EDITORIAL COMMENT 113

titled to use loading and unloading machinery, etc., on the basis of agree­
ments, concluded with the appropriate transportation and expeditionary
agencies” (Article 38, Soviet draft, Article 41, convention). But these
“ appropriate agencies” are Soviet-sponsored companies in Hungary, Ru­
mania and Yugoslavia. These companies have varying degrees of Soviet
ownership, but always effective Soviet control; the general manager is in
all cases a Soviet citizen. These companies have been given privileged
treatment and special (in the case of Budapest, nearly exclusive) privi­
leges; they dominate the Danube fleets in the various countries and have
obtained control of most of the useful ports and dock facilities. Thus,
Western shipping is at the mercy of these companies.
The United States, under these conditions, naturally rejected the con­
vention and “ will not, of course, recognize for itself or for those ports of
Austria and Germany which are under its control, the authority of any
commission set up in this manner to exercise any jurisdiction in those por­
tions of Austria and Germany.”
The Belgrade Conference is a failure as far as the Danube problem is
concerned. Although the convention will come into force among the seven
Eastern states, the Danube remains divided and dead. But there is even
more to it, which confirms the discouraging statement that international
law, as far as the laws of war and many other parts are concerned, is in a
deplorable state of retrogression. As Ambassador Cannon in his final re­
jection stated, “ The Soviet attitude defeats and destroys the whole concept
of international waterways which has been the public law of Europe for
over 130 years.”
The Belgrade Conference presents the picture of a caricature of an inter­
national conference under totalitarian domination. Last, though not least,
the Belgrade Conference has once more shown the crisis of our whole
Western Christian .culture, the danger of a new era of barbarism, by the
tremendous decline of good manners in diplomacy. Such decline is, as
Anthony Eden has stated, “ at the same time, one of the most troubling
factors in the present situation of the world.”
J osef L . K u n z

RECOGNITION OF STATES: SOME REFLECTIONS ON DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE

“ The recognition of a new state has been described as the assurance given
to it that it will be permitted to hold its place and rank in the character
of an independent political organism in the society of nations.” 1 The
practice of states demonstrates that the granting of recognition to a new
state is productive of juridical consequences in international law, but

i Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State, Address before the Council on Foreign Rela­
tions, Feb. 6,1931. Department o f State, Latin American Series, No. 4, p. 6.

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 114 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

doctrinal controversy has raged over the precise implications of the act of
recognition and the juridical status of the unrecognized state.2
Conceptualists, who, like Lauterpacht,3 Anzilotti,4 and Kelsen,5 start
from the premise that every juridical order, including international law,
must determine who are its subjects and at what point juridical personality
must be attributed to them, feel compelled by their own abstractions to
regard the act of recognition as constitutive—as creative of legal personality
in international law. Because international law possesses no central organ
to perform this “ legal” function of the establishment (la constatation)
of the “ legal fact” that a “ state-in-the-sense-of-international law” exists,
the function of recognition is attributed to each previously existing state
as an “ organ” of international law.6 Because, however, this decentralized
method of “ creating” new subjects of international law might lead to the
anomalous situation in which a new community is a state bound by inter­
national law for recognizing states but not for others, it is convenient to
posit: (1) that international law contains rules stipulating the requirements
of statehood and (2) that there is a legal duty under international law to
recognize a community which meets these requirements of statehood.7 The
act of recognition thus becomes a “ legal” act in the dual sense of being
required of existing states by international law and of legally creating a
new subject of international law.
2 See, for example, H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge
University, 1947); Josef L. Kunz, Die Anerhennung der Staaten und Regierungen im
Volkerrecht (1928); Sir John Fischer Williams, “ La Doctrine de la Reconnaissance en
Droit International et ses D6veloppements Recents,” 44 Academie de Droit International,
Recueil des Cours (1933), pp. 203-314; idem, “ Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of
Recognition in International Law,” 47 Harvard Law Review (1933-34), pp. 776-794;
Hans Kelsen, “ Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations,” this
J o u r n a l , Vol. 35 (1941), pp. 605-617, with comment by Philip Marshall Brown, ibid.,
Vol. 36 (1942), p. 106, and Edwin M. Borchard, ibid., p. 108; Annuaire de I’Institut de
Droit International, Paris, 1934, pp. 302-357 (Philip Marshall Brown, Rapporteur) and
Brussels, 1936, I, pp. 233-245, II, pp. 175-255, 300-305 (for English translation of reso­
lutions adopted, see this J o u r n a l , Supp., Vol. 30 (1936), p. 185); Arnold Raestad, “ La
Reconnaissance Internationale des Nouveaux Mats et des Nouveaux Gouvernements,”
Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee (3rd. Ser.), Vol. 17 (1936),
pp. 257-313; Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations, In Particular of the
Recognition of Foreign Powers (1933), Ch. II; Dionisio Anzilotti, Cours de Droit
International (trad. Gidel, 1929), Vol. I, pp. 159-177; Le Normand, La Reconnaissance
Internationale et ses Diverses Applications (1899).
3 Op. cit., p. 7 ff.
4Op. cit., p. 160 ff.
5Loo. cit., p. 606 ff.
8 See Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 6; Kelsen, loc. cit., p. 607.
i Although both Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 26 ff., and Kelsen, loc. cit., p. 607 ff., assert
that international law determines the requirements of statehood, Lauterpacht asserts and
Kelsen denies (loc. cit., p. 609 ff.) the duty to recognize a state which fulfills these
requirements. ,

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 EDITORIAL COMMENT 115

Although it is possible to conclude, by induction from the practice of

states, that states achieving recognition possess people, territory, an ef­
fective government, independence, and the capacity for international rela­
tions, that same practice seems to indicate that states have no “ legal”
origin.8 A colony revolts or is permitted to secede from the parent country
and establishes its independent control over its territorial domain; or a
group of states and territories combine to form a new state {e.g., Yugo­
slavia in 1918). No rules of international law prescribe or proscribe the
creation of such a new state; nor, except perhaps in the national juris­
prudential theology, can the state be said to have had a “ legal” origin.
The origin of the Republic of the Philippines provides an instructive
example. On July 4, 1946, “ The United States of America and the Re­
public of the Philippines, being animated by the desire . . . to provide
for the recognition of the independence of the Republic of the Philippines
as of July 4, 1946 and the relinquishment of American sovereignty over the
Philippine Islands,” signed at Manila a Treaty of General Relations,8 from
the Preamble of which the above words are taken, and which provides
further:

Article I. The United States of America agrees to withdraw and

surrender, and does hereby withdraw and surrender, all right of pos­
session, supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty existing and
exercised by the United States of America in and over the territory
and the people of the Philippine Islands, except the use of such bases,
necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto,
as the United States of America, by agreement with the Republic of
the Philippines, may deem necessary to retain for the mutual protec­
tion of the United States of America and of the Republic of the Philip­
pines. The United States of America further agrees to recognize, and
does hereby recognize, the independence of the Republic of the Philip­
pines as a separate self-governing nation and to acknowledge, and does
hereby acknowledge, the authority and control over the same of the
Government instituted by the people thereof, under the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Article II. The diplomatic representatives of each country shall
enjoy in the territories of the other the privileges and immunities
derived from generally recognized international law and usage. . . .
Article III. Pending the final establishment of the requisite Philip­
pine Foreign Service establishments abroad, the United States of
America and the Republic of the Philippines agree that at the request
of the Republic of the Philippines the United States of America will
endeavor, in so far as it may be practicable, to represent through its
Foreign Service the interests of the Republic of the Philippines in
countries where there is no Philippine representation. The two coun-
s Compare Louis Cavar4, “ La Reconnaissance de I’Mat et le Mandchoukouo, ’ ’ jRevue
Generate de Droit International Public, Vol. 42 (1935), pp. 5-99.
8 Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 1568.

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 116 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

tries further agree that any such arrangements are to be subject to

termination when in the judgment of either country such arrangements
are no longer necessary.

Article VIII. This Treaty shall enter into force on the exchange of
instruments of ratification. . . .
It should be noted that although the Preamble states that one of the
purposes of the treaty was “ to provide for the recognition of the inde­
pendence of the Republic of the Philippines as of July 4,1946, ’ ’ the obliga­
tion assumed by the United States in Article I “ hereby” to “ withdraw and
surrender . . . sovereignty” and to “ recognize the independence of the
Republic of the Philippines as a separate self-governing nation” was not
legally effective, according to Article VIII, until October 22, 1946, the date
of the exchange of ratifications. It should also be noted that, by an “ In­
terim Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, Signed at Manila, July
10 and 12, 1946, Effective July 4, 1946,” the United States and the Re­
public of the Philippines agreed to observe the provisions of Articles II
and III of the Treaty, pending the final ratification thereof, in accordance
with the provisions of a Protocol signed July 4, 1946, to accompany the
Treaty and which had provided in part: “ It is understood and agreed that
pending final ratification of this Treaty, the provisions of Articles II and
III shall be observed by executive agreement.”
It would appear to be significant that the drafters of the Interim Agree­
ment omitted to stipulate that Article I of the Treaty, providing for the
recognition of the Republic of the Philippines, should be observed as from
July 4, 1946. The implication would seem to be that by signing the
Treaty10 and concluding the Interim Agreement the United States had al­
ready recognized the independence of the Republic.
No one will question the conclusion that it was the policy of the United
States which made possible the independence of her former colony, the
Philippine Islands. However, was statehood conferred on the Philippines
in any legal sense by United States recognition? I f the Republic of the
Philippines was not already a state prior to the signing of the agreements
on July 4, did she have the legal capacity to conclude agreements intended
to be governed by international law? I f statehood and the legal capacity
to conclude international agreements were conferred by the United States,
what is to prevent the United States from withdrawing them? It is sub­
mitted that if the agreements were terminated, the question whether the
Republic of the Philippines was or was not an independent state would be
a question of fact, not of law.11 Similarly, although the policy of the United
10 Cf. Republic of China v. Merchant’s Fire Assurance Corporation o f New York
(1929), 30 Fed. 2d. 278.
11 Compare Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (1923), 234
N. Y. 372: “ Whether or not a government exists, clothed with the power to enforce its

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 EDITORIAL COMMENT 117

States made it possible for the people of the Philippines to organize them­
selves as a state, neither the United States nor international law “ created”
that state.
At this point troublesome theoretical questions recur: Is the new state
endowed with rights and obligations under international law at birth or
does it exist in a legal vacuum, without international legal rights and obliga­
tions with respect to states which have not recognized it? Adherents of
the constitutive theory of recognition are logically forced to regard the
new state as without rights or obligations under international law until
recognized; although Lauterpacht attempts to minimize the embarrassment
by taking refuge in his conceptualism. To assert, he writes,12 that “ whether
a state exists is a question of fact” is “ to predicate that a given legal re­
sult is a question of fact.” Jaffe,13 suggesting the pragmatic approach of
the foreign office when confronted with the emergence of a new state, ob­
serves that:
. . . recognized statehood is but the completion of a process wherein
fact is informed by law, and where at any particular stage it may be
difficult to say whether a thing is so because it is the fact or because
it is the law . . . recognition does not create international personality
. . . there may be limited relationships, necessarily implying the state­
hood of the parties, which do not rise to the dignity and completeness
of the relation between recognizant states.
Nascent states, however indeterminate their status politically or legally,
do not exist in a vacuum. Legal and political relations of varying intensity
with neighboring or more distant states are an immediate or inevitable
necessity and practice even prior to recognition.14 Although the pronounce­
ments of foreign offices and judicial tribunals sometimes echo the constitu­
tive theory, the practice of states of entering into “ unofficial” relations
with unrecognized states, of concluding international agreements with them,
of respecting their territorial limits, and of respecting their power to gov­
ern and establish legal relationships within that territorial domain would
seem to be predicated, as Lauterpacht admits,15 upon the possession by the
unrecognized community of “ a measure of statehood” — i.e., of international
legal personality. Not only is there a necessary implication of the juridical
authority within its own territory, obeyed by the people over whom it rules, capable of
performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power, able to
enforce its claims by military force, is a fact, not a theory. For it recognition does
not create the state, although it may be desirable.”
12 Op. cit., pp. 24, 45 ff.
is Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations, In Particular of the Recog­
nition of Foreign Powers (Harvard University, 1933), pp. 96, 121.
1 * See illustrative materials, sometimes under the rubric “ Acts Falling Short of
Recognition,” in Moore, Digest o f International Law, Vol. I, p. 206 fit.; Hackworth,
Digest of International Law, Vol. I, p. 327 ff.; H. A. Smith, Great Britain and the Law
of Nations, Vol. I (1932), pp. 115 ff., 190; Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 369 ff.
is Op. cit., p. 54.

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 118 THE A MERICAN JOURNAL OP INTERNATIONAL LAW

capacity of the unrecognized state through its agents to conclude agree­

ments which are legally binding under international law,18 but the unrecog­
nized state is regarded as obligated not to commit acts in violation of a law
by which, according to the constitutive theory, it is not bound. An un­
recognized state, writes Lauterpacht17 with careful dialectic,
cannot, in reliance on the formal logic of its non-recognition, claim the
right to commit acts which if done by a recognized authority would
constitute a violation of international law. . . . There can be no ob­
jection to treating the unrecognized state as if it were bound by obliga­
tions of international law if these obligations are so compelling as to
be universally admitted and if the non-recognizing state acknowledges
itself to be bound by them.
Thus, on May 9,1922, the American Commissioner in Albania was instructed
to protest to the governmental authorities of the unrecognized Albanian
state against their action in depriving American citizens of Albanian origin
of their American passports and forcing them to take Albanian passports.
Although the printed correspondence describing the American protest and
the Albanian engagement to recognize all United States passports contains
no reference to international law, the evidence suggests that, despite non­
recognition of Albania by the United States, international law was re­
garded by both states as regulating their relations and as establishing both
the delictual responsibility and the contractual capacity of the unrecog­
nized state.18
Since “ unofficial relations” are a convenient, although juridically am­
biguous, device for dealing with communities from which, because of their
indeterminate status or for political reasons, it is considered desirable to
withhold recognition, foreign offices have been reluctant to admit a legal
duty to recognize. “ We are not in a position,” admits Lauterpacht19
after a barren search for convincing evidence to the contrary, “ to say
either that there is a clear and uniform practice of states in support of the
legal view of recognition, or that the process of recognition has invariably
taken place, in all its aspects, under the aegis of international law. ’ ’
A study of the practice of states 20 reveals that considerations which have
i« See, for example, the agreement relating to most-favored-nation treatment and other
matters concluded by the United States and Albania by exchange o f notes at Tirana,
June 23 and 25, 1922, prior to, and as a condition of, United States recognition of
Albania as a state on July 28, 1922. U. S. Foreign Relations, 1922, Vol. I, pp. 603-604;
ibid., 1925, Vol. I, pp. 511-512.
if Op. oit., pp. 53-54.
is U. S. Foreign Eelations, 1922, Vol. I, p. 599; ibid., 1925, Vol. I, pp. 511-514.
19 Op. cit., p. 78.
20 As set forth particularly in Moore, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 77 ff.; Hackworth, op. cit.,
Vol. I, p. 195 ff.; H. A. Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 77 S. ; M. W. Graham, The Diplomatic
Recognition of the Border States: I, Finland; II, Estonia; III, Latvia; Lauterpacht,
op. cit., pp. 12 ff., 26-37; Fontes Juris Oentivm, Ser. B, Ser. 1, Tom. 1, Digest of the
Diplomatic Correspondence of the European States, 1856-1871, p. 130 ff., and ibid.,
Tom. 2, 1871-1878, p. 78 ff.; U. S. Foreign Relations, passim.

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 EDITORIAL COMMENT 119

been weighed by foreign offices in determining whether to recognize a new

state or to defer or withhold recognition include: the freedom of the new
state from external control; the stability and effectiveness of its govern­
ment, and perhaps an estimate of its permanence as indicated by popular
support; the ability, and perhaps the willingness, of the new state to ful­
fill its obligations under international law; whether “ its existence responds
to political exigencies” in a region such as Europe or the Adriatic or in
the world community; the extent to which it “ commands international sup­
port,” i.e., has been recognized by other states; the extent to which its es­
tablishment affronts principles of dynastic or constitutional legitimacy;
whether its recognition would offend an ally or be otherwise premature;
whether its recognition would not go far “ to support legitimate enter­
prise” of the recognizing state or be politically advantageous; the use of
non-recognition as a sanction of national policy or of international law.
Particular considerations adverted to in state papers may be deemed by
an observer to be politically noxious or juridically ambiguous but, despite
occasional references to a natural right to recognition or a moral obligation
to recognize, the evidence fails to support the thesis that, in granting recog­
nition, foreign offices regard themselves as fulfilling a legal duty or per­
forming a function as an “ organ” of international law. Was it really
the failure of Israel to fulfill the “ basic criteria” of statehood or considera­
tions of British foreign policy and international politics which caused the
British Foreign Office to decline recognition to Israel in May 1948 ? 21
When the United States hastily granted de facto recognition to Israel and
the Soviet Union countered by granting de jure recognition, and the Arab
states granted no recognition, does the available evidence suggest that con­
siderations of national or international politics were subordinated to legal
criteria or that any one of these states was fulfilling a legal obligation or
violating international law? “ The main difficulty with the constitutive
theory,” writes Philip Marshall Brown, “ is that it is mere theory.” 22
What, then, is the juridical function of recognition as determined by state
pronouncements and conduct? The establishment of diplomatic relations,
although a normal consequence of recognition, is not a consequence re­
quired by international law, since states are legally entitled to establish
“ unofficial relations” prior to recognition and to delay, establish or sever
official diplomatic relations even after recognition. The principal juridical
function of recognition is that, by acknowledging the full status of a
hitherto indeterminate community, the recognizing state makes possible the
regularizing of relations between them on the basis of international law.
The acknowledgment that the recognized political community possesses the
attributes of statehood and full capacity in international law at the time
of recognition does not pretend to answer the question as to how long prior
See Philip Marshall Brown, “ The Recognition of Israel,” this J o u r n a l , Vol. 42
(1948), pp. 620-627.
2 2 “ The Effects of Recognition,” this J o u r n a l , Vol. 36 (1942), p. 106.

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 120 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OP INTERNATIONAL LAW

to recognition the community may or may not have been in possession of

the attributes of statehood and legal capacity. The act of recognition is
thus not constitutive in the sense that it confers international juridical
personality upon an entity which did not possess it prior to recognition.
Nor is recognition merely cognition. The cognitive element of acknowledg­
ing that the recognized community possesses the attributes of statehood
and capacity under international law is formally embodied in an official
assurance that the legal consequences of statehood and capacity will be ac­
cepted by the recognizing state.23
There is no necessary implication that the probably limited relations be­
tween them prior to recognition were not governed by international law.
The theoretical objection that, if the unrecognized state possesses rights
under international law prior to recognition, it is a violation of inter­
national law for a non-recognizing state to deny the exercise of these rights,
assumes too much and proves too little. Even between recognized states
the exercise of certain rights is suspended when diplomatic relations are
severed. Moreover, except perhaps in such fields as the extraterritorial
effect to be given to certain state acts, practice with regard to unrecognized
states reveals no wholesale disregard of the rights and obligations stipu­
lated by international law for the governance of international relations.
The significant fact is that, prior to recognition, relations with an un­
recognized state are likely to be limited in scope.
Foreign offices have not been concerned with pushing juridical concep­
tions to the limit of their logic and have regarded recognition as extending
the scope of rights and obligations between recognizing and recognized
states, without indulging in sterile debate as to whether the act of recog­
nition “ confirmed” previously existing rights or “ created” new rights.
The practical effect has been an increased sense of obligation on the part
of the recognizing state and an increasing ability on the part of the recog­
nized state to secure the enjoyment of its rights abroad. The belief that
“ the unrecognized state and its acts do not legally exist prior to recog­
nition” 24—a confusion exhibited by English and American courts in the
early 19th century—has influenced national jurisprudence, but appears to
be based upon a misconstrued judicial deference for the acts of another
branch of the same government in granting or withholding recognition, or
upon conceptualist logic, rather than upon the requirements of international
law.25
28 Compare J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (3rd ed., 1942), p. 100: “ The primary
function of recognition is formally to acknowledge -as a fact something which has
hitherto been uncertain, namely, the independence of the state recognized, and to de­
clare the recognizing state’s readiness to accept the normal consequences of that
fact. . .
2 4 Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 44. Compare Kelsen, loc. cit., p. 608: “ Before recognition,
the unrecognized community does not legally exist vis-d-vis the recognizing state.”
25 See P. L. Bushe-Fox, ‘ ‘ The Court of Chancery and Recognition, 1804-31, ’ ’ British
Year Book of International Law, 1931, p. 63; Bushe-Fox, “ Unrecognized States: Cases

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 EDITORIAL COMMENT 121

Juridical theories of recognition logically deduced from jurisprudential

concepts fail to explain the facts of state conduct, and inductions from the
conduct of states have failed to provide a juridically unambiguous theory
of recognition. The path to the future is clearly indicated by two considera­
tions: the decentralized nature of the practice of recognition and the de­
veloping community interest in the emergence of new states. Collective
recognition by the Great Powers has been sparingly employed in the past
and has sometimes savored of collective intervention.28 Whether admission
to membership in the League of Nations constituted automatic recognition
was always controversial.27 Nor has the United Nations clearly settled the
question of the relation of membership to recognition.28 In his A Modern
Law of Nations, Philip Jessup has proposed that the United Nations Gen­
eral Assembly might by general convention or declaration establish the
essential criteria of statehood, provide for a finding that a particular entity
possesses the required attributes and pledge members not to accord recog­
nition to new states except in accordance with a standard procedure.29
With the centralization of the recognition of states in an international
organization, the granting of recognition might well acquire the role of a
legal function performed on behalf of the organized community of states,
a role which today appears to exist more in theory than in fact.
H erbert W. B riggs

in the Admiralty and Common Law Courts, 1805-26,” ibid., 1932, p. 39; A. B. Lyons,
“ The Conelusiveness of the Foreign Office Certificate,” ibid., 1946, pp. 240, 245 ff.;
Jaffe, op. cit., passim; E. D. Dickinson, “ The Unrecognized Government or State in
English and American Law,” 22 Michigan Law Review (1923), pp. 29, 118. For the
decision of an international tribunal affirming the declaratory nature of recognition, see
Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State, decided Aug. 1, 1929, by the
German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Recueil des Decisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux
Mixtes, Vol. IX , pp. 336, 344; see comment thereon by Hans Herz, “ Le Problime de
la Naissance de I’M at et la Decision . . . du J Aout 1929,” Revue de Droit International
et de Legislation Comparee (3rd ser.), Vol. 17 (1936), p. 564.
28 See, for example, collective recognition o f Greece, 1830, British and Foreign State
Papers, Vol. X V II, p. 191; of Belgium, 1831, ibid., Vol. X V III, pp. 645, 723 ff.; of
Montenegro, Serbia and Roumania, 1878, ibid., Vol. L X IX , pp. 758, 761, 763, 862 ff.;
of Albania, 1921, League of Nations Official Journal (2nd Year, 1921), p. 1195, and
G eT h a rd Pink, The Conference of Ambassadors (Paris, 1920-1931), Geneva Studies,
Vol. X II, Nos. 4-5 (1942), pp. 106-116, 203 ff.; of Estonia and Latvia, 1921, British
and Foreign State Papers, Vol. CXIV, p. 558, and M. W. Graham, op. cit., p. 290 ff.
See also British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. CXII, p. 225 ff., Clemenceau to Pader­
ewski, June 24, 1919.
27 Graham, op. cit., pp. 295 ff., 300-301, 372, 375-6; Graham, The League o f Nations
and the Recognition of States (1933), and the works there cited.
28 The Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1948, of the International Court of Justice on
Conditions of Admission o f a State to Membership in the United Nations (Charter,
Art. 4) (I. C. J . Reports, 1947-1948, p. 57 ff.; this J o u r n a l , Vol. 42 (1948), p. 927),
while dealing with the criteria of membership in the United Nations, discusses neither
the criteria of statehood nor recognition.
2» Op. cit. (1948), pp. 44-51.

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