G.R. No. 179090. June 5, 2009.
* Same; Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Although Republic Act
LEONILO SANCHEZ alias NILO, appellant, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, appellees.
Criminal Law; Republic Act No. 7610 (Child Abuse Law); Definition of Child
Abuse.—Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the
maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes any of the
following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3)
Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.
Same; Same; As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the
child, whether the same is habitual or not.—Appellant contends that, after proof, the
act should not be considered as child abuse but merely as slight physical injuries
defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant
conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to
the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. As
defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether the same
is habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition. We,
therefore, cannot accept appellant’s contention.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
748
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanchez vs. People
Same; Same; Evidence; Appeals; Witnesses; Full weight and respect are
usually accorded by the appellate court to the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses since the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses.—Appellant could only proffer the defense of denial.
Notably, the RTC found VVV and MMM to be credible witnesses, whose
testimonies deserve full credence. It bears stressing that full weight and respect are
usually accorded by the appellate court to the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses. Equally noteworthy is the fact that the CA did not disturb
the RTC’s appreciation of the witnesses’ credibility. Thus, we apply the cardinal rule
that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on such findings, are accorded respect, if not
conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA. The exception is when it is
established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted
cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the
case.
No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the Revised Penal Code for graduating
penalties by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied; Where the
special law adopted penalties from the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law will apply just as it would in felonies.—The penalty for Other Acts of
Child Abuse is prision mayor in its minimum period. This penalty is derived from,
and defined in, the Revised Penal Code. Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the
rules in the Revised Penal Code for graduating penalties by degrees or determining
the proper period should be applied. Thus, where the special law adopted penalties
from the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it
would in felonies.
Criminal  Procedure; Information; What controls is not the title of the
information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited therein.—
We reject appellant’s claim that the Information filed against him was defective.
In Resty Jumaquio v. Hon. Joselito C. Villarosa, 576 SCRA 204 (2009), we held that
what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but
the actual facts recited therein. Without doubt, the averments in the Information
clearly make out the offense of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
The following were alleged: (1) the minority of VVV; (2) the acts constituting
physical abuse, committed by appellant against VVV; and (3) said acts are clearly
punishable under R.A. No. 7610 in relation to P.D. No. 603. Indeed, as
749
VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009 749
Sanchez vs. People
argued by the OSG, the commission of the offense is clearly recited in the
Information, and appellant cannot now feign ignorance of this.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
  Gonzalo D. Malig-on, Jr. for petitioner.
  The Solicitor General for respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision2 dated February 20, 2007 which affirmed the Decision 3 dated July 30, 2003
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, convicting appellant
Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo(appellant) of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse
punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 4 in relation to Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 603,5 with a modification of the penalty imposed.
The Facts
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an
Information6 dated August 29, 2001 which reads:
1
_______________
1 Dated August 28, 2007; Rollo, pp. 10-30.
2  Particularly docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27817, penned by Associate Justice
Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Romeo F.
Barza, concurring; Rollo, pp. 39-55.
3 Particularly docketed as Crim. Case No. 11110 and penned by Judge Teofilo D.
Baluma; Rollo, pp. 61-82.
4 The Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.
5 The Child and Youth Welfare Code.
6 Rollo, pp. 59-60.
750
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanchez vs. People
“The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses
Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of
Child Abuse, committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin,
province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
acting as a Family Court, the above-named accused, with intent to abuse, exploit
and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV], 7 a sixteen
(16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and which acts
are prejudicial to the child-victim’s development which acts are not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D.
No. 603 as amended; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the
amount to be proved during the trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections
3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.”
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. In
the course of the trial, two varying versions emerged.
Version of the Prosecution
Private complainant VVV was born on March 24, 1984 in Mentalongon,
Dalaguete, Cebu to FFF and MMM.8
On September 24, 1997, VVV’s father, FFF, started leasing a portion of the
fishpond owned by Escolastico Ronquillo (Escolas-
_______________
7 Per this Court’s Resolution dated September 19, 2006 in A.M. No. 04-11-09-
SC, as well as our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693, September 19,
2006, 502 SCRA 419), pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262, also known as the “Anti-
Violence against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,” and its implementing
rules, the real name of the victim and those of her immediate family members other
than the accused are to be withheld and fictitious initials are instead used to protect
the victim’s privacy.
8 Records, p. 10.
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VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009 751
Sanchez vs. People
tico), located at Lajog, Clarin, Bohol. FFF and his family occupied the house beside
the fishpond which was left by the former tenant.9
On September 2, 2000 at around 7:00 in the morning, while VVV was cutting
grass in their yard, appellant arrived looking for FFF who was then at another
fishpond owned by Nilda Parilla located in Boacao, Clarin, Bohol. VVV knew
appellant because he is the husband of Bienvenida Ronquillo (Bienvenida), one of
the heirs of Escolastico. 10 She noticed that appellant had a sanggot(sickle) tucked in
his waist.
Appellant then went to VVV’s house and inquired from VVV’s younger brother,
BBB, the whereabouts of the latter’s father. BBB did not answer but his mother,
MMM, told appellant that FFF was not around. Right then and there, appellant told
them to leave the place and started destroying the house with the use of his sickle. As
a result, appellant destroyed the roof, the wall and the windows of the house. 11 MMM
got angry and told appellant that he could not just drive them away since the contract
for the use of the fishpond was not yet terminated. VVV was then sent by MMM to
fetch a barangay tanod. She did as ordered but barangay tanod Nicolas Patayon
refused to oblige because he did not want to interfere in the problem concerning the
fishpond. On her way back to their house, VVV saw appellant coming from his shop
with a gallon of gasoline, headed to their house. Appellant warned VVV to better
pack up her family’s things because he would burn their house.12
Upon reaching their house, VVV saw her brother, BBB, get a piece of wood
from the back of their house to defend themselves and their house from appellant.
However, appellant approached BBB, grabbed the piece of wood from the latter and
started beating him with it.13 At the sight, VVV approached appellant and pushed
him. Irked by what she did, appellant turned to her and struck her
_______________
9  TSN, January 25, 2002, p. 4.
10 Id., at pp. 3-5.
11 Id., at p. 6.
12 Id., at pp. 6-10.
13 Records, pp. 3-4.
752
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanchez vs. People
2
with the piece of wood three (3) times, twice on the left thigh and once below her
right buttocks. As a result, the wood broke into several pieces. VVV picked up some
of the broken pieces and threw them back at appellant. MMM restrained BBB,
telling him not to fight back. After which, appellant left, bringing with him the gallon
of gasoline.14
FFF arrived at about 10:00 in the morning of that day. When he learned about
what had happened, FFF brought his daughter to the Clarin Health Center for
medical attention and treatment.15 Dr. Vicente Manalo (Dr. Manalo) attended to
VVV and issued her a medical certificate 16dated September 2, 2000, stating that
VVV sustained the following:
CONTUSION WITH HEMATOMA PROXIMAL  the instant case was fabricated and was being used as a means to extort money from
LATERAL PORTION OF THIGH, RIGHT
TIME TO HEAL: 3-4 DAYS, BARRING COMPLICATIONS
From the health center, FFF and VVV went to the Clarin Police Station where
they had the incident blottered. 17 Thereafter, FFF requested Eliezer Inferido to take
pictures of the injuries sustained by VVV.18
Version of the Defense
Appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, developed and operated the fishpond from
1982 to 1987. Sometime in 1997, FFF occupied the fishpond and the nipa hut beside
the same, by virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement 19(MOA) entered into by FFF
with the Heirs of Escolastico, as represented by Segundino Ronquillo. After the
MOA expired in 1998, appellant and his wife, Bienvenida, decided
_______________
14 TSN, February 5, 2002, pp. 2-7.
15 Id., at pp. 7-8.
16 Records, p. 11.
17 Supra note 12, at pp. 11-13; Records, p. 82.
18 TSN, May 13, 2002; Records, p. 85.
19 Records, pp. 106-107.
753
VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009 753
Sanchez vs. People
to discontinue the lease because they did not understand the management and
accounting of FFF. They made several demands on him to return possession of the
fishpond but FFF refused, asking for a written termination of the contract from all
the heirs of Escolastico. To solve the problem, appellant and Bienvenida engaged the
services of FFF as caretaker of the fishpond, providing him with fingerlings,
fertilizers and all necessary expenses.
This notwithstanding, FFF still failed to make an accounting. Thus, on
September 2, 2000, at around 7:00 in the morning, after pasturing his cattle,
appellant dropped by the house of FFF to ask him to make a detailed accounting
because he and his wife were not satisfied with the harvest in August of 2000.
MMM, however, retorted, saying that they would no longer make any accounting, as
Benny Ronquillo, brother of appellant’s wife, would finance the next cropping.
Displeased with MMM’s statement, appellant got angry and demanded that they
leave the fishpond. FFF’s family resented this demand and a commotion ensued.
BBB got a piece of wood and struck appellant but the latter was able to parry the
blow. Appellant got hold of the piece of wood which actually broke. Intending not to
hurt anybody, appellant threw the same behind him. Suddenly from behind, VVV
appeared, got hold of the said piece of wood and hit appellant once at the back of his
shoulder. Appellant testified that the blow was not strong enough to injure him.20
Appellant claimed that he was surprised that a criminal case was filed by VVV
against him for allegedly beating her. Appellant denied that he beat VVV, saying that
him.21 Moreover, appellant asseverated that Ronald Lauren 22 (Ronald) witnessed the
incident.
Ronald testified that he saw BBB strike appellant with a piece of wood but
appellant was able to parry the blow; that appellant threw away the piece of wood;
that when appellant
_______________
20 TSN, July 24, 2002.
21 TSN, August 28, 2002.
22 Initially referred to by appellant as Tagoro Laurel; id., at p. 11.
754
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanchez vs. People
threw the piece of wood, there was no one there at the time; and that appellant left
the place immediately.23
The RTC’s Ruling
On July 30, 2003, the RTC found that at the arraignment, appellant, through
former counsel Atty. Theodore Cabahug (Atty. Cabahug), admitted that he hit VVV,
although unintentionally. Thus, appellant had the burden of proving that, at the time
VVV was hit, appellant was performing a lawful act. The RTC ruled that the
evidence did not favor appellant because his demand for FFF’s family to vacate the
fishpond, coupled with threats and punctuated with actual use of force, exceeded the
limits allowed by law. The RTC also held that the injuries sustained by VVV were
distinguishable, indicating that the blow was forceful, and that the force used was
strong. Thus, the RTC disposed in this wise:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds LEONILO
SANCHEZ y Aranas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating paragraph (a),
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610, and applying in his favor the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, this Court imposes on him the indeterminate sentence of an
imprisonment of Six (6) years of prision [correccional] as minimum to seven (7)
years and four (4) months of prision mayor as maximum, with costs against him. The
3
Court orders him to pay [VVV] the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) _______________
for civil indemnity and the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for
damages; the awards for civil indemnity and damages are without subsidiary 25 Id., at pp. 83-88.
penalties in case of insolvency. 26 Id., at pp. 89-92.
IN ACCORDANCE with letter (f) of Section 31 of Republic Act No. 7610, the 27 Records, p. 183.
Court exercising its discretion also imposes on Leonilo Sanchez y Aranas the penalty 756
of a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) without subsidiary penalty in case of 756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
insolvency.
SO ORDERED.”24 Sanchez vs. People
_______________ as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum of prision mayor. The fine imposed is
retained.
23 TSN, October 14, 2002, pp. 5-6. The Order dated August 8, 2003 denying appellant’s motion for reconsideration
24 Rollo, p. 82. is hereby AFFIRMED.
755 The award of civil indemnity and damages in the assailed Decision is deleted.
With costs.
VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009 755 SO ORDERED.”28
Sanchez vs. People Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration 29 which the CA denied in its
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration 25contending that appellant never Resolution30 dated July 11, 2007.
admitted that he hit VVV. The RTC, however, denied the motion in its Order 26 dated Hence, this Petition claiming that the CA erred:
August 8, 2003 for being pro forma. Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the CA.27  
1. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED DESPITE
The CA’s Ruling THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT[;]
On February 20, 2007, the CA held that the record of the proceedings taken 2. IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT IT HAD
during appellant’s arraignment before the RTC belied appellant’s contention that his JURISDICTION [OVER] THE CASE DESPITE A DEFECTIVE
defense was one of absolute denial. The CA pointed to a manifestation of appellant’s INFORMATION WHICH ALLEGED THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED
counsel, Atty. Cabahug, in open court that appellant was putting up an affirmative OF IS (sic) NOT COVERED BY THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
defense because the act of hitting VVV was unintentional. Furthermore, the defense AMENDED[; AND]
of absolute denial interposed by appellant cannot prevail over the positive and 3. IN SUSTAINING THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED OF THE
categorical statements of VVV and her witnesses, giving full credence to the factual CRIME CHARGED (VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(a) OF R.A. NO. 7610)
findings of the RTC. The CA also ruled that the Information filed against appellant NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE ACT COMPLAINED OF IS
was not defective inasmuch as the allegations therein were explicit. In sum, the CA OBVIOUSLY COVERED BY THE REVISED PENAL CODE (Act No.
held that the prosecution had fully established the elements of the offense 3815) AS SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURY.31
charged, i.e., Other Acts of Child Abuse under R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603. Appellant posits that his conviction is not supported by proof beyond reasonable
However, the CA opined that the RTC erred in applying the Indeterminate Sentence doubt; that the RTC erred when it shifted the burden of proof to appellant; that the
Law because R.A. No. 7610 is a special law. Lastly, the CA deleted the award of RTC and CA erred in ruling that appellant interposed an affirmative defense when,
civil indemnity and damages for utter lack of basis. The fallo of the CA decision all throughout his testimony before the RTC, he denied having in-
reads: _______________
“WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed Judgment dated
July 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City in 28 Rollo, pp. 54-55.
Criminal Case No. 11110 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt 29 Id., at pp. 56-58.
of Other Acts of Child Abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 and Presidential Decree 30 Id., at pp. 36-37.
No. 603 is hereby UPHELD with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. 31 Supra note 1, at p. 18.
Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years 757
and one (1) day VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009 757

4
 Sanchez vs. People
flicted any injury on VVV; and that appellant and his counsel did not sign any
written stipulation for appellant to be bound thereby, hence, the burden of proof still
rests in the prosecution. Moreover, appellant claims that VVV and her family had ill
motive to implicate him because of the pressure he exerted against them to give up
the fishpond. Appellant pointed out that VVV, in her testimony, made material
inconsistencies as to who got the piece of wood at the back of their house. Appellant
also claims that he had no motive or intention of harming anyone, otherwise, he
would have done so earlier that day; that if BBB was also beaten, he should have
submitted himself for medical treatment and examination; and that the Information
charging appellant was substantially and jurisdictionally defective as the acts
complained of were covered by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant
submits that, if duly proven, the acts complained of are clearly constitutive of Slight
Physical Injuries punishable under Article 26632 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant, likewise, posits that the instant case is not one for child abuse, since
VVV was neither punished in a cruel and unusual manner nor deliberately subjected
to excessive indignities or humiliation. The act was not cruel since the injury was
merely slight per medical findings; the location of the injury was on the thigh which
is not unusual; and VVV was not beaten in front of many people as to humiliate her.
Lastly, no evidence was submit-
_______________
32 Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment.—The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which
shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period;
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from
engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance;
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos
when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.
758
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanchez vs. People
ted by the prosecution, such as a testimony of a child psychologist, or even of VVV’s
teacher who could have observed changes in the victim’s behavior, as to prove that
the injury was prejudicial to the victim’s development. Appellant alleges that the
charge was obviously made as one for child abuse, instead of slight physical injuries,
in order to subject him to a much heavier penalty. Appellant prays for acquittal based
on reasonable doubt and, in the alternative, if found guilty, he should be convicted
only of the crime of slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code.33
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asseverates that the
instant Petition is fatally defective because it raises purely factual issues contrary to
the mandatory provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; that the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes (TSN) taken during appellant’s arraignment on November 6,
2001 clearly shows that appellant, through Atty. Cabahug, raised an affirmative
defense, hence, appellant cannot now change his theory; that the prosecution
established the fact that appellant committed the acts complained of by virtue of the
direct, positive and categorical testimonies of VVV, corroborated by MMM and duly
supported by the medical examination conducted by Dr. Manalo and the entry in the
police blotter; that VVV’s and MMM’s statements are consistent with their
allegations in their respective complaint-affidavits; and that appellant failed to
present any reason or ground to set aside the decisions of the RTC and the CA.
Furthermore, the OSG argues that there is no ambiguity in the Information as the
allegations are clear and explicit to constitute the essential elements of the offense of
child abuse, to wit: (a) minority of the victim; (b) acts complained of are prejudicial
to the development of the child-victim; and (c) the said acts are covered by the
pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603. The OSG submits that
appellant cannot now feign ignorance of the offense under which he was specifically
charged, and to which he voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned. 34
_______________
33 Supra note 1 and Appellant’s Reply dated October 15, 2008; Rollo, pp. 183-
192.
34 OSG’s Comment dated June 6, 2008; Rollo, pp. 151-179.
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VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009 759
Sanchez vs. People
However, the OSG opines that the CA erred in modifying the indeterminate
sentence imposed by the RTC. The offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse as defined
and punished under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, a special law, carries the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period which is a penalty defined in the Revised
Penal Code. The OSG states that the RTC correctly applied the first part of Section 1
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing appellant to an indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years and
four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, the minimum term thereof being
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to the prescribed penalty, as
there were no attendant mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances. Thus, the OSG
prays that the instant petition be denied and the assailed CA Decision be modified as
aforementioned but affirmed in all other respects.35
Our Ruling
The instant Petition is bereft of merit.
Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610, child abuse refers to the
maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes any of the
following:
5
 (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting
in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.36
_______________
35 Id.
36 Emphasis supplied.
760
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanchez vs. People
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 37 of P.D. No. 603 and Section
10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
_______________
37 ART. 59. Crimes.—Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who:
(1) Conceals or abandons the child with intent to make such child lose his civil
status.
(2) Abandons the child under such circumstances as to deprive him of the love,
care and protection he needs.
(3) Sells or abandons the child to another person for valuable consideration.
(4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family’s
station in life and financial conditions permit.
(5) Fails or refuses, without justifiable grounds, to enroll the child as required
by Article 72.
(6)  Causes, abates, or permits the truancy of the child from the school where
he is enrolled. “Truancy” as here used means absence without cause for more than
twenty schooldays, not necessarily consecutive.
It shall be the duty of the teacher in charge to report to the parents the absences
of the child the moment these exceed five schooldays.
(7)  Improperly exploits the child by using him, directly or indirectly, such as
for purposes of begging and other acts which are inimical to his interest and welfare.
(8)  Inflicts cruel and unusual punishment upon the child or deliberately
subjects him to indignitions and other excessive chastisement that embarrass or
humiliate him.
(9) Causes or encourages the child to lead an immoral or dissolute life.
(10) Permits the child to possess, handle or carry a deadly weapon, regardless
of its ownership.
(11)  Allows or requires the child to drive without a license or with a license
which the parent knows to have been illegally procured. If the motor vehicle driven
by the child belongs to the parent, it shall [be] presumed that he permitted or ordered
the child to drive.
“Parents” as here used shall include the guardian and the head of the institution
or foster home which has custody of the child.
761
VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009 761
Sanchez vs. People
“SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and
Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development.—
(a)  Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
In this connection, our ruling in Araneta v. People38 is instructive:
“As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those
enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct
acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules and
Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse,
cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one
another and from the act prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to
petitioner’s assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under
Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four
acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child
cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an
act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word “or” is a disjunctive
term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things
enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies.
Hence, the use of “or” in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase
“be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development”
supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child
abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The fourth
penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition
for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned
provision does not warrant such construal.”39
_______________
38 G.R. No. 174205, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 323.
39 Id., at pp. 333-335. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
6
 761
VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009 761
Sanchez vs. People
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child
abuse but merely as slight physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266
of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that when the incident
happened, VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as
mandated by the Constitution.40 As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical
abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of appellant falls
squarely within this definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant’s contention.
In the same manner, we reject appellant’s claim that the Information filed against
him was defective. In Resty Jumaquio v. Hon. Joselito C. Villarosa,41 we held that
what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but
the actual facts recited therein. Without doubt, the averments in the Information
clearly make out the offense of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
The following were alleged: (1) the minority of VVV; (2) the acts constituting
physical abuse, committed by appellant against VVV; and (3) said acts are clearly
punishable under R.A. No. 7610 in relation to P.D. No. 603. Indeed, as argued by the
OSG, the commission of the offense is clearly recited in the Information, and
appellant cannot now feign ignorance of this.
Appellant could only proffer the defense of denial. Notably, the RTC found VVV
and MMM to be credible witnesses, whose testimonies deserve full credence. It bears
stressing that full weight and respect are usually accorded by the appellate court to
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge had
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. 42Equally noteworthy is the
fact that the CA did not disturb
_______________
40  Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, of the 1987 Constitution provides that
“The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including proper care
and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.”
41 G.R. No. 165924, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 204.
42 People v. Roma, G.R. No. 147996, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 413, 426-
427.
763
VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009 763
Sanchez vs. People
the RTC’s appreciation of the witnesses’ credibility. Thus, we apply the cardinal rule
that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on such findings, are accorded respect, if not
conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA. The exception is when it is
established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted
cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the
case. We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the CA and we find no reason to
deviate from the findings of both courts and their uniform conclusion that appellant
is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Other Acts of Child
Abuse.43
However, the penalty imposed upon appellant by the CA deserves review. The
imposable penalty under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610
is prision mayorin its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the RTC imposed upon appellant the penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum.
The CA modified this by imposing upon appellant the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, of prision
mayor, postulating that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the RTC should have
imposed on appellant an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the same.” 44 On the other hand, the OSG contends
that the RTC appropriately applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law, citing our ruling
in People v. Simon.45
We agree with the OSG.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides:
_______________
43 Casitas v. People, G.R. No. 152358, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 242, 248.
44 Sec. 1, Act No. 4103.
45 G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555.
764
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanchez vs. People
“SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said
law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same.”
To repeat, the penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in its
minimum period. This penalty is derived from, and defined in, the Revised Penal
Code. Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the Revised Penal Code
for graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper period should be
applied. Thus, where the special law adopted penalties from the Revised Penal Code,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it would in felonies. 46 In People v.
Simon,47 the Court applied the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
7
Law to cases of illegal drugs. In Cadua v. Court of Appeals,48 the Court applied the 50 Supra note 38.
same principle to cases involving illegal possession of firearms. In those instances, 51 Id., at p. 332. (Citations omitted.)
the offenses were also penalized under special laws. Finally, in Dulla v. Court of **  Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales per
Appeals,49 a case involving sexual abuse of a child as penalized underSection 5(b), Special Order No. 646 dated May 15, 2009.
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the Court likewise applied the same first clause of the ***  Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per
Indeterminate Sentence Law. This case should be no exception. Special Order No. 631 dated April 29, 2009.
In the absence of any modifying circumstances, and because it is favorable to 766
appellant, we find the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days 766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of prision correccional, as mini-
_______________ Sanchez vs. People
Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modification.
46 Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, First Edition, p. 205, citing People v. Note.—The Information need not use the language of the statute in stating the
Martin Simon; id. acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. (People vs. Cadampog,
47 Supra note 45. 428 SCRA 336 [2004])
48 371 Phil. 627; 312 SCRA 703 (1999). ——o0o—— 
49 382 Phil. 791; 326 SCRA 32 (2000).
765  
VOL. 588, JUNE 5, 2009 765
Sanchez vs. People
mum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, proper.
As a final word, we reiterate our view in Araneta,50 to wit:
“Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a
national comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of
the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate
under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that “The State shall defend the right of
the children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.” This piece of legislation supplies the
inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely,
the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth
Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence
against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties
for their commission, and a means by which child traffickers could easily be
prosecuted and penalized.”51
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
February 20, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27817 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that appellant Leonilo Sanchez is hereby sentenced to four (4) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Carpio,** Corona***and Peralta, JJ., concur.
_______________

8

G.R. No. 186080. August 14, 2009.*
JULIUS AMANQUITON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Criminal Law; Presumption of Innocence; An accused is entitled to an
acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt—it is the primordial
duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty.
—The Constitution itself provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. An accused is entitled to an
acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. It is the primordial duty
of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction
becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty. The
necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt was discussed in People v.
Berroya (283 SCRA 111 [1997]): [Proof beyond reasonable doubt] lies in the
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
367
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 367
Amanquiton vs. People
fact that in a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it
enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means
of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as
public officers, as therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of
tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed
and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position, the
law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction where there is
reasonable doubt of guilt. However, proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only
moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.
Same; Same; Pro Reo Principle; Equipoise Rule; Words and Phrases; Where
the evidence on an issue of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the
evidence weighs, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused; If inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and will not justify a conviction.
—While we ordinarily do not interfere with the findings of the lower courts on the
trustworthiness of witnesses, when there appear in the records facts and
circumstances of real weight which might have been overlooked or misapprehended,
this Court cannot shirk from its duty to sift fact from fiction. We apply the pro
reo principle and the equipoise rule in this case. Where the evidence on an issue of
fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the evidence weighs, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the accused. If inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and will not justify a conviction.
Same; Same; Child Abuse Law (Republic Act No. 7610); Republic Act No.
7610 supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against
children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the
Child and Youth Welfare Code; While Republic Act No. 7610 is a statute that
provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the commission of child
abuse and exploitation, this noble statute should not be used as a sharp sword, ready
to be brandished against an accused even if there
368
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Amanquiton vs. People
is a patent lack of proof to convict him of the crime—the right of an accused to
liberty is as important as a minor’s right not to be subjected to any form of abuse.—
Time and again, we have held that: Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared
towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for the survival of
the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping
with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that “The
State shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including proper care
and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.” This piece
of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed
against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or
the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for
strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has
stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by which child traffickers could
easily be prosecuted and penalized. Also, the definition of child abuse is expanded to
encompass not only those specific acts of child abuse under existing laws but
includes also “other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development.” However, this noble statute
should not be used as a sharp sword, ready to be brandished against an accused even
if there is a patent lack of proof to convict him of the crime. The right of an accused
to liberty is as important as a minor’s right not to be subjected to any form of abuse.
Both are enshrined in the Constitution. One need not be sacrificed for the other.
9
 Same; Same; Same; While unfortunately, incidents of maltreatment of children
abound amidst social ills, care has to be likewise taken that wayward youths should
not be cuddled by a misapplication of the law—society, through its laws, should
correct the deviant conduct of the youth rather than take the cudgels for them.—
There is no dearth of law, rules and regulations protecting a child from any and all
forms of abuse. While unfortunately, incidents of maltreatment of children abound
amidst social ills, care has to be likewise taken that wayward youths should not be
cuddled by a misapplication of the law. Society, through its laws, should correct the
deviant conduct of the youth rather than take the cudgels for them. Lest we regress to
a culture of juvenile delinquency and errant
369
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 369
Amanquiton vs. People
behavior, laws for the protection of children against abuse should be applied
only and strictly to actual abusers. The objective of this seemingly catch-all
provision on abuses against children will be best achieved if parameters are set in the
law itself, if only to prevent baseless accusations against innocent individuals.
Perhaps the time has come for Congress to review this matter and institute the
safeguards necessary for the attainment of its laudable ends.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Fernandez & Associates Law Firm for petitioner.
  The Solicitor General for respondent.
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner Julius Amanquiton was a purok leader of Barangay Western Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila. As a purok leader and barangay tanod, he was responsible for
the maintenance of cleanliness, peace and order of the community.
At 10:45 p.m. on October 30, 2001, petitioner heard an explosion. He, together
with two auxiliary tanod, Dominador Amante1 and a certain Cabisudo, proceeded to
Sambong Street where the explosion took place. Thereafter, they saw complainant
Leoselie John Bañaga being chased by a certain Gil Gepulane. Upon learning that
Bañaga was the one who threw the pillbox2 that caused the explosion, petitioner and
his companions also went after him.
On reaching Bañaga’s house, petitioner, Cabisudo and Amante knocked on the
door. When no one answered, they decided to hide some distance away. After five
minutes,
_______________
1 Co-accused of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 122996. Amante opted to apply
for probation. Rollo, p. 34.
2 An improvised explosive device.
370
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Amanquiton vs. People
Bañaga came out of the house. At this juncture, petitioner and his companions
immediately apprehended him. Bañaga’s aunt, Marilyn Alimpuyo, followed them to
the barangay hall.
Bañaga was later brought to the police station. On the way to the police station,
Gepulane suddenly appeared from nowhere and boxed Bañaga in the face. This
caused petitioner to order Gepulane’s apprehension along with Bañaga. An incident
report was made.3
During the investigation, petitioner learned Bañaga had been previously mauled
by a group made up of a certain Raul, Boyet and Cris but failed to identify two
others. The mauling was the result of gang trouble in a certain residental compound
in Taguig City. Bañaga’s mauling was recorded in a barangay blotter which read:
10-30-201
Time: 10-15 p.m.
RECORD purposes
Dumating dito sa Barangay Head Quarters si Dossen 4Bañaga si Alimpuyo
16 years old student nakatira sa 10 B Kalachuchi St. M.B.T. M.M.
_______________
3 “10-30-201
Time: 10-06 p.m.
RECORD purposes
                   Nagsadya si Gel Pulane Y Castello 25 yrs. Old Binata may trabaho
Tubong Bacolod nakatira sa no. 03 Sambong St., M.B.T. Mla.
                   Upang ireklamo si Neosen (sic) Banaga 14 yrs old Dahil siya ang
nakita-naming na naghagis ng pillbox sa harap ng tricycle na nakaparada sa
kahabaan ng sambong.
Patunay dito ang kanyang lagda.”
Gel pulanes (sgd).” Rollo, p. 8.
4 Dossen Bañaga is the same person as Leoselie John A. Bañaga.
371
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 371
Amanquiton vs. People
Upang ireklamo yong sumapak sa akin sina Raul[,] Boyet [at] Cris at
yong dalawang sumapak ay hindi ko kilala. Nang yari ito kaninang 10:p.m.
araw ng [M]artes taong kasalukuyan at yong labi ko pumutok at yong
kabilang mata ko ay namaga sa bandang kanan. Ang iyong kaliwang mukha
at pati yong likod ko ay may tama sa sapak.
Patunay dito ang aking lagda.
Dossen Banaga (sgd.)
Thereafter, an Information for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI,
RA5 71606 in relation to Section 5 (j) of R.A. 8369 was filed against petitioner,
Amante and Gepulane. The Information read:
10
 “The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Julius
Amanquiton, Dominador Amante and Gil Gepulane of the crime of Violations of
Section 10 (a) Article VI, Republic Act No. 7610 in relation to Section 5 (j) of R.A.
No. 8369 committed as follows:
That on the 30th day of October, 2001, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused in conspiracy with one another, armed with nightstick, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence,
a form of physical abuse, upon the person of Leoselie John A. [Bañaga], seventeen
(17) years old, a minor, by then and there manhandling him and hitting him with
their nightsticks, thus, constituting other acts of child abuse, which is inimical or
prejudicial to child’s development, in violation of the above-mentioned law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
On arraignment, petitioner and Amante both pleaded not guilty. Gepulane
remains at-large.
_______________
5 Republic Act.
6 An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for Its Violation and for
Other Purposes.
372
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Amanquiton vs. People
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. Paulito
Cruz, medico-legal officer of the Taguig-Pateros District Hospital who attended to
Bañaga on October 30, 2001, Bañaga himself, Alimpuyo and Rachelle Bañaga
(complainant’s mother).
The defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Amante and Briccio Cuyos,
then deputy chief barangaytanod of the same barangay. Cuyos testified that the
blotter notation entered by Gepulane and Bañaga was signed in his presence and that
they read the contents thereof before affixing their signatures.
On May 10, 2005, the RTC found petitioner and Amante guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 7 The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
read:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused JULIUS
AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR AMANTE “GUILTY” beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Article VI Sec. 10 (a) of Republic Act 7610 in relation to
Section 3 (j) of Republic Act 8369, hereby sentences accused JULIUS
AMANQUITON and DOMINADOR AMANTE a straight penalty of thirty (30) days
of Arresto Menor.
Both accused Julius Amanquiton and Dominador Amante are hereby directed to
pay Leoselie John A. Bañaga the following:
1. Actual damages in the amount of P5,000.00;
2. Moral Damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and
3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00.
The case against the accused Gil Gepulane is hereby sent to the ARCHIVES to
be revived upon the arrest of the accused. Let [a] warrant of arrest be issued against
him.
SO ORDERED.”
Amanquiton’s motion for reconsideration was denied.8
_______________
7 Rollo, pp. 52-67.
8 Resolution dated June 29, 2006. Id., pp. 76-77.
373
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 373
Amanquiton vs. People
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was given due course. On August 28,
2008, the CA rendered a decision9which affirmed the conviction but increased the
penalty. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision read:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accused-appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional maximum up to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum as
maximum. In addition to the damages already awarded, a fine of thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) is hereby solidarily imposed the proceeds of which shall be
administered as a cash fund by the DSWD.
IT IS SO ORDERED.”
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.10
Hence, this petition. Petitioner principally argues that the facts of the case as
established did not constitute a violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7160
and definitely did not prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
The Constitution itself provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 11 An accused is entitled to an
acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. 12 It is the primordial
duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral
certainty.13
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt was discussed in People v.
Berroya:14 
_______________
9  Id., pp. 34-50.
10 Resolution dated January 15, 2009. Id., p. 51.
11 Constitution, Article III, Section 14 (2).
12 Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 2.
13 People v. Fernandez, 434 Phil. 435, 445; 385 SCRA 224, 242 (2002).
11
 14 347 Phil. 410, 423; 283 SCRA 111, 122 (1997).
374
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Amanquiton vs. People
“[Proof beyond reasonable doubt] lies in the fact that in a criminal prosecution,
the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory
finding in its hands; with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of
authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, as therefore as speaking
semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to
that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for
life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to
be no conviction where there is reasonable doubt of guilt. However, proof beyond
reasonable doubt requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.”
The RTC and CA hinged their finding of petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt (of the crime of child abuse) solely on the supposed positive identification by
the complainant and his witness (Alimpuyo) of petitioner and his co-accused as the
perpetrators of the crime.
We note Bañaga’s statement that, when he was apprehended by petitioner and
Amante, there were many people around. 15 Yet, the prosecution presented only
Bañaga and his aunt, Alimpuyo, as witnesses to the mauling incident itself. Where
were the other people who could have testified, in an unbiased manner, on the
alleged mauling of Bañaga by petitioner and Amante, as supposedly witnessed by
Alimpuyo?16 The testimonies of the two other prosecution witnesses, Dr. Paulito
Cruz and Rachelle Bañaga, did not fortify Bañaga’s claim that petitioner mauled
him, for the following reasons: Dr. Cruz merely attended to Bañaga’s injuries, while
Rachelle testified that she saw Bañaga only after the injuries have been inflicted on
him.
We note furthermore that, Bañaga failed to controvert the validity of
the barangay blotter he signed regarding the mauling incident which happened prior
to his apprehension by
_______________
15 Rollo, p. 90.
16 Id.
375
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 375
Amanquiton vs. People
petitioner. Neither did he ever deny the allegation that he figured in a prior battery by
gang members.
All this raises serious doubt on whether Bañaga’s injuries were really inflicted by
petitioner, et al., to the exclusion of other people. In fact, petitioner testified clearly
that Gepulane, who had been harboring a grudge against Bañaga, came out of
nowhere and punched Bañaga while the latter was being brought to the police
station. Gepulane, not petitioner, could very well have caused Bañaga’s injuries.
Alimpuyo admitted that she did not see who actually caused the bloodied
condition of Bañaga’s face because she had to first put down the baby she was then
carrying when the melee started.17 More importantly, Alimpuyo stated that she was
told by Bañaga that, while he was allegedly being held by the neck by petitioner,
others were hitting him. Alimpuyo was obviously testifying not on what she
personally saw but on what Bañaga told her.
While we ordinarily do not interfere with the findings of the lower courts on the
trustworthiness of witnesses, when there appear in the records facts and
circumstances of real weight which might have been overlooked or misapprehended,
this Court cannot shirk from its duty to sift fact from fiction.
We apply the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule in this case. Where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the
evidence weighs, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. 18 If
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence
_______________
17 Id., p. 16.
18 People v. Abarquez, G.R. No. 150762, 20 January 2006, 479 SCRA 225, 239.
376
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Amanquiton vs. People
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and will not justify a conviction.19
Time and again, we have held that:
“Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a
national comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of
the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate
under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that “The State shall defend the right of
the children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.” This piece of legislation supplies the
inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes committed against children, namely,
the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth
Welfare Code. As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence
against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties
for their commission, and a means by which child traffickers could easily be
prosecuted and penalized. Also, the definition of child abuse is expanded to
encompass not only those specific acts of child abuse under existing laws but
includes also “other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development.”20
12
 However, this noble statute should not be used as a sharp sword, ready to be
brandished against an accused even if there is a patent lack of proof to convict him of
the crime. The right of an accused to liberty is as important as a minor’s right not to
be subjected to any form of abuse. Both are enshrined in the Constitution. One need
not be sacrificed for the other.
 There is no dearth of law, rules and regulations protecting a child from any and
all forms of abuse. While unfortunately,
_______________

19 People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 633; 306 SCRA 157, 181 (1999).
20 Gonzalo Araneta v. People, G.R. No. 174205, 27 June 2008, 556 SCRA 323,
332.
377
VOL. 596, AUGUST 14, 2009 377
Amanquiton vs. People
G.R. No. 182941. July 3, 2009.*
incidents of maltreatment of children abound amidst social ills, care has to be
ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
likewise taken that wayward youths should not be cuddled by a misapplication of the
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
law. Society, through its laws, should correct the deviant conduct of the youth rather
Criminal Law; Exempting Circumstances; Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
than take the cudgels for them. Lest we regress to a culture of juvenile delinquency
2006 (Republic Act No. 9344); The defense is entitled to present all alternative
and errant behavior, laws for the protection of children against abuse should be
defenses available to it, even inconsistent ones.—While the defense, on appeal,
applied only and strictly to actual abusers.
raises a new ground—i.e., exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344—
The objective of this seemingly catch-all provision on abuses against children
that implies an admission of guilt, this consideration in no way swayed the
will be best achieved if parameters are set in the law itself, if only to prevent baseless
conclusion we made above, as the defense is entitled to present all alternative
accusations against innocent individuals. Perhaps the time has come for Congress to
defenses available to it, even inconsistent ones. We note, too, that the defense’s
review this matter and institute the safeguards necessary for the attainment of its
claim of exemption from liability was made for the first time in its appeal to the CA.
laudable ends.
While this may initially imply an essential change of theory that is usually
We reiterate our ruling in People v. Mamalias:21
disallowed on appeal for reasons of fairness, no essential change is really involved as
“We emphasize that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to
the claim for exemption from liability is not incompatible with the evi-
send people to the gaol but to do justice. The prosecution’s job is to prove that the
_______________
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must be based on the strength
of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Thus, when the evidence
* SECOND DIVISION.
of the prosecution is not enough to sustain a conviction, it must be rejected and the
667
accused absolved and released at once.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 28, 2008 decision VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 667
and January 15, 2009 resolution of Court of Appeals are reversed and SET ASIDE. Sierra vs. People
Petitioner Julius Amanquiton is hereby ACQUITTED of violation of Section 10 (a), dence submitted below and with the lower courts’ conclusion that the
Article VI of RA 7160. petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. An exempting circumstance, by its nature,
SO ORDERED. admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from criminal
Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro and Bersamin, liability; in other words, the accused committed a crime, but he cannot be held
JJ., concur. criminally liable therefor because of an exemption granted by law. In admitting this
type of defense on appeal, we are not unmindful, too, that the appeal of a criminal
case (even one made under Rule 45) opens the whole case for review, even on
  questions that the parties did not raise. By mandate of the Constitution, no less, we
are bound to look into every circumstance and resolve every doubt in favor of the

13
accused. It is with these considerations in mind and in obedience to the direct and
more specific commands of R.A. No. 9344 on how the cases of children in conflict
with the law should be handled that we rule in this Rule 45 petition.
Same; Same; Same; The age of the accused is critical for purposes of his
entitlement to exemption from criminal liability under Republic Act No. 9344, while
the age of the victim is material in characterizing the crime committed and in
considering the resulting civil liability that R.A. No. 9344 does not remove.—In
tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset that the ages of both
the petitioner and the complaining victim are material and are at issue. The age of the
petitioner is critical for purposes of his entitlement to exemption from criminal
liability under R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the latter is material in characterizing
the crime committed and in considering the resulting civil liability that R.A. No.
9344 does not remove.
Same; Same; Same; The intent of Republic Act No. 9344 is to promote and
protect the rights of a child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing a
system that would ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to
their well-being through a variety of disposition measures such as care, guidance
and super-vision orders, counseling, probation, foster care, education and
vocational training programs and other alternatives to institutional care; The
current law also drew its changes from the principle of restorative justice that it
espouses—it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and gives minors of
these ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion and intervention
measures.—R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect
on May 20,
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the rights of a child in conflict with
the law or a child at risk by providing a system that would ensure that children are
dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being through a variety of
disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders, counseling,
probation, foster care, education and vocational training programs and other alter-
natives to institutional care. More importantly in the context of this case, this law
modifies as well the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor
offenders; it changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, previously provided—i.e., from “under nine years of age”
and “above nine years of age and under fifteen” (who acted without discern-ment)—
to “fifteen years old or under” and “above fifteen but below 18” (who acted without
discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability. In providing
exemption, the new law—as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did—
presumes that the minor offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish
right from wrong, so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they
cannot be held accountable. The current law also drew its changes from the principle
of restorative justice that it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative
years and gives minors of these ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion
and intervention measures.
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; In a criminal case, the burden of proof
to establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to
prove all the essential ingredients of the crime; The defense, not the prosecution, has
the burden of showing by evidence that the accused was 15 years old or less when he
committed the rape charged—minority and age are not elements of the crime of
rape.—Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, refers
to the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue in order to establish his
or her claim or defense. In a criminal case, the burden of proof to establish the guilt
of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to prove all the essential
ingredients of the crime. The prosecution completes its case as soon as it has
presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required elements. At this
point, the burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution
has shown by evidence, or to prove by evidence the circumstances showing that the
accused did not commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be
669
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 669
Sierra vs. People
held liable therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence
and had done everything that the law requires it to do. The burden of evidence has
now shifted to the defense which now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the
accused, even if guilty, should be exempt from criminal liability because of his age
when he committed the crime. The defense, therefore, not the prosecution, has the
burden of showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less when he
committed the rape charged. This conclusion can also be reached by considering that
minority and age are not elements of the crime of rape; the prosecution therefore has
no duty to prove these circumstances. To impose the burden of proof on the
prosecution would make minority and age integral elements of the crime when
clearly they are not. If the prosecution has a burden related to age, this burden relates
to proof of the age of the victim as a circumstance that qualifies the crime of rape.
Same; Same; Same; Section 7, Republic Act No. 9344, while a relatively new
law (having been passed only in 2006), does not depart from the jurisprudence
existing at that time on the evidence that may be admitted as satisfactory proof of the
accused’s minority and age.—Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law
(having been passed only in 2006), does not depart from the jurisprudence existing at
that time on the evidence that may be admitted as satisfactory proof of the accused’s
minority and age. In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino, 3 Phil. 59 (1903), we
accepted testimonial evidence to prove the minority and age of the accused in the
absence of any document or other satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth.
This was followed by U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 186 (1905), where the defendant’s
statement about his age was considered sufficient, even without corroborative
evidence, to establish that he was a minor of 16 years at the time he committed the
offense charged. Subsequent-ly, in People v. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 (1991), the
14
Court appreciated the minority and age of the accused on the basis of his claim that
he was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense in the absence of
any contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the prosecution. Then,
in People v. Villagracia, 226 SCRA 374 (1993), we found the testimony of the
accused that he was less than 15 years old sufficient to establish his minority. We
reiterated these dicta in the cases of People v. Morial, 368 SCRA 96
(2001), and David v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 727 (1998), and ruled that the
allegations of minority and age by the accused will be accepted as facts
670
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
upon the prosecution’s failure to disprove the claim by contrary evidence.
 Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; The testimony that the accused was 15 years
old when the crime took place should be read to mean that he was not more than 15
years old as this is the more favorable reading that Republic Act No. 9344 directs.—
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that
any doubt on the age of the child must be resolved in his favor. Hence, any doubt in
this case regarding the petitioner’s age at the time he committed the rape should be
resolved in his favor. In other words, the testimony that the petitioner as 15 years old
when the crime took place should be read to mean that he was not more than 15
years old as this is the more favorable reading that R.A. No. 9344 directs. Given the
express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its implementing rules, and established
jurisprudence in accord with the latest statutory developments, the CA therefore
cannot but be in error in not appreciating and giving evidentiary value to the
petitioner’s and CCC’s testimonies relating to the former’s age.
 Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9344 has retroactive application—what
is controlling with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the accused is
not his age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but his age at the time of the
commission of the offense.—That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No.
9344 took effect and that he is no longer a minor (he was already 20 years old when
he took the stand) will not bar him from enjoying the benefit of total exemption that
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants. As we explained in discussing Sections 64 and 68
of R.A. No. 9344 in the recent case of Ortega v. People, 562 SCRA 450 (2008),
Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and
below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the
exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL’s age at the time of
the promulgation of judgment but the CICL’s age at the time of the commission of
the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility
has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344
is also justified under Article 22 of the RPC, as amended, which provides that penal
laws are to be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is not
671
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 671
Sierra vs. People
found to be a habitual criminal. Nothing in the records of this case indicates
that the petitioner is a habitual criminal.
 Same; Qualified Rape; Guidelines in Appreciating the Age of the
Complainant in Qualified Rape.—The relationship between the petitioner and AAA,
as siblings, does not appear to be a disputed matter. Their mother, CCC, declared in
her testimony that AAA and the petitioner are her children. The prosecution and the
defense likewise stipulated in the proceedings below that the relationship exists. We
find, however, that AAA’s minority, though alleged in the Information, had not been
sufficiently proven. People v. Pruna, 390 SCRA 577 (2002), laid down these
guidelines in appreciating the age of the complainant: In order to remove any
confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the
following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance. 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party
is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In
the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear
and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the
exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the
victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is
alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document,
or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the
complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the
age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. The records fail to show any
evidence proving the age of AAA. They do not likewise show that the petitioner ever
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
expressly and clearly admitted AAA’s age at the time of the rape. Pursuant
to Pruna, neither can his failure to object to AAA’s testimony be taken against him.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Dwelling; Damages; Exemplary
Damages; Even if dwelling as an aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the
Information, established jurisprudence holds that it may nevertheless be appreciated
as basis for the award of exemplary damages.—We uphold the grant of moral
15
damages of P50,000.00 but increase the awarded exemplary damages P30,000.00,
both pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. Moral damages are automatically awarded
to rape victims without the necessity of proof; the law assumes that the victim
suffered moral injuries entitling her to this award. Article 2230 of the Civil Code
justifies the award of exemplary damages because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of relationship between AAA and petitioner and dwelling. As
discussed above, the relationship (between the parties) is not disputed. We appreciate
dwelling as an aggravating circumstance based on AAA’s testimony that the rape
was committed in their house. While dwelling as an aggravating circumstance was
not alleged in the Information, established jurisprudence holds that it may
nevertheless be appreciated as basis for the award of exemplary damages.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
  The Solicitor General for respondent.
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda (petitioner) for the review
on certiorari1 of the Decision2 and Reso-
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2 Dated February 29, 2008; Rollo, pp. 81-103.
673
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 673
Sierra vs. People
lution3 of the Court of Appeals4 (CA) that affirmed with modification his conviction
for the crime of qualified rape rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
159, Pasig City, in its decision of April 5, 2006.
The Antecedent Facts
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA5 was playing with her friend BBB in the
second floor of her family’s house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a
knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. The petitioner then
undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA,
undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male organ
into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher) and to
Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who both accompanied AAA to
the barangay office. AAA was later subjected to physical examination that revealed
a laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of
the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner was charged with rape under
the following Information:
_______________
3 Dated May 22, 2008; id., pp. 115-117.
4 Docketed as CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218, and penned by Associate Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza and Associate Justice
Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring.
5 The real name of the victim as well as those of her immediate family members
is withheld per Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger
Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination, and for Other Purposes) and R.A. No. 9262 (An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes).
674
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
“On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, a minor, 15 years old, with lewd designs and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his (accused) sister, AAA, thirteen
years of age, against the latter’s will and consent.
Contrary to law.”6
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the defenses of denial
and alibi. He claimed that he was selling cigarettes at the time of the alleged rape. He
also claimed that AAA only invented her story because she bore him a grudge for the
beatings he gave her. The parties’ mother (CCC) supported the petitioner’s story; she
also stated that AAA was a troublemaker. Both CCC and son testified that the
petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when the alleged incident happened.7
The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner raped her; she
confirmed the petitioner’s claim that AAA bore her brother a grudge.
On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ROBERT
SIERRA y CANEDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
(Violation of R.A. 8353 in relation to SC A.M. 99-1-13) and hereby sentences the
said juvenile in conflict with law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua; and to indemnify the victim the amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity,
P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.”8
_______________
6 This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 120292-H; Rollo, pp. 82-83.
7 Id., pp. 51 and 53.
8 Id., pp. 81-82.
675
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 675
16
 Sierra vs. People
The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by attacking AAA’s
credibility. He also invoked paragraph 1, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)9 to exempt him from criminal liability considering
that he was only 15 years old at the time the crime was com-mitted.
The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioner’s conviction with modification as to
penalty as follows:
“WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in convicting Robert
Sierra, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
Robert Sierra has to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of RECLUSION TEMPORALMAXIMUM. The award of damages are likewise
affirmed.
SO ORDERED.”10
In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability, the CA held:
“As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that Robert
is not exempt from liability. First, it was not clearly established and proved by the
defense that Robert was 15 years old or below at the time of the commission of the
crime. It was incumbent for the defense to present Robert’s birth certificate if it was
to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344. Neither is the suspension of sentence
available to Robert as the Supreme Court, in one case, clarified that:
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20,
2006. Section 38 of the law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence.—Once the child
who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
_______________
9  SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.—A child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. x x x
10 Rollo, pp. 102-103.  following issues:
676
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the
juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of
P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not
been deleted from Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Evidently, the
intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as provided
in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-
1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable
penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life impri-sonment or reclusion
perpetua to death or death, are dis-qualified from having their sentences
suspended.11
The CA denied the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration; hence, the
present petition.
The Issues
The petitioner no longer assails the prosecution’s evidence on his guilt of the
crime charged; what he now assails is the
_______________
11 Id., pp. 127-129.
677
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 677
Sierra vs. People
failure of the CA to apply paragraph 1, Section 6 12 of R.A. No. 9344 under the
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 on the petitioner’s exemption from criminal liability;
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the
defense to present the petitioner’s birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of
R.A. No. 9344 when the burden of proving his age lies with the prosecution
by express provisions of R.A. No. 9344; and
(3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in Declarador v.
Hon. Gubaton13 thereby denying the petitioner the benefit of exemption from
criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344.
The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who bears the burden of
proof for purposes of determining exemption from criminal liability based on the age
of the petitioner at the time the crime was committed.
17
 The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on the prosecution as the
party who stands to lose the case if no evidence is presented to show that the
petitioner was not a
_______________
12 SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.—A child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing
laws.
13 G.R. No. 159208, August 18, 2006, 499 SCRA 341.
678
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
15-year old minor entitled to the exempting benefit provided under Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9344.14 He additionally claims that Sections 3, 15 7,16 and 6817 of the law also
provide a presumption of minority in favor of a child in conflict with the law, so that
any doubt regarding his age should be resolved in his favor.
The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and evidence on record—
specifically: the allegation of the Information, the testimonies of the petitioner and
CCC that the prosecution never objected to, and the findings of the RTC—
established that he was not more than 15 years old at the time of the commission of
the crime.
The People’s Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
counters that the burden belongs to the peti-
_______________
14 Rollo, pp. 10-23.
15 SEC. 3. Liberal Construction of this Act.—In case of doubt, the
interpretation of any of the provisions of this Act, including its implementing rules
and regulations (IRRs), shall be construed liberally in favor of the child in conflict
with the law.
16 SEC. 7. Determination of Age.—The child in conflict with the law shall
enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in
conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The
age of a child may be determined from the child’s birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age
may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
17 SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence.
—Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time
the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They
shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their
sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.
679
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 679
Sierra vs. People
tioner who should have presented his birth certificate or other documentary evidence
proving that his age was 15 years or below. The OSG also stressed that while
petitioner is presumed to be a minor, he is disqualified to have his sentence
suspended following the ruling in Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton.18
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
We examine at the outset the prosecution’s evidence and the findings of the
lower courts on the petitioner’s guilt, since the petition opens the whole case for
review and the issues before us are predicated on the petitioner’s guilt of the crime
charged. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant under the terms of R.A. No.
9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal, not on the civil, liability.
We see no compelling reason, after examination of the CA decision and the
records of the case, to deviate from the lower courts’ findings of guilt. The records
show that the prose-cution established all the elements of the crime charged through
the credible testimony of AAA and the other corro-borating evidence; sexual
intercourse did indeed take place as the information charged. 19 As against AAA’s
testimony, the petitioner could only raise the defenses of denial and alibi—defenses
that, in a long line of cases, we have held to be inherently weak unless supported by
clear and convincing evidence; the petitioner failed to present this required
evidentiary support.20 We have held, too, that as negative defenses, denial and alibi
cannot prevail over the credible and positive
_______________
18 Supra note 13, citing the case of People v. Lugto, 190 SCRA 754 (1990).
19 Rollo, p. 46.
20 People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 20, 2006, 506 SCRA 168, 185.
680
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
18
testimony of the complainant.21 We sustain the lower courts on the issue of
credibility, as we see no compelling reason to doubt the validity of their conclusions
in this regard.
While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground—i.e., exemption from
criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344—that implies an admission of guilt, this
consideration in no way swayed the conclusion we made above, as the defense is
entitled to present all alternative defenses available to it, even inconsistent ones. We
note, too, that the defense’s claim of exemption from liability was made for the first
time in its appeal to the CA. While this may initially imply an essential change of
theory that is usually disallowed on appeal for reasons of fairness, 22 no essential
change is really involved as the claim for exemption from liability is not
incompatible with the evidence submitted below and with the lower courts’
conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. An exempting
circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the
accused is freed from criminal liability; in other words, the accused committed a
crime, but he cannot be held criminally liable therefor because of an exemption
granted by law. In admitting this type of defense on appeal, we are not unmindful,
too, that the appeal of a criminal case (even one made under Rule 45) opens the
whole case for review, even on questions that the parties did not raise. 23 By mandate
of the Constitution, no less, we are bound to look into every circumstance and
resolve every doubt in favor of the accused. 24 It is with these conside-rations in mind
and in obedience to the direct and more specific commands of
_______________
21 Ibid.
22 Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004, 439 SCRA 94, 103.
23 People v. Yam-id, G.R. No. 126116, January 21, 1999, 308 SCRA 651, 655,
citing Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 (1986).
24 Id.
681
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 681
Sierra vs. People
R.A. No. 9344 on how the cases of children in conflict with the law should be
handled that we rule in this Rule 45 petition.
We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the applicable law on
exemption from liability compelling because of the patent errors the CA committed
in these regards. Specifically, the CA’s findings of fact on the issues of age and
minority, premised on the supposed absence of evidence, are contradicted by the
evidence on record; it also manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 25
In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset that the ages of
both the petitioner and the com-plaining victim are material and are at issue. The age
of the petitioner is critical for purposes of his entitlement to exemption from criminal
liability under R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the latter is material in characterizing
the crime committed and in considering the resulting civil liability that R.A. No.
9344 does not remove.
Minority as an Exempting Circumstance
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect on May
20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the rights of a child in conflict with the
law or a child at risk by providing a system that would ensure that children are dealt
with in a manner appropriate to their well-being through a variety of disposition
measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders, counseling, probation,
foster care, education and vocational training programs and other alternatives to
institutional care.26More importantly in the context of this case, this law modifies as
well the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor offenders; it
_______________
25 Manila Doctors Hospital v. So Un Chua, G.R. No. 150355, July 31, 2006,
497 SCRA 230, 238.
26 Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 9344.
682
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code ( RPC), as
amended, previously provided—i.e., from “under nine years of age” and “above nine
years of age and under fifteen” (who acted without discernment)—to “fifteen years
old or under” and “above fifteen but below 18” (who acted without discernment) in
determining exemption from criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new law
—as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did—presumes that the minor
offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right from wrong, so that
their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they cannot be held
accountable.27 The current law also drew its changes from the principle of restorative
justice that it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and
gives minors of these ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion and
intervention measures.28
In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption from criminal liability
because he was not more than 15 years old at the time the rape took place. The CA
disbelieved this claim for the petitioner’s failure to present his birth certificate as
required by Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344.29 The CA also found him disqualified to
avail of a suspension of sentence because the imposable penalty for the crime of rape
is reclusion perpetua to death.
_______________
27 See: Reyes, Revised Penal Code; Book 1 (2008 ed.), p. 40.
28 See Section 4(q) of R.A. No. 9344.
29 SEC. 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and
Below.—Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and
below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and
19
the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development
officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether
to release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention
programs as provided under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and
undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released,
unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.
683
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 683
Sierra vs. People
Burden of Proof
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, refers to
the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue in order to establish his or
her claim or defense. In a criminal case, the burden of proof to establish the  guilt of
the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to prove all the essential
ingredients of the crime. The prosecution completes its case as soon as it has
presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required elements. At this
point, the burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution
has shown by evidence, or to prove by evidence the circumstances showing that the
accused did not commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable
therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence and had done
everything that the law requires it to do. The burden of evidence has now shifted to
the defense which now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused, even if
guilty, should be exempt from criminal liability because of his age when he
committed the crime. The defense, therefore, not the prosecution, has the burden of
showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less when he committed
the rape charged.30
This conclusion can also be reached by considering that minority and age are not
elements of the crime of rape; the prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these
circumstances. To impose the burden of proof on the prosecution would make
minority and age integral elements of the crime
_______________
30 People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 136844, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA 74, 78;
See: People v. Austria, G.R. Nos. 111517-19, July 31, 1996, 260 SCRA 106, 117; Ty
v. People, G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 220, 231; People v.
Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 215, 227; Ortega v. People,
G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 450.
684
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
when clearly they are not.31 If the prosecution has a burden related to age, this burden
relates to proof of the age of the victim as a circumstance that qualifies the crime of
rape.32
Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence 
to Prove the Accused’s Minority and Age
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing that the
petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he committed the crime. Section 7 of
R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how the age of a child in conflict with the law may be
determined:
“SEC. 7. Determination of Age.—x x x The age of a child may be
determined from the child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as
to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.” [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 9344 provides
the implementing details of this provision by enumerating the measures that may be
undertaken by a law enforcement officer to ascertain the child’s age:
_______________
31 The elements of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC, as
amended are: (1) The offender is a man; (2) The offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (3) That such act is accomplished under any of the following
circumstances: (a) by using force and intimidation; or (b) when the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority; or (d) when the woman is under 12 years of
age or demented; Reyes, II  Revised Penal Code, p. 556 (2008 edition).
32 People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. Nos. 131167-68, August 23, 2000, 338 SCRA
582; People v. Villarama, G.R. No. 139211, February 12, 2003, 397 SCRA 306.
685
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 685
Sierra vs. People
“(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the child’s age, such as
(a) Child’s birth certificate;
(b) Child’s baptismal certificate ;or
(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not limited to the child’s school
records, dental records, or travel papers.
(2) x x x
(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or pending receipt of such
documents, the law enforcement officer shall exhaust other measures to determine
age by:
(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information that indicate age (e.g. date
of birthday, grade level in school);
(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that indicate[s] age of the
child (e.g. relatives, neighbors, teachers, classmates);
(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height, built) of the child; and
(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.
20
 x x x”  37 G.R. No. 129295, August 15, 2001, 368 SCRA 96, 125-126.
Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law (having been passed only in
2006), does not depart from the jurisprudence existing at that time on the evidence
that may be admitted as satisfactory proof of the accused’s minority and age.
In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,33 we accepted testimonial evidence to
prove the minority and age of the accused in the absence of any document or other
satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth. This was followed by U.S. v.
Roxas34 where the defendant’s statement about his age was considered sufficient,
even without corroborative evidence, to establish that he was a minor of 16 years at
the time he committed
_______________
33 3 Phil. 59, 61 (1903).
34 5 Phil. 186, 187 (1905).
686
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
the offense charged. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo,35 the Court appreciated the
minority and age of the accused on the basis of his claim that he was 17 years old at
the time of the commission of the offense in the absence of any contradictory
evidence or objection on the part of the prosecution. Then, in People v.
Villagracia,36 we found the testimony of the accused that he was less than 15 years
old sufficient to establish his minority. We reiterated these dicta in the cases
of People v. Morial37 and David v. Court of Appeals,38 and ruled that the allegations
of minority and age by the accused will be accepted as facts upon the prosecution’s
failure to disprove the claim by contrary evidence.
In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial evidence on the
accused’s minority and age upon the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the
absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal
certificate, or similar documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused;
(2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority
of the accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the
part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the
accused’s and/or his relatives’ testimonies are untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the petitioner and CCC both
testified regarding his minority and age when the rape was committed. 39 Second, the
records before us show that these pieces of testimonial evidence were never objected
to by the prosecution. And lastly, the prosecution did not present any contrary
evidence to prove that the petitioner was above 15 years old when the crime was
committed.
_______________
35 G.R. No. 44773, December 4, 1991, 204 SCRA 535, 556-557.
36 G.R. No. 94471, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 374, 381.
38 G.R. Nos. 11168-69, June 17, 1998, 290 SCRA 727, 745.
39 See note 7.
687
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 687
Sierra vs. People
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that
any doubt on the age of the child must be resolved in his favor. 40 Hence, any doubt in
this case regarding the petitioner’s age at the time he committed the rape should be
resolved in his favor. In other words, the testimony that the petitioner as 15 years old
when the crime took place should be read to mean that he was not more than 15
years old as this is the more favorable reading that R.A. No. 9344 directs.
Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its implementing rules, and
established jurisprudence in accord with the latest statutory developments, the CA
therefore cannot but be in error in not appreciating and giving evidentiary value to
the petitioner’s and CCC’s testimonies relating to the former’s age.
Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344
That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 took effect and that
he is no longer a minor (he was already 20 years old when he took the stand) will not
bar him from enjoying the benefit of total exemption that Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344
grants.41 As we explained in discussing Sections 64 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344 42 in the
recent case of   Ortega v.
_______________
40 Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344.
41 Rollo, p. 51.
42 SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old
and Below.—Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and
below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and
the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development
officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child shall determine whether
to release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention
programs, as provided under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and
undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released,
unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.
688
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
People:43
“Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old
and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to
the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL’s age at the
21
time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL’s age at the time of the
commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.” [Emphasis supplied]
The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified under Article 22 of the
RPC, as amended, which provides that penal laws are to be given retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the accused who is not found to be a habitual criminal. Nothing
in the records of this case indicates that the petitioner is a habitual criminal.
Civil Liability
The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the accused shall
continue to be civilly liable despite his exemption from criminal liability; hence, the
petitioner is
_______________
42x x x
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences.—Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time
of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at
the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.
They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their
sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
43 Supra note 30.
689
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 689
Sierra vs. People
civilly liable to AAA despite his exemption from criminal liability. The extent of his
civil liability depends on the crime he would have been liable for had he not been
found to be exempt from criminal liability.
The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-B of the RPC, as
amended, that the petitioner is guilty of qualified rape because of his relationship
with AAA within the second civil degree of consanguinity and the latter’s
minority.44 Both courts accordingly imposed the civil liability corresponding to
qualified rape.
The relationship between the petitioner and AAA, as siblings, does not appear to
be a disputed matter. Their mother, CCC, declared in her testimony that AAA and
the petitioner are her children. The prosecution and the defense likewise stipulated in
the proceedings below that the relationship exists. We find, however, that AAA’s
minority, though alleged in the Information, had not been sufficiently
proven.45 People v. Pruna46 laid down these guidelines in appreciating the age of the
complainant:
“In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing
cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and
_______________
44 1) Whether the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
45 Rollo, pp. 51 and 84.
46 G.R. No. 138471, October 10, 2002, 390 SCRA 577, 603-604; see
also People v. Lopit, G.R. No. 177742, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 372.
690
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity
who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony
of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the
complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.” [Emphasis supplied]
The records fail to show any evidence proving the age of AAA. They do not
likewise show that the petitioner ever expressly and clearly admitted AAA’s age at
the time of the rape. Pursuant to Pruna, neither can his failure to object to AAA’s
testimony be taken against him.
Thus, the required concurrence of circumstances that would upgrade the crime to
qualified rape—i.e., relationship
691
VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 691
Sierra vs. People
22
within the third degree of consanguinity and minority of the victim—does not exist. Unless there are other valid causes for petitioner’s continued detention, we
The crime for which the petitioner should have been found criminally liable should hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE RELEASE under the above terms.
therefore only be simple rape pursuant to par. 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, not Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of
qualified rape. The civil liability that can be imposed on the petitioner follows the Corrections in Muntinlupa City for its immediate implementation. The Director of
characterization of the crime and the attendant circumstances. the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from
Accordingly, we uphold the grant of moral damages of P50,000.00 but increase receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
the awarded exemplary damages P30,000.00, both pursuant to prevailing Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the Juvenile Justice and
jurisprudence.47Moral damages are automatically awarded to rape victims without Welfare Council.
the necessity of proof; the law assumes that the victim suffered moral injuries _______________
entitling her to this award. 48Article 2230 of the Civil Code justifies the award of
exemplary damages because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of 52 Supra note 46.
relationship between AAA and petitioner and dwelling. 49 As discussed above, the 53 People v. Canares, G.R. No. 174065, February 18, 2009, 579 SCRA 588.
relationship (between the parties) is not disputed. We appreciate dwelling as an 693
aggravating circumstance based on AAA’s testimony that the rape was committed in VOL. 591, JULY 3, 2009 693
their house.50 While dwelling as an aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the
Information, established jurisprudence holds that it may nevertheless be appreciated Sierra vs. People
as basis for the award of exemplary damages.51 SO ORDERED.
We modify the awarded civil indemnity of P75,000.00 to P50,000.00, the latter Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Chico-Nazario** and Leonardo-
being the civil indemnity appropriate De Castro, JJ.,***  concur.
_______________ Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—R.A. No. 9344, which took effect on 20 May 2006, merely amended
47 Id., People v. Sia, G.R. No. 174059, February 27, 2009, 580 SCRA 364, Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the
and People v. Bandin, G.R. No. 176531, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 633. suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years
48 People v. Suarez, G.R. Nos. 153573-76, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 333, 352. of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt; Juveniles who have
been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life
49 Paragraph 3 of Article 13 and Article 15 of the RPC, as amended.
imprisonment or reclusion perpetuato death or death, are disqualified from having
50 Rollo, p. 46.
their sentences suspended. (Declarador vs. Gubaton, 499 SCRA 341 [2006])
51 People v. Blancaflor, G.R. No. 130586, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 354,
The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 should be given retroactive effect
365-366.
insofar as it favors a person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal.
 
(Estioca vs. People, 556 SCRA 300 [2008])
692
——o0o—— 
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sierra vs. People
for simple rape52 on the finding that rape had been committed.53
In light of the above discussion and our conclusions, we see no need to discuss
the petition’s third assignment of error.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 29, 2008 and Resolution dated May 22, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal Case No. 120292-H for rape
filed against petitioner Robert Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is
REFERRED to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer who
shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9344. Petitioner is
ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

23

G.R. No. 168546. July 23, 2008.*
MICHAEL PADUA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Actions; Certiorari; Requisites.—For certiorari to prosper, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Words and Phrases; “Without Jurisdiction,”
“Excess of Jurisdiction,” and “Grave Abuse of Discretion,” Defined.—“Without
jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is
“excess of jurisdiction” when the court transcends its power or acts without any
statutory authority. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Criminal Law; Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165);
Probation; Statutory Construction; It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165
that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of
probation.—Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of
Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep.
Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the
privilege of probation, to wit: SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for
Drug Traffickers and Pushers.—Any person convicted for drug trafficking or
pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot
avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No.
968, as amended.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
520
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Padua vs. People
Same; Same; Same; Same; The elementary rule in statutory construction is
that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what it says.—The law is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of
the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words
and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is
known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index
animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should
be no departure.
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. No. 9344); Suspension of
Sentence; Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years
of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence while Section 40 provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or
extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of 21 years.—Suspension of sentence under Section
38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner’s
benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of
age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child
reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child,
order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already
reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for
24
purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40
appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.
521
VOL. 559, JULY 23, 2008 521
Padua vs. People
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Cesar T. Ching for petitioner.
   The Solicitor General for the People.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 dated April 19, 2005 and
Resolution2 dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977
which had respectively dismissed Michael Padua’s petition for certiorari and denied
his motion for reconsideration. Padua’s petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 20043 and July 28, 20044 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for
probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were
charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5, 5 Article II of
Republic Act
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 18-24. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando,
with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa
concurring.
2 Id., at p. 26.
3 Id., at pp. 37-38.
4 CA Rollo, p. 34.
5 SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution
and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals.—The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, includ-
522
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Padua vs. People
No. 9165,6 otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Danger-
_______________
ing any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such
transactions.
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or
transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed in every case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as
runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.
If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or
should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical
involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any
person who organizes, manages or acts as a “financier” of any of the illegal activities
prescribed in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of
imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who
acts as a “protector/coddler” of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
6 An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
Repealing Republic Act No. 6425, Otherwise Known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, approved on
June 7, 2002.
523
VOL. 559, JULY 23, 2008 523
Padua vs. People
ous Drugs Act of 2002,” for selling dangerous drugs.7 The Information reads:
“The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar
Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a. “Allan” and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a.
“Mike,” with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in
relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael
Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and
25
 confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to
PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint
containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found
positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said
law.
Contrary to law.”8
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio,
entered a plea of not guilty.9
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua’s counsel
manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a
plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section
7010 of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed
_______________
7  Rollo, p. 19.
8  Id., at p. 27.
9  Id., at p. 29.
10 SEC. 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor
Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment.—Upon promulgation of the sentence, the court
may, in its discretion, place the accused under probation, even if the sentence
provided under this Act is higher than that provided under existing law on probation,
or impose community service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of probation, the
supervision and rehabilitative surveillance shall be undertaken by
524
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Padua vs. People
no objection.11 Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order 12 stating that the
former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-
arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision 13 dated February 6, 2004, the
RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged:
“In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty
of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5
par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
_______________
the Board through the DOH in coordination with the Board of Pardons and Parole
and the Probation Administration. Upon compliance with the conditions of the
probation, the Board shall submit a written report to the court recommending
termination of probation and a final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the
court shall issue such an order.
The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place
as may be determined by the court in its discretion and upon the recommendation of
the Board and shall apply only to violators of Section 15 of this Act. The completion
of the community service shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative
surveillance of the Board during the period required by the court. Thereafter, the
Board shall render a report on the manner of compliance of said community service.
The court in its discretion may require extension of the community service or order a
final discharge.
In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections
60 and 64 of this Act.
If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent
in the Center by the accused during the suspended sentence period shall be deducted
from the sentence to be served.
11 Rollo, pp. 19-20.
12 Id., at p. 30.
13 Id., at pp. 31-32. Penned by Judge Leticia Querubin Ulibarri.
525
VOL. 559, JULY 23, 2008 525
Padua vs. People
No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail
to pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.”14
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation 15dated February 10, 2004
alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the
benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 16 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise
known as “The Probation Law of 1976” and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He
further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the said laws.
The RTC in an Order 17 dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of
Pasig City to conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a report and
recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was
also directed to submit his comment on the said petition within five days from receipt
of the order.
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana
submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that
Padua be placed on probation.18
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-
Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under
Section 2419 of
_______________
26
 14 Id., at p. 32.
15 Id., at p. 33.
16 Establishing A Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefor And For
Other Purposes, done on July 24, 1976.
17 Rollo, p. 34.
18 CA Rollo, pp. 22-26.
19 SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and
Pushers.—Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act,
regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted
by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
526
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Padua vs. People
Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus:
“Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on
minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer
Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and
Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor
Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on
Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence and commitment of
youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find application in this case, the
matter before the Court being an application for probation by minor Michael Padua y
Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence.
On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals
with the Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54
to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations of either
Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever
mentioned.
More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70
thereof deals with Probation or Community Service for First-Time Minor Offender
in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds that minor Michael
Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II,
R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section in view of the provision of
Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:
“Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law forDrug Traffickers
and Pushers.—Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under
this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended.” (underscoring supplied)527
VOL. 559, JULY 23, 2008 527
Padua vs. People
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by
Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.”20
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on
July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19,
2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.”21
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it
was denied. Hence, this petition where he raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED
PETITIONER’S RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.
[02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN
CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[’S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER
RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE LIGHT OF
R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,
CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER
DEPARTMENT OF
_______________
20 Rollo, pp. 37-38.
21 Id., at pp. 23-24.
528
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Padua vs. People
JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.22
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted
to adopt its Comment23 as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that
I.
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS IN
APPLYING SECTION 24, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165 INSTEAD OF SECTION
70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE SAME LAW.
II.
SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “RULE
ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW” HAS NO APPLICATION TO
THE INSTANT CASE.24
27
 Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Padua’s
petition for certiorari assailing the trial court’s order denying his petition for
probation? (2) Was Padua’s right under Rep. Act No. 9344, 25 the “Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006,” violated? and (3) Does Section 3226
_______________
22 Id., at p. 97.
23 Id., at pp. 48-71.
24 Id., at pp. 55, 64.
25 An Act Establishing A Comprehensive Juvenile Justice And Welfare System,
Creating The Juvenile Justice And Welfare Council Under The Department Of
Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor And For Other Purposes, approved on April
28, 2006.
26 Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders.—The
sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the juvenile in conflict
with the law. The court shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen
(15) days from the promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social
worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem. It
shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the
529
VOL. 559, JULY 23, 2008 529
Padua vs. People
of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the “Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law” have application in this case?
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
Padua’s petition for certiorari.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
_______________
following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the
juvenile:
1. Care, guidance, and supervision orders;
2. Community service orders;
3. Drug and alcohol treatment;
4. Participation in group counseling and similar activities;
5. Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other
centers for juveniles in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of the
DSWD.
The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall
monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with the disposition
measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and progress report
on the matter. The Family Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such
report in the presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and
other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with
the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at
the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of
age or over.
530
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Padua vs. People
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.27
“Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority.
There is “excess of jurisdiction” when the court transcends its power or acts without
any statutory authority. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.28
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua’s petition for probation shows
that the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion
because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction
in denying Padua’s petition for probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep.
Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act
No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege
of probation, to wit:
“SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and
Pushers.—Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act,
regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for
drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of
_______________
27 Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No.
156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 133.
28 Id.
531
28
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Padua vs. People
the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words
and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean
exactly what it says.29 If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is
known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index
animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.30 Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should
be no departure.31
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the
legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher
punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while
extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents
who are found guilty of violation of Sections 1132
_______________
29 Baranda v. Gustilo, No. L-81163, September 26, 1988, 165 SCRA 757, 770.
30 R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction 124 (5th ed., 2003).
31 Id.
32 SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.—The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the
following quantities, regardless of the decree or purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu”;
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
532
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Padua vs. People
and 1533 of the Act. The law considers the users and posses-
_______________
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or “ecstasy,” paramethoxyamphetamine
(PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), gamma
hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and
their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is
far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in
accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” is ten (10) grams or more but less than
fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment
and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams
or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride or “shabu,” or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
MDMA or “ecstasy,” PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or
newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value
or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred
(300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and
a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five
(5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana
resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu,” or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or “ecstasy,” PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives,
without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
33 SEC. 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs.—A person apprehended or arrested,
who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test,
shall be imposed a penalty of a
533
VOL. 559, JULY 23, 2008 533
Padua vs. People
sors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators.
Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified
from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors
alike, are given the chance to mend their ways. 34 The Court of Appeals also correctly
stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application
of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time
offenders, the law could have easily declared so.35
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers
while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or
dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government
29
center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165,
while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No.
9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep.
Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006” was violated. Nor can
he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the
_______________
minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense,
subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any
dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine from Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person
tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug
provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein
shall apply.
34 Rollo, pp. 22-23.
35 Id., at p. 23.
534
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Padua vs. People
“Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law” has application in this case. Section
6836 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to
suspension of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 37of Rep. Act No. 9344
could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of Rep.
Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the
offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 38 of
Rep. Act No. 9344,
_______________
36 SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence.—
Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time
the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They
shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their
sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.
37 SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence.—Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of
the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in
the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
38 SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.—If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in
conflict with the law have not been
535
VOL. 559, JULY 23, 2008 535
Padua vs. People
however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and
thus, could no longer be considered a child39 for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344.
Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his
case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19,
2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
30
 G.R. No. 200793. June 4, 2014.*
 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MILAN ROXAS y AGUILUZ, accused-appellant.
Statutory Construction; When the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.—In determining age
for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the age
as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age as
argued by accused-appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt
or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Only when the law
is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true
intent.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Child-Witness; When the offended party

is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of
what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to
which she would be ex-
_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.
 
 
182
posed if the matter to which she testified is not true.—We have repeatedly held
that testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the
offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her
account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also
the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not
true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

Same; Same; Same; When it comes to evaluating the credibility of the

testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial
judge who is in a better position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and
manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who among them is telling the truth.
—When it comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses,
great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better position
to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses,
and to decide who among them is telling the truth. As the trial court further observed,
the defense witnesses were not eyewitnesses. A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as provided in the Rules of Court. AAA’s mother and brothers
were not present when the five rapes allegedly occurred, and therefore any testimony
on their part as to whether or not the complained acts actually happened is hearsay.

31
 Criminal Law; Rape; Qualifying Circumstances; Minority and Relationship;
The allegation that AAA was accused-appellant Roxas’s “niece” in each
Information is insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship.—The allegation that AAA was accused-appellant Roxas’s “niece” in
each Information is therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances
of minority and relationship. Instead, the applicable qualifying circumstance is that
of the use of a deadly weapon, for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since there was no other aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information and
proven during the trial, the imposed penalty of reclusion perpetuafor each count of
rape is nonetheless proper even as we overturn the lower courts’ appreciation of  the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
 
 
183
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
 
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:  and inserting his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge
This is an appeal from the Decision  of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-
1 That on or about the 16th day of September 1997 in Quezon City,
H.C. No. 03473 dated August 16, 2011, which affirmed with modification the
Judgment2 of Branch 94, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City dated
December 11, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91967 to Q-00-91971 finding
accused-appellant Milan Roxas y Aguiluz guilty of five counts of rape against
AAA,3a minor who was 9 years old at the time of the first rape and 10 years old at
the time of the succeeding four rapes.
Five Informations were filed against accused-appellant Roxas, charging him as
follows:
1. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967:
That on or about the 9 th day of August 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the abovenamed accused with force and intimidation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 2-32; penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz with Associate
Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Agnes Reyes-Carpio, concurring.
2 CA Rollo, pp. 59-70.
3 In line with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703;
502 SCRA 419 [2006]), the real name and identity of the rape victim is withheld and,
instead, fictitious initials are used to represent her. Also, the personal circumstances
of the victim or any other information tending to establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of her immediate family, are not disclosed in this decision.
Instead, the rape victim and her immediate family shall herein be referred to as AAA
to EEE, while her uncles and aunts shall be referred to as WWW to ZZZ.
 
 
184
and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the person of
[AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age by then and there blindfolding
her, then removed her shorts and underwear then accused inserted his penis
inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will
and without her consent.4
2. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968:
That on or about the 28 th day of July 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the abovenamed accused with force and intimidation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at
knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age
by then and there blindfolding her and removing her shorts and underwear
of her against her will and without her consent.5
3. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969:
Philippines, the abovenamed accused with force and intimidation did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault
at knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 9 years of age
by then and there laying her on the chairs inside the bathroom, then
blindfolded her and then removed her shorts and underwear then accused
inserted his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of
her against her will and without her consent.6
_______________
4 Records, p. 2.
5 Id., at p. 4.
6 Id., at p. 10.
 
 
185
4. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970:
That on or about the 20th day of March 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the abovenamed accused with force and intimidation did then and there
32
 willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at
knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age
by then and there laying her down on a bed inside his grandparents’ room
then blindfolded her, then removed her shorts and underwear, then accused
inserted his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of
her against her will and without her consent.7
5. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971:
That on or about the 11th day of May 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the abovenamed accused with force and intimidation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at
knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age
by then and there removing her shorts and underwear and inserting his penis
inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will
and without her consent.8
 
Accused-appellant Roxas entered a plea of Not Guilty to all the crimes charged. 9
The prosecution’s factual account based on the testimony of AAA was concisely
stated by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Appellee’s Brief, as follows:
On 16 September 1997, [AAA], who was then 9 years of age, was at her
grandmother [CCC]’s house located on [XXX], Quezon City. In the morning of said
date, she was at the dirty kitchen with her aunt [ZZZ] who was
_______________
7 Id., at p. 16.
8 Id., at p. 22.
9 Id., at p. 312.
186
then washing clothes. Her aunt asked her if she had already taken a bath, she replied
in the negative.
Her uncle, accused-appellant, overheard their conversation so he volunteered to
give [AAA] a bath. Subsequently, he brought her upstairs to the bathroom.
While inside the bathroom, accused-appellant told [AAA] to turn around. After
she complied with his directive, he blindfolded her. [AAA] started to wonder what
the accused-appellant was doing so she told him that he was supposed to give her a
bath. Accused-appellant told her that they would play first for a while.
He turned her around three (3) times and then, removed her shorts and
underwear. After that, he sat on a chair, which was inside the bathroom, and raised
both of her legs.
Thereafter, she felt him on top of her. She also felt accused-appellant’s penis
enter her vagina which she found painful.
She cried and shouted the name of her aunt, but accused-appellant got angry and
poked a sharp instrument on her neck. [AAA] did not report the incident because
accused-appellant threatened to cut her tongue and to kill her and her mother.
[AAA] was raped again on 20 March 1998 while she was at the same house of
her paternal grandparents. She was on the terrace on the second floor of the house
when accused-appellant, who was in her grandparents’ bedroom at that time, called
her. She hesitated to go near him because she was afraid that he might rape her again.
Accused-appellant then went to the terrace and dragged her to the bedroom of
her grandparents. She could not run anymore nor shout for help because aside from
the fact that there was nobody else in the room, accused-appellant was holding a
pointed weapon.
While [AAA] and accused-appellant were inside the room, he blindfolded her,
removed her shorts and underwear, and then laid her down the bed. Thereafter, he
moved on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina. Again, she did not report
the incident because of accused-
 
 
187
appellant’s threats should she report the incident to anybody.
Another incident of rape took place on 11 May 1998 while [AAA] was again at
her paternal grandparents’ house. On the said date, she was alone in the living room
on the second floor of the house when accused-appellant called her. She did not
accede to his bidding because she was scared of him. Thereafter, he shouted at her
and demanded that she come near him, so she went to him.
He brought her inside her grandmother’s bedroom and upon reaching the room,
he immediately blindfolded her and poked a bladed weapon on her neck. He turned
her around three (3) times, removed her shorts and underwear, laid her down the bed,
moved on top of her, and inserted his penis in her vagina. Again, the accused-
appellant threatened her so she did not report what had happened.
[AAA]’s ordeal did not stop there. She was raped for the fourth time on 28 July
1998 at her paternal grandparents’ house. She and the accused were incidentally
alone in the living room on the second floor of the house. He asked her to go with
him inside the bedroom of her grandparents, but she did not get up from her seat. So
accused-appellant pulled her toward the bedroom. She tried to free herself, but he
poked a pointed instrument at her.
Accused-appellant committed the same acts he had perpetrated on [AAA] during
her three [previous] rape incidents: he removed her shorts and underwear, laid her on
the bed, moved on top of her and thereafter, inserted his penis in her vagina. She was
again threatened by the accused-appellant not to tell anybody about the incident or
else he would cut her tongue and kill her and her mother.
33
 The fifth and last incident of rape happened on 09 August 1998. At that time,
[AAA] was at the terrace on the second floor of her paternal grandparents’ house;
and accused-appellant also happened to be there. He pulled her and brought her
inside the room, blindfolded her, and
 
188
turned her around three (3) times. He employed the same method in raping her: he
removed her shorts and underwear, laid her on the bed and moved on top of her. She
tried to push him and raise her shorts and panty, but she did not succeed because he
poked a pointed instrument on her neck. Thereafter, he inserted his penis in her
vagina. Again, she did not report the incident to anyone because she was scared of
his threats.10 (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
 
In contrast, the defense presented four witnesses: AAA’s mother (BBB), AAA’s
two brothers (DDD and EEE), and Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology. The defense’s statement of the antecedent
facts as contained in the Appellant’s Brief is reproduced here:
Accused Milan Roxas denied having raped [AAA] on all the five (5) counts of
rape.
[DDD], brother of herein private complainant, testified that his aunt in the
maternal side, [Tita YYY], induced him by giving toys if he would tell his father that
the accused was raping his sister, [AAA]. Upon prodding of his maternal aunt,
[DDD], who was only eight (8) years old then, told his father that he saw the accused
rape his sister. His father ran amuck which led to the filing of the instant case.
On subsequent days, while [DDD] and [AAA] were in a grocery store buying
something, their [Tito XXX], [Tito WWW] and [TitaYYY] arrived on board an FX
vehicle. [Tita YYY] told [DDD] that they will be going to buy toys. [DDD] said that
he will first ask permission from his grandfather, but [Tita YYY] said that it would
only take a few minutes and they will bring them home afterwards. [AAA] was
brought to SSDD, a place under the administration of the DSWD, while [DDD] was
brought to Caloocan. On the following day, he was brought to Muñoz, in a rented
house of his [Tita YYY]
_______________
10 CA Rollo, pp. 94-99.
 
 
189
and her husband. [DDD] stayed there for almost a year. He was forbidden to go
outside as the door was always locked. When [his Tita VVV] arrived from Japan
they went to Tarlac where his paternal grandmother fetched him.
[EEE], brother of herein private complainant, likewise testified that when
[his Tita VVV] arrived, they went to North Olympus, Quezon City where [his]
maternal relatives reside. On one occasion, he saw his sister, [AAA] and his maternal
uncle [Tito XXX] entered one of the bedrooms. He tried to open the door to see what
the duo were doing, but it was locked. [EEE] looked for a wire and was able to open
the door. He saw private complainant on top of his [TitoXXX], both naked. When
the duo saw him, private complainant and his [Tito XXX] stood up. The latter
threatened him not to tell anybody or he will cut off his tongue.
On November 26, 1999, [BBB], mother of the private complainant testified that
her two (2) children, [AAA] and [DDD], were missing. She looked for them, but to
no avail. So she went to the police station to have it blottered. Later did she know
when she called her sister who resides in Project 6, Quezon City that [DDD] was
brought to Ilocos and [AAA] at the SSDD in Kamuning by her 3 brothers and
sister.  She filed a case of kidnapping against his brother [Tito WWW].
[Tito WWW], however, promised to return her children if she will have the said case
dismissed which she did.
She denied the allegations that [her] brother-in-law, herein accused, raped her
daughter, [AAA]. In fact, before the filing of the present rape cases there was one
rape case filed on September 22, 1999 which was dismissed because [AAA]
retracted her statements. As told to [BBB] by her daughter [AAA], she was not raped
by herein accused. She told a lie and made the false accusation against the accused,
because she does not want to put the blame on any of her maternal relatives. [AAA]
was greatly indebted to her maternal grandmother and her maternal uncles and aunts
because they had taken care of her since she was three (3) years old.
190
Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology testified that based on her examination of the accused, she concluded that
he is suffering from a mild mental retardation with a mental age of nine (9) to ten
(10) years old. She observed that the subject was aware that he was being accused of
rape, but he had consistently denied the allegations against him.11 (Citations omitted)
 
The RTC of Quezon City rendered its Judgment on December 11, 2007, finding
accused-appellant Roxas guilty as charged in each of the five Informations filed
against him. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in all five (5) counts of rape as recited in
the information[s] and sentences accused MILAN ROXAS:
1) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967 — to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay
moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
34
 2) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968 — to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay
moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
3) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969 — to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay
moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
4) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970 — to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay
moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs; and
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 47-50.
191
5) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971 — to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay
moral damages in the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
To credit in favor of the herein accused the full period of his detention in
accordance with law.  THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE
Resultantly, all pending incidents are deemed moot and academic. 12
 
The RTC held that accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal
responsibility on the ground that he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or
insane person, since Dr. Aglipay merely testified that he was an eighteen-year old
with a mental development comparable to that of children between nine to ten years
old. The RTC found the testimony of AAA credible, and found the testimonies of the
defense witnesses to be “flimsy.”
Accused-appellant Roxas elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, where the
case was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03473. Accused-appellant Roxas
submitted the following Assignment of Errors in the appellate court:
 
I 16 Id., at p. 48.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.13
 
On August 16, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision,
modifying the Judgment of the RTC as follows:
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 69-70.
13 Id., at p. 42.
192
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated 11 December 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in the case entitled “People of
the Philippines vs. Milan Roxas y Aguiluz,” docketed therein as Criminal Case Nos.
Q-00-91967 to Q-00-91971, is AFFIRMED with modification that accused-
appellant is ordered to pay private complainant on each count civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00, and exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape.14
Hence, accused-appellant Roxas interposed this appeal, where he, in his
Supplemental Brief, presented an Additional Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY.15
Accused-appellant Roxas claims that the testimony of AAA is replete with
inconsistencies and narrations that are contrary to common experience, human nature
and the natural course of things. 16 Accused-appellant Roxas likewise points out that
under Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
minors fifteen (15) years old and below are exempt from criminal responsibility.
Accused-appellant Roxas claims that since he has a mental age of nine years old, he
should also be “exempt from criminal liability although his chronological age at the
time of the commission of the crime was already eighteen years old.”17
_______________
14 Rollo, p. 31.
15 Id., at p. 46.
17 Id., at pp. 51-52.
 
193
In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No.
934418 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.—A child fifteen (15) years
of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
35
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth
anniversary of his/her birthdate.  testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing
laws. (Emphasis supplied)  22 People v. Araojo, 616 Phil. 275, 287; 600 SCRA 295, 307 (2009).
In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6
clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not
the mental age as argued by accused-appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or
construe its true intent.19
On the matter of the credibility of AAA, we carefully examined AAA’s
testimony and found ourselves in agreement with
_______________
18 As amended by Republic Act No. 10630.
19 Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 378
Phil. 10, 22; 320 SCRA 279, 289 (1999).
 
 
194the assessment of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As observed by the
appellate court:
We note that she recounted her ordeal in a logical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner, without any artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the veracity
of her testimony. She recalled the tragic experience and positively identified
accused-appellant as the one who ravished her on five occasions. Her testimony was
unshaken by a grueling cross-examination and there is no impression whatsoever that
the same is a mere fabrication. For her to come out in the open and publicly describe
her harrowing experience at a trial can only be taken as a badge of her sincerity and
the truth of her claims.20
 
We further underscore that AAA was merely 14 years old at the time she
testified.21 We have repeatedly held that testimonies of child-victims are normally
given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in
fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts
are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her
relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter
to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity.22
It is likewise axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the
judge who is in a better position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and
manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who
_______________
20 Rollo, p. 13.
21 TSN, August 3, 2003, p. 3.
 
195among them is telling the truth.23 As the trial court further observed, the defense
witnesses were not eyewitnesses. A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as provided in the Rules of Court. 24AAA’s mother and brothers
were not present when the five rapes allegedly occurred, and therefore any testimony
on their part as to whether or not the complained acts actually happened is hearsay.
We shall now discuss the criminal liability of accused-appellant Roxas. As stated
above, the trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of
rape.
The first rape incident was committed in July 1997, and therefore the law
applicable is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 which provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed.—Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1.       By using force or intimidation;
2.       When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and
3.       When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
_______________
23 People v. Estoya, G.R. No. 200531, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 376, 383.
24 Rule 130, Section 36.
 
 
196
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
36
 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
 
The succeeding counts of rape were committed after the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 8353 on October 22, 1997, which transported the rape provision of the
Revised Penal Code to Title 8 under Crimes against Persons, and amended the same
to its present wording:
Article 266-A. Rape, When And How Committed.—
Rape is committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present.
Article 266-B. Penalties.—Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
 
197
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim[.]
While it appears that the circumstance of minority under Article 335 (old rape
provision) and Article 266-B was sufficiently proven, the allegation of the
relationship between AAA and accused-appellant Roxas is considered insufficient
under present jurisprudence. This Court has thus held:
However, as regards the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of
the victim, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently
satisfy the requirements of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., it must be
succinctly stated that appellant is a relative within the 3 rd civil degree by
consanguinity or affinity. It is immaterial that appellant admitted that the victim is
his niece. In the same manner, it is irrelevant that “AAA” testified that appellant is
her uncle. We held in People v. Velasquez, 377 SCRA 214 (2002):
However, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on accused-
appellant, applying Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659. We have
consistently held that the circumstances under the amendatory provisions of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, the attendance of which could mandate the
imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death, are in the nature of
qualifying circumstances which cannot be proved as such unless alleged in
the information. Even in cases where such circumstances are proved, the
death penalty cannot be imposed where the information failed to allege them.
To impose the death penalty on the basis of a qualifying circumstance which
has not been alleged in the information would violate the accused’s consti-
 
198
tutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
While the informations in this case alleged that accused-
appellant is the uncle of the two victims, they did not state
that he is their relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity. The testimonial evidence that
accused-appellant’s wife and Luisa de Guzman are sisters is
immaterial. The circumstance that accused-appellant is a
relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree must be alleged in the information. In the
case at bar, the allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle
of private complainants was not sufficient to satisfy the
special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It was
necessary to specifically allege that such relationship was
within the third civil degree. Hence, accused-appellant can
only be convicted of simple rape on two counts, for which
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in each case.25
In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was accused-appellant Roxas’s
“niece” in each Information is therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship. Instead, the applicable qualifying
circumstance is that of the use of a deadly weapon, for which the penalty is reclusion
37
perpetua to death. Since there was no other aggravating circumstance alleged in the
Information and proven during the trial, the imposed penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape is nonetheless proper even as we overturn the lower
courts’ appreciation of  the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
_______________
25 People v. Estrada, G.R. No. 178318, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 222, 234-
235.
 
 
199
For consistency with prevailing jurisprudence, we reduce the awards of civil
indemnity and moral damages to P50,000.00 each, for each count of rape. The award
of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for each count, on the other
hand, is in line with recent jurisprudence.26
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03473 dated August 16, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded
to the complainant are reduced to P50,000.00 each, for each count of rape, plus legal
interest upon the amounts of indemnity and damages awarded at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.—A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and
free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation
— there is only room for application. (Bolos vs. Bolos, 634 SCRA 429 [2010])
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. (People vs.
De Jesus, 706 SCRA 763 [2013])
 
——o0o——
G.R. No. 151085. August 20, 2008.*
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Criminal Law; Rape; In rape, actual penetration of the victim’s organ or
rupture of the hymen is not required—the slightest touching of the lips of the female
organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.—In sum, we are convinced
that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for rape,
the complainant’s candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant’s
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that
basis. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA’s credibility, and found
no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to
positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB’s
testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister.
While petitioner asserts that AAA’s poverty is enough motive for the imputation of
the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF
would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the
embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would
damage their daughter’s psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true. We find
petitioner’s claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the
genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from petitioner’s parents, highly
incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of rape committed against
young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim’s
organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that
actual penetration of the victim’s organ or rupture of the hymen is not required.
Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having
full penetration, because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of
the labia of the pudendumconstitutes rape.
Same; Same; Exempting Circumstances; One who acts by virtue of any of the
exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of
any of the conditions which constitute free 
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
451
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 451
Ortega vs. People
38
 will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises—while there is a
crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.—For one who acts by virtue of any
of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete
absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the
act, no criminal liability arises. Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no
criminal liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar, 169 SCRA 476 (1989),
we held: [I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the
exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence
of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the
part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus,
Albert has stated: “The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power,
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit
act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law
exempts (him) from criminal liability.” It is for this reason, therefore, why minors
nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act.
Same; Exempting Circumstances; Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
(R.A. 9344); By virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been
raised from 9 to 15 years old; Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are
given retroactive effect.—Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of
children 15 years old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local
social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore,
with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL’s
age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL’s age at the time of the
commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. Given this precise statutory
declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application to the
aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in
criminal law—favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are
favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied in
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: Art. 22. Retroactive effect of
penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
persons
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule
5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Intent is the soul of the law.—The
Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in
interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that
intent is the soul of the law, viz.: The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid
it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is
the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a
law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a
statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which
gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to
start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which
harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent
policy and objects of the legislature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused.—Penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the
plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344’s unambiguous language, coupled with clear
lawmakers’ intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is
justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative
intent to favor the CICL.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While R.A. No. 9344 exempts children 15 years old
and below from criminal liability, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is
no concomitant exemption from civil liability.—While the law exempts petitioner
from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed against AAA,
Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from
civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed
by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity. This award is in
453
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 453
Ortega vs. People
the nature of actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a
conviction for rape.
Same; Rape; Damages; Moral damages are granted in recognition of the
victim’s injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.—The RTC erred
in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity awarded
to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the
necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages
are granted in recognition of the victim’s injury necessarily resulting from the odious
crime of rape.
Same; Statutory Construction; Courts; The Court has no discretion to give
statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law—
its task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the
proven facts.—The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case
effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA
who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the
petitioner, and one who deserves the law’s greater protection. However, this
39
consequence is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of
which is not subject to review by this Court. Any perception that the result reached
herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court
has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment
and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the
law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Valencia, Ciocon, Babao, Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Ravina and Pandan
Law Offices for petitioner.
   The Solicitor General for respondent.
454
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition 1 for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision2 dated October 26, 2000 which affirmed in toto the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999,
convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.
The Facts
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two
separate informations both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA, 6 then
about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory portions thereof respectively state:
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 12-32.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of this Court),
with Associate Justices Mariano M. Umali and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador
concurring; id., at pp. 35-52.
3 Penned by Judge Roberto S. Chiongson; id., at pp. 54-75.
4 Also referred to as Jomar Ortega, Joemar Ortiga and Joemart Ortiga in other
pleadings and documents.
5 As the birth certificate shows that petitioner was born on August 8, 1983
(Records, p. 157), he was only thirteen (13) years old in August and December 1,
1996. He was already fourteen (14) years old at the time of the filing of the two
Informations charging him of rape.
6 Per this Court’s Resolution dated September 19, 2006 in A.M. No. 04-11-09-
SC, as well as our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693, September 19,
2006, 502 SCRA 419), pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262 also known as the “Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004” and its implementing
rules, the real name of the victim and those of her immediate family members other
than the accused are to be withheld and fictitious initials are instead used to protect
the victim’s privacy. Likewise, the exact address of the victim is to be deleted
(People v. Rentoria, G.R. No. 175333, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 708).
455
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 455
Ortega vs. People
Criminal Case No. 98-19083
“That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic)
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual
intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”7
Criminal Case No. 98-19084
“That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX,
Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or
sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her
will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”8
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.9 Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two
varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. 10 Among her
siblings CCC, BBB, DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family.
Before these disturbing events, AAA’s family members were close friends of
petitioner’s family, aside from the fact that they were good neighbors. However,
BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB
then in-
_______________
7  CA Rollo, pp. 21-22.
8  Id., at pp. 23-24.
9  RTC Order dated September 10, 1998; Records, p. 83.
10 Certificate of Live Birth of AAA; id., at p. 167.
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
formed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA. 11There, AAA confessed that
petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter
AAA, then 6 years old and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda
40
Ortega12(Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2) nights because MMM had to
stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was sick. 13 During the first night at
petitioner’s residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with
Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There
petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the
petitioner’s residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to
their comfort room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his
penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned
AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her. 14 AAA did not tell her
parents about her ordeal.
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996.
Petitioner went to the house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a
battery-powered television. At that time, Luzviminda was conversing with MMM.
While AAA’s siblings were busy watching, petitioner called AAA to come to the
room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was lighted
by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and
brief, removed AAA’s shorts and panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis
into the vagina of AAA.15 AAA described petitioner’s penis as about five (5)
_______________
11 TSN, October 26, 1998, pp. 8-33.
12 Also referred to as Luzviminda Ortiga in other pleadings and documents.
13 TSN, November 6, 1998, p. 13.
14 Id., at pp. 13-19.
15 Id., at pp. 33-50.
457
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 457
Ortega vs. People
inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw
pubic hair on the base of his penis.16
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was
about to drink water in their kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was
shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from their waist down in the act of
sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping motion.
Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left.
Thereafter, BBB reported the incident to his mother, MMM.17
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her
that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that
this was not the only incident that petitioner molested AAA as there were two
previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not report her ordeal to them
out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported
the matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for
AAA’s brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined AAA’s vagina
and she noticed that the same was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out from
it. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that night. The following morning,
at about four o’clock, MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their
house. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her daughter, and
consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for
examination.18
 MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas 19 (Dr.
Katalbas), the Rural Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no
indication that
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 73-74.
17 Supra note 11, at pp. 9-34.
18 TSN, October 28, 1998, pp. 21-64.
19 Also referred to as Dr. Lucifre Katalbas or Dr. Katalbas in other pleadings and
documents.
458
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
she was molested.20 Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM
went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City
Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report 21showing that there were
“abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the
posterior fourchette.” She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA’s
genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could
disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her
certification that her findings required the confirmation of the Municipal Health
Officer of the locality.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families
through the DAWN Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and
children. Part of the settlement required petitioner to depart from their house to avoid
contact with AAA.23 As such, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality.
However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to
bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA’s father FFF was
infuriated and confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA’s parents went to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3)
counts of rape. However, the prosecutor’s office only filed the two (2) instant cases.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and
Luzviminda Ortega.24 He is the second child of
_______________
20 Records, pp. 155-155-A.
21 Id., at p. 112.
41
 22 Supra note 16, at p. 65. Please also see Certification dated February 5, 1998,
attesting to the fact that an amicable settlement was entered into by the two families;
Records, p. 156.
23 TSN, January 19, 1999, pp. 4-13.
24 Supra note 5.
459
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 459
Ortega vs. People
three siblings―an elder brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the
accusations made against him. He testified that: his parents and AAA’s parents were
good friends; when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother,
petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB and CCC while AAA slept
together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never touched or raped AAA or
showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in any instance; he
did not rape AAA in the former’s comfort room, but he merely accompanied and
helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of
washing, he may have accidentally touched AAA’s anus; on December 1, 1996,
petitioner together with his parents, went to AAA’s house; 25they were dancing and
playing together with all the other children at the time; while they were dancing,
petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at the instance of which BBB
ran and reported the matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying
that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse; 26 petitioner explained to
MMM that they were only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA what he
was accused of doing, as they were together with her brothers, and he treated AAA
like a younger sister;27 BBB was lying; AAA’s parents and his parents did not get
angry at him nor did they quarrel with each other; petitioner and his parents
peacefully left AAA’s house at about nine o’clock in the evening; however, at about
four o’clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were summoned by MMM to
go to the latter’s house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by his
father as AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested her; and MMM and  Thus, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years.
_______________
25 TSN, March 16, 1999, pp. 3-26.
26 Petitioner’s Counter-Affidavit dated January 6, 1998; Records, pp. 158-159.
27 TSN, March 25, 1999, pp. 7-8.
460
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for examination.28
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was
a minor at the time of the incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her
first marriage, while AAA and the rest of her  siblings were of the second marriage;
CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted AAA and her
brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her youngest
daughter in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at
AAA’s house watching television and conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto
were having a drinking spree in the kitchen; from where they were seated, she could
clearly see all the children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in the
dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were
conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood
up and looked for them, but both mothers did not find anything unusual as all the
children were playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just
laughed at BBB’s statement; the parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in
order to verify BBB’s statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them; and
they peacefully left AAA’s house. However, the following day, MMM woke
Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing
to BBB nor to petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda
intervened, telling FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for
examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found no
indication that AAA was molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After
getting the results of the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson, they went to the
police and at this instance only did Luzviminda learn that MMM accused peti-
_______________
28 Supra note 25, at pp. 17-24.
461
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 461
Ortega vs. People
tioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped
AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended
that they should seek advice from the Women’s Center. At the said Center, both
agreed on an amicable settlement wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA.
But almost every Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to
bring his dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-
mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist. Confrontations occurred until an altercation
erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA’s parents
filed the instant cases.29
The RTC’s Ruling
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner’s defenses of denial cannot
prevail over the positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by
AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty and credibility. Moreover, the RTC
opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA’s family to impute a serious
crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both families. Thus, the
RTC disposed of this case in this wise:
42
 “FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y
Felisario GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of
the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and
there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be imprisoned for each case for a
period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen
(15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is condemned to pay
the offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2)
rapes (sic).”
_______________
29 TSN, January 26, 1999, pp. 8-87.
462
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.30
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the
corresponding bail bond for his provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the
RTC ordered the petitioner’s release pending appeal.31
The CA’s Ruling
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that
the petitioner’s defense of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of
the petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother BBB, which were categorical,
consistent and without any showing of ill motive. The CA also held that the
respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it
is established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ
consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the
CA opined that petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts.
Finally, the CA accorded great weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC,
particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration 32 of the assailed Decision which
the CA denied in its Resolution33dated November 7, 2001.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN
FACTS OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT
AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
_______________
30 Notice of Appeal and Urgent Motion for Release on Recognizance pending
Appeal dated May 17, 1999; Records, pp. 251-252.
31 Release Order dated June 11, 1999; id., at p. 275.
32 Rollo, pp. 76-83.
33 Id., at p. 53.
463
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 463
Ortega vs. People
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR.
LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE
COURT, THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS
CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE
RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED
VICTIM’S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE
PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
FACTS SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE
CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME
IN AUGUST 1996.34
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are
conclusive on this Court, we are not prevented from overturning such findings if the
CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if
considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the
testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus,
AAA felt pain. Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true
that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts
would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA,
taking into consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner’s penis.
However, such allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas
who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA and
found that there were no signs or indications that AAA was raped or molested.
Petitioner submits that the CA
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 21-22.
464
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical report since it disproves
the allegation of the existence of rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to
prove its case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists.
Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio
who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As such, it is
43
incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13-year-old boy would commit such 37 Entitled An Act Establishing A Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare
act in the very dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not System, Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council Under the Department of
be controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM’s motive in filing Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.
the instant case, as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner. 38 Declarador v. Gubaton, G.R. No. 159208, August 18, 2006, 499 SCRA 341,
Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions 350.
that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could 39 SECTION 4. Definition of Terms.—The following terms as used in this Act
disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the shall be defined as follows:
medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days xxxx
after the alleged incident of rape, and that AAA’s parents only filed the instant case (e) “Child in Conflict with the Law” refers to a child who is alleged as,
after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine
deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA laws.
to prove their case and to depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was xxxx
actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were 40 (d) “Child at Risk” refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the risk of
merely coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.35 committing criminal offenses because of personal, family and social circumstances,
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the such as, but not limited to, the following:
Solicitor General (OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are (1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical, psychological,
mere reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, mental, economic or any other means and
did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of abrasions, 466
rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of the female 466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony
Ortega vs. People
_______________
appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as
35 Supra note 1. Please see also Petitioner’s Reply dated February 10, 2003; id., prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care
at pp. 113-119. programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure its implementation,
465 the law, particularly Section 841 thereof, has created the Juvenile
_______________
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 465
Ortega vs. People the parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or, unable to provide protection
of AAA that petitioner raped her in August and December of 1996; even in the for the child;
absence of force, rape was committed considering AAA’s age at that time; as such,
AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing petitioner; and it is established that the (2) being exploited including sexually or economically;
crime of rape could be committed even in the presence of other people nearby. (3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search and inquiry,
Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial court is the parent or guardian cannot be found;
accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly the (4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a parent or
demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness was telling the truth or guardian;
not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he (5) being out of school;
committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts. 36 (6) being a street child;
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare (7) being a member of a gang;
Act of 2006, was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, (8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug abuse;
2006.38 The law establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in conflict and
with the law39 (CICL) and children at risk40 with child- (9) living in situations of armed conflict.
_______________ 41 SECTION 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).
—A Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) is hereby created and attached to
36 OSG’s Comment dated May 27, 2002; id., at pp. 96-107. the Department of Justice and placed under its administrative supervision. The JJWC
shall be chaired by an Undersecretary of the Department of Social Welfare and

44
Development. It shall ensure the effective implementation of this Act and
coordination among the following agencies:
(a) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(b) Department of Education (DepEd);
(c) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
(d) Public Attorney’s Office (PAO);
(e) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);
(f) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA);
(g) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);
(i) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP);
(j) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
467
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 467
Ortega vs. People
Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain duties and
functions42 such as the formulation of policies
_______________
(k) Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA);
(l) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(m) Other institutions focused on juvenile justice and intervention programs.
The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose ranks shall not be lower
than director, to be designated by the concerned heads of the following departments
or agencies:
(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);
(c) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(d) Department of Education (DepEd);
(e) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
(f) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(g) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(h) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, one to be designated by the Secretary
of Justice and the other to be designated by the Secretary of Social Welfare and
Development.
The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of this Act.
The Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development shall
determine the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the JJWC.
The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court Administrator and the
Philippine Judicial Academy to ensure the realization of its mandate and the proper
discharge of its duties and functions, as herein provided.
42 SECTION 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC.—The JJWC shall have the
following duties and functions:
(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;
(b) To advise the President on all matters and policies relating to juvenile
justice and welfare;
(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the review and redrafting of existing
policies/regulations or in the formulation of new ones in line with the provisions of
this Act;
468
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the administration of
juvenile justice as well as the treatment
_______________
(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3 to 5-year national juvenile
intervention program, with the participation of government agencies concerned,
NGOs and youth organization;
(e) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile intervention programs and
activities by national government agencies and other activities which may have an
important bearing on the success of the entire national juvenile intervention program.
All programs relating to juvenile justice and welfare shall be adopted in consultation
with the JJWC;
(f) To formulate and recommend policies and strategies in consultation with
children for the prevention of juvenile delinquency and the administration of justice,
as well as for the treatment and rehabilitation of the children in conflict with the law;
(g) To collect relevant information and conduct continuing research and
support evaluations and studies on all matters relating to juvenile justice and welfare,
such as, but not limited to:
(1) the performance and results achieved by juvenile intervention
programs and by activities of the local government units and other
government agencies;
(2) the periodic trends, problems and causes of juvenile delinquency
and crimes; and
(3) the particular needs of children in conflict with the law in custody.
The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC in the improvement of the
administration of juvenile justice and welfare system.
The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to ensure that children are involved in
research and policy development.
(h) Through duly designated persons and with the assistance of the agencies
provided in the preceding section, to conduct regular inspections in detention and
rehabilitation facilities and to undertake spot inspections on their own initiative in
order to check compliance with the standards provided herein and to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate agencies;
(i) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for the personnel of the
agencies involved in the administration of the juve-
469
45
 VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 469
Ortega vs. People
and rehabilitation of the CICL. The law also provides for the immediate dismissal of
cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344’s
Transitory Provisions.43
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
Title VIII
Transitory Provisions
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and
Below.—Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and
below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and
the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development
officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether
to release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention
programs, as provided under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and
undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released,
unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial.—If the child is detained
pending trial, the Family Court shall also determine whether or not continued
detention is necessary and, if not, determine appropriate alternatives for detention. If
detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall immediately
order the transfer of the child to a youth detention home.
SECTION 66. Inventory of “Locked-up” and Detained Children in Conflict
with the Law.—The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit
to the JJWC, within ninety (90)  VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008
_______________
nile justice and welfare system and the juvenile intervention program;
(j) To submit an annual report to the President on the implementation of this
Act; and
(k) To perform such other functions as may be necessary to implement the
provisions of this Act.
43 JJWC’s Council Resolution No. 3, Series of 2006 entitled Guidelines to
Implement the Transitory Provisions of R.A. 9344, dated July 11, 2006.
470
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the
law under their custody.
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending
Diversion and Court Proceedings.—If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years
pending diversion and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in
consultation with the local social welfare and development officer or the Family
Court in consultation with the Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of
the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition.
In case the appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the
child in conflict with the law has already availed of probation under Presidential
Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply for probation if qualified
under the provisions of the Probation Law.
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences.—Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time
of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at
the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.
They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their
sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.”
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not
petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the
RTC and the CA. However, with the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner’s case
is pending before this Court, a new issue arises, namely, whether the pertinent
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner’s case, considering that at the time he
committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against
AAA. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s candor is the single most
important factor. If the complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the
471
471
Ortega vs. People
accused can be convicted solely on that basis.44 The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did
not doubt AAA’s credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of
the heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. Both
courts also accorded respect to BBB’s testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual
intercourse with his younger sister. While petitioner asserts that AAA’s poverty is
enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no
mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter
to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a
traumatic experience would damage their daughter’s psyche and mar her life if the
charge is not true.45 We find petitioner’s claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions
found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from
petitioner’s parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of
rape committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total
penetration of the victim’s organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening.
Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of the victim’s organ or rupture of the
hymen is not required.46 Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the
petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because the slightest touching of the
lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.47
46
 However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances,
although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions
which constitute free
_______________
44 People of the Philippines v. Jose Magbanua, G.R. 176265, April 30, 2008,
553 SCRA 698.
45 Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, April 26, 2006, 488 SCRA 376, 401.
46 People v. Villarama, 445 Phil. 323, 340; 397 SCRA 306, 321 (2003).
47 People v. Bascugin, G.R. No. 144195, May 25, 2004, 429 SCRA 140, 150,
citing People v. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 (1998).
472
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. 48 Therefore, while there is
a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v.
Almodovar,49 we held:
“[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the
part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus,
Albert has stated:
“The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power,
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from
an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no
intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability.”
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not
capable of performing a criminal act.”
In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no
longer covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as
1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the
CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner now
approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No.
9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A.
No. 9344 is applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as
explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner
may avail himself of the provisions of Section 3851 of R.A. No. 9344 pro-
_______________
48 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, book I, 14th ed., 1998, p. 204, citing
Guevara.
49 G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 476, 482 (Citations omitted)
(Emphasis supplied).
50 Rollo, pp. 128-133.
51 Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides, to wit:
473
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 473
Ortega vs. People
viding for automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG
argued that while it is a recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may
be given retroactive application, such principle does not apply if the law itself
provides for conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
“SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.—A child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention
program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing
laws.”
_______________
SECTION 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence.—Once the child
who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence
shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age
or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of
the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in
the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
474
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15
years old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately
be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare
and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to
the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL’s age at the time
of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL’s age at the time of the commission of
47
the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility
has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.52
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord
retroactive application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to
the well-entrenched principle in criminal law—favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive
effect.53 This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
“Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.
_______________
52 Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 115-2006
entitled Guidelines on the Transitory Provisions of R.A. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act, dated August 10, 2006.
53 People v. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 704, 718.
475
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 475
Ortega vs. People
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded
application in certain instances involving special laws. 54 R.A. No. 9344 should be no
exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344’s retroactivity is even patent from
the deliberations on the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to
35, may I humbly propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the
following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER
THIS LAW PENDING THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE
WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL
FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR,
SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD
INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION
PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN
BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult
offenders?
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not
have the capability at the moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.
_______________
54 Go v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 451,
citing People v. Langit, 392 Phil. 94, 119; 337 SCRA 323, 344 (2000), Gonzales v.
Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 297, 306; 277 SCRA 518 (1997), People v. Ganguso,
320 Phil. 324, 340; 250 SCRA 268, 279 (1995), and People v. Simon, 234 SCRA
555, 570 (1994).
This doctrine follows the rule enunciated under Art. 10 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that the provisions thereof apply supplementarily to special
laws.
476
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the
facilities are ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak
here of children who do not have criminal liability under this law, we are
referring here to those who currently have criminal liability, but because of
the retroactive effect of this measure, will now be exempt. It is quite
confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their
parents or through a diversion program, Mr. President. That is my
understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of
sifting before that. That is why I was proposing that they should be given to
the DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process, except that apparently, the
DSWD does not have the physical facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will
now have to just craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier by the good
Senator is included and the capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb these
individuals. Likewise, the issue should also be incorporated in the
amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes
effective, all those children in conflict with the law, who were convicted
in the present Penal Code, for example, who will now not be subject to
incarceration under this law, will be immediately released. Is that the
understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to
them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled .
. . . . provides, for example, for con-
48
 477
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 477
Ortega vs. People
ferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These
methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require
some sort of infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel from the
DSWD will have to address the counseling. So, there must be a transition in
terms of building the capacity and absorbing those who will benefit from this
measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an
amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
Santiago amendment is accepted.55
xxxx
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their
application, I would like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate
some kind of a transitory provision that would make this law apply also
to those who might already have been convicted but are awaiting, let us
say, execution of their penalties as adults when, in fact, they are
juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the
Transitory Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the good
Senator, specifically, Section 67. For example, “Upon effectivity of this
Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the
commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child
_______________
55 Deliberations of the Senate on Senate Bill No. 1402, November 9, 2005, pp.
47-50 (Emphasis supplied).
478
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development
officer.” So that would be giving retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was
trying to cite the instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as
adults awaiting execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an
additional amendment, subject to style.
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that
we have to address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a
separate provision.
The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the
offender is able to prove that at the time of the commission of the offense he
is a minor under this law, he should be given the benefit of the law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment. 56
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor
in interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases,
that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:
“The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect
according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the
essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect
to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and
must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent
_______________
56 Deliberations of the Senate on Senate Bill No. 1402, November 22, 2005, pp.
27-29 (Emphasis supplied).
479
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 479
Ortega vs. People
with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it
leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and
follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best
with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects
of the legislature.”57
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. 58 In this
case, the plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344’s unambiguous language, coupled with
clear lawmakers’ intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No other
interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates
the legislative intent to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth,
by petitioner’s own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore,
49
petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the
CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below
15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2)
counts of rape committed against AAA,  59 People v. Blancaflor, 466 Phil. 86, 103; 421 SCRA 354, 365 (2004),
_______________
57 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No.
160528, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 91, 101-102, citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan,
434 SCRA 388 (2004); National Tobacco Administration v. Commission on Audit,
370 Phil. 793; 311 SCRA 755 (1999), and Philippine National Bank v. Office of the
President, 322 Phil. 6, 14; 252 SCRA 5, 11 (1996); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil.
50, 57 (1950); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145-146 (1931)
citing Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. II, pp. 693-695.
58 Celino, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA
195, 202, citing People v. Ladjaalam, 395 Phil. 1; 340 SCRA 617 (2000).
480
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from
civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed
by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, and
is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct
from the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article
2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other
than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim’s injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.59
A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law
intended to protect our children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not
cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and children at risk in our country, has
been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major concerns have
been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale for
the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that:
“The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006 raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old
has compounded the problem of employment of children in the drug trade several
times over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most
particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using
children 15 years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They
claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful
discharge of their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into custody children
15
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citing People v. Viajedor, 401 SCRA 312 (2003).
481
VOL. 562, AUGUST 20, 2008 481
Ortega vs. People
years old or below who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of
illicit drugs, simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability under the
new law.”60
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively
exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only
a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the petitioner, and one who
deserves the law’s greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable
because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to
review by this Court.61 Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust
or unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to
give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the
law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence
to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.62
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-
19084 filed against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is
hereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for
the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered
to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.
_______________
60 A.M. No. 07-8-2-SC—Rule on Children Charged Under Republic Act No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, effective November 5,
2007, p. 23.
61 People v. Garcia, 424 Phil. 158, 190; 373 SCRA 134, 160 (2002),
citing People v. Ladjaalam, supra note 58.
62 Evangelista v. Sistoza, 414 Phil. 874, 881; 362 SCRA 563, 569-570 (2001),
citing People v. Ladjaalam, id.
482
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ortega vs. People
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).
SO ORDERED.
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 Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Corona ** and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.
Criminal cases against petitioner dismissed.
Notes.—It is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed to commit
rape be so great or of such character as could not be resisted because all that is
required is that it be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in
mind. It is instinctive for a young, unmarried woman to protect her honor and it is
thus difficult to believe that she would fabricate a tale of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts, reveal her shame and permit herself to be the
subject of a public trial if she had not really been ravished. (People vs. Dela Cruz,
529 SCRA 109 [2007])
Moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further
proof other than the commission of the crime, because it is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award, and the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon justifies the
award of exemplary damages. (People vs. Hapin, 531 SCRA 224 [2007])
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