The Somnath Expedition of

Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni

Shagnick Bhattacharya

ABSTRACT
There have been many moments in Indian history which have shaped the past as we know it to be,
and the Ghaznavid invasion of North-western part of Indian subcontinent was one such event. The
Somnath expedition, in particular, was one of the greatest feats of military adventures and continues
to be a source of political controversy in modern-day India, due to the (largely false) belief of this
event being seen as an "Islamic" invasion resulting a period of trauma for the local "Hindu" people.
Through this paper, it is my aim to deconstruct such myths, and have a closer look at the characters
and events involved with the Somanatha expedition.

BACKGROUND
By 1025, Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni had carried out raids and plundered widely
across Northern India, including places like Mathura and Kanauj. Sultan
Mahmud’s military strategy revolved around swift manoeuvres (almost like a
medieval form of ‘Blitzkrieg’) and implementing shock tactics on enemy forces
using cavalry, as well as putting full focus on maximising plunder and not
usually on territorial conquests.
Ferishta, the medieval historian from the late 16th century, had described
Somnath as the place where “the people of Hind” believed their souls went to
upon death, from where a new body was assigned to them by god. The ‘divine’
importance of the place continues to exist to this day. Not much is known
about the origin of the Somnath temple, although the fact that it existed for at
least a century before the Ghaznavid invasion came is supported by the local
inscriptions mentioning royal pilgrims visiting the temple in the late tenth or
early eleventh century, and by Al-Biruni’s mention of the temple in his
accounts on India, as well as by what is suggested from the excavation of the
site. Besides, the fact that the site existed as Prabhasa Pattana, a place of
pilgrimage even long before that is evident (Thapar 2005, 28-29).
The wealth of the Somnath temple was exemplary. It had been endowed with
about 10,000 villages by various princes for the purposes of its upkeep, apart
from all the generous donations received from millions of pilgrims from all
over the subcontinent over time. Its staff reportedly consisted of about a
thousand Brahmanas for the worship of the deity, 500 singing and dancing
girls, 200 musicians, and 300 barbers. The temple was a spacious edifice, and
its roof was supported by 56 ornamented columns (Habib 1967, 52-53). The
idol was made entirely of stone, and was kept in a fairly dark garbhagriha, with
the only sources of light being lamps hanging from the ceiling which were
covered with gems.

THE EXPEDITION
On the Monday morning of 18th of October, Sultan Mahmud left his capital city
of Ghazna with 30,000 regular cavalry and some hundreds of volunteer-troops
(Nazim 1931, 115). The year was 1025, and their destination was Multan. Their
ultimate aim was Somnath. Prior to this, the Sultan was reported to have
distributed 50,000 dinars among those who had volunteered to take part in the
campaign.
On the 9th of November, 1025, the Ghaznavid army reached the city of Multan.
It was the middle of the month of Ramazan, and the Sultan and his forces were
to stay here until after the festival of Eid (Nazim 1931). During the period of
their stay here, the Sultan made preparations for what lay ahead. There were
serious logistical problems to be dealt with, most importantly the provision of
fodder and water for the march to be undertaken through the hostile climate
of the Thar desert. Each trooper was said to have been provided with two
camels just for carrying water. Nevertheless, emergency reserves of water
were also known to have been kept, which required about 30,000 more camels
for the purpose.
With all preparations done to their best capabilities, Sultan Mahmud and his
army took their leave from Multan on the 26th of November, just a few days
after Eid. The aspect of immense dangers faced by the Ghaznavids in the
campaign are overlooked by many. The Ghaznavid army was to traverse
through hitherto unknown and uncharted territories, full of hostile and brave
local Rajput resistance (Sharma 1966, 53). Muhammad Habib has said that by
undertaking this expedition, the Sultan “for the first and the last time threw his
caution aside, defied the inclemencies of nature [and] the spears of his
opponents and ventured into a territory where the slightest mishap would
have meant complete ruin.” (Habib 1967, 54)
Upon exiting from Multan, the Ghaznavid force initially moved along the
Chenab river until its junction point with the Sutlej, from whence they moved
south through the desert. Once they reached the fort of Lodurva (about 16
kilometres north-west of Jaisalmer), they found their passage blocked by a
force of 20,000 Bhati Rajputs. The higher mobility of the Ghaznavid forces
proved instrumental in their victory here, and the Rajputs were routed.
Farrukhi, a medieval historian who had followed the Sultan on this expedition,
had written a qashida in which he had described that the Lodurva fort was
among the many forts to have been captured and razed to the ground.
The Sultan continued his march along the nearby ridge. About a month after
the start of the expedition, and after possibly passing through the Chiklodar
Mata Hill (about 27 kilometres north of present-day Palanpur), the Sultan
reached Anhalwara (identified as Nehrwala by medieval Muslim historians, and
also as Anahilapataka), passing via Ajmer, whose ruler had fled at the sight of
the invaders and the city was plundered (Habib 1967, 54). Anhalwara was the
capital of the Chaulukyas, whose rulers belonged to the Solanki clan. When the
Ghaznavid forces suddenly appeared over the horizon, Bhima I who had been
the ruler for just about four years yet, had a tough choice to make – to fight
the enemy or flee. The Solanki ruler was at a huge disadvantage considering
the suddenness of Sultan Mahmud’s arrival, as well as due to lack of proper
fortifications. Without wasting any time, Bhimadeva decided to flee to the
strong fort of Kanthkot in Cutch, and hence allowing Mahmud an unopposed
entry into the city. Since Muslim historians do not mention any massacre or
looting in the Chaulukya capital, it is possible that residents of the city had
been evacuated in time (Majumdar 1956, 44-45). At Nehrwala the Sultan
halted for a few days in order to replenish the supplies of water and provisions.
Just about 29 kilometres south of Nehrwala was the town of Mudhera (also
called Mundher), and Sultan Mahmud decided to go further south via this
town. When he reached the town with his forces, however, he discovered a
relatively smaller force of 20,000 Rajput warriors under the command of
various chieftains, strongly entrenched just outside the town, awaiting the
arrival of his forces. But Ghaznavid tactical superiority over the defenders
saved the day for the Sultan’s forces, as the Rajputs were scattered and
defeated. It is now believed that the Mudhera Sun Temple, built about a year
later by Bhima I, was built to commemorate this brave act of defence.
From here, the Sultan and his forces marched across the Kathiawar peninsula
to reach Delvada, situated on the coast of the Arabian Sea, and near the towns
of Una and Diu. The locals of Delvada did not offer much resistance to the
invaders, as they believed that the god Somnath himself would annihilate the
Muslims. Somnath was now just about 64 kilometres away from the Ghaznavid
forces.
This close to Somnath, the Sultan wanted to reach the final destination of this
campaign as soon as possible. He might have expected an imminent enemy
attack to stop him from taking Somnath, and the only way around that he
might have seen was to take Somnath before that happened. Hence a forced
march was ordered (Sharma 1966, 54) and the Ghaznavid army finally stood
before the fortress of Somnath on Thursday, the 6th of January, 1026. The
entire march of about a thousand miles between Multan and Somnath had
been undertaken in just 42 days. The town was immediately put under siege.
It is mentioned that the ramparts of the fort were filled with Brahmanas who
mocked at the invaders as they arrived. Gardizi, a medieval historian, writes
that the commander of the fort escaped to an island and did not return till
Mahmud was out of the country, but this might have been an exaggeration.
Another chronicler, Ibnu’l-Athir, has given an account of what had happened
next. The garrison of Somnath had been reinforced by thousands of
Brahmanas and devotees and they were supposed to have fought with the
“courage and desperation of fanatics”. However, the next morning the
Ghaznavids let out a deadly shower of arrows, due to which the defenders
were forced to desert their battlements. As such, the invaders immediately
scaled the walls with the help of their kamands, and were on Somnath fort’s
ramparts by afternoon. Since it was the time for the Juma’ prayer, victory was
proclaimed by sounding the call to prayer. But the battle was not over here.
Thousands of devotees, after casting themselves before the idol and
beseeching it for victory, launched a daring and desperate attack against the
invaders. Caught off-guard, the Ghaznavids could hold their position only for
some time before they had to retreat to their initial positions. As night fell, and
darkness gathered, the Sultan had no choice but to wait for the next morning.
The next morning, Saturday, 8th January of 1026, the Ghaznavids to their
horror found out an approaching Indian force hastily assembled by the
neighbouring Rais for stopping them. The exact size of this army is not known,
as reinforcements kept arriving throughout the day. The Ghaznavids found
themselves being encircled, and they had to act quickly. Mahmud kept a small
part of his forces to continue the siege of Somnath, and rushed to attack with
the majority of his army. The situation of Ghaznavids was critical – defeat
would have meant complete annihilation. The fighting was fierce, and for a
moment the Ghaznavids were brought to the verge of defeat. According to
sources, a desperate and crucial charge led by Mahmud himself could finally
break the ranks of the Indian forces. Ghaznavid victory was achieved a little
later.
Seeing the result of the battle remotely, the garrison was said to have been
overcome by fear, and offered no further resistance to the invaders. The
devotees of the temple did not give up, however. They formed a last line of
defence around the temple gates, invoking the assistance of their deity, and a
dreadful melee with the Ghaznavid troops commenced. The fight did not last
long, though. The Sultan immediately rushed his forces to occupy the fort and
guard the nearby coast. More than 50,000 devotees are said to have been
killed under his orders. The survivors who tried to escape through the sea by
boats were killed by the troops posted at the sea coast (Nazim 1931, 117-118).
Sultan Mahmud finally entered the temple, and from here all records get
confused between reality and fiction. Take for example, the detail that
Mahmud struck the idol with his mace and precious stones came out of its
broken stomach. This is false, since Somnath temple was a part of Shaiva cult
and the idol was thus a solid unsculptured linga, not a statue. On the other
hand, the fact that the idol was broken is true enough. Again, it is true that the
temple was plundered of its wealth, with the worth of plunder being as high as
20 million dinars (equivalent to more than a hundred and three crore rupees).
But then again, it is false that the temple, and in some accounts the entire city,
was burnt, as we have no archaeological evidence to suggest that.
The Sultan did not stay here for more than a fortnight, and started his return
journey immediately, which was still very dangerous. A Hindu king named
“Param Dev” had assembled a huge force to fight the Ghaznavids, and blocked
the path to Multan. This king has been identified either with Bhima I
mentioned earlier, or with the Paramara king Bhoja, the ruler of Malwa. The
latter seems to be more probable. The huge amount of plunder with the
Ghaznavids made it risky to engage in battle, and thus Mahmud somehow
managed to evade fighting by going through Sind. But for our purposes, we
need not discuss it here.

AFTERMATH: SOMNATH AND ITS HISTORY

We have ample evidence available to suggest that the ruins that are claimed to
be that of the original Somnath temple may or may not be correct. It can be
argued that the descriptions of the original temple that we have from the
chronicles of medieval historians simply do not match with the one identified
as the ruins of the original temple. Both Muhammad Nazim and Mohammad
Habib have suggested two different possible sites where the original temple
might have stood (Nazim 1931, 212-214).
Over time, a highly communal interpretation of the history of the Somnath
campaign surfaced. The British played a major role in this, as they depicted the
Ghaznavid invasion as an event of trauma for the entire Hindu population in
India by overly emphasising on triumphalist accounts in Turko-Persian sources,
and ignoring the local Sanskrit and Jaina textual and inscriptional sources
(which barely mention the Ghazanvid raid at best and show a completely
different picture of the society), because it helped them to divide and rule a
culturally and economically rich subcontinent on communal lines. British
imperialist historians following the methodology laid out by James Mill in his
1806 book, History of British India, stressed on the theory of permanent and
perpetual confrontation between ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ communities, and
succeeded in re-imagining and largely fabricating a deeply divisive, mutually
agonistic and profoundly religion-based past, which became accepted and
eventually crystallised as a part of Indian history (Thapar 2005). This,
unfortunately, has unpleasant consequences to this day, including the partition
of India more than seven decades ago.
That the Ghaznavid Sultan’s plundering of the temple caused minimal or
insignificant damage to it is corroborated by two pieces of evidence put
forward by Romila Thapar (Thapar 2005, 74-79). She cites an inscription issued
in the year 1038 by the then Kadamba king of modern-day Goa. The inscription
records the royal patron’s pilgrimage to Somnath by sea and, even though
Mahmud had plundered and supposed to have destroyed the temple a little
over a decade ago at that time, neither mentions any acts of destruction nor
mentions any acts of reconstruction. Further, an inscription issued by the
Somnath temple itself in 1169 refers to its renovation under the initiative of
the king Kumarapala, and mentions both mythological and practical reasons
for the need of renovation, two of which are – firstly, due to the dilapidation
caused by time (“kalajirnam”); secondly, due to the prevalence of the Kaliyuga
(the age in which temples are believed to deteriorate due to lack of care).
Mahmud’s plundering of this temple is not at all mentioned in any way.
The period from AD 1000 to 1300 saw an upward swing of the economy in
Gujarat. This is a direct contradiction of Turko-Persian sources that claimed
that the Ghaznavid invasion had devastated the local economy, although it is
understandable given the fact that not only the chroniclers themselves did not
stay in India much longer after Sultan Mahmud’s campaign, and it would have
been difficult for them to take the long-run situation into account, but also
because they had to emit a sense of triumph through their written accounts to
win the grace and patronage of the Sultan. Just as an example, the historian
Farrukhi was rewarded with “an elephant load of gold” by Sultan Mahmud for
having accompanied him in the campaign and producing a glorified (and
inevitably exaggerated) account of his patron’s victories in a qashida, as
recounted by Ta’rikh-i-Fakhru’d Din Mubarakshah.
In contrast to what has been given in the Turko-Persian sources, especially in
case of Al-Biruni’s account of devastation of the local economy, Gujarat
between 11th and 15th centuries experienced a flourishing culture and
economy, especially in case of the Jaina mercantile community (Thapar 2005).
Apparently, the devastation caused by Mahmud of Ghazni was not significant.
There was an extensive trade with West Asia and the Mediterranean, and the
Chaulukya rulers encouraged further economic development by improving
agriculture through systems of irrigation, as well as by improving
transportation through the creation of new roads.
Furthermore, if we look at the society of the time, contrary to the common
idea of communal tension that existed in the concerned period, diverse
Muslim communities, such as the Khojas, Bohras and Isma’ilis, constituted a
large part of the population in Gujarat and amicably coexisted with the local
Jains and Hindus, even going so far as to adopt a number of Vaishnava
elements and traditions into their own religious practices. That even Mahmud
was not the religious zealot that he is believed to be can be seen from the fact
that Ghaznavid coins minted in Lahore were bilingually stamped, in both
Sanskrit and Arabic, occasionally going so far as to proclaim the Prophet
Muhammad an avatara of Allah. Even the Ghaznavid armies too tended to be
multi-ethnic at all times and included men of various religious affiliations –
although it primarily consisted of Turks, there were Arabs, Afghans, Dailamites,
Khurasanis, Ghuris and Indians (even Hindus, mostly after the conquest of
Punjab) too in significant numbers (Shafiuzzaman 2013, 51). The
conceptualisation of the Ghaznavid raid as a ‘Muslim’ invasion into India is
hence not correct. It was only in later Persian narratives of much later times
that Mahmud was shown as the first ‘Muslim’ conqueror of India, completely
ignoring the Arab invasion of Sindh in 8th century, by the likes of Ziauddin
Barani. Thus, the idea of permanent and perpetual communal tensions in the
given period is a myth.
Thapar has stressed specifically on the need to see the wider socio-economic
context of the Ghaznavid empire in order to think about the motives for
Ghaznavid raids into India. She argues that as the capital city of his empire,
Mahmud’s Ghazni was under direct cultural and economic competition with
Baghdad, Cairo, Samarqand and Bukhara. As such, the constant need for
increasing and replenishing the treasury could certainly be considered to be a
vital factor in motivating the Sultan to pillage and plunder unceasingly. Not
only that, looting and pillage was a culturally sanctioned norm among the
Turkish tribes, and hence Ghaznavid raids were nothing out of the ordinary at
the time, except maybe the amount of risk and reward involved for the raiders.
Sultan Mahmud certainly was celebrated as the hero of Islam for his
desecration of Somnath temple and destruction of its idol, but it can definitely
be said that achieving this objective could not have been the main motive for
him to undertake the expedition. Additionally, the chroniclers who glorified
Mahmud as a hero of Islam had personal motives for doing so, like the
example I had given earlier of Farrukhi. We should also not ignore the fact that
Ghazni’s position was not necessarily a stable one, being surrounded by
enemies as it was on all sides, and that an act of aggression against another
faith would serve to provide legislation for the Sultan.
There is also an existing myth that the temple of Somnath was completely
destroyed and/or a mosque was built in its place. Archaeological evidence has
shown this to be false, and it was not until 1655 that the Somnath temple was
destroyed at the orders of Aurangzeb, and later replaced by a mosque.

Bibliography
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Majumdar, Asoke Kumar. 1956. Chaulukyas of Gujarat: A Survey of the History and Culture of Gujarat
from the Middle of the Tenth to the End of the Thirteenth Century. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.

Nazim, Muhammad. 1931. The Life and Times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna. London: Cambridge
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Shafiuzzaman. 2013. Military Systems of Mahmud Ghaznavi and Indian Rulers: A Comparative Study.
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Sharma, Lt Col Gautam. 1966. "The next 1500 years." In Indian Army Through The Ages, 52-55. New
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