence, the instant petition, in which DARAB assigns the following errors to the Court of Appeals:

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled:

1. THAT THE PETITIONER (DARAB), BEING A FORMAL PARTY, SHOULD NOT HAVE FILED COMMENT TO
THE PETITION AND INSTEAD, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CO-RESPONDENT LAND BANK, THE FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARY OF CARP;

2. THAT PETITIONER HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER DSCA 0252 WHICH IS A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
AND

3. THAT WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY DARAB IN DSCA 0252 WAS NULL AND VOID
FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IT ISSUED.25

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This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the DARAB does not have jurisdiction over Land
Bank’s petition for certiorari.

Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter
of law.26 It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law.27 It is
never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance
conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which
have such power are expressly designated.28

Pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 and Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-A, the DARAB was
created to act as the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR. With the passage of R.A. No. 6657, the adjudicatory
powers and functions of the DAR were further delineated when, under Section 50 thereof, it was vested with
the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
and the Special Agrarian Courts. The same provision granted the DAR the power to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of books and
documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and enforce its
writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers, and the broad power to adopt a uniform rule of
procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases before it.29 Section 13 of
E.O. No. 129-A also authorized the DAR to delegate its adjudicatory powers and functions to its regional
offices.

To this end, the DARAB adopted its Rules of Procedure, where it delegated to the RARADs and PARADs the
authority "to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in connection
therewith, arising within their assigned territorial jurisdiction."30 In the absence of a specific statutory
grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body
with only limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Bank’s petition for certiorari. Neither
the quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment of
authority.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise
is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity
may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency.31 The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied.
There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-
judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the
authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DAR’s competence and field of expertise. In
conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended to create
a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority
over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No.
129-A.

In addition, Rule XIII, §11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure allows a party who does not agree with the
RARAD’s preliminary valuation in land compensation cases fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice to bring
the matter to the proper special agrarian court, thus:

SECTION 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The
decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party
shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.

In Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals,32 this Court affirmed the dismissal of a landowner’s
petition for judicial determination of just compensation for its failure to file the petition within the fifteen-
day reglementary period provided under Rule XIII, §11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.

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In the instant case, Land Bank received a copy of the RARAD order denying its motion for reconsideration
on March 26, 2001. Land Bank filed the petition for just compensation with the special agrarian court only
on April 20, 2001, which is doubtlessly beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. Thus, the RARAD
Decision had already attained finality in accordance with the afore-quoted rule, notwithstanding Land
Bank’s recourse to the special agrarian court.

DARAB takes exception to the general rule that jurisdiction over special civil actions must be expressly
conferred by law before a court or tribunal can take cognizance thereof. It believes that this principle is
applicable only in cases where the officials/entities contemplated to be subject thereof are not within the
administrative power/competence, or in any manner under the control or supervision, of the issuing
authority.

This Court is not persuaded. The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds
of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.33 In the instant case, the RARAD issued the order of finality and the writ of execution upon
the belief that its decision had become final and executory, as authorized under Section 1, Rule XII of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure. It is worth noting that in its petition, DARAB maintains that in preventing the
RARAD from implementing its decision, it merely "exercised its residual power of supervision, to insure that
the RARAD acted within the bounds of delegated authority and/or prevent/avoid her from committing grave
and serious disservice to the Program."34 DARAB’s action, therefore, is a rectification of what it perceived
as an abuse of the RARAD’s jurisdiction. By its own admission, DARAB took upon itself the power to correct
errors of jurisdiction which is ordinarily lodged with the regular courts by virtue of express constitutional
grant or legislative enactments.

This Court recognizes the supervisory authority of the DARAB over its delegates, namely, the RARADs and
PARADs, but the same should be exercised within the context of administrative supervision and/or control.
In the event that the RARADs or PARADs act beyond its adjudicatory functions, nothing prevents the
aggrieved party from availing of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is ordinarily within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.

That the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own rules of procedure does not permit it with unbridled
discretion to grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Procedure, as
distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide
a class of cases is put into action. Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive. They
cover only rules on pleadings and practice.35

While the Court of Appeals held that the DARAB should not have participated in the proceedings before
said court by filing a comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, this Court considers satisfactory the explanation
of the DARAB that it has a peculiar interest in the final outcome of this case. As DARAB pointed out, while
it is only an adjunct of, it is at the same time not totally independent from it. The DARAB is composed of
the senior officials of the DAR, who are guided by the State’s main policy in agrarian reform when resolving
disputes before the DARAB. The DARAB’s interest in the case is not purely legal but also a matter of
governance; thus, it cannot be strictly considered as a nominal party which must refrain from taking an
active part in the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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ASSESSMENT

NAME: ____________________________________
SECTION: _________________________________

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Josefina Lubrica

G.R. No. 159145
April 29, 2005

FACTS:
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ISSUE(S):
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RULING:
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