Wytze van der Gaast

International Climate Negotiation

Factors
Design, Process, Tactics
Wytze van der Gaast
JIN Climate and Sustainability, Groningen, The Netherlands

ISBN 978-3-319-46797-9 e-ISBN 978-3-319-46798-6

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46798-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016952902

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For Alicia’s generation
Acknowledgements
On 26 January 2015, I defended my Ph.D. thesis at the University of
Groningen. It concluded a research into twenty years of climate negotiations.
During the project, I tried to understand why I did not like attending
negotiation sessions as I often felt that watching a glacier move was more
exciting. At the same time, I have been surprised several times by the sudden
accelerations in negotiation processes, leading to an agreement. What are
drivers for negotiation success, how important is it to organise all these
meetings, and what is the influence of environmental groups and knowledge
institutes in the corridors?
After working on the Ph.D. thesis project, I continued the analysis by
closely following the negotiations leading towards last year’s Paris
Agreement. In combination with the negotiations dossiers on the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) during the early
1990s and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 with continued negotiations on its
implementation, I was able to present an analysis of 25 years of climate
negotiations.
I would like to thank Catrinus Jepma for supervising the Ph.D. project
and stimulating me to write this book, my colleague Erwin Hofman for
reviewing the manuscript so carefully, and Anthony Doyle at Springer for
believing in this book project. Furthermore, I would like to thank Katie Begg
for years long support in several projects, including an earlier book that we
wrote together.
Finally, I want to thank Ania for her support and for listening to ideas for
this book and Alicia for taking climate change much more seriously than I did
when I was her age.
Groningen
July 2016

Wytze van der Gaast

Abbreviations
AAU Assigned Amount Units
AGBM Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Berlin Mandate
AILAC Association of Independent Latin American and Caribbean states
AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States
AWG DP Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced
Action
AWG KP Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol
AWG LCA Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action
under the Convention
BASIC Group of countries with Brazil, South Africa, India and China
C Celsius
CACAM Central Asia, Caucasus and Moldova
CDM Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol
CER Certified emission reductions
CFC Chlorofluorocarbons
CH 4 Methane
CMA Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to
the Paris Agreement
CMP Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to
the Kyoto Protocol
CO 2 Carbon Dioxide
CO 2 -eq Carbon Dioxide-equivalent
COMIFAC Central African Forestry Commission
COP Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
COW Committee of the Whole (at COP sessions)
CTCN Climate Technology Centre and Networks
EIG Environmental Integrity Group
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme
EU European Union
EUR Euro (€)
G-7 The Group of 7: consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
UK and the USA
G-77&China Group of developing countries (initially 77 country
members) with China
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEF Global Environment Facility
ICA International Consultation and Analysis
INC Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change
INDC Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JI Joint Implementation
JUSSCANZ Group of Parties with Japan, the USA, Switzerland, Canada,
Australia, Norway and New Zealand
LDC Least Developed Countries
LMDC Like Minded Group of Developing Countries
LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
MRV Measuring (monitoring), Reporting and Verification
Mt Megatonne
N 2 O Nitrous Oxide
NAMAs Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NAPs National Adaptation Plans
NDC Nationally Determined Contributions
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
ODS Ozone Depleting Substances
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
QELRCs Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction Commitments
QELROs Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction Objectives
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SAR IPCC Second Assessment Report
SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SDI Small Island Developing States
TAP Technology Action Plan
TEC Technology Executive Committee
TNA Technology Needs Assessment
UN United Nations
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development or
Earth Summit
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD US dollar
USSR Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
WCCC World Conference on Climate Change
WMO World Meteorological Organisation
WTO World Trade Organisation
Contents
1 Introduction

1.1 Climate Change as an Emerging Policy Issue

1.2 Why Climate Negotiations Are not Ideal

1.3 Scope and Structure of This Book

References

2 Climate Negotiation Factors: Design, Process and Tactics

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Design Aspects of a Climate Policy Agreement

2.2.1 Handling International Environmental Cooperation

2.2.2 Determining the Size of an International Policy Coalition

2.3 Organising Climate Negotiation Processes

2.3.1 Integrated Versus Distributive Negotiations

2.3.2 Organisation of Climate Negotiations Under the UNFCCC

2.4 The Scope for Tactics During Climate Negotiations

2.4.1 Reflection of National Interests in Countries’ Positions

2.4.2 Tactical Factors for Climate Negotiations

2.5 Analysis of Climate Negotiation Dossiers in This Book

References
3 The First Phase—Negotiating the UN Climate Convention

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Countries Take Their Positions During INC Negotiations

3.2.1 G-77&China

3.2.2 OECD Industrialised Countries

3.2.3 Central and Eastern Europe

3.3 Towards Agreement on the UNFCCC

3.4 Discussion: Assessment of UNFCCC Negotiations Against

Design, Process and Tactical Factors

3.4.1 Negotiation Factor 1: Design of the UNFCCC

3.4.2 Negotiation Factors 2 and 3: Impact of Negotiation Process

and Tactics

References

4 The Negotiation Process Leading to the Kyoto Protocol

4.1 Introduction

4.2 From ‘Berlin’ to ‘Kyoto’—Negotiations Under the Berlin

Mandate

4.3 Concluding Negotiations on the Berlin Mandate—The Kyoto

Climate Conference

4.4 Continued Negotiations on Modalities and Procedures for

Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol

4.4.1 EU: Shift in Negotiation Strategy

 4.4.2 Bonn Agreement

4.4.3 Russian Hesitation

4.5 Discussion: Assessment of Kyoto Protocol Negotiations Against

Design, Process and Tactical Factors

4.5.1 Negotiation Factor 1: Kyoto Protocol Design for an

Effective International Climate Coalition

4.5.2 Negotiation Factor 2: Impact of Negotiation Process Under

the Berlin Mandate on Kyoto Protocol Agreement

4.5.3 Negotiations Factor 3: Decisive Negotiation Tactics and

Facilitating Aspects During AGBM Protocol Negotiations

References

5 Towards a Future Climate Policy—From the Kyoto Protocol to the

Paris Agreement

5.1 Introduction: Aligning Climate Policies with Development Policies

5.2 Trying to Extend the Kyoto Protocol (2005–2009)

5.2.1 Bali: The Bali Action Plan

5.2.2 Copenhagen: No Consensus About the Copenhagen Accord

5.3 Regaining Confidence in UN-Led Climate Negotiations (2010–

2011)

5.3.1 Cancún: Pledge and Review Paradigm in Cancún

Agreement

5.3.2 Durban: Bringing Negotiations to a New Platform

5.3.3 Doha: A Negotiation Gateway to the Future

 5.4 Towards the Paris Agreement

5.4.1 Warsaw: Introduction of Intended Nationally Determined

Contributions

5.4.2 Lima: Calling for Climate Actions at COP-20 in Lima

5.4.3 Paris: All’s Well that Ends Well

5.5 Discussion: Assessment of Post-2020 Climate Negotiations

Against Design, Process and Tactical Factors

5.5.1 Negotiation Factor 1: Design of the Paris Agreement

5.5.2 Negotiation Factor 2: Impact of Negotiation Process

Organisation

5.5.3 Negotiation Factor 3: Tactical Aspects Influencing the

Course and Outcomes of Negotiations

References

6 Dealing with the Climate Negotiations Paradox

6.1 Summary of Past Negotiations in Light of Design, Process and

Tactical Factors

6.2 Negotiating Modalities for Implementing Paris Agreement

6.3 Breaking the Paradox

References
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
Wytze van der Gaast, International Climate Negotiation Factors, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46798-6_1

1. Introduction
Wytze van der Gaast1
(1) JIN Climate and Sustainability, Groningen, The Netherlands

Wytze van der Gaast

Email: wytze@jin.ngo

Abstract
International climate negotiations are complex as they address a global
environmental problem which affects and requires collaboration between all
countries. At the same time, countries may have different interests and
abilities to contribute climate policy solutions. This chapters identifies three
factors for achieving climate negotiation success: design of the climate
agreement, the flexibility of the negotiation process and decisive tactics and
facilitative negotiation support to enable changes in the course and/or
direction of negotiations.

1.1 Climate Change as an Emerging Policy Issue

The international climate conference held in Paris in December 2015 has
clearly shown how big and important climate change has become as a topic
of international collaboration. During the two weeks in Paris, the world
could see how world political leaders but also business leaders gathered to
express their concerns about how a changing climate has become visible,
both in developing and developed countries. After that, negotiation texts
could be downloaded from the Internet so that everyone could see how
seemingly simple terms were thoroughly discussed and compared with,
perhaps, politically more balanced alternatives. Negotiation ‘outsiders’ who
tried to read these texts, usually soon gave up because of all the words and
phrases in brackets and options still to be decided on. Eventually, after two
weeks of intense negotiations, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Laurent
Fabius, in his role as President of the Conference, closed the meeting with
the adoption of a new international climate policy agreement, called the Paris
Agreement.
‘Paris’ was by far the biggest United Nations (UN) climate summit since
climate negotiations began in the late 1980s. Already before that, at the end
of the 1970s, a series of governmental meetings and conferences had been
held, even though human–induced global warming was in those days mainly
considered a theoretical possibility, insufficiently backed by scientific
evidence and surrounded by relatively large uncertainties (Arts 1998, p. 102;
Gaast and Begg 2012). In 1985, the Villach Conference (9–15 October 1985,
Villach, Austria) presented new scientific insights (WMO 1986) which
increased awareness of the topic among a wider audience. At the level of the
UN, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established
in 1988, which brought together international leading scientists to assess the
latest scientific insights and inform policy makers about their conclusions.
Since the late 1980s, UN-led climate policy negotiations have resulted in
several milestones, such as the adoption of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol in
1997 and the Paris Agreement in 2015. Initially, climate negotiations, despite
the participation of (almost) all countries in the World, received relatively
little attention in non-specialist media sources. Climate negotiations were
done and followed by climate specialists and climate change was generally
not considered among core socio-economic issues. By the time of the UN
Climate Conference in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997, climate change had drawn
attention from more interest groups, both groups expressing their concerns
(such as environmental non-governmental organisations or concerned
scientists) about the IPCC findings (IPCC 1995) that people could actually
influence climate systems, and groups, such as business lobby groups, for
whom greenhouse gas emission reductions would imply the need to make
costly changes of their business operations. Especially, the latter group had
an interest in highlighting uncertainties about the IPCC findings.
Climate change had become really big as an international political topic
when negotiations moved to Copenhagen in 2009. First, there was increased
scientific evidence on climate change patterns, risks, possible social,
economic and environmental damage from changing climate systems and
related costs, such as documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
(IPCC 2007). Second, the initiative of former US-Vice President Al Gore to
launch the documentary An Inconvenient Truth with a best-selling book
(Gore 2006) helped to visualise climate change and its possible
consequences. Third, in 2007, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Al
Gore and the IPCC for their efforts to disseminate knowledge of climate
change. With these developments, climate change had becom ‘hot’. Perhaps,
‘Copenhagen’ was too big to handle for negotiators at that time, but in Paris,
around 25 years after the start of international climate negotiations,
negotiation tactics, processes and knowledge of what are effective climate
policies had developed to a level that enabled reaching a global agreement
on future climate policy making.
In this book, the process of international climate negotiations since the
late 1980s is looked at in more detail in an attempt to understand the
complexity of finding a global solution for a global problem and identify a
number of key factors that contribute to the success of negotiations. This is
done by focusing on three main negotiation files—the adoption of the
UNFCCC in 1992, the agreement on and eventual ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol in 1997 and 2005, and the 10-year process leading to the Paris
Agreement of 2015.

1.2 Why Climate Negotiations Are not Ideal

Climate negotiations have, especially during the 1990s, long been
characterised by the fact that greenhouse gas emission reduction goals were
often subject of negotiations, rather than that such goals guided negotiations.
This was largely due to the initially limited scientific knowledge of how
human actions could affect global climate systems. For instance, both the
objective to stabilise industrialised countries’ greenhouse gas emissions
between 1990 and 2000 (UNFCCC agreement in 1992) and the goal to
collectively reduce their emissions by 5.2 % by 2008–2012 (Kyoto Protocol
agreement in 1997) were the result of negotiations, rather than that these
targets were derived from science as negotiation guidance.
Ideally, although it may be difficult to determine what an ideal
negotiation process may look like for addressing international environmental
or other issues, a clear support to negotiations is a clear identification and
description of the (environmental) problem to be addressed with
corresponding goals (Fells 2012, pp. 57–58; Susskind et al. 2000; APRAISE
2012). Such goals (for example, a quantified goal in terms of required
greenhouse gas emission reductions, maximum atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentration level, or maximum allowable temperature increase) would
provide reference points for negotiators and help assess whether and to what
extent the course of a negotiation process is in line with the upfront goal(s).
Negotiation parties (i.e., countries) would then agree on forming an
international coalition to implement pathways towards the goals and with
clear descriptions of each party’s responsibility in the negotiated package.
In this respect, the Montreal Protocol for the phase-out of ozone depleting
substances (ODS) could serve as an example of a successful coalition
formation process for addressing an international environmental problem. As
is explained in Box 1.1, during the 1980s the depletion of the ozone layer
became internationally recognised as an important environmental problem
with corresponding health impacts. As scientific evidence for the problem
became available, a clear problem statement could be formulated which
facilitated negotiations on country actions and timetables. Moreover, as
explained in Box 1.1, the number of ODS emitting countries was relatively
small and alternative technologies were relatively cheap, once operational.
Although this comparison is not meant to consider the Montreal Protocol
negotiations as easy or ‘ideal’, they contained several of the above aspects
for an ‘ideal’ negotiation process.
In an international climate policy context, such an ‘ideal’ situation could
exist if scientific research resulted in a clear description of the climate
change problem and corresponding damage with related costs, as well as a
long term greenhouse gas emission reduction target, which countries, through
negotiations, could divide among each other in individual country targets. In
Fig. 1.1, this ‘ideal’ situation is shown by point A. At this point, all countries
agree on a climate policy package for reaching an overall climate target, e.g.,
as derived from the best available scientific knowledge.
Fig. 1.1 Interaction between ambition and participation of Parties in climate negotiations (author’s own
elaboration)

Box 1.1. Successful Policy Design Through International

Cooperation Under the Montreal Protocol
One example of how building an international coalition with effective
compliance was arranged within an international treaty is the 1987
Montreal Protocol (and its 1990 London amendments) for the phase-out of
ozone depleting substances (ODS).1 To a large extent, successful
compliance was supported by the availability of relatively cheap ODS
substitutes, so that compliance costs could be kept low (De Zeeuw 2001).
Moreover, the Montreal Protocol commitments were accompanied by
financial assistance to developing countries (through a multilateral fund),
availability of technical expertise and dissemination of project lessons
within countries and regions, which also supported compliance. This
process was facilitated by the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
Finally, countries were able to take specific initiatives to support others
to comply.
 For example, when the Russian Federation (responsible for 10 per
cent of global ODS emissions) declared that it lacked the financial and
technical capability to comply with ‘Montreal’ by the deadlines of 1994
and 1996, and requested a four-year extension until 2000, the GEF and ten
donor countries provided support. The ‘Special Initiative for Ozone
Depleting Substances Production Closure in the Russian Federation’
gathered USD 26.2 million, which was used to close ODS production
facilities in the seven Russian companies concerned (World Bank 1999).
Regarding the willingness of countries to participate in and comply
with a legally binding agreement, however, compliance with the Montreal
Protocol is generally considered much easier to achieve than in the case
of a global regime for climate policy. First, substitutes for greenhouse
gas-intensive fossil fuels (e.g., renewable energy sources such as wind,
solar, hydro, and geothermal energy) have been relatively costly (as
mentioned above, ODS substitutes were relatively cheap because
substitutes were widely available and could be used in a cost-effective
manner) (De Zeeuw 2001). Second, during the 1980s, the damage to the
ozone layer due to the emissions of ODS was considered by society and
politicians an extremely serious environmental and health issue, so that
benefits from abatement action were clear and supported by scientific
evidence. On the other hand, the science behind climate change has long
been surrounded by uncertainties, especially concerning the relationship
between greenhouse gas emissions and atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations, and, subsequently, the impact on the earth’s average
temperature and the climate (World Bank 1999; De Zeeuw 2001; Barrett
1991; Gaast and Begg 2012).

However, in the practice of climate negotiations since the early 1990s, such
an ideal situation has been difficult to realise. Projections in the First and
Second Assessment Reports of the IPCC (Houghton et al. 1990; IPCC 1995)
provided indications of how climate change and corresponding climatic
impacts may occur due to increasing greenhouse gas emissions, but these
scenarios were also surrounded by several uncertainties. As a result, early
climate change negotiations were limited by a lack of a clear problem
description of the climate change issue, so that setting a medium to long term
greenhouse gas emission reduction goal became a topic of negotiations in
itself, rather than that negotiations were guided by scientifically determined
goals and targets.
A second reason why climate policy negotiations have deviated from an
‘ideal’ negotiation pathway is related to game-theoretical aspects of
negotiations. Investing in greenhouse gas emission reductions may well
require economic restructuring with accompanying socio-economic costs and
addressing questions such as: what would such a restructuring look like, how
to balance short-term socio-economic costs with possible longer-term
benefits,2 how would it affect a country’s competitiveness and whose further
interests are negatively or positively affected (Jackson 2009; Gaast and Begg
2012)? Most countries will generate different answers to these questions due
to their different short-, medium- to longer-term development priorities,
welfare levels, and perception of the urgency of the climate change issue.
Based on that, it can be assumed that the higher the (perceived) costs for
countries of a climate policy package, the lower their willingness to support
such a package. A particular aspect which could be observed during
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol negotiations was the choice of policy
instruments with some Parties being in favour of legally-binding national
emission quota while others preferred sets of policies and measures
determined at the country-level (see Chap. 3 for a more detailed discussion).
In a nutshell, this explains the game-theoretical dilemma of UN climate
policy negotiations (which is discussed in Chap. 2): a climate policy regime
with strict emission reduction measures may be supported by few countries
only, whereas a globally supported deal is easier to achieve if measures are
less strict and costly. This outcome can be explained by the following
underlying dynamics of international climate policy making:
Greenhouse gases mix evenly in the atmosphere, which implies that
emissions in one country will have an impact across the globe. At the
same time, no country can be excluded from the benefits of greenhouse
gas emission reduction efforts. Based on game theoretical insights, such
as ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ or ‘tragedy of the commons’ (see next chapter),
one could therefore argue that in the absence of international climate
policy cooperation, individual countries may prefer no or limited
climate abatement action: i.e. a country could refrain from climate
actions if it assumes no abatement actions by others, while the country
could also decide not to undertake climate action if it assumes
greenhouse gas emission reduction measures by others from which it
 cannot be excluded (‘free riding’) (Posner and Weisbach 2010). This
argument is in line with insights from game theory that if countries
would only take their own costs and benefits of climate change
mitigation actions into consideration, many globally existing abatement
opportunities could be missed (Tulkens 1998). Through a global policy
collaboration, free riding can be better addressed while countries can
be supported in achieving benefits from international cooperation that
are not feasible without such cooperation.
In spite of these potential benefits from international cooperation, the
effectiveness of a climate regime is generally hampered by the fact that
it is based on an agreement between sovereign states without an
overarching disciplinary system above them (Cooper 1999; Gaast and
Begg 2012). As a consequence, international agreements are largely
based on voluntary participation and compliance systems that create
sufficient surpluses for states to join the agreement and to remain ‘on
board’. It is thus essential that international agreements are self-
enforcing, which implies that they provide incentives to countries to
comply with the agreed commitments (Barrett 1990, 1995; McEvoy
2007; De Zeeuw 2001; Tulkens 1998). Too costly agreements (from the
perspective of countries) would then have a lower self-enforcement
potential.
The above-described aspects of (initial) lack of scientific evidence
concerning the climate change issues and game theoretical characteristics of
climate change negotiations have generally (since the early 1990s) resulted
in negotiated climate policy packages which deviate from the ‘ideal’
outcome A in Fig. 1.1 (where all countries adopt a climate package with
emission reduction actions that are fully in line with latest scientific
findings). Instead, negotiation directions have often been largely guided by
two principles covered by (UNFCCC 1992): the precautionary principle
and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. According
to the first principle, “Parties should take precautionary measures to
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its
adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
such measures” (UNFCCC 1992, pp. 9–10, Art. 3.3). In Fig. 1.1, the
precautionary principle is shown as a driving force for climate policy
actions with stronger greenhouse gas emission reductions measures.
With the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the
UNFCCC acknowledges the global nature of climate change and calls for
“the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in
an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and
their social and economic conditions” (UNFCCC 1992, p. 2). As explained
above in this chapter (with more detailed elaborations in Chaps. 3 and 4),
both during the negotiations on the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, this
principle could easily lead to a stand-still in negotiations with countries
blaming each other for not taking their responsibilities. As a result, Parties
could express a lower willingness to adopt greenhouse gas emission
reduction or limitation targets if other Parties would not undertake such
mitigation actions either. In Fig. 1.1, this situation is shown by outcome B
(the number of countries willing to adopt an ambitious climate package
becomes smaller). Then, in order to obtain wider country support,
greenhouse gas emission reduction measures are scaled down (outcome C,
where the number of countries willing to adopt a climate package increases
because the package is ‘watered down’).
However, at this point, other countries may find the suggested climate
policy measures insufficient so that another negotiation ‘twist’ is needed to
increase policy ambitions while keeping the initially opposing countries on
board (outcome D, where more ‘ambition’ is added to climate policy
package so that support for it increases). It must be noted that the distances
between A, B, C and D are purely hypothetical, while the processes from A
to D in practice are usually not as linear as represented by the straight
arrows.
Contrary to the UNFCCC negotiations in 1992 and Kyoto Protocol
negotiations in 1997, recent negotiation sessions (after the UN Climate
Conference in Copenhagen in 2009, see Chap. 5) have had a much stronger
and broader scientific evidence support. For instance, current climate
negotiations are fed by scientific insights that average global temperatures
should not rise by more than 2 ℃ above pre-industrial times levels (IPCC
2007, 2013; UNEP 2015). In addition, a continuation of greenhouse gas
emission growth according to business-as-usual trends could lead to even a
4 ℃ rise in global temperature in the second half of this century (to further
increase thereafter) (New et al. 2011). Accordingly, based on this growing
scientific knowledge, the 2 ℃ temperature increase threshold has become an
important negotiation target and was officially included in the Cancún
Agreements of 2010 (UNFCCC 2011). In the Paris Agreement of 2015, the
2 ℃ target has become an official goal of long-term climate policy, with the
addition that global average temperature increase should preferably be
limited to 1.5 ℃ (UNFCCC 2015).
It is noted that growing scientific evidence (with the 2 ℃ goal) could
even lead to a higher ambition level for negotiations as it could create a
stronger sense of urgency among Parties (in Fig. 1.1 this could lead to a
situation where point A moves to the right) (New et al. 2011). Although this
may have an impact on how Parties play their negotiation ‘game’ (e.g.,
Parties may feel a stronger responsibility to address the urgency), the game
theoretical dynamics as described above may continue to exist.
An important challenge that remains, should A in Fig. 1.1 represent the
1.5 or 2 ℃ target, is to bring the negotiation outcome from D to A (which is
the main focus of UNEP (2015)). What such a pathway may look like will be
subject of ongoing and future climate negotiations. However, as will be
argued in Chap. 5, since the COP sessions of Copenhagen in 2009 and
Cancún in 2010, there has been a tendency to focus on embedding actions for
climate change mitigation and adaptation more strongly in countries’ national
socio-economic planning and organising international support for that. The
main rationale for this changed focus is that while a national, quantified
target for a country as in the Kyoto Protocol (for industrialised countries)
may initially lead to a clearer envisaged policy outcome, reality has shown
that such targets are difficult to enforce. In a ‘bottom up’ approach, as is
explained in Chap. 5, a country could formulate a medium to long term
national plan with social, economic and environmental targets which are to
be achieved with low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient
(technology) options. Such an embedding of climate measures in socio-
economic planning could provide a stronger stimulus to greenhouse gas
mitigation and adaptation measures as these would support countries’
national green development.

1.3 Scope and Structure of This Book

From the above it can be concluded that climate policy negotiators face the
challenge of achieving a globally supported policy package which is in line
with the UNFCCC precautionary principle and recommendations derived
from best available scientific knowledge. As explained, this challenge is
complicated by the potential trade-off that stricter climate policy measures
(higher envisioned greenhouse gas emission reductions) with accompanying
socio-economic costs may reduce the number of countries willing to join the
climate policy coalition. As the next chapters will show, since the late
1980s, climate policy makers have spent considerable time on the design and
structure of climate policy negotiation packages in order to deal with the
game-theoretical negotiation aspects (as introduced above and specified in
more detail in Chap. 2), such as limiting free riding and achieving a broad
international climate coalition despite the absence of an overarching
disciplinarian (such as an international government).
Next to these design aspects (including choice of policy instruments), it is
also important that the negotiation process enables taking the steps to move
from points A to D via B and C as in Fig. 1.1. As the examples in Chaps. 3, 4
and 5 will show, negotiations under the UNFCCC have, for instance, been
characterised by attempts to make progress by taking several small steps
when necessary followed by larger steps when feasible. The resulting
agreements, the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, have all
been the result of gradual, multi-year negotiation processes.
Moreover, as the examples discussed elsewhere in this book will show,
there have been situations where the direction of negotiations was influenced
by, a.o.:
Publication of scientific reports on climate change patterns and their
consequences (e.g., IPCC 1995),
Personalities of important negotiators (e.g., US Vice President Gore at
Kyoto), the chair of a negotiation process (e.g., the President of a COP
session), as well as,
Ability of the UNFCCC Secretariat to facilitate negotiation processes
(e.g., formulating negotiation texts, preparing background papers,
organising expert meetings, etc.).
Such tactical and facilitating aspects can change the course of
negotiations (e.g., at points B and C in Fig. 1.1), so that the negotiation
process becomes more effective with an improved negotiation result.
Therefore, this book analyses for a number of key climate negotiations
processes since the late 1980s how successful climate policy negotiations (in
terms of climate policy measures leading to lower greenhouse gas emissions
and stronger climate resilience about which UNFCCC Parties reach
consensus) have been driven by the following three negotiation factors:

1. The design of the overall policy regime must acknowledge that:

(a) International cooperation can lead to more effective outcomes than

individual country actions, as it, among others, helps to avoid free
riding behaviour (Tulkens 1998),

(b) States are sovereign and their national self-interests need to be

reflected by the policy agreement, which leads to a tension that
proposed greenhouse gas emission reduction measures may have to
be mitigated in order to keep all countries on board, and

(c) Coalition building by groups of countries may be an effective way

to have a balanced assessment of countries’ varying economic and
social backgrounds.

2. The process of negotiations needs to reflect that reaching a global

climate deal takes times, that trying to accelerate negotiations may at
some points be counterproductive and that taking small steps at a time
can be relatively productive. As illustrated in Fig. 1.1, the process must
have the flexibility to change the course of negotiations when necessary
for achieving a broader support from countries for a climate policy
package.
3. In order to change the course of negotiations, such as at points B and C
in Fig. 1.1, the process needs to be responsive to tactical and
facilitating aspects, such as: does the President of the COP have the
personality to bring parties closer together? As explained above, an
important facilitating factor is the input from science to negotiations,
such as IPCC assessment reports or the UNEP Emissions Gap reports
 (e.g., UNEP 2015), as well as the support from the UNFCCC Secretariat
in terms of background papers, synthesis reports and draft negotiation
texts, etc. Negotiations also require careful balancing of the positions of
various (groups of) countries, which includes that negotiation outcomes
need to reflect their positions (e.g., exemption of developing countries
from commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, inclusion of carbon credit trading, etc.).
Finally, availability of general information sources such as newsletters,
policy briefs, blogs and project report dissemination can be mentioned
as a facilitating factor for negotiations, particularly when they aim at
providing balanced information about the pros and cons of politically
delicate issues.
These key factors for progressing negotiations are not exhaustive but
follow from the discussion in this chapter about addressing game theoretical
aspects of climate negotiations, and facilitating implementation of the
precautionary principle and the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities, as in the UNFCCC. They will be further elaborated on in
Chap. 2.
The three factors are not only important individually for negotiation
success, but in particular their combined effect can be decisive for the
success of climate policy design and implementation. For instance, without
the review of adequacy of agreed measures under the UNFCCC in 1995, the
Berlin Mandate towards a Kyoto Protocol would have been less likely or
even unlikely (see also Chap. 4). Moreover, to give another example, the
negotiation process towards ‘Copenhagen’ (in 2009) showed an increasing
agreement on mitigation actions by developing countries too and the
establishment of a Green Climate Fund and a Technology Mechanism to
support developing countries on climate change mitigation, adaptation and
technology transfer (see Chap. 5). However, the negotiation process at
‘Copenhagen’ could never build the momentum that characterised the
negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. This contributed to the lack of
consensus to adopt the Copenhagen Accord.
These examples indicate the importance of the three key factors for
successful climate policy negotiations simultaneously: e.g., even with a good
overall structure and with good support from scientific sources, negotiations
may fail if the process does not allow Parties to exchange points of view and
bridge gaps between their positions.
In this book three negotiation ‘dossiers’ will be analysed to see whether
and to what extent international climate negotiations have been facilitated by
the factors design, process and tactics. The first dossier covers the process
of establishing the UNFCCC as an overall framework for a climate regime
during 1988–1994 (Chap. 3). Second, the negotiation process leading to the
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and its entry into force in 2005 is
explained, with a view to how formal (negotiations at UN climate sessions)
and informal (national and international political developments taking place
outside the UN climate sessions) negotiations shaped the eventual protocol
text (Chap. 4). Third, the negotiations about a successor of the Kyoto
Protocol, leading to the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 are analysis
(Chap. 5). The findings for these dossiers will be summarised in Chap. 6.

References
APRAISE (2012). The APRAISE 3E method—Deliverable 2.2. Groningen, the Netherlands; Graz,
Austria: Consortium for FP7 project APRAISE.

Arts, B. (1998). The political influence of global NGOs. Utrecht, the Netherlands: International
Books.

Barrett, S. (1990). Montreal versus Kyoto. Global Public Goods, 192–220.

Barrett, S. (1991). The problem of global environmental protection. In D. Helm (Ed.), Economic policy
towards the environment (pp. 137–155). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Barrett, S. (1995). The economics of international agreements for the protection of environmental
and agricultural resources. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).

Cooper, R. (1999). International approaches to climate change—Working Paper No. 99-03.

Cambridge, MA, USA: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.

De Zeeuw, A. (2001). Klimaatonderhandelingen vanuit Speltheoretisch Perspectief. Economisch

Statistische Berichten, D28–D31.

European Commission (2011). A roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in
2050. Brussels, Belgium: European Commisison, COM (2011) 112 final.

Fells, R. (2012). Effective negotiations: From research to results. Cambridge, MA, USA: Cambridge
University Press.
[CrossRef]
Gaast, W. v., & Begg, K. (2012). Challenges and solutions for climate change. London, UK:
Springer.

Gore, A. (2006). An inconvenient truth. Pennsylvania, USA: Rodale Press.

Houghton, J., Jenkins, G., & Ephraums, J. (1990). Climate change: The IPCC scientific assessment
(1990). Cambridge, Great Britain, New York, NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge
University Press.

IPCC (1995). Second assessment report: Climate change—Summary for policy makers. Geneve,
Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

IPCC (2007). Fourth assessment report: Climate change 2007. Geneva, Switzerland:
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

IPCC (2013). Fifth assessment report: Climate change 2013. Geneva, Switzerland:
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Jackson, T. (2009). Prosperity without growth: Economics for a finite planet (1st ed.). London:
Earthscan.

McEvoy, D. (2007). Enforcing voluntary agreements for environmental protection: A theoretical

and experimental analysis. Ann Arbor, MI, USA: ProQuest.

New, M., Liverman, D., Schröder, H., & Anderson, K. (2011). Four degrees and beyond: The potential
for a global temperature increase of four degrees and its implications. Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society, 369, 6–19.
[CrossRef]

Posner, E., & Weisbach, D. (2010). Climate change justice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Susskind, L., Levy, P., & Thomas-Larmer, J. (2000). Negotiating environmental agreements: How to
avoid escalating confrontation, needles costs and unnecessary litigation. Washington, D.C., USA:
Island Press.

Tulkens, H. (1998). Co-operation versus free-riding in international environmental affairs: Two

approaches. In N. Hanley & H. Folmer (Eds.), Game theory and the environment (pp. 30–44).
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

UNEP (2015). The emissions gap report 2015. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP).

UNFCCC (1992). United Nations framework convention on climate change. Bonn: UNFCCC.

UNFCCC (2011). Report of the conference of the parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun
from 29 November to 10 December 2010; Addendum—Part two: Action taken by the conference
of the parties. Bonn, German: UNFCCC.

UNFCCC (2015). Report of the conference of the parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris
from 30 November to 13 December 2015; FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. Bonn, Germany: United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

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project—Third tranche. Washington, D.C.

Footnotes
1 Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl chloroform.

2 As the EU Climate Policy Roadmap for 2050 has shown, longer-term economic benefits of an
economic restructuring towards a low-emission or even 85 % carbon-free society could even be
positive due to lower energy cost, stimulating of renewable energy technology producing and service
sectors, etc. (European Commission 2011).
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
Wytze van der Gaast, International Climate Negotiation Factors, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46798-6_2

2. Climate Negotiation Factors: Design,

Process and Tactics
Wytze van der Gaast1
(1) JIN Climate and Sustainability, Groningen, The Netherlands

Wytze van der Gaast

Email: wytze@jin.ngo

Abstract
International climate negotiations take place in absence of an overarching
authority to enforce compliance with the agreed objectives. As a
consequence, negotiations need to motivate countries to join a climate
coalition, both from an international climate and national socio-economic
perspective. In order to arrive at an effective climate coalition, the process
of negotiations needs to be flexible and focussed on win-win solutions.
Tactical manoeuvres are needed to change the course of negotiations when
needed. These tactics can take various forms such as new scientific insights
or personalities of key negotiators.

2.1 Introduction
General characteristics of climate policy making have been described in
Chap. 1 as an introduction to this book. It has been explained how climate
negotiations were initially complicated by limited scientific knowledge of
climatic impacts caused by human activities, which made it rather difficult to
‘precisely’ determine required emission reductions for meeting the
precautionary principle of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the scientific knowledge base has been
growing over the past two decades, negotiations have also been complicated
by game theoretical aspects such as countries’ potential incentives for free
riding and lack of an overarching international disciplinary or authority.
In order to deal with the above aspects, in Chap. 1 it has been argued that
successful negotiation outcomes not only depend on the design of the policy
package to be negotiated, but also on the extent to which the negotiation
process provides sufficient flexibility and scope for dealing with country
positions and interests, as well as on tactical and facilitating aspects. The
identification of these three factors for successful negotiations is not meant to
be exhaustive. Instead, they are considered minimally required aspects for
achieving a successful international climate policy negotiation result (in
terms of agreeing on globally supported low-emission and climate-resilient
policy measures).
Before analysing in the next chapters how these factors have determined
the course and outcomes of negotiations on the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol
and the Paris Agreement, in this chapter aspects of climate negotiations are
analysed in further detail.
Aspects related to the design of a global climate policy are described in
Sect. 2.2 using insights on formation of international coalitions. It is
discussed how coalition building works in a situation where countries jointly
aim at achieving an agreement without an overarching disciplinarian, such as
an international government, and whether and how trade-off effects take
place in such situations between strictness of policy measures and size of the
coalition. With these insights it can be better understood how international
coalition building dynamics have an impact on the design of an international
climate policy.
In Sect. 2.3, aspects related to the process of negotiations are described
in different negotiation contexts, such as in cases where clear win-win
potentials exist in policy making (negotiations enable negotiators to be all
better off) and negotiations taking place in so-called win-lose situations
(some negotiators are worse off whereas others are better off). In addition,
the process of climate negotiations under the UNFCCC is explained in further
detail, by describing both the high-level negotiations process at sessions of
the Conference of the Parties (COP) and the more technical negotiations on
particular policy issues such as instruments and mechanisms and modalities
and procedures for these.
 Finally, in Sect. 2.4 it is explained how country negotiation positions and
tactics emerge from domestic values, interests, institutions and experience
and how these can have an impact on the result of climate negotiations.
Moreover, based on climate negotiation experience, a range of facilitating
and negotiation tactics factors are discussed, including how these have
influenced the direction and scope of the agreements reached (Fig. 2.1).

Fig. 2.1 Climate negotiation factors: design, process and tactics (author’s own elaboration)

2.2 Design Aspects of a Climate Policy Agreement

2.2.1 Handling International Environmental
Cooperation
As explained in Chap. 1, achieving an ‘ideal’ international climate policy
coalition is difficult to achieve due to a number of aspects which are well
understood from literature about game theory. One aspect is the absence of an
overarching international authority, such as an international government. As
sovereign states, countries (or groups of countries) cannot be forced to join
an international climate coalition and they may decide not to adopt a climate
agreement if they consider this not in line with their domestic preferences. As
a consequence, if too many countries feel that proposed greenhouse gas
emission reduction measures are too strict and therefore too costly for them,
negotiations may move towards softening proposed measures in order to get
more countries on board of a climate coalition (Barrett 1999; Kiyono and
Okuno-Fujiwara 2004). This possible trade-off between higher or lower
targets and country support for an agreement results in a challenge to design
an international climate policy regime which keeps emission reduction
measures sufficiently strict for meeting the UNFCCC precautionary principle
(as explained in Chap. 1) and stimulates a sufficient number of countries to
join the coalition for achieving climate policy goals.
For the latter, compensatory measures or ways to reduce the costs of
compliance could be introduced, which is not only important for making it
attractive for countries to join a coalition but also to support their
compliance with commitments in the agreement. After all, the absence of an
overarching disciplinarian also complicates enforcement of compliance with
the agreement made by the coalition. Of course, not committing to objectives
in an international policy regime may cause a loss of goodwill for a country,
a complaint in the framework of the International Court of Justice or a
sanction, but these ‘sanctions’ could become difficult to impose and are far
from a guarantee that countries will comply with multilateral treaties (Barrett
1999; Barton et al. 2006). In fact, as will be described in Chap. 3, in spite of
the US agreement with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the country never ratified
the protocol. Moreover, to give another example, Canada’s ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol in 2002 was followed in 2012 by a unilateral decision by the
Canadian government not to comply with its quantified greenhouse gas
emission reduction commitments under the Protocol (see Chap. 5). There
was little that the international climate policy regime could do to prevent
these cases.
At the same time, an important reason for international cooperation on
environmental issues is that it enables countries to reduce costs and achieve
larger benefits than in case of unilateral country actions (Barrett 1991).
Collaboration enables countries to explore options for cost reductions, such
as through the use of concepts of emissions trading and international division
of abatement actions (Jepma 1995). This insight is generally supported by
game theory, which has been well known since the work by Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).
Game theory is based on games where two or more individuals choose
strategies to maximise their benefits in competitive situations. The
individuals are faced with clear rules and it is assumed that they behave fully
rationally and that information is exchanged symmetrically among the players
in the game. Particularly interesting for the discussion on climate policy
negotiations are the so-called non-cooperative games,1 which refer to
situations in which no overarching authority exists to assure that players stick
to the agreed rules. Hence, as explained above, cooperation in these games
must be self-enforcing.2 A well-known example of a non-cooperative game
is the so-called ‘prisoners’ dilemma’, which explains how players are worse
off if they do not collaborate, in comparison to a situation in which
collaborate (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2009).
Key characteristics of the prisoners’ dilemma are that both players act
rationally, have the same amount and type of information and do not
communicate with each other. After all, should they be able to exchange
views on the situation they have been placed in, a different outcome would
have been likely in order to create a larger common surplus. Another
characteristic of this game is that there is no repetition. Should the game be
repeated in a second round, then players may make different choices based
on their behaviour in the first round.
It can be argued that decision making on climate change resembles the
prisoners’ dilemma. Suppose, taking a very stylistic example, that a country
has two choices regarding what policy it will undertake concerning climate
change: it can take greenhouse gas emission reduction measures or it can
decide not to take any action. Moreover, there is no international regime and
no information exchange among countries, although all countries have access
to the same information sources, so that a country will have to assume what
other countries will do in terms of climate policy. For the other countries,
also two options exist: carry out climate change abatement policy or no
climate policy activities at all.
In case the country assumes that the other countries are all likely to carry
out greenhouse gas emission reduction measures, it has an incentive to
undertake no action. After all, by doing nothing the country would benefit
from the activities by all other countries at zero costs. Hence, in this case the
country could be a free rider, taking profit of the public good created by other
countries. On the other hand, if the country assumes that none of the other
countries will carry out climate policy measures, it has no incentive to
undertake abatement action itself; the benefits from such action would
generally be much smaller than the costs, especially when the country is
small or medium-sized. This outcome resembles the prisoners’ dilemma
case: whatever the policy action by other countries, without a cooperative
framework, the country’s optimal policy is to refrain from climate change
abatement action. A repetition of the game in a second round of negotiations
could lead to a different outcome, for instance, if it turns out that refraining
from abatement action leads to considerable environmental damage and
economic costs.
Another extension of the prisoners’ dilemma, and which has a high
relevance for environmental issues, has become known as the ‘tragedy of the
commons’. The origin of this concept goes even back to Aristotle (“What is
common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it”) (Ostrom
1990) and in more recent scientific literature its roots go back to Hardin
(1968). The commons refer to any resource which is shared by a group of
people, e.g., air and water, but also land, fish and wood. A general
characteristic of commons is that they are not protected by property rights as
everybody can freely use the commons.
A problem that could arise with using the commons, and this is where the
link to the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ can be made, is that overuse reduces their
quality. For example, the overuse of land in Britain in the fourteenth century
(as in Hardin’s example) due to the free use of common pastures by nearby
villages to graze horses, cattle and sheep, resulted in ruining of the pastures.
In order to halt this process, property rights were introduced by parcelling up
the common pastures in individually owned parcels. Each household then had
a responsibility for its own parcel and an incentive to prevent overgrazing.
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ is also often used in the context of fishing
(too much fishing would deteriorate fish populations) and in the context of air
pollution: considering the air as a common, people have emitted pollutants in
the air, which has gradually reduced air quality. Based on these examples, the
tragedy of the commons can be defined as the result of the perception of
people that using a ‘common’ results in an individual benefit, whereas the
costs of using it can be shared so that they are hardly felt by individuals. As a
consequence, up to the point where the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is truly felt
by the users themselves, there is little incentive to adjust behaviour in terms
of, e.g., reduction of emissions of pollutants.
This makes the ‘tragedy of the commons’ helpful in describing the issue
of global warming and why it is taking place and why it could become a
problem (Böhringer 2002; Paavola 2011). It also offers some solutions for
addressing the problem (internalising the costs of emissions in individual
cost calculations, e.g., with a Pigovian tax, or translating emissions into
individual property rights), but its value to the discussion of what an optimal
size of a stable climate coalition would be is limited. The concept of ‘public
goods’ is more useful for that purpose.
Although interrelated, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the ‘public
goods’ concepts are different in the sense that the first refers to the over-use
of a common good, whereas a public good is a good from which no-one can
be excluded. In the example of global warming, a ‘tragedy of the commons’
takes place when worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases lead to climate
change; the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the prevention of
global warming would then be a public good. Especially, the public good
characteristic of climate change policy has turned out to be important when
designing a climate regime. This is mainly because of the free-rider incentive
that countries may have when they see that others are active with abatement
policies whereas no country can be excluded from the improved
circumstances. In conclusion, international climate policy aims at preventing
a ‘tragedy of the commons’ situation for the global climate, but must prevent
free rider behaviour due to the public good character of the results of the
formulated policy.
The above discussion has shown that insights from game theory help
explain why climate policy negotiation outcomes, in an attempt to reach
consensus among UNFCCC Parties, often result in lower greenhouse gas
emission reduction targets than in an ‘ideal’ situation (as illustrated in
Chap. 1). Within the eventually achieved coalition, countries try to achieve
the best outcomes for themselves individually and, depending on the
negotiation case, for the ‘group’ (such as the global climate). How this game
has been played so far by countries in the context of establishing a climate
regime will be discussed elsewhere in this book, based on experience with
negotiating the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.

2.2.2 Determining the Size of an International Policy

Coalition
Based on the above discussion, a challenge of establishing and maintaining
an international climate policy is that it must have a widespread international
coverage as climate change is a global issue. Similar to the example of the
prisoners’ dilemma, policy cooperation between countries on climate change
could generate larger benefits than unilateral actions. For example, countries
with relatively high marginal greenhouse gas abatement costs could carry out
emission reductions in countries where marginal costs are relatively low (as
the impact of greenhouse gas emissions is independent of the location where
the emissions take place). This would not only reduce overall abatement
costs but also increase overall benefits as new sustainable energy
technologies become available in countries where they would not have been
available otherwise. Countries could also agree on differentiated targets
and/or commitments based on socio-economic welfare levels. In addition,
within a framework of cooperation, countries could agree on financial and
technology transfers or specific support measures to reduce costs of and
increase benefits from cooperation.
For example, the UNFCCC contained, as a first international climate
policy step, promises by industrialised countries to bring their greenhouse
gas emissions back to 1990 levels by the year 2000. This coalition was not
difficult to maintain as almost all (groups of) negotiating parties were
satisfied: for industrialised countries the greenhouse gas stabilisation goal
was not legally binding and developing countries did not have quantitative
targets at all. The Kyoto Protocol in 1997 also achieved global support, but
this coalition could only be achieved by exempting developing countries
from quantitative emission reduction or limitation commitments and enabling
industrialised countries to partly achieve their commitments through
international emissions trading mechanisms (UNFCCC 1998). For example,
as will be explained in detail in Chap. 3, in return for its willingness at
‘Kyoto’ to join the group of countries with quantitative commitments, the
Russian Federation was allowed to adopt a relatively easy target (i.e.
stabilisation of its greenhouse gas emissions at l990 levels, when the country
was still part of the USSR). US negotiators, who had been given a mandate
by the Congress to only agree on a stabilisation of US emissions (Byrd and
Hagel 1997), felt that the inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol of the concept of
emissions trading (basically on a worldwide scale) would be enough
compensation for committing the USA to a 7 % emission reduction (on which
they soon turned out to be wrong, though).
As benefits from greenhouse gas emission reduction have the
characteristic of a global public good, as explained above, no country can be
excluded from these. By not joining or leaving a climate coalition, a country
can benefit from the actions undertaken by countries in the coalition without
undertaking actions itself. This could induce other countries also to withdraw
from the coalition, thus threatening the overall objectives of the regime.
Literature on game theory then suggests that international agreements, given
the enforcement complexities, must be self-enforcing, i.e. the agreement must
be designed in such a manner that the incentives for countries to stay in the
coalition are larger than the incentives to leave the coalition (Neumann and
Morgenstern 1944; Barrett 1991; De Zeeuw 2001; Tulkens 1998; Eyckmans
and Finus 2003; Ray 2000).3 In that case participating countries are
compensated for their efforts (reduced costs) and receive a share of the
benefits that result from the cooperation (De Zeeuw 2001; Altamirano-
Cabrera and Finus 2006, p. 25). As a result, all participating countries are
better off by staying a member of the coalition.
An important question that remains is how large an international climate
policy coalition would need to be. In theory, since no country can be
excluded from enjoying the benefits of greenhouse gas emission reduction
(e.g., lower costs needed for adapting to climatic changes), a climate
coalition would have to be global. This would prevent any country from
taking a free ride on the greenhouse gas emission reduction efforts of other
countries or that countries feeling that their efforts are offset by lack of action
by others. However, whether this practically means that all countries would
have to join the coalition of countries undertaking abatement actions remains
to be seen. For instance, an effective and stable coalition with countries with
commitments may not need to contain all countries in the world but mainly
the key players: “the success of an international environmental agreement is
not related to the total number of participants, but to the number of key
players for tackling the problem—in the case of global warming USA, China,
Russia (FSU) and India, among others” (Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus
2006, p. 27).
What such a coalition with “key players for tackling the problem” could
look like was illustrated in 2009 by the World Resources Institute (WRI
2009) in a diagram which plotted countries from left to right according to
their absolute annual greenhouse gas emissions. The analysis showed that, in
2005, the fifteen UNFCCC Parties (both developed and developing
countries, taking the EU as one Party) with the largest greenhouse gas
emissions together accounted for approximately 80 % of global emissions.
Obviously, the above analysis (WRI 2009) was not hindered by political
negotiation barriers, but, as is explained in Chap. 5, a few months after the
climate negotiations at ‘Copenhagen’ 55 countries, including a number of
developing countries, had submitted national pledges to the UNFCCC
Secretariat to cut and limit their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020,4 together
accounting for 78 % of global emissions from energy use.

Fig. 2.2 Cumulative global greenhouse gas emissions in 2005 [author’s own elaboration, based on WRI
(2009)]

These examples show that while climate policy making has a global
scope due to the uniform mixing of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere with
climate impacts for all countries (to a larger or lesser extent), negotiations
and literature analysis up to 2009 tended to focus on international coalition
building with quantitative greenhouse gas emission reduction actions for
relatively small groups of countries with relatively large greenhouse gas
emissions. Countries within such a coalition could then still collaborate with
other (developing) countries on emission reduction projects (such as the
Clean Development Mechanism, CDM), climate change adaptation support
and technology transfer.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, as is described in Chap. 4, the coalition
consisted only of industrialised countries with their adoption of quantified,
legally binding commitments, including the possibility of emissions trading.
This proved to be ineffective as rapidly growing developing countries such
as Brazil, China, India and Mexico did not have such commitments. The
absence of these countries was an important reason for the USA to leave the
‘Kyoto’ coalition in 2001. Attempts to establish an effective coalition under
a post-Kyoto regime with the inclusion of quantified climate commentments
for rapidly industrialising developing countries too failed at the Climate
Conference of Copenhagen in 2009. Since then, coalition building has been
focussed on a global collaboration based on mainly voluntary emission
reductions or limitation measures by all countries. The adoption of the Paris
Agreement in December 2015 (see Chap. 5) clearly illustrated this change in
negotiations from legally binding commitments for a relatively small group of
countries to more voluntary-based national climate action plans for basically
all countries in the World.

2.3 Organising Climate Negotiation Processes

In Sect. 2.2 climate policy making has been described with help of game-
theoretical and economic concepts such as ‘prisoners’ dilemma’, ‘tragedy of
the commons’ and the ‘public good’ nature of benefiting from greenhouse
emission reductions. In addition, basic characteristics of building an
international climate policy coalition without an overarching disciplinarian
have been discussed. Due to these factors, climate negotiation outcomes have
often developed towards outcomes where a broad international coalition can
only be achieved by watering down the required climate actions of
individual countries (IISD 2015, p. 44). In this section, the importance of the
negotiation process itself is discussed as a factor enabling negotiators to
consider the above-mentioned game-theoretical aspects in their discussions.

2.3.1 Integrated Versus Distributive Negotiations

The literature distinguishes two main approaches to negotiations (Fisher and
Ury 2011; Nierenberg 1978; Wertheim n.d.; Sprangler 2012; Meerts and
Postma 2005). The first approach is called ‘integrative’ or ‘cooperative’ and
is recommended in circumstances where clear potentials for win-win
situations exist. The second approach is called ‘distributive negotiations’
and is generally applied in so-called win-lose situations where parties have
to compete with each other because of strongly differing interests (e.g., a
customer negotiating the price of a product with the potential seller). The
outcome of distributive negotiations is generally referred to as a zero-sum
game—one party wins what the other one loses—although also lose-lose
outcomes are possible if a party realises that it cannot win and cancels the
negotiations.
In cases of ‘integrative’ (win-win) negotiation circumstances,
negotiations are focussed more on striking creative deals which could result
in negotiation outcomes where for each party the advantageous aspects
outweigh the disadvantageous aspects. A typical characteristic of
‘integrative’ negotiation circumstances is that a party which ‘loses’ on one
issue can be compensated by winning on another issue, so that both parties
benefit from negotiations. Awareness of such a situation among the
negotiation parties creates an incentive for both sides to strive for
maximisation of the joint outcome. These circumstances also make it easier
for parties to solve mutual problems, to share information, and to prevent
decentralised behaviour with a focus on individual optimisation (Barrett
1999, p. 2).
Of the approaches described here, the ‘integrative/cooperative’
negotiation approach has the largest potential of offering a way out of the
‘prisoners’ dilemma’ situations described in Sect. 2.2, as it limits or
prevents decentralised action (Barrett 1999, p. 3). During ‘integrative’
negotiations it is important for negotiators to consider the interests of
opponents so that mutually satisfactory solutions can be found. Such an
approach generally increases the flexibility of parties to find compromises
that do not conflict with one’s own interests. This could even lead to ‘Pareto
efficient’ outcome whereby no options remain on the table that could make at
least one party better off without making the other parties worse off
(Wertheim n.d., p. 12).
The Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997 (as discussed in Chap. 4) could
be considered an example of how an initially ‘distributive’ negotiation
approach turned towards an ‘integrative’ approach. During the first week of
the ‘Kyoto’ negotiations countries mainly defended their own positions, but
this changed during the second week when industrialised countries eventually
adopted quantitative emission reduction commitments because their
developing country negotiation partners agreed that these could be achieved
flexibly, including via international carbon credit trading based on emission
reduction projects. As a result, the ‘Kyoto’ negotiations could be completed
successfully, because the protocol text reflected the national priorities of the
several countries, such as “binding targets for the EU, flexibility for the U.S.,
success in Kyoto for Japan, no commitments for developing countries,
financial pay-off for Russia, and good terms with the EU for Eastern Europe”
(Wijen and Zoeteman 2004, p. 31).
Finally, Fisher and Ury (2011) and Wertheim (n.d.) conclude that the
‘integrative/cooperative’ negotiation approach is often used when
negotiations take place as a series of subsequent rather than isolated events.5
Therefore, it is important that negotiators take into consideration that they
will meet again and keep in mind that the negotiation atmosphere during one
session may have an impact on the atmosphere in a next session, i.e. parties
may harden their position if another party formerly did not want to cooperate,
or show willingness to compromise if former negotiations resulted in a true
win-win situation (Fisher and Ury 2011).
With a view to the climate change talks, this negotiation aspect can be
illustrated by the opposition of developing countries, prior to the COP-1
(Berlin 1995), to Joint Implementation (JI) as an official instrument for
helping industrialised countries stabilising their greenhouse gas emissions by
the year 2000 at 1990 emission levels. This opposition was strongly
motivated by developing countries’ point of view that industrialised
countries should invest in emission reduction measures ‘at home’, rather than
setting up lower-cost project investments (through JI) abroad. However,
simply rejecting JI as a policy instrument at COP-1 would likely have
frustrated climate negotiations for the next couple of years. Therefore, at
COP-1, in order to continue the climate negotiation progress, a pilot phase
for JI called activities implemented jointly was established, as a
compromise (see also Chap. 4).
With this compromise, the JI concept remained ‘alive’, but industrialised
countries could, for the time being, not use it for compliance with their
UNFCCC objectives.
With a view to these examples and assuming on-going relationships
between the negotiation parties in most of the cases, “the key to successful
negotiations is to shift the situation to a ‘win-win’ even if it looks like a
‘win-lose’ situation. Almost all negotiations have at least some elements of
win-win. Successful negotiations often depend on finding the win-win
aspects in any situation” (Wertheim n.d., p. 2).
2.3.2 Organisation of Climate Negotiations Under the
UNFCCC
Since the early 1990s, climate negotiations under the UNFCCC have taken
place during multiple ‘rounds’ as described in Chap. 1. Initially, the
Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC) was the main negotiation
forum which prepared the text of the UNFCCC that was adopted in 1992 (see
Chap. 3) and which continued until the first Conference of the Parties (COP)
in Berlin (Germany, March–April 1995). Since then, the COP, established by
the UNFCCC (1992, p. 17, Art. 7), has been the central body for
international climate negotiations. The COP is hosted annually during two
week-sessions, usually by the end of the year, by either a developed or a
developing country. Generally, countries try to apply the ‘rule’ that when a
COP is hosted by a developed country in one year, then the next year a
developing country will host the session. The ground rules for the process of
negotiations within the context of the UNFCCC, as further explained in this
section, have been determined by UNFCCC (1992). In the course of ongoing
negotiations, additional bodies with their accompanying operational rules
have been added to the UNFCCC organisational structure, such as the
Subsidiary Bodies (SB, for advice and implementation, see below), the Ad
Hoc Working Group on the Berlin Mandate (1995–1997, see Chap. 4), the
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (2011–2015, see Chap. 5),
the CDM Executive Board (2005-ongoing) and the Technology Mechanism
(2010-ongoing) (see Fig. 2.3 for an overview of current bodies under the
UNFCCC, as per January 2016, after the adoption of the Paris Agreement).
These bodies receive their mandates from the COP, which also appoints their
governing boards. The boards determine their operational processes and
report annually to the COP.
Fig. 2.3 Summary of main UNFCCC Bodies (UNFCCC) (author’s own elaboration)

Between 1995 and 1997, COP negotiations focussed on the Berlin

Mandate to agree on a protocol with further specific (quantified) climate
policy actions. After the conclusion on the Kyoto Protocol in 1997,
negotiations focussed on modalities and procedures for successful
implementation of protocol agreements. An important role in this process
was played by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
(SBSTA) of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). These two
bodies support the COP negotiation process and negotiators meet usually
twice a year for these discussions, during spring (May–June) and during the
first week of the COP by the end of the year. As per June 2016, 44 SBSTA
and SBI sessions have been held in total.
In 2005, when the Kyoto Protocol formally entered into force, after
receipt of the Russian instrument of ratification in November 2004, a new
negotiation track was established under the COP which had the objective to
work on a climate agreement for the period after 2012 (to cover the period
after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol). This negotiation
track was organised under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)
(UNFCCC-CMP 2006, p. 3, para 2). In 2007, at the COP at Bali (Indonesia),
a second, parallel negotiation track was established under the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention
(AWG-LCA). The reason for having two working groups for negotiations on
a post-2012 climate agreement was that not all UNFCCC Parties had ratified
the Kyoto Protocol (yet) (among these countries was the USA). Therefore,
limiting the negotiations to Parties to the Kyoto Protocol would exclude these
non-ratifying Parties from post-2012 negotiation. AWG-LCA was aimed at
keeping these Parties ‘in the loop’ and it was hoped that, eventually, both
working group tracks would come together by 2012 (see Chap. 5 for a more
detailed discussion on these parallel negotiation tracks).
As is discussed in Chap. 5, the Copenhagen COP session in 2009 (COP-
15) failed at reaching a climate agreement as successor of the Kyoto
Protocol’s first commitment period. As a consequence, at COP-17 in Durban
(December 2011) a new negotiation track was established to conclude on a
climate policy regime by 2015, which would need to become effective after
2020. At COP-18 in Doha (December 2012) work on this Durban Platform
for Enhanced Action was started and the work on the AWG-LCA and AWG-
KP formally concluded. During this overall negotiation process of over 100
meetings, several milestones were achieved, which are summarised in
Table 2.1 for milestones achieved at COP sessions.

Table 2.1 COP sessions held and their milestones

COP Location Milestones

COP-1 Berlin, Berlin Mandate to start negotiations on a Climate Protocol
(March– Germany
April 1995)
COP-2 Geneva, USA agrees to negotiate legally-binding targets
(July 1996) Switzerland Geneva Declaration
COP-3 Kyoto, Adoption of Kyoto Protocol
(December Japan
1997)
COP-4 Buenos Buenos Aires Plan of Action for protocol modalities and procedures
(November Aires,
1998) Argentina
COP Location Milestones
COP-5 Bonn, Self-imposed deadline for Kyoto Protocol entry-into-force by the time of
(November Germany Rio+10 summit in 2002
1999)
COP-6 The Hague, President’s Note based on topic-wise agreement on implementation of
(November The Kyoto Protocol instruments and mechanisms; no overall consensus reached
2000) Netherlands though
COP-6-bis Bonn, Bonn Agreement on, a.o., compliance issues under the Kyoto Protocol, to
(June Germany keep ‘Kyoto’ coalition in tact
2001)
COP-7 Marrakech, Marrakech Accords on modalities and procedures for implementation of
(November Morocco Kyoto Protocol (based on Buenos Plan of Action and Bonn Agreement)
2001)
COP-8 New Delhi, New Delhi Statement on adaptation and future climate policy regime
(November India
2002)
COP-9 Milan, Italy Role of sinks in Kyoto Protocol further defined as an option to account for
(December carbon sequestration in forests and through land-use change under Protocol
2003) commitments
COP-10 Buenos Start of post-2012 negotiations; second commitment period of Kyoto
(December Aires, Protocol, with protocol entry-into-force nearly there
2004) Argentina
COP-11 Montreal, First meeting of Parties to Kyoto Protocol, establishment of AWG KP
(December Canada
2005)
COP-12 Nairobi, Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate
(November Kenya change
2006)
COP-13 Bali, The Bali Action Plan, establishment of AWG LCA to also include non-
(December Indonesia ratifying Parties to Kyoto Protocol in post-2012 negotiations
2007)
COP-14 Poznan, Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer
(December Poland
2008)
COP-15 Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord on post-2012 climate policy regime (not adopted though
(December Denmark by consensus decision)
2009)
COP-16 Cancun, The Cancun Agreements with visions on climate change mitigation and
(December Mexico adaptation, including on emission reduction pledges by developed and
2010) developing countries
COP-17 Durban, Durban Platform for Enhanced Action to negotiation on post-2020 climate
(December South Africa policy regime
2011)
COP Location Milestones
COP-18 Doha, Qatar Doha Climate Gateway and Doha Amendment to Kyoto Protocol, with new
(December commitments for (some) developed countries during period 2012–2020
2012)
COP-19 Warsaw, Introduction of the concept of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
(November Poland (INDC) for developed and developing countries to pledge climate change
2013) mitigation action, considering national circumstances
COP-20 Lima, Peru Decision that countries shall submit INDCs before COP-21, with a review
(December of these by the UNFCCC secretariat
2014)
COP-21 Paris, Paris Agreement on a post-2020 climate policy regime, including decision
(December France that global average temperature increase be limited to 1.5 or 2 ℃ (see
2015) Chap. 5 for detailed discussion)

In terms of milestones, COP-1 (Berlin Mandate), COP-3 (Kyoto

Protocol), COP-6bis (Bonn Agreement), COP-7 (Marrakech Accords), COP-
13 (Bali Plan of Action), COP-16 (Cancun Agreements), COP-17 (Durban
Platform) and COP-21 (Paris Agreement) may be considered (arbitrarily
though) the most important negotiation sessions. Most of the other COPs
became ‘intermediate’ sessions, which was also often a consequence of the
time schedules agreed at earlier COPs. The Berlin Mandate of 1995, for
example, had a deadline for 1997, which implied that COP-2 would mainly
have to create the momentum to keep negotiations on track. COP-17
formalised a new negotiation process towards post-2020 climate policy
making, to be concluded in Paris (2015).
The sequence of annual ‘milestone’ and ‘intermediate’ COP sessions
have turned out to allow for a flexible negotiation process in the sense that
topics can be placed on the agenda of a COP which have been identified at
an earlier COP and/or by a preparatory meeting. COP practice shows that
identification of issues is usually initiated by one or more Parties at a COP
discussion, which is then considered for further consideration, either by the
same COP, or a next session of the COP or a subsidiary body or ad hoc
working group. This generally supports addressing more flexibly the game
theoretical aspects as explained elsewhere in this Chapter and handling the
issue, as discussed in Chap. 1, that climate policy target setting, especially
during the 1990s, but also during the negotiations towards the Paris
Agreement, has often been subject of climate negotiations, rather than that
negotiators have taken scientifically determined targets as a given.
 Countries that have ratified the UNFCCC have access to the COP
negotiations. Since the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol on 16 February
2005, which was 90 days after the submission of the instrument of
ratification by the Russian Federation, the COP has also served as the
meeting of the Parties that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). AWG-KP
negotiations, as mentioned above, therefore took place under supervision of
the CMP. The implication of this change is that countries that have ratified the
UNFCCC but which had not (yet) ratified the Kyoto Protocol (e.g., USA and,
until May 2009, Turkey) could only participate at CMP sessions as
observers, without the right to vote, upon invitation of the CMP President
(generally the Minister for the Environment or Foreign Affairs of the hosting
country).
As explained above, the sessions of the COP are prepared and supported
by the so-called Subsidiary Bodies (SB) and ad hoc working groups (AWG).
SB and AWG sessions take place somewhat ‘in the shadow’ with less of the
pressure to achieve agreements which is often so strongly felt at COPs. It is
also important to note that these more technical sessions are not pressurised
with the necessity to gain political prestige from hosting the sessions, as
these sessions are generally held in Bonn and organised by the UNFCCC
Secretariat, mostly in May/June. SB sessions are also held in conjunction
with the COP for the final preparations of the eventual COP decisions. AWG
sessions were held more often throughout the year, depending on the political
agenda. For example, the AWG-Durban Platform met 15 times between May
2012 and December 2015, of which five times during 2015 as preparation
for the Paris COP (UNFCCC 2015).
Decision-making by the COP takes place according to a procedure that
has never officially been adopted. Before the first session of the COP in
1995, the UNFCCC Secretariat had prepared a voting procedure upon which
Parties could not reach agreement (UNFCCC 1996; Depledge 2004). As a
consequence, “in the absence of any specified majority voting rule, there is
currently a broad understanding in the climate change regime that substantive
decisions should be adopted by consensus” (Depledge 2004, p. 5). More
recent amendments to these rules state that the COP should make every effort
to reach agreement by consensus, but where consensus cannot be reached,
amendments to the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol may be adopted by a three-
quarter majority vote of the Parties present and voting (Siegele 2013).
 At this point, the President of the COP must ensure that two-third of the
Parties are present at the meeting. However, this still requires a definition of
what consensus means. In the context of the climate negotiations, consensus is
generally achieved if there are no stated objections to a decision. The
complication of consensus as a guiding principle for voting is that any Party
can block decisions and that additional efforts are needed to adjust the
decision text in such a way that it meets the concerns of the Party or Parties
that have stated objections. This happened, for instance, at the ‘Copenhagen’
COP in 2009 when a few developing countries, among them Venezuela,
Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua, rejected the Copenhagen Accords, so that it
was not adopted. However, when a similar situation occurred at COP-16 in
Cancún, a year later, during AWG-LCA negotiations, “Colombia questioned
how not having any agreement could be beneficial for the environment and,
supported by Gabon, noted that consensus did not mean that one country
could block decisions” (IISD 2010, p. 12) (see also Chap. 5).
In order to avoid situations where decisions are blocked by a small
group of Parties, COP Presidents often establish small informal working
groups (or ‘joint contact groups’, or ‘negotiating groups’, or ‘drafting
groups’) to prepare decisions on particular topics during the COP. These
groups consist of experts that form a fair representation of the UNFCCC
regions, i.e. Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and the
Caribbean, and Western Europe and others, including Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and USA. They are often chaired by a co-Chair from a
developed country and a co-Chair from a developing country. Generally,
when an informal working group has reached agreement on a particular issue
and the decision text is presented to the COP plenary, consensus can more
easily be reached.
In this process the SB sessions held in parallel with the COP play an
important role (especially during the first week of the COP). The informal
working group members have often already formed a similar working group
at the annual SB and AWG sessions in Bonn (the May–June meetings
mentioned above) where country representatives prepare first drafts of
decision texts, which often have the form of consolidated texts based on
proposals submitted by Parties. Then, at the COP, these consolidated texts
can be further developed into COP decision texts, which become subject to
the consensus ‘voting’ procedure. It should be noted that negotiations do
often not take place at the plenary meetings of the COP. The working groups
mentioned above, preferably with a balanced geographical division and
specific competence, work on the texts and when they have completed their
work and have reached agreement, these can be presented for conclusion to
the Plenary of the COP.
The negotiations are furthermore supported by technical workshops
organised by the UNFCCC Secretariat on issues that need further exploration
by country representatives in consultation with third-party experts, who are
invited to these workshops. In addition, negotiations during 2005–2015
resulted in new bodies to work on technology development and transfer
(Technology Mechanism), finance (Green Climate Fund) and adaptation
(Adaptation Fund Board) (see Fig. 2.3). These bodies are also populated by
representatives of developed and developing countries and meet a few times
a year at Bonn (van der Gaast and Begg 2012).
While preparing for the COP, its President often identifies the issues that
could ‘break or make’ the COP. In order to already sort out some of the
issues before the COP, the President can organise a small workshop with key
players, about two months before the COP session. These key players are,
for instance, the EU Presidency Trio (of incoming, present and former chairs
of the EU Council), the main negotiators of important industrialised
countries, the acting chair of the G-77&China, a representative of the
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), etc. This meeting generally offers a
good opportunity for the President to show his/her “charm, cunning, humour,
daring and a range of other techniques” (Depledge 2004, p. 6) that later may
help to generate consensus at the COP. In addition, several COP Presidents in
the past formed so-called ‘friends of the President’ groups, which are small
gatherings of selected negotiators to support the President in preparing the
negotiations, identifying key issues during the negotiations, and drafting
compromise texts during the final stage of the COP sessions (at this stage
also some ministers attending the Ministerial or high-level segment of the
COP—generally the last two days of the session—could join the ‘friends’
group).
Obviously, inviting country representatives to the groups is a very
delicate task for the President to perform as it requires a politically sensitive
selection of key countries. One option to select negotiators is to select from
each UN region one representative, so that all regions are represented.
Another option, which is nowadays mostly used by COP Presidents, is to
invite one representative from the various negotiation coalitions that have
been active in the course of the climate negotiations over the past 20 years
(see for an overview Box 2.1).
An example of using the latter option was at COP-6bis in Bonn (June
2001) which was chaired by the Dutch Minister of Environment, Mr. Jan
Pronk. He had already intended to establish a negotiation table system with
key negotiators selected from the country groups at COP-6 in November
2000, but then it was met with too much resistance, as within the groups it
was difficult to appoint a ‘leading country’. At the Bonn COP session, Mr.
Pronk tried again and this time a negotiation table could be formed with one
chair per group to be taken by a spokesperson who was backed by a number
of colleagues from the same group sitting on chairs behind him/her. Perhaps
also the changed negotiation climate facilitated this set-up of the ‘friends’
group. After all, since the decision by US President Bush, early 2001, to
consider the Kyoto Protocol “fatally flawed” (see Chap. 4), the remaining
countries had become engaged in an intense diplomatic carousel with
representatives from negotiation groups visiting each other in order to design
strategies to save the protocol at the resumed session of COP-6 in Bonn.
Since the successful application of the ‘friends of the President’ formula
at COP-6bis, it has also been applied by other COP Presidents, although not
always with similar successes. The ‘friends’ groups do not always manage to
step beyond political dividing lines, so that, during the final hours of the COP
sessions, the President still needs to negotiate bilaterally with particular
negotiators to strike final deals (Depledge 2004, p. 22). An important
condition for organising such group or ‘friends’ discussions is that they keep
all other countries and their negotiators included in the process. For example,
when in 2009, before COP-15 in Copenhagen, rumours were heard about a
Danish ‘President’s Text’ for guiding the COP negotiations, this immediately
raised concerns among several country negotiators who felt excluded from
the negotiation process (see Chap. 5 for a detailed discussion on this
process).

Box 2.1. Groupings of UNFCCC Parties During Climate Negotiations

According to the UN tradition, Parties, while they are each represented by
national delegations, are organised in five regional groups, mainly for
administrative reasons:
– African States,
 – Asian States,
– Eastern European States,
– Latin American and the Caribbean States, and
– Western European and Other States (e.g., including EU, Australia,
Norway, Switzerland and USA).
In order to have their substantive interests better presented at
negotiations, Parties usually organise themselves in ‘like-minded’ groups.
According to the UNFCCC website, the main groups are:
– Group of 77 (G-77), which was founded in 1964 and has
nowadays 134 developing country members; China generally
collaborates with G-77 so that the group’s inputs to the COP are
usually tabled as G-77&China submissions,
– Small Island Developing States (SIDS), which is a coalition of 43
low-lying and small island countries,
– Least Developed Countries (LDC), which contains 48 countries
and which share a common interest in, e.g., vulnerability and
adaptation to climate change,
– European Union (EU), which as a regional economic integration
organisation has become a Party to the UNFCCC itself,
– Umbrella Group, which is a loose coalition of non-EU developed
countries (usually made up of Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, Kazakhstan, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine
and the USA), and
– Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), which comprises Mexico,
Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland.
– The Like Minded Group of Developing Countries (LMDC) with
the following countries, who are also part of the G-77: Algeria,
Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, India, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia,
Mali, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria,
Venezuela and Vietnam.
 Several of these groups have overlaps as countries are member of
more than one group. For example, most of the countries that belong to
SIDS, LDC and LMDC are also part of the G-77.
In addition, there are several other groups, such as OPEC
(Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries), CACAM (Central Asia,
Caucasus and Moldova), BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China),
and COMIFAC (Central African Forestry Commission), which speak with
common voices at climate negotiation sessions.
Source: UNFCCC (2014b).

Finally, the COP sessions acquire an extra political dimension through the
participation of ministers or high-level officials from the Parties in the
concluding phase of the negotiations. The influence of ministers on the final
outcome differs from case to case. Sometimes, ministers or high-level
officials create a breakthrough in negotiations because their political power
goes beyond the mandate of the official negotiators. The speech delivered by
US Vice-President Al Gore in 1997 at COP-3 is seen as a good example of
this effect. However, the high-level segment’s contribution to reaching an
agreement is not always decisive. The outcome of the Copenhagen Climate
Conference in 2009, as discussed in Chap. 5, is a clear example of how the
high-level segment can lead to a negotiation process which mainly focuses on
a relatively small number of ‘key’ countries (e.g., the countries with the
highest greenhouse gas emissions) and ‘excludes’ others. Several ‘excluded’
negotiators, who had worked for almost four years on a negotiation text, only
heard about an agreement through the Internet or via the press conference of
US President Barack Obama. Eventually, some of them refused to adopt the
Copenhagen Accords.

2.4 The Scope for Tactics During Climate

Negotiations
Earlier in this chapter it has been discussed how climate negotiations need to
consider (game-theoretical) aspects of building an international climate
coalition and that this requires a sufficiently flexible negotiation process to
handle the different country (group) perspectives well. As illustrated by
Fig. 1.1 in Chap. 1, at several points during negotiations, tactics are required
to change the course of negotiations in the direction of more countries on
board of the coalition, agreeing on measures for a achieving a climate goal.
This section first elaborates on possible (domestic) drivers for Parties’
positions and negotiation tactics, which is followed by an identification of
tactical and facilitating factors which can, each in their own way, determine
the course of negotiations and whether, when and how negotiation
breakthroughs can be achieved.

2.4.1 Reflection of National Interests in Countries’

Positions
In Sect. 2.2 it has been concluded that countries have an incentive to join a
climate policy regime if their share in the regime’s surplus is sufficiently
large to outweigh the costs of participation. The term ‘share’ is rather
abstract though and it generally consists of the benefits that accrue to
countries when joining a climate regime. However, what is actually
perceived as a benefit typically depends on the country concerned. Some
countries may take into consideration all benefits to the national economy,
whereas other countries only look at the benefits that accrue to powerful
interest groups. Yet, other countries may take a more altruistic approach and
consider a slowdown of global warming, the protection of ecosystems and
the prevention of damage to vulnerable countries important benefits. Similar
definition issues arise when assessing costs of joining a global climate
regime, e.g., should costs be defined on a national level or only for key
interest groups and assessed with a view to the short term or also the medium
to longer term.
The process of determining what share a country would need from the
surplus of a climate policy coalition before being willing to join is an
important determinant of a country’s negotiation position. A number of
theories have tried to formalise how a domestic interplay between a
government and interest groups, a country’s perception of international norms
and values, and domestic institutional structures add up to the negotiation
position of the country (Cass 2002; Heck et al. 2004).
For instance, when determining their desired share in a coalition’s
surplus, countries could consider the absolute gains of joining an
international treaty or the relative gains vis-à-vis other countries. In the first
viewpoint, often referred to as ‘neo-liberalism’, a country does not
necessarily look at how other countries gain or lose, as long as it gains itself.
According to the second viewpoint, ‘neo-realism’, a focus on relative gains
is justified by countries’ traditional focus on the division of power between
states and it identifies security, safety and prosperity as key elements for the
positions that countries take at international negotiations. The most important
objective of a country is to maintain its relative power vis-à-vis other
countries and cooperation is generally based on defensive arguments, i.e. a
country is willing to join an international policy regime if it feels that their
security, safety and prosperity (or one or more of these factors) are
threatened and that the coalition can improve this situation. The key actors in
the neo-realism tradition are states and only little attention is paid to the
behaviour and interests of individuals and private groups within countries
(Cass 2002; Heck et al. 2004).
Other theoretical approaches, such as ‘social constructivism’, focus on
how a country’s national negotiation position is influenced by opinions,
expectations, and perceptions in their domestic social context. An important
element that constructivist theories add to the theories mentioned above is an
explanation of how the behaviour of states may be influenced by ideational
interests, next to material goals such as economic prosperity, safety and
security. This leads to a fundamental difference with neo-realist and neo-
liberal theories (Heck et al. 2004): whereas neo-realists and neo-liberals
consider state behaviour as egocentric in the sense that states take
international positions to protect their own well-being, social-constructivists
believe that also ‘soft’ elements such as political culture, history, perceptions
regarding identity, norms, well-being of other states and population groups
play an important role in the formulation of national and international
policies by countries. The precautionary principle, included in the
UNFCCC, is an example of such a position, as it calls upon countries to take
action in the short term in order to prevent environmental damage, rather than
to wait until the damage occurs and to take costlier measures then (UNFCCC
1992, pp. 9–10, Art. 3.3). Therefore, as also explained in Chap. 1, the
precautionary principle is both aimed at preventing damage from climatic
changes and saving costs of adapting to such changes, even when the
projections of future climate damage are surrounded by uncertainties.
In the view of social constructivists, collective mental constructions such
as ideologies, countries’ perceptions with respect to cooperative and non-
cooperative international players, and countries’ self-esteem are also
important elements to take into consideration when explaining the positions
taken by countries in international cooperation contexts, next to economic
well-being, safety and security. In this respect, also the experience of a
country’s private and public actors with policy concepts can become a factor
in formulating a country’s negotiation position. For example, before
greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes were introduced in climate
negotiations in the 1990s (e.g., the JI concept), there had already been a
decade’s long tradition of emissions trading schemes in the USA whereby
polluters faced emission quota (maximum amounts of allowable pollution)
with the possibility to trade quota surpluses and deficits among other
polluters. At negotiation sessions on the Kyoto Protocol during 1995–1997,
US negotiators repetitively argued in favour of international emissions
trading as a policy tool to increase the cost-effectiveness of an international
greenhouse gas abatement policy. Several EU Member States, such as
Germany and the Netherlands, referring to their domestic experience, were in
favour of voluntary agreements with industries, which allowed polluting
companies sufficient freedom to achieve energy efficiency improvements and
greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets in their own way. Only in 2002,
the European Commission started to adopt emissions trading as a key tool to
achieve EU Kyoto Protocol targets, which eventually resulted in the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (European Commission 2016).
Next to theoretical insights on motivations for countries to take
negotiation positions (absolute vs. relative gains and whether and how a
negotiation position is based on opinion, expectations, ideals and
perceptions in the country context), other theories also offer insights on how
a negotiation position can be formed through a country’s institutional
characteristics. According to ‘material and institutional liberalism’ theories,
the central actors in society are individuals and private groups that rationally
pursue their private interests, which are subsequently reflected in the policy
making at the level of the state (Cass 2002).
An important aspect in this process is how micro-level interests
eventually culminate into a national policy. For instance, if from a macro
perspective a certain national policy position were optimal, there may still
be individual interest groups that wish to prevent the position if it would be
harmful for them. The extent to which these groups are able to do so depends
on a number of institutional issues. For example, an election system with
proportional parliamentary representation provides a larger scope for
environmental parties (e.g., the Grünnen in Germany or Groen Links in the
Netherlands), than is the case in countries with district election systems such
as in the UK and USA (Cass 2002, p. 10). The latter systems tend to provide
scope for larger ‘catch all’ parties which consider environmental protection
as one of the several items on their political agenda.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the position of
countries in international debates and negotiations can be influenced by a
range of factors, for which each country may have different weights. It is
outside the scope of this book to analyse in detail how national procedures
culminate in country positions at international climate negotiations, but for a
good understanding of how climate negotiations develop, it is useful to take
into consideration how and why domestic decision-making institutions and
procedures influence the positions of countries at international negotiations.
In conclusion, some countries may let their participation in a climate
coalition depend on a cost-benefit analysis in a narrow sense by balancing
present and future costs and socio-economic benefits using market discount
factors. Other countries may use a broader assessment by also taking into
consideration the damage from climate change that may occur to other
countries or to ecosystems in terms of loss of biodiversity (such as the
precautionary principle). Countries may base their positions on what other
countries do (including perceptions), or what they believe that other
countries expect them to do. Countries could also place the issue of climate
change in the context of other international issues and aim at ‘package deals’
and/or realise that the position taken in the climate debate may have an
impact on their benefits under other international treaties and agreements.
Finally, countries could use international negotiations as an opportunity to
emphasise their national identity or image, e.g., as a country with a long
tradition in underlining international solidarity or, on the contrary, as a
country that has the power to follow an independent course of action.

2.4.2 Tactical Factors for Climate Negotiations

In addition to the context in which negotiations take place (win-win or win-
lose) and the extent to which national, domestic interests and priorities are
reflected in negotiation positions, negotiations and their eventual outcomes
also depend on several tactics-related factors with respect to the
circumstances under which negotiations take place, the personality of the
negotiators, whether the negotiation is a stand-alone process or a step in an
on-going process, whether all negotiators have clear upfront targets, etc.
These tactical factors are briefly described below and illustrated with
anecdotes taken from past climate change negotiation sessions.

Upfront negotiation target

According to Wertheim (n.d.), “too many negotiations fail because people are
so worried about being taken advantage of that they forget their needs.” This
could make parties decide to break off or complicate negotiations, even if a
reasonable deal is about to be closed, because they are reluctant to accept
any deal due to their fear that they will be taken advantage of and lose. Such
situations could be prevented if negotiators clearly explore a priori what
would be a fair and reasonable deal and what would be minimally
acceptable (Fisher and Ury 2011).

An example of how such reluctance by a Party to accept a deal eventually

blocked an agreement, was the final stage of the negotiations at the sixth COP
held in The Hague (November 2000). After two weeks of intense
negotiations, COP-6 President Jan Pronk (Dutch Minister of the Environment,
see earlier in this chapter) presented his so-called President’s Note which
contained compromises on all the crunch issues that had remained on the
agenda. This Note brought the negotiations close to an end and when US
negotiator Frank Loy and UK Minister John Prescott proposed a final
agreement on the hottest issue (i.e. to account for carbon sequestration
investments in agricultural soils as a way to comply with Kyoto Protocol
commitments, which the USA was in favour of, thereby opposed by the EU
negotiators), which addressed the concerns of the EU on this issue, the COP
meeting was about to be closed successfully. However, at the last minute, the
EU rejected the deal in the person of its main negotiator, French Minister
Dominique Voyner, because she was not convinced about the environmental
integrity of the US-UK proposal. According to Mr. Prescott, Ms. Voyner “got
cold feet. She was exhausted and tired and could not understand the detail”
(Oakley 2001).

The extent to which people/countries are separated from issues

In the view of Fisher and Ury (2011), negotiations should be on issues and
best take place in a rational, goal-oriented frame of mind. It is therefore
critical to separate people or countries from the issues during negotiations.
Parties that exchange person/country-oriented, emotional arguments run a
considerable risk that the real issues are overlooked (Wertheim n.d.). In the
context of climate negotiations, during 1991–1997, when negotiating on a
UNFCCC text, and later the Kyoto Protocol (see Chaps. 3 and 4), but also
during 2005–2015, when negotiating on a post-2020 climate policy (see
Chap. 5), negotiations were largely focussed on distrust between developed
and developing countries with respect to willingness to effectively tackle
climate change.

Over the years, developing countries have repeatedly held developed

industrialised countries responsible for the global warming issue, given their
historic emissions of greenhouse gases, and therefore insisted that developed
countries should take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and that
developing countries should be exempted from such actions (at least, for the
time being). This discussion at some point overshadowed the fact that some
developing countries were in the process of rapid industrialisation and were
becoming major emitters themselves. Only after the Copenhagen COP
session in 2009, the strict dividing line between developed and developing
countries was partly removed and in Paris (in 2015), also developing
countries committed themselves to formulating national climate plans
(Nationally Determined Contributions or NDCs, see Chap. 5).

Mandates for negotiators given by their governments

Usually, negotiators receive mandates from their government which
determine their scope of manoeuvre during the negotiations. While these
mandates often provide a handhold to negotiators, they could also create a
considerable barrier, when they ‘forbid’ negotiators to make a move that is
required for a breakthrough in the discussion. In such cases, negotiators can
decide to move on and try to find creative solutions to bring negotiations to
an end. This often requires strong personalities and considerable experience
of the negotiators. After all, if the negotiation outcome for a country differs
largely from the mandate negotiators had been given, there may be little
chance that the national government will approve of the negotiated outcome.
At the same time, if they only focus on their own mandate and insufficiently
care about the extent to which the mandates of other negotiators are taken into
consideration, they may win the negotiations but eventually lose the treaty,
because the other countries will not ratify the outcome.
Overstepping mandates does not always have to be a problem as long as the
negotiators have valid arguments to explain ‘back home’ how this happened.
A reason for overstepping is often that the mandates are generally based on
estimates of what negotiations may look like. At negotiations, the position of
countries can change, conflicting proposals creatively combined, and new,
unexpected proposals tabled. What is important in the end is that country
negotiators are able to judge whether the proposed negotiation outcome
package is acceptable for the governments they represent.
For example, the US negotiators at Kyoto (1997) believed that the Kyoto
Protocol package with emissions trading among industrialised countries and
cooperation with developing countries through a broader application of the
concept of emissions trading (i.e. JI, the CDM and international emissions
trading among developed countries, see Chap. 3) weighed sufficiently against
the 7 % emission reduction target for the USA without corresponding
commitments for key developing countries. This package largely deviated
from the negotiation mandate given by the US Congress, e.g., Byrd-Hagel
resolution of 1997 (see Chap. 4). This resolution instructed the US
negotiators to accept nothing more than a target to stabilise emissions at 1990
levels. On the other hand, the Brazilian negotiators rightly concluded that the
establishment of the CDM was in line with the Brazilian proposal to support
sustainable development in developing countries through a clean
development fund (Matsuo 2003). Therefore, the outcome of the CDM as a
market mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol remained within the mandate of
the Brazilian negotiators.

Set up of the negotiation session

Negotiations are often more effective if they take place in smaller working
groups per topic instead of in large plenary sessions with over 190 countries
and their representatives (see also Sect. 2.3.2). The small groups consist of
issue specialists and communication can be less formal and more direct than
in a plenary. At COP sessions, negotiations largely take place in technical
working groups with specialists from country delegations. The working
groups are always established with a balanced representation from
developed and developing countries. These groups prepare negotiation texts
for presentation to and approval by the COP plenary.
However, while such a working group approach may generally be effective,
it must be avoided, as the Copenhagen climate negotiations in 2009 showed,
that some countries feel excluded from the process. This can create suspicion
that deals are hammered out by the smaller groups based on their criteria,
rather than on criteria of the wider international coalition that is aimed at. In
Copenhagen, this resulted in a refusal by some countries to adopt the
Copenhagen Accords. At next COP sessions, Presidents assured countries
that negotiations would be inclusive, which was specifically illustrated by
the set-up of most of the COP negotiations in Durban in 2011, in the form of
the traditional Indaba work sessions (see Chap. 5).

Time pressure and exhaustion

Regularly, international negotiations between countries (e.g., under the UN or
World Trade Organisation, WTO) are characterised by negotiations around
the clock during the last days of the session. In this final phase, working
groups draft decision texts on particular issues, ministers or other high-level
country delegates negotiate outstanding issues, ‘friends of the President’
groups are formed to facilitate more informal talks, etc. Lack of time to
complete negotiations could lead to unexpected outcomes where Parties
suddenly give in because they do not want to be blamed for the failure of the
negotiations. Or, instead, a lack of time could make Parties reluctant to
accept a proposed deal, even it would in principle meet the criteria for a
win-win case, simply because negotiators have insufficient time to carefully
judge the proposal. Climate negotiations have shown examples of both
effects. The negotiations in Kyoto in 1997 came under a time pressure,
because several exhausted delegates had to catch their planes, especially
delegates from developing countries who often had low-cost, fixed tickets
(Depledge 2004, p. 24), and, although not all legal texts had been discussed
in a plenary meeting, the protocol text was adopted. On the other hand, the
COP-6 talks failed in November 2000 because the EU negotiator was not
convinced that the last-minute proposal for a deal adequately covered the EU
concerns (see earlier in this chapter).

Another problem that may arise in this phase is that exhaustion of delegates
particularly affects relatively small delegations (e.g., of some developing
countries) (IISD 2013, p. 29). Negotiators from small delegations must often
follow the round the clock schedule, whereas delegates from the larger
delegations are regularly replaced by ‘fresh’ colleagues. This unbalance
could have an impact in two directions: either exhausted delegates agree on
texts that they would otherwise not have agreed on, or they refuse to agree on
draft decisions simply because they have lost view on the consequences of
the text. One option for smaller delegations is to collaborate within larger
negotiation groups, as described in Box 2.1.

Location of the negotiations

Hosting a negotiation session, such as the COP, is prestigious and the host
will do whatever it can to make the session a success so that the agreement
can be named after the city where the session was held (e.g., Berlin Mandate,
Kyoto Protocol, Buenos Aires Plan of Action, Bonn Agreement, Marrakech
Accords, Bali Plan of Action, Cancun Agreement, Durban Platform, Paris
Agreement). This could affect the negotiation position of the host country. For
example, in order to contribute to the success of COP-3 in Kyoto, the
Japanese government was willing to accept relatively strict emission
reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, in an effort to show the
right example.

Availability of documents
All official documents (i.e. reports, negotiation texts, etc. prepared by the
official secretariat of the UNFCCC) to be discussed at UN negotiation
sessions need to be made available at least six weeks before the session in
the six official UN languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish. In practice, however, this rule is difficult to comply with as
compiling official texts and translating these into the six languages is a time-
consuming process (several tens of official documents are submitted to
negotiations). Not rarely, texts become only available at the meeting itself
and only in English, which makes negotiations on these texts more difficult
for non-English speaking (or even non-native English speaking) negotiators.
This could delay negotiations as delegates at COP negotiations could refuse
to continue negotiating without the availability of a text in their own UN
language (which actually happened in the past).

Personalities of the key negotiators

Finally, for their success negotiations strongly rely on confidence in
negotiators’ intentions to come to a successful closure of the sessions. The
personality of the key negotiators plays an important role in this respect.
When US Vice-President Al Gore came to Kyoto (in December 1997) to
address COP-3, he offered more flexibility from the side of the USA during
in the remainder of the COP session. He effectively stepped over the Byrd-
Hagel resolution ‘mandate’ and allowed the US negotiators to accept
emission reduction commitments, even if key developing countries would not
accept such commitments. This facilitated negotiations during the second
week of the COP after a very disappointing first week.

Another example is the role of the chairperson of the COP-3 working group
on a Protocol text, Mr. Raul Estrada from Argentina. He cleverly merged the
US proposal to establish project-based emissions trading between
industrialised and developing countries with the Brazilian idea to establish a
Clean Development Fund (see earlier in this chapter). The latter fund would
collect penalties from industrialised countries that would not comply with the
Kyoto Protocol commitments, and use this money to invest in sustainable
development projects in developing countries (Matsuo 2003). Estrada took
the sustainable development objective of the Brazilian idea as a starting
point but proposed that industrialised countries immediately invest in such
projects for which they would receive greenhouse gas emission reduction
credits in return, instead of waiting for penalties to become available after
2012. Estrada thus kept the project-based emissions trading idea (which
developing countries had generally opposed) alive by ensuring that its main
objective would be sustainable development for developing countries. This
combination was acceptable for developed countries and difficult to be
rejected by developing countries as it was mainly based on an idea put
forward by a developing country, Brazil.
Finally, the role of French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Laurent
Fabius, has been praised by many delegates to the Paris COP-21 (2015) for
his style of leading the negotiations, based on a text that country negotiators
had written before the COP (with many options and conditional language).
This resulted in ownership of the text by all countries - no President’s Text as
was tried at COP-16 in Copenhagen - but Fabius kept a strong eye on the
timeline and pressed negotiators to observe the deadlines. Inclusiveness and
strictness therefore became two key characterisations of Fabius’ leadership
towards the successful adoption of the Paris Agreement.
Information availability
Section 2.2 has shown cases where a prisoners’ dilemma situation could
emerge because of a lack of communication between players or the absence
of an overarching authority to guide players to the aggregate optimum: the
outcomes may be optimal from the viewpoint of individual players (given
their options and available information), but sub-optimal from an overall,
aggregate perspective. Communication among the players via an overarching
authority, through bargaining concepts or through external sources, such as
IPCC Assessment Reports, but also newsletter, policy briefs, books,
workshops and conferences, could subsequently help achieve a better
aggregate outcome. In the context of climate change policy, such
communication would for instance enhance the common knowledge of the
players of the benefits and costs related to cooperation in a climate policy
regime, which could create opportunities to jointly carry out greenhouse gas
abatement actions that countries would not have carried out on their own.

2.5 Analysis of Climate Negotiation Dossiers in This

Book
In this chapter, three factors for successful international climate policy
negotiations have been discussed in further detail, based on a literature
review and experience from past negotiation sessions, mainly on climate
change. From literature on game theory, factors have been identified that
determine the design (i.e. size and structure) of an international coalition,
such as for climate policy making. It has been concluded that formal
negotiations on international agreements, such as under the auspices of the
UN, are characterised by the absence of an overarching authority to enforce
compliance with the agreed objectives and targets. It has been explained how
incentives for compliance should preferably come from within the agreement
in the form of political goodwill from cooperation, compensating financial
and technology transfers, and cost-effective mechanisms to reduce
compliance costs (e.g., emissions trading).
Such incentives not only enable the creation of a sufficiently large
climate policy coalition to address free riding, consider climate change as
‘tragedy of the commons’ and treat climate policy making as a public good,
but also keep the coalition stable during its operationalisation. An important
aspect of negotiations, in order to establish a stable coalition, is that an
acceptable allocation of commitments and surpluses is sought across the
participating parties and that institutional structures are adequate for
monitoring the compliance with agreed commitments.
Insights on the process of negotiations have been generated from
literature sources on ‘integrative’ versus ‘distributive’ negotiation process
contexts and it has been examined to what extent climate negotiations would
fall in either category, or in both with development from one process
category to the other as a result of repetitive negotiation rounds. The chapter
has also described what the official climate regime negotiation process looks
like, with a central role for the COP.
Finally, tactical and facilitating aspects during negotiations have been
elaborated on. It has been discussed how country tactics can be determined
by preferences of the state as a whole, preferences of domestic interest
groups and the role of domestic institutional structures in building up a
national negotiation position. It has also been discussed how the course of
negotiations (and their outcomes) can be influenced by a range of tactical
and/or facilitating factors, such as whether negotiators have clear mandates
from their governments, are influenced by (international) interest groups such
as environmental NGOs, face time pressure to complete negotiations before a
deadline, and have all necessary documents available in the right languages
and at the right moment.
In the next chapters, it is examined whether and how these facts have
been met during negotiations on the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and the Paris
Agreement (Chaps. 3–5).

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Footnotes
1 Nash formulated this aspect of game theory for the first time during the early 1950s, see among other
publications Nash (1996).

2 Games in which players can enforce contracts through outside parties/authorities are termed
cooperative games.

3 It must be noted that applying the theory of coalition building to climate change policy is complicated
by the complexity of determining marginal benefits and costs of policy action. For instance,
calculating costs and benefits from climate abatement actions is surrounded by several complexities
and uncertainties (IPCC 2001, p. 200, Working Group I). In addition, the benefits and costs differ
across countries.
4 Among these pledges was the EU target of 20 % emission reduction by 2020 as well as a number of
individual EU Member State pledges. Therefore, the number of Parties with pledges after
‘Copenhagen’ is larger than the number of states listed in under the 80 % level in Fig. 2.2.

5 It must be noted that a strict distinction between ‘integrative/cooperative’ and

‘distributive/competitive’ may not exist in practice and parties, although aiming at a long-term
cooperation and acting with an incentive to strive for a win-win outcome, could still to some extent try
to introduce some elements of competitive negotiation in the talks (Wertheim n.d.; Barrett 1999, p. 2).
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
Wytze van der Gaast, International Climate Negotiation Factors, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46798-6_3

3. The First Phase—Negotiating the UN

Climate Convention
Wytze van der Gaast1
(1) JIN Climate and Sustainability, Groningen, The Netherlands

Wytze van der Gaast

Email: wytze@jin.ngo

Abstract
The adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in 1992 was the result of a two-year negotiation process. The
UNFCCC was globally supported but only contained (not legally-binding)
objectives by developed countries to stabilise their greenhouse gas
emissions between 1990 and 2000. In terms of process, negotiators managed
to accelerate the negotiations in order to be ready by the Earth Summit of
June 1992. Important tactics for global support for the Convention were the
inclusion of the precautionary principle and the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities.

3.1 Introduction
In 1989, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World
Meteorological Organisation (WMO) started preparations for negotiations on
a framework convention on climate change. This initiative followed a series
of governmental meeting and conferences which started at the end of the
1970s (van der Gaast and Begg 2012). In 1979, the WMO had organised the
First World Climate Conference (WMO 1979). In 1985, the Villach
Conference (Villach, Austria) called for global actions on climate change. In
1988 and 1989, three important conferences on climate change were
organised in Toronto (Canada), Hamburg (Canada) and Noordwijk (the
Netherlands), which already proposed quantified targets for limiting
emissions of greenhouse gases. These discussions were supported by
growing scientific knowledge on climate change and its
possible consequences, which was particularly stimulated by the
establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in
1988, by UNEP and WMO (van der Gaast and Begg 2012).
From 1991 through mid-1992, climate negotiations took place during five
sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change (INC).1 As explained below in this chapter, a
key challenge during the negotiations was to agree on who was responsible
for historic emissions of greenhouse gases and who was most vulnerable to a
changing climate and how this could lead to a differentiation among countries
based on historical greenhouse gas emission patterns and socio-economic
welfare levels (Grubb and Patterson 1992). During the negotiations the latter
concept became known as the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities (UNFCCC 1992a, p. 2).
At the fifth session of INC (May 1992), countries agreed on a
compromise text which was opened for signature one month later at the UN
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, held in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil) as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to achieve a
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere “at a level
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system” (UNFCCC 1992a, p. 9 Art. 2). This should be achieved “within a
time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate
change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner” (UNFCCC
1992a, p. 9 Art. 2).
With the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in mind,
the UNFCCC formally distinguished between developed and developing
countries, which allowed for assigning different commitments and
responsibilities to different groups of countries, based on economic welfare
levels and historic emissions of greenhouse gases. Developed countries were
listed in Annex I of the Convention (so-called Annex I Parties) (UNFCCC
1992a, p. 32, Annex I). Annex I Parties agreed, in 1992, to return
individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of anthropogenic emissions of
CO2 and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol (see
Box 1.1 in Chap. 1 for a short explanation of the Montreal Protocol) by the
end of the 1990s. Developing countries (non-Annex I Parties) did not have
such a quantified objective under the UNFCCC.
Since 1992, in the context of the UNFCCC, a large number of policies,
measures and instruments have been developed which generally aim at
climate change mitigation and/or adaptation. This chapter describes the
process of designing the structure of the UNFCCC and discusses the main
elements of the Convention, including the steps in the negotiation processes
followed, as well as the tactical and facilitating aspects of the negotiations
during the first half of the 1990s. The chapter concludes with an analysis of
how and to what extent the three factors for successful negotiations, as
discussed in Chap. 2, have been important during the UNFCCC negotiation
process and the agreed outcome.

3.2 Countries Take Their Positions During INC

Negotiations
As explained above, international climate negotiations started by the end of
the 1980s upon the initiative of the UNEP and WMO. Eventually, the INC
negotiation process was established on 21 December 1990 through a
decision, Resolution 45/212, of the UN General Assembly (UN 1990). It
was scheduled that the INC would deliver a draft Convention text that would
be ready for signature at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, May-June 1992).
The INC held five negotiation sessions during 1991–1992 under the
chairmanship of Mr Jean Ripert (France). In order to complete INC’s work,
the discussion in the fifth and final round had to be continued in a resumed
session. All UN members were invited to the INC sessions and almost from
the outset of the negotiations, the priorities of the negotiating countries
differed widely. These differences became particularly clear when
discussing which countries could or should be held responsible for past
greenhouse gas emissions and how this responsibility could or should be
translated into concrete actions for these countries. Negotiation positions
were also increasingly determined within country groups rather than by
individual countries. The main groups and what positions they represented
are briefly described below (see also Box 2.1 in Chap. 2).

3.2.1 G-77&China
First, developing countries attempted to speak with a common voice in order
to express the concerns and priorities of the ‘South’. The so-called Group of
77 and China (G-77&China) officially presented the common position of the
developing countries by emphasising they are more vulnerable to the adverse
effects of possible climate change than developed countries.2 For instance,
small and low-lying island states and coastal areas in developing countries
with a high population density would need assistance in order to adapt
themselves to a projected rise of the sea level due to global warming. Such
assistance would, in their view, have to take place in the form of transfers of
technologies for mitigation and adaptation and financial resources.
At the same time, developing countries were concerned about adopting
absolute emission reduction or limitation targets, as this could hamper their
socio-economic developments. They argued that they needed sufficient scope
for an increase in their standards of living and thus should not be subjected to
emission cuts that could produce public backlash and political impasse
(PANOS 2000).
In addition, the G-77&China argued that industrialised countries, through
their large-scale combustion of fossil fuels in the past, had been mainly
responsible for the build-up of anthropogenic greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere. In the negotiations, G-77&China claimed that industrialised
countries would, given this responsibility, have to take the lead in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions through adoption of quantitative emission
reduction or limitation targets to be achieved within a particular timeframe.
Throughout INC negotiations, this position formed the basis for the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities (see above).
In the course of the negotiations, however, the group of developing
countries slowly but surely became fragmented, which reflected the wide
spectrum of countries with diverse levels of development and different
priorities as far as the global warming issue is concerned (Depledge 2004).
The oil producing and exporting countries (OPEC), for example, became
increasingly reluctant to accept a climate convention with (strong) emission
reduction targets for industrialised countries as this could affect OPEC oil
exports. The small islands states, many of them directly vulnerable to sea
level rise, started to present their own position papers under the heading of
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS, later called small island
development states, SIDS) and were in favour of emission reduction targets
for industrialised countries. The targets proposed by AOSIS were often
stricter than those proposed by the G-77&China.

3.2.2 OECD Industrialised Countries

A second category of countries consisted of members of the OECD. This
group of industrialised countries did not speak with a common voice either
as they strongly differed with respect to their readiness to commit to
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. The European Community,3 for
example, at the Second World Climate Conference (Geneva, November
1990), proposed that industrialised countries stabilise their CO2 emissions at
1990 levels by the year 2000 (Bodansky 2001). This proposal, which the
European Community subsequently submitted to the INC negotiation process,
was met with huge resistance from particularly the USA, which strongly
opposed any binding quantitative target to be achieved within the short or
medium term. Other countries, such as Japan, Canada, New Zealand and
Australia were not as outspokenly restrictive as the USA, but did not support
the European Community proposal for a quantitative target, either.
The USA was a strong opponent to binding commitments in the early
1990s and even threatened to stay away from the UNCED meeting if other
countries (especially the European Community and the G-77&China) would
pursue such commitments (Shah 2012). Domestic interests played an
important role in this respect (see Chap. 2). The US economy strongly relied
(and relies) on fossil fuels and, being a large producer of oil and coal, the
USA had (has) a comparative advantage in fossil fuel-intensive products.
Moreover, the powerful fossil fuel based US business lobby was able to
affect government decisions and positions on climate change policy (Shah
2012).
Also individual European Community Member States and their business
communities expressed concerns about the impact of a global climate treaty
with binding commitments on their competitiveness. In that sense, EU
Member States did not differ from other industrialised countries in the
OECD, where a growing awareness among the population of environmental
issues went together with economic concerns (Shah 2012), especially if a
global treaty would not involve commitments for developing countries.

3.2.3 Central and Eastern Europe

The former socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe formed a third
category of countries. These countries had just started a process of transition
from a centrally-planned to a market-based economy, but were, given their
industrial tradition, considered industrialised countries within the INC
context. For them, the discussions on targets were not as sensitive as for most
of their OECD colleagues because the disintegration of the centrally led
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe had resulted in a sharp reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions since 1989/1990. Therefore, a greenhouse gas
stabilisation target at, say, 1990 levels would probably hardly affect their
economic transition process, because during the 1990s the actual emission
levels in Central and Eastern Europe were generally well below 1990 levels
(European Environment Agency, n.d.). As a result, the Central and Eastern
European countries, though active at INC sessions, did not have a crucial and
decisive influence on the negotiations.

3.3 Towards Agreement on the UNFCCC

The above-mentioned differences in points of view between countries or
groups of countries still had to crystallise when the first INC session (INC-1)
was held in Chantilly (USA) in February 1991 (INC 1991a). Negotiations
were slow and often characterised by an extensive discussion on procedural
matters.4 The third INC session, held in Nairobi (Kenya, September 1991) to
a certain extent managed to deal with the contents of the future Convention,
although progress remained slow (INC 1991c). The main negotiation topic
was the extent to which industrialised countries would agree on an emission
reduction target5 and a timetable for this to be achieved. As discussed in
Chap. 1, the INC negotiations therefore formed a clear example of a process
without an upfront greenhouse gas emission reduction goal, but where the
target was subject of negotiations itself. Another crunch issue was the extent
to which industrialised countries would be willing to transfer adequate and
additional funding to developing countries under the Climate Convention.
The latter issue was crucial for developing countries’ support for the
Convention to be established (see also above).
The fragmentation of the G-77&China became apparent at INC-4
(Geneva, December 1991) (INC 1991d). For the first time at INC, a
distinction could be made between the positions of the OPEC, AOSIS and
‘middle position countries’ like India and China.
The little progress made at INC-1 through INC-4 required the delegates
to meet twice, instead of once more before UNCED. INC-5 was therefore
held in two sessions (both held in New York, USA, one in February and the
other in May 1992) which were both characterised by tough negotiations on
binding targets and timetables, and on technology and financial transfers
(INC 1992). One group of industrialised countries (led by the USA) totally
opposed binding targets and timetables, whereas the European Community,
for example, remained in favour of a target to stabilise industrialised
countries’ greenhouse gas emissions by a certain point in time in the future at
the level of a chosen base year.
At the resumed fifth session of INC (New York, May 1992) (INC 1992),
countries found a compromise on a text for the Convention. This text
reflected the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities because
it contained an objective for industrialised countries to return their
greenhouse gas levels to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (or another base year
for countries with economies in transition), whereas for developing countries
no such objective was included (UNFCCC 1992a, p. 12, Art. 4.2(a)).
The status of this ‘objective’ was rather ambiguous though, because it
was not formulated as a legally binding target and the text did not refer to an
instrument to deal with non-compliance. The objective was rather a formal
recognition that a stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions would contribute
to achieving the overarching objective of stabilising greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at safe levels. The INC negotiations had
made clear that a non-legally binding stabilisation objective was, for the time
being, the most feasible quantitative target for the UNFCCC. This
compromise, including an agreement on the issue of financial transfers to
developing countries, was submitted by the INC to UNCED as a text for the
UNFCCC (INC 1992).
The UNFCCC was opened for signature on 4 June 1992 at UNCED, and
it entered into force on 21 March 1994, 90 days after deposit of the 50th
instrument of ratification (Portugal, 21 December 1993) (UNFCCC 1992b).
3.4 Discussion: Assessment of UNFCCC
Negotiations Against Design, Process and Tactical
Factors
As concluded earlier in this book, the negotiations leading to the UNFCCC
needed to balance the aim of creating an environmentally effective treaty on
the one hand, and acquiring as much support from countries as reasonably
possible on the other hand, given the global nature of the climate change
issue. However, as explained in Chap. 2, a global climate treaty faces
compliance problems since there is no overarching authority to enforce
compliance with internationally agreed goals or commitments. Therefore, the
challenge of negotiations is to establish an international climate coalition
which creates sufficient surpluses, in order to make it more attractive for
countries to become/remain part of the coalition than to stay outside/to leave
it. Consequently, a global climate treaty must balance between strictness and
international country participation.
This section discusses how this balancing took place during negotiations
leading to the UNFCCC of 1992 and its entry-into-force in 1994. For that, it
is first analysed to what extent the UNFCCC—with 197 ratifying Parties, but
without legally binding commitments—can be considered reasonably
effective with a view to contributing to its own goal of stabilising greenhouse
gas emissions in the atmosphere. It must be noted though that an analysis on
the effectiveness of the UNFCCC must be interpreted with care because the
UNFCCC was the first global climate change policy treaty of its kind under
the auspices of the UN when scientific evidence of the relation between
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and global warming was still
limited. By the time of adopting the UNFCCC in 1992, the IPCC had just
completed its First Assessment Report (Houghton et al. 1990). Only in 1995,
in its Second Assessment Report, IPCC for the first time stated that “there is
a discernible human influence on the climate systems” (IPCC 1995). This
conclusion offered policy makers a more specific input on human-induced
climate change during climate regime negotiations in the second half of the
1990s.

3.4.1 Negotiation Factor 1: Design of the UNFCCC

In the particular case of the UNFCCC it is obvious that the objective of
global participation was achieved as the Convention was adopted at INC by
consensus and has been ratified since then by 197 Parties (196 countries and
the EU) (UNFCCC 1992b). To what extent the UNFCCC has established an
effective climate regime, in terms of reducing or limiting greenhouse gas
emissions on a global scale, is explored below.
The UNFCCC contains a long-term objective to stabilise greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would “prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992a, p. 9,
Art. 2). This objective, however, was not further defined in terms of the
concentration of CO2 or greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. At best it
placed an important question on scientific and political agendas: beyond
which atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration levels will “dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” take place? The
UNFCCC also included a short-term objective for industrialised countries to
stabilise their emissions by the year 2000 on 1990 levels. However, the
Convention did not establish a link between these two objectives in terms of
the extent to which the short-term stabilisation of emissions would contribute
to achieving the long-term atmospheric concentration stabilisation. Rather, as
explained in Sect. 3.2.2, it could be concluded that the short-term
stabilisation objective for industrialised countries was the result of a
political process of finding a compromise between the desire of, among
others, the AOSIS and the European Community to have binding limitation
targets for industrialised countries with clear timetables, and the opposition
to such targets from mainly the USA.
The short-term stabilisation objective of the UNFCCC was absolute: it
was not related to the economic performance or demographic developments
within countries. It was common in the sense that it applied to all developed
(Annex I) countries in the same manner, but differentiated in the sense that
developing countries were exempted from such an objective. Next to the
quantified greenhouse gas stabilisation objective, the UNFCCC included
commitments in terms of: facilitating technological and financial transfers
from industrialised countries to developing countries, developing national
inventories of greenhouse gas emissions by sources (all countries), and
promoting scientific, educational, training and public awareness initiatives
(all countries).
 An important element in the UNFCCC was the inclusion of Joint
Implementation (JI) as a market-based instrument, to enable countries to
invest in emission reduction projects on the territory of other countries,
where such actions are cheaper. As such, the UNFCCC provided ample
scope for achieving cost-effectiveness of abatement actions. However, the
decision at COP-1 in 1995 to establish a pilot programme for JI, called
Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ), without the possibility of crediting the
emission reductions achieved under AIJ against countries’ UNFCCC
objectives, made this market-based instrument non-effective for the time
being (see Chap. 4).
As a consequence of this political game, the best achievable outcome for
the UNFCCC was a non-binding target or objective for the short term (year
2000). Therefore, meeting the UNFCCC objectives was largely based on
voluntary actions and, related to that, the economic performance of the
countries. For example, for the countries with economies in transition in
Central and Eastern Europe, meeting the UNFCCC stabilisation objective for
the year 2000 was not expected not to be a big problem as their greenhouse
gas emissions were likely to drop due to the disintegration of their centrally
planned economies. In many OECD countries, however, greenhouse gas
emission levels continued to grow during the 1990s due to their strong
economic growth (UNFCCC 2016). This made their efforts to return
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 difficult, especially without an
effective use of JI.6 Should the UNFCCC stabilisation targets have been
legally-binding commitments, it would have been rather difficult for most
OECD countries to comply with these.
In the design of the UNFCCC it was assured that the treaty would be
compatible with other treaties. For example, in its formulation of the
stabilisation objective between 1990 and 2000, the UNFCCC text explicitly
stated that the stabilisation target does not apply to greenhouse gases already
controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Thus, reductions under the Montreal
Protocol could not be counted under the UNFCCC. With respect to
compatibility of the UNFCCC with domestic policies, countries had a fairly
large scope of flexibility in making climate measures compatible with
already existing national policies. Finally, the UNFCCC explicitly stated that
countries should not use climate change measures as a disguised restriction
of international trade (UNFCCC 1992a, pp. 9–10).
 The eventual outcome of the INC negotiations on the UNFCCC was
strongly based on equity considerations. As explained earlier in this chapter,
developing countries successfully pointed at their disadvantageous position
in terms of socio-economic welfare and the fact that industrialised countries
in the past had released most of the greenhouse gases, caused by human
activities, into the atmosphere. Based on their ‘ability to pay’ and ‘larger
responsibility’, industrialised countries were expected to take the lead.
In conclusion, the agreement in 1992 on the UNFCCC without specifying
legally binding quantitative commitments for countries and without a
compliance regime towards the year 2000 had a low effectiveness in terms
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In line with the analysis in Chap. 2,
the 1992 climate agreement left considerable scope for ‘free riding’ and it
hardly created incentives for countries to carry out additional efforts to bring
greenhouse gas emissions back to 1990 levels. The benefits from such efforts
(‘share of the surplus’) were mainly goodwill (e.g., progressive action and a
green image) and to some extent establishing and/or enhancing cooperation
between countries on promoting sustainable development and energy
efficiency improvement.7 However, compliance with the UNFCCC
objectives did not guarantee a favourable treatment during future negotiation
rounds (e.g., in Kyoto in 1997), nor did over-compliance offer banking
opportunities against future commitments.
In this respect, it can be concluded that concerning the design of the
UNFCCC (the first factor discussed in Chap. 2), the final outcome of the INC
negotiations was quite far away from what would be considered an
environmentally effective agreement. Although it showed increasing
recognition among Parties that the danger of human-induced climate change is
real8 and that developed countries should take the lead in solving the
problem (‘common but differentiated responsibilities’), the absence of
binding commitments, clear timetables for further action, and emissions
trading made the UNFCCC far from effective during the 1990–2000 decade.
The negotiation power of industrialised countries such as the USA versus the
group-wise negotiation positions of developing countries and Europe created
a situation in which achieving the objective of global participation and
cooperation was only feasible if the Convention text itself was watered
down to a relatively weak treaty (in terms of Fig. 1.1 in Chap. 1, the distance
between A and D was rather large). At the same time, it could be said that
thanks to the watered down text, a global coalition was reached and a
negotiation structure established which is still in use nowadays, almost
twenty five years later. Moreover, just before a prestigious summit as
UNCED (held in 1992), countries realised that it was better to have a weak
climate treaty than no treaty at all.

3.4.2 Negotiation Factors 2 and 3: Impact of

Negotiation Process and Tactics
With respect to the second factor identified in Chap. 2 for successful climate
negotiations, the negotiation process itself, the INC demonstrated the
flexibility to accelerate negotiations shortly before the UNCED summit.
However, it also became clear that the two-year negotiation period 1991–
1992 was rather short for agreeing on an effective and ambitious climate
treaty. The adoption of, e.g., the principles of common but differentiated
responsibilities and taking precautionary actions, as well as handling of the
stabilisation objectives for industrialised countries without legally-binding
status showed that at some negotiation stages there had been decisive tactical
manoeuvres, which enabled reaching an agreement (demonstrating the third
negotiation factor identified in this book, tactics).
Below follows a summary of the assessment in this chapter of UNFCCC
negotiations against the factors design, process and tactics factors
(Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Summary of design, procedural and tactical factors of UNFCCC negotiations

Description of negotiations per Assessment of negotiations per factora

negotiation factor
 Description of negotiations per Assessment of negotiations per factora
negotiation factor
Design of Scope (+) UNFCCC aims at global collaboration
UNFCCC Global coverage, but with (non-legally binding) (−) No binding commitments for countries
objectives for developed countries (Annex I (−) Only objectives for developed countries,
Parties) only with risk of free-riding
Both mitigation and adaptation (−) No enforcement of financial and
Principles technology transfer support to developing
Common but differentiated responsibilities, to countries
highlight different positions of developed and
developing countries in negotiations
Precautionary principle
Cost-effectiveness
Goals
Stabilisation of greenhouse emissions of
developed country by the year 2000 at 1990
levels
Means
Technology and financial support from
developed to developing countries
Introduction of Joint Implementation as carbon
emissions trading instrument
Enabling Meetings (+) Sufficiently flexible process to
negotiation Five meetings of Intergovernmental accelerate negotiations towards UNCED
process Negotiating Committee (with a prolonged (−) Two-year process was rather short, so
meeting shortly before UNCED in 1992) that soon negotiations came under pressure
Strategy to agree on a deal
Process started with focus on procedures,
followed by detailed content discussions
Responsibility
INC established by UN
 Description of negotiations per Assessment of negotiations per factora
negotiation factor
Decisive IPCC First Assessment Report 1990—no (+) Agreeing on principles (precautionary
tactics and indication yet of human influence on climate actions and common but differentiated
facilitation systems, so that influence of report on responsibilities) enabled all countries to
negotiations was not very strong adopt the UNFCCC
The adoption of the principles of common but (−) Realisation that it was better to have a
differentiated responsibilities addressed weak deal than no deal, resulted in a
developing countries’ concerns that developed Convention text that could be supported
countries should take the lead on emission globally, but which did do little to reduce
reduction measures. greenhouse gas emissions in the short term
The legal status of ‘objectives’ (non-legally
binding) for developed countries’ actions to
stabilise their greenhouse gas emissions
between 1990 and 2000, was sufficiently
flexible for developed countries to agree on
this

a+ Means that an aspect positively contributed to successful negotiations and

negotiation outcome; − Means that the contribution was negative

References
Bodansky, D. (2001). The history of the global climate change regime. In U. Luterbacher & D. Sprinz
(Eds.), International relations and global climate change (pp. 23–42). Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT
Press.

Depledge, J. (2004). The organization of global negotiations: Constructing the climate change
regime. London, UK: Earthscan.

European Environment Agency (n.d.). Energy related greenhouse gas emissions. Retrieved
November 21, 2014, from http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/en01-energy-related-
greenhouse-gas-emissions/en01

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INC (1991b). A/AC.237/15. Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee.

INC (1991c). A/AC.237/12/Corr.1. Nairobi, Kenya: Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee.

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Framework Convention on Climate Change.

IPCC (1995). Second assessment report: Climate change—summary for policy makers. Geneve,
Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

PANOS (2000). Just a lot of hot air? A close look at the kyoto protocol. UK: PANOS.

Shah, A. (2012). Reactions to climate change negotiations and action. Retrieved April 16, 2014,
from http://www.globalissues.org/article/179/reactions-to-climate-change-negotiations-and-action

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Footnotes
1 INC was established on 21 December 1990 by the UN General Assembly (Resolution 45/212). It
was scheduled that INC would deliver a draft Convention text that would be ready for signature at
the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, May-
June 1992).
2 The G-77 was formed in 1964 and consisted by that time of 77 countries; nowadays, it comprises 134
members and is active throughout the UN system (UNFCCC 2014). The term G-77&China stems
from the time that China was not a member of the G-77 but usually allied with the group during
negotiations (Depledge 2004; UNFCCC 2014). Nowadays, China is also member.

3 By the time of the UNFCCC negotiations during the early 1990s, the European Community was the
officially name for the group of European countries which is currently called the European Union or
EU.

4 For example, discussions at the INC-2 (Geneva, July 1991) (INC 1991b) were extremely delayed
because the delegates could not agree on who would chair the working groups established by INC-1.
One working group was to focus on the contents of a future climate convention and the second
working group’s focus was on legal and institutional matters.

5 For example, there were discussions on whether a target would have to be set, or perhaps whether
an objective would be politically feasible. Furthermore, views differed on whether to focus on
emission reductions or emission stabilisation or emission limitation.

6 Of the OECD countries in 1992, only Germany (due to the unification of West and East Germany),
Luxembourg, and the UK (due to the reform of its electricity production in the early 1990s, which
implied a large-scale conversion from coal-firing to less carbon intensive fuels) met the UNFCCC
stabilisation target in 2000. This conclusion is based on an analysis of National Communications by
Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC (2015).

7 For instance, the Netherlands Government gave its bilateral energy cooperation programme with
countries with economies in transition (Programma Samenwerking Oost-Europa, PSO, established in
the early 1990s) a considerable climate change dimension by underlining the greenhouse gas
abatement potential of PSO energy efficiency and conservation projects. Another example can be
found in the range of bilateral sustainable development agreements that the Clinton Administration
signed with the countries in the Central Americas during 1993–1995 as part of the US Climate Action
Plan of 1993.
8 This aspect can be pointed out as a success of the UNFCCC as in the early 1990s a huge amount of
scepticism existed on whether human action could really affect the climate. Some scientists argued
that global warming could also be the consequence of natural millennium-type cycles in the change of
the climate (Shah 2012).
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
Wytze van der Gaast, International Climate Negotiation Factors, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46798-6_4

4. The Negotiation Process Leading to

the Kyoto Protocol
Wytze van der Gaast1
(1) JIN Climate and Sustainability, Groningen, The Netherlands

Wytze van der Gaast

Email: wytze@jin.ngo

Abstract
In the Kyoto Protocol developed countries committed to emission reductions
in return for considerable flexibility to achieve these, including carbon credit
trading. Negotiations took place with several small steps, thereby allowing
negotiation tactics to lead towards a final agreement. Important tactical
aspects of the negotiations were: personalities of key negotiators, growing
scientific knowledge of climate change impacts, handling the ‘Kyoto crisis’
after the US withdrawal, and linking Russia’s support to the Kyoto Protocol
with its desire to become WTO member.

4.1 Introduction
After the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or
Convention) had entered into force in 1994, the first Conference of Parties to
the Convention (COP-1) was held in Berlin, the new capital of Germany
after the German unification.1 A key task of COP-1 was to review the
adequacy of commitments for developed countries (Annex I Parties)2 as
agreed in the Convention. An important instrument for this review was the
obligation for countries to prepare national inventories (‘national
communications’) of their greenhouse gas emissions, including climate
policies and measures undertaken and their estimated effect on national
emission levels (UNFCCC 1992, p. 15, Art. 12). One month before COP-1,
at the eleventh session of INC in New York (February 1995) (INC 1995a),
fifteen developed countries (together responsible for 41 % of global
greenhouse gas emissions) had submitted their national communications.
Based on these reports the INC had made a first assessment of how these
countries had complied with the UNFCCC objectives. This included an
analysis of whether they were on a pathway to stabilise their greenhouse gas
emissions by 2000 at the levels of 1990, as they had agreed when adopting
the Convention in 1992 (see Chap. 3).
It was concluded that nine developed countries projected an increase in
their CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2000. Six countries expected that
their CO2 emissions would either stabilise or decrease by 2000 or 2005.
Based on this assessment and in light of the new scientific insights on human
influence on climate systems, which were soon to be published in the IPCC’s
Second Assessment Report (SAR) of 1995 (IPCC 1995), Parties agreed that
the stabilisation targets for developed countries as agreed under the
UNFCCC in May 1992 were inadequate for reaching the overall goal of the
Convention, i.e. to stabilise concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions in
the atmosphere at a “level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992, p. 4, Art. 2).
Parties disagreed, however, on the next step to be taken by the COP (IISD
1995a). Several developed countries, particularly Germany and the USA,
proposed that COP-1 would formulate new aims for a global climate policy
for the period after 2000, for instance via a protocol or other legal
instrument. Developing countries, however, said that negotiations on new
aims and legal instruments for the post-2000 period should not lead to a
diversion of attention away from developed countries’ promised stabilisation
of emissions by 2000. Moreover, developing countries feared that a debate
on new commitments could put pressure on them to also adopt national
emission reduction or limitation commitments. This concern was particularly
raised in reaction to the German ‘elements paper’, which was circulated at
INC-11 and which suggested formulating differentiated commitments for
some groups of developing countries.3 Consequently, while agreeing on the
inadequacy of commitments, developing countries stressed at INC-11 that
post-2000 negotiations should not focus on commitments for them (IISD
1995a).
When countries met in Berlin a month later for COP-1 (March-April
1995) (Fig. 4.1), developing countries repeated these concerns. In the course
of the two-week negotiations, countries slowly moved towards a
compromise on a mandate to establish a protocol or other legal instrument
for post-2000 commitments, based on the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities. Several Parties tabled proposals for a
protocol, which varied from proposing the ‘Toronto target’ (20 %
greenhouse gas emission reduction below 1989 levels (Arts 1998, p. 103),
derived from a climate meeting held in Toronto, Canada, in 1988, see Chap.
3) by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to New Zealand’s
proposal that, next to industrialised countries, also developing countries with
relatively high greenhouse gas emissions should adopt emission reduction
targets in the near future. Eventually, a ‘Friends of the Chair’ group with
representatives of 24 countries prepared the final text that was agreed upon
by the COP as the Berlin Mandate (IISD 1995b).4
The Berlin Mandate aimed, for developed countries, “to elaborate on
policies and measures, as well as to set quantified limitation and reduction
objectives within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for
… anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol” (UNFCCC 1995a, p. 5). As a
result, the overall goal to be achieved by the package to be negotiated under
the Berlin Mandate, became a negotiation topic itself (see discussion in
Chap. 1 around Fig. 1.1).
Furthermore, the mandate recognised that developed countries differ in
terms of economic structure and resource base, which would need to be
reflected in the eventual negotiation outcome. It was specifically mentioned
that no new commitments would be introduced for developing countries.
Finally, the mandate called upon Parties to carry out the negotiation process
“in the light of the best available scientific information and assessment on
climate change and its impact.” The Berlin Mandate negotiations took place
at sessions of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) during
1995–1997.
A breakthrough at COP-1 on the Berlin Mandate was achieved in a
number of ways (IISD 1995b). First, developed countries agreed with a
similar interpretation of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities as in 1992 under the UNFCCC, i.e. negotiations on a post-
2000 climate protocol should only focus on new commitments for developed
countries, not for developing countries. Second, developed countries made
clear that negotiations on post-2000 commitments would not come in the
place of, or delay, their promise in the UNFCCC to stabilise national
greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2000. Third, the G-77&China
temporarily ‘broke’ with the OPEC countries in the group because the latter
were of the opinion that it was premature to draft a protocol at all. In the
corridors, it was said that OPEC countries were against attempts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions as this might reduce global demand for fossil fuels,
including oil. The G-77&China, inspired by India’s input, continued
negotiations as the so-called Green Group, which was in favour of a post-
2000 climate protocol with common but differentiated responsibilities.

4.2 From ‘Berlin’ to ‘Kyoto’—Negotiations Under

the Berlin Mandate
Between August 1995 and December 1997, the AGBM met eight times to
negotiate a protocol or other legal instrument for a post-2000 climate policy.
Similar to the process leading to the UNFCCC, also the first AGBM
negotiation sessions were focused on procedures and principles before
countries5 actually began drafting a legal document. Especially the notion in
the Berlin Mandate that the negotiations were to take place in the light of best
available scientific information led to considerable confusion. Some
countries proposed to assess available information first in the AGBM context
before starting the actual negotiations, whereas others believed that the
assessment and the negotiations could, or even should, be carried out in
conjunction. Eventually, countries decided in favour of the latter option, but
when time was running out towards the deadline at COP-3 in 1997, countries
mainly focussed on negotiation dynamics and less on the (scientific)
information which could feed the negotiation process.
Despite the agreement at COP-1 not to focus on new commitments for
developing countries, this remained a pending issue throughout the AGBM
process. For example, voluntary targets or packages of policies and
measures were suggested by developed countries to be adopted by
developing countries. According to US President Clinton, when he
announced the US proposal for a protocol or other legal instrument6 in 1997,
developing countries should ‘meaningfully participate’ in international
climate policy. At AGBM-2 (Geneva, Switzerland, October–November
1995), the US delegation quoted the recently presented IPCC SAR, which
concluded that the “balance of evidence suggests a discernible human
influence on global climate” (IPCC 1995), to argue that already in the first
half of the twenty-first century, absolute greenhouse gas emission levels in
developing countries would become higher than those of developed countries
(IISD 1995c).
Developing countries felt that the US proposal and its rationale were a
direct violation of the Berlin Mandate and a clear attempt to shift the focus of
the AGBM to a discussion on emission reduction commitments for
developing countries too. The group was particularly critical on the fact that
the US delegation seemed to disregard historical, structural differences
between countries on a global scale and argued that these differences had
precisely formed the basis of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities in both the UNFCCC and the Berlin Mandate. They rejected
any claim from developed countries that new scientific information from
IPCC had changed the background for negotiations after COP-1 and argued
that there was no need to adjust the Berlin Mandate accordingly.
Fig. 4.1 COP-1 umbrella—still in use by author

In this discussion, the European Union (EU), unlike countries such as

New Zealand and Australia, did not support the USA. The EU focussed
strongly on formulating sets of policies and measures for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions to be adopted by developed and developing
countries and held on to its official position taken prior to COP-1 that
developed countries should show a considerable climate change abatement
effort first before requesting developing countries to also adopt such
commitments. Nevertheless, also the EU’s proposal contained elements in the
direction of a more active role for developing countries in a future legal
instrument. However, instead of shaping this via quantified commitments, the
EU’s text described this role in terms of policies and measures, such as
energy efficiency, production standards, and labelling. On the latter, the EU
distinguished three types of activities: mandatory policies and measures for
developed countries; voluntary action by developing countries; and certain
measures that all countries would have to carry out.
One effect of the debate on the participation of developing countries in a
Protocol was that the splitting of the G-77&China into a ‘Green group’ and
the OPEC countries, which happened at COP-1, was repaired during the
AGBM process. OPEC countries managed to include on the agenda the topic
of compensation for developing countries whose economies strongly depend
on income generated from fossil fuel production and exports. The other G-
77&China countries generally supported the OPEC countries on this.
Eventually, the G-77&China negotiators turned out to be very skilful in
avoiding detailed debates on commitments for developing countries,
especially at COP-3 when they focussed so much on the issue of emissions
trading (introduced by the USA) that, by the end of the session, no consensus
could be found anymore for negotiating meaningful participation by
developing countries.
Notwithstanding the importance of this topic, most attention during the
negotiations was paid to the issues of setting targets/commitments for
developed countries and to what extent these could be achieved flexibly in
terms of location, timing and inclusion of greenhouse gases other than CO2. In
this context, countries discussed a number of options. Some countries
proposed so-called flat rate commitments (a similar emission reduction
percentage target for all developed countries) with maximum flexibility in
terms of:
location where emission reductions can be achieved (e.g., trading of
carbon credits on emission reduction projects via Joint
Implementation, JI, or international trading of emissions quota);
timing, with proposals varying from a single compliance year to an
emissions budget or commitment period of five years; and,
number of greenhouse gases covered, whereby proposals ranged from
focussing on CO2 only to baskets of greenhouse gases expressed as
CO2-eq.
Other countries proposed differentiated targets, which would reflect
structural differences between developed countries. However, there was a
long debate on whether such differentiation should be based on a formula
with agreed, scientifically supported, criteria or simply be left to the
dynamics of negotiations. It was increasingly felt during the AGBM process
that differentiation was necessary for reaching agreement, but, as stated by
the German delegation at AGBM-6 (March 1997), scientifically derived
indicators may not necessarily reflect political reality (see later in this
chapter). Hence, in the course of time, countries began issuing proposals
with their own quantified targets which had either been scientifically
determined, or set as a matter of principle or reflecting domestic political
interests. For example, in March 1997 the EU presented its collective
greenhouse gas emission reduction target of 15 % (below 1990 levels to be
achieved in 2010), which was based on the scientifically determined
Triptych Approach (Phylipsen et al. 1998) (see also later in this chapter).
The USA, instead, announced in October 1997 that it aimed at stabilising its
greenhouse gas emissions during a period of five years (2008–2012) at 1990
levels, which reflected the Byrd-Hagel resolution in the House of
Representatives adopted in July 1997 (Byrd and Hagel 1997).
AGBM-3 had already created some openings in the negotiations on a
number of key issues in the Berlin Mandate context, such as: quantitative
targets for developed countries; differentiation of these targets among
countries based on domestic circumstances; policies and measures;
participation of developing countries; and flexibility of meeting commitments
in terms of location and time. This was followed by considerable progress at
AGBM-4, which was held during COP-2 (Geneva, Switzerland, July 1996).
Perhaps the biggest achievement of COP-2 was the announcement by the
USA that it supported a legally-binding protocol or other legal instrument.
Thus far in the AGBM process, the US delegation had submitted proposals
on the design of an instrument (cumulative targets, differentiation, multiple
gases, etc.), but had never been clear on its legal nature. Note that the US
announcement was made at the more political high-level segment of the COP
(the Ministerial Segment on 17–19 July 1996), not at the AGBM-4 meeting
itself (IISD 1996a).
The USA, however, also called upon other countries to create maximum
flexibility in a legal instrument, in order to complement legally-binding
commitments. Important elements in the US proposal for flexibility were: a
global application of the JI concept for project-based emissions trading and
the establishment of an international greenhouse gas emissions trading
scheme with participation of countries with quantitative commitments. The
latter option was also discussed at AGBM-4 in combination with a flat rate
target approach as an alternative to differentiated targets approaches.
Regarding the inclusion of policies and measures in a global climate
regime, which former AGBM sessions had basically considered in
conjunction with quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (or
QELROs), countries agreed that these should not be overly strictly applied.
In fact, countries suggested that differences in national circumstances should
be an important factor in deciding which policies and measures to
incorporate in national climate policies. There was discussion on whether
the COP should define a menu of policies and measures from which countries
could choose and whether a limited set of policies and measures should
become mandatory for developed countries. Most outspoken in this respect
was the US delegation which argued that no single set of policies and
measures exists that fits all countries.
The progress made at AGBM-4/COP-2 was reflected by the Geneva
Declaration in which the Ministers and Heads of Delegations, among other
aspects, stated that, while notifying the principles of common but
differentiated responsibilities and precautionary actions, they would “instruct
their representatives to accelerate negotiations on a legally-binding protocol
or other legal instrument to be completed by COP-3” (IISD 1996a; UNFCCC
1996b).
After AGBM-4/COP-2, AGBM-Chair Raul Estrada called upon country
delegates to submit proposals for a legal instrument text, in order to
accelerate the drafting of a negotiation text. By its fifth session, also held in
Geneva, the AGBM could consider fourteen proposals submitted by
countries, including one from the EU as a whole (IISD 1996b). Although the
proposal texts still showed a wide range of views on issues such as policies
and measures and quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives, it
could be observed that negotiations had become more streamlined now that
consensus had been reached on the nature of eventual targets as legally-
binding commitments. Now, as UNFCCC Executive Secretary Michael
Zammit Cutajar said, the time had come to decide which proposals should be
set aside or could be considered mutually exclusive, in order to single out a
limited number of options to focus on in the final year of the Berlin Mandate
process (IISD 1996b).
However, it also became clear at AGBM-5 that the issue of involvement
of developing countries had become even more sensitive than before. This
was most clearly illustrated by the protest raised by the USA when Chair
Estrada presented his draft conclusions of the session and, among others,
quoted the Berlin Mandate which specifies that no new commitments for
developing countries should be included in a legal instrument (UNFCCC
1995a, p. 5, para. 2b). The USA, but also the EU, did not understand why
emphasising this issue was needed (IISD 1996b, p. 7). Nonetheless, at
AGBM-5, the USA had somewhat changed its tone by proposing positive
incentives for developing countries to join the group of countries with
quantitative targets. Also to this proposal the G-77&China replied that
developing country participation would only be up for discussion if
developed countries showed clear progress towards meeting their
stabilisation objectives by 2000 as defined in the UNFCCC (1992, p. 6, Art.
4.2(a)).
In March 1997, when AGBM-6 met in Bonn, which had become the new
location of the UNFCCC Secretariat, the EU presented the proposal by the
EU Council of Ministers and Heads of State of a common EU emission
reduction target for three greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, CO2;
nitrous oxide, N2O; and methane, CH4) of 15 % below 1990 levels to be
achieved by 2010. The aggregate target had been differentiated across the
EU, using the above-mentioned Triptych Approach,7 with relatively strong
emission reduction targets for, e.g., Germany and the UK and permissible
emission increases for several other Member States, e.g., Greece and
Portugal. In addition, the EU kept pushing its proposal on policies and
measures which it wanted to become legally-binding under a legal instrument
to be adopted by AGBM. On this issue, the discussion showed that the EU
became increasingly isolated within the negotiations, as also the G-
77&China criticised the proposal because of its possibly negative impacts on
developing countries (both directly through their envisaged participation in
policies and measures schemes in the EU proposal and indirectly through
negative trade effects from implementing policies and measures in
industrialised countries, such as reducing imports from developing
countries). Other countries, such as the USA, Japan, and Australia, repeated
their criticism on this issue and/or proposed less strict alternatives.
Despite its specific proposal for a quantitative emission reduction or
limitation objective of 15 % for the EU block, which was generally
applauded, the EU was not able to ‘steer’ the agenda for the negotiations. On
differentiation of targets between countries, the EU had never been very
clear, but now it could not oppose the concept anymore as it now had applied
a differentiation or burden sharing formula itself. In addition, on emissions
trading, introduced in the negotiations by the USA, the EU did not present a
clear view, except that it cautioned that international trade in greenhouse gas
emission allowances between countries should not lead to postponement of
domestic climate change abatement actions in developed countries.
Particularly painful for the EU was that Chair Estrada had not copied any of
the 200 policies and measures priority options from the EU proposal in his
“Framework Compilation of Proposals from Parties for the Elements of a
Protocol or Another Legal Instrument” (UNFCCC 1997a).
At AGBM-6 it became clear that countries had generally accepted the
principle of differentiation of quantified emission limitation or reduction
objectives among countries. As explained above, the EU had applied
differentiation internally among its Member States and also the USA agreed
on including differentiation as an option in the negotiation text (up to then the
US delegation had been in favour of a flat rate target with emissions trading
as an instrument to even out cost differences between countries). Countries
only had to sort out how to apply differentiation for which basically two
options existed: either formalise differentiation using criteria and indicators
(formula-based or selective approach), or ‘simply’ leave it to negotiations
(negotiation approach). During the AGBM-6 talks, countries slowly seemed
to move towards the latter approach, mainly for practical reasons, or, as a
German delegate put it: “indicators do not necessarily reflect political
reality” (IISD 1997d, p. 7). The proposals submitted to AGBM-6 revealed
an increasing preference for a top-down approach with an aggregate target
for developed countries to be allocated among them through negotiations.
Perhaps the biggest issue at AGBM-6 was ‘flexibility’: to what extent
could developed countries with quantified emission or limitation objectives
acquire emission reduction credits from abroad through JI projects (Fig.
4.2) and emissions quota trading between countries? This debate focused
largely on the geographical scope for JI and on the extent to which developed
countries could apply this flexibility mechanism to comply with their
objectives. Several developed countries proposed JI cooperation both among
developed countries and between developed and developing countries. The
latter was opposed by the G-77&China which even proposed deleting the
text on JI from the Chair’s compilation text. Developing countries again
urged developed countries to first show demonstrable progress with reaching
their stabilisation objectives for the year 2000, as in the UNFCCC (see
Chap. 3). The G-77&China and also the EU argued that acquiring emission
reduction credits or emission allowances from abroad should not entirely nor
largely replace required domestic abatement action in developed countries.
Less than half a year before COP-3 (at AGBM-7 in Bonn, October 1997),
negotiations were somewhat overshadowed by the domestic political debate
within the USA, which had resulted in a strong support for the resolution
sponsored by Senators Byrd and Hagel by the House of Representatives and
the Senate (in July 1997, shortly before AGBM-7) (Byrd and Hagel 1997).8
The Byrd-Hagel resolution stated that “the United States should not be a
signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto
in December 1997, or thereafter, which would…mandate new commitments
to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless
the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing
Country Parties within the same compliance period”. Senator Byrd
personally contacted AGBM Chair Estrada to explain US domestic
objections to unilateral commitments by developed countries.
Although several developed countries in principle supported the US
position on ‘meaningful participation’ by developing countries (e.g., the EU
wanted developing countries to adopt some greenhouse gas abatement
policies and measures), the general view was that preparations for
commitments for rapidly growing or ‘industrialising developing countries’ in
a climate regime should not be started within the context of the Berlin
Mandate, i.e. ‘yes’ to evolution of developing country participation, but not
yet.9 Consequently, Chair Estrada literally stuck to the Berlin Mandate (‘no
new commitments for non-Annex I Parties’) (UNFCCC 1995a) and left the
US proposal on ‘evolution’ out of the draft negotiating text.
About a month before COP-3, the negotiations were approaching a
climax, particularly because key developed countries had submitted their
proposals for quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives. AGBM-
8 (Bonn, Germany, October 1997) also made clear that the real negotiations
were actually taking place outside the ‘Bonn context’, via bilateral talks
through various ‘shuttle diplomacies’. The US delegation visited EU Member
States to sort out issues before COP-3, the EU Presidency Trio (with the
present, former and incoming presidents of the EU Council of Ministers) met
with US government officials and leading senators on the issue of climate
change, and Japan, being the host of COP-3, had regular contact with the US
administration and EU leaders when submitting its proposal for a legal
instrument to AGBM (see below).
Shortly before AGBM-8, US President Clinton had announced the US
proposal for a legal instrument on climate change (IISD 1997a, p. 3). It
contained a stabilisation target for the USA at 1990 levels for six greenhouse
gases to be achieved during the five-year period 2008–2012. In addition, the
proposal called upon developing countries to participate in a meaningful
way, although it did not refer to an evolutionary process, which at ABGM-7
had turned out to be controversial. Finally, the USA proposed inclusion of JI
among developed countries and with developing countries, as well as trading
of emission allowances among developed countries.
The G-77&China criticised the US proposal as, in their view, it was in
conflict with the Berlin Mandate (based on arguments they had elaborated on
at earlier AGBM sessions, see above). Chair Estrada tried his best to find
compromises in this respect by suggesting a more general discussion at COP-
3 on the future participation of developing countries in quantitative target
regimes, but to separate such a debate from the Berlin Mandate negotiations.
He also considered including terms of reference for JI cooperation with
developing countries in the draft negotiating text, i.e. only projects leading to
a transfer of sustainable (energy) technologies to developing countries would
be eligible in JI cooperation between developed and developing countries.
Moreover, Estrada considered including a paragraph on voluntary
participation of developing countries in an emissions trading regime (IISD
1997a, p. 5).
Fig. 4.2 Greenhouse gas certificate issued by Costa Rica based on JI projects in the country

4.3 Concluding Negotiations on the Berlin Mandate

—The Kyoto Climate Conference
At COP-3 (Kyoto, Japan, December 1997), negotiations continued based on
a list of articles which had been suggested by Parties during the AGBM
process for a legal instrument or protocol10 and several text proposals for
each article. The main focus was on the proposed Article 3 of the protocol
which was about commitments for countries and which had been so heavily
discussed during the AGBM process (especially whether and how to
differentiate these commitments, and what flexibility to offer developed
countries in terms of accounting for greenhouse gas emission reduction,
location and timing).
The debate on commitments took place in the context of Estrada’s11 ‘big
bubble’ proposal (IISD 1997b, p. 7). In this proposal, the EU was to reduce
its emissions by 8 % below 1990 levels during a proposed commitment
period of 2006–2010 (note that before AGBM-6, the EU had proposed to
collectively reduce its emissions by 15 %). Estrada proposed a −5 % target
for Canada, the Russian Federation, the USA, and Ukraine, and −4.5 % for
Japan. Countries like Australia and Norway had to limit their greenhouse gas
emissions to 5 % above 1990 levels. Together, developed countries would
reduce their emissions by 5 % below 1990 emission levels. The differences
in targets in Estrada’s proposal were a reflection of different national
circumstances of the Parties (e.g., large reliance on renewables, or strong
coal sector), although no formal calculation method for differentiation, as
proposed at a number of AGBM sessions, had been used for this. The
proposed targets in the ‘big bubble’ could be achieved by reducing
emissions of three greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, and N2O).
Informal discussions persuaded the Chair to make several adjustments to
his proposal, especially with respect to flexibility, the number of gases
covered, delaying the commitment period (the period during which countries
would be held accountable for their achieved greenhouse gas emission
reductions or limitations) to 2008–2012, and voluntary commitments for
developing countries. On the last day of the COP, when negotiations
continued ‘round the clock’, the Russian Federation and Ukraine expressed
their dissatisfaction with the differentiated targets because they did not
reflect both countries’ proposals to stabilise their greenhouse gas emissions
at 1990 levels (when they were still part of the Soviet Union, and thus before
the disintegration of the communist system). Eventually, Article 3 was
adopted with quantified emission reduction or limitation commitments for
developed countries (QELRCs; note that the word objectives was replaced
by the legally stronger term commitments), which were listed in Annex B to
the Protocol (UNFCCC 1998a).
On aggregate, developed countries agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions (for six gases, listed in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol) by 5.2 %
during the period 2008–2012 (the so-called first commitment period)
compared to 1990 emission levels. These commitments were defined as
national emission budgets (so-called assigned amounts), which were
expressed as a percentage of developed countries’ emissions levels in 1990.
For example, a country with an assigned amount of 93 % must reduce its
emissions by 7 %.
Developed countries acquired further flexibility (next to the choice of
which greenhouse gases to reduce and possibility to spread compliance with
their QELRCs over five years) as they could fulfil their commitments partly
in collaboration with and on the territory of other countries, using the
instrument of emissions trading. For that, the protocol contained three
possibilities: Joint Implementation (JI) for project-based emissions trading
between developed countries, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
for project-based emissions trading with developing countries, and
International Emissions Trading between developed countries (trading
countries’ assigned amount units) (see Box 4.1).
The surprising inclusion of these three flexibility mechanisms in the
Protocol cannot be seen in isolation from the hectic negotiations during the
second week of COP-3. The US delegation had hold onto its stabilisation
target during the first week of COP-3 [returning US emissions to the levels of
1990, as ‘instructed’ by the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (Byrd and Hagel 1997)],
but was openly instructed to show more flexibility during negotiations when
US Vice-President Al Gore addressed the COP in person at the beginning of
the second week. The willingness of the USA to accept an emission
reduction commitment was accompanied by US pressure for more flexibility
in terms of emissions trading and broadening the JI concept towards
collaboration with developing countries (from which the CDM resulted). In
other words, in return for stronger commitments, the USA, and other
developed countries, obtained the right to fulfil these on the territory of other
countries, for example, where emission reduction investments could be done
at lower costs.
On meaningful participation of developing countries, however, the US
delegation did not achieve what it intended. Throughout the AGBM process,
this issue had been extremely sensitive, both in terms of voluntary quantified
targets and in terms of adopting policies and measures. The G-77&China
demonstrated a strong determination to literally stick to the text of the Berlin
Mandate and did not allow any margin for interpretation in this respect. The
group repeatedly argued that developing countries would only consider
adopting targets and/or policies and measures once developed countries had
demonstrated real progress with meeting their UNFCCC targets (of returning
their emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000).
According to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, the key negotiators of the
G-77&China group effectively defeated the original Article 10 in the draft
protocol on developing countries’ commitments: “in a clever play, India and
China led off a debate on emissions trading, ambushing the US and
JUSSCANZ12 and succeeding in delaying the pace at which trading will
come into effect. In doing so in the closing hours of the negotiations, they
signalled decisive opposition to the Article on voluntary commitments and
exhausted all proponents. As a result, the article on voluntary commitments
was dropped” (IISD 1997b, p. 15).
On Thursday, 11 December 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was adopted.

Box 4.1. Inclusion of Flexibility Mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol

When agreeing under the UNFCCC that developed countries shall “adopt
national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of
climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and
reservoirs” (UNFCCC 1992, p. 12, Art. 4.2a), it was also agreed that
“these Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with
other Parties” (UNFCCC 1992, p. 12, Art. 4.2b). This agreement formed
the basis of the concept of ‘Joint Implementation’ (JI) which created the
possibility for Parties to invest in greenhouse gas emission reduction
measures on the territory of and in cooperation with other countries. The
main rationale for JI is that greenhouse gases mix evenly within the
atmosphere so that there is no direct link between the location and the
impact of GHG emissions or emission reductions (Cubasch et al. 2013,
pp. 123–129). A JI project results in greenhouse gas emission reductions
which are transferred as carbon credits to a party that can use these for
complying with its greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments.
At COP-3, it was decided that developed countries could fulfil part of
their commitments through use of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms
(UNFCCC 1998a):
– Article 6 cooperation (Kyoto Protocol Article 6), which deals
with project-based greenhouse gas emission reduction cooperation
among developed countries. Credits generated through these JI
projects are called Emission Reduction Units.
– The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Kyoto Protocol
Article 12), which deals with project-based greenhouse gas
emission reduction cooperation between developed and
developing countries. Emission reductions achieved through CDM
 projects can be transferred to developed countries as Certified
Emission Reductions.
– International Emissions Trading (Kyoto Protocol Article 17),
which allows countries with greenhouse gas emissions below their
assigned amount under the Kyoto Protocol to sell these surpluses
to other countries whose emissions surpass their assigned amount.
The first two (project) mechanisms are based on the JI concept as
included in the UNFCCC.
By July 2016, the JI market had developed into a pipeline of 761
projects in Central and Eastern Europe, of which 604 had been registered
by the JI Supervisory Committee. The CDM pipeline contained 8475
projects, of which 7724 had been registered by the CDM Executive Board
as validated CDM projects (Fenhann 2016).

4.4 Continued Negotiations on Modalities and

Procedures for Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
The discussion of the negotiations in the Berlin Mandate context has made
clear that a relatively small group of countries played a key role in shaping
the final text of the Kyoto Protocol. China and India strictly opposed attempts
from some developed countries to incorporate commitments for developing
countries, either as voluntary policies and measures or as flexible emission
budgets. Several institutional elements of the Kyoto Protocol were taken
from the US proposals—e.g, national emission budgets (the assigned
amounts), international emissions trading based on countries’ assigned
amounts, project-based emissions trading with developing countries,
multiple gases, and a multi-year commitment period—whereas, on the other
hand, the US delegation managed to get rid of the legally-binding status of
policies and measures, as proposed by the EU. This lower profile for
policies and measures was a disappointment for the EU, which had spent
much effort on precisely this element. However, the EU softened the
disagreement between the USA and G-77&China on legally binding
commitments for developing countries by literally sticking to the text of the
Berlin Mandate. The EU strongly influenced the debate on differentiation of
commitments, a concept which it initially seemed to oppose but suddenly
applied in practice itself through the March 1997 burden sharing agreement
among the EU Member States. Finally, Japan perhaps showed more
flexibility during the negotiations because of its status as host of COP-3.
These countries continued to play their key roles also after the adoption
of the Kyoto Protocol when negotiations focussed on working out its
operational details. The analysis of the post-1997 negotiations in this section
will focus on themes and key players rather than on a chronological
description of negotiation sessions. The main reason for this approach is that,
contrary to the Berlin Mandate negotiation process, the 1998–2005
negotiations were largely characterised by (high-level) bilateral meetings
between key countries (sometimes even in the context of other multilateral
meetings such as of the World Trade Organisation, WTO). These diplomatic
meetings of country representatives between the official UNFCCC sessions
turned out to be almost as important as the discussions inside the official
negotiations room. A focus on negotiation sessions alone would thus only
cover part of the story.
COP-3 recognised that the Kyoto Protocol, despite being a much more
specific treaty than the UNFCCC, still needed further decisions on specific
modalities and procedures for its operationalisation. For instance, the
inclusion of land-use (change) and forestry in Article 3 as an option for
reducing carbon emissions enabled developed countries to achieve their
commitments partly by investing in forests and land-use change projects. The
Kyoto Protocol had not yet defined how and to what extent this should be
included, e.g., what type of forestry would be eligible (afforestation and/or
forest conservation) and how land use and land-use change should be defined
as an emission reduction option. Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol opened a
large new debate on the so-called flexibility mechanisms JI, CDM and
International Emissions Trading, which were included in the Protocol to help
developed countries comply with their commitments through collaboration
with other countries (see Box 4.1). Finally, COP-3 did not really resolve the
issue of compliance, i.e. what are the consequences for countries (e.g.,
sanctions and compensation) in case they would not meet their Kyoto
Protocol commitments? Addressing these issues was foreseen under the
Buenos Aires Plan of Action, which was adopted at COP-4 (November
1998, Buenos Aires, Argentina) (UNFCCC 1998b).
The process of developing modalities and procedures for the Kyoto
Protocol was, however, largely overshadowed by the problems that arose
when, in March 2001, US President George W. Bush decided not to support
the protocol. He considered the Protocol ‘fatally flawed’ because it did not
contain quantified commitments for rapidly industrialising developing
countries such as China, India, Mexico, Brazil and South Korea. Moreover,
the protocol would require an emission reduction effort from the USA which
could, in the view of the Bush Administration, strongly disrupt the US
economy [by 2001 US greenhouse gas emissions had grown to over 15 %
above 1990 levels, whereas the country had agreed under the Kyoto Protocol
to reduce its emissions by 7 % by 2008–2012 (US EPA 2011)].
Note, however, that the decision of the Bush Administration could not be
considered a sudden change in the US governmental position concerning a
global climate policy. Earlier in this chapter, the Byrd-Hagel resolution of
1997 has been mentioned, and between COP-3 and COP-6, the USA tried at
least five times to include the issue of ‘meaningful participation by
developing countries’ in the agenda for negotiations, without the desired
result (IISD 2000a, p. 2). In fact, the Dutch Presidency of COP-6 argued,
based on its pre-COP bilateral meetings with developing country
representatives, that adopting a decision on ‘meaningful participation’ at
COP-6 would not be realistic and thus left it out of the agenda.
The US decision to withdraw from ‘Kyoto’ posed a serious threat to the
Kyoto Protocol. For the protocol to become legally-binding at least 55 % of
developed countries’ greenhouse gas emissions (in the year 1990) should be
covered by ratifications. Early 2001, the EU had already expressed its
readiness to ratify the protocol, but for reaching the 55 % threshold also
ratification by the Russian Federation (17.4 %), Japan (8.5 %), Canada
(3.3 %), and Australia (2.1 %) had become crucial (see Table 4.1). The US
decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol suddenly increased the
negotiation power of these four countries in the remainder of the process.

Table 4.1 Percentage of developed countries emissions in 1990—Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocola

USA 36.1
EU 24.2
Russian Federation 17.4
Japan 8.5
Canada 3.3
Poland 3.0
Australia 2.1
Czech Republic 1.2
Romania 1.2
Bulgaria 0.6
Hungary 0.5
Slovakia 0.4
Estonia 0.3
Norway 0.3
Switzerland 0.3
Latvia 0.2
New Zealand 0.2
Other developed countries 2.2
Total emissions developed countries in 1990 100 %

aThis list does not include Ukraine which, by 1997, had not yet submitted its
national communication on 1990 emissions. Therefore, its emissions are not
included in the Table annexed to Article 25 of the Protocol. The Ukrainian
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol therefore had no effect on the entry-into-
force of the Protocol (UNFCCC 1998a, p. 18, Art. 25)

The role of the G-77&China became less important as their emissions

did not count for reaching the 55 % threshold, whereas they strongly
supported the Kyoto Protocol and showed willingness to accept special
wishes of some industrialised countries which could even reduce the
environmental integrity of the protocol (see below). Consequently, the
negotiations during 2001–2005 did not focus so much on how to include
developing countries in a climate policy regime (as had been the case during
1995–1997), but on how to persuade key developed countries to continue
their support to the Kyoto Protocol. In this process, the EU eventually played
a key, if not decisive, role.

4.4.1 EU: Shift in Negotiation Strategy

Although the Kyoto Protocol deviated on several points from the EU
proposals submitted during AGBM negotiations, the EU remained a strong
supporter of the protocol throughout the period 1997–2000. During
negotiations at COP-4 through 6, the EU delegations tried to identify a
number of issues to support the environmental integrity of the protocol. For
example, the EU was strongly in favour of defining the term
‘supplementarity’ in relation to using the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms
(which part of the commitment should countries do within their own
borders?). The protocol stated that developed countries’ use of JI, CDM and
emissions trading should be supplemental to their domestic activities
(UNFCCC 1998a, pp. 6–7, Art. 6.1(d) and 11–12, Art. 12.3(b)). However, it
was not specified which part of the commitments could be done through the
flexibility mechanisms.
In the course of 1999, the European Commission and the EU Council of
Environment Ministers developed a formula which would limit the use of the
flexibility mechanisms to about 50 % of Parties’ abatement effort under the
Protocol (Zhang 2001). This ceiling approach was heavily criticised by the
so-called Umbrella Group,13 which wanted freedom for each Annex I Party
to define its own supplementarity rules. The main rationale for the EU to
propose a ceiling was that it feared that a large use of the flexibility
mechanisms would reduce developed countries’ domestic abatement efforts.
On this topic, the EU was strongly supported by the G-77&China. In
addition, the EU argued that the use of the flexibility mechanisms was
surrounded by several methodological uncertainties about calculating
emission reductions achieved through JI and CDM projects, which would
need to be addressed first.
Furthermore, the EU wanted to limit the scope for using land use, land-
use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities in support of developed
countries’ compliance efforts. Especially during the year 2000, at the
sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies in June (Bonn, Germany) and
September (Lyon, France) and at COP-6 (the Hague, the Netherlands, Fig.
4.3), the US delegation had opened the debate with a proposal to also
include improved agricultural harvesting techniques in Article 3.3 of the
protocol, which would reduce the release of carbon from soils due to
agricultural activities. The EU delegation argued, in a reaction, that a broad
interpretation of LULUCF would enable several developed countries to
largely avoid energy and industrial sector emission reductions, and doubted
whether there was already enough scientific evidence on how long the
carbon stored in trees and soils would stay there.
Throughout the period 1998–2000, the EU thus tried to counterweigh the
more flexible attitude of the Umbrella Group (especially the USA) towards
the modalities and procedures of the Kyoto Protocol. As the Earth
Negotiations Bulletin wrote in 1997, when anonymously quoting a US
delegate: “the EU had more fun in being green than in being practical” (IISD
1997b, p. 15). This difference of opinion eventually resulted in the failure to
reach agreement at COP-6 on a text on LULUCF measures (November 2000),
which forced the Dutch COP Presidency to suspend the negotiations to July
2001.
After the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol process, however, a
significant change in the EU negotiation position could be observed.
Concerns about the entry-into-force of the protocol stimulated the EU to start
an intense diplomatic campaign in March 2001, which led to a number of
bilateral meetings with Australia, Canada, Japan, the Russian Federation,
and the G-77&China delegations. An important observation from this period
is that the EU showed much more coherence than before when disagreements
among Member States regularly led to weaker EU positions at negotiation
sessions (Hyvarinen 2000). After March 2001, the EU showed a strong
unanimous determination to rescue the Kyoto Protocol. Eventually, at the
resumed session of COP-6 in Bonn (Germany, July 2001), the EU efforts
paid off as Parties reached consensus on the Bonn Agreement, which was
generally considered the rescue of the Kyoto Protocol.

Fig. 4.3 Environmental NGOs campaign to stop climate change, COP-6, The Hague (2000)
4.4.2 Bonn Agreement
Strikingly, the Bonn Agreement was much ‘less green’ than the EU proposals
for modalities and procedures before the US withdrawal. For instance, the
Bonn Agreement allowed developed countries a larger use of LULUCF
activities in complying with their protocol commitments, which was
especially beneficial for forest-rich countries as Canada, Japan and the
Russian Federation. It was unavoidable to link this additional flexibility to
Canada, Japan and the Russian Federation with the EU’s efforts to gain these
countries’ support to the Kyoto Protocol. In a closed negotiation group on
LULUCF, which met at the resumed COP-6 meeting in Bonn, the delegates of
the three countries had emphasised that LULUCF was fundamental to their
ratification of the Protocol (IISD 2001, p. 13).
An even stronger example of how the US withdrawal from the Kyoto
process affected the environmental integrity of the Protocol could be found in
the debate on compliance. At COP-6, Parties were quite close to an
agreement on a compliance regime under the Kyoto Protocol that would
legally bind non-complying countries to a compensation of the
‘environmental damage’ caused by their non-compliance, e.g., through
payments. The EU and the G-77&China, supported by the USA, were then in
favour of strong compliance measures, whereas Australia, Japan and the
Russian Federation proposed a compliance regime based on ‘environmental
integrity’ rather than based on ‘reparation of damage’ (IISD 2000b, p. 10).
In The Hague, the latter position was clearly a minority point of view, but
at the resumed COP-6 session in Bonn, six months and the inauguration of
President Bush later, this situation had changed. Now, without the support of
the USA, the EU and the G-77&China had less negotiation power to move
their strict compliance proposals forward and Australia, Japan and the
Russian Federation cleverly managed to re-open the compliance debate.
Eventually, negotiators needed a marathon session, which lasted from
Saturday morning on 21 July until the following Monday morning, to settle
the compliance issue in the Bonn Agreement. The result was that, instead of
‘reparation payments’, developed countries who surpass their assigned
amounts of greenhouse gas emissions (their emission ‘budgets’) would have
to carry out extra abatement efforts in a future, post-2012, commitment
period. This extra effort would amount to 1.3 times the excess emissions
from the country’s first commitment period assigned amount (IISD 2001, p.
8).
 This was a much weaker compliance regime than initially envisaged by
the EU and the G-77&China, as well as by most of the other countries at
COP-6. For instance, although the required extra effort during a future
commitment period was presented as an incentive for present compliance, it
could also easily be interpreted as an elegant way to postpone abatement
action. This interpretation was especially relevant when assuming that future
commitments would be negotiated in a similar way as during the Berlin
Mandate process. In other words, a country realising that it will overshoot its
Kyoto Protocol budget has an incentive to negotiate a higher future assigned
amount so that the required extra abatement effort (1.3 times the excess
emissions) can be compensated by a more flexible future target.

4.4.3 Russian Hesitation

After the Bonn Agreement and Marrakech Accords in 2001,14 the entry into
force of the Kyoto Protocol was still uncertain, even though the countries
with a potentially decisive vote, especially Japan, the Russian Federation,
Australia and Canada, had been offered considerable concessions at the
COPs in Bonn and Marrakech. After Japan’s ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol on 4 June 2002, the Russian Federation held the key to the entry into
force of the protocol. Assuming that Central and Eastern European countries
would ratify, which they had indicated and which was likely to happen as
most of these countries had become candidates for EU Membership, the
Japanese step raised the percentage of 1990 greenhouse gas emissions
covered by ratifications to over 40. For this percentage to surpass the 55 %
threshold, the 17.4 % of the Russian Federation was needed, irrespective of
whether Canada and/or Australia would ratify.15
Initially, during the 1990s, the Russian Federal Service for
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet) was
responsible for the UNFCCC negotiations as climate change was long
considered a mainly scientific or technical issue. The Kyoto Protocol
changed this picture as the introduction of both quota and project-based
emissions trading implied interesting business opportunities for the country.
With its greenhouse gas emissions capped at 1990 levels and after having
experienced a 35 % greenhouse gas emission reduction since 1990 due to the
disintegration of the communist Soviet system (Government of the Russian
Federation 2013), the country realised in 1997 that it could earn a lot of
money from selling surplus assigned amounts to other developed countries.
This new political situation made the Russian Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade a key player in the Russian debate on climate change
policy (JIN 2003, p. 2). Understandingly, the US withdrawal from the Kyoto
Protocol was a big disappointment for this Ministry as the American move
strongly reduced potential international demand for Russian surplus assigned
amount units and thus lowered projected and actual credit prices and
revenues.16 Without this big earning potential, climate change was no longer
a priority issue for the Russian government, which basically halted the
ratification process.
However, under pressure of the EU and Japan, the Russian Government
decided to analyse the impact on the Russian economy of joining the Kyoto
Protocol (Henry and McIntosh Sundstrom 2007). A key concern of the
Government was the implication of President Putin’s objective to double the
country’s GDP by 2010 compared with the year 1990. According to some
Russian experts, this could easily lead to a larger use of relatively cheap and
carbon-intensive fuels in Russian industrial processes (JIN 2003, p. 1).
Consequently, increasing Russian greenhouse gas emissions would reduce
the assigned amount surplus. Model simulations showed that a doubling of
Russia’s GDP would turn the country from carbon credit seller to buyer
(Henry and McIntosh Sundstrom 2007, p. 51; Illarionov and Pivovarova
2004).
Some Russian politicians, such as deputy prime-minister Viktor
Khristenko, considered the Kyoto Protocol an opportunity to acquire
sustainable energy technologies (JIN 2003, p. 1), but others, especially
Putin’s economic advisor Andrey Illarionov, strongly questioned the benefits
of ratifying the protocol (The Economist 2003). Within the Government, the
Ministry of Energy supported the Kyoto Protocol with a view to its potential
contribution to improving energy conservation and reliability of energy
delivery, particularly through JI emissions trading. The Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade, as explained above, lost interest in a Protocol
without the USA as a potential buyer of carbon credits, and believed that
ratification could only be supported if considered in the context of other
multilateral agreements. However, perhaps the most important step in the
ratification process would be the first one: a decision by President Putin to
officially request the Cabinet of Ministers to take a decision on the Kyoto
Protocol. Subsequently, in case of a positive decision, the documents had to
be sent to both the Duma (lower house) and the Federation Council (upper
house). Upon an endorsement by the Council, President Putin would have to
sign and forward the ratification to the UN.
Eventually, the ratification process was halted until approximately May
2004. President Putin did not give any indication on his next steps when the
Russian Federation hosted the World Conference on Climate Change
(WCCC, September 2003). On the contrary, at a WCCC press conference, he
even remarked, or joked, that climate change, and the resulting melting of
permafrost, may have net benefits for the country in terms of higher
agricultural revenues (Baker and McKenzie 2003). Also, almost at the same
time, Mr. Vladimir Popatov, the Deputy Secretary of Russia’s Security
Council, in an article in the newspaper Russian Gazette, made a comparison
with the Russian ratification of the Montreal Protocol, which, in his view,
had been naïve and had led to serious economic disadvantages for the
Russian economy (Baker and McKenzie 2003). Finally, the Russian
Government had expressed its disappointment over the €2 million in the form
of technical assistance that the European Commission had promised in case
of Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The ‘Kremlin’ repeatedly
complained that the European Commission negotiated with moral arguments
instead of tangible incentives (Baker and McKenzie 2003).
By the time of COP-9 (Milan, Italy, December 2003), the perspective of
Russian ratification had become very low, as Illarionov again explained to
the climate ‘community’ why the Kyoto Protocol would only bring illusory
benefits to his country (Walsh 2003).
The first breakthrough, however, came on 21 May 2004 when the Russian
Federation reached a bilateral agreement with the EU on future Russian
membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Given the large trade
flows between the EU and the Russian Federation, this agreement was
extremely important for the Putin Administration. During the negotiations, the
EU had softened its position regarding the artificially low energy prices in
the Russian Federation, which it had always considered an important
obstacle to a WTO agreement and membership. At the press conference on
the same day, Putin said that the positive outcome of the WTO negotiations
with the EU “could not but have helped Moscow’s positive attitude to
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol” (The Boston Globe 2004).
A second breakthrough took place on 30 September 2004 when the
Russian Cabinet decided to send the Kyoto Protocol to the Duma for final
debate and ratification. This decision followed Putin’s re-election as
President but also came after a month during which contradicting signals
were heard from the Russian Government with the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Lavrov, expressing doubts about the protocol’s benefits and
Prime Minister Mr. Fadkov being in favour of ratification. The votes of the
Duma and the Federation Council, which were dominated by the pro-Putin
United Russia Party, were acquired relatively easily so that President Putin
could send the Russian Federation’s instrument of ratification to the UN
Secretary General on 19 November 2004. Ninety days later, on 16 February
2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force.17

Fig. 4.4 Overview of key step during process of negotiating the Kyoto Protocol

4.5 Discussion: Assessment of Kyoto Protocol

Negotiations Against Design, Process and Tactical
Factors
In this chapter the process leading to the agreement on the Kyoto Protocol in
1997 at COP-3 and its entry into force in 2005 has been discussed in a
largely chronological order with specific attention to negotiation themes,
country positions and dynamics (Fig. 4.4). In this section, the negotiation
process leading towards implementation of the Kyoto Protocol will be
assessed against the three key negotiation factors as described in Chaps. 1
and 2: design of the negotiation outcome as a package to establish an
international climate coalition, process of the negotiations for facilitating
coalition building, and scope for tactical manoeuvres for reaching a final
agreement.

4.5.1 Negotiation Factor 1: Kyoto Protocol Design for

an Effective International Climate Coalition
The key elements of the Kyoto Protocol design as it entered into force on 16
February 2005 were the following. Its geographical scope was clearly
global, which has been substantiated by 192 countries which have ratified the
Kyoto Protocol. During the negotiations the largest thematic focus was on
greenhouse gas emission reduction efforts (mitigation); adaptation was
discussed by countries but was never really a crunch issue to ‘make or
break’ a negotiation step.
Among the key principles of the Kyoto Protocol is that of common but
differentiated responsibilities. This was reflected by the fact that only
developed countries adopted quantified commitments under the protocol, so
that the actual coalition of countries with quantified emission reduction or
limitation commitments had a size of 36 countries (listed in Annex B of the
protocol). The actual participation of developing countries in the protocol
has been more indirect via their possible involvement in greenhouse gas
emission reduction projects via the CDM or via, e.g., technology transfer
support programmes. Under the Berlin Mandate, some developed countries
(mainly the USA) argued that also developing countries, especially those
with rapidly growing economies, should adopt quantified emission reduction
targets (even on a voluntary basis), but developing country negotiators
managed to avoid this step at COP-3.
The main goal towards mitigating greenhouse gas emissions in the Kyoto
Protocol was that all developed countries would jointly reduce their
emissions by 5.2 % during the commitment period 2008–2012 compared to
emission levels in 1990. This common goal was built up by individual
country goals as specified in Annex B of the protocol. As explained in this
chapter, this overall target and the differentiation of country targets was not
based on scientific analysis; rather, it was the result of negotiation dynamics
during the last days at COP-3. Having a longer term target (scheduled to be
achieved ten to fifteen years after 1997), however, made it difficult for
countries to clearly assess what would be the economic costs and other
consequences of the negotiation results at ‘Kyoto’. Moreover, there could be
a risk of non-compliance by countries should it become clear over time that
compliance costs become too high. In order to reduce this risk, the Kyoto
Protocol aimed at a five-year commitment period so that compliance costs
could be spread across multiple years.
The Kyoto Protocol introduced a number of policy instruments to enable
countries to comply with the protocol goals. The key instrument for
determining quantitative commitments for developed countries was that of
annually assigned amounts of greenhouse gas emissions per country (i.e.
maximum emission levels or national emission budgets). These assigned
amounts were tradable so that countries with surplus assigned amounts could
sell these to other countries with a deficit. To their assigned amounts,
countries could add credits which had been derived from JI and CDM
projects. With these two mechanisms, it was aimed to increase the ‘surplus’
for developed countries to join the Kyoto Protocol coalition as it would
enable them to broaden their assigned amounts with relatively low-cost
mitigation options in other countries.
Next to the geographical flexibility and flexibility in terms of timing for
developed countries to fulfil their commitments, the protocol also included
flexibility in terms of commitments across multiple greenhouse gases.
Instead of considering only CO2 emissions, assigned amounts were
expressed in CO2-equivalents based on six greenhouse gases. Finally,
flexibility was introduced under the protocol, and further broadened after US
withdrawal from the protocol, through accounting of greenhouse gas emission
reductions achieved with land use, land-use change and forestry measures.
With these forms of flexibility, the Kyoto Protocol offered a wider scope
for developed countries to lower compliance costs as they could choose
where greenhouse gas reduction measures would be relatively cheap, when
taking actions would be most beneficial and which greenhouse gases would
be most efficient to focus on when reducing emissions.
The compliance regime developed under the Kyoto Protocol to enforce
developed countries to comply with their quantified commitments was rather
weak. In fact, the regime enabled countries to postpone actions until after
2012. As a result, environmental NGOs criticised the Bonn Agreement by
dubbing it a ‘Kyoto lite’ agreement (IISD 2001, p. 13). It could therefore be
argued that the Kyoto Protocol design had lost part of its environmental
integrity while trying to keep other developed countries on board (after the
withdrawal of the USA) (Dessai and Schipper 2003).
 In conclusion, the Kyoto Protocol negotiation process resulted in a design
with greenhouse gas emission reduction or limitation commitments for the
relatively small group of developed countries. As greenhouse gas emissions
of developing countries were not capped by the protocol, the growing
emissions of rapidly industrialising developing countries, such as China,
India and Mexico, remained unaddressed. As a compensation, the net
quantified abatement targets that developed countries faced (emission
reduction with inclusion of accounting of carbon sequestration through
LULUCF) were relatively low, with a rather weak compliance regime and a
large scope for using the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms for carbon credit
trading. At the same time, through the flexibility mechanisms (in particular
the CDM), the Kyoto Protocol design enabled an almost global scope for
greenhouse gas emission reduction measures.
In terms of the negotiation framework described in Chap. 1, Fig. 1.1, this
chapter has shown how initially the design of the Kyoto Protocol moved to
outcome B when it was realised that only quantitative commitments for
developed countries were feasible. The turn towards outcome C, with
increasing support by developed countries, was made by introducing
flexibility in the protocol text (JI, CDM, emissions trading, a five-year
commitment period and multiple greenhouse gases). An output close to point
D was achieved by, among others, acknowledging that CDM projects would
need to contribute to developing countries’ development priorities and
allowing developed countries to partly meet their commitments through
carbon sequestration land use, land-use change and forestry activities.
The deviation between D and ‘ideal’ situation A (in the hypothetical
situation of Fig. 1.1) in the final Kyoto Protocol package can be explained by
the weak compliance procedures and the fact that the protocol did not limit
emissions of rapidly growing developing countries.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the negotiations successfully
considered the several game theoretical aspects of country behaviour in
order to have a globally supported agreement (as explained in Chap. 2).
However, as the Kyoto Protocol was softened considerably after the US
withdrawal, its final design was unlikely to result in strong global
greenhouse gas emission reductions.
4.5.2 Negotiation Factor 2: Impact of Negotiation
Process Under the Berlin Mandate on Kyoto Protocol
Agreement
The negotiation process leading to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and its entry-
into-force in 2005 began officially in March 1995 when the first COP was
held. From then on, an intense negotiations trajectory took place with the
following key characteristics.
Parties to the UNFCCC met annually at sessions of the COP to take
political decisions at the highest political UNFCCC level. The COP process
was supported by meetings and more technical negotiations (SBSTA and SBI
sessions). In addition, for the development of the Kyoto Protocol the COP
adopted the Berlin Mandate and the ad hoc working group, AGBM, which
met twice a year or sometimes even more. During 1995–1997, the COP,
supported by SBSTA/SBI, worked on implementation of the UNFCCC,
whereas AGBM solely focussed on protocol negotiations. Therefore, these
processes were largely kept separate whereby AGBM formally reported to
the COP.
During the AGBM process, as well as before 1992, during the
negotiation process towards an UNFCCC agreement, the first meetings
mainly focused on organisational or procedural matters, which were
followed at later sessions by discussions on more fundamental issues such as
whether developing countries would have to adopt greenhouse gas emission
reduction commitments or whether and how commitments should be focussed
on mandatory policies and measures or national emission quotas or budgets.
The final stages of these processes were largely characterised by intense
negotiations where eventually agreed commitments and responsibilities were
mainly the result of negotiation dynamics under time pressure rather than
based on scientifically derived methodologies.
The negotiation processes towards the Kyoto Protocol (as well as
towards the UNFCCC) could also be characterised by taking several small
steps instead of trying to make a few large steps towards a final agreement.
With small steps countries could familiarise themselves well with positions
of other countries and related sensitivities. Although progress may not
always have been visible and satisfactory during the AGBM process, these
small steps were indispensable for making the final step in Kyoto.
 During negotiations under the AGBM process and after ‘Kyoto’,
countries hardly negotiated as individual countries. Instead, they formed
negotiation groups or coalitions to jointly formulate and express their views
and demands on what benefits they expected from a protocol and what costs
they would accept. Logically, country negotiation groups were formed by
‘like-minded’ countries which had common concerns and interests (e.g., the
Alliance of Small Island States and the Umbrella group). The groups
subsequently appointed representatives to smaller negotiation groups such as
‘Friends of the Chair’ or working groups on specific topics. At some stages
during the AGBM process, especially the G-77&China sometimes seemed to
splinter into smaller developing country groups with different interests on
particular topics. However, by the time of ‘Kyoto’, the G-77&China regained
unity and formed an important negotiation partner with strong influence on the
eventual negotiation outcome.
While the Berlin Mandate negotiation process had mainly taken place
within the AGBM and COP framework, during 1998–2005 negotiations were
increasingly characterised by (high-level) bilateral meetings between key
Parties. These diplomatic meetings of country representatives turned out to
be almost as important as the discussions inside the official climate
negotiations room, especially after the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol
by the USA.
In conclusion, the main benefit from the Kyoto Protocol negotiation
process was that it was sufficiently flexible to enable an ongoing
international debate on climate change by observing the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities so that most countries decided to
ratify the protocol. After all, the negotiation process in this chapter has
shown that generally there was no disagreement about the requirement to
combat global warming. Disagreements emerged about the pathways to be
taken and the AGBM process managed to find a mutually acceptable pathway
for developed and developing countries. On this pathway, the process
enabled making distinctions between political and technical issues, by
leaving some negotiation steps to the COP and others to the AGBM and
Subsidiary Bodies, so that political issues would not necessarily have to
block technical discussions, and the other way round.
In that respect, it can be concluded that the factor of a facilitating process
turned out to be important for the final negotiation outcome. It showed that the
negotiation process was sufficiently enabling to work flexibly from
hypothetical point A to point D in Fig. 1.1 (in Chap. 1). Moreover, when
external ‘shocks’ emerged, such as the US withdrawal from the Kyoto
Protocol, the process received ‘external’ support, such as bi- or multilateral
meetings of government leaders.

4.5.3 Negotiations Factor 3: Decisive Negotiation

Tactics and Facilitating Aspects During AGBM
Protocol Negotiations
The Kyoto Protocol design and structure and the progress during the
negotiation process were influenced by the following negotiation tactics and
facilitating aspects.
In 1995, the IPCC published its Second Assessment Report with the
important conclusion that human action could have climatic impacts. This
conclusion had a direct impact on climate policy making with the COP-1
decision that the stabilisation targets for developed countries agreed under
the UNFCCC for the year 2000 were inadequate. The IPCC report
conclusions thus formed an important input for the Berlin Mandate
negotiations.
The personalities of Chair Raul Estrada during the AGBM process and
US Vice President Al Gore were important factors for successful completion
of the AGBM and COP-3 negotiations. Estrada managed to keep all Parties
on board despite their controversies and disagreements and managed to keep
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities alive (important
for developing countries) while enabling considerable flexibility to
developed countries for fulfilling commitments (thereby utilising a broad
range of US proposals for the protocol text). Gore’s intervention halfway the
negotiations at ‘Kyoto’ was important to mobilise the US position in a
direction away from the mandate ‘provided’ by the Byrd-Hagel resolution.
However, this tactical manoeuvre overlooked that the thus agreed Kyoto
Protocol text could not be supported by the US Congress after ‘Kyoto’, so
that US ratification of the text never took place.
During the AGBM negotiation process and thereafter, at several points in
time, crucial negotiation breakthroughs were achieved so that negotiation
deadlocks could be avoided. For instance, the US agreement with the legally-
binding nature of greenhouse gas emission reduction or limitation targets (at
AGBM-4) was an important step for continuing protocol design work. It
clearly facilitated the flexibility in meeting mitigation targets as desired by
the USA (flexibility in terms of geography, timing and a ‘basket’ with
multiple greenhouse gases). At ‘Kyoto’, broadening the scope of the JI
mechanism to developing countries (through the CDM) and allowing
international quota trading between countries were important breakthroughs
as these enabled developed countries to accept quantified emission reduction
or limitation commitments.
Another main breakthrough took place at the resumed COP-6 meeting in
July 2001 when countries agreed on a wider application of land use, land-
use change and forestry as emission reduction option for meeting Kyoto
Protocol commitments and on an overall compliance procedure. These two
aspects triggered protocol support by Japan, the Russian Federation and
Australia. Finally, a key breakthrough for the entry-into-force of the protocol
was the EU agreement in May 2004 with Russian membership of the WTO,
which strongly facilitated Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2004.
During the negotiation process, several negotiation groups played
prominent and decisive tactical and facilitating roles:
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) were prominent during the
first stages of the negotiation process by tabling concrete proposals for
overall emission reduction targets with clear equity principles. These
proposals were particularly important as they were a reflection of the
concerns of states directly threatened by climatic changes.
The JUSSCANZ and later the Umbrella Group strongly argued in favour
of emission reduction commitments for both developed and developing
countries, especially those with rapidly growing economies and
increasing greenhouse gas emissions. This proposal was not agreed in
the eventual Kyoto Protocol text, but in return for ‘losing’ this point,
industrialised countries acquired more flexibility in complying with
their commitments (as explained above).
G-77&China negotiators managed to keep commitments for developing
countries, even voluntary targets, out of the Kyoto Protocol, which they
could claim as a success, but which also reduced the political support
for the protocol by some developed countries and their compliance with
protocol targets later on (see also Chap. 5).
 The Russian Federation position during protocol negotiations was
characterised by ‘threats’ to support the OPEC Parties position and thus
to refuse adoption of quantified emission reduction targets. Eventually,
the Russian Federation was kept on board of the Kyoto Protocol
coalition by agreeing that the country would stabilise its greenhouse gas
emissions at 1990 levels, which granted the country with a large surplus
of emission allowances to be traded with other countries.
The EU, finally, faced several difficulties during the AGBM
negotiations as its core proposal, mandatory policies and measures for
Parties under the protocol, was not supported and eventually
withdrawn. After the US withdrawal from the protocol in 2001,
however, it was mainly the EU that took the lead to save the protocol
through careful diplomacy.
At the stage of developing a climate regime during the Kyoto Protocol
negotiations, probably the most important aspect was to obtain a broad
international political support for a climate policy framework, either
through quantified commitments or through non-quantifiable measures, such
as reporting, awareness building, voluntary action, etc.18 Eventually, the
global climate ‘community’ was sufficiently determined to keep a global
climate policy regime alive, when looking at the sudden increase in
international diplomacy, both with involvement of industrialised and
developing countries, after the US decision to withdraw itself from the Kyoto
process and when the Russian Federation hesitated to ratify the protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol process has revealed some of the tactical
characteristics of the international relations theories explained in Chap. 2.
The behaviour of Australia, Japan, Russia and Canada during July–
November 2001 (i.e., after the US withdrawal from the protocol) can be
explained from a neo-realist perspective (Dessai and Schipper 2003), which
states that countries look at the distribution of power among the other states
and then assess what the prospects are for cooperation and making a deal.
Realising that they, as a group, actually had veto power, the four countries
did all they could to acquire the negotiation outcomes that they wanted.
Nonetheless, also elements from constructivism can be found in the sense that
the vast majority of Parties have continuously realised that individual
decision-making on climate policy would lead to less beneficial (long-term)
outcomes than multilateral cooperation would (Dessai and Schipper 2003).
 With respect to the above observations, it can be concluded that the
factor of tactics and facilitation has been of key importance during the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations in several ways: emerging scientific knowledge
creating a stronger sense of urgency, personalities with decisive value during
key negotiation stages, linking Kyoto Protocol negotiations with external
negotiation processes such as WTO (EU and Russia), and showing creativity
by introducing new concepts and weighing other Parties’ responses to that.
On the other hand, some tactical manoeuvres by key negotiators (such as by
the US delegation at Kyoto in 1997) have, with hindsight, been less
successful, as they led to short-term gains (adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at
COP-3), but postponed or refused domestic acceptance at a later stage.
The assessment of Kyoto Protocol negotiations against the design,
process and tactics factors is summarised in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Summary of design, procedural and tactical aspects of Kyoto Protocol negotiations

Description of negotiations per Assessment of negotiations per factora

negotiation factor
Design of Scope (+) Key principles of the UNFCCC were
Kyoto Global coverage, but with commitments for considered in protocol (mainly precautionary
Protocol developed countries only actions and common but differentiated
Both mitigation and adaptation responsibilities)
Principles (−) Uncertainties about developed countries’
domestic policy context and protocol
Common but differentiated responsibilities
implementation willingness remained
Precautionary principle
(−) Compliance system was weak
Cost-effectiveness
Goals
Overall greenhouse gas reduction target
(>5 % for developed countries)
Differentiated commitments for developed
countries
Means
Flexibility in terms of timing (5-year
commitment period)
Geographical flexibility (JI, CDM)
Multiple greenhouse gases for compliance
 Description of negotiations per Assessment of negotiations per factora
negotiation factor
Enabling Meetings (+) Sufficiently flexible process to enable an
negotiation Annual COP sessions ongoing debate on climate change and policies
process Meetings of AGBM (+) Distinction between political and technical
Bilateral country leader meetings (esp. issues
2001–2005) (−) After US withdrawal, UNFCCC
Strategy negotiation process needed external support
from bilateral negotiations outside Convention
AGBM enabled small step negotiations
Process started with focus on procedures,
followed by detailed content discussions
and concluded with high-pressure
negotiations
Responsibility
COP chairs annually appointed
AGBM chair appointment was longer term
Negotiation topics negotiated in working
groups
Decisive IPCC SAR 1995—indication of possible (+) Stronger sense of urgency, role of
tactics and human impact on climate systems personalities, link with external negotiations
facilitation UNFCCC Secretariat facilitated meetings (WTO), new concepts introduced
by preparing negotiation texts in multiple (+) Inclusion of world-wide greenhouse gas
languages emissions trading instruments
AGBM-Chair Estrada and US Vice- (+) Facilitative Secretariat support
President Gore had important roles (−) US agreement of Kyoto Protocol was not
towards COP-3 agreement on Kyoto backed by US Congress support
Protocol
Inclusion of JI and CDM on global scale
facilitated agreement on Annex I Party
commitments
EU recognition of Russia’s WTO
ambitions supported Kyoto Protocol
ratification
US withdrawal from Kyoto Protocol led to
weaker compliance regime of protocol

a+ Means that an aspect positively contributed to successful negotiations and

negotiation outcome; − Means that the contribution was negative

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Footnotes
1 COP-1 was held one year after the entry-into-force of the UNFCCC, which took place in March
1994; between UNCED (1992) and COP-1 (1995) Parties continued negotiations in the context of
the INC (see also Chap. 3, in which the first five sessions of INC are discussed; after UNCED, INC
sessions continued until COP-1). The COP itself was established under the UNFCCC in Article 7 as
 the supreme body of the Convention with, among other tasks, the task to periodically examine the
obligations of the Parties (UNFCCC 1992, p. 17, Art. 7).

2 In accordance with Article 4.2(d) of UNFCCC (1992).

3 The German delegation circulated the paper in preparation for its role as Chair of COP-1 (IISD
1995a).

4 Decision 1/CP.1 (UNFCCC 1995a). The name ‘Berlin Mandate’ was suggested by the US
delegation.

5 Formally, countries negotiate as ‘Parties to the UNFCCC’ or ‘Parties’. However, since Parties, with
the exception of the EU, which is a UNFCCC Party in itself, are in fact countries, in the remainder of
this chapter, Parties are referred to as countries. For similar reason, in order to avoid too formal
terminologies, in this chapter Annex I Parties are called developed (or industrialised) countries and
non-Annex I Parties are referred to as developing countries.

6 Throughout the AGBM negotiations the legal shape of the negotiation outcome of the Berlin Mandate
was still to be decided. In their proposals, countries, in conformity with the Berlin Mandate, referred
to ‘a protocol or other legal instrument’, In the remainder of this section, the term ‘legal instrument’
will be used unless countries specifically mentioned ‘protocol’ (IISD 1995–1997).

7 The Triptych Approach was developed by the University of Utrecht (Phylipsen et al. 1998) and was
based on historical and projected emission trends in three different (categories of) sectors within the
EU: the power sector, internationally-operating energy-intensive industry, and domestically-oriented
sectors.

8 The Byrd-Hagel Resolution was sponsored by Senator Robert Byrd (Democrat, West Virginia) and
Senator Chuck Hagel (Republican, Nebraska) and expressed the sense of the Senate regarding the
conditions for the US becoming a signatory to any international agreement on greenhouse gas
emissions under the United Nations (Passed by the Senate 95-0) (105th CONGRESS 1st Session S.
RES. 98) (Byrd and Hagel 1997).
9 Of the developing countries, Brazil proposed at AGBM-7 that in the future all countries should adopt
commitments (IISD 1997c, p. 3).

10 Note that throughout the Kyoto discussions Parties generally referred to a protocol instead of a legal
instrument. ‘Protocol’ also appeared in Estrada’s negotiation text (UNFCCC 1997b).

11 AGBM Chairman Raúl Estrada Oyela also led the negotiations in the context of the Berlin Mandate
at COP-3.

12 JUSSCANZ was an acronym for a group of Parties with Japan, the USA, Switzerland, Canada,
Australia, Norway and New Zealand. At later negotiation, JUSSCANZ became part of the Umbrella
Group (see Box 2.1 in Chap. 2).

13 The Umbrella Group was the new name of the former JUSSCANZ group (see footnote 12 and Box
2.1).

14 The Marrakech Accords, agreed at COP-7 in Marrakech, Morocco, concluded the negotiations on
the Buenos Aires Plan of Action and contained agreed modalities and procedures for implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 2001).

15 Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 17 December 2002; Australia ratified on 12 December 2007
(UNFCCC 2014).

16 In 1998, prices of Kyoto credits—JI and CDM project credits and assigned amount units—were
expected to amount to approximately USD 20 per tonne CO2-eq. (Jepma et al. 1998). After the US
withdrawal from the Kyoto process, project and actual prices dropped to approximately USD 5/tonne.
According the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the annual value of Russia’s credits dropped
from at least USD 10 billion per year to between USD 100 and USD 200 million per year (Bernard et
al. 2003).
17 Eventually, 192 countries ratified the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 2014).

18 Some authors argued that the Kyoto Protocol should be looked at as a learning-by-doing experiment,
to be improved in subsequent protocols (Dessai and Schipper 2003).
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
Wytze van der Gaast, International Climate Negotiation Factors, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46798-6_5

5. Towards a Future Climate Policy—

From the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris
Agreement
Wytze van der Gaast1
(1) JIN Climate and Sustainability, Groningen, The Netherlands

Wytze van der Gaast

Email: wytze@jin.ngo

Abstract
This chapter describes the three main climate negotiation phases between
2005 and 2015 when the Paris Agreement was adopted. During 2005–2009,
negotiations aimed at extending the Kyoto Protocol structure. Between 2009
and 2012, the main focus was on restoring confidence in the UN-led climate
negotiations after the failure to reach a long-term climate agreement in
Copenhagen. The third stage of negotiations resulted in the Paris Agreement
and aimed at embedding climate actions in countries’ national socio-
economic plans.

5.1 Introduction: Aligning Climate Policies with

Development Policies
During the negotiations on the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, a critical negotiation
factor has been the division of responsibilities between developed and
developing countries. According to Depledge and Yamin (2009), the division
between industrialised and developing countries has even been the greatest
weakness within the international climate change regime. Therefore, after the
entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, the question was raised
whether greenhouse gas emission reduction measures would actually need a
global support as only relatively few countries are responsible for most of
the global emissions (Victor 2006, 2007; Prins and Rayner 2007; Haas 2008;
WRI 2005). At least, it may seem easier to negotiate within such a smaller
group of countries (see for instance the example of Montreal Protocol
negotiations in Chap. 1). As could be concluded from Chap. 3, the Kyoto
Protocol de facto created a relatively small coalition of developed countries
with quantified commitments, from which developing countries were
exempted, although this coalition could not have emerged without the
cooperation between developed and developing countries on the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). In 2009, the Major Economies Forum on
Energy and Climate was launched to facilitate a dialogue on energy and
climate change among larger developed and developing countries, thereby
potentially limiting the ‘coalition size’ to these countries.1
Nevertheless, it can be questioned whether building such smaller
coalitions would be simpler than a global approach, such as argued in
Chap. 2 and aimed at under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. First of
all, the group of countries with highest greenhouse gas emissions is very
diverse; not only are major developed countries (e.g. G-7 countries) among
them, with varying interests and profiles, but also rapidly industrialising
countries, such as China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. As is explained
later in this Chapter, negotiations on a future climate policy regime have
made clear that the latter countries have been unwilling to follow a ‘target
and timetable’ approach with national, legally-binding targets, which has
complicated their joining of a climate policy coalition with such targets.2
Second, a system with emission reduction commitments for only a particular
group of countries can lead to ‘trade leakage’, also called ‘carbon leakage’
(Schreuder 2009).3 Carbon leakage reduces the effectiveness of a
geographically limited climate policy regime as companies can move their
business to countries or regions without commitments. As a result, strong
action by a limited number of Parties without comparable action by other
countries reduces the effectiveness of an international climate policy (Gros
and Egenhofer 2010). In light of the above, the framework described in
Chap. 1 (Fig. 1.1) for realising a climate policy package with globally
supported greenhouse gas emission reduction measures can also be applied
for an analysis of ‘post-Kyoto’ climate policy negotiations in this chapter.
The differentiation between roles and responsibilities for developed and
developing countries has not become easier over time. While during
negotiations on the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol one could argue that
developed and developing countries formed two quite distinct groups
(especially with a view to historical emissions of greenhouse gases), this
point of view turned out to be increasingly difficult to maintain during
negotiations on a ‘post-Kyoto’ climate regime. Treating all developing
countries as one group did no longer do justice to the wide diversity among
them. For example, in addition to the group of small-island state developing
countries, which already operated as a negotiation group during the early
1990s (see Chap. 2, Box 2.1), negotiations have increasingly focussed on the
position of rapidly growing developing countries and whether or not these
countries would still have to be considered ‘real’ developing countries or
should join the Annex I group (as in the UNFCCC, see Chap. 3). Moreover,
countries differ in terms of their longer term economic, social and
environmental priorities.
Developments in climate negotiations, especially since the COPs in
Copenhagen (2009) and Cancún (2010) (see later in this chapter), have
shown an increasing interest in embedding climate change mitigation and
adaptation actions in national economic, social and environmental planning,
especially in developing countries, as climate change mitigation and
adaptation have become increasingly interlinked with domestic planning (van
der Gaast and Begg 2012). After the failure at COP-15 in Copenhagen to
achieve a global climate agreement with quantified emission reduction
commitments for a wider group of developed and developing countries for
the period beyond 2012, the Cancún Agreements moved the negotiations
away from a focus on national, legally-binding emission reduction
commitments towards an approach whereby developed and developing
countries could pledge (voluntary) emission reductions. Moreover,
developing countries’ mitigation actions should be ‘nationally appropriate’4
(UNFCCC 2011, pp. 7–12) based on ‘low-emission development strategies’
(UNFCCC 2011, pp. 9 and 11, para 45 and 65).
With the decisions at ‘Cancún’, climate negotiations took a turn from
legally-binding quantitative commitments to nationally appropriate climate
change mitigation actions. This trend was further reinforced by the nature of
the COP-decisions at Warsaw (2013), Lima (2014) and Paris (2015), which
called upon Parties to formulate (Intended) Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs). With NDCs, countries can formulate plans for
reaching their national development goals with low emissions and strong
climate resilience. While not guaranteeing that these actions taken together
will lead to the objective of limiting global average temperature increase to
2 °C or even 1.5 °C (above pre-industrial times levels), as agreed in the
Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015b), integrating climate policy actions in
countries’ national development planning could create additional incentives
for countries to take climate measures as these support reaching their national
development targets.
The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015b) builds further on the pledge and
review approach followed since ‘Copenhagen’ and ‘Cancún’ and therefore
on countries’ voluntary actions. The NDCs are subject to regular review
after periods of five years. With these reviews it can be checked to what
extent all plans together result in a temperature increase limitation of 1.5 or
2 °C. In case of deviations between these temperature goals and the joint
results of NDCs, negotiations will focus on increasing countries’ actions on
greenhouse gas emission reductions.
In this chapter, these recent negotiation developments leading towards the
Paris Agreement are assessed against the three negotiation factors identified
in Chaps. 1 and 2 in this book for successful negotiations: i.e. design of the
agreement for an effective global climate coalition, a facilitating negotiations
process and decisive tactics for changing the course of negotiations. For that,
the chapter describes the three main phases of negotiations between 2005,
when the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, and 2015, when Paris
Agreement was adopted:

1. Negotiations between 2005 and 2009, attempting to extend the Kyoto

Protocol structure with broadening quantified emission reduction or
limitation commitments;

2. Restoring confidence in the UN-led climate negotiations after the failure

to reach a long-term climate agreement at the COP in Copenhagen; and
3. Building on a new climate regime with a turn toward more voluntary
climate actions by countries, which became an important input for the
Paris Agreement
 Paris Agreement.

5.2 Trying to Extend the Kyoto Protocol (2005–2009)

5.2.1 Bali: The Bali Action Plan
After the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005, a legally-
binding regime was in place to govern international climate policy making
until the end of 2012. All in all, the process of negotiating the protocol during
1995–1997 under the Berlin Mandate, adopting it in Kyoto in 1997, and
having it ratified by a sufficient number of countries (i.e., 55 countries and
55 % of developed countries’ greenhouse gas emissions covered by
ratifications) had taken ten years. Negotiators therefore realised that the time
left for countries to agree on a new climate deal for the period after 2012 and
have this ratified by enough countries on time was shorter than that: seven
years only.
It is therefore that negotiations immediately started early 2005 with an
informal ‘Comfy Armchair’ session held in Bonn (Germany) with country
negotiators elaborating on possible directions for a future climate policy
regime (IISD 2005). While that meeting was set up in a relaxed mode, soon it
became clear, also at next negotiation meetings, that many developed
countries could not see a future climate regime without legally binding
commitments for rapidly growing developing countries, while these countries
themselves referred to the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities by arguing that it was, given historical emission patterns,
developed countries’ responsibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions first.
In fact, in terms of tension and ‘North-South’ divide, the story of the
Kyoto negotiations continued, but this time it was more clear what was at
stake. For example, scientific information about climate change and its
potential damage had become much more detailed and convincing, showing
how human action could affect climatic systems and what could be the risks
of that (IPCC 2007; Gore 2006). It caused more countries to point out the
need for urgent action and resulted in concrete proposals by for example the
EU, which had just started an ambitious internal emissions trading scheme
covering all Member States and over 12,000 installations (European
Parliament & European Council 2003). The increased sense of urgency
versus the debate between developed and developing countries about who
should undertake legally-binding emission reduction commitments added
much complexity to the negotiation process and required taking on board the
lessons from the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in terms of process flexibility
and applying the right tactics and skills at the right moment.
Given the tight time schedule it was important to reach a milestone at
COP-13 at Bali (December 2007) in the form of an action plan towards an
agreement on a post-Kyoto climate regime well before 2012. In the worst
case, negotiators believed, a short transition period would be needed to
cover the time between the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol and the beginning of a next commitment period.
In any case, time was short and it was soon felt that should ‘Bali’ fail,
this would be a serious setback in the process of shaping an international
climate policy regime along the lines recommended by IPCC (2007) and
increasingly hoped for by the general public. As often at COP sessions, the
final hours of the negotiations were full of drama, tension and nervous
working on texts (Müller 2008), even though the focus in the end was on
mainly one sentence in the draft decision text.
The crucial paragraph during the final hours of the negotiations was
paragraph 1.b.ii of the Draft decision text, which dealt with mitigation
actions by developing countries. In the draft text, two alternative
formulations for this paragraph were included (‘bracketed’). According to
one formulation, developing countries would undertake nationally
appropriate mitigation actions in a measurable, reportable and verifiable
manner, thereby supported by developed countries (through financial,
technological and capacity building support). The second formulation was
slightly different and seemed to imply that the financing, technology and
capacity building support by developed countries would have to be
measurable, reportable and verifiable. A slight difference in wording could
thus have strong implications.
There was a problem when the COP President presented a final draft text
in which the first formulation (measurable, reportable and verifiable
mitigation actions for developing countries) was included while the second
was not. India protested and after hectic deliberations and postponed and
interrupted plenary sessions, the second formulation was suggested by the G-
77&China instead of the first one. This was unacceptable for the US
delegation because they feared that the second formulation was too flexible
for developing countries in terms of their future mitigation actions.
Eventually, the delegation of South Africa explained that the text was a
reflection of the willingness expressed by developing countries during the
Bali meeting to voluntarily commit themselves to measurable, reportable and
verifiable mitigation actions.
Eventually, it was this explanation that made the US delegation adopt the
Decision by COP-13 on the Bali Action Plan: “… to launch a comprehensive
process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the
Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond
2012, …, by addressing inter alia: … (b) Enhanced national/international
action on mitigation of climate change, including, inter alia, consideration of:
… (ii) Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country
Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by
technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and
verifiable manner” (UNFCCC 2008, p. 3, para 1).
Perhaps equally important in this COP decision was paragraph 1.b.1,
which stated that all developed countries will consider “measurable,
reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or
actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives,
…, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, taking into
account differences in their national circumstances.” This paragraph also
covered the involvement of developed countries that were not part of the
Kyoto Protocol, such as the USA and Turkey, in a future climate policy
regime.
Interestingly, the Bali Action Plan spoke about developed and developing
countries instead of the formal Annex I Parties and non-Annex I jargon as in
earlier COP decisions. According to IISD (2007, p. 19), this could be
considered both a breakthrough and a risk. On the one hand, it created “a
prospect of moving beyond the constraints of working within only Annex I
and non-Annex I countries when defining future contributions to a future
agreement”. On the other hand, however, some developing countries
expressed concern that this new distinction might lead to a situation in which
some present Annex I Parties “would seize on this development to ‘jump
ship’ and attempt to adopt more relaxed commitments than those under the
Kyoto Protocol” (IISD 2007, p. 19). One consequence of the new distinction
between developed and developing countries might be that some present non-
Annex I Parties may in a future climate regime be considered developed
countries.
 Process-wise, the Bali COP launched a new negotiation track called the
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA),
which co-existed with the already established Ad Hoc Working Group on
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol [AWG-
KP, established at COP-11 in 2005 (UNFCCC 2006, p. 3)]. The main reason
for launching the AWG-LCA was to ensure that also countries that had not
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, in particular the USA, would still be included in
the negotiations on a future climate policy regime. AWG-LCA thus enabled a
more inclusive negotiation process on future climate policy making and it
could also open discussions for actions to be taken by developing countries
(as the AWG-KP only focussed on further commitments for developed
countries). Formally, the AWG-LCA negotiation track would have to be
concluded in 2009 at COP-15, to be held in Copenhagen, with an agreed
climate policy regime for the period after 2012.
Whether the Bali Action Plan would lead to success in Copenhagen
obviously remained to be seen, but the outcome of the ‘Bali COP’ led to a
general feeling of optimism about next negotiation steps. It seemed that the
momentum created by Al Gore’s ‘Inconvenient Truth’ (Gore 2006) and the
IPCC reports of 2007 (IPCC 2007) had been continued at the COP. The
process that was started at Bali and which needed to result in a new climate
policy regime in 2009, resembled the process that was started in 1995 at
COP-1 with the ‘Berlin Mandate’ (AGBM) and which led to the Kyoto
Protocol (see Chap. 4). In the next sections the developments with
negotiations, based on the Bali Action Plan, towards the Copenhagen Climate
Conference are described.

5.2.2 Copenhagen: No Consensus About the

Copenhagen Accord
From the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol it could be learned that a slow
progress during consecutive sessions is no reason to panic and worry about
the final outcome of the negotiations. As discussed in Chap. 3, during the
AGBM process several nice ideas were tabled, which varied from
measurable and verifiable policies and measures proposed by the EU, to
smart formula’s for calculating developed countries’ individual and
differentiated emission reduction commitments. Eventually, however, in
Kyoto, a lot turned out to be different with commitments for developed
countries and a global scope for emissions trading. Despite the hard work at
the AGBM sessions, success in Kyoto was largely due to the address by US
Vice-President Al Gore, the momentum of ‘boiling’ negotiations at COP-3
during the final hours of the meeting, and the leadership of key negotiators
such as AGBM Chairman Raul Estrada (Argentina).
After one COP (held in Poznan, Poland, 2008), seven sessions of AWG-
LCA and nine sessions of AWG-KP, Parties, reached COP-15 in Copenhagen
(December 2009) with the goal to conclude the negotiations on the Bali
Action Plan and agree on a climate regime for the period after 2012.
‘Copenhagen’ was by far the biggest COP session in the history of the
UNFCCC with over 40,000 participants registered (whereas the venue for
the session could only host 15,000 persons). It was also a COP which took
place against a different political and economic backdrop. At Bali, two years
earlier, negotiations were fed by a new assessment report by the IPCC and
increased international familiarity with and sense of urgency about the issue
of climate change. By the time of ‘Copenhagen’, however, the world was
suffering from the impacts of a strong financial crisis and the resulting
economic recession. It was generally feared that in the national planning of
many countries, rescuing the financial systems in the short run had become
more urgent than saving the climate in the longer run.
On a positive note, the election of Barack Obama in 2008 as US
President had been met with an increased hope of a stronger willingness of
the USA to agree on an ambitious climate package. Obama’s position on
climate change was more positive in terms of willingness to take action than
that of the former US President George W. Bush, under whose leadership the
US government had formally withdrawn itself from the Kyoto Protocol
(which was an important reason why negotiations between Bali and
Copenhagen took place within two separate negotiation tracks, as discussed
above). This hope had been substantiated by the proposal of the Obama
Administration to reduce the US greenhouse gas emissions by 17 % by 2020
below 2005 levels (Bianco et al. 2013).
Nevertheless, the course of the negotiations at Copenhagen were a clear
example of why choosing the right tactical manoeuvres is so important,
especially for the COP President to find a balance between being a leader
and a facilitator. Any country hosting a COP hopes to conclude it with a
declaration carrying the name of the city of the COP venue, such as Berlin
Mandate, Kyoto Protocol and Marrakech Accords. Moreover, COP host
countries are often keen on writing history by leading a negotiation process
that results in a historical agreement. This may be what the Danish
government tried to achieve when it prepared a negotiation text for the COP
and showed it to a small group of countries at a preparatory meeting for the
COP (held in November 2015). When the Danish COP presidency announced
during the opening of the COP that it intended to table its own negotiation
text(s), and when this text was leaked to the press during the first week of the
COP (Vidal 2009; IISD 2009, p. 28), many negotiators criticised this attempt
of leadership as they felt that the negotiations held during 2008–2009 had
been insufficiently reflected in the text. As a consequence, after a few days of
discussions, negotiations continued only with texts produced by the AWG-KP
and AWG-LCA. But trust turned out to be difficult to regain.
Another tactical mistake during the COP was the fact that President
Obama announced, during the final day of the session, an agreement on a
Copenhagen Accord, while many negotiators were still unaware of that.
Obama had been negotiating with a small number of other leaders in a
‘Friends of the Chair’ consultation and reached an agreement, which most
negotiators first read about on the internet (IISD 2009, p. 28). Friends of the
Chair sessions had been successful before as an enabler for more focussed
discussions, but it is important that all countries feel represented by the
‘Friends’ and this was not the case at Copenhagen. It seemed that the attempt
to ensure the participation of the USA and China in a future climate regime
strengthened the feeling of other countries that they were being neglected.
When all countries eventually were asked, at a final plenary meeting, to
adopt the Copenhagen Accord, COP President Rasmussen was confronted
with much resistance and eventually the refusal of a few developing
countries, among them Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua as most
outspoken ones, to agree on the Accord. Without consensus, the maximum that
could be achieved was that COP-15 took note of the Copenhagen Accord.
The Copenhagen Accord therefore was not legally binding and as a
consequence the several mechanisms proposed in the text (e.g., Copenhagen
Green Climate Fund and the Technology Mechanism) could not be
implemented yet and needed to wait for the formal acceptance of the accord
by the COP at a later session.
The Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009a) nevertheless invited
industrialised countries to submit individual or joint quantified economy-
wide emission targets for the year 2020. In addition, it stated that “Non-
Annex I Parties to the Convention will implement mitigation actions”
(UNFCCC 2009a, p. 6, para 5). Both developed and developing countries
were requested to submit their targets and actions to the UNFCCC
Secretariat by 31 January 2010 (UNFCCC 2009a, p. 6, para 5). This
deadline was met by 55 countries who submitted national pledges to cut and
limit their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (Climatico 2010, pp. 7–8).
These countries together accounted for over three-quarter of global
emissions from energy use. Of these countries, several presented proposals
for medium term targets. The EU made clear that it would hold on to its
pledged emission reduction of greenhouse gases by 20 % by the year 2020
(below 1990 levels).5 Another important signal came from the so-called
BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) which proposed the
following greenhouse gas emission reduction targets (JIN 2009–2010):
Brazil: 36 % emission reduction below business-as-usual by 2020;
South Africa: 34 % emission reduction below business-as-usual by 20;
India: 20 % reduction in the carbon intensity6 by 2020 compared to
2005 levels;
China: 45 % reduction in the carbon intensity by 2020 compared to
2005 levels.
The US climate position remained uncertain. Before Copenhagen,
Obama’s Energy and Climate bill had passed the House of Representatives,
but not the Senate (JIN 2009–2010). Later, due to mid-term elections in
2010, the Democratic Party lost its 60–40 majority in the Senate, which
reduced the chances of the bill being adopted.
The political process moved on, but towards the next COP in Cancún,
Mexico, a lot of faith in the process had to be regained. ‘Copenhagen’ had
made clear that negotiators wanted the process to be more participatory with
texts being developed during preparatory meetings and completed at high-
level COP sessions. From now on, COP sessions would become more
inclusive with participation of all Parties.
An overview of milestones during the post-Kyoto negotiation process
from 2005 (Montreal) through 2009 (Copenhagen) is presented in Fig. 5.1.
Fig. 5.1 Summary of post-Kyoto negotiations 2005–2009 (author’s own elaboration)

5.3 Regaining Confidence in UN-Led Climate

Negotiations (2010–2011)
5.3.1 Cancún: Pledge and Review Paradigm in
Cancún Agreement
After Copenhagen, climate negotiations entered a stage of uncertainty, as four
years of negotiations had not resulted in a second commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol and even if the Copenhagen Accord had been adopted by
COP-15, it would not have included quantified emission reduction
commitments for countries.7 Another uncertainty was about the UNFCCC as
central framework for negotiating an international climate regime. Reaching
consensus among over 190 countries had become increasingly difficult,
which was demonstrated during the final hours in Copenhagen when a few
developing countries blocked the agreement.
The year after Copenhagen was used to address this uncertainty in two
ways. One the one hand, countries seemed to accept that a worldwide policy
regime with quantified commitments for major emitting countries was not
feasible and turned their attention towards an approach which centred around
the concept of low-emission development strategies (UNFCCC 2011, p. 3,
para 6). This concept had already been discussed at COP-15, among others,
based on proposals by the EU and the Republic of Korea that developing
countries prepare plans for low-emission growth (UNFCCC 2009b) to
enable them to pursue greenhouse gas emission reduction and economic
development at the same time. It was a pragmatic way to broaden the group
of developed and developing countries that would agree on undertaking
greenhouse gas emission reduction measures, without the need to make them
adopt legally binding commitments.
The uncertainty regarding the role of the UNFCCC was mitigated by the
progress made during the negotiations in Cancún, especially with a view to
openness of the talks and the assurance of the Mexican Minister Espinosa,
who presided the COP in Cancún, that they had not prepared a ‘Mexican’
text. Negotiations in Cancún took place on the basis of prepared texts by the
AWG-LCA and AWG-KP. The process was therefore more inclusive than in
Copenhagen. A second reason why the UNFCCC remained the central body
for climate negotiations was the decision of Ms Espinosa not to allow
Bolivia to block the Cancún Agreements during the final plenary session of
the COP. Bolivia raised several concerns about the final text and argued that
therefore no consensus could be reached. Ms Espinosa replied that consensus
did not mean that one country had the right to veto an agreement that all other
countries agreed on (IISD 2010, p. 28). The Cancún Agreements were thus
adopted which re-positioned the UNFCCC as the main body to address
climate change internationally.
Prior to the negotiations in Cancún (November-December 2010),
expectations for significant progress has still been rather low and there had
been an ongoing debate on the validity, viability and importance of the
Copenhagen Accord (Taminiau 2010–2011, pp. 5–8). With the Cancún
Agreements, the main elements of the Copenhagen Accord were adopted into
the UNFCCC process (PCGCC 2010):
An outline of a phased approach to strengthen efforts by developing
countries to realise measures for Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation of land (REDD+), thereby recognising
the importance of deforestation and land degradation as a source of
greenhouse gas emissions.
The creation of a Technology Mechanism to support international
technology transfer, especially to developing countries, with a political
arm, the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), and an operational
arm, the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).
 For the first time in an adopted UNFCCC decision, the Cancún
Agreements contained a longer term target to keep global average
temperature rise below 2 °C compared to pre-industrial times levels. In
addition, the Cancún Agreements also emphasised the need to establish a
process to define a date for global greenhouse gas emissions to peak and to
establish a global emission reduction goal for 2050 (UNFCCC 2011, p. 3,
para 6). Additionally, the text contained a phrase that the above long-term
goal should be strengthened should scientific evidence show the need for
limiting the temperature rise to 1.5 °C only (UNFCCC 2011, p. 3, para 4).
Generally, the Cancún Agreements were positively received by
countries. According to U.S. Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Stern,
the result of COP-16 was “fundamentally consistent with US objectives” (US
Department of State 2010) as it enabled a broader group of counties to
pledge their climate change measures, on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless, the
Obama Administration was facing an increasingly difficult domestic
situation, as, due to elections in November 2010, the Republican Party had
gained control of the House of Representatives, which made the passage of
climate legislation virtually impossible (Carson and Román 2010).
Obviously, these domestic problems had an impact on what the US
negotiators could agree at international negotiation sessions.
As became already clear during the final hours of negotiations in
Copenhagen, the interaction between China and the USA remained crucial for
successful negotiation outcomes. At a meeting in Tianjin, earlier in 2010,
both countries had openly disagreed on the next steps for climate policy
(Watts 2010), but they managed to reach agreement at Cancún (PCGCC
2010). An important topic on which both countries had disagreed was
whether and how to monitor, report on and verify (MRV) countries’
compliance with their pledges. Several countries, including the USA,
proposed that such an MRV process should be external (carried out by other
countries), while developing countries, with China, objected to this as they
preferred domestic reviews and argued that with closer embedding of
climate measures in domestic development planning, countries had stronger
incentives to comply with their climate pledges. The situation was rescued
by a proposal by India to organise an International Consultation and Analysis
(ICA) for climate plans of all countries responsible for at least 1 % of
greenhouse gas emissions (Taminiau 2010–2011). The ICA proposal was
‘softer’ as it was not formulated as an instrument to identify non-compliance,
but as an instrument to support countries in achieving their pledged
contribution. ICA was not included in the Cancún Agreements text, but
helped overcome critical obstacles in the MRV discussion.
The main issue in the debate between US and Chinese negotiators
remained the risk of asymmetry between developed countries with
commitments and emerging economies without commitments. US negotiators
continued to underline that the USA would only be willing to adopt legally
binding commitments under a future climate policy regime if such
commitments would also apply to rapidly growing developing countries (US
Department of State 2010). During 2009–2010, China had pledged to reduce
the country’s carbon intensity by 40–45 % by 2020 below 2005 levels
(emissions per unit of gross domestic product), but, with the G-77 countries,
refused to adopt binding emission reduction commitments for developing
countries (referring to the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities) (Hallding and Jürisoo 2010).
Finally, with respect to a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, the Cancún
negotiations provided little hope. As argued above, the negotiations took
place along two different tracks: one about a second commitment period for
the Kyoto Protocol with only countries which had ratified the protocol
(AWG-KP), and one about longer term climate collaboration, with all
countries (AWG-LCA). Most attention was paid to the second track (as it
included the USA) and it remained an open question whether the outcome of
this track would be a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol or another legal
document. Especially the EU, supported by developing countries, tried to
also keep the Kyoto Protocol meaningful with attempts to form ‘coalitions of
the willing’ (Tangen 2010) with countries committing themselves to a second
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. However, in Cancún hopes for
such coalitions diminished when Japan, Canada and Russia stated that they
would not enter into a second commitment period (Goldenberg 2010; Vidal
2010). Since the group of countries with quantified commitments during the
first commitment period of the protocol (2008–2012) accounted for less than
a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions (as this group did not contain
the USA after its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001), these
countries felt that the protocol had lost its effectiveness in terms of
addressing climate change (compared to when it was adopted in 1997).
After the failure to reach agreement in Copenhagen, the Cancún
Agreements brought renewed optimism to the negotiations and confidence in
the UNFCCC process. Nevertheless, important negotiation topics remained
on the table, the most important of which was to decide on the legal format
for international climate change policy action. Discussions since Copenhagen
and the text of the Cancún Agreements with a vision on low emission
development strategies had shown a trend in favour of domestic bottom-up
climate actions (embedding climate change mitigation and adaptation actions
in national development planning) over international top-down action. As a
result, it appeared much more likely that a follow-up climate policy
framework would be in the form of a domestic pledge and review
framework, accompanied by UN-level arrangements for adaptation,
technology transfer, capacity building, and finance.

5.3.2 Durban: Bringing Negotiations to a New

Platform
Notwithstanding the optimism after Cancún, three years after Bali, still no
agreement had been reached on a future climate policy, so that both
negotiation tracks (AWG-KP and AWG-LCA) remained on the agenda of the
COP. Building further on the renewed optimism after Cancún and the restored
confidence in the UNFCCC process, COP-17 (Durban, South Africa,
November-December 2011) had the task to open the window towards a new
comprehensive, legally binding agreement on climate change. For that the
COP had two main goals. First, it tried, via the AWG-LCA track, to build
further on the recent development that both developed and developing
countries had pledged measures to reduce their emissions of greenhouse
gases, which opened the door to reach an agreement that included all main
emitting Parties. Second, COP-17 tried to revitalise the Kyoto Protocol
through the establishment of a second commitment period for the years 2013–
2020, which could immediately follow the ongoing commitment period of
2008–2012, even though countries realised that ratification of a deal would
not be completed by the end of 2012.
With respect to the second goal, COP-17 (which took two days longer
than scheduled and which was the longest COP until then) was successful as
the Durban Agreement contained the establishment of a second commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol, which was scheduled to start in 2013 and end
in either 2017 or 2020 (to be decided upon at COP-18) (UNFCCC-CMP
2012). It was agreed that developed countries would reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions by at least 25–40 % below 1990 levels by 2020 (IISD 2011).
To realise this, developed countries’ pledges for emission reductions, as
included in the Cancún Agreements, could be converted into quantified
emission limitation or reduction objectives (Taminiau 2011). In order to
prevent a gap between the pledged reductions and the 25–40 % emission
reduction goal, the COP decided on a review of pledges during 2013–2015
(UNFCCC 2012, p. 3).
On the first goal, COP-17 agreed on the start of a negotiation process
which would have to lead to a “protocol, or legal instrument, or agreed
outcome with legal force” for developed and developing countries which
would have to come into effect in 2020 (UNFCCC 2012, p. 2, para 4). For
this negotiation track, the Ad hoc Working Group on a Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action (AWG-DP) was established with a scheduled completion
in 2015.
Both results largely reflected the call for a ‘roadmap for climate action’
made by the EU prior to COP-17 (EU 2011), with the aim to link the second
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to an early start of new
negotiations on a future climate policy regime (linking both negotiation tracks
AWG-KP and AWG-LCA). At recent COPs, the role of the EU as negotiation
party had become overshadowed by the focus on mainly the USA and China,
as well as the position of the BASIC countries, but this time, the EU liaised
with the group of small island states and least developed countries (Vidal
and Harvey 2011) to form a block in favour of continuing the Kyoto Protocol
and establishing a timetable for reaching a long-term climate agreement for
after 2020.
For the EU, many ends came together with its roadmap proposal as South
Africa, as COP-17 host, did not want that the Kyoto Protocol, so heavily
desired by developing countries (as it only contained commitments in the
short run for developed countries), would find its grave on African soil
(IISD 2011), while the Durban Platform for a longer-term climate agreement
was based on the assumption that both developed and developing countries
would undertake emission reduction actions (Vidal and Harvey 2011).
Chinese support for the EU’s roadmap proposal was obtained because of the
EU’s willingness to commit to a second commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol. India did not like the lack of clarity about the legal nature of the
post-2020 climate policy regime, as this left open the possibility of a
commitment with legal force ‘applicable to all Parties’. However, India
alone could not block an agreement.
Although COP-17 Chair Maite Nkoana-Mashabana said that countries
had “made history” at Durban, it was already clear that Canada would not
comply with its commitments during the first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol (EurActiv.com 2011), while there were strong signals that Russia
and Japan would not take part in the second commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol. Also, the wording of AWG-DP to realize a “protocol, or legal
instrument, or agreed outcome with legal force” was sufficiently ambiguous
to allow for multiple interpretations about what was to come into effect in
2020.
In addition to the agreements on the second commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol and the Durban Platform, COP-17 continued, under AWG-
LCA, with building the organisational structure for further supporting
international collaboration on climate change mitigation and adaptation, such
as the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund (UNFCCC 2012, pp. 55–
66) and the Technology Mechanism (UNFCCC 2012, pp. 67–79), which both
had been introduced in the Copenhagen Accords.

5.3.3 Doha: A Negotiation Gateway to the Future

At COP-18, held in Doha (Qatar, November–December 2012), the transition
from a negotiation path with a central role for the Kyoto Protocol to a new
regime based on more voluntary climate actions was formalised. Initially, a
future climate policy regime was meant to become an extension of the Kyoto
Protocol (AWG-KP), but, as explained earlier in this chapter, the AWG-LCA
track had become more important for negotiations on a future global climate
policy. In Doha, AWG-LCA was concluded so that negotiations could enter a
final stage under the Durban Platform (AWG-DP).
On the Kyoto Protocol, it was decided that a second commitment period
would start on 1 January 2013 (UNFCCC-CMP 2013, p. 3, para 6), while
realising that this would be provisional as this amendment to the protocol
(Doha Amendment) would need to be ratified by 144 countries (75 % of
Kyoto Protocol Parties). The commitment period would last until 2020, so
that there would be no gap between this period and the envisaged start of the
regime to be decided on by AWG-DP. Nevertheless, the conclusion of seven
years of protocol negotiations was disappointing as Japan, Canada, New
Zealand and the Russian Federation had decided not to accept new Kyoto
Protocol commitments. As a result, the Doha Amendment would cover only
15 % of global greenhouse gas emissions (IISD 2012, p. 26).
The good news was that institutions and market mechanisms developed
under the protocol would continue to exist, although they could only be used
by countries who would ratify the Doha Amendment. Especially the market
mechanisms, such as the CDM, had been popular during the first commitment
period 2008–2012 (see Chap. 4), but most discussion at Doha was about
countries’ unused emission allowances. Under the Kyoto Protocol,
industrialised countries had been assigned with amounts of greenhouse gases
that they could emit at maximum per year, so called assigned amount units
(AAUs, see Chap. 4). It was also agreed that countries could bank unused
AAUs (in case of fewer emissions than assigned amounts) for use in a future
commitment period.
This became a hot topic at Doha when the Russian Federation claimed
that it had saved large amounts of AAUs during 2008–2012 for future use,
including selling these to other countries with commitments. However, as an
implication of the Doha Amendment, AAU trade could only take place
between countries that would ratify the amendment and have AAUs during
the second commitment period. As a consequence of Russia’s intention not to
ratify the Doha Amendment, the country’s excess AAUs from the first
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol would become useless. Russia,
supported by Ukraine and Belarus, attempted to block the COP-decision on
the Doha Amendment (UNFCCC-CMP 2013) but its intervention was
ignored or not noticed by COP President Al-Attiyah. Half a year later, this
resulted in a refusal of the Russian delegation to continue negotiations at the
Bonn Climate Sessions as it wanted to discuss procedures on voting first.
Effectively, AWG-LCA negotiations had already been concluded a year
before in Durban, and in Doha it was time to look at back at what had been
achieved. Surely, the LCA track had been important as it brought the USA
back in the negotiations and managed to talk about developed and developing
countries, instead of the formal Annex I and non-Annex I Parties jargon.
AWG-LCA had softened the tone on commitments and opened the door for
more voluntary-based actions such as pledges, whether or not these would be
subject to external reviews, to be adopted by both developed and developing
countries. Here, the LCA track demonstrated that in order to broaden the
international coalition of countries with inclusion of developing countries, it
was necessary to let go of the concept of legally-binding emission reduction
commitments. Most developing countries, and some developed countries,
would not accept these. The changing role of developing countries had been
reflected by the emergence of two new negotiation groups: the Association of
Independent Latin American and Caribbean states (AILAC) which
focussed on collaboration between countries to reach the 2 °C goal, and the
Like Minded Group of Developing Countries (LMDC) which wanted to
keep a strict division between the role of developed and developing
countries under the Convention.
The broadening of the ‘coalition’ was illustrated by the fact that by the
end of 2012, over 85 developing and developed countries had presented
emission reduction pledges under the Convention (IISD 2012, p. 27), which
was over twice as many countries as those with commitments during the first
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, closer examination
of these pledges showed that “the aggregated emissions level from all
countries’ pledges is still likely to induce warming exceeding 2 °C by a wide
margin, unless pledges are improved and more policies implemented on a
national level” (Vieweg et al. 2012). This conclusion was a strong contrast
with the emotional plea for action during the opening session of COP-18 by
delegate Naderev Sano from the Philippines, a country which had shortly
before the COP been hit by typhoon Bopha (IISD 2012, p. 26).
With the completion of the negotiation tracks for the Kyoto Protocol and
long-term climate actions, including the earlier establishment of the
Adaptation Committee, the Standing Committee on Finance, the Green
Climate Fund, and the Technology Mechanism (UNFCCC 2013a), the
window could be opened to the future. With the AGW-DP as main
negotiation track, the next steps were clear: in 2015, a new climate regime
would have to be concluded for the period after 2020, based on a broad
coalition of developed and developing countries, jointly aiming for a 2 °C
target (UNFCCC 2013b). Success was not guaranteed though and the next
COPs in Warsaw and Lima had a lot of work to do.
This work seemed to be supported by real life signals of climate change
impacts and a new scientific report by the IPCC on the risks of extreme
events and disasters due to a changing climate (IPCC 2012). While during the
early 1990s progress with climate negotiations had often been limited due to
lack of scientific evidence of human-induced climate change, by the time of
COP-18 and COP-19 there remained little doubt about the relation between
the burning of fossil fuels and temperature increase on earth.
 Nevertheless, negotiators did not let themselves be rushed by all these
facts and evidence. On the contrary, although time for completing the Durban
Platform negotiations by 2015 was very short, negotiators remained patient
and cautious. Of course, what was at stake was not easy to decide upon. Next
to building up evidence about human impacts on climate systems, science had
also indicated how strongly global greenhouse gas emissions would have to
be reduced to achieve the 2 °C target (IPCC 2013). Moreover, it had become
clear that already pledged emission reductions (since the Copenhagen and
Cancún COPs) would be insufficient for that (UNEP 2013). This situation
kept negotiators in a headlock as domestic economic consequences of
ambitious climate actions could be strong and negative, especially in the
short run, and countries were cautious that the burden would be shared
equally. This, of course, required an agreement on what would be equal.
An overview of milestones during the post-Kyoto negotiation process
from 2005 (Montreal) through 2012 (Doha) is presented in Fig. 5.2.

Fig. 5.2 Summary of post-Kyoto negotiations up until Doha Climate Conference (author’s own
elaboration)

5.4 Towards the Paris Agreement

5.4.1 Warsaw: Introduction of Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions
COP-19 in Warsaw (November 2013) did not result in big steps towards a
new post-2020 climate agreement. According to the analysis by IISD (2013,
p. 29), this was still partly due to lack of trust in the negotiation process,
which had arisen at earlier COPs (including the questionable ways at Cancún
and Doha to overrule and neglect some countries’ disagreements with COP-
decisions, so that consensus could be proclaimed). Moreover, some
developing country negotiators wondered whether the exhaustive negotiation
schedule at Warsaw was tactical as “many developing countries’ delegations
were spread too thinly to be able to effectively follow the packed agenda.
Late nights, too, continued to compromise transparency, efficiency and
inclusiveness, which led some to wonder if all night negotiations could be
some parties’ tactic” (IISD 2013, p. 29). Another reason for lack of trust was
that the contributions by developed countries to the Green Climate Fund were
still limited, remaining very far away from the targeted USD 100 billion per
year in 2020.
Eventually, on the Durban Platform (AWG-DP), COP-19 invited all
countries, so both developed and developing countries, to formulate so-
called ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ (INDCs) before COP-
21 in Paris (UNFCCC 2014a, p. 4, para 2b). Building further on the
developments since COP-15 in Copenhagen, INDCs would be voluntary
pledges by countries (‘contributions’ instead of ‘commitments’). The
decision also reflected the growing consensus that both developed and
developing countries would need to contribute to emission reductions, while
leaving scope for differentiation between developed and developing
countries. Another important development since ‘Copenhagen’ and ‘Cancún’
had been the preference of countries to identify climate change mitigation
(and adaptation) measures in light of domestic development plans. It was
hoped that countries’ willingness to undertake climate measures would
increase if these were embedded in national socio-economic and
environmental planning. Finally, countries agreed not to use a common format
for INDC reporting, so that countries would have flexibility in formulating
their contributions.
Although generally considered a disappointing COP, with the INDC
concept, ‘Warsaw’ had established a next step for further specification by
countries of how they plan to achieve longer-term socio-economic growth
with low emissions and strong climate resilience. This specification would
imply the need for: ensuring that all INDCs together would lead to an overall
greenhouse gas emission reduction that limits global average temperature
increase to 1.5 or 2 °C, organising international financial, technological and
human capital support for developing countries to help them achieve these,
and organising a solid monitoring process to ensure that planned INDCs will
actually be implemented.

5.4.2 Lima: Calling for Climate Actions at COP-20 in

Lima
The twentieth COP, held in Lima (Peru, December 2014), was the last COP
session before the deadline for adopting a new post-2020 climate regime at
COP-21 (UNFCCC 2014a, p. 4, para 2). Earlier COPs had laid the
groundwork for that by tearing down the wall between developed and
developing countries, establishing a Green Climate Fund to financially
support implementation of the regime, operating a Technology Mechanism to
accelerate development and transfer of low emission and climate resilient
technologies (specially to developing countries) and slowly but surely
developing a regime where climate measures are embedded in national
development plans. Now, it was time to work on the scope, content and
review of nationally proposed climate measures (the INDCs, which had been
introduced at COP-19 in Warsaw, see above).
The negotiations at COP-20 benefited from a number of inspiring events
which had taken place in the months and weeks before the meeting in Lima.
First, the IPCC had substantiated its earlier conclusions about how human
actions can influence global climate systems (IPCC 2014), which contributed
to an enhanced sense of urgency. The UNEP Emissions Gap report 2014,
using IPCC data, showed that the remaining ‘carbon budget’ for the world as
a whole (remaining greenhouse gas emissions before reaching the 2 °C
threshold) was around 1000 giga tonnes of greenhouse gases. With global
greenhouse gas emissions amounting to 55 giga tonnes per year, this budget
would be fully spent within 20 years (UNEP 2014).
At the political level, a few weeks before the COP, on 12 November
2014, US President Obama, in a meeting with the Chinese President Xi
Jinping in Beijing during an APEC summit, announced that the USA would
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 by 26–28 % compared to
emission levels in 2005. President Xi announced that Chinese greenhouse gas
emissions would peak by the year 2030, after which a decline in emissions
would have to take place (Vlaskamp and Elshout 2014). On the financial
front, the COP could kick off with a message that the Green Climate Fund had
been receiving donations from developed and developing countries and
during COP-20 the targeted initial capitalisation of the fund (USD 10 billion)
was achieved (IISD 2014).
So far, things went smoothly and the ‘atmosphere’ or ‘momentum’
seemed to have been created for a successful COP. However, the question
of whether the negotiations were a success was not univocally answered as
several country negotiators, especially those from developing countries,
were disappointed about progress with discussions on finance. Despite
reaching the USD 10 billion capitalisation threshold for the Green Climate
Fund, there was still a lack of trust in whether the agreed USD 100 billion
per year in 2020 would be reached. There had been progress, but it had been
slow and without guarantees. Moreover, there were concerns about how the
COP had handled differentiation between developed and developing
countries. Now that all countries had been invited to define their INDCs,
especially the like-minded developing countries questioned whether this
development was in line with the UNFCCC principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities. In Lima, developing countries used the
negotiation time to ensure that differentiation between developed and
developing countries should be reflected in the INDCs. At the end of the
session, however, no clear agreement was reached on differentiation.
Instead, differentiation was implicitly facilitated in the Lima Call for Action
by allowing countries to include in their INDCs different (types of) content,
scopes and review processes (UNFCCC 2015a).
On content of countries’ INDCs, the AWG-DP negotiations identified
several potential topics to be included, such as actions, quantification of
effort, time frames, methodologies for calculating emission reductions, and
responsibilities (UNFCCC 2015a, p. 3, para 14). However, these items were
not made mandatory, so that countries had considerable scope of freedom in
formulating their plans. In terms of scope, developing countries complained
at Lima that INDCs only seemed to focus on greenhouse gas emission
reduction (climate change mitigation), while for developing countries,
especially the most vulnerable ones, ability to protect themselves against
climate change (adaptation) was equally, if not more important (IISD 2014).
With the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (UNFCCC
2014b) developing countries had already formalised this issue in a policy
framework, but they wanted adaptation to also be considered an important
element of INDCs. Eventually, COP-20’s decision on the Lima Call for
Action contained an invitation to countries to also ‘consider including’
adaptation measures in their INDCs (UNFCCC 2015a; IISD 2014, p. 44).
However, perhaps the most important question in a post-2020 climate
regime will be whether and how all INDCs together will help the world stay
below a global average temperature increase of 1.5 or 2 °C. Embedding
climate actions in national socio-economic (development) plans implies the
risk that climate ambitions are limited by economic boundaries or
preferences. In order to keep a clear view on countries’ common progress
towards the 1.5 or 2 °C goals, the EU and the Small Island Development
States (the latter driven by their particularly vulnerable position) called for a
strong review process with measures to support countries to do more if
needed (IISD 2014). This strong review proposal did not survive the COP-
20 negotiations, though. Instead, it was agreed that countries would
communicate their INDCs well in advance of COP-21 (UNFCCC 2015a, p.
3, para 13) so that the UNFCCC Secretariat could prepare a synthesis report
on their aggregate effect as input for the COP-21 negotiations (UNFCCC
2015a, p. 3, para 16b).
In terms of timing, this was challenging, as countries only had around
nine months to formulate complete climate change mitigation (and adaptation)
plans in light of their domestic socio-economic priorities. Identifying climate
measures in light of development priorities usually requires participatory
discussions with stakeholders, identification of strategic sectors or areas for
climate and development and prioritisation of (technology) options within
these sectors or areas, as well as formulation of (business) proposals for
implementation of these options. Based on experience with, for example,
technology needs assessment (TNA) projects under the Convention
(UNFCCC Secretariat 2013), such a process may easily take around two
years. As a consequence, the short time frame for preparing INDCs
before ‘Paris’ could lead to shallow plans without thorough, inclusive
participatory analysis.
A second potential problem was that there would be very little time
between 1 November 2015, when the Secretariat would make available its
INDC synthesis report, and the start of the decisive COP-21 in Paris (about
three weeks later). As a result, should the synthesis report conclude that the
aggregate effect of the INDCs communicated by countries would be
insufficient for meeting the 2 °C target, no time would be left for corrective
actions. It was an unavoidable consequence of negotiations under pressure
with a primary focus on completing a negotiation process: there was
insufficient time to focus on the quality of content.

5.4.3 Paris: All’s Well that Ends Well

Despite these limitations, COP-21 took off on 29 November 2015 with 189
countries having communicated their INDCs to the UNFCCC Secretariat. As
could be expected from the above, many of these country plans contained no
more than a few pages, with little underlying analysis. Nevertheless, the
targets mentioned and the timetables included in the INDCs enabled the
UNFCCC Secretariat to write a synthesis report (based on 119 INDCs
communicated by 1 October 2015, representing 147 countries8). It was
concluded that “the estimated aggregate annual global emission levels
resulting from the implementation of the INDCs do not fall within least-cost
2 °C scenarios by 2025 and 2030… Therefore, much greater emission
reductions effort than those associated with the INDCs will be required in
the period after 2025 and 2030 to hold the temperature rise below 2 °C
above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC Secretariat 2015, p. 11, para 39–40).
This conclusion that the pledges made by countries in their communicated
INDCs did not go far enough to limit global warming to 2 °C contributed to
the mixed feelings of optimism and pessimism that many negotiators had
before the COP. Several of them still remembered how the high pressure in
Copenhagen in 2009 eventually paralysed negotiations and led to a failure.
Moreover, negotiations during 2015 had not been easy. The text produced by
AWG-DP negotiators had swollen to a lengthy document with several options
for considerations in bracketed texts. Sometimes it seemed that negotiations
to make the text shorter led to extra optional texts resulting, instead, in a
longer document.
At the same time, several things had changed since ‘Copenhagen’. In the
first place, scientific evidence on global warming and corresponding risk
had become more detailed (IPCC 2013, 2014). This, among others, resulted
in several non-state initiatives to combat global warming. For example,
insurance company Allianz announced in Paris that it would no longer invest
in coal-fired plants. Convinced by climate science, the company realised that
climate change would lead to more damage and therefore higher payments to
be made to victims (Smit 2015). Allianz was among the more than 500
organisations worldwide during COP-21 to make fossil fuel divestment
pledges. Together, these organisations represented over USD 3.4 trillion in
assets (UNEP 2015a).
Second, COP Presidents had learned over the past seven years that
negotiations had to be open, inclusive and participatory; the COP-21
presidency underlined this by arguing that heads of state and government
should not negotiate texts but only provide political guidance (IISD 2015, p.
43). This was the reason why the high-level segment with heads of state and
government was held at the beginning of the COP, instead of at the end, as
had been common practice thus far.
The main challenge which COP-21 had to address was to link the
communicated country plans, the INDCs, to the goal of 2 °C. Without legally
binding country commitments there would be little guarantee that countries
would take sufficient individual actions in order to collectively reach the
overall temperature limitation goal (see the discussion on ‘prisoners’
dilemma in Chap. 2). The solution found in Paris was that countries’ national
climate plans (NDCs, the I of intended was dropped in the course of COP-
21 negotiations) remained country-driven (embedding climate measures in
countries’ national socio-economic and development plans). The process of
undertaking NDC and communicating these to the COP, however, is legally-
binding (UNFCCC 2016, p. 22, Annex, Art. 3 and 4). On top of that,
countries are committed to renew their NDC every five years after 2020
(UNFCCC 2016, p. 5, para 24) and renewed NDCs must be more ambitious
than the former plans (UNFCCC 2016, p. 22, Annex, Art. 3). Based on
communicated NDCs, the COP will regularly assess the collective efforts of
countries through a global stocktake, which will be undertaken for the first
time in 2023 and every five years thereafter (UNFCCC 2016, p. 32, Annex,
Art. 14).9, 10
At ‘Paris’ also the goal of 2 °C was heavily debated as several countries,
especially climate-change vulnerable developing countries, wanted the more
ambitious goal of 1.5 °C. The compromise found in the Paris Agreement was
a formulation to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that
this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change”
(UNFCCC 2016, p. 22, Annex, Art. 2.1a).
The contentious issue at earlier COPs of differentiation between
developed and developing countries was addressed by COP-21 in the sense
that “developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by
undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing
country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are
encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or
limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances” (UNFCCC
2016, p. 23, Annex, Art. 4.4). Common but differentiated responsibilities had
remained a leading principle, but the strong wall between developed and
developing countries, which had existed for so long, had largely disappeared
in Paris. Another important gain of the Paris Agreement was that all major
emitting countries, such as the USA, China, India and the EU, agreed with the
above explained arrangements.
How could this be achieved? As the discussion in this chapter of
negotiations since 2005 has shown, negotiations moved from top-down
legally-binding commitments to country-driven voluntary actions. This
helped a lot to broaden the international climate coalition (see also Chap. 2).
Also, the personality of the French COP President, French Minister of
Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius, was praised, as he made the negotiations
participatory and ensured that negotiation texts were worked on by countries,
instead of by the presidency, while at the same time being strict on timing,
procedures and openness. The latter was reflected by the several moments
during the COP that the updated negotiation text was made available through
press conferences and the internet.
Finally, an important tactical aspect during the final stages of the COP
negotiations was to avoid any binding emission (reduction) targets or new
financial obligations in the Paris Agreement. In this form, the Paris
Agreement can be accepted by the US President as a presidential-executive
agreement so that congressional approval procedures can be bypassed
(Baker & McKenzie 2015, p. 15).11 With President Obama still in office
during 2016, this increased the chances of the Paris Agreement becoming a
binding document for the US government. This would also avoid a repetition
of complex domestic US approval processes as in the case of the Kyoto
Protocol (see Chap. 3). On 3 September 2016, President Obama announced
US acceptance of the Paris Agreement so that the USA is listed among the
countries that have formally ratified, accepted or approved the agreement
(United Nations 2016).
When the Paris Agreement will enter into force depends on the
ratifications of the countries. When 55 countries, which together represent
55 % of global greenhouse gas emissions, will have ratified the Paris
Agreement, it can enter into force. Countries have a few years’ time for that
until 2020. Status of ratification can be followed at United Nations (2016).
An overview of milestones during the post-Kyoto negotiation process
from 2005 (Montreal) through 2015 (Paris) is presented in Fig. 5.3.

Fig. 5.3 Overview of negotiation process towards Paris Agreement (author’s own elaboration)

5.5 Discussion: Assessment of Post-2020 Climate

Negotiations Against Design, Process and Tactical
Factors
The adoption on 12 December 2015 of the Paris Agreement marked the
conclusion of a negotiation process which had begun in 2005. In the
discussion in this chapter on the 2005–2015 negotiation process, there have
been several examples of how countries considered the design of a future
climate agreement, such as whether actions to reduce greenhouse gas
emission would have to be legally-binding or could be voluntary actions, or
whether and to what extent developing countries would undertake climate
change mitigation actions next to developed countries. There have also been
examples of how negotiation processes were modified a few times, for
example when it became clear that the formal continuation of negotiations
under the Kyoto Protocol would exclude the USA as key negotiation party.
Moreover, at some occasions, negotiation progress was spurred by tactical
aspects, such as flexible interpretation by COP-16 President Espinosa of
what is meant by consensus, the impact of typhoons in the Philippines on the
negotiations atmosphere in Doha and Warsaw and the publication of a new
IPCC Assessment Report.
Below follows an assessment of negotiations leading to the Paris
Agreement against the design, process and tactics factors, which is
summarised in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Summary of design, procedural and tactical aspects of post-Kyoto negotiations

Description of negotiations per Assessment of negotiations per factora

negotiation factor
Design of Scope (+) Division between developed and developing
Paris Global coverage with NDCs for both country categories has partly disappeared, which
Agreement developed and developing countries has made the Paris Agreement be based on a
Both mitigation and adaptation truly global coalition
Principles (+) NCD communication by countries is
mandatory and subsequent NDCs much lead to
Common but differentiated
stronger emission reductions than earlier plans
responsibilities, but less strong as in
earlier agreements (−) Uncertainty remains about implementation of
NDCs
Precautionary principle
Goal
Limit global average temperature
increase to 1.5 or 2 °C (compared to
pre-industrial times)
Means
Nationally Determined Contributions
(NDCs)
NDC communication is mandatory
Global Stocktaking to review progress
 Description of negotiations per Assessment of negotiations per factora
negotiation factor
Enabling Meetings (+) Sufficiently flexible process to enable an
negotiation Annual COP sessions ongoing debate on climate change and policies
process Meetings AWG-KP, AWG-LCA and (+) Two separate AWG negotiation tracks
AWG-DB enabled bringing the USA back on board during
Strategy negotiations
AWG-KP worked on continuation of (−) the several negotiation tracks and small steps
Kyoto Protocol; AWG-LCA focused on could sometime lead to a lower sense of urgency,
long-term climate collaboration as there several meetings to go
AWG-DP was main negotiation track
towards Paris
AWG’s enabled small step negotiations
‘Responsibility
COP chairs annually appointed
AGBM chair appointment was longer
term
Negotiation topics negotiated in working
groups
Decisive IPCC reports—increasing evidence on (+) Stronger sense of urgency due to scientific
tactics and climate change impacts evidence,
facilitation UNFCCC Secretariat supported (−) COP-15 Presidency tried to table own
negotiations with several expert negotiation text
workshops (+) Personalities of COP Presidents avoided that
Personalities of key negotiators could individual countries could not block agreements
either halt or spur negotiations and that negotiations were participatory and
Avoid legally binding commitments for inclusive
countries, so that broader coalition could
be achieved, but ensure that NDCs are
mandatory
Bilateral agreement between US
President Obama and China’s President
Xi on both countries’ climate policies
stimulated negotiations
500 (business) organisations make fossil
fuel divestment pledges during COP-21

a+ Means that an aspect positively contributed to successful negotiations and

negotiation outcome; − Means that the contribution was negative
5.5.1 Negotiation Factor 1: Design of the Paris
Agreement
The Paris Agreement has been called historical as it is the first time that both
developed and developing countries will work on reducing their greenhouse
gas emissions in order to achieve the 1.5 or 2 °C goal. While this target
setting is ambitious, it remains to be seen whether countries will be
sufficiently triggered to enhance the climate ambition level of their individual
NDCs. From the text of the Paris Agreement the impression is that the 1.5–
2 °C target will be leading and that countries will design their NDCs in
economically and socially acceptable ways. However, most of the national
climate plans submitted by over 170 countries before the Paris COP seemed
to demonstrate that countries mainly aim at achieving national socio-
economic goals with the lowest greenhouse gas emissions possible.
These two impressions are not the same: in the first one, climate goals
are leading, whilst in the second one, national socio-economic goals are the
main focus. In practice, this could lead to a gap between what countries will
achieve via their NDCs and what the Paris Agreement aims at. A first
indication of that was found in the UNEP Emissions Gap report based on an
analysis of INDCs communicated before COP-21, which showed that “full
implementation of unconditional INDC results in emission level estimates in
2030 that are most consistent with scenarios that limit global average
temperature increase to below 3.5 °C until 2100 with a greater than 66 %
chance” (UNEP 2015b, p. xviii). Rogelj et al. (2016) conclude that “the
INDCs collectively lower greenhouse gas emissions compared to where
current policies stand, but still imply a median warming of 2.6–3.1 % by
2100.”
An important result of the negotiations from Montreal (COP-11) to Paris
(COP-21) has been that the coalition of countries to formulate national
climate action plans (NDCs) has become worldwide, which is a big step
forward in comparison with the Kyoto Protocol where only developed
countries adopted legally-binding commitments on greenhouse gas emission
reductions. The price that had to be paid for that, remember the discussion in
Chap. 2 how broadening a climate coalition often goes at the expense of
strictness of the agreed actions, is that countries are free to formulate their
own actions; only the submission of the NDCs is mandatory and each update
of the plans must be more ambitious than the former. A particular uncertainty
is how countries will formulate their NDCs and whether planned actions will
actually be implemented. This is an uncertainty that Paris has not addressed
in detail and the INDCs submitted before the COP mostly lacked specific
implementation plans and/or justification of how the proposed actions would
lead to a pledged emission reduction. It must be noted though that countries
had only a few months between ‘Lima’ and ‘Paris’ to formulate their climate
plans, while experience with processes such as NAMAs and TNAs shows
that such analytical and often participatory processes may easily require two
years.
A recurring issue during the negotiations was that of differentiation.
During the first 15 years of UNFCCC negotiations there was a clear
distinction between developed and developing countries, based on the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. In 2007, the Bali
Action Plan referred to developed and developing countries and two years
later, in Copenhagen, the issue of emission reduction targets for major
emitting developing countries was an important negotiation topic. After
‘Copenhagen’, the road of ‘pledge-and-review’ was followed which
gradually made developing countries feel more comfortable about
formulating climate actions in light of their national socio-economic
development priorities. Both the newly introduced concepts of NAMA, for
mitigation actions, and NAP, for climate change adaptation, were based on
embedding climate actions in national development planning. Eventually, this
was the key to the successful broadening of the international climate policy
coalition; the focus on voluntary actions extended the group of countries
which communicated their INDCs to COP-21 to almost all countries, instead
of the major emitters only.
With respect to implementation of and complying with the Paris
Agreement, countries nowadays can benefit from a much wider institutional
support than at the times of adopting the Kyoto Protocol. The development of
the Adaptation Framework, the Green Climate Fund, and the Technology
Mechanism gradually continued during the negotiations between 2005 and
2015. Moreover, the formulation and implementation of NDCs can greatly
benefit from the large range of NAMA and TNA activities.
Realising that in a negotiation process such as in the case of the
UNFCCC, without an overarching authority (as explained in Chap. 2),
reaching a global coalition with legally-binding emission reduction
commitments for all is extremely difficult, there could have been a risk of
only a few countries adopting such measures, but with low collective, global
impact. The 2005–2015 negotiations managed to reach a global coalition by
tearing down the wall between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties and making
the process of national climate action planning (NAMA, INDC, NDC)
voluntary with international reviews. By making the publication and review
process of NDCs mandatory, the Paris Agreement aims at avoiding that
NDCs may become too little too late.

5.5.2 Negotiation Factor 2: Impact of Negotiation

Process Organisation
The co-existence of two parallel negotiation tracks between 2007 and 2012
(AWG-KP and AWG-LCA) increased the flexibility of the overall
negotiation process with respect to specifying the role of the major emitting
countries (developed countries and rapidly growing developing countries).
The Kyoto-track AWG-KP was limited as it was built around the strict
division between developed (Annex I) and developing (non-Annex
I) countries. Moreover, the USA was not a Party in the AWG-KP
negotiations.
The long-term climate action track (AWG-LCA) did not have these
problems, at least to a much lesser extent. Although developing countries
continued to focus on the importance of differentiation between developed
and developing countries, AWG-LCA negotiations became increasingly
inclusive, with the USA and with all developing countries around the table
discussing potential actions. In fact, when the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto
Protocol was adopted in 2012, as the main outcome of the Kyoto negotiation
track, a few countries really seemed to care that it only covered 15 % of the
global greenhouse gas emissions (see earlier in this chapter).

Box 5.1. Negotiation meetings held between 2005 and 2015

From COP-11 in Montreal (2005) through COP-21 in Paris (2015), the
following formal negotiation sessions were held to agree on a
continuation of the Kyoto Protocol and a post-2020 climate policy regime:
– 11 sessions of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
(COP).
 – 11 sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP-MOP).
– 21 sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advise (SBSTA).
– 21 sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI).
– 15 sessions of the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform
(AWG-DP).
– 17 sessions of the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments
for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP).
– 15 sessions of the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA).

Similar to earlier climate negotiation processes discussed in this book, the

2005–2015 process was characterised by many meetings (see Box 5.1). The
parallel negotiation tracks each had their own meeting schedule, which were
supported by the meetings of the subsidiary bodies, and which reached their
peaks at the annual sessions of the COP. Similar to the Kyoto Protocol
negotiations between 1995 and 2005, an important advantage of a high
density of meetings was that no big steps were needed; many small steps with
carefully selected accelerations were enough. Only twice during the process,
much pressure was placed on a COP session, in Copenhagen (2009) and
Paris (2015). The pressure in Copenhagen became too heavy as the Danish
Presidency tried, with its own text, to leap to an agreement. The pressure in
Paris was well-managed. World leaders opened the COP to give the
negotiations a head start, after which professional negotiators had two weeks
to prepare texts in informal groups and come to an agreement to be sealed by
their ministers. Also here, several small steps in a row during the two weeks
of ‘Paris’ turned out to be very effective.
Finally, between 2005 and 2015 negotiation texts became increasingly
owned by the negotiators, who met at all the COPs and the preparatory
sessions, rather than seeing their texts being overruled by ministers and heads
of state and government during the high-level sessions of the COPs. In
Copenhagen, many negotiators were not involved in writing the text of the
Copenhagen Accord, which caused reluctance to adopt it eventually. At later
COPs, especially in Cancún and in Durban, it was reassured that there were
no President’s texts, which was affirmed by organising the negotiations in
several participatory sessions. Such a participatory approach in open
meetings was repeated in Paris so that the final text of the Paris Agreement
was written by negotiators and politically fine-tuned by their ministers.

5.5.3 Negotiation Factor 3: Tactical Aspects

Influencing the Course and Outcomes of Negotiations
‘Paris’ was in several ways different from earlier decisive COPs. The
negotiation process turned out to be a study book example of how important
negotiation tactics are for a successful outcome. COP-21 illustrated, among
others, the importance of the personality of the COP President. While in
Kyoto in 1997, the personalities of US Vice President Al Gore and
negotiation leader Raul Estrada (see Chap. 4) were decisive for an
agreement on the Kyoto Protocol, this time it was the leadership of COP
President Fabius to direct the negotiations towards success. Other examples
of the (positive or negative) role of personalities at COPs are the conclusion
by Ms Espinosa, President of COP-16 in Cancún, that no single country can
prevent consensus reached by other, and how COP-18 President Al-Attiyah
neglected or missed the Russian request for speaking time at the final plenary
of the COP.
A particular tactical move, with a view to future ratification of the
agreement, was to avoid legally binding targets for individual countries and
new financial commitments in the Paris Agreement. Without these, the COP-
21 decision can be adopted by the US President alone, without the need for
congressional approval. With this manoeuvre a withdrawal by the USA from
the Paris Agreement, as happened in 2001 with the Kyoto Protocol, could be
avoided.
The final stage of the 2005–2015 negotiations were characterised by
important bilateral agreements, such as between US President Obama and
Chinese President Xi in October 2014. Such bilateral meetings provided
strong signals to the rest of the world that these major emitters were willing
to formulate much more ambitious targets then they had done in the past. With
this personal involvement, Obama repaired the damage that he was partly
responsible for during the final days of the Copenhagen negotiations when
several negotiators had to learn from media that the Copenhagen Accord was
ready.
Finally, an important facilitating factor during the 2005–2015
negotiations was the rapid build-up of scientific knowledge of climate
change and its impacts on the world’s ecosystems. Contrary to Kyoto
negotiations under the Berlin Mandate, when scientific insights were still
much less developed, the 2005–2015 negotiations could strongly rely on
concrete evidence of how people, through emissions of greenhouse gases,
can influence global climate systems. Perhaps even more impressive were
the emotional opening statements by the Philippine negotiator at the COP,
shortly after his country had been hit hard by two typhoons in a row. It is not
that negotiations immediately changed directions, but it showed the world
that climate negotiations are not only technical discussions about targets,
money and technologies, but increasingly address real world problems. This
was precisely what the Paris COP and all the NGO and business initiatives
in Paris tried to emphasise: climate change has become a real, existing and
observable problem, which requires actions, by all countries. Negotiations
are ‘only’ a vehicle for that.

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Footnotes
1 The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate contained the following countries: Australia,
Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Mexico, Russian Federation, South Africa, the UK, and the USA.

2 Although the Chinese President Xi agreed, during a meeting with US President Obama on 12
November 2014, to let Chinese greenhouse gas emissions peak by 2030, followed by a greenhouse
gas emission reduction pattern, a clear emission reduction target was not announced (Vlaskamp and
Elshout 2014).

3 In the context of climate change policy, two aspects of trade leakage could be distinguished. First,
countries with emission reduction commitments would switch from carbon-intensive fossil fuels to
fuels with lower carbon content or to renewable energy sources. Due to the lower demand for fossil
fuels in these countries fossil fuel prices will go down, which could create an incentive for countries
 without commitments to increase their demand for fossil fuels. The greenhouse gas emission
reductions achieved because of the commitments would thus be offset by increased emissions
elsewhere. Second, trade leakage can occur if companies decide to shift their production from
countries with commitments to countries without commitments (Schreuder 2009; Barrett 1997, 2000).

4 Nationally appropriate mitigation actions or NAMAs.

5 Before Copenhagen, the EU had stated that it would be willing to reduce emission by 30 % if other
key emitting countries would also offer ambitious reduction targets at Copenhagen. Now, that COP-
15 had not resulted in a legally-binding agreement, this offer was from the table, at least for the time
being.

6 Carbon intensity in these proposals means greenhouse gas emissions per unit of gross domestic
product.

7 In paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Copenhagen Accord, it was only stated that Annex I Parties (developed
countries) committed to quantified economy-wide emissions targets for the year 2020, which they had
to propose themselves by 31 January 2010. For non-Annex I Parties (developing countries), the
formulation avoided the word ‘committed’; instead it was stated that non-Annex I Parties “will
implement mitigation actions”.

8 It is noted that the EU Member States submitted one INDC.

9 A first stocktake, a so-called ‘facilitative dialogue’ is also scheduled to take place in 2018 as an
assessment of pledged mitigation actions before the year 2020 (UNFCCC 2016, p. 4, para 20).

10 Note that the Paris Agreement does not contain sanctions in case countries do not meet the targets
in their own NDC. The regular review as part of the global stocktaking exercise is hoped to introduce
peer pressure from other countries to perform. The strength of this pressure remains to be seen. For
example, should a country be the only one not complying with its NDC, then it will feel stronger
international pressure then if it is part of a (much) larger group of countries lagging behind their
planning.
11 The decision on financial contributions by developed countries to the Green Climate Fund, the
collective effort to bring together USD 100 billion per year by 2020, was therefore softened, so that
the Paris Agreement would not contain new financial commitments. In practice, this implies that the
deadline for collecting USD 100 billion per annum was postponed until 2025 (Baker & McKenzie
2015, p. 12).
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
Wytze van der Gaast, International Climate Negotiation Factors, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46798-6_6

6. Dealing with the Climate Negotiations

Paradox
Wytze van der Gaast1
(1) JIN Climate and Sustainability, Groningen, The Netherlands

Wytze van der Gaast

Email: wytze@jin.ngo

Abstract
After the adoption of the Paris Agreement the next focus of climate
negotiations will be on its implementation. These negotiations are likely to
be more technical to support countries in formulating national climate plans
(NDCs), implementing these and reviewing progress. Past negotiations on the
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol have shown that such technical
negotiations may also require lengthy processes for a successful negotiation
result. However, there is little time left to address climate change challenges.
This paradox can be broken as many building blocks for implementation of
the Paris Agreement already exist, so that negotiations can remain on pace.

6.1 Summary of Past Negotiations in Light of Design,

Process and Tactical Factors
In this book, climate negotiations covering the period from the early 1990s
until the present have been analysed in order to obtain a better understanding
of how countries formulate their negotiation positions and how these
positions are brought together in an international climate policy coalition. It
has been argued that since climate change is a global issue, effective climate
policy making also requires a global participation of countries. However,
such an ‘ideal’ situation is difficult to achieve as countries may have
incentives for free-rider behaviour while countries cannot be excluded from
the benefits of greenhouse gas emission reduction efforts by other countries.
According to game-theoretical insights, in the absence of an overarching
international authority, the size of a policy coalition will be determined by
the number of countries for which the benefits of joining the coalition
outweigh the costs.
Climate negotiations since the early 1990s have also been complicated
by an initial lack of scientific knowledge of the impact of human activities on
global climate systems. As a result, negotiations could not be clearly guided
by an overall, scientifically substantiated climate policy goal. In fact,
determining climate policy goals became a subject of negotiations itself.
As a reference point, this book has attempted to describe what an ‘ideal’
climate policy regime could look like, with climate change policy measures
determined in order to avoid irreversible climate change damage, which are
globally supported by countries. In actual practice, however, climate
negotiations often develop in a direction where ambitious climate policies
(e.g., strong emission reduction targets) are only supported by a subset of
countries. In order to gain the support of more countries, negotiations usually
lead to a scaling down of climate policy measures (e.g., lower targets for
greenhouse gas emission reductions). In a final negotiation stage, solutions
are tried to be found to achieve a package with climate policy measures that
are ‘reasonably ambitious’ and on which countries can reach international
consensus.
Based on this observation, this book has identified three key factors for
successful international climate negotiations. First, the design of the policy
package must reflect the preferences of different (groups of) countries and
address the game-theoretical considerations that countries may have. Second,
the negotiation process needs to be sufficiently flexible to consider different
country positions and modify the policy design accordingly. Third, for that to
happen, the course of negotiations may need to change several times in order
to work towards stricter climate policy measures and global support. Such
(tactical) manoeuvres can be stimulated by, for instance, personalities of key
negotiators, emerging scientific evidence or efficient support by facilitating
services such as the UNFCCC Secretariat.
 During negotiations on the design of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol in the 1990s, developing countries called upon the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities. With that, they emphasised that
developed countries had been responsible for most of the past emissions of
greenhouse gases caused by human activities and should thus take the lead by
reducing their emissions first. Several developed countries, in particular the
USA, protested against this position by pointing at several rapidly
industrialising developing countries with growing greenhouse gas emissions.
Eventually, in Kyoto, it was agreed that only developed countries would
adopt legally binding emission reduction commitments. Developing countries
remained exempted from such commitments, but they would actively take part
in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol through the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM).
The CDM had two objectives. On the one hand, developed countries
could partly achieve their Kyoto Protocol commitments through investments
in emission reduction projects in developing countries and receive credits
for that. On the other hand, CDM projects had to support sustainable
development in developing host countries. With these two objectives,
developing countries hoped to receive additional support for their domestic
low-emission development, while developed countries had an opportunity to
achieve their commitments at lower costs (in comparison with domestic
investments). Eventually, it turned out that the Kyoto Protocol did not
correctly reflect domestic positions of participating countries (the most
important of them being the USA, which withdrew from the protocol in 2001)
while its weak compliance regime provided little guarantee that countries
would comply with their commitments.
In terms of negotiation process, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol
negotiations took place with several small steps at the time. During
negotiation sessions in 1989–1992, progress was slow, but eventually it
resulted in the adoption of the UNFCCC before the 1992 UN Earth Summit.
At the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) in 1995, a mandate was
agreed to negotiate on further specifications of the UNFCCC in the form of a
Protocol. For this mandate the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Berlin Mandate
(AGBM) was formed, which also facilitated a step-wise negotiation process
with a few meetings per year. By the time of COP-3 in Kyoto (1997),
political pressure had increased so that negotiation tactics could become
decisive for reaching a final agreement.
 An important tactical aspect of the negotiations leading to the Kyoto
Protocol was the change in the position of the US delegation at COP-3,
which was initially determined by the US Congress resolution (Byrd-Hagel)
not to agree on a protocol without meaningful participation by rapidly
growing developing countries. At COP-3, the G-77&China group managed to
remain exempted from quantified commitments in return for which they
supported the emissions trading mechanisms Joint Implementation (JI) and
the CDM. The latter had been a US desire throughout the negotiations. The
US delegation was also satisfied with the agreed multi-year commitment
period and the accounting of emission reductions across six greenhouse
gases, rather than only carbon dioxide. Both aspects had been suggested by
the US proposal for the Kyoto Protocol text.
Other key tactical aspects during the Kyoto Protocol negotiation process
were: the personalities of key negotiators who managed to translate slow
progress at one session into an acceleration of negotiations at another
session; the emerging scientific (IPCC) knowledge on the impacts of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions on global climate systems; the role
of the UNFCCC Secretariat in terms of supporting the negotiation process
with technical papers and provision of timely information; the handling of the
‘Kyoto Protocol crisis’ by the EU Presidency Trio delegation when in 2001
the US President George W. Bush decided to withdraw from the protocol;
and the link between the decisive Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
and the Russian desire to become World Trade Organisation (WTO) member.
After the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, climate
negotiation focussed on a climate policy regime for the period after 2012. It
has been described in this book how, in terms of design, after an initial,
unsuccessful focus on quantified emission reduction commitments for major
emitting developed and developing countries, negotiations moved towards a
(voluntary) ‘pledge and review’ approach. The latter formed the basis for the
Paris Agreement (adopted in December 2015), which commits countries to
communicate national climate plans (Nationally Determined Contributions
or NDCs) according to a fixed timetable, but which leaves countries
relatively free in formulating their plans. An important design aspect of the
Paris Agreement is that it requires both developed and developing countries
to communicate NDCs, while respecting the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities.
 Furthermore, negotiations during 2005–2015 have strengthened
international climate policy design by including financial, technical and
capacity building support for acceleration of innovation processes within
countries towards low-emission and climate-resilient development
strategies. This could create an incentive for countries to undertake more
greenhouse gas emission reduction measures for climate and development, as
they receive support for that. Moreover, a desired outcome of the Paris
Agreement has been regular ‘milestone measuring points’ for evaluating the
adequacy of global actions (i.e., all NDCs together) towards the 2 or even
1.5 °C target (the regular Global Stocktaking).
The negotiation process during 2005–2015 was characterised, during the
first stages, by the co-existence of two parallel negotiation tracks. One track
aimed at prolonging the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and one focused on
longer-term climate collaborative actions (AWG-LCA). The parallel tracks
increased the flexibility of the overall negotiation process and enabled
continued negotiations with countries that had not (yet) ratified the Kyoto
Protocol. At the Climate Conference in Doha (held in 2012), both tracks
were closed, so that the final stage of negotiations, eventually leading to the
Paris Agreement, took place under the Durban Platform (as decided in 2011).
Also here, negotiations were characterised by several small steps that were
taken during around 110 negotiation sessions in ten years’ time.
Tactics have been an important factor for success or lack thereof during
the 2005–2015 negotiations. At several points the importance of the
personality of the COP President was demonstrated. For example, a COP
President who intends to apply a strong control of the negotiation text may
lose credibility as country negotiators may fear that it is not their text
anymore (on which they often work for several years). This was a concern
expressed by negotiators before the Copenhagen negotiations in 2009 when
they heard about a ‘Danish Text’. A COP President may also feel that a
process is being obstructed for the sake of obstruction and may then decide to
use his/her authority to overrule that. The example of how Cancún COP
President Espinosa interpreted the meaning of consensus can be seen as an
example of that (“no single country can prevent consensus reached by
others”). Finally, COP Presidents can strongly facilitate negotiations by
being flexible on content but strict on the time lines. In that way, the
negotiation text remains ‘owned’ by the country negotiators, but it is also
clear to them that negotiations cannot last forever. The leadership of Paris
COP President Fabius is a good example of that approach, but also several
other COP Presidents after Copenhagen decided to keep negotiations
participatory (with inclusion of all countries and their negotiators), while
keeping an eye on the clock.
Other tactical aspects in support of the Paris Agreement have been the
avoidance of legally binding targets for individual countries and new
financial commitments in the Paris Agreement, so that ratification of the text
by the USA can become easier. The bilateral agreement between US
President Obama and Chinese President Xi in October 2014 provided a
strong signal that the two countries are willing to adopt ambitious domestic
climate targets. Moreover, during the 2005–2015 negotiations, scientific
knowledge of climate change and its impacts on the world’s ecosystems
became increasingly available for negotiators, so that they could rely on
concrete evidence of how people, through emissions of greenhouse gases,
can influence global climate systems. Finally, additional pressure was placed
on negotiators before and during COP-21 in Paris by over 500 NGO and
business initiatives announcing divestments in fossil fuel-based technologies
and energy-production.
The detailed examination in this book of climate negotiation files since
the early 1990s has shown that for negotiation success or failure the ‘devil
can be in the detail’. A good policy design is needed for addressing all
details related to preferences of developed and developing countries in an
international climate coalition. The negotiation process needs to enable that
the broad range of different viewpoints of countries are heard and
incorporated in the negotiation texts, which implies that steps are preferably
small and frequent. Finally, climate negotiations need to be responsive to
tactics which can change the course of the talks, such as incorporating timely
scientific knowledge in discussions, accepting ‘defeats’ when successes are
not feasible and adequately responding to changing economic and political
contexts.

6.2 Negotiating Modalities for Implementing Paris

Agreement
In this book a development in negotiations has been described from an initial
focus on mandatory national emission caps for countries towards formulating
national climate plans in accordance with domestic circumstances.
Especially with a view to bringing developing countries on board of an
international climate coalition, this approach turned out to be effective, as
has been demonstrated by the global support for the Paris Agreement. A
consequence of embedding climate plans in national planning (both for
climate change mitigation and adaptation) is that countries may determine for
themselves what their social, environmental and economic priorities are,
how they plan to realise these, and how this could be done with low
greenhouse gas emissions and strong resilience to climate change. Therefore,
countries’ climate plans (the NDCs) will, by their nature, be characterised by
voluntary pledges, which could complicate enforcement of proposed actions.
Moreover, communicating an NDC does not mean that the plan will be ready
for implementation.
Therefore, the implementation of the Paris Agreement faces a number of
challenges. First, since in NDCs greenhouse gas emission measures are
considered in combination with national or local priorities, reviewers need
to understand countries’ social, political and economic perspectives (Van
Asselt and Boessner 2016). For that, the Paris Agreement has established an
implementation and compliance mechanism (UNFCCC 2015, p. 19, Art. 15)
which will review whether countries achieve what they had planned in their
NDCs.
Second, especially for developing countries there will be capacity needs
to communicate NDCs that not only describe how climate actions fit in
national development goals, but also contain clear investment or business
proposals that can be considered by potential funders. For example, this
challenge has become clear from a synthesis of technology needs assessments
(TNA1) carried out by 31 developing countries during 2009–2013 (UNFCCC
2013). From this report, it has become clear that developing countries have
been able to embed climate technology choices in their sustainable
development planning, which is the main goal of a TNA. Subsequently,
countries identified barriers to the development and transfer of prioritised
technologies at the desired implementation scale, followed by finding
solutions to address these barriers. These solutions form the core of a
technology action plan (TAP). In a report by the Technology Executive
Committee in 2014 (UNFCCC 2014), interviews were held with 30 TNA
practitioners and international technology transfer experts on how they
perceived the quality of the TAPs as concrete business or investment
proposals for implementation of priority technologies and where, in their
view, improvements could be made.
In general, the interviews made clear that TAPs lacked information about
the “business case” of deploying or diffusing the priority technologies in the
countries concerned. Most plans contained information about costs, but a
clear indication of how these costs relate to the benefits accruing from a
technology was often lacking. Such benefit to cost ratios do not have to be
detailed, but policy makers and investors (both public and private) need to
have a good overview of the economic benefits of a technology (e.g., at the
project/programme level or for the national economy) within a country
during a certain timeframe, including the impact of policy decisions on the
implementability of the technology (UNFCCC 2014). Interviewees in the
TEC report recommended a stronger involvement of financial experts and
potential investors throughout the TNA process, as they could inform country
teams about requirements for well-structured investment plans. From the
analysis, it was also recommended to identify a few specific roles and
responsibilities in the implementation process such as ‘brokers’ with a good
understanding of the banking sector in the country concerned so that
perceived investment risks could be addressed and mitigated.
While the Paris Agreement has been the outcome of a high-level political
negotiation process with a focus on an overarching global climate target,
with responsibilities for developed and developing countries in achieving
this target, it is likely that the next series of negotiations will have a stronger
focus on more technical discussions: how can countries formulate ambitious
climate policy pledges, how to support implementation of these, and how to
review this planning and implementation? As such, the next years may be
comparable to the negotiations that followed the adoption of the Kyoto
Protocol in 1997 (van der Gaast 2015). While the protocol was clear about
commitments and policy instruments that could be used for complying with
these, translating commitments in national actions and how to apply the
policy instruments, especially CDM and JI, needed further elaboration. The
Buenos Aires Plan of Action of 1998 (see Chap. 4) kicked off a new
negotiation ‘round’ on these more technical aspects, which were concluded
at COP-7 in Marrakech (2001) with the Marrakech Accords. For example,
with ‘Marrakech’, countries had a rulebook for setting up CDM and JI
projects and to account for the emission reductions as carbon credits.
 The fact that negotiations on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action were much
more technical than those leading to the Kyoto Protocol itself, did not mean
that they were not political. On the contrary, the use of CDM and JI credits
against developed countries’ commitments was controversial as it was seen
by several developing countries and environmental organisations as a cheap
way out of developed countries’ commitments (van der Gaast 2015). In order
to address these concerns, the EU proposed a rule to maximise the amount of
carbon credits that developed countries could acquire from CDM and JI
projects for complying with their Kyoto Protocol commitments (as explained
in Chap. 4). Eventually, such a maximum rule did not survive the
negotiations, but the tone and argumentation had similarities with the
discussions on ‘differentiation’ which dominated the negotiations towards
the Paris Agreement so strongly.
Most attention during these technical negotiations between 1998 and
2002 was paid to the accounting of greenhouse gas emission reductions
achieved via CDM and JI projects. The main issues during these negotiations
were how to make sure that claimed emission reduction were additional to
what would have happened anyway and how to calculate emission
reductions. In light of that, the negotiations sought a balance between, on the
one hand, accepting that some aspects could not be accounted for, and, on the
other hand, strict additionality tests to ensure that all carbon credits would be
based on real and additional emission reductions. Here the negotiations
touched upon the trade-off between strong environmental integrity and
building a broad coalition for CDM and JI project collaboration: too strict
project procedures could scare off potential investors so that the full
potential of CDM and JI would not be used (van der Gaast 2015).
In order to handle these design issues, the process for negotiating
JI/CDM modalities and procedures during 1998 and 2001 mainly took place
at sessions of the UNFCCC’s subsidiary bodies with decisions taken or
endorsed by the annual COP. Once the negotiation process on the 1998
Buenos Aires Plan of Action had been completed with the Marrakech
Accords of 2001, negotiations on JI and CDM issues moved to the CDM
Executive Board and the JI Supervisory Committee (both technical bodies
for supervision of methodologies and project registration had been
established under the Kyoto Protocol). As a result, technical negotiation
bodies handled the technical accounting aspects, but when questions arose
that needed political guidance, issues were tabled at the COP sessions.
 In terms of tactics, after the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in
2001, the EU took a more flexible position on how many carbon credits
developed countries could purchase through JI and CDM and use for
compliance with their Kyoto commitments (this was an important reason why
the above-mentioned rule on maximising use of carbon credits disappeared
from the negotiation table). In this respect, the EU was willing to accept a
trade-off regarding the environmental strictness of using CDM and JI (more
flexible accounting rules) in return for gaining support for the Kyoto Protocol
from other developed countries (see Chap. 4). Other tactical aspects of these
more technical negotiations, were the many reports and scientific
publications on technical issues, e.g., Kartha et al. (2004) and PROBASE
(2003). Second, early investor actions in CDM and JI projects (such as the
World Bank and the Netherlands Government) supported the development of
guidelines for greenhouse gas accounting and fed negotiators with concrete
hands-on information on how to develop accounting rules that strike a
balance between environmental strictness and pragmatism (van der Gaast
2015).
Based on the experience with negotiating Kyoto Protocol modalities and
procedures during 1998–2008, it is likely that negotiations on modalities and
procedures for implementing the Paris Agreement follow similar patterns.
Similar to discussions on CDM and JI, negotiations can start, for example,
with strict proposals for review procedures that some countries may
consider absolutely necessary for achieving the goal of the Paris Agreement,
while other countries may find these proposals too strict and expensive to
implement. Then, the negotiation process needs flexibility to bring these
opposing views together by leaving some issues to technical negotiation
bodies while discussing other issues at the COP level, so that eventually a
global coalition is not only achieved for the Paris Agreement, but also for its
implementation plan. In order to move the negotiations in the right directions
at crucial stages, tactics are needed such as personalities, inputs from
knowledge institutes and pressure from outside of the negotiations, such as
business, society and science.

6.3 Breaking the Paradox

When I defended my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Groningen, including
the statement about the importance of the factors design, process and tactics
for negotiation success, one of my opponents said that I was prescribing a
recipe for lengthy negotiations. Referring to the negotiations in the
framework of the WTO, he was not sure whether climate negotiations, in
their current format, would lead to an effective climate agreement (i.e.,
enough and on time).
During the defence, we also discussed the urgency for taking climate
change mitigation and adaptation actions now, thereby referring to the recent
IPCC Assessment and UNEP Emissions Gap reports, which claimed that for
remaining below the 2 °C threshold, the world can only continue with on its
current greenhouse gas emissions trajectory for another 20 years.
This discussion illustrated the paradox of climate negotiations. History of
climate negotiations has shown that a lengthy process has a larger chance of
achieving a global climate coalition and that taking several steps at a time
can be more effective towards the end result than pursuing a few big steps.
However, we do not have much time left for addressing the challenges of a
changing climate (UNEP 2015; Rogelj et al. 2016). Therefore, we either
speed up negotiations or we accept a temperature increase of more than 2 °C.
While some observers may argue that surpassing the 2 °C threshold is
unavoidable, I would like to conclude this book by looking at how
negotiations can be accelerated. One solution could be to respond swiftly to
extreme events. For example, while the EU spoke about harmonising
economic and financial policies across the Member States of the Euro-zone
for almost twenty years, with several small steps made forward, a Bank
Union was established within a very short period of time after the recent
financial crisis and the resulting trouble with the Euro as a currency. A
similar observation can be made for the strengthening of an outer border
control system for the EU’s Schengen region after the refugee crisis in 2015.
Something that Member States had discussed for years could be arranged in a
few months.
Obviously, we do not want such climate extremes to take place before
acceleration of climate negotiations can take place. And it is not needed
either. After all, while future negotiations on the modalities for implementing
the Paris Agreement will at several points be political and re-open
discussions between developed and developing countries on differentiation,
a huge difference with negotiations on the implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol during 1998–2005 is that all pieces of the puzzle are available.
While accounting procedures for CDM and JI under the Kyoto Protocol, as
well as supervising institutions for these, had to be developed largely from
scratch, most of the building blocks for successful implementation of the
Paris Agreement have already been established, such as the Technology
Mechanism, the Green Climate Fund, the Capacity Development Framework
and the Adaptation Framework. As a result, there is ample opportunity to
keep negotiations on the implementation of the Paris Agreement on pace.
After 25 years, we know how climate negotiations work and we know
why they are important, for all of us. We cannot waste time and we do not
have to.

References
Kartha, S., Lazarus, M., & Bosi, M. (2004). Baseline recommendations for greenhouse gas mitigation
projects in the electric power sector. Energy Policy, 32, 545–566.
[CrossRef]

PROBASE (2003). Procedures for Accounting and Baselines for JI and CDM Projects. Groningen,
the Netherlands: Joint Implementation Network (project coordinator).

Rogelj, J., Den Elzen, M., Höhne, N., Fransen, T., Fekete, H., Winkler, H., et al. (2016). Paris
Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2 °C. Nature, 534, 631–639.
[CrossRef]

UNEP (2015). The Emissions Gap Report 2015. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP).

UNEP-DTU Partnership (2016). Technology Needs Assessment. Retrieved at July 17, 2016, from
http://www.tech-action.org/Participating-Countries

UNFCCC (2013). Third Synthesis Report on Technology Needs Identified by Parties not Included
in Annex I to the Convention, FCCC/SBSTA/2013/INF.7. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC.

UNFCCC (2014). TNA Good Practice Report. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC - document was presented
to Technology Executive Committee in August 2014 and has the status of a living document reflecting
continous experiences with TNAs.

UNFCCC (2015). The Paris Agreement. Bonn, Germany: United Nations Convention on Climate
Change.

Van Asselt, H., & Boessner, S. (2016). Reviewing implementation under the Paris Agreement. Issue:
CARISMA Policy Brief. 1. Retrieved at July 17, 2016, from http://www.carisma-project.eu/
Publications/Policy-brief-series

van der Gaast, W. (2015). International Climate Negotiation Conditions—Past and Future.
Groningen, the Netherlands: University of Groningen, Ph.D. thesis.

Footnotes
1 TNAs are country-driven assessments with the goal to support developing countries in prioritising
technologies for mitigation and adaptation against their social, environment and economic priorities.
TNAs are financially supported by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and managed by UNEP
and the UNEP Danish Technical University Partnership. Over 90 TNAs were conducted between
1999 and 2009, which was followed by the Global TNA Project which started in 2009, and in which
over 55 developing countries have thus far taken part (UNEP-DTU Partnership 2016).