Imen Khemakhem – YSMCHN – Theories of IR – Week 5 Reaction Paper – 2022

In their essays both Keohane et al (1995) and R. Jervis (1999) tried to articulate a position for the realist
and (neo)Liberalist doctrines vis a vis institutionalism, and their relative position in International
Relations. Both authors tried to highlight misconceptions about the realism, stating that realism
acknowledges institutions, but merely as a statecraft driven by interests.
For R. Jervis (1999) the main disagreement between Realist and Neoliberalists is about the need of
institutions to reach goals, as both recognize advancing interests. He argues that a zero-sum situation in
politics is unlikely, as agreements can be created to assure mutual security. Moreover, he stated that
Realism is about distribution, while neoliberalism about efficiency, thus the difference is analysis of
situations, and in the understanding of tools to reduce conflict. For R. Jervis (1999) to achieve
cooperation changes in preferences over strategies, over goals and sometimes internal changes are
needed. As such, he concludes that such cooperation can reduce costs, and engender institutionalized
cooperation. As for Keohane et (1995), he argues that institutions matter under certain conditions, as
states invest funds to form international institutions because they are useful. He also states that realism
and institutionalism differ when dealing with social science, as the difference lies in the understanding of
the need for institutions and how they apply their effects. Like R. Jervis (1999), Keohane et al (1995)
believes that for states to recognize the cooperation gains, institutions must coordinate between them, as
they can mitigate the fear or cheating, distributional conflicts.
According to R. Jervis (1999), the realist believes that institutions are a statecraft tool, states create
institution merely to reach certain goals, as cooperation is only needed when there is an apparent
advantage. The author also argues that in realism, politics are only about self-help, survival and
dominance, and that the world admits the best version of events, where alternatives that can channeled
through institutions do not exist, and where institutions are only a reflection of states interests, that
sometimes can bind you. For Keohane et al (1995), realism considers rationality, while analyzing reality
such as geography, history, politics, as here States are rational when creating institutions, as they value
information, and view institutions as appropriate channels.
Unlike Keohane et al (1995), R. Jervis (1999) articulated a distinction between the offensive and the
defensive realist. He asserted that for offensive realists, mutual security cannot be achieved or pursued, as
states seek power for security and for goals achievement. Moreover, he argued that is this case, war is the
results of the aggressivity of the expansionists states, as conflict represent incompatibility and cooperation
represents the last resort. He also explained that domination interests render cooperation unlikely, where
additional information cannot reduce conflict. On the other hand, R. Jervis (1999) believed that for
defensive realists the analysis of the situation is crucial, the security dilemma prevails, as states are
pushed by fear rather than gain. Here, he stated that it is the interaction of states that results in conflict, as
states cannot differentiate between an expansionist foe, or a scared state. Thus, the fear of mistrust and
cheating. For the author, defensive realists when facing a security dilemma, seek changes in their
preferences over policies, they are similar to neoliberals in the ways sought to diminish conflict, as such
increase information flow.
Moving on to the neoliberalist, and liberal institutionalist aspects in the articles. R. Jervis (1999) believes
that neoliberalists are not involved in vital interest of states’ collision, but consider conflict as a part of
politics, as states have the potential to cooperate for mutual gain, here distribution is secondary, as mutual
gains precede. He also states that neoliberalists believe in the possible efficiency, in finding the optimal
choice, as like in the prisoner’s dilemma, states fear other states because of cheating and the advantage
distribution. When facing conflict, neoliberalists believe that it is due to the failure to use institutions to

Keohane, Robert O. and Martin, Lisa L. (1995) “The promise of institutionalist theory.”
International Security vol. 20, pp. 39-51.
Jervis, Robert. (1999) “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate.”
International Security 24(1), pp. 42-63.
 Imen Khemakhem – YSMCHN – Theories of IR – Week 5 Reaction Paper – 2022

mediate security, as they view them as channels of interdependence (R. Jervis 1999). At last, for R. Jervis
(1999), in neoliberalism, changes in preferences can vastly influence mutual benefits, and consequently
institutions can influence and alter future taste and consequences. Here, Keohane et al (1995) criticizes
Mearsheimer, as the latter regards liberal institutionalist as rational egoists, that can only cooperate when
there are significant interests and gains.
R. Jervis (1999) believes that institutions are to be autonomous when analyzed by neoliberalists, as for the
latter they are not a statecraft. For him, while institutions can be binding for both parties, and costly when
violated, they can never be absolute, as they can shape preferences. Moreover, he addressed their missing
potential, stating that states do not recognize the unrealized common interest vis a vis cooperation, as
institutions are neglected instruments. R. Jervis (1999) also highlighted that, institutions can form a life
on their own, shape interests, and even aver to display unintended purposes and consequences, such as the
EU. For him, institutions can even provide legitimacy, and influence for the relevant actors, for they are
fragile but powerful when accompanied by actors, interests, and conflict. Both R. Jervis (1999), and
Keohane et al (1995) view institutions as a replication of states interests. For Keohane et al (1995)
institutions are important for state policies, though the ambiguity remains in the domains, conditions, and
effects that they are channeled through. He states that institutionalism seeks to clear that ambiguity, and to
highlight the true propositions of realism vis a vis the institutionalist theory, as the latter can be applied to
security issues as it deals with the information flow between states. Keohane et al (1995) believes that the
latter theory abstracts institutions as independent and dependent variables, that can alter the behavior
patterns of the system, and that not only deals with political economy but also with security as much as
the realist theory. When in usage, institutions facilitate reciprocity, provide crucial information, and
reduce costs, though when employed certain factors such as the importance of gains, the opportunity costs
of offense or defense, and the distributional issues must be analyzed (Keohane et al 1995).
Both authors tried to articulate the common and the different aspects between realism and neoliberalism
when it comes to institutions. They concluded that the two doctrines dealt different with the discipline, as
the latter even analyzed different components of social science. Here, realism is about reality, where
cooperation is the last alternative, as the opponent is to be feared and not trusted, whereas liberalist
institutionalist is about discovering potential alternatives to mitigate conflict and reach common gain,
with minimum causalities. Can institutions get states to stop behaving as power maximizers? Can
institutions prevail over anarchy in the future?

Keohane, Robert O. and Martin, Lisa L. (1995) “The promise of institutionalist theory.”
International Security vol. 20, pp. 39-51.
Jervis, Robert. (1999) “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate.”
International Security 24(1), pp. 42-63.