1NC vs LASA MC

OFF
 OFF
Negatives should not be burdened with rejoinder against affs that defend something
other than the desirability of topical action – winning the USFG should not enact
substantial CJR should always be a sufficient condition for voting negative.

Enact means to make law – that requires governmental action.

Berman 94 – Judge on the Superior Court of New Jersey, citing to prior precedent and dictionaries. Opinion by Glenn J. Berman,
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Civil, Middlesex County, South Brunswick Associates v. Township Council of Tp. of Monroe, 285 N.J.
Super. 377, Decided 17 May 1994, Lexis

Miller's conduct would be permissible under N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5i if the representation were regarding the " enactment of any ordinance, resolution or
other matter required to be voted upon or which is subject to executive approval or veto." Id. (emphasis added). However, this language suggests
legislative, not quasi-judicial action.2 If the Legislature intended to allow public officials [*381] to represent others in quasi-judicial
proceedings, it could have stated that public officials may participate in any proceeding which would not result in material or monetary gain to them. Cf. N.J.S.A.
40A:9-22.5i [FN 2] "Enactment"
is defined as the act or action of enacting: passing of a bill by the legislature;
something that has been enacted as a law, bill, or statute. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 745
(3d ed. 1986). "Enact" is defined as to enter into public records; to establish by legal and authoritative act , make

into law, especially to perform the last act of legislation that gives the validity of law. Ibid. [End FN]

USFG is the federal government of the USA, based in DC

Dictionary of Government and Politics ’98 (Ed. P.H. Collin, p. 292)
United States of America (USA) [ju:’naitid ‘steits av e’merike] noun independent country, a federation of states (originally
thirteen, now fifty in North America; the United States Code = book containing all the permanent laws of the USA, arranged in sections
according to subject and revised from time to time COMMENT: the federal government (based in Washington D.C.) is
formed of a legislature (the Congress) with two chambers (the Senate and House of Representatives), an executive (the President)
and a judiciary (the Supreme Court). Each of the fifty states making up the USA has its own legislature and executive (the Governor) as
well as its own legal system and constitution

Should expresses an obligation

Nieto 2009 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311
(Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104
(2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to
favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word
"should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld
instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt
instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the
courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be
misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d
690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v.
Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury
instructions [**16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark.
859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence
as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of
the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word
"should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318
S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or
commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be
mandatory).

Vote negative for predictable limits and ground – allowing the affirmative to pick any
grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible, by skirting a
predictable starting point and making our preparation and research useless. The aff
can shift their advocacy in later speeches instead of being tied to a particular text,
which obviates negative arguments.
They don’t get to weigh the aff – it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we
weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

This has two impacts:

First is fairness:
Their interp explodes limits and allows affs to monopolize the moral high ground. The
lack of a stable mechanism lets them radically re-contextualize their aff and erase neg
ground via perms. Fairness is good and prior – debate’s a game that requires effective
competition and negation, which makes their offense inevitable. Cutting negs to every
possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced
and minority debaters.
Second is idea testing:
A clear, well-defined resolution is critical to allow the neg to refute the aff in an in-
depth fashion – this process of negation produces iterative testing and improvement,
where we learn to improve our arguments based on our opponents’ arguments.
 OFF
Their cessation of revolutionary institution building abdicates the potential for true
communual power, reducing revolution to reactive bursts of energy. This debate must
be a question of the speed, scope, and scale of revolutionary strategy. Only dual
power organizing can build institutions that meet the material needs of community
and construct a revolutionary base in the face of compounding crises of climate
change, imperialism, and fascism.
Escalante 19 [Alyson, you should totally read her work for non-debate reasons, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-
Imperialist activist, "Communism and Climate Change: A Dual Power Approach," Failing That, Invent,
https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/02/15/communism-and-climate-change-a-dual-power-approach/

I have previously argued that a crucial advantage to dual power strategy is that it gives the masses an infrastructure of
socialist institutions which can directly provide for material needs in times of capitalist crisis. Socialist
agricultural and food distribution programs can take ground that the capitalist state cedes by
simultaneously meeting the needs of the masses while proving that socialist self-management and
political institutions can function independently of capitalism. This approach is not only capable of literally
saving lives in the case of crisis, but of demonstrating the possibility of a revolutionary project which seeks
to destroy rather than reform capitalism. One of the most pressing of the various crises which humanity faces today
is climate change. Capitalist production has devastated the planet, and everyday we discover that the small window of time for avoiding
its most disastrous effects is shorter than previously understood. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts
that we have 12 years to limit (not even prevent) the more catastrophic effects of climate change. The simple, and
horrific, fact that we all must face is that climate change has reached a point where many of its effects are
inevitable, and we are now in a post-brink world, where damage control is the primary concern. The
question is not whether we can escape a future of climate change, but whether we can survive it. Socialist
strategy must adapt accordingly. In the face of this crisis, the democratic socialists and social democrats in the United States
have largely settled on market based reforms. The Green New Deal, championed by Alexandria Ocasio Cortez and the left
wing of the Democratic Party, remains a thoroughly capitalist solution to a capitalist problem. The proposal does nothing to challenge
capitalism itself, but rather seeks to subsidize market solutions to reorient the US energy infrastructure
towards renewable energy production, to develop less energy consuming transportation, and the development of public
investment towards these ends. The plan does nothing to call into question the profit incentives and
endless resource consumption of capitalism which led us to this point . Rather, it seeks to reorient the
relentless market forces of capitalism towards slightly less destructive technological developments.
While the plan would lead to a massive investment in the manufacturing and deployment of solar
energy infrastructure, National Geographic reports that, “Fabricating [solar] panels requires caustic chemicals
such as sodium hydroxide and hydrofluoric acid, and the process uses water as well as electricity , the
production of which emits greenhouse gases.” Technology alone cannot sufficiently combat this crisis, as
the production of such technology through capitalist manufacturing infrastructure only perpetuates
environmental harm. Furthermore, subsidizing and incentivizing renewable energy stops far short of
actually combating the fossil fuel industry driving the current climate crisis. The technocratic market solutions offered in the
Green New Deal fail to adequately combat the driving factors of climate change. What is worse, they rely on a violent imperialist global system
in order to produce their technological solutions. The development
of high-tech energy infrastructure and the development
of low or zero emission
transportation requires the import of raw material and rare earth minerals which the
United States can only access because of the imperial division of the Global South. This imperial division of the
world requires constant militarism from the imperial core nations, and as Lenin demonstrates in Imperialism: The Highest
Stage of Capitalism, facilitates
constant warfare as imperial states compete for spheres of influence in order
to facilitate cheap resource extraction. The US military, one of many imperialist forces, is the single largest user of
petroleum, and one of its main functions is to ensure oil access for the United States. Without challenging this
imperialist division of the world and the role of the United States military in upholding it, the Green New Deal fails even further to challenge the
underlying causes of climate change. Even with the failed promises of the Green New Deal itself, it is unlikely that this tepid market proposal
will pass at all. Nancy Pelosi and other lead Democrats have largely condemned it and consider it “impractical” and “unfeasible.” This dismissal
is crucial because it reveals the total inability of capitalism to resolve this crisis. If the center-left party in the heart of the imperial core sees
even milquetoast capitalist reforms as a step too far, we ought to have very little hope that a reformist solution will present itself within the
ever shrinking 12 year time frame. There are times for delicacy and there are times for bluntness, and we are in the latter. To put things bluntly:
the capitalists are not going to save us, and if we don’t find a way to save ourselves, the collapse of
human civilization is a real possibility. The pressing question we now face is: how are we going to save ourselves?
Revolution and Dual Power If capitalism will not be able to resolve the current encroaching climate crisis, we must find a way to
organize outside the confines of capitalist institutions, towards the end of overthrowing capitalism . If the
Democratic Socialists of America backed candidates cannot offer real anti-capitalist solutions through the capitalist state, we should be
skeptical of the possibility for any socialist organization doing so. TheDSA is far larger and far more well funded than any of
the other socialist organizations in the United States, and they have failed to produce anything more revolutionary
than the Green New Deal. We have to abandon the idea that electoral strategy will be sufficient to
resolve the underlying causes of this crisis within 12 years. While many radicals call for revolution instead of reform, the
reformists often raise the same response: revolution is well and good, but what are you going to do in the mean
time? In many ways this question is fair. The socialist left in the United States today is not ready for revolutionary action, and a mass base
does not exist to back the various organizations which might undertake such a struggle. Revolutionaries must concede that we have much
work to be done before a revolutionary strategy can be enacted. This is a hard truth, but it is true. Much of the left
has sought to ignore this truth by embracing adventurism and violent protest theatrics, in the vain hope
of sparking revolutionary momentum which does not currently exist. If this is the core strategy of the socialist left,
we will accomplish nothing in the next 12 years . Such approaches are as useless as the opportunist reforms pushed by the
social democrats. Our task in these 12 years is not simply to arm ourselves and hope that magically the masses will wake up prepared for
revolution and willing to put their trust in our small ideological cadres. We
must instead, build a movement, and with it we must
build infrastructure which can survive revolution and provide a framework for socialist development . Dual
power is tooled towards this project best. The Marxist Center network has done an impressive amount
of work developing socialist institutions across the US, largely through tenants organizing and serve the
people programs. The left wing factions within the DSA itself have also begun to develop mutual aid programs
that could be useful for dual power strategy . At the same time, mutual aid is not enough. We cannot
simply build these institutions as a reform to make capitalism more survivable. Rather, we must make
these institutions part of a broader revolutionary movement and they ought to function as a material
prefiguration to a socialist society and economy . The institutions we build as dual power outside the capitalist
state today ought to be structured towards revolutionary ends, such that they will someday function as
the early institutions of a revolutionary socialist society. To accomplish this goal, we cannot simply declare
these institutions to be revolutionary. Rather they have to be linked together through an actual
revolutionary movement working towards revolutionary ends.

This means that dual power institutions cannot exist as ends in and of themselves, nor can abstract
notions of mutual aid cannot be conceptualized as an end in itself . The explicit purpose of these
institutions has to be to radicalize the masses through meeting their needs, and providing an
infrastructure for a socialist movement to meet the needs of its members and the communities in which
it operates. Revolutionary institutions that can provide food, housing, and other needs for a
revolutionary movement will be crucial for building a base among the masses and for constructing the
beginnings of a socialist infrastructure for when we eventually engage in revolutionary struggle.

Ritualization and performativity are products of capitalism that cannot be separated

from consumer-market logics. Their location of repetition of citational practice
inevitably re-entrenches the economic order.
Gonzalez ’20 (George Gonzalez Baruch College, NY, USA George González is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology (Religion
and Culture) at Baruch College-CUNY. Within religious studies, he specializes in secularism studies, theories and methods in the study of
religion, and religion and society, “The psychic life of consumer power: Judith Butler, Ernest Dichter, the American marketing reception of
Freud, and the rituals of consuming religion” SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2050303220952871#_i6, 8-31-
2020) AT

Concluding remarks on ritual power and ritual resistance in a performative age As Kathryn Lofton argues, in the late
nineteenth century American, “debates about ritual became articulated through the marketplace” (64).19 In the
mid-twentieth-century, Ernest Dichter represents a late capitalist apotheosis of sorts—a proud social scientist and purveyor of Freud’s ideas,
he comes to view marketers as society’s ritual experts par excellence. In fact, he claims, the religious
authorities have much to learn from marketers about the psychological foundations of ritual (Dichter 2012,
112). “Practicing cultural anthropology more than anything else,” Ernest Dichter (112) writes, motivation research marketing is in a position to
deeply understand the ways in which consumer media provide technologies of being. Explicitly connecting Western consumption to the social
rituals of Samoans, Trobriand Islanders, and Balkan peasants,20 among others, Dichter (2012, 41, 190, 197) who professed an affinity for the
work of Mircea Eliade and carried on an ongoing correspondence with Margaret Mead (Schwarzkopf and Gries 2010),21 explains that
mid-twentieth century marketers are, in effect, “merchants of security” who sell the scripts for
processes of what Dichter (2012, 196–201) directly calls “ ritualization” (197) that, in turn, provide
technologies for everyday living.22 Marketing rituals are related to broader forms of ritualization. Dichter
(197) writes, “Even from the beginning of kindergarten days we are taught in our lives to ritualize, to
squeeze the unorganized day into strict rules .” In Butlerian terms, our subjectivation around social norms is
the result of the mutual cooperation of authority figures, in this case parents, school teachers, and marketers. According
to Dichter, consumption fulfills the necessary role of ritualization in modern, American society. In Dicther’s
corpus, consumer ritual is versatile: it offers rewards, it structures the luxury of “me” time, it heightens anticipation, it intensifies our fetishistic
associations with consumer goods (Dichter 1947b), it
purifies and grounds the self, it binds families and communities,
it forms and signals identity, and it transforms and expands the self (Market Research and American Business, 1935–
1965. Adam Matthew Digital Collections). For Ernest Dichter, consumer rituals could take the mundane shape of oral hygiene practices or,
echoing Victor Turner’s work on puberty rites, the purchasing of something as grey and dreary as a life insurance policy. Life insurance, Dichter
insists, actually signals the transformation of the young person into a “full-fledged adult” (Dichter 2012, 216) with adult responsibilities.
Moreover, Dichter suggests, the “quest for identity” (282) increasingly compels consumers and marketers must, in turn, sell solutions to life
quandaries and “exert influence to encourage acceptance of change” (215). Motivation researchers can accomplish their manipulations, Dichter
believes, because they are trained in a psychoanalytic approach fluent in the pre-cognitive language of the body: dress codes, facial
expressions, symbolic objects, and bodily gestures (124–125). They understand the importance of placing consumer rites within the “total
framework of culture” (148). As Kathryn Lofton (112) reminds us, J.Z. Smith argued that ritual is a “focusing lens .” It heightens the
significance of some things while hiding and obscuring the significance of other things. It is the work of advertising to suggest and facilitate the
connections for the ritual expression of self (to manage the terms by which we come to be). Fully absent from Dichter’s
considerations of this dynamism, however, are the face of labor, the environmental and political costs
of doing business, and the social inequalities reproduced by consumption. Consumers’ deep dives into
the self are privatized through consumer ritual. Privatization implies the sacrifice of the social. Economic process mirrors the
quality of the soul. In the end, Ernest Dichter suggests that marketers, “offer a ritualistic framework within which certain
deviations are possible” (200). This idea directly anticipates the concept of citational performativity (of
bodily citations) popularized within the study of religion by readers and students of Judith Butler. It
strongly echoes Judith Butler’s association of “ritualized production” with the “regularized and constrained
repetition of norms,” as Amy Hollywood reads her, and Hollywood’s own suggestion that ritualization implies, “the
complex interplay of sameness and difference constitutive of repetition itself ” (2006). As we have already seen,
the social apparatus of American advertising has long been convinced that consumer ritual does things
—that social order and social change depend on consumer ritualization . As an archeological matter, I suggest, a
proto-account of performativity informs mid-twentieth century American marketing’s account of the subject and the ‘power’ which brings it
into existence. As we have seen, Judith Butler’s account of performativity is indebted to her ontologizing of
psychoanalysis as a first philosophy of the subject. As the anthropologist, Kath Weston (2002, 85), suggests, to turn to
psychoanalysis in a historical vacuum is to contribute to our collective amnesia around Freud’s relationship to
capitalist organization. Whatever our scholarly intentions, we contribute to the discourse of libertarianism by refashioning
psychoanalysis as natural law. The problem only redoubles when Butler’s account of performativity is itself
ontologized and dehistoricized. Explicitly connecting performativity and consumption, Weston (2002, 89)
further specifies that Butler’s account of performativity and of the citational practice of gender is
dangerously abstract since its repetitions are actually accomplished within the economic order, “through
the use of mass-produced commodities that augur gender as they augment the body.” Butler’s account of gender
performativity, much as neoliberal ideology would have it, locates gender within processes of
consumption at the expense of labor, despite the increasing feminization of service work and the harsh realities faced by global,
pink collar labor. It locates gender exclusively within the realm of the visible signifiers and markers of gender.23 Weston (85) concludes: “(the)
turn to psychoanalysis at the expense of political economy makes it difficult for performance theory to gauge the limits of its own applicability.
Lacking any historical perspective of its own, performativity
can scarcely attend to the historical circumstances of
its production.” Following Weston, I have attempted, here, to mitigate against this amnesic tendency by historicizing psychoanalytic
performativity within the history of postwar American marketing. As I also discuss elsewhere (González 2016), the anthropologist, David
Graeber (2012), explains that accounts
of performativity, which stress the idea that power creates its own truth, coincided
with the increased financialization of the economy between 1980 and 2008 and the ‘confidence games’ required to heat
and inflate market bubbles. This power to create the truths we are then obliged to live has important roots in mid-twentieth century
psychoanalytic marketing. As we have seen, the psychic abundance which Ernest Dichter made much of, when disciplined by marketing, is
always funneled into boxes, whether literal or figurative. While consumer markets provide technologies for being and (to an oft-
underappreciated degree, as Kathryn Lofton reminds us) provide the malleable “linguistic conditions” for the emergence of the contemporary
self (to echo Butler’s account of power), consumption, as Melinda Cooper’s analysis of neoliberal financialization also suggests, is never
deconstruction.24 The mid-century disciplining of psychic abundance prefigured and underwrote the antinormative expansion of credit in
neoliberal times. Performativity
is not simply a conceptual tool one uses to make sense of religion; it is a
product of a specific religious history of capitalism. It is an artifact of a religion which we may study and
critique but which we religion scholars must also confess to practicing. The philosophical anthropologist, Michael
Jackson (2018, 259) writes, “The same tension lies at the heart of anthropology and history, for while both disciplines have evolved
sophisticated methods for understanding the lives of others at other times or in other places, all intellectuals possess preunderstandings and
prejudices, born of the time and place from whence they came.” In the place and time of consuming religion, reflecting on our own ‘soulful’
ritualization by capital is necessary (if also insufficient) to the scholarly projects of understanding and critique (González 2015b). Even if the
religious contexts we study are pre-capitalist or non-capitalist, our embodiment (language, institutionalized labor, field of vision, sense of time,
and desires) as scholars disciplined and organized by capitalism is, by very definition, neither of these. While we
can critique
performativity on Marxist grounds (which explicitly implicates the varieties of world religions because, in different hands and
hearts, religious ideologies both sanctify and challenge capitalist organization), there are additional reasons all of this ought to matter for
religious studies. In the Dukheimian sense advanced by Kathryn Lofton, we
who study ritual are always and already also
organized by ritual. The Freudian disciplining of consumer ritual is, as it were, a form of religious organization. Scholars of
religion participate in this religious history of capitalism whether we mean to or not. We also do so in specific
ways. I want to suggest that by cordoning off affective, somatic, and linguistic experience from issues of political economy, religion scholars who
traffic in the Freudianized concept of performativity reproduce secularism’s inaugural separation of (economic) fact and (religious) value. In
short, performativity tends to reproduce the same social distortions that the category of religion does.
We do consumer ‘religion,’ schematizing the world and performing its ritual sacrifices of the
‘economic,’ by doing religious studies in this way.

The alternative is to affirm the dual power model of the Communist Party – only that
can provide accountability, mobilization, and connect local struggles to international
liberation
Escalante 18 (Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST
CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly
theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base
building and dual power strategy can
be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging
movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial
insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which
revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist
propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them.
The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions
which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the
oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work
to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding
endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The
question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing
socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of
communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders
hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough
to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of
communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist
party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are
organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must
be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party
organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such
organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line
determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for
holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined
goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the
party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations
which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They
function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their
liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A
party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing
has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and
informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique
form at the local level, we need to remember that our
struggle is against a material base which functions not only at
the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist
party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy
to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and
individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one
independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal
organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist
ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a
movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently
infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these
ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal
party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples
needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to
occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows
community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and
participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in
communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize
that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since
base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon
these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete
unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth
is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside
building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The
movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party
emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to
explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual
base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations
ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community
members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres
capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and
transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their
material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains
the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to
gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the
construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of
the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party
organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national
party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing
organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my
hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the
party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is
pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will
arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I
hope that I have put forward a useful
contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for
party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary
orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I
strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only
possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of
individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing
movement can succeed.
 OFF
Next is the Counter-Advocacy:
The United State federal government should enact substantial criminal justice reform
in the area of policing by creating the Corporate Crimes Division of the Department of
Justice.

Abolition doesn’t exist in a vacuum but is coopted by corporate criminals who have
more political influence – that reinforces punitive paradigms and neoliberal social
control – only the state can intervene
Alvesalo-Kuusi 17 (Anne Alvesalo-Kuusi, Steven Bittle and Liisa Lähteenmäki, Anne Alvesalo-Kuusi got her PhD from the University
of Turku in 2003. From 1996 to 2007 she worked as a senior researcher at the Police College of Finland and until 2010 she held a similar
position in the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health. Anne Alvesalo-Kuusi has studied extensively in the area of economic and corporate
crime control and criminal policy. In particular, her studies have focused on the problems of policing safety crimes and the misuse of migrant
labour in Finland. Her areas of interest also include the control and regulations of work. Steven Bittle is Associate Professor in the Department
of Criminology at the University of Ottawa. His research focuses broadly on crimes of the powerful and corporate crime, with particular interest
in corporate criminal liability/corporate manslaughter. He is currently developing new projects dealing with corporate corruption in Canada and
corporate accountability for forced labour in global supply chains, as well as preparing a book-length manuscript on corporate manslaughter
law and its reform. He is the co-book review editor for the Journal of White Collar and Corporate Crime and, since 2018, has been the
Coordinator of the Criminology Department’s PhD program. Prior to joining the University of Ottawa in 2010, he held various research and
management positions in the Federal Government, including the Department of Justice Canada, the Law Commission of Canada, and the
Security Intelligence Review Committee. He earned his PhD in Sociology at Queen’s University (Kingston, Canada), and holds a BA and MA in
Criminology from Simon Fraser University. , “Corporate Criminal Liability and Abolitionism – An unholy alliance of corporate power and critical
criminology?,” EG Press Limited, http://www.egpress.org/papers/alvesalo-kussi-et-al-corporate-criminal-liability-andabolitionism, 10-10-
2017)//Ilake-NC

Our analysis of the legislative process of corporate criminal liability and the enforcement of the law in cases of
occupational safety crimes in Finland reveals how the representatives of corporate power successfully hacked
select abolitionist discourses against (over)criminalising corporations and, at the same time, perpetuated the
myth of crime. Calls for denouncing punishment and the concept of crime, defining corporate harm as
non-criminal, restricting and limiting punishment, and the appeal to leave a considerable amount of
cases outside the criminal justice system, were paradoxically taken seriously in legislation and legal
praxis when it came to the crimes of the powerful. What is more, our analysis exposed the role of power and the
peculiarity of political processes in primary criminalisation and enforcement. First, it was the targets of corporate criminal liability
who had the most leverage in defining the content of the law – that is, ‘the moral capital of capital’ (Tombs,
2016: 33) helped to militate against (but not prevent) corporate criminal liability. The employers’ lobby, with its close
connections to political decision-making, managed to restrict the scope and depth of criminal definitions as well
as hinder the actual sentences at the beginning. The employers also successfully rejected the label of crime and criminality ,
thus preserving, at least to some degree, the ownership of the conflict. The law then served to cement the exclusion of
corporations from the ranks of ‘real criminals’, resulting ultimately in minimal CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND ABOLITIONISM
39 VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1. enforcement and ineffective consequences . As culpability is not perceived to cohere with corporate
conduct, the purpose of the law – wider accountability than the former legislation was able to deliver – never materialised. It is
still individuals who bear the liability, as corporations are either not prosecuted, or when prosecuted, sentenced with what amounts to a slap
on a wrist. It is easy to state that fines of a few thousand euros for killing or injuring workers demonstrate effective avoidance of punishment.
The fact that further punishment – such as corporate probation for a malicious corporate offence – was not even
contemplated by the legislator further underlines the lenient, forgiving attitude towards corporate crime.
Harm and pain is confined to the victims, and corporations are left to continue ‘business as usual’ ,
even in cases of severe offending. The broader take-away from this paper revolves around the ways in which abolitionist
arguments are heard in the context of corporate harm and wrongdoing while neglected in others. Ironically, abolitionist justifications
for less criminalisation, less punishment and more legal ‘fairness’ were co-opted by the powerful,
resulting in merely reinforcing the traditional concepts of crime and of the criminal, while not truly challenging
their ideological underpinnings. The ability of powerful corporate actors to use abolitionist arguments
stands as a stark reminder that academic knowledge claims do not exist in a vacuum. And while there is
no controlling for how our claims get heard, we can, as Snider (2006: 338) argues, make ‘our messages harder to mishear’. In
this respect, whilst we concur with abolitionist critiques of the criminal justice system, we submit that their
arguments might be heard more clearly via a more complete account of what to do about corporate
harm and wrongdoing – to fill a void in the abolitionist literature in order to resist the co-optation of
their arguments by powerful actors and interests. Doing so would perhaps entail some recognition that, unlike traditional
street ‘criminals’, corporations are not ‘normal’ political citizens – they are legally and structurally designed as a device to maximise profit for
their owners and investors (Glasbeek 2002). Thus, it is rational for it, at times, to behave as an amoral calculator when faced with laws that add
to the costs of production (Pearce and Tombs, 1998). Corporations are therefore not victims of poor social conditions or
abuse, as their offences involve rational planning, even callous calculation. Misbehaving corporations may therefore not
readily fall into the category of ‘problematic situations’ but instead be considered as ‘dangerous’ and thus
deserving of greater state intervention and the stigma of crime. In this way abolitionist arguments need to
challenge neoliberalism’s ‘ideological, cultural and moral’ (Tombs, 2016: 11) foundations by considering
how corporate harm and wrongdoing is a unique situation that demands a different response than what has historically been the case with
traditional ‘crimes’. At
the very least, the forms of punishment and other consequences of corporate
criminalisation are in desperate need of elaboration. In response to dominant claims that corporations are inherently good
and law-abiding with the capacity to self-regulate outside of the formal legal system, some critical corporate crime scholars have, indeed,
advocated for greater state intervention in the corporate realm.6 (Pearce, 1990: 424; Pearce and Tombs, 1997: 90; Alvesalo and Tombs 2002,
also see Glasbeek, 2002 and 2017; Tombs and Whyte 2015). Taking this position does not entail a prison-first
punishment strategy. Instead, it is part and parcel of broader ideological struggles over the meaning of corporate
harm and wrongdoing and how it should be controlled, and the recognition that some deterrence-based strategies have the
potential to work with corporate offenders in ways that have proven ineffective in the context of
traditional street crimes (see Tombs, 2016). At the very least it is an acknowledgement that the State, despite
its ongoing commitments to neoliberal capitalism, currently remains the only countervailing force capable of
confronting corporate ‘crime’ (Pearce and Tombs, 1998) and, as such, should be challenged to live up to its democratically-
appointed responsibilities in this regard.
 OFF
Next is the Ballot K:
Reject the affirmative’s call for the ballot –

It is a moment of interest convergence between the Affirmative and the judge – this
rhetorical alliance with alterity is a technology of political demand that repeats the
strategic attitude of the system it seeks to overturn. The guilt solidarity of the 1AC
masks the privilege that prevents the aff project from directly changing the lives they
invoke to warrant a ballot
Chow 93 – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993 (Rey, Writing Diaspora:
Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17)
Why are "tactics" useful at this moment? As discussions about "multiculturalism,' "interdisciplinarity," "the third world intellectual," and other
companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and
difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt
us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic
propriety, and the "otherness” ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and
victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control ; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial
diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness— all these forces create new "solidarities" whose
ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities arc often informed by a
strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over
and over again is We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those
who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and
are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their
"victimization" by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarity-with-the-oppressed), but the power,
wealth, and privilege that ironically accumulate from their "oppositional" viewpoint, and the
widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain
from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object
and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation .) The predicament we face in the West,
where intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, is that "if a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, ... he
will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen."28 Why
should we believe in those who continue
to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the
turning-into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper?
How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is "without any base where it could
stockpile its winnings" (de Certeau, p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military
no less than in the academic sense?
 OFF
Next is the 13th Counter-Advocacy:
The United States federal government should enact substantial criminal justice reform
in policing by interpreting “badges and incidents of slavery” to include all
discriminatory instances of policing and eliminating those “badges and incidents of
slavery.”
 OFF
The aff repeats precisely the violence of pornotroping: a reliance upon scenario
planning to interrogate death from air pollution that parasitically relies upon
blackness’ proximity to violence. The only response to our condition of white being is
symbolic extinction, a terroristic situational transfer that breaks their hail to futurity
that is in and of this World.
Gillespie 17 (John Gillespie, Undergraduate Researcher and Debater at Towson University, “On the
Prospect of Weaponized Death,” Propter Nos, Volume 2: Issue 1, Insurgency / Exhaustion, Fall 2017,
[AB])
We could never win a revolution, and the death that swallowed Lor Scoota is the same unceasing death that surrounds the people who
mourned him, and anyone who attempts to challenge the anti-Black world. It was not easy to come to this conclusion. I still obtain glimmers of
hope for the future, but the historical record shows that if the future is anything like the past, the only thing guaranteed is fungibility and
accumulation. I remember running home, crying, and writing the beginning sketches of what would become this essay. These sketches became
the building blocks for a theory of weaponization—one blackened answer to the question of “how should we live” in the unending age of anti-
blackness. I did not write this out of self-righteous radicalism. In fact, I believe that those who write radicalism selfrighteously forget that,
“Normally people are not radical, normally people are not moving against the system: normally people are just trying to live, to have a bit of
romance and to feed their kids.”3 I wrote this out of the sad belief that once we
have lost all hope in the prospect of black
lives ever being able to live, to matter, to sustain romance and feed their families without an unmoving proximity to
death , once antiBlackness has sucked every bit of spirit we have dry, our only hope is to lose hope, to
recognize we cannot win. The end of the World begins once we recognize that a Black sentence is a
death sentence , and learn to weaponize it. II. learning to die in the anthropocene must be done for
those who were never invited to the anthropos too —Anthropos Black life is lived in a white hyper-
reality . By this I mean, black life is lived inside a constituted white fiction which concretizes itself as fact . Black
life is a life
lived in non-existence; blackness “exists” as a symbol of death that is, but is not. Blackness
“exists” only insofar as White Being structures it onto a map of anti-black violence .4 Achille Mbembe
corroborates this in his Critique of Black Reason, stating: Racism consists, most of all, in substituting what is with something else, with another
reality. It
has the power to distort the real and to fix affect , but it is also a form of psychic derangement,
the mechanism through which the repressed suddenly surfaces . When the racist sees the Black person, he does not see
that the Black person is not there, does not exist, and is just a sign of a pathological fixation on the absence of a relationship. We must
therefore consider race as being both beside and beyond being.5 The reality that replaces that which is is a white hyper-
reality . This white hyperrealism fixes blackness as “a sign of a pathological fixation.” White hyper-
realism is the paradigm whereby consciousness is unable to distinguish between the fictions created
by White Being and the Real . It is this fact that permits black death to be subsumed in simulations by
each and every (analytic) encounter with Whiteness and the World. Questions like, “Can the Black
suffer?” and “Is it capable for the Black to be wronged?” arise due to the inability to access a grammar
of suffering to communicate a harm that has never ended , a harm that can never end without ending
the World itself. It is for this reason that viral videos of black death, more than opening the possibility for
liberal notions of justice, seem to suture the relationship between the mythical and the real that
perpetuates itself through the reification of black trauma. Black death, more than deconstructing the
ontics of the Human , seems to extend its hyper-reality . Black death makes it harder to distinguish
white fictions from any sense of real harm being done to human flesh . The Black is meant to
experience its death over and over and over again ; and the World itself recycles all its fictions-as-the-
Real. Put differently, the White World subjects the Black to perpetual, gratuitous violence , and then uses that
violence as evidence to further suggest that the Black is not Human. For how can a Human endure such a thing? The
experience of gratuitous violence secures the semiotics of the white hyper-reality . White Disneyland
stays intact . Blackness exists at the nexus of fact and fiction, possibility and (non)value, inclusion and
exclusion. Blackness is trapped even in saying it’s trapped because the “ trapped-ness ” of the Black
extends to locations where the diction and syntax of White “words don’t go. ”6 The Black does not have the
grammar to speak against where and how it is trapped since Blackness can only articulate itself through the semiotics of
Whiteness. That White Being continues to center black death as the matrix of possibility for its hyper-
realist structure indexes the promise of death insofar that White Being is promised futurity . The Black was
rendered fungible through the conjunction of the political and the libidinal economy of the anti-Black world. Blackness gave birth to the
commodity and the economy of signification that structures the cartography of the Human’s coordinates. This could be said to be a still birth,
insofar as the nature of Black
life in a white hyper-reality is conducted on a plane that guarantees natal
alienation, social, and ontological death. The Black body lives to die ; the specter of death shadows it
everywhere . What matters crucially here, in our invocation of the hyper-real, is the importance of the
Symbolic. The Symbolic is what “structures the libidinal economy of civil society.” 7 The Symbolic here is
understood as “the representational process” that structures “the curriculum and order of knowledge ”
and/or “the descriptive statement of the human” in our contemporary World.8 And in this World, white symbolism is
everywhere. In fact, in an anti-Black paradigm , white symbolism is everything . White symbolism over-

determines itself as the Symbolic itself, and denounces anything that challenges its genre-specific
mode of knowing , seeing and understanding the World. In other words, white symbolism holds a monopoly on the
Symbolic in ways that operate “lawlikely so within the terms of their/our order-specific modes of adaptive cognition-for, truth-for.”9
There is no outside to whiteness, to white semiotics, to white constructs of value and reality, to white structuring of libidinal value.
And for this reason, like Wilderson, “[I] am more interested in the symbolic value of Whiteness (and the
absence of Blackness's value)…”10 in a world of white hyper-reality. If Blackness is lived in the hyper-real, then
there is a hyper-intensification—an overrepresentation—of semiology that dictates the coercive
violence of the Black’s (non)existence. The semiotics of White Being is the factitious fiction that
simulates the entire World . White Being and black death are part of a globally blood-soaked symbolic
exchange that has extended itself over the terrain of the World to such an extent that there can be no
distinguishing between the Real and the Non-Real . White Being is that Being for whom ontological capacity exists,
whereas the Black is the antithesis to Being, that fleshly matter whose essence is incapacity. 11 If “language is the house of being,”12 as
Heidegger puts it, then Blackness is trapped at the very center of White Being. Dionne Brand puts it concisely when she writes, “We are people
without a translator. The language we use already contains our demise and any response contains that demise as each response emboldens
and strengthens the language it hopes to undermine.”13 This abject positionality was codified through a violence so
epochal that Modernity itself can be said to have been inaugurated through it. However, at the same time, “the
center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside it.” 14 That black death and anti-blackness exist in this liminal
positionality posits the impossible possibility of a rupture in the moment. For that which is inside the structure, only through
being outside the structure, enables the possibility of both sedimentation and disorientation . Jacques
Derrida writes, “The function of this center was not only to orient; balance, and organize the structure— one cannot in fact conceive of an
unorganized structure—but above all to make sure that theorganizing principle of the structure would limit what we might
call the freeplay of the structure.”15 If black death centers the structure , then it is somewhere in the perfection
and expansion of this antagonism (the inside-outside antagonism) that the cartography of gratuitous anti-Black
violence is laid out. What might happen when what orients the structure becomes insurgent , attacking
the structure through that which centers its very Being ? What might happen if black death became
weaponized in order to further limit the freeplay of the structure —the expansion of White Being ?
Afro-Pessimist thinkers, in favor of a diagnostic analysis, tend to veer away from the tradition of critical
social theory that prescribes solutions to the analysis in the conclusion of their work . However, one
finds throughout Afro-Pessimist literature a battle cry, a prophetic vision, a pulsing pessimist hope for the “end of the
World.” For if Whiteness ended Worlds through its colonial simulations and violent transmutations of
Africans into Blacks, then the only way out is an end to the White World . White Being is irredeemable, and so is
the World it fosters. Sexton says, “In a world structured by the twin axioms of white superiority and black inferiority, of white existence and
black non-existence, a world structured by a negative categorical imperative—‘above all, don’t be black’—in this world, the zero degree of
transformation is the turn toward blackness, a turn toward the shame, as it were, that ‘resides in the idea that 'I am thought of as less than
human.’”16 It’s
only through black vigilance that the simulacra of White Being is made clear and the
spectacle ofgratuitous freedom is made visible . It is somewhere in this structural antagonism, that on the one hand
conditions the possibility of the World, and on the other hand conditions the possibility of its end , its
limitations , its disorientation , that we found the language to say the unsayable and do the undoable. As Frank Wilderson reminds
us: Black Studies in general and Afro-Pessimism in particular present non-Black academics with more than an intellectual problem. It presents
them with an existential problem. Thereason is because there’s an aspect of Afro-Pessimism that we don’t talk
about…which is that were you to follow it to its logical conclusion, it’s calling for the end of the world…it
wants the death of everyone else in the same way that we experience our death ,so that one could not liberate
Blacks through AfroPessimism and be who one was on the other side of that. That’s the unspoken dynamic of Afro-Pessimism.17 If we are
engaging in a war in which the symbolic value , the semiotics of this World itself , positions “the Black
as death personified , the White as personification of diversity, of life itself ,”18 then resistance needs an
“ unspoken dynamic .” It needs a space where “ words don’t go ”—a form of guerrilla linguistics, a
submarined syntax , an undercommon communication . Perhaps, here, where the conversation is blackened, and the
theory is phobogenic, and the journal is Propter Nos, we can allow ourselves to excavate insurgent dictions still lost in
the lingua franca of White Being , but full of the specter of black terror, black disorientation . If the Black
is death personified, then what might happen if we weaponized our death ? What might happen if we

recognized the inevitability of that death? What if we began to think that the non-
uniqueness of that death was an opening towards the “end of Humanity?” In The Spirit of

Terrorism, Jean Baudrillard writes, “When global power monopolizes the situation to this extent, when
there is such a formidable condensation of all functions in the technocratic machinery, and when no
alternative form of thinking is allowed , what other way is there but a terroristic situational
transfer ?”19 Terrorism consists of the militaristic tactics used by those who are facing globalized White Being with asymmetrical
technologies of terror, violence, intimidation and war. A terrorist is any armed vigilante willing to rupture the system
of semiotics through an equally cofounding semiotic. A semiotic that returns one to the “ desert of the
[Black] Real ”—where a “ project of total disorder ” is unleashed upon the semiotic system .20 Black terrorism
is a violence that re-appropriates the death embedded in the Black’s ontological incapacity in order to
enable the possibility of a radical capacity — gratuitous freedom . White Being itself is a decentralized ontoepistemic
deployment of violence, and if violent insurgency is necessary, then the decentralized approach of the black terrorist is necessary to counter
the terror of White Being. This being said, black terrorism is perhaps better understood as counter-terror terrorism. We
do not have the
power to end the World with life. We only have the power to end the World through death . As Baudrillard
writes, “The radical difference is that the terrorist, while they have at their disposal weapons that are the
system’s own , possess a further lethal weapon: their own deaths .”21 The United States has an international military
force, a storehouse of nuclear arms, and the capacity, within their police state alone, to “terrorize” not just one block in Baltimore, but the
whole entire world. Black terrorism is what happens when we heed the Afro-Pessimist call that “A living
death is as much a death as it is a living,”22 it is what happens when we take seriously the unsayable in
Afro-Pessimism. Black Terrorism is (non)ontological fugitivity that disavows any need to focus on social
life—black terrorism steals black death itself from White Being . It is for this reason that Baudrillard
speaks to his own White Being and the specter of terror when he says : When Western culture sees all of its values
Our death is an extinction , an annihilation. Herein lies
extinguished one by one, it turns inward on itself in the very worst way.
our poverty. When a singularity throws its own death into the ring, it escapes this slow extermination, its
dies its own natural death . This is an immense game of double or quits. In committing suicide , the singularity
suicides the other at the same time— we might say that the terrorist acts literally ‘suicided’ the West. A
death for a death , then, but transfigured by the symbolic stakes . ‘ We have already devastated our world ,
what more do you want?’ says Muray. But precisely, we have devastated this world , it still has to be
destroyed . Destroyed symbolically . This is not at all the same undertaking. And though we did the first part , only
others are going to be able to do the second .23 We are the others. Tasked with the (un)fortunate task of
ending White hyper-realism , the White World , and White Being. Well aware that if White Fascism continues the
project of black annihilation, the only choice we will have is to fight. Not because we want to, but because we have to. But, ultimately, we must
remember the words of Huey Newton: “[T]he first lesson a revolutionary must learn is that he is a doomed man.”24 In the age of
Trump, the perfection of slavery reaches its horizon.25 The disavowal of the lives of refugees is White Being attempting to
reconcile the “NationState” simulation with the free track and flow of bodies it’s been attempting to murder; the deportation of
undocumented immigrants in conjunction with the materialization of borders is White Being attempting
to secure its linguistic and economic integrity; the rise of the private prison and the militarization of the
police force is White Being attempting to innovate the system of enslavement and necropolitics for the 21st
Century; the plundering of indigenous land and bodies is White Being attempting to finish off the project of
genocide; the disregard for the Earth is White Being ensuring the Anthropocene will also be the
Apocalypse. Trump is a reinvigoration, a call to arms, for White Being, and White Being can only be
“destroyed symbolically.” Black terrorism transfigures the symbolic stakes because it steals away that
condition of White Being’s possibility in a kind of fugitivity that is a zero-transformation into
Blackness. This being said, we all know that the only thing that follows the absolute loss of hope is this Black
Spring, this Neo-Fanonian violence, this blackened terroristic situational transfer. In Baudrillard’s words,
in the Age of Trump, let us remember the gift of immorality , “Terrorism is immoral. The World Trade
Center event, that symbolic challenge, is immoral, and it is a response to a globalization which is itself
immoral. So, let us be immoral …”26
CASE
 1NC – Top
Vote neg on presumption
[1] They have no intrinsic benefit to reading the 1AC within the debate space and thus
no reason to affirm their strategy
[2] Movements don’t spill up – competition means you ally yourself with people who
vote for you and alienate those who are forced to debate you ensuring the failure of
the movement
[3] The regurgitation of knowledge from the 1ac proves that it is not a departure from
the status quo, but rather gets coopted by academia

Advocacy ought to be tied to a political end. Self-formulation alone lapses into total
individualism that demolishes collective action.
Myers ’13 (Ella; Assistant Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies at the University of Utah, 2013, “Worldly Ethics: Democratic
Politics and Care for the World”, p. 44-45) *Edited for reading clarity

Unfortunately, Connolly is inconsistent in this regard, for he also positions Foucauldian self-artistry as [is] an “essential
preliminary to,” and even the necessary “condition of,” change at the macropolitical level.104 That is, although Connolly
claims that micropolitics and political movements work “in tandem,” each producing effects on the other,105 he sometimes privileges “ action
by the self on itself” as a starting point and necessary prelude to macropolitical change. This approach
not only avoids the question of the genesis of such reflexive action and its possible harmful effects but
also indicates that collective efforts to alter social conditions actually await proper techniques of the
self. For example, in a rich discussion of criminal punishment in the United States, Connolly contends that “today the micropolitics of desire in
the domain of criminal violence has become a condition for a macropolitics that reconfigures existing relations between class, race, crime and
punishment.”106 Here and elsewhere in Connolly’s writing the sequencing
renders these activities primary and secondary
rather than mutually inspiring and reinforcing.107 It is a mistake to grant chronological primacy to
ethical self-intervention, however. How, after all, is such intervention, credited with producing salient effects at the
macropolitical level, going to get off the ground, so to speak, or assuredly move in the direction of
democratic engagement (rather than withdrawal, for example) if it is not tethered, from the beginning, to
public claims that direct attention to a specific problem, defined as publicly significant and changeable ?
How and why would an individual take up reflexive work on the desire to punish if she were not already
attuned, at least partially, to problems afflicting current criminal punishment practices? And that
attunement is fostered, crucially, by the macropolitical efforts of democratic actors who define a public matter
of concern and elicit the attention of other citizens. 108 For reflexive self- care to be democratically
significant, it must be inspired by and continually connected to larger political mobilizations. Connolly
sometimes acknowledges that the arts of the self he celebrates are not themselves the starting point of collaborative action but instead exist in
a dynamic, reciprocal relation with cooperative and antagonistic efforts to shape collective arrangements. Yet the self’s relation with itself is
also treated as a privileged site, the very source of democratic spirit and action. This tendency to prioritize the self’s reflexive
relationship over other modes of relation defines the therapeutic ethics that ultimately emerges out of Foucault’s and,
to a lesser degree, Connolly’s work. This ethics not only elides differences between caring for oneself and caring
for conditions but also celebrates the former as primary or, as Foucault says, “ontologically prior.” An ethics centered
on the self’s engagement with itself may have value, but it is not an ethics fit for democracy.
Endorse the hard work of institutional reform – their sweeping claims lead to violence
and can’t engage materiality.
Condit ’15 (Celeste; 2/4/15; Ph.D. in Rhetorical Studies from the University of Iowa, B.S. in Speech from the University of Iowa,
Distinguished Research Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia, awarded author; Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol 101.
Issue 1. “Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change,”)

The theoriesof social change that dominated American Communication Studies at the close of the twentieth century
echoed those of the Western humanities. These theories spurred extensive thought about the performances of individual identity
and the relationship of identity to mass media and culture, and they probably had some laudable influence on the broader culture. They are,
however, inadequate to the evolving contexts I have described. One can sum up the most widely circulating theories of
social change among “critical social theorists” of the twentieth century in the following, admittedly simplified, statement:
There is an (evil) Totality (fill in the blank with one or more: patriarchy, whites, the West, the U.S., neo-
liberalism, global capitalism) that must be overturned by a Radical Revolution. We don't know the shape of
what will come after the Revolution, but The Evil is a construction of the Totality, so anything that comes
after will be better. All you need is … (fill in the blank: Love, Courage, Violence, etc.). For an example, read Slavoj Žižek's attack
on the evil Totality (“capitalism,”5 pp. 41/49), which requires the “excess” of violence named as “courage”6 (pp. 75, 78, 79), via “a leap”7 (p.
81), to eliminate “democracy” for a yet-to-be-imagined “new collectivity” (p. 85).8 The
resilience of this social theory identifies
it as a rhetorical attractor; a predispositional symbolic set that readily transmits emotive potency. To
appropriate Kenneth Burke's terms, the bio-symbolics of human political relationships readily create a “grammar”
and “rhetoric” in the form of a unified enemy that can be imagined as defeated in a singular battle, after
which, things in “our” tribe may be harmonious. To identify this fantasy theme in this way is to suggest that it may
not merely be the product of “Western” or “capitalist” imaginations, but rather that it arises from an intersection
of the structural characteristics of language systems and the nature of human biologies (which readily adopt both tribal social
cooperation and inter-tribal competition). Because neither biology nor symbolics are deterministic systems, this fantasy theme is avoidable,
even if it is powerfully attractive. Because both biology and symbolics are material, however, specific kinds of work are necessary in order to
avoid the lure of that predisposition. This point is crucial, because it invalidates the twentieth century (idealist) approaches to social change,
which envisioned a single (violent) leap away from the social as sufficient to create and maintain better worlds. Thus, when Žižek and others
urge us to “Act” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the
links between actions and consequences are never certain , we can call his appeal both a failure of imagination
and a failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates
quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the
romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of totalitarian states and /or violent factional strife. A
materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void.
All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that
trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions—the first iteration of which is the rule of
the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable
outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby
reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the
past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the
twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option ,
however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9).
The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is
piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity
than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical
Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the
appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not
provide a viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now,
then Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot
succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we
call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language,
and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left
Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

The aff’s shift in epistemology can’t create political change – only institutional focus
secures it.
Kitchen ’10 (Nicholas; Deputy Director of the London School of Economics IDEAS US International Affairs Program; 2010, Review of
International Studies, “Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation,” pg. 117-143)

Fundamentally the
state is made up of individuals. Individuals construct systems, institutions and bureaucracies;
individuals lead and follow; individuals make decisions. On what basis do individuals decide which ideas to hold? The first is the
quality of the idea itself - its internal coherence, its congruence with known realities. The second key to success resides in the speaker himself -
his intellectual status, his eloquence of advocacy. Thus the power of an idea to persuade others at any one moment in history
resides both in itself, and in the power of those who hold it. The causal effect of ideas on policies has tended to be
displaced onto the political effects of individuals in IR theory, so that the persuasiveness of ideas is assumed rather than
examined, and treated as constant.77 It is however, important to recognise that some ideas are 'better' than
others, and are more likely to progress into the policymaking arena, where institutional factors may then
come into play. This is not to deny the crucial role of forces exogenous to them that push certain ideas to heart of policymaking. Whilst
the degree to which ideas generate popular support may provide them with power mediated through public opinion, ideas can take a
shortcut to policy success if they have the backing of individuals and institutions that themselves have
power. The character of these 'couriers' of ideas that may be as important, if not more so, than anything intrinsic to the idea itself.78 At
the individual level then, neoclassical realism understands that the ideas held by powerful actors within the state
matter. Whilst the intrinsic power of a particular idea makes its progress into such positions more likely, the
ideas that will impact most upon foreign policy are those held by those in decision-making positions in the state
and those who directly advise them. Thus as Mead notes, 'It matters who the President is. If Theodore Roosevelt and not Woodrow
Wilson had been President when World War I broke out, American and world history might have taken a very different turn.'79 The second
location at which ideas may impact at the unit level occurs when individuals with shared ideas coalesce into
groups, organisations, and common practices within the state to form institutions that operate in both formal
and informal sectors of the policymaking process. The formation of institutions reflects the fact that ideas that are somehow
embedded in particular structures are possessed of greater power. Institutions can act as couriers for ideas in three
ways.80 'Epistemic communities' of experts have the policy-relevant knowledge to exert influence on the positions adopted by a wide range of
actors. The extent of the influence of such groups is dependent on their ability to occupy influential positions
within bureaucracies from where they may consolidate their power, thereby institutionalising the influence of the community.81
However, their ability to infiltrate bureaucratic posts will depend - at least in part - on the receptiveness of the
existing bureaucratic order to their ideas .82 A second means by which institutions act as couriers is by the encasing of ideas in
formal rules and procedures at the creation of the institution itself. Once they have become embedded in this way, those ideas with which the
institution was founded can continue to influence policy even though the interests or ideas of their creators may have changed. Thus, 'when
institutions intervene, the impact of ideas can be prolonged for decades or even generations.'83 In both of these
ways, 'ideas acquire force when they find organizational means of expression'.84 The third way in which ideas can
impact is through the structural arrangements institutions create. These structures set up road-blocks and through- routes which determine the
ease with which ideas can gain access to the policy process. Indeed, the
structure of the institutional framework may
determine the political and administrative 'viability' of particular ideas, that is, their ability to appeal to current conditions.
Institutional structure therefore ensures that policy- makers only have access to a limited set of ideas,
whether those are percolated up to them or searched for by them.85 In this way, the ideas that form what some refer to as 'strategic culture'
may provide a reliable guide to a state's likely reaction to shifts in the structure of the international system.86 Underlying both individuals and
institutions are the ideas contained in the broader cultural context within which the state is located. Ideas that are embedded in
social norms, patterns of discourse and collective identities become accepted , 'instinctual' parts of the social world
and are experienced as part of a natural objective reality.87 In this way cultural variables subconsciously set the limits and
terms of debate for both individuals and institutions, and so have 'a profound effect on the strategic behaviour of states.'88 Mediated
through institutions and individuals who are blinded to potential alternatives, ideas embedded in national culture
therefore have the potential to explain 'why some states act contrary to the structural imperatives of the
international system.'89 The power of ideas therefore rests on 'the ability of believers in ideas to alter the costs and benefits facing
those who are in a position to promote or hinder the policies that the ideas demand.'90 In the process of foreign policy 'engineering',
organisations and the ideas they espouse or represent vie with one another for dominance and autonomy.91 Decisions
taken reflect the process of formulating the choices to be presented.92 Throughout the process of making foreign policy powerful ideas -
whether that power resides in their couriers or is internal to the ideas themselves - are prevailing over weaker ideas.

Focusing on affect provides no resource for dealing with atrocities.

Richard Sherwin 15. New York Law School. “Too Late for Thinking: The Curious Quest for
Emancipatory Potential in Meaningless Affect and Some Jurisprudential Implications.” Law, Culture and
the Humanities. October 13. 1-13.
In the history of western culture we can point to three historic moments of epistemological de-centering. The Copernican revolution taught
humanity that we do not dwell at the center of the universe. The Freudian revolution taught us that the ‘‘I’’ is a lonely island besieged on all
sides by a raging sea of irrational, unconscious forces. Then quantum theory taught us that the universe is indeterminate: subject to uncanny
chance operations. Affect
theory, perhaps as an extension of the Darwinian evolutionary account of selective
adaptation, humbles rationalist pretensions further by subordinating mind to material, bio-chemical
processes. If thinking is always an after-thought, an after-the-fact construction, then we can never
reliably account for how we’ve actually been affected by things and others in the world around us. How
oppressive never to escape the grip of contingent social constructs . How depressing, if endless
deconstruction yields only more fragmentation. Surely something must abide, some Higgs Boson-like elementary particle
that can withstand deconstruction’s powerful blows. Is there anything real enough to withstand critique? Is there any basis left to hope for
emancipation from the destabilizing mutability of human fabrication? In Brian Massumi’s view, there is. As he puts it: “The world always already
offers degrees of freedom ready for amplification.”22 This takes us to the heart of the vitalist/ liberation impulse, namely: “escape from
crystallized power structures.”23 InMassumi’s writings, affect operates as a cipher – a black box into which he can
pack his emancipatory ideal.24 (“‘Affect’ is the word I use for ‘hope.’”25) What Massumi does not and perhaps cannot, or
simply does not care to do is formulate a coherent basis for political judgment . While he at some points expresses a
preference for “caring” and “belonging,”26 he offers no basis in affect theory for why those forms of behavior are
preferable to other perhaps more intense alternatives, such as “anger” and “shock,” which he also
embraces.27 But choices must be made. As Martha Nussbaum has noted, a society that cultivates conditions of
anger and disgust, for example, is different from one that promotes empathy, dignity, and love .28 Massumi is
enamored of the anti-structural,29 the spontaneous emergent process that Deleuze called “pure
immanence.” But with affective intensity as his ultimate value30 Massumi remains trapped in a double
bind. No critical judgment is forthcoming so long as intensity may be amplified .31 Because of this
Massumi cannot coherently critique manifestly oppressive political structures (such as futurism, Nazism,
and other intensity-fueled political regimes). How could he if the masses have opted to embrace such
regimes for the intensity they provide ? Massumi’s resistance to making judgments is consistent with his
theory, which minimizes to the vanishing point the human capacity for choice . For Massumi, the very
notions of ‘‘individual will’’ and ‘‘subjective reflection’’ are a fiction. (“There is no individual outside its own trans-
individual becoming.”32) Body is always conditioning mind – presumably without our conscious awareness. In the end, “events
decide.”33 What could human freedom mean under such conditions? The upshot is plain: in Massumi’s politics of
affect, human freedom loses its capacity to signify . Choices are a fiction, and in any event no apparent
normative basis exists for affirming, much less institutionalizing a preferred set of power structures .
Affective intensity lacks structure by definition . Indeed, that is its appeal. (“Intensity is a value in itself.”34) But as Anthony
Kronman has eloquently argued, without coherent structures, the legal, political, and cultural conditions
necessary for the meaningful exercise of freedom (including political judgment) are unlikely to emerge –
and if they do, they are unlikely to be sustainable.35 The latter point is borne out by the very political events that
Massumi identifies as exemplary of his theory . If the “Arab Spring” and the “Occupy Movement”36 illustrate
anything it is the effervescence of political action based on spontaneous intensity . In the absence of adequate political
structures, this kind of political action is destined to pass with the next day’s tide . The emancipatory cri du coeur that
can be heard echoing in the work of cultural theorists like Massumi may have landed on “trans-individual” affect as the intensive Higgs Boson
wave-particle of political science. Its indeconstructability promises freedom from subjective and cultural contingency – the prison house of
“crystallized power structures.” But there
is a price to be paid. The radical devaluation of reflective consciousness
produces a species of freedom that signifies nothing. Perhaps this is what it is like to embrace a Zeitgeist of “de-
humanism.”37 In Massumi’s politics of affect we can discern the impetus for ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ ideology. As Ben Anderson writes: “There
is always already an excess [affect] that power must work to recuperate

but is destined and doomed to miss. It is that excess that is central to the creativity of bio-political production and thus the power of naked
life.”38 Affect in this sense is “a movement of creative production” that always eludes capture. And this is what conveys a sense of its
emancipatory power.39 The intensity of affect liberates us from bondage to contingent cultural entanglement. Corporeal ontology precedes
cultural epistemology. This move away from the centrality of cognition marks the demise not only of identity politics,
but of identity itself, perhaps even of psychology.40 Simply stated, affect theorists like Massumi romanticize the
unknowable “fluid materiality of excitable networks” as a way of disrupting familiar social and cultural
hierarchies.41 In so doing, they elevate raw process over social and cultural regimentation and subjugation. It
is the neurobiological equivalent of Rousseau’s primitive origin of society , an updated version of the Romantics’
myth of enchantment. If only questions about freedom and responsibility for shared values, justice included,
could be resolved by so simple an expedient as the vitalist/liberation category shift from human agency to
‘‘trans-individual affective process.’’ Much can be learned about the various forms of political violence that affective intensity has
assumed over the course of human history. But one needn’t take the historical path to discern trouble for Massumi’s
emancipatory project. One can start with neuroscience itself .42 Theorists like Massumi play down (as they must)
a variety of obstacles that stand in the way of affective emancipation : from the constraints of evolution to
the biological programming of the amygdala itself.43 Indeed, what constitutes ‘‘fearfulness,’’ for
example, depends upon programming the amygdala based on a habituated pattern of external stimuli .44
There are other problems as well. For instance, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the question of how communication
occurs among different levels of the mind/body complex . As Steve Pile writes, for theorists like Massumi “affect is defined
in opposition to cognition, reflexivity, consciousness and humanness.”45 Feelings, on the other hand, occupy a space between non-cognitive
affect and highly socialized emotions. Feelings in this sense are pre-cognitive (“a response to transpersonal affects”).46 Our response to affects
personalizes them. Through feelings we associate affects with the subject who experiences them. For their part, emotions reflect a shift from
pre-cognitive subjectivity to the cognitive domain of socially constructed experience.47 Emotions, in this sense, are how I interpret what I’m
feeling through language and other representational or cultural symbolic practices. Affect
theorists like Massumi insist that my
choices and perhaps even my feelings may turn out to have nothing to do with the affect my body has
already processed without my knowing it . This view preserves the purity of affective intensity by keeping
it free of subjective or social significance. If you are in the ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ camp of affect theory along with Massumi,
affect can never be symbolized, which means it can never be cognized . Affect, in this view, is always beyond
consciousness. It’s like the dark matter that makes up the universe: we know it’s there, we just can’t say
anything about it. The problem for ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ theorists like Massumi is that they want to eat their cake and
have it too. Affects for them are ciphers – free-ranging radicals incapable of signifying . Yet, at the same
time, many of these same theorists engage in searing critiques of those “in power” who use mass media
along with other instrumentalities of affective manipulation for purposes of enhancing social or political control.48 The difficulty
is this: If affect is being actively engineered to manipulate people’s behavior – whether in the form of habits of
consumption, political judgments, or jury verdicts – it is incumbent upon the theorists to account for how exactly this
manipulation is being carried out. As Pile cogently notes, how are the agents of affective manipulation able to
“know the unknowable” sufficiently well to control their course and impact in society? 49 Thrift’s recourse to
metaphors such as “pipes and cables” is hardly sufficient to bear the burden of scientific explanation.
Indeed, the nomenclature that has emerged to account for the engineering of affect – ranging from “affect
flow between bodies,” “transmissions,” and “contagion” 50 – all seem to suffer from the same fundamental
lack of explanatory power. If we cannot know what affects are, it stands to reason that we cannot know
how to control their flow and impact in society.

Expenditure fails.
Ashcroft 94 – Senior Lecturer in English at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
(Bill, “Excess” in De-Scribing Empire edited by Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson, p36-39, accessed 1-7-15 //Bozzles the Bozz-Dawg Bozz Bozz)

Another mode of post-colonial excess is one I want to call ‘supplementarity’. In his book The Accursed Share (1967), Bataille proposes a theory
of excess which stems from a general economy of energy. Thus ‘ifthe demands of the life of beings (or groups) detached
from life’s immensity defines an interest to which every operation is referred , the general movement of
life is nevertheless accomplished beyond the demands of individuals’ (Bataille 1967: 74). Bataille’s economy
hinges on the need for a system to use up that excess energy which cannot be used for its growth . Thus the
unproductiveness of luxury itself; the apparently meaningless expenditure of sacrifice ; the tradition of gift giving
called ‘potlatch’ which demands the maintenance of honour by the return of a greater gift, all maintain a system’s balance by
using up surplus wealth. Within this general economy the sexual act is a pre-eminent form of non-
utilitarian expenditure of energy, war is almost essential, while death itself is the ultimate moment of
‘luxury’ in the system. Bataille summed up his general economy with the resonant statement that ‘the sexual act is in time what the
tiger is in space’ (Bataille 1967:12). If we accept at least the general proposition of this transphenomenal and trans-discursive movement of
energy, we discover something very revealing about the imperial process. Imperial
power expends its excess wealth
through war (that is, military force such as that employed in colonial expansion) to create greater wealth
which is then diffused as luxury, further military expansion and so on. Though it is a centred system, it is
never a closed system: the dissipation of the excess always increases wealth . But when we look at the colonial
world we see that the excess of ‘luxury’ is ideally exported as high culture . Culture, and the nonproductive superstructure
which it supports is an extremely prodigal expenditure of surplus energy originally accumulated as wealth. As post-colonial theory has long
known, theexpenditure of surplus energy through cultural hegemony long outlasts the ‘luxury’ of war,
invasion, and annexation, and maintains the production of wealth which is always distributed
centripetally. In other words, cultural hegemony maintains the economy of wealth distribution. This process of transformation maintains
the system of imperial hegemony intact. An instance of this hegemony can be seen in the export of theory, and this of course works on its own
momentum long after the official end of imperialism. Thus, whereas surplus value creates wealth for the centre in a fairly obvious way, so the
cultural surplus works to the same end. Even when manifested in apparently subversive and heterogeneous
formations su

ch as post-structuralism (with its own ironic doctrine of the surplus of the sign ), this cultural surplus
works through language to defuse opposition and preserve the system of wealth creation. The middle term
in this startling congruence of culture and wealth is discourse itself because the idea of wealth, despite its very obvious materiality, is a
discursive formation, a production of language. Thus the general economy of imperialism is an economy of discourse .
The oppositionality of the post-colonial finds its greatest material success in the counterdiscursive. The point to be emphasized here is that
cultural hegemony is not simply an effect of economic control. As ‘luxury’, cultural formations are a part of the actual mechanism of that
control. As Stephen Slemon has argued (1989:5), this explains the contradiction (‘paradox’) which Linda Hutcheon sees in postmodern
‘subversion’ as it both inscribes and contests culturally certified codes of recognition and representation (Hutcheon 1988: x, xii). Postmodern
culture, art and theory ‘uses and abuses, installs and then subverts’ (3), the ‘conventions of discourse’ (xiii) which it sets out to challenge. When
we see postmodernism as a luxury which actually maintains the general economy of neo-colonial (or ‘late capitalist’) hegemony, we begin to
understand the contradiction of its dependence on, and independence from, that which made it possible. According to Bataille, true opposition
is best effected by the one who spurns the very system in which wealth has its meaning. This is of crucial significance to post-colonialism since,
whatever else it is, it manifests itself as opposition from the beginning of colonialism. The true luxury…of our times falls to the poverty-stricken,
that is, to the individual who lies down and scoffs. A genuine luxury requires the complete contempt for riches, the sombre indifference of the
individual who refuses work and makes his life on the one hand an infinitely ruined splendour, and on the other, a silent insult to the laborious
lie of the rich.… henceforth no one can rediscover the meaning of wealth, the explosiveness that it heralds, unless it is in the splendour of rags
and the sombre challenge of indifference. One might say, finally, that the lie destines life’s exuberance to revolt. (Bataille 1967:76–7) Post-
colonial excess is quintessentially the exuberance of life which is destined to revolt . But the most
effective revolt is the one which denies the system its power over representation . The implication of this is an
economy of discourse, and specifically, the discursive production of wealth. The irony of the individual who refuses to work, making his life ‘an
infinitely ruined splendour’ is not a consolation for the poor but a strategy for resisting the very process of representation in which the binarism
of wealth and poverty is created. The option of ‘lying down poverty stricken to scoff’ is not an invitation to accept defeat but to dismantle the
binarism itself. This ‘unproductiveness’ which denies the very system that classifies it as unproductive is indeed a ‘genuine luxury’ as Bataille
says, but paradoxically one which resists the mechanism of control. Where
postmodernism may fail because it continually
installs that which it attempts to subvert, the post-colonial may successfully resist when it simply
ignores, refuses, or sidesteps the system of representation which constitutes it as subject . Wilson Harris does
this, for instance, when he persistently refuses to be called a ‘theorist’ —he simply sidesteps that discourse into which the practice of
articulation itself can be so easily incorporated. However, such an end may also be accomplished less cataclysmically in the strategy of
appropriation (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1989:38). This customarily describes the process of language adaptation but it also applies to theory
itself; the post-colonial subject is not only given a voice but the medium itself is changed in the process. The appropriation of that surplus
wealth represented by theory is therefore not just a cunning strategy, but one of a quite limited number of ways to recirculate the energy
stolen from the colonized world in the first place.

Sweeping psychological generalizations have no explanatory power for politics. They

represent the worst of non-falsifiable hindsight thinking.
Andrew Samuels 93. Training Analyst of the Society of Analytical Psychology, and a Science Associate
of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis. 1993. “The mirror and the hammer: depth psychology and
political transformation,” Free Associations: Psychoanalysis and Culture, Media, Groups, Politics, Vol. 3.
p. 545-593.

The paper is about the depth psychology of political processes, focusing on processes of political change. It
is a contribution to the
longstanding ambition of depth psychology to develop a form of political and cultural analysis that will, in
Freud's words, ‘understand the riddles of the world’ . It has to be admitted that there is an equally longstanding reluctance in the
non-psychological community to accept the many and varied ideas and suggestions concerning political matters that have been offered by
analysts of all persuasions. I do not believe this can all be put down to resistance. There
is something offensive above reductive
interpretations of complex socio-political problems in exclusively psychological terms . The tendency to
panpsychism on the part of some depth psychologists has led me to wonder if an adequate
methodology and ethos actually exists with which to make an engagement of depth psychology with the public sphere possible. By
‘politics’ I mean the arrangements within a culture for the organization and distribution of power,
especially economic power, and the way in which power is deployed to maintain the survival and enhance the quality of human life.
Economic and political power includes control of processes of information and representation as well as the use of physical force and
possession of vital resources such as land, food and water. On a more personal level, political power reflects the ability to choose freely
whether to act and what action to take in a given situation. ‘Politics’ refers to the interplay between the personal and public dimensions of
power. That is, there is an articulation between public, economic power and power as expressed on the personal, private level. This articulation
is demonstrated in family organization, gender and race relations, and in religious and artistic assumptions as they affect the life of individuals.
(I have also tried to be consistent in my use of the terms ‘culture’, ‘society’ and ‘collective’.)1 Here is an example of the difficulty with
psychological reductionism to which I am referring. At a conference I attended in London in 1990, a
distinguished psychoanalyst
referred to the revolutionary students in Paris in 1968 as ‘functioning as a regressive group’ . Now, for a large
group of students to be said to regress, there must be, in the speaker's mind, some sort of normative developmental starting point for them to
regress to. The social group is supposed to have a babyhood , as it were. Similarly, the speaker must have had in mind the
possibility of a healthier, progressive group process — what a more mature group of revolutionary students would have looked like. But
complex social and political phenomena do not conform to the individualistic, chronological, moralistic,
pathologizing framework that is often imported . The problem stems from treating the entire culture, or
large chunks of it, as if it were an individual or, worse, as if it were a baby. Psychoanalysts project a version of
personality development couched in judgemental terms onto a collective cultural and political process.
If we look in this manner for pathology in the culture, we will surely find it. As we are looking with a
psychological theory in mind, then, lo and behold, the theory will explain the pathology . But this is a
retrospective prophecy (to use a phrase of Freud's), twenty—twenty hindsight. In this psychoanalytic tautologizing
there is really nothing much to get excited about. Too much psychological writing on the culture, my own
included, has suffered from this kind of smug ‘correctness’ when the ‘material’ proves the theoretical
point. Of course it does! If we are interested in envy or greed, then we will find envy or greed in capitalistic organization. If we set out to
demonstrate the presence of archetypal patterns , such as projection of the shadow, in geopolitical relations, then, without a
doubt, they will seem to leap out at us . We influence what we analyse and so psychological reflection on culture and
politics needs to be muted; there is not so much ‘aha!’ as one hoped .
2NC
 Fuck the k
Ugly I hate the k

econ link The notion of economic rationality is detrimental for black folks because it
justifies the reduction of black bodies to a standing reserve to be exploited for profit
in the name of “efficiency”.
Dillon 13, [Stephen, “Fugitive Life: race, gender, and the rise of the neoliberal-carceral
state”, P. 65-9]//MHELLIE
For the slave, economic rationality possessed every moment of life’s terror and death’s release. Liberal
distinctions between the public and private, and the economic, political, and social were fabrications for
the slave, illusions that depended on their erasure from the realm of the human . This erasure made possible the
alchemy of the market so that with its social, economic, and discursive mechanisms, the market could
transform a human being into an object and test the limits of that object’s biological life .126 In Dessa Rose,
Nathan, a slave who aided in the coffle uprising, narrates the ways value, gender, race, and terror were intertwined
when he describes Dessa’s punishment after she attacks her Master (captor) for murdering her lover. I
seen her when she come out that sweatbox they put her in. Know what that is, Mis'es? It's a closed box they put willful darkies in, built so's you
can't lie down in it or sit or stand in it. It do got a few holes in it so you can breathe, but plenty people done suffocated in em. They whipped
her, put her in that, let her sweat out in the sun....They
lashed her about the hips and legs, branded along the inside of
her thighs...They'd just about whipped that dress off her and what hadn't been cut off her--dress,
drawers, shift--was hanging around her in tatters or else stuck in them wounds. Just from the waist
down, you see, cause they didn't wanna 'impair her value... I don't know how long they had her in that box. Her face was
swolled; she was bloody and dirty, cramped from laying up in there. I didn't think she could stand up; but she did...She stood up. (my emphasis)
127 Nathan’s description apprehends the ways slavery tested the boundary between life and death, torturing the
body, murdering the soul, but preserving biological life . The merger of white supremacy and the market animated the
power of the sweatbox. The market and the carceral are indistinguishable in the disciplining of Dessa. Wilson’s goal in torturing
Dessa was not death, “he didn’t believe in damaging goods,” rather “what he done then was mostly for
show, impress the mistress with how slaves ought to be handled...He wasn’t trying to kill her .”128 Dessa’s
incarceration in the sweatbox was the performative and pedagogical merging of race, terror, and the market. An assemblage that
produced social and living death as it flirted with biological death. Yet, death was not the goal because
the market set limits on how far white desire for pain could go. Wilson’s production of black suffering for his
wife, other slaves, and himself had to be balanced with his longing for the accumulation of capital. The violence of
chattel-slavery was not just driven by the need for capital; the pleasures of terror were also central to the maintenance and reproduction of the
social order. But the pleasures brought on by black pain had to be balanced with the production of value. The
value of the unnamed
pregnant rebel’s child trumped the desire for her death; “I had been spared death till I could birth a
baby the white folks wanted to keep slaved. ”129 By speaking the unspeakable and remembering the forgotten, this passage
shows us is that the market was central to slavery’s carceral technologies. The market possessed the body
with a logic of accumulation, fungibility, death and determined what form punishment and discipline
would take. By indexing a genealogy of the market’s relationship to the body of the slave , the work of Davis
and Williams can help us understand neoliberal biopolitics in a new capacity. As capital changed from a Fordist- Keysian
regime to a neoliberal regime of “flexible accumulation” in the 1970s, a number of scholars have argued
that we witnessed the transition from the formal to the real subsumption of life and labor under
capital.130 The 70s mark the moment when capital enveloped “life itself .” Yet, as evident in the writing of black
feminists in the 70s, this process goes back to the plantation, and is informed, animated, and possessed by
this past. While the economics of slavery possessed bodies and populations with its logic of accumulation
and disposability, the market fatally haunted black life, tracking and managing it everywhere captives
could find a moment of respite. Under chattel-slavery, the market possessed the body but also restricted,
controlled, and incarcerated it. The market under slavery was a prison itself. For Dessa, freedom did not lie outside
the sweatbox, off the coffle, or beyond the plantation. The carceral nature of white supremacy and the market made it so that Dessa could
literally not imagine freedom; “You could scape from a master, run away, but that didn’t mean you’d scaped from slavery. I knew for myself
how hard it was to find some place to go.”131 There was no place to go because everyplace was a marketplace. Smallwood writes: Those who
managed [to escape] found that, here again, the most powerful force opposing their desperate efforts to return to a place of social belonging
was not the physical constraint of prison walls and iron shackles, but rather the market itself.132 Smallwood,
like Shakur and
Williams, understands the market as a powerful extension of various technologies of capture: chains,
shackles, bars, prisons, and ships. Although penal technologies were central to detaining and
immobilizing captive Africans, white supremacy an d the market made them slaves. Whether they burrowed under prison
walls, killed a crew and overtook a ship, or quietly swam away, fugitive flesh was easily recognized as a commodity on the run. An expansive
grid of captivity engendered by race and commodification meant that there was no outside to the prison of slavery.133 As Smallwood notes,
“The market was everywhere, always shining a light on the captive’s ‘exchangability.”134 The market fused chattel and blackness together at
the level of discourse, skin, and ontology, ensuring the mark of commodification held stronger than iron and steel. The market produced a
regime of surveillance wherein black flesh became ontologically inseparable from slavery’s chattel logic. Thus, the terror of social and living
death would follow captives into what was ostensibly the free world. Blackness meant slave, and the market would follow wherever
commodified flesh could hide. This fabrication of blackness as ontological, as more than political, as more than the profound uneven
distribution of death and dying, meant that the necropolitics of race would live on well past the “non-event of emancipation” weaving slavery
and subjection into the very texture of freedom.135 Race and white supremacy carried slavery’s chattel logic into the future. Accordingly,
traces of slavery’s necropolitics live on in discourse, institutionality, and ontology.

Self abolition link--The alt’s baseless politics of abolition is a preferable to the aff’s
truncated account
Sexton 16 (Jared Sexton, associate professor of African American Studies at UC Irvine, associate
professor of Film and Media Studies at UC Irvine, PhD in ethnic studies from UC Berkeley, July 2016,
“The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign,” Critical Sociology Volume 42 Numbers 4-5,
modified) gz

‘The modern world owes its very existence to slavery’ (Grandin, 2014a).24 What could this impossible debt
possibly entail? Not only the infrastructure of its global economy but also the architecture of its
theological and philosophical discourses , its legal and political institutions , its scientific and
technological practices , indeed, the whole of its semantic field (Wilderson, 2010: 58). A politics of abolition
could never finally be a politics of resurgence, recovery, or recuperation . It could only ever begin with
degeneration , decline , or dissolution . Abolition is the interminable radicalization of every radical
movement , but a radicalization through the perverse affirmation of deracination , an uprooting of the
natal, the nation, and the notion , preventing any order of determination from taking root, a politics
without claim , without demand even, or a politics whose demand is ‘too radical to be formulated in
advance of its deeds’ (Trouillot, 2012: 88).25 The field of Black Studies consists in ‘tracking the figure of the
unsovereign’ (Chandler, 2013: 163) in order to meditate upon the paramount question: ‘ What if the problem is
sovereignty as such’ (Moten, 2013)? Abolition, the political dream of Black Studies, its unconscious thinking,
consists in the affirmation of the unsovereign slave – the affectable , the derelict , the monstrous , the
wretched 26 – figures of an order altogether different from (even when they coincide or cohabit with)
the colonized native – the occupied, the undocumented, the unprotected, the oppressed . Abolition is
beyond (the restoration of) sovereignty . Beyond the restoration of a lost commons through radical
redistribution (everything for everyone), there is the unimaginable loss of that all too imaginable loss
itself (nothing for no one).27 If the indigenous relation to land precedes and exceeds any regime of
property, then the slave’s inhabitation of the earth precedes and exceeds any prior relation to land –
landlessness . And selflessness is the correlate. No ground for identity , no ground to [be] stand (on) .
Everyone has a claim to everything until no one has a claim to anything . No claim. This is not a politics of
despair brought about by a failure to lament a loss, because it is not rooted in hope of winning . The
flesh of the earth demands it: the landless inhabitation of selfless existence .