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Crossing The Disciplinary Divide
Crossing The Disciplinary Divide
Crossing The Disciplinary Divide
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College Music Symposium
2Mugglestone, "Guido."
3Kerman, Contemplating Music.
hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful.
"Gadamer, Truth and Method, 43.
6Cited by Gadamer, Truth and Method, 58; see Kant, Critique, 175.
7Gadamer, Truth and Method, 82.
8Cited by Gadamer, Truth and Method, 82; see Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, 42 ff.
9Gadamer, Truth and Method, 82.
]0Ibid., 85. In proclaiming art to be the practice of freedom, and aesthetic education to be the end of the play
impulse, Schiller founds art's autonomous standpoint in opposition to reality.
musical competence evinces the difference between cultural musicology's and ethno
musicology's investment in overturning nineteenth-century ideals. More importantly
these differences highlight these disciplines' respective ripostes to the effects of a history
from which the concept of a work's aesthetic autonomy, aesthetic consciousness, an
the legitimacy of abstracting works from their life contexts spring.
It is evident from these critiques that one of the main points of contention for cul-
tural musicologists and ethnomusicologists is the idea that cultural values invested
the Western high art musical tradition in reality serve the political and social interests of
privileged individuals and groups. The ideal of aesthetic cultivation clearly presages th
role cultural works play in the struggle for position and power. Hannah Arendt argue
in this respect that culture acquires its social utility by becoming a "matter of social
prestige and social advancement."11 The ideal of self-cultivation through an education
to art decidedly turns art into an instrument of social violence. Pierre Bourdieu explain
that music exemplifies the demand that the bourgeois ethos of aesthetic cultivation makes
of all forms of art: "Music is the most 'spiritual' of the arts of the spirit and a love
music is a guarantee of [a form of] 'spirituality'"12 that disavows any materialist coars
ness. Following the logic of the economic world's reversal, music's aesthetic autonomy
signifies the inner sanctum of a realm of experience free from material exigencies
Hence, as one of the covert forms that violence takes when the use of the direct mean
of violence becomes impossible, the belief in music's transcendent autonomy masks
the social distinctions that this belief celebrates.13
Critical analysis of the belief in music's aesthetically autonomous value too often
identify music's social value as a weapon in the fight for position and power at the expense
of the work's capacity to affirm or contest an existing order of reality. This occultation
of the work's ontological vehemence therefore elicits yet another critique. This critiqu
intersects those mounted from the disciplinary perspectives of ethnomusicology an
musicology. At the same time, in directing itself toward the alienating effects of aesthetic
consciousness, this hermeneutical critique aims at rehabilitating our understanding of
the work with respect to our experience of it.
From the vantage-point of a hermeneutical understanding of the work, the abstraction
that aesthetic consciousness performs (through dissociating the work from its sustain
ing life contexts) alienates us from the experiences that originate with our encounter
with individual works. This experience is the source of our understanding of a work's
meaning. In order to combat the alienating effects of abstracting works from their sus-
taining life contexts, Gadamer undertakes an analysis of the ontology of the work of
art. In this analysis, the mode of being of the work of art, which is the mode in whic
we also encounter it, is that of play. Just as play exists only in its movement as such
New Horizons
tive condition for the renewal of reality in the light of heuristic fictions.
Every claim that music contests or subverts reality secretly acknowledges
the work's power to break open the real by prefiguring possibilities for
alternative ways of inhabiting the world. The power of thought and imagi-
nation at work, in what Paul Ricoeur refers to as the creative imitation of
reality, stands in stark opposition to the alienating effects of the work's
conscious differentiation from practical exigencies.17 In this respect, works
are invitations to think, experience, and feel more.
3. The last point is perhaps the most challenging of the three. It concerns the
relation between music's mode of communicability and its power of expres-
sion. Elsewhere I have argued that music's mimetic character is intimately
bound up with our affective dispositions toward the world.18 Moods and
feelings anchor our sense of participating in the world to which we belong
by attuning us to it. Martin Heidegger goes so far as to suggest that in "po-
etical discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one's
state-of-mind can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclos-
ing of existence."19 Heidegger's comment echoes Aristotle's notion in his
Politics that music is an imitation of states of character.20 Music's power to
redescribe affective dimensions of our experiences is attested most acutely
in its figuration of limit experiences, in which time seems to be surpassed
by its other. On this further horizon, music's power to express the joy and
pathos of our mortal dwelling conjoins human finitude to the mysteries
of time. At this juncture, the study of music merges with a philosophical
inquiry into the meaning of time.
Bibliography
Arendt, Hannah. Between Past and Future. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.
17Ricoeur, Time.
18See Savage, Hermeneutics, 93 ff.; Savage, "Is Music Mimetic?".
19Heidegger, Being, 205; see Ricoeur, The Rule, 221 ff.
20 Aristotle, Politics, 309.
Ricoeur, Paul. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Translated by John B. Thompson.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.