1NC---Round 1---Trevian

OFF (7)
 OFF
T SUBSETS:
Interp---‘substantial security cooperation’ means all the activities in an area
UN 82 [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 1. Page 26.
www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf]
1. For the purposes of this Convention:

(1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;

(2) "Authority" means the International Seabed Authority;

(3) "activities in the Area " means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the
resources of the Area;
(4) "pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into
the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources
and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea,
impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities;

(5) (a) "dumping" means:

(i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea;

(ii) any deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea;

(b) "dumping" does not include:

(i) the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms
or other man-made structures at sea and their equipment, other than wastes or other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft,
platforms or other man-made structures at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment
of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or structures;

(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided that such placement is not contrary to
the aims of this Convention.

Violation---They cooperate over a subset of responsible AI

Prefer it---allowing the aff to cooperate over miniscule parts of each of the
three topic areas exponentially multiplies the number of topical affs and makes
quality neg ground impossible because the aff is indistinct from the status quo
 OFF
T INFO SHARING:
Info sharing is NOT security cooperation.
Albert Zaccor 5, then a US Army Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, August 2005, “Security
Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy,”
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-
State_Threats.pdf, cc
Relationships built on trust and mutual interests are also necessary to obtain cooperation from foreign governments in the area of Intelligence and

Information. It is useful to separate the distinct , but related, issues of Intelligence Sharing and
Intelligence Security Cooperation . Intelligence Sharing is a critical element in the fight against non-state threats, or
strategic crime. By its nature, however, such sharing involves sensitive sources , methods and arrangements , normally
in the context of a bilateral relationship. Its sensitivity requires delicate handling in highly restrictive channels.
Intelligence sharing, in practice, falls outside the scope of Security Cooperation . Intelligence S ecurity
C ooperation, on the other hand, involves the development of interoperable and cooperative intelligence systems and processes designed to
enhance the ability of one partner to work with one or several other partners . The core activities in Intelligence
Security Cooperation are analytical and expertise exchanges , familiarization , training , and traditional Security Assistance.
Both Intelligence Sharing and Intelligence Security Cooperation are mutually supporting. It is clear that the quality and reliability of intelligence we get
from our partners depends on the competence, capability, professionalism, and trustworthiness of their national intelligence services and how
compatible their operations are with ours. Intelligence Security Cooperation provides the tools to develop long-range relationships with foreign
partners to improve both the quality of the intelligence we share and our ability to work together.

Violation---They info share.

Vote neg to preserve limits. Our interpretation excludes thousands of
affirmatives which merely release intel over microscopic issues, resulting in
inconsequential changes to the status quo that the negative can never predict.
 OFF
League of Democracies CP:
Text: the United States federal government should increase its security
cooperation with a United Democratic League, made up of nations that meet
objective criteria for democratic governance, by developing and deploying a
Responsible Artificial Intelligence system.
A new league of democracies solves the case, but keeping it separate from
NATO at the outset is key to global buy-in which solves a range of existential
threats
John Davenport 19, Professor of Philosophy and Peace & Justice Studies, Fordham University,
2019, A League of Democracies: Cosmopolitanism, Consolidation Arguments, and Global Public
Goods, p. 32-36 /jpb

Although it is not widely known, ideas for associations of democratic nations have been around under
various titles for a long time. As James Yunker describes, although ‘world federalist’ proposals peaked immediately following
World War II and tapered off during the Cold War, proposals for uniting democracies continued. In 1940, the American journalist,
Clarence Streit, suggested an alliance of Atlantic nations, which helped inspire NATO. In his 1961 book, Streit then proposed that
NATO nations found a new confederation aimed at becoming a tighter union over time.1

Following Streit and John Ikenberry, James Huntley

proposed an “Intercontinental Community of
Democracies” based on a treaty for mutual defense , a free trade zone modelled on the EU, and a central
council initially composed of democracies with advanced economies, significant militaries, and
“a demonstrated willingness to share burdens fairly .”2 By contrast, my proposal would include
more non-western and developing democracies as equal partners and add mass atrocity
prevention to the organization’s purposes. Huntley also suggested a broader Democratic Caucus at the UN and a
“Parliamentary Assembly of Democracies,” including up to 70 nations made up initially of delegates appointed by their governments
(and eventually, elected directly by their peoples).3 This looks like a smaller version of the UN limited to democracies, with a central
council larger than the UNSC’s but still much smaller than the Assembly. My proposal is structured differently (see chapter six), but I
will develop Huntley’s proposals for global arms controls and measures to resist “democide” by coup.

In recent policy circles, a concert of democracies has been a bipartisan idea in the U nited S tates, and it
has Europe an proponents as well. Perhaps inspired by Huntley, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her Polish
counterpart, Bronislaw Geremek, organized the Community of Democracies (CDem)4 beginning with a 2000 conference
in Warsaw attended by 106 nations. The resulting Warsaw Declaration is a bold statement that lays out a demanding set of
principles defining democracy, which
a future UDL could use as criteria for membership. CDem’s
“Governing Council” is made up of 27 well-established and solidly democratic nations that could
become future founders of a UDL. Yet most people have never heard of CDem because it has
operated only as a meeting of ministers taking little concrete action . CDem’s function is mainly symbolic,
and it has no aspirations to step into the breach when the Security Council fails to act. But it is a promising first step that led
Kinsman, as representative for Canada, to call for CDem to play a stronger role. Against rising isolationist sentiments, he affirms
Franklin Roosevelt’s sentiment that “other people’s lives do matter, because people ‘everywhere in the world, including Russia,
aspire to human rights we take for granted and [they] look to democrats beyond their borders for solidarity’ with their struggles.”5
To provide that solidarity would be a main function of a democratic league.

More recently, in a 2004 editorial, James Lindsay and Ivo Daalder (who later served as President Barack Obama’s ambassador to
NATO), proposed an “alliance of democracies” in response to the tensions occasioned by the American invasion of Iraq.6 Around the
same time, I outlined a “federation of democracies” in a debate on just war theory with Jean Elshtain.7 In 2006, the Princeton
Project on National Security finished its “bipartisan initiative” to develop a national security strategy for America. Anne-Marie
Slaughter, dean of the Wilson School, and John Ikenberry published the final report advocating for a “Concert of Democracies” to act
as a backup to the UN and regional institutions, rather than as a replacement for the Security Council.8 They
envisioned this
concert as a new treaty organization devoted primarily to strengthening “security
cooperation among the world’s liberal democracies” by operating whenever possible through “existing regional
and global institutions,” but also acting directly when the UN fails. Its membership would be “selective, but self-selected,” meaning
that member nation s would abide by key norms. In particular, they would commit to holding
multiparty, free-and-fair elections at regular intervals; guarantee civil and political rights for
their citizens enforceable by an independent judiciary; and accept that states have a “responsibility to protect”
their citizens from avoidable catastrophe and that the international community has a right to act if they fail to uphold it.9

Clearly this early endorsement of R2P, and their proposed institution to fulfill it goes in the direction that I advocate, especially if the
R2P principle is considered binding on all nations. Yet Ikenberry and Slaughter weaken this proposal by
suggesting that the democratic concert would not initially be founded as “a new alliance
system” to supersede NATO or the UN “as long as those institutions can be successfully reformed .”
They clarify, however, that if the UNSC cannot be reformed within a few years, then “the Concert could become an alternative
forum for the approval of the use of force” when UNSC vetoes prevented “free nations from keeping faith with the aims of the U.N.
Charter” and R2P. This could require the concert to add agreements on “approving the use of force by a supermajority of member
states, with no veto power” when needed to defend peace or to stop mass atrocities.10

These very promising provisions are incorporated within the UDL proposal. However, I maintain that a
league of
democracies should be founded from the beginning as a democracy-only organization with a
vetoless version of the Security Council that is directly elected by individual citizens of member nations and authorized to act even
before attempting to get UNSC approval. As I argued in the Introduction, it
is too late to adopt a more incremental
approach, and the main arguments for a democratic league depend on giving it binding power to
make collective decisions about security and humanitarian crises like Syria . In other words, one of the
main reasons to create it would be to replace the Security Council and thereby express the free world’s determination to end cynical
manipulation by antidemocratic regimes. It was never realistic to hope for UNSC implementation of R2P, given R2P’s tensions with
the principles on which the UN was built, as I will argue (chapter four). A
league of democracies is needed to
proclaim a more adequate basis for both R2P and the entire system of international law , which
must finally be aligned with democratic ideals .

I will also argue that such a league should immediately supersede NATO because mutually assured
security and determination to end mass atrocities should wed together all of the world’s liberal or
democracies (see chapter four). Ikenberry and Slaughter propose that NATO
sufficiently rights-respecting
should be revived and updated with new bargains to strengthen its purpose , and to give the EU a clearer
role within its framework. By contrast, while an improved NATO might continue for some time alongside a

fledgling UDL , the democratic league would need to have primacy to give developing nations
enough reason to join it (see chapter five). Moreover, replacing NATO would bring crucial advantages ,
because NATO is associated with the Cold War and thus widely misunderstood as an
institution that exists only to promote western interests. Even significant expansion of NATO’s
mission could not easily shake this image , whereas replacing NATO with a new UDL would
offer invaluable leverage with Russia .
These points bear directly on Didier Jacobs’s 2007 argument for expanding NATO into something like a global concert of
democracies. 11 Jacobs also suggests that political scientists focusing on transnational governance have been too reluctant to
embrace direct democratic control of global institutions by individual citizens,12 when in fact there is no adequate substitute for
democratic answerability at any level of law and policy. He makes good points: NATO is an alliance of democratic nations that, unlike
the Security Council, has proven itself by using the huge military power at its disposal effectively. It thus has the credibility to attract
new members, and its expansion would make it more legitimate as a global authority: “The bet of global democracy is thus that the
incremental expansion of an organization like NATO could increase its legitimacy, as well as its military might, without decreasing its
credibility.”13

Jacobs is right that a more inclusive NATO would be more legitimate — especially if its council were directly
elected—and that an effective global democratic institution would have to wield serious enforcement power, giving its decisions real
teeth. However, directly electing NATO’s Atlantic Council and allowing it to operate by majority
rule (rather than current consensus requirements) are changes too radical to achieve through
the existing NATO amendment process ; they would require a whole new treaty. In that case,
why retain an identity associated with western Cold War policy? In a later editorial, Jacobs acknowledges
that “an open League of Democracies would be less threatening than a closed club like NATO ,”
and he supports this proposal14 (although in another article, he still entertains the expansion of NATO as the way to create such a
league).15

I believe that a fresh start without any direct association with NATO stands a better chance of
buy-in from democracies in Asia and the global South . Including such nations as founding
members of the UDL is crucial to its legitimacy , and to solving a range of global problems , from
mutual security to a stable global financial system and fair global immigration processes . If
most NATO nations (including the largest powers) were founding members of a new democratic
league, it would inherit some of the credibility that NATO has built up , while billing it as a new
organization would express willingness to lay aside Cold War mind-sets and any associated
hegemonic ambitions . For NATO nations would be pledging themselves to live by the decisions
of a global democratic league that gave non-western democracies a strong voice and voting
weight (see chapter five).

The impact’s extinction---only a new league of democracies solves

TPGs = transnational public goods

John Davenport 19, Professor of Philosophy and Peace & Justice Studies, Fordham University,
2019, A League of Democracies: Cosmopolitanism, Consolidation Arguments, and Global Public
Goods, p. 25-26 /jpb

In sum, democracies are now in serious peril from the rising economic and political power of China’s soft
despotism, Putin’s military aggressions and cyber-invasions, and the many transnational consequences of
mass atrocities. While people are focused on terrorism, these larger existential threats to democracy are
much less noticed . These developments since 1989 support my larger argument for a new
transnational institution in three ways. First, they suggest that existing institutions such as NATO are not
sufficient to secure TPGs shared by democratic nations; western democracies need more
support from younger democracies around the world . Rather than try to make the UN system work, China and
Russia have largely used it as a cloak to hide their intensions while they perfected new strategies to undermine democracy.

Second, my analysis suggests that a much better approach to coop eration among democracies is still
feasible . Asian and South American democracies would probably stand with older western
democracies if a democratic league were organized in a way that was fair to them. Emerging
African democracies and nations still deciding their direction in central Asia would be encouraged by
the opportunities that such a league would provide. A UDL would offer them a viable alternative to
the emerging Russia-China axis of corrupt power.
Moreover, within a UDL, would-be democratic nations struggling against ultrafundamentalist religious movements, such as Pakistan
and Iraq, would have massive support from a broad group of democracies without risk of unilateral control by Washington. Then the
antidemocratic forces in China would be weakened , and Russians might be enabled to save their
nation. The great courage of the Ukrainians at the Kiev Maidan should be a wake-up call: if these ordinary Ukrainians could stand
alone against Putin’s despotism, imagine what a broad league of democracies could do.

The timewe have left to turn things around is shortened by other factors such as fast-rising US
federal debt (and interest on the debt), rising tensions within Europe, and environmental challenges —
not only climate change but also loss of fisheries, loss of topsoil and farmland, the destruction of
coastal wetlands, and the ongoing erasure of tropical rainforests and the biodiversity they contain. By
2050 there may be little of these priceless ecosystems left to save, whereas a UDL formed
during the next ten years could coordinate strong preservation initiatives .
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Czech PIC:
The United States federal government should increase its security cooperation
with Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in the area
of developing and deploying a NATO Responsible Artificial Intelligence system.
The United States federal judiciary should deem developing and deploying a
NATO Responsible Artificial Intelligence system with the Czech Republic
unconstitutional under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The CP solves the aff AND expands APA applicability to encompass the DoD’s
international operations, bolstering civilian control of the military.
Mark Patrick Nevitt 19, Mark P. Nevitt is the Sharswood Fellow, Lecturer-in-Law at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. A former Navy JAG and tactical jet aviator, he most
recently served as the Deputy Director of Administrative Law for the Office of the Navy JAG in
the Pentagon. Spring 2019, “Article: The Operational and Administrative Militaries,” Georgia Law
Review, 53, 905, pp. 953-955, Lexis, nihara
C. THE TWO-MILITARY'S THIRD LEGACY: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACTS'S (APA) UNEVEN
APPLICATION TO THE TWO MILITARIES

While the judiciary has historically been the least influential of the three branches in ensuring civilian
control over the military , judicial review via the APA remains an important vehicle in
ensuring accountability over all federal agencies, and the DoD is no exception . 293Indeed, citizen
suits - particularly in environmental law - ensure a continual level of accountability between the military and the citizenry. 294The
APA provides that connective tissue between the citizenry and the military ( via the judiciary ).
295In light of the DoD's unique mission, and the two-military divide, a fundamental question arises: Should administrative law and
the APA treat the operational military differently from the administrative military?

Despite the DoD's size, budget, and idiosyncratic mission, administrative law scholarship has
"generally passed over the study of the military in favor of the domestic agencies." 296Indeed, very little
legal scholarship has addressed the APA's applicability to the DoD (despite its status as the largest
federal agency). 297

The APA (passed in 1946, just one year before the National Security Act) provides for judicial review over agency
actions and sets out procedures that agencies must follow when promulgating rules and
adjudicating conflicts . 298The APA has been described as a "mini-Constitution" and widely praised as a mechanism to help
ensure democratic accountability and oversight over federal agencies. 299But the APA was designed for a far different time and
does not adequately take into account: (1) the DoD's existing legal architecture and two-
military divide ; and (2) the complexity of modern military operations to include the numerous
military activities that take place overseas outside of war . The APA was better suited to
regulate military activities, but it has not kept pace with changes to the massive military
organization and the nature of modern warfare. This results in a disconnect between the
APA's text and its ongoing applicability to the modern military organization.

Reviving civilian oversight of the DOD revives CMR---solves global threats.

Jim Golby 21, senior fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of
Texas at Austin; and Peter Feaver, professor of political science and public policy and director of
the American Grand Strategy Program at Duke University, “BIDEN INHERITS A CHALLENGING
CIVIL-MILITARY LEGACY,” https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/biden-inherits-a-challenging-
civil-military-legacy/

To be sure, the new Biden team will not be a carbon copy of the Obama team and even those that return will do so with new
perspective and their own lessons learned in the interval. However, they would be wise to recognize that a rapid
shift in leadership styles now may create a sort of civil-military whiplash . The Biden team almost
certainly will want to reestablish processes that provide greater civilian direction for war plans,
budgeting, and global priorities. After four years of relative autonomy for the Joint Staff and
combatant commands, combined with reduced daily civilian oversight due to under-filled political positions in the Pentagon, a
micromanagement narrative could almost write itself. Biden and his team will need to be
attuned to these dynamics and look for early opportunities to establish trust and clarify their
expectations about the civil-military relationship while also providing senior military officers a
real voice in the policy process that makes them feel respected and heard .
The Institutional Context

Biden’s team will have to manage these challenges with a toolbox that is under severe fiscal
constraint and with military leaders who already believe they are strapped thin . Trump did manage
to increase defense spending trends and slightly decrease the number of American military personnel deployed abroad, resulting in
a meaningful reinvestment in defense capabilities and a moderate decrease in operational tempo. But future defense
budgets will be under severe pressure , perhaps rivaling in the aggregate the kinds of cuts imposed by the Budget
Control Act, though hopefully with more flexibility and predictability to manage them in more sensible
ways than the threat of a sequester straitjacket permitted. Moreover, the decline in foreign deployments was matched, and in some
cases exceeded, by a decline in “permanent” foreign basing. The result is that the strains of military deployments on military
personnel and their families are as great as in earlier periods, when a larger number and a greater scale of deployments were
supported by more robust foreign basing infrastructure. To pick just one example: A shorter NATO rotation to Germany or Poland
without family accompanying (and without combat pay as a sweetener) could impose more strain on morale than a longer rotation
with family. There are few signs that civilian and military leaders fully understand these challenges or that they are willing to make
difficult tradeoffs.

In the meantime, the last four years have seen a failure to make the needed investments in the other tools of statecraft, particularly
diplomacy and development. While morale in the foreign policy and national security ranks will likely improve, at least initially, with
the return of something resembling establishment values, the damage caused by deferred or dysfunctional approaches to human
capital will hobble the Biden team for some time to come and will, in particular, make it hard to quickly rebuild the capacity of
civilian services to match advances in the uniformed ranks — especially in the face of the prolonged resource fights to come. The
Trump team was especially vigorous in burrowing in some of its most partisan and suspect appointments into civil service positions
and on bipartisan boards within the national security establishment. An
early challenge for the Biden team will be
deciding — likely on a case-by-case basis — whether the restoration of the “ above-partisan-politics ”
norm in these areas requires engaging in the seemingly partisan practice of cleaning house, or whether the norm would be made
stronger through greater forbearance. None of these choices will be straightforward.

In terms of the institutional environment, legislative

changes and four years of weak civilian control mean
that Biden will face a much stronger chairman of the Joint Chiefs and associated Joint Staff than he faced barely
four years ago. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act granted the chairman additional responsibilities for global integration,
technically expanding only his advisory role. In practice, these powers have become more expansive, with the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff taking on some roles that traditionally had fallen to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Trump administration
officials also changed some of the procedures for war plan reviews and political guidance, reducing the number of interactions
between military leaders and mid-level political appointees that previously had provided the civilian Office of the Secretary of
Defense more opportunities to play an active oversight role. Trump’s unorthodox and tumultuous personnel policies also
shifted practical authority to the Joint Staff. Long nomination delays and unfilled civilian posts resulting from
Trump administration infighting weakened that office further, leaving Mattis and his successors more beholden to the advice and
influence of the better-staffed and more efficient Joint Staff. Trump’s first chairman, Gen. Joe Dunford, enjoyed an unusually close
and trusting relationship with Mattis, whom Dunford had served under as a marine. A similar dynamic also existed between Milley
and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, who had led the Army as chief of staff and secretary, respectively, during the early days of the
Trump administration.

The appointment of Austin risks exacerbating this unbalance, unless he takes pains to develop and empower a capable team of
civilians in his immediate office and within the larger Office of the Secretary of Defense — a point that has already been emphasized.
The initial signs on this front are encouraging. The announcement that the Biden administration will nominate Kathleen Hicks as the
first female deputy secretary of defense and Colin Kahl as the undersecretary of defense for policy ensure that strong, experienced
civilian leaders who take civil-military issues seriously will hold key roles in the Pentagon assuming the Senate confirms their
appointments, as we fully expect. The unofficial reports that Austin will pick Kelly Magsamen as his chief of staff, likewise puts a well-
connected civilian with political experience in a key position. We both know all these individuals well, and one of us has worked for
Hicks (who oversaw Golby’s work on the “Thank You for Your Service” podcast) and Kahl (who was Golby’s direct supervisor on Vice
President Biden’s national security staff).

Even with these capable selections, the

civil-military dynamics awaiting the new secretary of defense and his team in the
Pentagon will be daunting . Because of the policy and personnel dynamics during the Trump administration, the Joint

Staff and the combatant commanders have become accustomed to a greater degree of autonomy and
influence . Biden’s political appointees, sitting at the head of the table and asking detailed questions, will
immediately cause some friction between these groups. They also will find themselves with smaller staffs,
fewer resources, and a shorter institutional memory than their military counterparts. Some of the savviest members of the Biden
team will recognize in these challenges echoes of the challenges political appointees faced late in the Obama years. But their
intensity in combined form will stretch Biden and members of his team in new ways. They must not let their well-intentioned
— and much needed — desire to reestablish processes of civilian oversight undermine the trust necessary for
effective civil-military cooperation .
At the same time, senior military officers on the Joint Staff and at the combatant commands should prepare their staffs for increased
expectations of public transparency, civilian interaction, and intrusive questioning than that to which they have become accustomed
in recent years. A culture that pronounces micromanagement at the first sign of tough questioning
can also undermine the trust required for effective civil-military communication. Iterative
discussion and questioning are an essential part of the process of aligning military ways and
means with political ends . More developed process and predictability can benefit the military,
too, but there will be conflict and misunderstanding as these institutional muscles learn to flex
again. However, the Biden team will bear the primary burden of demonstrating that its goal is not
civilian control for the sake of control, but rather civil-military trust and cooperation geared
toward the shared goal of effective national security policies .
The Societal Setting
Perhaps the aspect that will take the Biden team the longest to adjust to is the new societal context — the social milieu in which these civil-military dynamics take place. In a nutshell, the Biden administration
must adjust to deeper political polarization and changing attitudes about the appropriate role of serving and retired military officers in foreign policy and national security debates.

Two survey comparisons underscore this challenge: a 2014 YouGov survey — the closest thing we have to a comparable survey from the time Biden was in the White House — and nationally-representative
surveys of 4,500 Americans that the National Opinion Research Center conducted on our behalf in 2019 and 2020 (and that are proprietary until we finish a book on this topic) that reflect the environment today.
We do not have enough active duty military in these samples to offer statistically meaningful descriptions of the attitudes of the actual personnel who will constitute the “military” in civil-military policymaking, but
previous surveys have shown that the attitudes of veterans, particularly of recent veterans, is a satisfactory proxy that can guide our understanding. While some civil-military gaps we explored in both surveys are
overstated because they are driven primarily by demographic differences, others have grown and will create sharper civil-military challenges for the Biden administration. We also have found several areas where
civilian and veteran respondents largely agree, but in ways that undermine civilian control over policy processes.

Among the most striking findings from the 2014 snapshot was a “familiarity gap” tied to the lack of public knowledge about the military. Despite numerous ongoing American troop deployments, many civilian
respondents — often as many as a quarter or a third — would not even venture to answer basic questions about the military. Civilian and veteran respondents also expressed very different views about whether
and how to use military force. In general, veterans were more reluctant to express support for the use of military force than civilian respondents, but civilians were more likely to favor troop limits or other
restrictions when troops were deployed. Both civilian and veteran respondents expressed growing support for various forms of military resistance to unwise civilian orders. With respect to traditional civil-military
norms and best practices, these findings — including that majorities of nearly all subgroups supported the idea of military resignation in protest — were somewhat troubling. In part, these civil-military trends
were likely the result of broader societal trends reflecting lost public confidence in elected officials. In 2014, nearly 80 percent of all respondents reported that political leaders do not share the public’s values. In
contrast, nearly three-quarters of Americans expressed confidence in the military, with only small differences between civilian and veteran populations. These attitudes extended and intensified long-standing
patterns seen in other surveys during the post-Cold War Era.

Today, this dynamic persists and is intensified still further. In 2020, approximately 69 percent of Americans express “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military, down slightly from 74 percent in 2019
and 2014. Even at 69 percent, esteem for the military is higher than it is for any other national institution, and indeed far higher than it is for Congress, the Supreme Court, or the presidency. The public’s
confidence in the military is highly conditioned on partisanship, with 82 percent of Republicans expressing confidence in the military compared to just 60 percent of Democrats, reflecting a five-point larger
difference between parties than in 2014. Biden’s slice of the electorate in 2020 also contains large groups that harbor serious concerns about the military. Only 53 percent of self-identified liberals express
confidence in the military, with confidence dropping below 49 percent for both women liberals and non-white liberals. Our research suggests even these numbers may overstate the public’s true confidence in the
military by as much as 20 percentage points due to social pressure, however. Yet, the fact that many Americans feel this pressure is itself a sign of the military’s influence in American society and politics.

The five-point drop in confidence from 2019 to 2020 may, in part, be due to the military’s involvement in a number of controversies related to the Black Lives Matter protests during the summer of 2020. Although
Trump ultimately decided against invoking the Insurrection Act to use active duty troops in support of law enforcement on domestic soil, members of the National Guard did back up federal law enforcement in
Washington, D.C. on June 1, when they cleared Lafayette Square prior to Trump’s photo op at St. John’s church. We did find differences between civilian and military attitudes about the use of the Insurrection Act,
however. As many as 57 percent of veterans told us they would support the use of active duty troops if protests continued compared to only 41 percent of civilians. We also primed a subset of respondents with
reports suggesting the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed the use of active duty troops. The views of civilians who received this prompt did not change at all, but support among veterans who received
this prompt dropped 8 points to 49 percent. While pundits and national journalists focused on the electoral implications of retired generals’ comments, our survey suggests their statements were likely more
influential in shaping the attitudes of veterans and service members on this narrow issue.

The Biden administration’s commitment

to restoring normal processes may give it an initial civil-
military honeymoon, but it should not expect that to translate automatically into deference or
an easy civil-military relationship. In our 2020 survey, 62 percent of all veterans and 66 percent of post-9/11
veterans agreed with the statement, “Civilians who have not been to war should not question those
who have.” In contrast, 42 percent of civilians agreed with the statement while only 30 percent disagreed,
suggesting that pressure for civilian leaders to defer to military officers emanates from both
groups . Post-9/11 veterans — who volunteered to serve in America’s all-volunteer force during America’s longest military
conflicts with no full-time mobilization of society — also expressed some open contempt in our survey for those who did not
volunteer. A full 60 percent of post-9/11 veterans “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that the eligible Americans who did not volunteer
to serve during wartime should feel guilty compared to just 43 percent of older veterans and 22 percent of civilians. Given
perceptions that the Biden team will be prone to micromanagement , members of the Joint
Staff may find it easy to fall back into those familiar narratives when new political appointees enter the
Defense Department prepared to reestablish oversight and processes that have laid somewhat dormant since the Obama years.

The Biden team should also expect some normal points of civil-military friction on policy and missions to emerge. In general, veteran
and military respondents in our survey are more likely to believe the military’s most important role is to compete with great powers
like China and Russia, especially when compared to Democratic respondents. Veteran respondents are also more hawkish on Iran
than civilian respondents. They also tend to be more optimistic, though only slightly so, on the success of military operations in the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although only 13 percent of all civilians and 10 percent of Democrats agreed that these operations
have been “very successful,” 24 percent of post-9/11 veterans said the same. Veterans were also particularly optimistic on progress
in Afghanistan, though there are notable generational divides: 44 percent of post-9/11 veterans “agree” or “strongly agree” that the
United States has accomplished its goals in Afghanistan while 39 percent “disagree” or “strongly disagree.” Older veterans and
civilians break 30-47 and 21-39, respectively. Post-9/11 veterans are also particularly supportive of troop reductions in the context of
the deal with the Taliban with 54 percent in support and only 29 percent against. While there is some civilian support among
civilians for troop reductions as part of a deal with the Taliban, a 40 percent plurality of civilians chose “no opinion” when asked
about both troop reductions and military success in Afghanistan. Most Americans simply are not paying much attention.

Conclusion

Civil-military relationships are not an end in themselves. These relationships exist only to provide effective
national security policies in a given geopolitical environment in the context of democratic
accountability. Unfortunately, the environment is not benign. As they sort through the civil-military and institutional baggage
— the items they bring with them and the items they inherit — Biden’s team must also navigate intensified great-
power conflict , persistent instability in the broader Middle East , strained ties with key allies, and little
progress on all of the other stubborn problems that have bedeviled leaders in the post-Cold War era, including: the
proliferation of w eapons of m ass d estruction, transnational networks of terrorism , failed states , and ethnic
rivalries . And, of course, Biden must still lead the country out of the worst pandemic in a century
while recovering from all of the associated economic upheaval . There will be no strategic
holiday during which the Biden team can painstakingly sort through its civil-military affairs .
The new commander-in-chief starts with the enormous advantage of being “not Trump.” He will need all of that advantage — and
will need to have learned from Obama-era missteps — in order to navigate through the tricky civil-military waters we have described
above. Members of the Biden team come in as seasoned professionals, but we hope that leads them to
caution and humility rather than unwariness and hubris as they conduct national security
policy. If Lloyd Austin wins over the critics and proves himself to be both fully sensitive to these civil-military realities and savvy in
how he seeks to overcome them, he may yet emerge as the successful and strong secretary of defense the Department of Defense
so desperately needs. The early slate of civilian nominees named for key roles is a welcome sign. The initial weeks after the
inauguration will
be of particular importance in setting the tone, especially after the tumultuous
and stressful transition. Even so, the norm of civilian management of the Defense Department will be more difficult to
reestablish, like so many other civil-military norms that have weakened in recent years, if Congress does grant another recently-
retired general legal permission to serve as secretary of defense. Biden, and Austin, will need all the top civilian defense talent they
can get.

Notwithstanding all of the other urgent priorities vying for his attention, neglect of the civil-military file would likely
impose intolerable costs on Biden down the road — a price that would be vividly evident, sooner or later,
when an urgent national security crisis takes center stage. The only prudent course is for the
Biden team to attend to both policy and process at the same time — to move out quickly on the
pandemic and the economy, while also setting the national security establishment on the path to healthier
civil-military relations . Problems in the civil-military foundations of an administration must be fixed
before a crisis lays bare the rot that may lie just out of view.
 OFF
Security K:
Security Cooperation extinguishes the species from global war and ecological
crisis. The alternative is dissolving militaries in favor of ecological security.
Theresa Wolfwood 12. Director at the The Barnard-Boecker Centre Foundation; Rosalie Bartell
was was an American scientist, author, epidemiologist, and environmental activist. September
2012, "Bertell, Rosalie. Planet Earth: The latest weapon of war Black Rose Books, Canada, 2001.
The Women’s Press, London, UK, 2000.," No Publication,
http://bookreviews.bbcf.ca/2012/09/bertell-rosalie-planet-earth-the-latest-weapon-of-war-
black-rose-books-canada-2001-the-womens-press-london-uk-2000/ //barn
Rosalie Bertell believes, as have many ecologists before her, that the current focus on economics is at the expense of ecology and the social
environment. In Planet Earth, this internationally-respected scientist states that the
most urgent problem facing humanity
now is how to sustain Earth, our life-support system. To do this, we must find a new model of
global living which is not based on military force in support of a hard, unbending capitalism. This book is a vital contribution
to the search for new solutions and means to create change. She sees signs of hope in new social movements springing up around the world.

She begins with a detailed and devastating analysis of the wars of the last ten years of the 20th
century. In Part II she provides an acute scientific basis for the madness of war and the destruction
that science, harnessed to the military, is planning for us and our world. She discusses so-called
natural disasters that are linked to human-caused climate change, the “down-to-earth problems with Start
Wars,” and the environmental crises spawned by war-making, including pollution caused by
depleted uranium and chlorine-based herbicides . She examines the economic fallacy of the
military providing jobs and prosperity. There is detail and fact here enough to convince any concerned citizen,
particularly those who see saving the environment as a separate struggle, that the work of peace, economic justice and ecology are
one.

In the chapter Rethinking Security, Bertell brings it all together. She says that "global
consumption of resources is
exceeding Earth's restorative capacity by at least 33 per cent. War and the preparations for war
drastically reduce the store of these resources still further, leading to a self-perpetuating cycle
in which competition for raw materials leads to further conflict ."

In order to redress this crisis, she says, we must tackle the question of security. We need to challenge the
belief of many that military force is a ‘ necessary evil’. This new concept embraces a vision of
social justice, human rights and the health of the environment. Security will be achieved
through the protection and responsible stewardship of the Earth.

Bertell calls this ‘ ecological security, ’ based on a complex multi-faceted approach to the world’s problems. Realizing
this vision is a big job and required multi-faceted solutions.

Bertell has many insights and ideas on how to create such solutions. She cites the need to alter the core belief of
military security. Change always follows a challenge to core belief. Consider the examples of civil rights,
women’s rights, gay rights and the new challenges in the work of children’s rights, child soldiers and animal rights.
 OFF
DOS CP
The United States federal government should increase its military assistance
and military-to-military engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization in the area of developing and deploying a NATO Responsible
Artificial Intelligence system.
It solves and competes: at a minimum, security cooperation includes…
Colonel Albert Zaccor, currently Director for Southern Europe in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, “Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy,”
August 2005, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-
State_Threats.pdf, cc
It is an oft-repeated mantra that in order to defeat transnational terrorism, and by extension other related non-state threats, the United States must

apply all the elements of national power, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.34 The OSD SCG directs that
DOD Security Cooperation “will be integrated with other elements of national power…in order to achieve national
security, defense, and foreign policy objectives.”35 This formulation, while helpful , obscures two key facts . First,
Security Cooperation includes activities that by their very nature involve the simultaneous
application of more than one element of national power . Security Cooperation at a
minimum requires the combination of diplomatic relations , military assistance , military-to-
military contacts , and public diplomacy . In other words, Security Cooperation is itself an appli cation
of at least three of the classic elements of national power.36 Second, DOD is not the only entity in the USG that interacts with foreign governments to
achieve the stated objectives: relationships, capabilities, information and intelligence, and access. The Department of State , the
Intelligence Community, and to a lesser extent, other departments and agencies, conduct activities aimed at the accomplishment of these objectives,
broadly understood. There is, however, no common USG, or interagency, definition or concept of Security Cooperation.37 We will return to this issue in
the final section of this paper. For the purposes of the present discussion, this paper offers the following working definition of Security Cooperation:

That’s Zaccor 5.
The CP solves case while avoiding the dip cap disad.
 OFF
DIP CAP DA
Support to Ukraine left Middle Eastern allies neglected, but a new series of
visits promises to restore diplomatic engagement which establishes regional
security---the plan trades off.
Daniel L. Byman 22, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, 7/8/22,
“Biden’s difficult task: Reviving US partnerships in the Middle East,”
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/07/08/bidens-difficult-task-reviving-
us-partnerships-in-the-middle-east/

As President Joe Biden prepares to travel to the Middle East, his administration faces several challenges in its
relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other regional (non-treaty) allies. At the most basic level, the
United States and these allies do not share the same priorities. Part of why Biden is traveling to
Saudi Arabia is to convince the country’s leaders to pump more oil as global prices soar. In
addition, the United States seeks to maintain pressure on the Islamic State group (IS) to prevent
the terror organization from rebuilding. Yet both the Russia-Ukraine war and the struggle against the remnants of IS
are ancillary concerns for regional states , and they are concerned that the U.S. focus on Asia and Europe

will make the U nited S tates a less useful security partner.

Iran , the foreign policy priority for Israel, Saudi Arabia, and many other regional states, is a major sticking point. Indeed, most
regional allies oppose the Biden administration’s efforts to restore the Iran nuclear deal, seeing it as making too many concessions to
Tehran and fearing that the United States in general will not stand up to Iranian aggression and subversion. With regular Iranian
missile strikes on Iraq and missile strikes from Iran’s Houthi allies in Yemen on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, this fear is
quite strong. Nuclear
talks appear to be floundering, and the Biden administration will need to decide
whether to try to revive them at the risk of further alienating regional states or abandon them only to work
on the next challenge
— how to create other diplomatic — and military — options that will stop the Iranian bomb and

ensure regional security . Iran, for its part, will interpret the Biden visit as the United States further siding with its regional
enemies.

Russia is another sticking point. The United States is trying to create a global coalition to oppose Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Middle Eastern states , however, see Russia as a source of wheat, while their populations question why Ukraine
should be the subject of global solidarity while Syria was not. Many are more anti-American than pro-Ukraine.
Regardless of regime views on Ukraine, Russia is also a military player in Syria, and Israel works with Moscow to ensure that Israel
can strike Iranian assets in Syria without interference from Russian forces.

In order to win over regional leaders, Biden will also need to curtail some of his critical rhetoric. This is especially true with his
condemnation of the Saudi murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the brutal Saudi and UAE war in Yemen. These are the right
stances from a human rights perspective, but Riyadh and its allies will not be accommodating in other areas if they are the subject of
regular, public criticism.

Actually walking back his comments on these grave human rights issues would be politically difficult even if Biden were inclined to
openly abandon the moral high ground. In practice, refraining from future criticism, the legitimacy bestowed by the trip itself, and
other steps that make it clear that Riyadh is being embraced, not shunned. As in the past, the United States is again emphasizing
that pragmatic concerns like oil prices and Iran, not human rights, will drive U.S. policy toward the kingdom.

Making these problems more difficult , the Biden administration inherited a weak hand from its
predecessors. U.S. engagement with the Middle East has declined dramatically since the George
W. Bush administration, when 9/11 and the Iraq War put the region at the center of U.S. foreign
policy. President Barack Obama tried to reduce U.S. involvement in the Middle East, and President Donald Trump, while more
sympathetic to autocratic Arab allies, also favored limited U.S. involvement in the region. The Biden administration has
emphasized great power competition, with the war in Ukraine and the rivalry with China
dominating strategic thinking. Biden’s trip is thus occurring with a regional perception that the
U nited S tates is focused on other parts of the world and at home, with little appetite for
resolving regional disputes and leading regional allies as it sought to in the past. Indeed, Biden’s
understandable focus on energy and Russia will reinforce this, making it clear that it is non-regional concerns that are driving his visit
rather than shared interests. The Biden administration also claims the trip is to encourage Saudi Arabia to formally make peace with
Israel, though U.S. officials almost certainly recognize a formal peace is highly unlikely even though Riyadh and Israel have stepped
up their security partnership.

Making the job even harder, Middle Eastern allies have preferred Republican presidents. Gulf state rulers believe Republican leaders
are more anti-Iran and less concerned about human rights. Israeli leaders too believe Republicans are more pro-Israel and more
likely to stand up to Tehran. In addition, regional allies rightly recognize that Trump or another disruptive leader may again assume
the U.S. presidency. The U nited S tates, in other words, will be considered an erratic ally, with policies and interest in
the Middle East varying wildly by administration.

One goal that may have more success is encouraging U.S. allies to work together. The United States historically has preferred
bilateral cooperation, with countries working with Washington more than with one another. As the U.S. limits its involvement,
however, it will want regional states to step up and combine their efforts, whether this is to counter Iran or to resolve regional wars
like those in Yemen and Libya. Israel, with its formidable military and intelligence services, can play an important role here, offering
high-end capabilities, such as providing radar systems to Bahrain and the UAE, when the United States is reluctant to do so for
political reasons.

The United States is also likely to have help from partners in sustaining the fighting against IS and other dangerous jihadi groups.
Although this struggle is less of a priority for allies, they too worry about violent jihadism and will continue longstanding intelligence
and military cooperation. Jihadi groups also remain weak compared with their past selves, limiting the effort required.

Regional partners will be aware of U.S. pivoting to focus on Asia and Europe, and Biden’s visit will not change this perception. The
best the administration can hope for is to make clear , both in private and in public, that the U nited S tates will
remain diplomatically and militarily involved in the Middle East, whether it be to counter IS or deter
Iran . The president’s visit is thus a useful signal , even if regional states will remain unsatisfied.

Perhaps the best that can be hoped from this trip is simply to restart the U.S. engagement with its allies in the region.
Such a goal doesn’t promise big wins — there may at best be modest concessions like a Saudi announcement it will pump a small
amount of additional oil — but it offers the hope of future improvements. For now , the U.S. relationship with
regional allies is transactional, with little trust or respect on either side. Repeated visits by high-
level officials will make them more likely to listen to Washington and consider U.S. interests rather than see
U.S. concerns as irrelevant, or even opposed, to their day-to-day problems.

Disengagement greenlights regional instability---extinction.

H. Brandon Morgan 22, U.S. Army Officer and non-resident fellow at the Modern War
Institute, 6/7/22, “The Imperative of Middle East Regional Order and U.S. Diplomacy,”
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2022/6/7/the-imperative-of-middle-east-regional-
order-and-us-diplomacy

For U.S. strategists seeking to thwart rising Chinese hegemony or Russian military imperialism,
the idea of America leaving a volatile Middle East to its fate may sound appealing . Civil war in Syria
and Yemen coupled with the troubled democracies in Iraq and Sudan are only a few examples showcasing Washington’s ongoing
regional challenges. President Biden’s withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 perhaps reflected the country’s
general frustration with America’s Middle East engagement over the past two decades. Indeed, U.S. ambivalence towards recent
Iran-backed Houthi strikes against Saudi and Emirate oil facilities suggest that Washington is ready to accept broader strategic
disengagement from the region, come what may. But strategic disengagement from the Middle East to focus
on China and a war-bound Russia will likely come at high cost for Washington. Indeed, without a U.S.-
supported Middle East security architecture, the long simmering tensions could erupt into a
firestorm of region wide conflict inevitably requiring American military intervention to prevent
an oil crisis or renewal of transnational terrorism. This would completely undermine
Washington’s desire to pivot strategic focus towards the Indo-Pacific. But insuring against
negative outcomes in the Middle East—the region of traditional U.S. focus—also provides the opportunity
for the rise of positive outcomes in economic growth and institutional development. This would
not only provide positive trade benefits for the U.S., but it would also promote an American friendly regional order
while limiting the growing influence of China and Russia. Fortunately , the tools to prevent
strategic crises and promote Middle East regional growth lie increasingly less in military capacity
and more in the realm of diplomatic and economic engagement. This excess of military
capacity in the Middle East could prove highly valuable in the Indo-Pacific and Eastern
Europe .

A POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWDER KEG IN THE MAKING

These attacks by Iranian irregular-proxy forces, combined with their turnkey nuclear program ,
suggests that the U.S. maximum pressure strategy has placed America’s interests of regional
stability and energy security at serious risk . Additionally, U.S. disengagement from the region—signaled by America’s
reluctance to counter Iran’s attacks—has led the Arab-Israeli coalition to determine that accelerating a
conventional weapons buildup is the only way to ensure their own protection .[7] U.S.
disengagement, Arab-Israeli arms buildup, and Iranian asymmetric warfare may have the
potential to become its own cycle of violence and instability . Left unchecked , this cycle could
contain grave risk of escalation towards regional conflict—one in which Iran could resort to completing its
nuclear weapons program and spark incipient proliferation . A Middle Eastern war between Iran and an
Arab-Israeli coalition could place the security of the Hormuz Strait and Suez Canal at risk, requiring
active intervention by the European and Asian powers whose economies fundamentally rely on
the energy and trade flow from these vital trade corridors . Some may argue that with America’s limited energy
imports from the region, these outside powers should be the ones to resolve such a conflict.[8] But allowing other great powers such
as China, Russia, and others to rewrite the Middle East’s security architecture with the U.S. on the sidelines is not in the geopolitical
interests of the American government. To prevent such an outcome, finishing a renewed nuclear deal is a central imperative for U.S.
interests.

FOUNDATIONS OF A REGIONAL ORDER

If a renewed nuclear deal could be completed, the U.N. Security Council plus Germany would be able to extend Iran’s nuclear
breakout time from three weeks to six months, establish a verifiable nuclear inspection regime, and forestall a nuclear crisis in the
Middle East.[9] Despite these crucial benefits, there are still some who call for the U.S. to reject the deal entirely. Critics often state
that the economic benefits to Iran will only increase Tehran’s ability to wage proxy warfare, building an ever-larger arsenal of
missiles and drones against the U.S. and regional partners.[10] Indeed, Iran’s economy grew by 13.4% in 2016—all before full
sanctions relief implementation, strongly suggesting that Iran stands to benefit from a renewed deal.[11] But it is important to
remember that although Iran has long maintained its asymmetric and ballistic missile capabilities, the scale and severity of attacks
against strategic oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Persian Gulf came after U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal in
2018. This suggests that while Tehran is not likely to surrender the Revolutionary Guard and proxy-force funding in the short term, it
is possible for the U.S. to establish a security dialogue that minimizes regional tensions and builds momentum for further diplomatic
victories in the long term.
A regional security architecture in the Middle East must be founded on reassurance to Arab-
Israeli partners, continued deterrence against Iran, and good faith negotiations. The U.S. should revitalize its
diplomatic engagement with Arab-Israeli partners. Importantly, this requires astute diplomacy that recognizes that a
general pivot to other regions does not equate to complete strategic disengagement from the Middle East. The U.S. should reassure
its Arab-Israeli partners that the American government will diplomatically support the coalition against attacks by Iran while offering
economic assistance in the aftermath of Iranian strikes. To deter Iran, the U.S. must re-signal its willingness and determination to
conduct proportional military counterstrikes in response to Tehran’s military aggression that threatens American partners in the
region. With U.S. security assurances established, the coalition can slow the pace of their arms buildup. This
would reduce
Iran’s perceived need to respond with asymmetrical strikes, thus limiting the escalation cycle. By
reestablishing Iranian deterrence, Washington will garner greater maneuvering space to
negotiate mutually desirable outcomes.
 Deterrence Advantage
1. Regulation destroys AI control by driving it underground, abroad, or into
higher-risk areas
Dr. Nell Watson 21, PhD in Engineering from the University of Gloucestershire, Degree in AGI
Safety Fundamentals from the University of Cambridge, Senior Scientific Advisor to The Future
Society at Harvard University, Fellow at the British Computing Society and Royal Statistical
Society, “Regulatory Challenges to Catastrophic AI Risk”, ExO Insight, 11/24/2021,
https://insight.openexo.com/regulatory-challenges-to-ai/
Rick Increase Factors:

Obfuscation: Reg ulation s may drive research underground where it is harder to monitor , or to
‘flag of convenience’ jurisdictions with lax restrictions , by embedding dangerous tech nologies
with in apparently benign cover operations (multipurpose technologies), or by obfuscating the
externalized effects of a system, such as in the vehicle emissions scandal (Wikipedia).
Arms race: Recent advances in machine learning such as multimodal abstractions models (aka Transformers, Large Language
Models, Foundation Models) such as GPT-3 and DALL-E illustrate that dumping computing resources (and the funds for them) in
colossal models seems to be a worthy investment. So far, there is no apparent limit or diminishing return on model size, and so now
state and non-state actors are scrambling to produce the largest models feasible in order to access thousands of new capabilities
never before possible. An arms race is afoot. Such arms
races can lead to rapid and unexpected take-off in
terms of AI capability, and the rush can blindside people to risks, especially when the loss of a race
can mean an existential threat to a nation or organization.
Perverse incentives: Incentives can be powerful forces within organizations, and financialization, moral panic, or fear of political
danger may cause irrational or incorrigible behavior of personnel within organizations.

Postmodern Warfare: Inexpensive Drones and other AI-enabled technologies have tremendous disruptive promise within the realm
of warfare, especially given their asynchronous nature. Control of drone swarms must be performed using AI technologies, and this
may encourage the entire theatre of war to be increasingly delegating to AI, perhaps including the interpretation of rules of
engagement and grand strategy. (Lsusr, 2021)

Cyber Warfare: Hacking of systems is increasingly being augmented with machine intelligence (Cisomag, 2021), through GAN-
enabled password crackers (Griffin, 2019) and advanced social engineering tools (Newman, 2021). This is equally the case in the
realm of defense, where only machine intelligence may provide the swift execution required to defend systems from attack. A lack
of international cyberwar regulations, and poor international policing of organized cybercrimes, may increase the risk of catastrophic
risks to societal systems.

Zersetzung: The human mind is becoming a new theatre of war, through personalized generative propaganda, which may even
extend to gaslighting attacks on targeted individuals, significantly leading to destabilization of societies (Williams, 2021). Such
technologies are also plausibly deniable, being difficult to prove who may be responsible.

Inflexibility: The German Military after WW1 was not allowed to develop their artillery
materiel, and so developed powerful rocket tech nologies instead , as these were not subject
to regulation . Similarly, inflexible rules may permit exploitable loopholes . They may also not
be sufficiently adaptive to allow for the implementation of new technologies and even
improved industry standards .
Limitation of problem spaces: – It
may be taboo to allow machine intelligence to work on sensitive issues
or to be exposed to controversial (if potentially accurate) datasets. This may limit the ability of
AI to make sense of out complex issues, and thereby frustrate finding solutions for crises .

2. That causes catastrophic AI since it’ll be controlled by rogues with no

precautions AND without defensive countermeasures
Robert A. Freitas 22 Jr., JD from the University of Santa Clara (Santa Clara, CA), School of Law,
Research Fellow at the Institute for Molecular Manufacturing, Won the 2009 Feynman Prize in
Nanotechnology for Theory, BS in Physics and Psychology from Harvey Mudd College,
“Molecular Manufacturing: Too Dangerous to Allow?”, Nanotechnology Perceptions, Volume 2,
Number 1, Republished at The Lifeboat Foundation,
https://lifeboat.com/ex/molecular.manufacturing

Attempts to block or “relinquish” [3, 12] molecular manufacturing research will make the world a more,
not less, dangerous place [13]. This paradoxical conclusion is founded on two premises. First,
attempts to block the research will fail . Second, such attempts will preferentially block or slow
the development of defensive measures by responsible groups. One of the clear conclusions reached by
Freitas [4] was that effective countermeasures against self-replicating systems should be feasible , but will
require significant effort to develop and deploy . (Nanotechnology critic Bill Joy, responding to this author,
complained in late 2000 that any nanoshield defense to protect against global ecophagy “appears to be so outlandishly dangerous
that I can’t imagine we would attempt to deploy it.” [12]) But blocking the development of defensive systems
would simply insure that offensive systems, once deployed, would achieve their intended
objective in the absence of effective countermeasures . James Hughes [13] concurs: “The only safe and
feasible approach to the dangers of emerging tech nology is to build the social and scientific
infrastructure to monitor, regulate and respond to their threats.”
We can reasonably conclude that blocking the development of defensive systems would be an extraordinarily bad idea. Actively
encouraging rapid development of defensive systems by responsible groups while simultaneously slowing or hindering development
and deployment by less responsible groups (“nations of concern”) would seem to be a more attractive strategy, and is supported by
the Foresight Guidelines [10]. As even nanotechnology critic Bill Joy [14] finally admitted in late 2003: “These technologies won’t
stop themselves, so we need to do whatever we can to give the good guys a head start.”

While a 100% effective ban against development might theoretically be effective at avoiding the potential adverse
consequences, blocking all groups for all time does not appear to be a feasible goal. The attempt would strip us of
defenses against attack, increasing rather than decreasing the risks. In addition, blocking development would insure
that the substantial economic, environmental, and medical benefits [15] of this new technology
would not be available.
Observes Glenn Reynolds [16]:

To the extent that such efforts [to ban all development] succeed, the cure may be
worse than the disease . In 1875, Great Britain, then the world’s sole superpower, was sufficiently
concerned about the dangers of the new technology of high explosives that it passed an act bar ring all
private experimentation in explosives and rocketry. The result was that German missiles
bombarded London rather than the other way around. Similarly, efforts to control
nano technology, biotech nology or a rtificial i ntelligence are more likely to drive research
 underground (often under covert government sponsorship, regardless of international
agreement) than they are to prevent research entirely. The research would be conducted
by unaccountable scientists, often in rogue regimes , and often under inadequate
safety precautions . Meanwhile, legit imate research that might cure disease or solve
important environmental problems would suffer .

3. No Russia war.
Khramchikhin 18 – Aleksandr Khramchikhin, deputy director of the Institute for Political and
Military Analysis in Moscow. [Rethinking the Danger of Escalation: The Russia-NATO Military
Balance, 1-25-18, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/rethinking-danger-of-escalation-
russia-nato-military-balance-pub-75346]
In an atmosphere of crisis permeated by mutual recriminations and suspicions, both sides—NATO and Russia—have engaged in a
series of military activities along the line of contact. These maneuvers in turn have triggered multiple warnings from both sides of a
sharp deterioration in European security, a growing threat of a military confrontation between Russia and NATO, and an urgent need
to deescalate the situation in order to avoid a catastrophic war with disastrous consequences for all. An emerging
conventional wisdom maintains that the new Cold War in Europe, if allowed to continue unchecked, runs
the risk of escalating into a hot war unless steps to reduce tensions are taken swiftly.

But conventional wisdom is often wrong , and so it is this time. The hysteria that has engulfed public commentary
throughout Europe about this ostensibly dire military situation on the brink of getting out of hand has little, if any , basis in
fact. Both sides in the standoff exaggerate the tensions and the danger of escalation , and the risks
of the military moves—their own and their adversary’s—supposedly driving these tensions.

In reality, the military balance between Russia and NATO is stable , the danger of escalation is
hardly approaching critical levels , and little needs to be done militarily to defuse the current
tensions . The true cause of the tensions is not military , but political and diplomatic . Until
those causes are resolved , tensions between Russia and the West will remain high . The
likelihood of a military confrontation will remain low , however, because neither side’s posture
points to a heightened state of readiness or intention to go on the offensive. Until that changes, political and
diplomatic tensions will remain mere tensions .

4. No China wars.
Thompson 17 – Timothy Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the RAND
Corporation. William R. Thompson, Political Science Professor at Indiana University. [U.S.-China
Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/us-china-tensions-
are-unlikely-to-lead-to-war.html]
Graham Allison's April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,” explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic
dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article
fails to persuade because it neglects the key political and geostrategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without
those conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war becomes far lower. The U.S.-China relationship
today may be trending towards greater tension, but the relative stability and overall low level of hostility make the
prospect of an accidental escalation to war extremely unlikely .
In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established
flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison’s article argues that given the
context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase
the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates
conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears
persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison’s groundbreaking work on the
organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous.

However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible
in the first place. Allison’s analysis implies that the United States and China are in a situation analogous to that of the Soviet Union
and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and
engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises
and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in
a crisis.

By contrast, the U.S.-China relationship today operates at a much lower level of hostility and threat. China and the United States
may be experiencing an increase in tensions, but the two countries remain far from the bitter, acrimonious rivalry that defined the
U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its
principal enemy . Today’s rivals may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but they also view
each other as important trade partners and partners on some shared concerns, such as North Korea, as the recent summit between
President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated. The behavior of their respective militaries underscores the
relatively restrained rivalry. The military competition between China and the United States may be growing, but it operates at a far
lower level of intensity than the relentless arms racing that typified the U.S.-Soviet standoff. And unlike their Cold War counterparts,
U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight each other in major wars . Moreover, polls
show that the people of the two countries regard each other with mixed views—a considerable contrast from the hostile sentiment
expressed by the U.S. and Soviet publics for each other. Lacking both preparations for major war and a
constituency for conflict , leaders and bureaucracies in both countries have less incentive to misjudge
crisis situations in favor of unwarranted escalation .

To the contrary, political leaders and bureaucracies currently face a strong incentive to find ways of
defus ing crises in a manner that avoids unwanted escalation. This inclination manifested itself in the EP-3 airplane
collision off Hainan Island in 2001, and in subsequent incidents involving U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft, such as the harassment
of the USNS Impeccable in 2009. This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a dangerous militarized
crisis may be growing. Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more
escalatory options in a crisis and thereby make Allison’s scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types
of developments that would most likely propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile, competitive one featuring an elevated risk
of conflict.

The most important driver, as Allison recognizes, would be a growing parity between China and the United States as economic,
technological and geostrategic leaders of the international system. The United States and China feature an increasing parity in the
size of their economies, but the United States retains a considerable lead in virtually every other
dimension of national power . The current U.S.-China rivalry is a regional one centered on the Asia-Pacific region, but it
retains the considerable potential of escalating into a global, systemic competition down the road. A second important driver would
be the mobilization of public opinion behind the view that the other country is a primary source of threat, thereby providing a
stronger constituency for escalatory policies. A related development would be the formal designation by leaders in both capitals of
the other country as a primary hostile threat and likely foe. These developments would most likely be fueled by a growing array of
intractable disputes, and further accelerated by a serious militarized crisis. The cumulative effect would be the exacerbation of an
antagonistic competitive rivalry, repeated and volatile militarized crisis, and heightened risk that any flashpoint could escalate
rapidly to war—a relationship that would resemble the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s.

Yet even if the relationship evolved towards a more hostile form of rivalry, unique features of the contemporary world suggest
lessons drawn from the past may have limited applicability. Economic interdependence in the twenty-first century is
much different and far more complex than in it was in the past. So is the lethality of weaponry available to the major powers. In the
sixteenth century, armies fought with pikes, swords and primitive guns. In the twenty-first century, it is possible to eliminate all
life on the planet in a full-bore nuclear exchange . These features likely affect the willingness of leaders to
escalate in a crisis in a manner far differently than in past rivalries.
More broadly, Allison’s analysis about the “Thucydides Trap” may be criticized for exaggerating the risks of war. In his claims to
identify a high propensity for war between “rising” and “ruling” countries, he fails to clarify those terms, and does not distinguish the
more dangerous from the less volatile types of rivalries. Contests for supremacy over land regions , for example,
have historically proven the most conflict-prone , while competition for supremacy over
maritime regions has, by contrast, tended to be less lethal . Rivalries also wax and wane over time, with varying
levels of risks of war. A more careful review of rivalries and their variety, duration and patterns of interaction suggests that although
most wars involve rivalries, many rivals avoid going to war .
 Cyber-AI Nexus Advantage
1. No cyber impact---attribution, restraint, and capabilities.
Lewis ’20 [James Andrew; 8/17/20; senior vice president and director of the Strategic
Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; "Dismissing Cyber
Catastrophe," https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe]

More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch
catastrophe attacks . We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber
techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives ,
capabilities , and intentions . We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews
and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can
draw from this are:

Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical
damage at any level, much less a catastrophe . There have been regular predictions every year
for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in
what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible , which dissuades the skilled
cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills . One mystery is why these groups
have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden
mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals.

There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the U nited S tates’ ability to
attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They
are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.)

No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical
damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to
nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand
casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are
catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber
warfare.

State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests.
Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion . The U nited S tates has
opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic
cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation . Their goal is
to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not
start a war.

This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation , something that has also never
occurred . The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and
strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations , and the absence of
inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced
states . Attackers, particularly among the U nited S tates’ major opponents for whom cyber is
just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation .

The U nited S tates has two opponents ( China and Russia ) who are capable of damaging
cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China
would be well served by a similar attack on the U nited S tates. Iran is improving and may reach the
point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has
decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the U nited S tates. Iran might attack targets outside
the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure.
North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability.

2. No cyber escalation.
Softness 17 – Nicole Softness, a graduate student at Columbia University’s School of
International and Public Affairs, studying International Security & Cyber Policy. [How Should the
U.S. Respond to a Russian Cyber Attack? Yale Journal of International Affairs, Volume 10,
http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2017a_99_softness.pdf]

Russia’s past strategic choices , demonstrate an unwillingness to commit an act that could
trigger a full-scale war , potentially with nuclear weapons . The country’s focus on battlefield preparation and
intelligence gathering suggests that strategies would work to take advantage of U.S. complacency via the preponderance of smaller-
scale cyber attacks, and would conduct an attack unlikely to trigger a full-scale military response. By choosing an industry with
consequences limited to the United States, Russia could avoid damaging its alliances or inciting other states to join forces against
Russia militarily, politically, or economically. According to this analysis, Russia would choose not to conduct a cyber
attack on the majority of the United States’ critical infrastructure sectors , for fear of over-
escalation .15 Attacks on the defense, nuclear, and chemical sectors could be immediately considered acts of war, while attacks
on the financial, food and agricultural, or critical manufacturing sectors would be likely to enrage other states dependent on the
United States for economic stability. Thus, with these strategic choices and toolkits in mind, if Russia were to
conduct a cyber-to-conventional attack against the United States, it would choose to target either
the communications or IT critical infrastructure sectors .

3. Developing trust in AI is impossible---black box problem means true

integration is impossible
Erik Lin-Greenberg 20, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World
House. Texas National Security Review, Vol 3, Iss 2. Spring. "Allies and Artificial Intelligence:
Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making" https://tnsr.org/2020/03/allies-and-artificial-
intelligence-obstacles-to-operations-and-decision-making/ //pipk

AI can also strain alliance decision-making by fueling uncertainty about information and military
actions. Unlike human analysts or military personnel who can be asked to explain and justify
their findings or decisions, AI generally operates in a “black box.” 97 The neural networks that
underpin many cutting-edge AI systems are opaque and offer little insight into how they arrive
at their conclusions.98 These networks rely on deep learning, a process that passes information from large data sets through a hierarchy of
digital nodes that analyze data inputs and make predictions using mathematical rules. As data flows through the neural

network, the net makes internal adjustments to refine the quality of outputs. Researchers are
often unable to explain how neural nets make these internal adjustments. Because of this lack of
“explainability,” users of AI systems may have difficulty understanding failures and correcting
errors.99

Policymakers have called for the development of more transparent AI systems, and researchers
are working to develop explainable AI tools that peer inside the AI black box.100 Yet, many
decision-makers remain uncomfortable with the uncertainty surrounding AI-enabled systems .
The commander of the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command, for instance, publicly explained that he was not yet willing to rely on AI programs to
analyze the full-motion video collected by reconnaissance drones. He argued that although systems are improving, they are still unable to consistently
provide accurate analysis.101 So long as the decisions and analysis of AI systems remain opaque, military commanders may be reluctant to trust AI-
enabled systems. And if used, AI
may contribute to the fog of war, rather than reduce it, making it difficult
to make decisions using information delivered by AI technologies .

The operational implications associated with uncertainty and lack of trust in AI would likely
be exacerbated in multinational alliance contexts. There is significant cross-national variation
in trust in AI technologies, even among close allies. One 2018 survey, for instance, found that just 13 percent of
respondents in Japan and 17 percent of respondents in South Korea trust artificial intelligence, compared to 25 percent of respondents in the United
States. Similar disparities
exist between the United States and many of its NATO allies. In Spain, 34 percent of
respondents trust artificial intelligence, compared to 21 percent in Canada, 40 percent in Poland, and 43 percent in Turkey.102 Given
this
variation, policymakers and commanders from some states may be more reluctant to use AI-
enabled systems or trust the information they deliver than leaders from other states during
multinational operations.

Allied decision-makers will also face uncertainty when confronting a rival’s use of AI-enabled
technologies. Leaders will be forced to wrestle with whether to respond to actions carried out
by AI-enabled systems — like autonomous aircraft or ships — in the same way as actions carried
out by traditionally manned assets. Existing doctrine and law are generally silent on these issues,
providing no guidance on the appropriate response . States have drafted domestic policies to govern their own use of
autonomous weapon systems, but these regulations and international law make no distinction between how states should react to a rival’s AI-enabled
military actions versus “traditional” military actions.103 Yet, decision-makers may believe that a rival’s use of AI technologies demands different
responses than those involving manned platforms.104 What happens if a rival claims that an attack carried out by an AI-enabled system was the result
of a flawed algorithm? Should air defense forces respond differently to an adversary’s autonomous drones that penetrate friendly airspace than to a
manned aircraft that does the same? Decision-makers may find themselves with little time to consider these complicated issues, particularly as AI
technology accelerates the speed of a rival’s military operations.

4. NATO says no:

A---SPOILERS---states like Turkey will ruin the process.
Basu ’5-18 — Zachary; national security reporter at Axios. "Strongmen spoilers in Turkey and
Hungary threaten Western unity"; Axios; https://www.axios.com/2022/05/18/turkey- NATO-
finland-sweden-hungary-russia; //CYang

Why it matters: Critics have accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of employing a " hostage-taking " tactic
also practiced by Hungary, which for weeks has been singlehandedly blocking the European Union from
imposing an embargo on Russian oil. The outsized influence of single-member states in the EU and
NATO has drawn increased scrutiny in recent years, especially as both Hungary and Turkey have drifted toward authoritarianism
and strengthened their ties with Russia. Their resistance to two critical Western priorities risks undermining the united

front that leaders like President Biden have touted as key to effectively responding to Russia's invasion of
Ukraine. Driving the news: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who has said he is "very confident" all NATO allies will ultimately
approve Sweden and Finland's applications, will meet on Wednesday with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. Çavuşoğlu
said Sunday that in exchange for Turkey lifting its opposition, Sweden and Finland must end their alleged support for Kurdish groups
that Turkey views as terrorists and a top national security threat. Turkey is also expected to use its leverage to seek bilateral
concessions from the U.S., including speeding up the potential sale of F-16 fighter jets. Between the liens: Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı,
director of the German Marshall Fund's office in Ankara, told Axios that Erdoğan "saw an opportunity to extract some benefits both
for Turkey and for his own political standing" ahead of a crucial election next year. Erdoğan
believes he's "more or less free
to do whatever he wants ," Ünlühisarcıklı said. He argued it's hard to stand up to Erdogan on this issue,
given the high stakes of Sweden and Finland's NATO applications, and the unique role Turkey is playing in
Ukraine as both a mediator in peace talks and supplier of highly effective drones. Critics, meanwhile, say the stunt could set a
precedent for other NATO leaders to essentially seek bribes in moments of crisis — with some going
as far as to call Turkey a "Trojan horse" within the Western alliance. Zoom out: That label has long been used to describe
Hungary's role as a spoiler within the EU. Hungary's far-right prime minister Viktor Orbán is viewed as the most
pro-Russian leader in the EU, and for weeks has used his veto to prevent the bloc from banning imports
of Russian oil. In the meantime, Orbán has used his leverage to pressure the EU to send Hungary a financial
compensation package — effectively neutralizing Brussels' landmark decision this year to withhold
pandemic recovery funds from Hungary over its democratic backsliding.

B---STRATEGIC REFUSAL---allies exercise non-cooperation to increase future

clout.
Judith Kelley 5, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University, 6/08/2005, “Strategic
Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq,” International Politics 42,
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800105, cc

I discuss some of these explanations when discussing Iraq later. However, here I argue that the possibility that non-cooperation may be
strategic should be taken seriously: a possible deal exists, but one party deliberately rejects it. The traditional
relative gains argument falls in this category: states’ insecurity in an anarchic world leads them to reject absolute gains
if these represent a relative loss (Snidal, 1991, 704). The assumption is that the relative loss translates into a long-term security risk,
which outweighs any short-term gain, because of the high premium states put on security (ibid.). While it may operate on security issues, the concept
of strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing transcends the relative gains argument in that it does not depend on an assumption of security concerns.

Indeed, strategic non-cooperation can operate between allies , not just between enemies. The logic of strategic
noncooperation rests on maximizing absolute gains by building a reputation that increases
negotiating power over future outcomes . When a state rejects cooperation, it does not necessarily do so because it worries
that the other state will attack it in the future. Rather, it rejects it because accepting highly asymmetrical gains is in and of itself a poor long-term
optimizing strategy. As such strategic non-cooperation represents a form of intra-alliance bargaining. However, strategic non-cooperation can be a soft
balancing strategy even in a context devoid of security concerns, and as such it differs from traditional discussion of intra-alliance bargaining.4

Game theoretic experiments support the argument that actors may reject inequitable gains. In the ‘Divide the dollar game,’
also called the ‘ultimatum game,’ or in classical game theory, ‘bilateral monopoly,’ one actor proposes a division of a sum of money and the other actor
either accepts the offer (in which case they both get the portion suggested by the proposer) or rejects the offer (in which case they both get nothing).
The bilateral monopoly game envisions this as a situation with a single seller and a single buyer. It appears rational for the proposer to suggest highly
asymmetrical distributions (say, in the case of the divide the dollar scenario 99 cents to himself and a penny to his partner), since it is better for the

partner to accept something over nothing. Experiments show, however, that if the total stakes are not too high, then the second actor
may reject highly inequitable , although rationally he then makes himself worse off (Thales, 1988;
Rabin, 1993).

Most of the explanations for such rejections rest on unfairness: Rejection is not as much calculated as it is emotional . Strategic non-
cooperation is a calculated soft balancing tool, however, used by the weaker actor to increase its influence vis-a`-vis a
stronger actor via non-military means . The weaker state believes that the game is repeated or that its
reputation carries to other future interaction , and it therefore wants to avoid a reputation as a
‘ pushover .’ The state calculates that incurring short-term costs will signal its resolve and impose costs on the other state, increasing the stronger
state’s willingness to compromise in the future in order to collect some part of the dollar. This actually resembles a labor strike. Since their strike hurts
the business owners (and, quite consistent with the ‘divide the dollar game’ neither party gets anything while the factory stands idle), workers hope
that the short-term cost of foregone pay will be outweighed by the concessions ultimately made by the owners for a more equitable distribution of the
profits. It also has parallels in other uses of economic leverage, such as sanctions, which are also selfdamaging protest moves to bring about beneficial
changes in the behavior of the target state. Both strikes and sanctions only make sense when the long-term payoffs are considered.

That iteration of a game transforms actors’ strategies is nothing new for game theorists. However, for strategic non-cooperation, the assumption is not
repetition of a particular game, but the states’ understanding that individual negotiations are embedded in a larger meta-game in which the overall

patterns of bargaining are important. Reputation carries. IR scholars have often emphasized that the connectedness of
all international cooperation makes reputation important . However, in this context reputation mostly refers to
whether states can be counted on to do as they say.5 Most commonly, credibility refers to the commitment problem: Violating agreements hampers
states’ ability to make credible commitments in the future.6 In strategic noncooperation, on the other hand, ‘reputation’ concerns the character of the
state as a negotiator. Schelling discusses this as the concept of ‘bargaining reputation’ (1960, 25). The uncertainty is not whether a state can be counted
on to keep commitments, but whether it will concede under pressure. Strategic non-cooperation is a costly signal that the state is a strong and
independent negotiator who will not accept any beneficial outcome, however inequitable.

C---BARGAINING OVERSHOOT---negotiators will gamble to extract concessions.

Once one party walks away, negotiations are unsalvageable.
Judith Kelley 5, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University, 6/08/2005, “Strategic
Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq,” International Politics 42,
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800105, cc

Backfiring Tactical Commitments: Sometimes actors may fail to find agreement because they both make
tactical commitments that result in an apparent eliminat ion of the bargaining space (Schelling, 1960, 28). Actors,
in hopes of holding out for a concession from the other party , may dig in their heels on a position.
As Duncan Black observed already in 1958, the root of difficulty in international relations is not necessarily that nations cannot reap joint gains from

cooperation, but that the often indeterminate solution to their bargaining introduces incentives for gambling and
obstinacy , which can lead to failures to agree at all (1998, 175–177). That is, actors may stake out a position
strategically, counting on a concession from the other party to resolve the crises (Hopmann, 1978, 65). In retrospect, if the other party

walks away , the party might regret , but may still be unwilling to reveal this to avoid
reputational damage in future negotiations. Thus, the negotiations cannot be salvaged .

D---NORDIC STATES---their politicians will drag their feet---kills consensus.

Dr. Karsten Friis 21, PhD from the University of Groningen, Senior Research Fellow and head of
NUPIs Research group on security and defence, 4/06/2021, “Analyzing Security Subregions:
Forces of Push, Pull, and Resistance in Nordic Defense Cooperation,” Journal of Global Security
Studies, 6(4) https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab009, cc

It is well known, if not always admitted, that many Nordic security and defense cooperation initiatives over the last ten
years have proven challenging , to say the least. When it comes to concrete projects , political will
has been less enthusiastic than the rhetoric would suggest.
An example is Stoltenberg's proposed Nordic declaration of solidarity, namely that “the Nordic governments could issue a mutually binding declaration
containing a security policy guarantee. In such a declaration, the countries could clarify in binding terms how they would respond if a Nordic country
were subject to external attack or undue pressure” (Stoltenberg 2009, 34). A declaration of solidarity was indeed passed in 2011, but its formulations
were neither binding nor very explicit: “Should a Nordic country be affected, the others will, upon request from that country, assist with relevant
means” (Nordic Declaration of Solidarity 2011). The rest of the declaration was similarly vague.
There has also been a general reluctance on the part of the Nordics to “stick together” as closely as
the United States has at times desired. While most agree that greater unity would give more presence and influence ,
there remains a low-key “beauty contest” to be Washington's number one Nordic ally. As a result, the Nordics keep a watchful eye on each other when
it comes to, for example, invitations to the White House or official visits.

Denmark was the most reluctant partner in NORDEFCO's first years (Wivel 2018), with Copenhagen's political priorities primarily focused
on Washington and NATO as “the only game in town” (Jakobsen 2006, cited in Saxi 2011, 55). Since 2003, Denmark's strategic military
orientation had been to move away from holding a balanced military force , abandoning certain platforms (such as
submarines) in favor of developing “niche capacities” for international deployment with its big allies (Saxi 2011, 45). As a result, Denmark opted out of
many NORDEFCO initiatives. Also, Norway has over the years regarded Nordic cooperation as “nice to have,” but not fully necessary (Græger 2018). An
Atlantic orientation has remained the priority for Norwegian politicians when it comes to “safeguarding Norwegian security and for international
status-seeking” (Græger 2018, 372).

When it comes to concrete Nordic defense initiatives , some have been implemented with varying degrees of success,
while others have hardly been implemented at all or seen slow progress and a lack of continuity ,
with some eventually grinding to a halt . In particular, cooperation on defense materiel has struggled, with NORDEFCO failing to achieve
the intended system similarity, and therefore joint force production or harmonization of military needs. Procurement processes have remained national
prerogatives, with planning processes based on national needs, priorities, procedures, and planning cycles (Saxi 2011, 75). There
has never
been sufficient political will to change this, which has at times caused significant crises in bilateral
relationships , particularly regarding joint acquisition and procurement projects. In some cases, protection of national defense industries may
also lie behind this reluctance (Bredesen and Friis 2019).

Following several failed bilateral procurement processes between Sweden and Norway, the political drive for NORDEFCO also cooled. In 2013, for
instance, Sweden conducted an inquiry into its international defense cooperation, led by diplomat Tomas Bertelman (Bertelman 2013). The report
argued that there was “too great a distance between positive political rhetoric and real political willingness regarding defence cooperation” (Saxi 2019,
670). In other words, insufficient political will existed to overcome the numerous obstacles preventing substantial Nordic defense integration.

Several projects are also limited by political–legal circumstances related to NATO membership. Many of NORDEFCO's
landmark agreements, such as the exchange of air surveillance data (NORECAS) and the easy access agreement, remain limited to

peacetime. This limits their value when it comes to enhancing Nordic security , with many Nordic officials
expressing a strong desire for the NORECAS agreement to be extended to times of crisis and even wartime. However, Swedish and Finnish military non-
alignment, and the Norwegian preference for formal treaty-enshrined guaranties, has thus far made this difficult. Sweden and Finland have, though,
found it somewhat easier to deepen their bilateral cooperation “beyond peacetime conditions” (Bringéus 2016, 14–15). The Nordic NATO states worry
about becoming dependent upon these arrangements, only to see their radar screens go dark and landing rights withdrawn in a crisis—for them,
NORDEFCO is an addition, not an alternative, to NATO. Conversely, Sweden and Finland worry about losing—at least theoretically—their national
freedom of action to keep out of a conflict (Bringéus 2016, 13; Dalsjö 2017).

In short, the Nordic states’ divergent strategic orientations have not changed as a result of outside-in push forces.
Sweden and Finland remain non-aligned, while Norway and Denmark remain in NATO. This limits the extent and depth of possible
defense cooperation . Despite the language of NORDEFCO's Vision 2025 referring to cooperation in “peace, crisis, and conflict,” certain red
lines constrain Nordic defense cooperation. Until there is the political will for greater security interdependence among the Nordic
states, this will remain the case .

E---IMBALANCE---weaker NATO states will refuse security cooperation, fearing

betrayal and loss of influence.
Joshua Byun 22, PhD candidate at the University of Chicago and a 2021–2 Hans J. Morgenthau
Fellow at the University of Notre Dame's International Security Center, May 2022, “Regional
security cooperation against hegemonic threats: Theory and evidence from France and West
Germany (1945–65),” European Journal of International Security, 7(2)
https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2021.32, cc
Importantly for my purposes, the materially inferior state has reasons to fear the capability-enhancing
effects that security cooperation will have for its regional partner, despite the fact that this same
outcome will unquestionably increase its chances of successfully deterring or defeating their
shared adversary. First, and most obviously, states fear that their partners may someday turn around and
attack them from a reinforced strategic position . Consider cooperation to allow a stronger partner’s
troops to exert improved mobility and initiative on the battlefield, say, by relaxing previously recognised limits
on their regular area of operations. Even if , in principle, doing so improves the coalition’s overall military
readiness , the ensuing strategic expansion may just as well enable the same member to attack or coerce its
partner more effectively later on . The same dilemma arises in contemplating whether to encourage
a resource-rich partner to build larger and deadlier forces, or even in merely allowing it to do so
without significant political opposition . In all such circumstances, states fear that ‘minds can be
changed , new leaders can come to power , values can shift , new dangers and opportunities can arise ’. 19

Second, even if states can dismiss the prospect of future war with their prospective coalition partner, they must worry
that enhanced military capabilities will grant it undue bargaining clout within the coalition. In
1995, James Fearon reasoned that a state might fail to avoid the costs of conflict with an external rival ‘ not because it fears
being attacked in the future but because it fears the peace it will have to accept after the rival has
grown stronger ’. 20 In the context of coalition politics, a powerful state that can credibly communicate its current
peaceful designs may nonetheless be unable to persuade its partners that it will refrain from
making progressively unpalatable demands in the future as the dictates of military efficiency lead the coalition to reorient its
readiness posture towards dependence on the materially superior member’s capabilities. They will be particularly concerned that

such dependence will allow the superior partner to entrap the rest of the coalition in costly
conflicts over issues of secondary importance.21

In sum, balancing via regional security cooperation generates two important effects that bear upon a state’s
security . On the one hand, it generally increases the collective ability of participating states to check an aspiring potential hegemon. Regional
powers that are approximate equals in terms of material resources are well positioned to pursue such security benefits, à la received neorealism. On
the other hand, when the distribution of power between regional military partners is relatively unbalanced, security cooperation tends to prompt
disproportionate growth in the capabilities of coalition members with greater ex ante endowments of military and socioeconomic resources. The
reason is that the force-multiplying effects of security cooperation are normally achieved by capitalising on the ability of such privileged states to
expand their force levels and strategic flexibility. Because the anticipated consequences of the second effect are often nearly as worrisome to regional
powers as those implied by a failure to bring about the first, the materially inferior members of putative coalitions should be
reluctant to cooperate intimately with neighbouring states that enjoy substantially larger endowments of ex ante power.
Enthusiastic overtures on the part of powerful states for cooperation will be met by foot-
dragging and obstructionism on the part of their underprivileged neighbours, who find it difficult to trust their
partners from using their revamped advantages against them in the future. Unbalanced power is therefore conducive to

stunted cooperation – at worst, it will fail to materialise at all , but even at best proceed in a
slow and agonising manner .