Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation No. 28 Richard C. Taylor, Editor

Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation
No. 28
Richard C. Taylor, Editor
The Trinity, Or, The First Principle = :

De Trinitate, Seu De Primo Principio
title:
Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in
Translation ; No. 28
author: William.; Teske, Roland J.
publisher: Marquette University Press
isbn10 | asin: 087462231X
print isbn13: 9780874622317
ebook isbn13: 9780585173726
language: English
Trinity--Early works to 1800, Philosophy,
subject
Medieval.
publication date: 1989
lcc: BT110.W55 1989eb
ddc: 231/.044
Trinity--Early works to 1800, Philosophy,
subject:
Medieval.
William of Auvergne The Trinity, or the First Principles [De
Trinitate, Sue de Primo Principio]
Translated from the Latin
by
Roland J. Teske, S.J.
and
Francis C. Wade, S.J.
Introduction by Roland J. Teske, s.J.
MARQUETTE
UNIVERSITY
PRESS
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 88-63254
ISBN 0-87462-231-X
Copyright © 1989
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without prior permission of the publisher.
Marquette University Press
Second Printing 1995
Printed in the United States of America

Page i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface vii
Abbreviations Used in the Work viii
Introduction 1
I. William's Life and Works 1
II. William's Aim in The Teaching on God 5
III. The Trinity 8
1. The Teaching on Being 8
2. The Teaching on Power, Potency, and Possibility 15
3. The Teaching on the Three Persons 25
4. The Teaching on the Differences of the Persons 34
5. The Teaching on Language about God 47
IV. William's Style 52
V. The Significance of William's The Trinity 53
Some Conventions Used in the Translation 59
The Trinity, or The First Principle 61
Prologue 63
Chapter I: Being is said of something according to 65
substance1
1. The chapter titles are taken from the Paris-Orléns Edition.

Page ii
Chapter II: What has being according to essence is 68

uncaused
Chapter III: Such being is utterly simple, apart from any 72
accidental clothing
Chapter IV: That being is one and common in no way 74
Chapter V: That being is the cause of all others 79
Chapter VI: All secondary being necessarily depends upon 80
the first being
Chapter VII: All potential being depends on the first being 87
and is drawn by it into act
Chapter VIII: Power is the principle of effects and 92
operations
Chapter IX: There is a first power almighty through itself 97
both by its will and its wisdom
Chapter X: Although the divine wisdom and will and power 106
are eternal, there need not be any effect from eternity
Chapter XI: The divine will produces new things, while it 111
remains utterly immutable
Chapter XII: All things flow forth from the abundance of 115
the first giver according to his good pleasure
Chapter XIII: A recapitulation of some of the preceding 117
Chapter XIV: In the first original essence there are three 118
realities, of which one has being originally and
primordially, the second by generation, and the third by
procession
Chapter XV: One emanation which is by way of generation 127
is wisdom or the Word; the other is by way of grit or of
love, which is the bond of both, namely, the Holy Spirit
Chapter XVI: The first emanation is produced by way of 132
generation as understanding or word from the one who
understands

Page iii
Chapter XVII: The word is equal in every respect to the one 134
who understands it
Chapter XVIII: The divine Word is coeternal with the 135
Father
Chapter XIX: The divine Word and its speaker are one 140
essence
Chapter XX: The first generator and the first-born share 143
some third reality
Chapter XXI: The the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of a 145
pure gift and of most perfect love
Chapter XXII: The love by which the Father and the Word 148
love each other is the same essence with them and equal in
every respect
Chapter XXIII: Between the first mutual lovers there can be 150
a single love
Chapter XXIV: All things are subject to the Son and to the 154
Holy Spirit as they are to the Father
Chapter XXV: The blessed Trinity is reflected in individual 160
things
Chapter XXVI: The image of the Trinity is found in the 167
rational soul
Chapter XXVII: The Trinity of persons does not lessen the 177
simplicity and unity
Chapter XXVIII: On the difference and diversity of three 180
persons from one another
Chapter XXIX: The relations in God are not realities 186
distinct from the persons
Chapter XXX: The notions add nothing to the divine 190
persons
Chapter XXXI: The relations are not realities added to the 195
things compared

Page iv
Chapter XXXII: Being the Father does not indicate 198

something new in the Father, but the Son to whom the
Father is related
Chapter XXXIII: By the eternal generation of the Son no 204
change or anything else happens in the Father
Chapter XXXIV: The action of the agent and the production 206
of the effect are not distinct realities
Chapter XXXV: The prepositions, "by" and "from," and the 209
rest convey only the principle of the production of the Son
and nothing new in the Father
Chapter XXXVI: Paternity as paternity does not indicate a 211
what or something, but rather indicates a relation or
reference to something
Chapter XXXVII: The various opinions concerning the 215
notions are recoaciled
Chapter XXXVIII: Properly speaking, paternity is not said 218
to have generated and sonship is not said to have been
generated
Chapter XXXIX: Nothing is added to God from the 223
assertion of paternity, and that nothing is taken away or
lessened by its removal
Chapter XL: Whether or not one admits that paternity is 226
from another, one still has to admit that sonship is from
another
Chapter XLI: The common number of the notions 229
Chapter XLII: The diversity of the notions 234
Chapter XLIII: By one spiration the Father and the Son 237
produce and breathe forth the Holy Spirit
Chapter XLIV: The diversity of the predicaments and 240
manners of speaking applied to God

Page v
Chapter XLV: The predication of personal terms2 247

Chapter XLVI: He continues to compare the essence with 252
the persons
Bibliography 267
Index of Names 275
Index of Scripture References 279
Index of Terms 280
2. The Paris-Orléans edition splits Chapter XLIV into three parts.

Page vii
PREFACE
When Fr. Francis C. Wade, S.J., retired from his forty years of
teaching philosophy at Marquette University in May of 1985, he
turned his time and energy to a translation of William of
Auvergne's De trinitate. In November of 1985 he asked whether I
would check his translation. As a result we collaborated on the
translation and notes and a draft of the introduction until Father's
death in July of 1987. By this time the translation and notes have
been revised so often that it is all but impossible to assign specific
credit or blame to either of us. For better or worse I must admit
responsibility for the final choices and decisions.
The introduction is basically my own work. As the surviving
partner in this undertaking, I have the opportunity to dedicate the
introduction and the volume to Father Wade who has been a friend,
colleague, fellow Jesuit and ideal for me at least during my 18
years at Marquette and in some matters for far longer than that.
Without Fr. Wade's luring me into this partnership I would never
have taken this work upon myself; without the encouragement he
gave and the the model of perseverance he presented I would never
have finished it. Were he still here, I would never get away with
this move, but since he is with the Lord, I trust that he will
understand my good intention in dedicating the introduction and
translation to him and simply deflect the honor I would pay him to
the greater glory of God for whom he labored all his life.
I would also like to express my gratitude to the Christian
Commitment Fund of Marquette University for providing me with
a reduced teaching load in order to complete this volume, as well
as to my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy for their
support and encouragement and to the members of the Marquette
University Jesuit Community for the example of scholarship and
brotherhood they provided. I offer special thanks to Dr. Lee C.
Rice, of the Department of Philosophy, who generously assisted
with the completion of this project and to Miss Julia Galbus whose
long, patient and meticulous work at the computer brought this
volume to its present form.
ROLAND J. TESKE, S.J.
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
EASTER, 1988

Page viii
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE WORK

AHDLMA -- Archive d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen
Age
CCL -- Corpus Christianorum Latinorum
CCLCM -- Corpus Christianorum Latinorum Continuatio
Medievalis
CSEL -- Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
De heb. -- De hebdomadibus
De Gen. ad lit. -- De Genesi ad litteram
De Gen. Man. -- De Genesi contra Manichaeos
De lib. arb. -- De libero arbitrio
De trin. -- De trinitate
DB -- Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum
et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum. 12th ed. Freiburg:
Herder, 1913.
DS -- Denzinger-Schönmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum
Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum. 32nd ed.
Freiburg: Herder, 1963.
Enarr. in Ps. -- Enarrationes in Psalmos
In Ioan. Ev. -- In Ioannis Evangelium
MS -- Mediaeval Studies
NS -- New Scholasticism
PL -- Patrologia Latina
RTAM -- Recherche de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale
Solil. -- Soliloquiae
TMS -- The Modern Schoolman

Page 1
INTRODUCTION
I.
William's Life and Works
On April 10th 1228 Pope Gregory IX wrote to the canons of the
cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris,
Since we do not want your church to suffer the absence of a pastor,
we have . . . named for you as bishop a man of eminent knowledge
and unsullied virtue, Master William. After having ordained him
priest and consecrated him bishop, we return him to you.1
This new bishop of Paris was William of Auvergne who would
preside over the see of Paris until his death in 1249. William had
gone to Rome as a mere deacon in order to appeal the election by
the canons of the cathedral of a successor to Bartholomaeus who
had died on the previous October 20th. His arguments, along with
his knowledge and character, apparently moved the Pope not
merely to set aside the election of the Dean of the Cathedral, but to
ordain William priest and bishop and to place him over the see of
Paris.2
Little is known of William's early life and education. He was born
in Aurillac in the former province of Auvergne in south central
France. His birthdate is given as "probably prior to 1190," "shortly
before 1190," and at times as early as 1180.3 He was a canon of
Notre Dame and master of theology by 1223 and professor of
theology at the University of Paris by 1225. For this latter honor
one ordinarily had to be thirty five. In 1224 and 1225 William is
mentioned in two bulls of Honorius III; hence, he had by
1. Noël Valois, Guillaume d;Auvergne évèque de Paris (1228-1249):
sa vie et ses ouvrages (Paris: Picard, 1880), p. 11. Valois cites the
Bull of Gregory IX from Notes et Extraits des Manuscrits de la
Bibliothèque Impériale XXI (Paris, 1865), p. 206. Subsequent
references to all works cited will be in abbreviated form.
2. For an account of the difficulties in electing a succecssor to
Bartholomaeus, cf. Valois, pp. 8-11, as well as Ernest A. Moody,
"William of Auvergne and His Treatise De Anima," p. 2, in Ernest A.
Moody, Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1975).
3. For these dates, cf. respectively, Moody, p. 1; R. J. O'Donnell,
"William of Auvergne (of Paris)," The New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol.
14 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 921; and R. Heinzmann,
"Wilhelm v. Auvergne," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche. 2 ed. Vol. 10
(Freiburg in Breisgau: 1965), p. 1127. Bruno Switalski, in William of
Auvergne: De trinitate: An Edition of the Latin Text with an Introduction
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1976), opts for the
early date (p. 1). The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy
ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), also opts for the early date (p. 890).

Page 2
that time earned a sufficient reputation to be singled out by the
Pope for various commisions.4
William's varied activities as bishop are well described by Valois
and, in a much shorter version, by Moody. Of special interest to
philosophy and theology is William's part in the disturbances in the
University in 1229.5 During Carnival in that year some students
rioted after too much to drink and did sufficient damage to property
to warrant royal intervention. Blanche of Castille, Queen-regent for
the future Saint Louis, sent soldiers to quell the disturbance, and
several students were killed. The masters and students asked
William to obtain redress for the violation of their rights. When
William failed to accomplish anything, the students and masters
went on strike and withdrew from Paris to other cities.6 The
strikers appealed to the pope who strongly rebuked William,
appointed a commission to settle the dispute, and later intervened
with Blanche to receive the returning Masters. The language of
Gregory's letter to William is worth noting:
Believing that we had found a man after our own heart and that we
exulted and rejoiced in you as one rightly beloved, we poured the oil
of sacred anointing over your head. . . . But see -- and we report this
in sorrow -- bearing a wound from an unexpected foe and frustrated
in the hope we had conceived, we are so confounded by your actions
that we are forced to say, albeit unwillingly, ''We regret having made
this man." . . . With what great shame do you think we are covered
when some can mock us, saying, "Behold, the man you have set over
the church of Paris. . . ."7
Despite such strong language William apparently returned to the
good graces of Gregory and received many important missions
from him in the years ahead. For example, William acted as
representative of the Pope in the peace negotiations between
France and England in 1231. In 1246 William become receiver in
bankruptcy of the church of Cologne. When, however, Gregory IX
asked William to send him troops in 1229 to fight Frederick II,
William sent only money.
In the long run the strike was a success and was a significant step
in the movement of the University to complete independence from
the bishop of Paris. The strike was also significant insofar as the
Dominicans
4. Cf. Valois, pp. 333-335, for these letters.
5. Cf. Moody, p. 3.
6. For an account of the strike, cf. Moody, p. 4, and Valois, pp. 48-60.
7. For the Latin text, cf. Valois, pp. 343-345.

Page 3
first obtained a chair in the University during the strike when
William appointed Roland of Cremona.8
The second quarter of the thirteenth century was a period of
intellectual ferment in the University of Paris -- perhaps
unparalleled not merely in its brief past, but also in the many and
distinguished years ahead.
Up to the last years of the twelfth century, when the Christian world
unexpectedly discovered the existence of non-Christian
interpretations of the universe, Christian theology never had to
concern itself with the fact that a non-Christian interpretation of the
world as a whole, including man and his destiny, was still an open
possibility.9
But during the second half of the twelfth century and the beginning
decades of the thirteenth, the Latin West was presented with
translations of nearly all the Aristotelian works along with the
works of the Arab and Jewish philosophers and theologians.10
William's work as a philosopher and theologian marks an important
stage in this encounter of Christian faith with Aristotle and the
great philosophers of the Arab world. Despite frequent
ecclesiastical condemnations of and warnings against the
Aristotelian works, the impact of this discovery of a whole new
intellectual view of the world was not to be stopped.11 William's
stance
8. Switalski says, "William . . . helped to introduce the first mendicant
masters to the University of Paris, by assigning in 1229 a chair to the
Dominican Roland of Cremona, and by permitting a secular master,
Alexander of Hales, to retain his position after receiving the
Franciscan habit in 1236" (p. 1).
9. Etienne Gilson, The Elements of Christian Philosophy (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday and Company, 1960), p. 11.
10. For the translators, the history of the translations, and lists of the
translated works, cf. Bernard G. Dod, "Aristoteles latinus," in The
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 45-79, and also
David C. Lindberg's "The Transmission of Greek and Arabic Learning
to the West," in Science in the Middle Ages, ed. David C. Lindberg
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 52-90.
11. The teaching of Aristotle's scientific treatises along with their
Arabian commentaries was forbidden at the University of Paris in 1210.
"As early as the year 1210, the provincial Council of Paris, under the
presidency of Peter of Corbeil, archbishop of Sens, forbade under
penalty of excommunication, the teaching in Paris, either publically or
privately, of Aristotle's writings on natural philosophy or their
commentaries" (Etienne Gilson, The History of Christian Philosophy in
the Middle Ages [New York: Random House, 1955], p. 244). Further
prohibitions against the teaching of Aristotle were included in the
statutes of the University of Paris sanctioned in 1215. And in April of
1231 Gregory IX renewed the prohibition of teaching Aristotle until his
doctrine had been purged of its errors by a commission that Gregory
appointed for that purpose. Despite all this, the bishop of Paris certainly
went right on with his study of Aristotelian metaphysics and psychology
and with his magnum opus that so strikingly testifies to his interest in
Aristotelianism, especially as he knew it through Avicenna.

Page 4
toward Aristotle is clear: When Aristotle is opposed to the truth, he
must be rejected, but when he is found to be correct, he should be
accepted and defended.12 That is, William is one of the first
Christian thinkers to be confronted with the wealth of Greek and
Arabian philosophical thought, and he used this thought, especially
the metaphysics of Avicenna, to articulate a doctrine on God and
the created world that is both philosophically profound and
thoroughly Christian.
William's principal work is his Magisterium divinale et sapientiale
which he began around 1223. Switalski points out, "By
'magisterium' William means the doctrine communicated by the
master to the student . . ." and adds that 'divinale' indicates the
theological content, while 'sapientiale' refers to the manner of
treatment.13 Hence, we have translated the title as: The Teaching
on God in the Mode of Wisdom. This huge work has seven main
parts:
1. The Trinity (De trinitate) or, as it is sometimes called, The First
Principle (De primo principio),
2. The Universe of Creatures (De universo creaturarum),
3. The Soul (De anima),
4. The Reasons Why God Became Man (De causis cur Deus homo),
5. Faith and Laws (De fide et legibus),
6. The Sacraments (De sacramentis),
7. Virtues and Morals (De virtutibus et moribus).14
12. Cf. below, p. 8, for the full citation of the text. William's professed
stance toward Aristotle is not, as I see it, nearly as hostile and
defensive as Kramp takes it to be (cf. below, notes 14 and 28). Both
in content and in style the influence of Avicenna -- whom William
lumps together with Aristotle and his followers -- upon William's
work is too extensive and profound to permit one simply to
characterize William's attitude toward Aristotelian thought as hostile
or apologetic. Indeed, William's avowed policy and his practice
squares well with Aquinas's descriptions of Augustine's relation to the
Platonists: "[W]henever Augustine . . . found in their teaching
anything consistent with the faith, he adopted it, and those things
which he found contrary to the faith he amended" (Summa
Theologiae I, q. 84, a. 5).
13. Switalski, p. 6, n. 23.
14. The above order was established by Josef Kramp, "Des Wilhelm von
Auvergne 'Magisterium divinale'," Gregorianum 1 (1920) 538-584 and 2
(1921) 42-78, 174-87. Kramp dates The Trinity, The Reasons Why God
Became Man, and The Sacraments around 1223; all the rest he dates
from the earliest years of William's episcopacy, except for The Universe
of Creatures and The Soul, which he dates between 1231-1236.
Switalski accepts this ordering (cf. p. 5, n. 18); Marrone does so as well
with minor emendations and qualification (cf. Steven P. Marrone,
William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the
Early Thirteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983,
p. 28, n. 4).

Page 5
Among William's twenty other works are The Immortality of the
Soul (De immortalitate animae), Divine Rhetoric (De rhetorica
divina), and Good and Evil (De bono et malo).15 The sermons
published in the Opera Omnia edition of William's works belong to
William Perrauld, a Dominican, though William himself wrote
many sermons.16
II.
William's Aim in The Teaching on God
William's The Trinity is the first part of The Teaching on God in the
Mode of Wisdom. The Prologue is an introduction not merely to the
The Trinity, but to the entire seven volumes. In the Prologue he
states that there are three ways of gaining the sort of knowledge
that he is dealing with: first, by prophetic gift; second, by the virtue
of faith; third, by proof and inquiry. The first two are divine gifts;
the third is the way of those who philosophize (philosophantes),
which can be of use only to the learned who can be advised of their
errors through it. William proposes in his Magisterium divinale to
proceed in the manner of those who philosophize.17
Once he offers what sounds like a definition of the activity of
philosophizing. He says that the image and likeness of God that is
only potentially in the soul is brought to its ultimate actuality by
philosophizing,
that is, by doing battle against the errors and darkness of falsity and
depravity and against the wickedness of its loves -- by pursuing with
a chaste and other-worldly desire and love the light of truth by the
light of the true and salutary faith and by pursuing the sweetness of
15. There are two treatises entitled Good and Evil, both edited by J.
R. O'Donnell in Medieval Studies 8 (1946) 245-299 and 16 (1954)
219-271.
16. References to William's Magisterium Divinale, except for De
trinitate, will be to Guilelmi Alverni Episcopi Parisiensis Opera Omnia,
2 vols., ed. F. Hotot, and Supplementum, ed. Blaise Le Feron (Orléans-
Paris, 1674; reprinted Frankfurt A.M., 1963).
17. William uses philosophus or philosophi 17 times in the De trinitate;
these terms refer to the Aristotelians, especially Avicenna and
Avicebron. William uses the verb philosophare 9 times, especially in the
participial form philosophantes, and he uses philosophia 4 times and
philosophicus twice. He regards what he is doing as philosophy or
philosophizing. Cf. Etienne Gilson, "Les 'Philosophantes,' " AHDLMA
19 (1952) 135-140. Gilson examines the term in Roger Marston and
Roger Bacon; he finds it a somewhat pejorative term qualifying
theologians who devote themselves to philosophy in their work. He
found it only in the Franciscan school after 1250. I find no trace of such
a pejorative sense in William who uses the term a full quarter century
earlier.

Page 6
goodness by the trace of its scent which is hope (p. 173).18
Philosophizing thus has both a negative and a positive side, for one
who philosophizes both fights error and wickedness and pursues
truth and goodness. Philosophizing is not merely a matter of the
cognitive pursuit of truth, but involves the affective pursuit of
goodness as well. Finally, philosophizing is carried out by the light
of faith, in hope and with love, even though William also claims
that in philosophizing he aims only at "demonstrative certitude"
and "irrefragible proofs."19
Though William says that belief that is based on proofs "has no
merit or favor before God" (p. 64), he is still going to conform his
teaching to the normal procedure of those engaged in philosophy in
order to satisfy these men as far as possible. In Chapter VIII (p. 93)
William points out that, though the true faith utterly rejects belief
that rests upon persuasion by philosophizing, he will endeavour to
speak persuasively. In his De gratia he explains that not all
knowledge of God is salutary, meritorious or pleasing to God.
Indeed belief "persuaded or extorted by proofs or signs" is not even
a belief in God or God's words.20
The Introduction to the De universo tells us more about William's
aim in his Magisterium divinale. He begins by distinguishing two
intentions of knowledge of the universe. In one intention it is the
philosophy constituted by the aggregate of all philosophical
knowledges (scientiarum). As the universe itself is simply the
totality of its parts, so this knowledge is "philosophy complete in
its totality."21 As the knowledge of the circle and that of the
triangle make up the complete science of geometry, so the
knowledge of the universe is composed of all sciences of
everything knowable. In the second intention knowledge of the
universe is knowledge of the way that the universe is, that is, of
those things which are and of the way in which it is a universe.
William uses this intention to refer to what he is doing, and he will,
he tells us, pursue this knowledge
18. References to The Trinity will be inserted in the text in
parenthesis; they are to the pages of the translation.
19. For example, William says in his De universo III, 3, 7, "But you
should understand that in all these special treatises I do not use the
testimony of a law, and it is not my intention to support by testimony,
but by irrefragible proofs the truth that is common and that men should
commonly know or believe" (Opera Omnia, I, p. 1028). And in De
anima 1, 1, he says, "Let it not even enter your mind that I wish to use
the words of Aristotle as authoritative for proof of those things which I
am going to say. I know that a citation from authority can only be
dialectical and can only produce belief, while my aim -- both in this
treatise and wherever I can -- is to produce demonstrative certitude
which leaves you no trace of doubt" (Opera Omnia II, Supplementum, p.
65).
20. Cf. below, ch. 8, n. 5 for a full citation of this text from William's De
gratia.
21.Opera Omnia I, p. 593.

Page 7
"with careful investigation and by way of proofs and explanations,
through which you may acquire, if God wills, certitude about these
matters."22
William says that the purpose of this teaching is twofold: "One is
the honor and glory of the Creator who is the chief and ultimate
end of this teaching on God in the mode of wisdom."23 Only those
who philosophize for this end philosophize in human affairs rightly
and truly. That is, the end is not merely knowledge of God's great
and wonderful deeds, but "rather that he be magnified and
acknowledged to be God and Lord of the ages and that human
souls be persuaded or rather pressed to pay him the honor of
worship."24 Mere knowledge and reporting of his great deeds are
not all we owe him and do not of themselves perfect our souls.
Rather we owe him "the truth and sincerity of the highest
veneration on account of his supereminent glory and loftiness.''25
And it is this veneration that is the perfection of our souls.
Others produce errors in their philosophizing and sin against the
true philosophy in five ways. These five defects, of course, reveal
what William took the true philosophy to be. These others, first of
all, empty philosophy of its most important content, namely, "the
glory, or glorification, of the Creator."26 Second, they render it
fruitless by removing the reward of eternal happiness. Third, they
make it ugly by removing its end, for its principal beauty and
loveliness lies in its end, just as the main beauty of a peacock lies
in its tail. Fourth, they make it foolish, since it makes them to be
foolish and to act foolishly rather than to be wise and to act wisely.
Fifth, they made it injurious to and contemptuous of God by
depriving him of honor and seeking their own honor and glory.
Such men are not genuine philosophers; rather they are ridiculous
apes of real philosophers (philosophorum simias ridiculosissimas).
The true philosophy, on the other hand, has as its end the glory of
God; its fruit is eternal felicity. Its beauty lies in its end: the glory
of God and eternal happiness. It makes wise those who
philosophize truly, for they seek God's glory rather than their own.
The second reason for this teaching is the refutation of errors
regarding the universe which turn one "aside from the roads of
truth and the paths of rightness by which one comes to this end,
namely, of true philosophizing."27 William includes as examples of
error any doctrine that deprives God of glory or honor or worship.
He specifically mentions Manichean dualism, the opinions that
God acted out of necessity, that he does not have providence over
creation and that the world is eternal.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 594.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.

Page 8
Kramp's emphasis upon the apologetic character of William's work
seems to overlook the first aim of true philosophy.28 Furthermore,
while William is certainly on guard against the errors of Aristotle
and his followers, William's attitude toward them is far from simple
hostility and opposition. He stands with them wherever they are not
opposed to the truth. "Although in many matters we have to
contradict Aristotle, as is truly right and proper, and this holds for
all the statements by which he contradicts the truth, still he should
be accepted, that is, upheld, in all those statements in which he is
found to have held the correct position."29
In summary, William aims at a Christian wisdom, philosophia, that
involves both knowledge and praise of God. This wisdom is not
attained by philosophers, but those who philosophize, that is,
Christian theologians who have given themselves to philosophizing
in faith and hope and love of God. Though the proofs William aims
at may not be salvific, they may be helpful in preserving the faith
of the learned, and those who philosophize in faith, hope and love
actualize the image of God in their souls.
III.
The Trinity
1. The Teaching on Being
William begins the first and highly metaphysical section of The
Trinity by noting that a being (ens) and being (esse) have many
intentions and that they do not have an account or definition. From
the opening sentence his debt to the Aristotelian tradition which he
knew through Avicenna is clear.30 But he immediately adds that
the intentions of being are like those of good, for we speak of good
according to substance and good according to participation. Thus
he links the Aristotelian multivocity of being with the Boethian
doctrine of being according to substance and according to
participation. As there is something good by participation and
something good by substance or essentially, so we have at least the
notion of a being "whose essence is for it being (esse), which we
predicate
28. Kramp lists as errors that William is fighting: Aristotelian and
Arabian philosophy, the pantheism of Amaury of Bène, the
Albigensians, and the moral laxity of the era; he then adds: "To
oppose all these errors and abuses, to stand in the way of heresies
moving with frightful power, to lead the confused back to the right
path, to keep the faithful from apostasy: that is the goal of the
magisterium divinale" [my translation; his emphasis], (Kramp, I, p.
578). Kramp admits that Avicenna has influenced William's
vocabulary, manner of presentation and thought, but he explains this
in terms of William's finding a non-Christian author who suited his
purpose (ibid., p. 582).
29. Opera Omnia II, Supplementum, p. 82. De anima 2, 12. Kramp finds
the order of opposition and support significant. "The hostile relation
then comes first, and the friendly posture is rather toleration than a
welcoming" (Kramp, II, p. 48)
30. For further documentation, cf. the notes to the appropriate chapters
in the translation.

Page 9
when we say, 'It is,' so that it itself and its being (esse) . . . are one
thing in every way" (p. 65). If the "It is" is the veiled reference it
seems to be to the God who in Exodus 3:14 gave his name to
Moses as "He Who Is," William has managed also to indicate his
debt to the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures. Furthermore, the phrase
"one thing in every way" could well be a reference to Augustine's
De doctrina christiana 1, 5, 5, which was cited by the Fourth
Lateran Council in the condemnation of Abbot Joachim of Flora,
thus indicating William's concern to abide by that Council's
teaching as well as his debt to Augustine and his interest in current
theological problems.31
Boethius has taught William that everything simple "has its being
(esse) and what it is as one" (p. 66). What is simple cannot be
divided into that which it is and its being, into what participates
and what is participated. William shows that the "ways of
speaking" about good, namely, "according to substance" and
"according to participation," and "essentially'' and "accidentally,"
are so related that it is impossible to have a good by participation
unless there is a good according to substance. For a good by
participation is caused by the good in which it participates, and the
series of participants must terminate in a good that is essentially
good, or the intellect is never brought to rest.
William invokes another Boethian principle: "everything that is
said of a thing is either essential to it or accidental to it" (p. 66).
What is neither the essence nor part of the essence of a thing is
accidental to it, and what is accidental to a thing is possessed by
and said of a thing according to participation. Being, then, William
argues, must be said of something according to essence or
substance. Just as it is impossible to have things good by
participation without something that is essentially good, so it is
impossible to have beings by participation without something
whose essence is its being. William shows in two ways that it is
impossible that there only be things which are good by
participation. First, he shows that the participation cannot be
circular, that is, if A is good by having B and B is good by having
A, we come to the contradiction that A is the cause of its own
goodness and gives goodness to B before it has it from B to give.
Second, he shows that the participation cannot move in a straight
line such that A is good by having B, which is good by having C,
and so on. An infinite series of good things which are good by
having good would mean that there is nothing left in the intention
of good except "having" repeated without end. Such an infinity
neither determines nor settles the
31. William frequently alludes to the text of Fourth Lateran's
condemnation of the Abbot Joachim and struggles to render
intelligible its teaching that the essence does not generate and is not
generated, though the one essence is the Father, Son and Holy Spirit;
cf. DS 803.

Page 10
intellect; the intellect in searching for the intention of good finds
only an endless series of things that have good, but never the good
they have.
The various secondary modes of speaking, namely, according to
participation, accidentally, and qualifiedly, entail their correlative
primary modes: according to substance, essentially, and
unqualifiedly. William's argument for the simple being whose
essence is its being shows that, given one of the secondary modes
of speaking of being, being in the primary mode must be admitted,
or the intellect is faced with either contradiction or unintelligibility.
Gilson is right in claiming that the argument is conceptual and that
it is not a version of the Anselmian argument that begins from a
concept of God.32 William, however, begins from an experimental
fact every bit as much as Aquinas does in the Five Ways. Hence,
Gilson's claim that William's argument rests on "the principle that
the intrinsic intelligibility of the concept demands the existence of
its object" and that consequently William's argument "is no less
'ontological,' under another form, than that of the Proslogion"
seems no more justified in William's case than in it is in the case of
the Third Way.33
The Two Intentions of Being
Being has two intentions. The first has two determinations. In one
of them it is what is left if one removes all the clothing of the
various accidents; this is the essence or substance; along with this
intention one grasps all being. In the other determination we have
the being signified by the definition or by the name of the species;
this is the essence of a thing. The second determination seems
unproblematic, but William is not terribly clear as to what he
means by the first determination. I suspect that he means the
essence or substance stripped of all the forms that come to it; these
forms include in Socrates, for example, the form by which he is an
individual, as well as those by which he is rational, animal, and
body; thus one is left with substance and "his being or entity . . .
with which the Creator first clothed him."34 This intimate and bare
entitas may be what William means by "all being (omne esse),"
namely, the least formal determination of whatever is not nothing.
The second intention of being is the being we express when we say
of anything that it is; being in this intention lies beyond the
definition of anything, the sole exception being the case where
being is said essen-
32. Etienne Gilson, "La notion d'existence chez Guillaume
d'Auvergne," AHDLMA 21 (1946) 70-71.
33. Ibid., 73.
34.De universo II, 1, 30, Opera Omnia II, p. 625; cf. below, ch. 3, n. 3
for my translation of this passage.

Page 11
tially, that is, where "the essence and its being are in every way one
thing" (p. 69). William approaches this second intention of being in
another way. Either a thing is its own being, or something else is
being for it. If in the case of each thing its being is other than the
thing, we are faced once again with a causal explanation that
moves either in a circle or in a straight line. The circular form of
explanation again proves contradictory, and the regress in a straight
line leads to an infinite series such that the being of the thing with
which we begin can never be grasped by the intellect. Such an
infinity spells the destruction of intellectual knowledge, and
William will have nothing to do with "those who block the path to
philosophizing and destroy the principle and root of knowledge,
which the intellect truly is . . ." (pp. 70-71). That is, William
appeals to a principle of intelligibility of the sort that is implicit and
operative in any a posteriori argument for the existence of God.35
Everything of which being is said according to essence is
uncaused, provided one means that it is not caused by something
external, that is, by something of another essence. For William
does speak of the generation of the Son and the spiration of the
Holy Spirit as internal and perfect causation. Of everything created,
on the other hand, being is not said according to essence. Being is
properly a name only of that of which being is said according to
essence, just as "man" names the species and does not name any
individual man. It would seem that things of which being is said
according to accident are denominated as "beings," just as the
accident "white'' does not name, but denominates a white thing.
Being cannot be separated in actuality or in thought from that
which it properly names, since being is either the essence or part of
the essence of that of which it is said according to essence. Hence,
William concludes that there is being which cannot not be and
cannot be known not to be. In fact he argues that one cannot
intellectually know or affirm that such a being is not. Despite
language reminiscent of the Anselmian argument, William's claim
is rather a conclusion about the nature of the being the existence of
which he has established than a version of the ontological
argument. Every caused being has being that is acquired; it is in
itself possible and can receive either being or not being. Everything
which is caused is other than its being and its not being, for what
receives is other than what is received and what acquires is other
than what is acquired.36
35. On this point, cf. W. Norris Clarke, "How the Philosopher Can
Give Meaning to Language about God," in The Idea of God:
Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Edward H. Madden, Rollo Handy,
and Martin Farber (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1968),
especially pp. 5-9.
36. Gilson argues that "the distinction of essence and existence that is
here in question is simply the fact that in the created being the essence
exists only in virtue of the existence that its creator confers on it" ("La
notion," p. 82). He does not find that "in the very metaphysical structure
of the created being existence forms an element distinct
(footnote continued on the next page)

Page 12
An essential being, then, is uncaused by any external cause, that is,
by a cause that does not share its essence; it is simple, uncomposed,
and incapable of resolution into parts. To it there is nothing prior or
superior; such a being is bare of any clothing by essential or
accidental forms. This being, which is utterly simple and bare,
cannot be common; that is, it is not shared like a universal by other
beings. It is common neither as a genus, a species or a difference
nor as an accident. Moreover, in such a being there is no essential
plurality, though there is, as William later shows, a plurality of
persons. An essential being is indivisible in both act and potency
and is numerically one. Almost in an aside William refers to this
being as pure act when he mentions that what is caused by the first
cause with perfect causality is "pure act . . . from pure act" (p. 77).
William's concern, however, focuses upon the numerical unity and
singularity of being through its essence. Finally, at the end of the
fourth chapter William tells us that the First, singular and bare, is
being through its essence and that in Exodus 3:14 he gave to Moses
"He Who Is" as his name. Though we usually, William notes, call
him God, Lord of the universe, or Lord of the ages, such terms are
our ways of praising and glorifying him; being is his name and
expresses his essence. "With knowledge of that alone everything is
known that can be said of his essence" (p. 78).
Since everything subsequent to the being through its essence is
caused and composed, he is the cause and author of everything
after him. In whatever way being may come to any caused thing, he
is the first source of being and apart from him there is no source of
being. Hence, William points out the folly of the Cathars who
claimed there were two first principles.37 These heretics remained
in William's time a serious threat to the Catholic faith in southern
France, and William spends the first ten chapters of the First Part of
his De universo in refuting their "most pernicious error."38 The
first being is solitary; there is nothing equal to it or of equal
duration. It has no opposite save what is not being, and not being is
simply nothing and cannot be the principle of being for anything.
Using one of his homey metaphors, William calls the first being the
one root or source of being to which every other being owes its
being. All things insofar as they are are the outpourings of this first
and abundant source. The possibility of the universe is the recipient
of its outpouring. As light fills the air and penetrates it, so the
abundance of the first being, who is pure goodness and abounding
generosity, fills and
(footnote continued from the previous page)
from the essence . . ." (ibid.).
37. William is alluding to the doctrine of the Neo-Manichean dualists, if
not to the book, Liber de duobus principiis (The Book on the Two
Principles); cf. A. Dondaine, Un traité néo-manichéen du xiiie siècle: Le
'Liber de duobus principiis.' Rome: Istituto Storico Domenicano, 1939,
for more on 13th century Catharism.
38.De universo I, 1, Opera Omnia I, p. 594.

Page 13
penetrates the possibility of the universe according to the capacity
of each thing to receive it.
Secondary and Caused Being
William turns in Chapter VI to a discussion of secondary and
caused being. He first calls such being: "being in need, possible
being, false being, flowing being and dependent being" (p. 80).
Then he adds eleven further names of secondary being and argues
that each of these intentions provides "a certain path leading the
knower's inquiry to the first being" (p. 81). The root of the
argument in each of these involves a move "from the lesser and
from opposites, since the appropriate predicates belong first to
what is prior and more to what is greater" (p. 85). That is, by "the
analogy of opposites" (p. 86), he moves from being in need to
being that is sufficient, from possible being to necessary being, and
so on.
His definition of possible being as "that for which, considered in
and through itself, nothing is found that excludes its being" (p. 81)
allows him to maintain that the possible does not have being, but is
close to having being, thus preparing the way for him to reject
Avicenna's views that possibility is a relation and that matter is
eternal. What is possible, he tells us in clear dependence upon
Avicenna, needs "a giver of being" that "adds to it the actuality of
being" (p. 83). William argues that, if we suppose that everything
in the universe is only possible, then the universe can neither give
itself actuality nor receive it from anything else. It cannot give
itself actuality, since, by hypothesis, it does not have it; it cannot
receive it from anything else, since there is nothing apart from the
universe. Hence, if everything in the universe were only possible;
there would be nothing at all. Therefore, there is something that is
not merely possible, that is, there is a necessary being.39 Each of
the sixteen intentions of secondary being leads in similar fashion to
so many names of the first being.
With Chapter VII William turns to the way of being of the possible
universe. Since the being of a possible being does not belong to it
essentially, the being and its being are really two; the one comes to
(accidit) the other and does not fall within its definition or
quiddity.40 Such being is composite and can be resolved into its
possibility, or quiddity, and its being. Hence, possible being
requires a cause that joins
39. The similarity of William's argument to the Third Way is striking.
40. For Avicenna's account of the accidental character of being, cf. F.
Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Avicenna," Mediaeval and
Renaissance Studies 4 (1958) 1-16. Rahman criticizes the view of A.-M.
Goichon, La Distinction de L'Essence et de L'Existence d'après Ibn Sina
(Paris, 1937). Cf. also Beatrice H. Zedler, "Another Look at Avicenna,"
The New Scholasticism 50 (1976) 504-521.

Page 14
its being with its possibility. Possible being is only by participation
in the first being which alone is being. Thus the being of the
possibles reveals the first being. For "the first being through itself
and alone is primarily and principally the being of all things, and
all things are said to be by participation in it" (p. 88). As such the
first being fills and penetrates all things; possibility is like a
container or receptacle that the first being fills, though not
everything has an equal share of the first being. The first being is
the being by which all other things are, but not what those things
are. As the light of the sun fills the air which reflects the light, so
by its omnipresence the first being falls the universe which reflects
it by its being. William draws an analogy between the soul which is
the life of the body and God who is the being of all things. He asks
us to suppose that one soul is the life of many bodies which,
nonetheless, preserve their essential differences; in the same way
God is the one being of all things, though the individual things
maintain their essential differences.
God is for some of his effects the being by which they immediately
are; through such effects he is the being of other things. As the soul
gives life to the flesh and bones through the animal spirits, so God
gives being to some things by the mediation of others. Thus the
human soul is immediately created by God, and since God is
immediately being for the soul, William says that "the life by
which I live is God" (p. 90). The human body, on the other hand,
exists and lives by reason of its union with the soul.
Proof that everything is either immediately or mediately by
participation in the first being is found in the love of all things for
being, for a thing will risk one part of itself to protect another in
which its being seems more to lie. Such love of all things for being
shows that "being is both something other and better than all things
that are" (p. 91). Hence, being in itself cannot be an accident, but
"is necessarily better than every substance and accident" (p. 91).
The being that is loved by all things does not seem to be a created
reality, but the divine essence itself, for this being "is everywhere
and essentially whole, since wherever there is a being, the being of
the First is necessarily there also" (p. 91). Though William's
language at times leads one to think of each created thing as having
its own participated actuality of being such that in a created thing
there is a real composition between the thing and its being, at other
times he speaks, as he does here, as though the first being is the
being of all things -- not what they are, but that by which they are.
As the being of all things, the first being is omnipresent, and the
love of the universe declares that he is pure goodness.

Page 15
2. The Teaching on Power, Potency and Possibility

In Chapter VIII William turns to the procession of things from
God. He poses a series of questions to be dealt with in this and the
following chapters: Do things proceed from him by nature or by
reason and will? Is he the maker as well as creator of the universe?
Is his wisdom something distinct from him? Does he necessarily
know all things and himself in his wisdom? Does his goodness
force him to make everything of which he is capable?
William deals with power and potency in preparation for dealing
with omnipotence; then he turns to the first wisdom which is the
exemplar of the universe, the Son of the omnipotent Father. Finally,
he turns to their mutual love. Hence, the discussion of the
procession of creatures is entirely within a Trinitarian context in
which the Father is linked with power, the Son with wisdom, and
the Spirit with love.
William follows quite faithfully Avicenna's exposition of the terms
"potency," "power," and "possibility." Indeed these chapters
provide an excellent example of William's declared policy toward
Aristotle and his followers.41 Thus William begins by
distinguishing several sorts of potency. First, there is active or
agent potency which is the principle of operations, the overflowing
or ray of being from which operations pour forth. Second, there is
dominion or political power which is the obedience or consent of
subjects to the ruler; for it is through the obedience of subjects that
a king is able to do things. Third, there is passive potency, the
quality by which something resists modification from other agents
wholly or partially. Active potencies accompanied by reason and
will are called rational; those not so accompanied are irrational.
Finally, there is a metaphorical power which is what geometers call
the square of a line.
Possibility and the Eternity of the World
Possibility is the potency or suitability to receive impressions from
active potencies. Thus an egg has the possibility from which the
animal might emerge; this possibility is a weak potency since it is
in itself indifferent to becoming the animal or not. In this sense any
man has the possibility of becoming king, that is, a weak potency,
which is a requisite for becoming king, but nothing that makes
kingship due to him. Some possibilities are remote and come to
their full actualization only through
41. Cf. above, p. 8.

Page 16
many intermediate steps. Thus rock in a quarry or trees in a forest
are remote possibilities for houses.
With Avicenna still in mind, William points out that "some of the
better philosophers" (p. 95) hold that possibility is a relation that
matter possesses and that, consequently, everything that comes to
be is made out of something. Thus the Aristotelians conclude that
matter is eternal. They argue that in everything that comes to be
non-being precedes being, and possibility actuality. But in order to
precede actuality possibility must be something, and it can only be
a relation that matter has to the being that actually comes to be in
it. Matter then must be eternal, that is, must not come to be. If
matter came to be, it would be preceded by another possibility,
which in turn would be made out of still another possibility. Hence,
this series of possibilities in possibilities is either endless or there is
an eternal matter. Though the Aristotelians apparently thought that
one had on these grounds to accept an eternal matter, William
points out that there is no escaping the endless series of
possibilities by accepting an eternal matter. For possibility must
precede actuality, if not in time, at least by nature.
William understands a possible being as one that is proximate to
being. It can be proximate to being (esse) through both its material
principle and its agent principle or through its agent principle
alone. Thus a house is possible through wood and stones and its
builder, but it is also possible through the builder alone if the
builder is able to produce the wood and stones. In the latter case the
possibility of things lies in the maker, and it is the active potency of
the maker or creator. Perhaps, William notes, possibility is simply
the absence in things of anything that excludes their being, such as
a contrariety of natures. In William's sense the possible is not
possible in virtue of the possibility of the matter; rather, before the
world was made, the world was possible in virtue of the active
potency of the creator.
The Power of the First
William turns in Chapter IX to the characteristics of the first
potency. As first, it is preceded by no other and is furthest from
powerlessness and weakness. Some potencies are diminished by
being limited to one of two opposites; a power that extends to each
of two opposites is greater than one limited to only one. Second,
some potencies are prevented or impeded in their operation; a
power that is not prevented or impeded is greater. Third, some
potencies require for their operation some external assistance, such
as a recipient of their activity, a means or an instrument; a power
that needs none of these is further

Page 17
removed from powerlessness. Finally, some powers can be forced;
a power that cannot be forced is mightier than one that can be.
The First is powerful through his essence. Were his potency
acquired, the potency would be prior to the First which acquires it;
yet it cannot be prior to the First because the First is its cause, as it
is the cause of all else. Thus this potency is the first powerful one.
Hence, he cannot be forced or coerced. Powerlessness falls into
three classes: limitation of the potency to one of two opposites, the
cessation of the potency by coercion, or its being subject to
prevention. This then is the intention of omnipotence: "a power of
every sort which has no injury or diminution from any side, since
injury refers to coercion and prevention and since diminution refers
to restriction to one of two opposites" (p. 99).
Since the First is powerful through his essence, he must be
wherever he can act. If a king acted through his essence instead of
through his agents, he too would have to be wherever he had
power. Hence, the First is essentially present wherever he can act.
He cannot become more or less powerful, since he is his potency
and he cannot increase or decrease in any way. Since his power
extends to both opposites, that is, to making and to not making, he
must have choice and will, for both of the two opposites cannot
proceed from him and neither would, if he were utterly indifferent.
Power in itself is utterly indifferent; hence, that he makes
something at one time and at another does not is due to choice,
since coercion or prevention have been already ruled out. There
may be external aids, means and recipients of an agent's action, but
William is here dealing with the immediate operations of the First,
and these must obviously be without such external aids. But even
in the case of mediate operations external aids do not force such a
potency that is over two opposites to act. Hence, it is by choice and
will that the first potency at one time acts and at another time does
not. "The omnipotence of the first powerful one means that he can
neither be forced to do what he does not will nor be prevented from
doing what he wills, and this is the liberty of his magnificence" (p.
101). Furthermore, will and choice imply knowledge and wisdom.
Though the beauty and order of the world ought to convince
rational beings that there is a first wisdom, William goes about
establishing this point with the same sort of argument he used to
establish being through its essence. For there is wisdom, and either
the First has it or some other has it. Wisdom is either all acquired
or only some is acquired, and what is acquired is posterior to
essential wisdom.
William argues that in the First knowledge cannot be subsequent to
his willing, that his willing is not something that he acquires, and
that his knowledge, therefore, must be not acquired, but essential.
Secondly, William argues that the First knows and wills the being
of things before the things themselves are; hence, they cannot be
the cause of his knowing and willing. His cognition and choice are
not acquired from things; rather

Page 18
they are essential to him. Hence, the First is his power, wisdom and
will. He is not caused by anything, but is the one cause of all
things. His power, wisdom and will are one perfection of the divine
artisan. William appeals to the Aristotelian doctrine that things are
capable of knowledge to the extent that they are free from matter;
since the First is pure and free, not bound to matter in any way, he
is tightly called wisdom, for "every pure and free essence is
intellectual, because immersion in matter is a darkening of its
being" (p. 103).
Power, knowledge and will belong to the First in the highest degree
of perfection. All things are subject to his power; nothing comes
from him save though his will, "and he holds in being what he wills
and when he wills and how he wills" (pp. 104-105). His wisdom is
the first light that discloses itself and all other things. Human
wisdom is derived; it is like a light that is illumined or a book that
is inscribed with the likenesses of things or a mirror reflecting the
appearances of the intelligibles. But the first wisdom is the
wisdom, art and exemplar of all things, the intelligible or
archetypal world; it is brilliant light through its essence, the true
light, book of life and scripture of truth in which one can read the
whole series of the ages. His will is pure benignity freely willing
things to be without any advantage for himself.
Against the Aristotelians
Because his power, wisdom and will are essential to the First, the
Peripatetics, William says, have maintained that the operations of
the First are eternal. Nothing external to him can induce him to will
at a particular time, and he is always fully capable of whatever he
does, without need for anything else. Since he was from eternity
the entire sufficiency of his effects, these effects are necessarily
eternal. Hence, William sees that Avicenna and the other
Aristotelians are forced to say that everything is eternal.
William's response involves a distinction between God's willing
that something be without qualification and willing that something
be with qualification. If God wills that X be without qualification,
then X is without qualification, but if God wills that X be now or
later, X is now or will be later. He wills that there be an order in
things, and it is not necessary that the world or anything in it be
eternal; rather things begin and cease to be when it is his good
pleasure. Moreover, William argues for a creation of the world in
time. We have to admit, William says, that the world was created in
the sense that it was drawn from its possibility into actuality. The
Aristotelians claim this creation was neither in time nor in eternity.
Thus they held that the world is eternal with no beginning or end of
its existence. For William this means that they hold the creation of
a

Page 19
world that is not created. Hence, he concludes that it was created
either in time or from time, that is, in an instant.
The first maker either acted in order to make the world or not. If he
did not act to make the world, he cannot be called its maker. Hence,
he did act, and his action either had some extent in time or not. If it
did, this extent was either finite or infinite. If the extent is finite,
the first maker made the world in time. If the extent is infinite, the
world, it seems, was not created, since the infinite is not
transversible. If his action had no extent in time, it was
instantaneous. That is, he created the world from time.
William's third argument is another dilemma: either the whole of
past time is infinite or it is not. If it is infinite, how could the whole
of it have passed? For the infinite without qualification cannot be
transversed. If the infinity of all past time did not prevent it from
passing, why should the infinity of the future prevent its passing?
But if at some time in the future, all future time shall have passed,
future time is not infinite, but limited at both ends. Hence, the
whole of past time is finite.
William quotes Avicenna's principle which he regards as the source
of the whole error of the Aristotelians: "A pure and true intellect
testifies that, if the one essence is now as it was before when
nothing came forth from it, something will not now come forth
from it" (p. 108). That is, the principle claims that creation in time
or from time implies a change in the divine essence, and neither
Christians nor Aristotelians were willing to surrender the
immutability of the divine essence.42
William argues that God can create something that is independent
of the things that are, that is, things other than God. If he could not,
the things that are would set a limit to his potency. He could not,
for instance, create another world or another sun or moon. Both
sides agree, William claims, that God acts through choice and will.
But then William asks what God's first choice would have been if
he could not create other things, that is, another world, a greater or
better one.43 If he could not, his potency must have been limited,
but the first power is absolute power without any qualification.
God's power extends over everything that is possible in itself, that
is, over everything whose nature does not involve contradiction,
and not merely over the universe that actually is.
42. Cf. Amato Masnovo, Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a S. Tommaso
d'Aquino (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1946) II, pp. 97-106, for a
discussion of this principle, its source in Avicenna, and its appearance
in William of Auxerre, Albert the Great and others.
43. William's words recall the condemnation of Abelard at the Council
of Sens who seems to have held that God could not have created another
world than he did create; cf. DS 726 -- but this is also Avicenna's
doctrine. William is incorrect in thinking that Avicenna's God acts by
choice.

Page 20
A limitation of God's power to a determinate end would be due to
something that prevents it or to powerlessness -- neither of which
can be found in God. As what is possible in itself is possible
without qualification and not merely in relation to something, so
the first power is not powerful for some determinate thing. God
"will have power over the possible absolutely. For the possible is
able to receive being, and the one powerful through himself is
absolutely able to give it absolutely" (p. 109). As he is through his
essence alone, so he is powerful through himself alone and can
give being to what is possible in itself, namely, that which is able to
receive being. William asks us to suppose that the possible is now
being created; in that case the first essence either is as it was before
or is not as it was before. The "true and pure intellect" has no
problem with the first alternative, and the Aristotelians rightly do
not accept the second alternative, since there is no variation or
change in God. William then says that there need be no variation or
change made in things, since the divine essence in no way depends
upon them. Hence, there is no need for something new to come
about either in the Creator or in things.44
William uses another argument: Either there is something new, or
all things are eternal. Obviously all things are not eternal since
things come to be and cease to be and since there is time and
motion. Hence, there is something new, something that "was not
before and is now" (p. 110); let us call it A. Either there was the
totality of the conditions sufficient for A's being or there was not. If
there was, then, according to the Aristotelians, A already was;
hence, it was not new. If there was not, there was something
lacking in the conditions sufficient for A's being; let us call what is
lacking B. But the question as to the sufficiency of the conditions
recurs with respect to B. Hence, we are either launched upon an
endless regress, never coming to the sufficient conditions for B's
being -- and in that case B is not and does not come to be. Or we
come to something which is the totality of the conditions sufficient
for B. Yet B first was not by reason of that totality and later is,
though the totality of conditions sufficient for B was exactly the
same then as it is now. That is, either one is faced with an infinity
of things requisite for anything that comes to be, or one admits that
"what they attributed to a pure and true intellect is false" (p.
110).45
44. The text is not entirely clear. The printed version of the Chartres
manuscript destroyed in World War II seems to say that, even if there
were some change in things, there is none in the divine essence, since
it does not depend on them. But perhaps William is saying that the
bestowal of being upon a possible is not a variation or change and
that when something is created, nothing new comes to he in it or in
God. Nothing new comes to be in God, because a cause does not
change in producing an effect, as William will argue later at length.
45. William's rejection of the eternity of the created world seems to be
independent of Maimonides' arguments against an eternal world. Cf. Jan
Rohls, Wilhelm von Auvergne und der mittelalterliche Aristotelismus
(Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1980), p. 163.

Page 21
Avicenna clearly held that creation had no beginning and that the
universe always existed. Verbeke says,
One of the principal arguments put forward by our author to defend
his point of view is that the necessary being is immutable, stripped of
every form of potency; if he had become creator at a certain moment
without having been so before, a change would be produced in him,
for to create is not the same thing as not to create.46
Avicenna refuses to allow that the first being began to create by

reason of a free decision. Verbeke adds, ''If God exists alone and is
immutable, one cannot see what could have led him to begin his
creative activity."47 Furthermore, Avicenna would not permit talk
about God being before the world. Nonetheless, he surely admitted
generation and corruption, change, motion and time in the world,
and thus one can wonder whether William's argument really
touches him. Perhaps Avicenna's doctrine of mediate creation
which removes God from direct involvement in the world of
change is what renders him safe from the sort of argument William
raises. Or conversely perhaps William's doctrine that every created
being is by the being that is God is what allows him to catch -- or
think that he catches -- Avicenna in this dilemma. For William's
God is present and at work in every being. It is by God's being that
each created being is, and it is the abundance of the First that
overflows in each instance of a creature's producing something.
The Causality of Creatures
William begins Chapter XI with the claim that he has shown that
the one cause is not changed by reason of the fact that he was
previously not doing something and is now doing something.
Created causes act at his sign (nutus) and good pleasure, though his
will is unchanged. From all eternity he willed that X begin to be at
a certain time, but he did not have to add anything to secondary
agents to enable them to act. In giving them natures he gave them
the ability to act. Thus a body moves to its natural place by its
nature, and fire burns and water flows by their natures. In the
miracle of the burning bush the fire and the bush both retained the
poten-
46. Gerard Verbeke, in his introduction to Avicenna Latinus. Liber de
Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina. Edition critique de la
traduction médiévale par S. Van Riet. Introduction doctrinale par G.
Verbeke. 3 Vol. Louvain: E. Peeters; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977, 1980,
1983. Cf. II, p. 53; the translation is mine. Subsequent references to
this work will be to: Avicenna, Metaphysics.
47. Ibid.

Page 22
cies to burn and to be burned. The nature of fire remains exactly
the same whether it burns the bush or not. William argues that, if
the fire lost its power to burn the bush or if the bush lost its
combustible nature, there would have been no miracle and Moses
would have been deceived by an illusion. William's point is that a
cause that acts by its nature is not changed by reason of the fact
that it causes something. So too the first cause remains utterly
unchanged whether it creates or does not create.
William points out not only that the testimony Avicenna attributed
to the pure and true intellect is false, but also that Avicenna has
forgotten that he said -- and correctly -- that nature acts not by
choice and will, but as a servant dependent upon the sign and will
of the lord of all things. William insists that the Aristotelians have
attributed more to nature than it can do and have spoken as if God
left natures to themselves. William is fond of Augustine's image of
creatures as signs or nods by which God indicates to us his will, for
all of nature's power is subject to the divine will. If, for example,
light emitted light from itself without any lessening of itself, it
would seem to create light. As a being in need, light receives light
from another source so that its emitting light is an overflow from
its capacity. Thus "the power of natures is only the will of the
maker and . . . they are able to do nothing against his will or
beyond it or other than it" (p. 113). Though natures have certain
limited powers, "there is absolutely no necessity in a nature,
considered in itself, that it operate and pour forth something from
out of itself" (p. 114). William uses several images to illustrate the
role of created causes. We might be tempted to say that the lighting
of a house is due to a window, but it is more proper to say that it is
due to the sun. The sun's causality is comparable to that of the
First; the window's to that of created natures. "For intermediate
natures are certain paths and windows of all the outflowings
descending from the First, but not causes, unless we use the name
somewhat improperly" (p. 114-115). As a stream fills its bed and
then flows on to fill other areas, so the first principle initially fills
the essences closer to it and then fills others from the overflow of
these. Hence, created natures are not properly causes, save in
relation to our sense knowledge; considered in themselves, they
have no necessity by which they act. Their power is simply the will
of God who can without change of himself or of the created nature
pour forth his abundance through the created nature or not. Thus
the sun's ceasing to emit light at the Passion involved no change in
God or in the sun which remained full of light, but not full to the
point that it overflowed.48
48. Gilson refers to William's position as a "pulverisation of natures
and their causal efficacy" (Cf. Gilson, History, p. 255). Though
Gilson correctly sees William "as a theologian defending the liberty
of the Christian God against the necessity of the Greek nature . . ."
(ibid.), he exaggerates William's position. According to William

Page 23
Chapter XII continues the discussion of causality. The most noble
of all the philosophers, namely, Avicebron, saw that the power of
creatures has passed beyond their legitimate boundaries and limits;
that is, creatures do something that they themselves are not capable
of doing. Each nature offers itself in obedience to the will of the
First, and "proof of the generosity of the giver of goodness is the
obedience of all things to him" (p. 115). The flow of goodness is
stopped in each nature like water caught in a bucket; if the water
overflows the bucket, this overflow is due to the abundance of
water, not to the bucket's stopping the flow. So too natures receive
neither more nor less of the outpouring from the First whether or
not they pour out what they received beyond their capacity unto
other things. William points to the error of the philosophers who
have located in natures the necessity of causing other things; that
influence and causing is simply the compulsion of the first
generosity. He argues that a thing that receives being cannot give
being out of itself. If it gives being, it gives it as a channel or as a
courier that carries being in order to pass it on. Thus the creature is
like a servant bearing the gift of another. Hence, William concludes
that there is no cause of being but the First who gives being out of
himself and out of what is his own. Though the First and he alone
is a cause in the strict meaning, other things seem to operate and to
be causes in relation to sense knowledge. But the creator "alone is a
cause worthy of the name" (p. 117).
In Chapter XIII William summarizes what he has established thus
far. Since every creature is subject to the will of the First, "the
universe is like his word and sign by which he speaks his power
and wisdom and goodness to rational beings, and the whole
universe is like a book or tablet written by the marvelousness and
beauty of the creator for those who correctly philosophize to read .
. ." (p. 117). However, it is the divine essence which is the
summation ( summa) of that book, and the whole aim of the book
of the universe is to disclose the divine essence. The truth of the
book of philosophy does not lie, as some have mistakenly thought,
in words of the book of the universe, but in the divine essence.
Though a beginner with an untrained intellect needs the book of the
universe, while he philosophizes in the body, one with a perfect
and free intellect reads the book in its creator and does so with
greater clarity, since he knows the truth more perfectly in itself than
in its sign or expression.49
´secondary causes have the power to act; what they do not have is
an intrinsic necessity that would withdraw them from God's control.
49. William says in De anima 7, 6, Opera Omnia II, Supplementum, p.
211: "The creator himself is the natural and proper book of the human
intellect. He produces the impressions with which we are concerned and
the inscriptions of the aforementioned in our intellective power." These
impressions and inscriptions, however, are limited to "all rules of truth, I
mean, first and self-evident rules, and likewise the rules of moral

Page 24
That is indeed an amazing claim, for William seems to say that the
man with a trained intellect can, even while philosophizing in the
body, have such a free and perfect intellect that he reads the truth in
the divine essence rather than in its expression in the universe. It is
also a puzzling claim, since William later is quite emphatic in
rejecting the Platonic doctrine that the true man and the true tree
lies in the archetypal world, while the man and the tree of this
world are shadows or copies of the truth. Marrone's study of truth
in William has correctly pointed out that in the De universo
William no sooner introduces the idea of God as the truth of the
universe than he begins to qualify it.50 Unlike most words we use,
there are some words we use to speak of things in this world which
"more properly signif[y] qualities belonging to the Creator
Himself, and they are found in their fullest meaning only when
applied to Him."51 Examples of such terms are: powerful, being,
true, good, beautiful, wise, high and noble, along with their
respective abstract nouns.52 Thus William limits Platonic
exemplarism, according to Marrone, to those terms which properly
name God who is their truth, even though these terms are used far
more often to denominate creatures. William does not in De
trinitate qualify his statement as he does in the later De universo,
though what he says seems compatible with it, for one who reads
the book in its truth finds there God's power, wisdom and
goodness, not the ideal forms of trees and horses. William says in
De universo,
You should constantly bear in mind that the human soul is at the
boundary line of two worlds and at the limit of two regions and that it
is naturally free to incline toward the lower and to rise or lift itself to
the higher unless the corruption from the side of the body should
interfere.53
He goes on to mention his youthful presumption that he could

easily attain by his own efforts the illumination of a prophet
"because our souls are so to speak touching each of these worlds or
each of these regions,"54 though he has now learned that this can
only be done by divine grace and power.
goodness" (ibid.) as well as all that is only knowable by grace and
revelation. Gilson interprets this text to mean that William makes God
to play the role of illuminator in his theory of knowledge, a role that
Avicenna assigned to the agent intellect. Cf. "Pourquoi saint Thomas
a critiqué saint Augustin," AHDLMA 7 (1926), pp. 71-72.
50. Marrone, p. 47.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 49.
53.De universo II, 3, 7, Opera Omnia I, p. 1056.
54. Ibid. Note, however, that in his maturity William still believes that it
can be done, though not by one's own effort.

Page 25
The obedience of the universe bears witness to God's power; its
beauty and order bears witness to his wisdom. His goodness is
manifested not merely by the delights it offers us, but by the love
of the universe for the divine essence. Each thing strives to
preserve and defend its being, and each creature's being is its
clinging to the Creator. The parallel with William's earlier
discussion of the love each thing has for its being is striking, and
there is every reason to read William as saying that the being of
each thing is not a created act of being, but the very essence or
being of God, by which each thing is. If one may sum up his view
in a Berkeleian sort of tag, Creaturis esse est adhaerere Deo: For
creatures to be is to adhere to God.
3. The Teaching on the Three Persons
Chapter XIV begins the second and Trinitarian part of the work.
William sets out to convince his readers that three persons
somehow share the same divine essence. One has the essence
primordially and as source; the second has it by generation; the
third has it by procession. William argues that the first source
emanates according to its abundance without need of anything else
and that what emanates from the first source has the same being as
the first source, namely, being necessary through itself. What first
proceeds from the first source is not something other than what the
first source is; there is not an essential plurality so that there are
three different essences. The first emanation is one in essence with
the first source and has in itself necessary being; though the first
offspring and the first gift are caused, they are caused by "perfect
causality" and thus are not possible in themselves, but share with
the first source the first and highest essence.
Two Emanations in the One Essence
The reasons William offers seem far from demonstrative. Though
at times it sounds as though he was trying to prove two
consubstantial emanations within the Godhead, at other times it
seems as though he is merely trying to render plausible what his
readers already hold as a matter of faith. He uses the image of
source or spring and emanation or stream from Ws 7:25 as a
helpful aid to "the weak intellect" (p. 123). For there is one and the
same water in the spring and the stream, and the stream proceeds
from the spring. Though there is the same water in both the spring
and the stream, the water itself does not emanate. William's
concern is not merely with the numerical oneness of

Page 26
the essence which the three share, but with an explanation of
Lateran IV's doctrine that the essence does not generate and is not
generated.55
The essence emanates nothing at all out of (de) itself. If the essence
emanated something out of itself, what it emanated could only be
that very same essence. What was emanated out of it could only be
being itself. Thus one and the same thing would generate itself and
be generated by itself. Though the first essence sheds the light of
being over the universe, it does not emanate out of itself the
essences of creatures. Yet by or from (ab) it the essences of
creatures receive being. There could not be a multitude of things, if
they came out of the first essence and were, therefore, being.
Hence, William maintains that in itself the essence is utterly quiet
and at peace, though it casts the light of being upon all else. Being
just as being has power only over non-beings; it is in itself sterile
and infecund with respect to generation. On the other hand, the first
potency is full and abundant and cannot be sterile and without
fecundity. As the generative potency is greatest, so generation is
the greatest and most perfect of causations and what is generated is
most perfectly assimilated to its cause. Hence, the first offspring is
above all creatures and of one essence with the first generator.
William then identifies the first potency with the Father and the
first offspring with the only-begotten Son, using a duster of
Scripture texts to show that this heady argumentation in highly
philosophical language is the doctrine with which his readers are
already familar. He is here at the very core of the Trinitarian
mystery. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are this one
essence; each has it wholly, yet the Father is not the Son and not
the Spirit. The Father is the first source fertile, fecund and
generative, though the essence which the Father is is not source,
not fertile, fecund or generative. The essence is quiet and at rest;
the Father is active and generative, and yet the Father is the
essence.56
William continues to link power or potency with the Father,
wisdom with the Son and love or will with the Spirit. Yet power,
wisdom and love or will are common to each of the three, not
proper to a particular person. To insist upon the identification of
power with the Father, wisdom with the Son and will with the Holy
Spirit leads either to a modalism in accord with which Father, Son
and Holy Spirit are merely different ways of referring to the one
essence or to a tritheism in accord with which the three differ in
essential attributes. Abelard had been censured for his
identification of power, wisdom and will with the three persons; yet
later
55. William has in mind throughout this section the teaching of the
Fourth Lateran Council; cf. DS 804.
56. Cf. A. P. Martinich, "Identity and Trinity," The Journal of Religion
58 (1978) 169-181, for a modern attempt to deal with the Trinitarian
mystery.

Page 27
theology will continue to use the common attributes as
"appropriated" to the persons.57 While William does not have a
clearly articulated doctrine of the appropriation of common
attributes to particular persons, he is well aware that he needs a
different sense of power for its common and its proper
application.58
Since the Father is "the mouth of the most high" (Si 24:5), his
offspring is wisdom, not merely because the offspring is the
essence, but because the Father is pure intellect who acts by
wisdom in a spiritual action that needs nothing but the agent, just
as the human intellect needs nothing in order to act but one who
illumines it. Our intellect needs such illumination only because it is
not light for itself. The Father then is a spiritual power pregnant
with wisdom, like a human intellect that has the habit of an art with
which it is pregnant. The first agent is intellect pregnant with
wisdom which it brings forth. William points out that intellect
cannot be pregnant with or generate love, since what is generated is
always of the same species with the generator, while apprehension
and affection are specifically diverse. Love is rather a gift. To be
generated is to be caused for oneself; to be given as a gift is to be
caused for another. Generation terminates in being; giving
terminates in having something. A generator aims at the offspring;
a giver intends the recipient of the gift. William thus attempts to
show that the generation of the first offspring, the Son, is different
from the procession of the first gift, the Holy Spirit.
Our intellects are in a sense fecundated by the forms they receive
from outside; once they are so impregnated, they naturally bring
forth knowledge. So too the first intellect, that is most fecund in
itseft, brings forth out of itself intellectual knowledge equal to
itself. William uses the image of an intellect with a habit of
scientific knowledge. When our intellect has acquired such a habit
of knowledge, having -- in a biologically puzzling mixed metaphor
-- "filled itself by eating the bread of truth and tearing and grinding
it with the teeth of investigations and definitions" (p. 129), it
generates knowledge in act. William points out that even in us the
habitual knowledge and the knowledge in act do not differ
essentially.
Our intellect needs to be made fertile by sense experience so that
afterward it can bring forth wisdom. Since in our intellect the seeds
are sown only one by one, our intellect does not bring forth the
whole of wisdom, but bits and pieces like so many miscarriages.
But an intellect that has no need of any external help or of any
seeding through experience will bring forth out of itself the whole
of wisdom all at once, a wisdom of the
57. For a brief and clear discussion of the problem of essential
attributes and their appropriation to individual Persons, cf. Bertrand
de Margerie, The Christian Trinity in History (Still River, MA: St.
Bede's Publications, 1982), pp. 193-196. Thomas Aquinas speaks of
"appropriation" as "a manifestation of the Persons by means of
essential properties" (Summa Theologiae I, qu. 39, a. 7).
58. Cf. below, ch. 25, p. 160.

Page 28
same essence as its parent. The generated wisdom is one word
which speaks the whole of what is naturally knowable, one thought
or vision by which it sees or thinks all things the intelligible world
containing all knowable things. Unlike our intellect which is in
potency and attains gradually only partial knowledge, the first
intellect is always in complete act, and its generation is eternal so
that the generated wisdom is coeternal with the first generator.
Again William points to Scripture texts to show that all this
doctrine is found there. Then he doses Chapter XV with the
statement that even the philosophers call his individuality pure
goodness -- a clear reference to the Liber de causis (The Book of
Causes) and perhaps to Avicenna as well.59 Then, using the
Platonic argument that the good is not envious, William shows that
the goodness and power of the Father entailed that he generated
one of equal goodness and did so without any loss to himseft.60
In Chapter XVI William continues to develop the analogy between
intellectual knowing and generating. Intellectual knowledge is the
most perfect of operations, since it needs nothing else. Our intellect
needs to be illumined only because it is not itself light. William
maintains that intellectual knowing is merely the generation of
intellectual knowledge; yet he has to avoid saying that the
intellectual knowing that is generative is the intellectual knowing
of the essence. He is clear that we have to take the intellectual
knowing that is generative of the first interior word as other than
the knowing that is essential, but he is not at all clear about how we
are to think about the relation between the essential knowing
common to all three and the personal knowing of the Father that
generates the first word. He holds, nonetheless, that the generated
intellectual knowledge is the intellect's interior word; it is the
perfect image of the generating intellect and the form in the divine
artist in accord with which he imposes forms upon the things he
creates.
William continues the psychological analogy in Chapter XVII. The
first-born intellectual knowledge is the perfect image of and
consubstantial with the Father -- equally powerful and equally
good and, hence, deserving equal honor and glory. William argues
that every maker
59. Cf. below, ch. 15, n. 5
60. While William applies this argument from Augustine to the
generation of the Son, he is adamant that it does not apply to the creation
of the world, as Augustine seems to have been willing to do. Augustine
several times places the generation of the Son and the creation of the
world on the same basis in terms of God's freedom; cf. Olivier du Roy,
"Bonus nulli bono invidet," in his L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité
selon saint Augustin: Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1966), pp. 474-475, for the texts. The
doctrine of divine freedom, as well as that of human freedom, was
gradually being articulated in the twelfth and thirteenth century. Cf. O.
Lottin, La psychologie et morale aux xiie et xiiie siècles. I. 2nd ed.
(Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1957), pp. 74-75, n. 3, for Lottin's brief mention
of William's role in this development.

Page 29
first produces something interiorly before he produces something
exteriorly for without an exemplar he would be acting merely by
chance. He returns again to the image of an intellectual habit. A
habit loses nothing when it brings forth knowledge in act. He asks
that we imagine a habit that is perfect and always in act; then the
habit and the knowledge flowing from it will be of the same
essence. Thus the Father has the essence as habit and source, while
the Son has it as wisdom and knowledge.
Chapter XVIII turns the analogy to the Father as speaker of the first
word. If it was possible, William argues, for the first intellect to
speak itself, it would speak itself with the spiritual speech that is
the perfect word. And since the first intellect is abundant fecundity
and necessary, it necessarily generates from all eternity an interior
word. If the first intellect could not speak itself in an interior word,
there would be the external word, namely, the universe, with no
interior word behind it -- like a sound signifying nothing. Yet an
external word is a word only because of the interior word. If the
first intellect could not speak himself in his first interior word, he
would lack what he has given to other things, for everything else
speaks itself by its image to our senses and to our intellect. William
pleads in a series of rhetorical questions, "Since all things speak,
will the author of all speech be mute? . . . While the universe cries
out, will he alone not be heard and be silent?" (p. 137). William
continues to argue, at best suasively, that speech is natural to the
intellect and that speaking is the generation of the interior word;
hence, the first and greatest intellect cannot but generate the first
and greatest word, a perfect image of its generator and the
exemplar of all else the first maker produces.
In Chapter XIX William argues that there can be but one word.
Another word exactly like the first would be the same in essence
and signification; it would be the same word. Moreover, the Father
would have acted foolishly, saying the same word twice, even
though he has forbidden us to speak an idle word. If there were two
words, they would be merely diverse. A plurality of words,
however, is not intelligible when the speaker speaks "neither many
times nor many ways and where the essence of the words is one in
every way" (p. 141). Since the first word is sufficient as the
exemplar of the universe and as the art by which the first artist
works, the first maker has no need or use for more words. William
offers a series of arguments to show that the first word cannot
generate another word either out of itself or out of the Father.

Page 30
The Procession of the Holy Spirit
William turns in Chapter XX to the Holy Spirit. The Father and
Son share the one highest essence, but they have another sharing or
communion. The first duality is not alone, but requires a third
unity, namely, their communion. William identifies this third unity
by the many, mainly scriptural, names believers have used for it,
but focuses upon love -- the mutual love of the best Father and the
best Son. "[W]hen there really are two, each of which is best, there
necessarily [is] the highest unity of will, the highest peace, the
highest harmony, the mutual embrace of the highest goodness" (p.
144). Just as by appropriation the Father is the source of all
generation and the Son is the principle of all knowledge and light,
so the Holy Spirit is the principle of all love.
Chapter XXI examines the sort of love that exists between the
Father and the Son. Love, William tells us, is always directed
toward what is or appears to be good. However, love that is for sale
or has its price is not true love; true love is gratuitous and proceeds
from good will or benignity. Such utterly gratuitous love is the first
gift through which external gifts proceed. Even in our ordinary
language we say, William reminds us, that love is a gift, even "the
most welcome and most rare of all gifts" (p. 145), and we say that
true lovers give themselves to each other. Since the Father's
benignity is no less than his fecundity, the love that proceeds from
him is not inferior to the Son. William proceeds to develop the
analogy between human love and the mutual love of the Father and
the Son, always carefully removing from the divine persons any
passivity or imperfection, while pointing out as well that we do not
speak of love as the son of goodness, but as its gift.
William goes on in Chapter XXII to argue that it is necessary that
there be two emanations from the first source, for its abundance is
either fecundity or benignity; hence, the first source both generates
the first offspring and gives the first gift. As the only-begotten Son
is of the same essence as the Father, so too the first gift is of the
same essence as the other two. Then William argues in the
following chapter that there is only one love between the first
lovers. The series of arguments he presents are reasonably clear
attempts to render it plausible that the mutual love of the Father
and the Son is a single love that binds the two together and that is
of the same essence as the Father and the Son.
The Son, then, is lord of all in three ways. First, he is lord of all
things because he is along with the Father and the Holy Spirit the
one creator. Second, he is lord of all by right of inheritance as the
first-born Son. Third, he is lord of all by the gift of love, for even if
he were not lord by right of creation and sonship, he would have
universal lordship in virtue of the Father's love. For love wants to
share everything with the beloved. William sums up the doctrine of
the two processions that he has

Page 31
so far developed and then gives a Trinitarian view of creation from
the Father, through the Son and in the Holy Spirit. The Trinity is
life, light and joy in the ultimate degree. The Father is intellectual
life that shines forth with a light coeternal to him that is the full
utterance and interpretation of his life. From the union of these two
there pours forth the highest joy. But William then goes on to show
that each of the persons is life, light and joy. That is, the one divine
essence is life, light and joy, even if we can somehow also speak of
the Father as life, of the Son as light and of their Spirit as joy.
Vestiges of the Trinity in Creation
Hence, William begins Chapter XXV by distinguishing two
intentions. In one intention life, light and joy are appropriated to
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit respectively;, in another sense they
are common to all three. William sets out ''to clarify these
intentions . . . lest we seem to confound the Trinity" (p. 160). He
beans to search out reflections, shadows and vestiges of the Trinity
in creatures, which are "the back" of the God whose face we cannot
see (Ex 3:20, 23). First, William shows how each sensible thing
speaks itself to the senses by its various accidents as if by an
external word and how things love and try to preserve their
external beauty. Thus in each sensible thing William finds a vestige
of the three persons. He then turns to matter and form and the
natural love between them. In both of these images, of course, there
is lacking the unity found in the Trinity, but no creature can
perfectly mirror the Trinity. Furthermore, sensible creatures are
most remote and, hence, least like their Creator. William uses a
third example: a piece of brass and the statue formed out of it are
one in essence, and the brass brings forth, with the help of the
artist, from out of itself the figure of the statue so that the matter or
brass and the figure or shape are related as parent and offspring.
And in their union William finds a vestige of the third person. Next
William turns to universal first matter and first form, a doctrine that
he derives from Avicebron whom he regarded as a Christian and
ranked "among the most noble philosophers" (p. 165). Here the
crux of the image lies in the fact that the actualization of matter and
of form are one and the same; thus "matter and form have one
being in act" (p. 164). If matter did not need another's help, but
could bring forth the form from out of itself, the generation of the
first form would be a real speaking or giving birth. William appeals
to instances of second matter to show that matter is not merely
passive, but generative. So too the inseparability of matter and
form is a mark of their great natural love for each other. Finally,
William uses the equilateral triangle to illustrate that, as each of the
angles has the same area, so each of the persons has the same
divine

Page 32
essence. The vestiges of the Trinity to which William points
presuppose the rudiments of first philosophy: a familiarity with
substance and accidents and with first and second matter and form
and their union, as well as some geometry. But in comparison with
the images of the Trinity found in the human soul, he tells us, these
images are quite remote.
Images of the Trinity in the Human Soul
In Chapter XXVI William turns to the images of the Trinity in the
rational human soul. First, there is an image of the Trinity found in
the soul's activity with regard to the body: its giving the body life
reflects the Father; its governing it with wisdom reflects the Son;
its love for the body reflects the Spirit. Thus the body bears a
vestige of the trinity found in the soul, namely, life, apprehension
and affection, and these latter provide an image of the divine
Trinity. For life is like the parent of apprehension and the giver of
affection. In language and thought William's debt to Avicenna
becomes clear. William holds "with highest certainty that in
everyone who understands, understanding oneself is first and that
the power of understanding and the presence of its truth comes to it
before the things that are outside can possibly reach it through their
likenesses" (p. 168-169). That is, intellectual self-knowledge is
both prior to knowledge of external sensible things and
independent of such knowledge. Like the Avicennian "floating
man," the intellect of William's knower can know itself and its truth
independently of the body and the senses.61 William concedes a
temporal priority to the sensitive power which in some way assists
the apprehensive, but insists "the intellective power apprehends
that it is and lives and apprehends its essence or life before it
apprehends any other likeness it has" (p. 169).
William argues that life, intellect and affection in the human soul
are each the whole rational soul; they are not in the soul as parts or
as accidents. Hence, the three provide an image of the persons,
each of whom is the whole essence. Despite what he has said about
the priority of the intellect's self-knowledge, William is quite clear
that for other knowledge sensible forms "act upon the soul through
the organs of the senses so that intellectual knowledge might be
formed in it" (p. 170). Through many such actions upon the soul,
intellectual understanding is educed from the material intellect as
its word or formal intellect. William reminds us that he is speaking
of intellectual life, not bodily or sensitive
61. Cf. Avicenna Latinus. Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus.
Edition critique de la traduction latine médiévale par S. wan Riet.
Introduction sur la doctrine psychologique d'Avicenne par G. Verbeke
(Louvain: E. Peeters; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952) I, 1, vol. 1, pp. 36-37.

Page 33
life. This intellectual life is the material intellect, and its word is the
formal intellect or the intellectual knowledge it brings forth. The
love between intellectual life and its word can be seen from the
love we have for the senses which are only helps toward
intellectual knowledge. Thus in intellectual life, its word and their
mutual love we have an image of the Trinity.
But in its state of glory, when it has attained its perfection, the
human soul will be like a most pure mirror of its Creator. The
human possible intellect is naturally able to understand all things,
and in its full perfection it will be the actual knowledge of all
things so that, like the first-born Word, it will be an intelligible
world. Thus "our intellect in its ultimate perfection is a perfect
image or perfect exemplification of the first-born Word" (p. 173).
The potency which brings forth this intellectual knowledge is the
perfect image of the Father, and the intellect's love for this perfect
knowledge is the perfect image of the Spirit. William then sees the
human intellect as attaining the state in which it perfectly images
the triune God "when he shall appear" (1 Jn 3:2), for man was
created in God's image and likeness precisely to attain this
perfection. The image and likeness is potentially in the soul as it is
created, but "is brought to its ultimate act by philosophizing" (p.
173), which William understands, as we saw above, in a very wide
sense that includes opposition to error and wickedness and the
pursuit of truth and goodness in faith, hope and charity.
Next William uses one of his favorite strategems, namely a
counterfactual supposition. He supposes that the intellect is
separate from the body; as such it would understand itself without
the disturbance of phantasms and would speak itself in perfect
spiritual speech. Thus it would generate a word which would be the
perfect image of itself and of the same essence as its generator. The
intellect would love its own word and its beauty with a love that is
also of the same essence. This imaging of the Trinity will be
realized in the glorified intellect. The knower will "see his own
word as an exemplification in act of the first-born Word and as the
intelligible world in act . . ." (p. 175). By this word he will speak
himself wholly, and he will be bound in love to this same word.
Hence, the glorified intellect will be the full actualization of the
image of the Trinity, but that image is present in the potentiality
and darkness of the soul in this life. William interprets Gn 1:26-27
so that "image" refers to the potency in which God created man and
"likeness" refers to the ultimate actuality of the glorified intellect.
William stresses that the human mind is both one and a trinity; the
soul is not an aggregate of accidental powers, a doctrine which he
sees as leading to the assertion of three souls in man. He mentions
in passing that Augustine had called the intellect memory (p. 176),
thus claiming for his highly Avicennian account of the soul an
Augustinian ancestry, and

Page 34
then goes on to argue in good Augustinian fashion that it is the
same one who has the potency to know, who knows in act and who
loves.62 Similarly, there is one essence of the Father, Son and Holy
Spirit, though William has above referred to them by the
appropriated terms: life, light and joy.
In Chapter XXVII William promises to show us how the generator,
first-born and gift are one "this something" -- a single reality,
though none of the three is either of the other two. William warns
that "an intellect still blinded and wrapped in darkness" will be
amazed at how the one essence "is said of all of them and of each
individually, though they are not said of one another" (p. 177). He
promises to inform us of "the number and character of their
differences" and of whether these differences are something real or
merely our manner of apprehension. That is, having shown that
there are three in the one highest essence, William turns to the
explanation of how they differ one from the other. These personal
differences are referred to as the notions because they make the
persons known in their distinctness one from the others.63
4. The Teaching on the Differences of the Persons

Having shown that there are three persons in the one essence and
that there are two processions, William asks how the three persons
differ. He argues that they cannot differ accidentally, since there are
no accidents in God. However, he also maintains that they do not
differ by relation, since "a difference of relation admits mutual
predication of one another at least according to accident" (p. 180).
That is, a man can be both father and son, though, of course, not of
the same person. William did not adopt the Anselmian formula,
already implicit in Augustine, that the Council of Florence would
raise to official status, namely that the persons differ only by
relations of opposition.64
William argues that, since a cause does not depend upon its effect
except insofar as the cause is said to be related to its effect, we can
suppose that the Father never generated a Son and that the Son was
never generated by the Father and that each of them still exists,
though they would, of course, not be generator and generated. In
that case the
62. Cf. Augustine, De trin. 11, 3, 6 (CCL 50, 340). The identity of the
powers with the soul remained a characteristic of the Franciscan
school into the 14th century. Cf. Gilson, History, p. 2.56.
63. For the patristic sources of the doctrine of the notions, cf. G. L.
Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: S.P.C.K., 1959), pp. 243-
245.
64. Cf. DS 1330 as well as Saint Anselm's De processione Spiritus
Sancti c. 1, in Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera
Omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946),
2, pp. 180-181 and Saint Augustine, De trin. 9, 1, 1 (CCL 50, 293) and
De civ. dei 11, 10, 1 (CCL 48, 330).

Page 35
relations of paternity and sonship would come to the persons as
already distinct, for relations are the most extrinsic of the
accidents.65
A relation requires as its subject a substance or quantity or quality,
as Avicenna had taught. Hence, as relations, paternity and sonship
are accidental to the first principle in the sense that they are not
essential to him, but are separable at least in thought. William
qualifies all this with "insofar as it is permissible to say this in the
case of the blessed Trinity" (p. 182). On the other hand, they are
not accidental to the divine essence; otherwise the one essence
would be both father and son of itself! In any case we need a
subject of the relations of paternity and sonship, and if we remove
in thought these relations, their subjects must differ by another
difference. William's argument that there must be another
difference between the persons besides the difference of relation is
one of the most difficult and problematic sections of the work. His
conclusion, however, is clear, namely, that each person must be
something absolutely before it can be relatively (p. 184). Hence,
William distinguishes three sorts of being: "apart from being (esse)
the Father and being (esse) the highest essence we must assign to
him another being (esse), in virtue of which and according to which
he is generative" (p. 185).
William turns to a consideration of personal being (esse). The
Boethian definition of person as an individual substance of a
rational nature raises obvious problems in the discussion of the
Trinity. For it seems to fit the divine essence better than the
persons.66 William interprets "individual substance" as implying
incommunicability, thus incorporating the qualification that
Richard of Saint Victor added to the Boethian definition precisely
in order to make the definition applicable to the divine persons. Yet
William also allows that the divine essence is a person and that
Boethius' definition applies to it as well, though it is not, he says, a
definition of the essence.
65. St. Thomas Aquinas speaks of the being of a relation as "the
weakest being" (esse debilissimum); cf. De potentia q. 8, a. 1 ad 4um.
William, on the other hand, sees relation as the most extrinsic.
66. Häiring says, "For many centuries, the theologians hesitated to apply
the Boethian definition to the trinitarian persons. How ambiguous such
an application could be may be gathered from Gerhoh of Reichersberg,
Lib. de novitatibus hujus temporis, c. 12; ed. O. J. Thatcher (Chicago,
1903), p. 204: 'There are three divine persons, each of which is a rational
substance"' (my translation); cf. "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée
Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154)" MS 13 (1951), p. 19, n. 12.

Page 36
Four Modes of Being
Chapter XXIX begins with a distinction of three kinds of being
found in the Trinity: essential being, personal being, and relative
being. The being of the essence is referred to by neuter pronouns;
the being of the persons is referred to by masculine pronouns.
Relative being is spoken of concretely with terms like "father,"
"image," and "word." Terms like "paternity" and ''sonship" require
a fourth mode of being. Hence, there was need for four kinds of
terms: terms for the essence, terms for the persons absolutely,
concrete terms for comparison or relation, and abstract terms for
the relations. These latter are called notional terms, because the
comparisons and differences of the persons are called notions.
William sets out to determine whether the differences or notions
are something more than the persons, that is, whether paternity or
sonship adds something to the persons. Gilbert of Poitiers and his
followers were at least understood to have held such a doctrine.67
William first argues against an analogous, but much more serious
error. Some masters apparently held that properties, such as
paternity, were realities distinct from God. William argues that
paternity cannot be something other than God.68
In the following chapter he sets forth the three opinions on the
notions. Some, like Praepositinus of Cremona, held that the notions
were merely metaphors for the concrete terms; thus "paternity"
should be understood as "father," as when someone uses as a form
of address, "your paternity" -- or we might add, "your holiness" or
"your majesty." A second group, apparently Gilbert of Poitiers and
his followers, spoke of the notions not as "being," but as "being
present to" the persons. A third group said the notions were real,
but not truly accidental to the persons.69
William sets outs first to explain the truth of the matter, and then he
will argue that all these groups really agree in this truth despite
their apparent opposition. He argues that the Father's being "this
one" is not his being "the Father," for an absolute intention and a
relative intention cannot be the same. Hence, there is a difference
in thought, though not in the subject. William uses the
grammarians' distinction between the
67. Cf. below, ch. 29, n. 4.
68. Perhaps William is referring to the position mentioned by Abelard in
Theologia christiana 3, 167 (CCLCM 12, 257) of a contemporary
master who held that "the properties of the persons were things other
than God and the person. . ." That is, he held that "these properties by
which the persons differ are things diverse from the divine substance"
(ibid. 168). Cf. also Theologia Christiana 4, 77 (CCLCM 12, 301). This
master is probably Ulgerius of Angers, bishop of Angers from 1126-
1148, according to the critical edition of the Abelard text.
69. For more on these three positions cf. the notes to ch. 30.

Page 37
substance and the quality of a noun to maintain that "the substance
is that on which the name is imposed and the quality is the
comparative intention by reason of which the name is imposed (p.
192).70 "Father" can be resolved into two intentions: "this one," an
absolute intention signifying the substance of the noun, and
"paternity," the comparative intention signifying the quality of the
noun. Thus paternity seems to be something beyond the intention
by which he is this one.
Though "grammarian" asserts something in its subject, "father"
does not assert something in him who is said to be a father; rather it
asserts an offspring extrinsic to the one who is said to be a father.
William follows the Augustinian and Boethian doctrine that
relations neither add anything to nor detract anything from the
subjects of which they are predicated. He argues that in the case of
predication about God the category of relation, unlike those of
quantity and quality, preserves its proper meaning; it could not do
so if relation asserted something in God. Hence, when the first
person is said to be the Father, nothing is said to be in him; rather
he is said to have the Son who is for him.
In Chapter XXXI William argues that a relation, such as likeness,
is not something that is caused by the whitenesses in two white
things. Nothing comes to be in the first white thing when another
one is produced, though the first white thing is now like the second,
that is, has a likeness to the second. William points out the oddities
of supposing the contrary. For example, objects at great distances
from one another would act upon each other, and the producer of
the second white thing would make two things, namely, the white
thing and its likeness, though the maker of the first white thing
made only one thing. William maintains that we can mentally
abstract or separate things whose essences are diverse; we cannot,
however, abstract a relation, such as likeness, from its causes.
Hence, the likeness is not something other than the two qualities of
one kind.71
Chapter XXXII begins with a summary view of the categories.
Unlike predication according to quantity and quality, relative terms
do not assert a change in their subjects. The destruction of one term
of a
70. For this distinction between the substance and quality of a noun,
cf. N.M. Häring, "The Case of Gilbert," pp. 5-11.
71. Joseph Owens says, "Many writers in the Scholastic tradition,
ancient and modern, deny any distinction in reality between a relation
and its ground;" cf. An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1963), p. 183, n. 16. Owens continues, "The real identity of
relation and ground is implied in any explanation that denies that they
are two really distinct entities, one relative and the other absolute. . ."
(ibid.). Owens has no fear of the ontological "population explosion" that
his position seems to entail, for these real relations add "no absolutely
inherent being whatsoever'' and "[t]he ordered universe requires and is
fully capable of sustaining its myriad relations" (ibid., p. 187, n. 28). It
seems that William is quite willing to shave these myriad relations from
the face of the universe.

Page 38
relation does not destroy anything in the other term. So too, insofar
as a cause or a principle acts, the cause does not acquire anything
in itself. The causality of a cause, that is, that by which a cause
causes something, is not something that a cause must first acquire
in order for it to cause. Were that the case, we would be launched
upon an infinite regress. William relies upon the Aristotelian
doctrine that action is nothing in the agent, but is rather a change in
the thing acted upon. Thus there is no change in the sun because I
open my eyes to its light, and there is no change in the fire when it
begins to warm my hands.72
William distinguishes between things that are sources of change in
other things without any change in themselves and things that are
sources of change in other things only if they themselves are first
moved. The former are things which act by their essence; the latter
do not. Examples of the former are fire and God; examples of the
latter are water which does not turn a mill unless it is first moved or
an ax which has to be moved before it cuts the tree. Hence, not
every relation asserts something in its subject, and not every cause
has first to receive the causality by which it is a cause. Similarly,
William argues that the prepositions "from" and "out of" need not
indicate anything in that which is a principle or source for
something else. Hence, William concludes that by having the Son
the Father does not acquire something new in himself, though he
acquires a Son. So too, in having a Son equal to himself, he does
not acquire something in himself, namely the relation of equality to
the Son.
A Counter-Factual Supposition
In order to make clear that in accord with the faith that the Father
generates the Son without any change and that he gains only the
Son by generating, William explicitly takes up in Chapter XXXIII
a counterfactual supposition, namely that the Father gave birth to
the Son in time. He explains that this sort of move is both
intellectually possible and also permitted by the faith for the sake
of inquiry. Indeed, such a supposition seems to have been implicit
in the preceding chapter. In accord with it, William removes from
the generation of the Son only its eternity. Thus previous to the
generation of the Son the Father was not the Father, and in the
generation of the Son only the Son comes to be. William argues
that paternity, or that by which the Father is father, is not
72. That is, William comes down on the right side of a controversy
that continues to the present day. Cf. Peter T. Geach, Logic Matters
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp.
321ff. Geach contrasts "Cambridge change" with "real change." Thus
Socrates becomes shorter than Theatetus (by "Cambridge change"),
when Theatetus grows taller (by "real change").

Page 39
something that comes to be in the Father when he generates the
Son. Thus "the Father is father, not by having anything in himself,
except perhaps by having the Son, whom he, of course, has
eternally in himself" (p. 204).73
Though paternity may seem to be something in a human father
because of the various motions and passions he experiences, we
may not think that anything of this sort is present in the first
generator. Rather active generation and passive generation, or
sonship, are related as action and being acted upon. Like a cause
operating through its essence, the Father does not receive
something in himself, namely paternity, by which he generates the
Son.
Thus causality, William continues in Chapter XXXIV, is nothing in
the cause, but is rather the effect that comes to be for the cause.
The effectiveness of the cause is merely the cause in relation to
which there is the subsequent effect. Though one might claim that
paternity was something in a human father since such a father is
changed by generating an offspring, the first Father is in no way
changed by generating the Son. For the Father retains his whole
substance, while he pours forth his whole substance into the first-
born Son. The Father generates the Son without any change in
himself and without any intervening means that would be like a
bond or link between them. William is adamant that paternity
should not be thought of as a relation linking the Father and the
Son, as one might think of paternity in human generation.
William says that we may think of the essence as the subject of
both paternity and sonship. The essence is paternity insofar as it is
in the Son from the Father; the essence is sonship insofar as it is in
the Son. Where there is no change, we can only understand
generation as the essence being from one person. For the Father to
generate is merely to give the essence to the Son, and for the Son to
be generated is merely to receive the essence from the Father. But
we must correctly understand this; for to have the essence from
another must be understood here as to be from another.
Chapter XXXV once again returns to the topic of prepositions to
show that nothing need be in the Father because the Son is said to
be from the Father. So too, there is nothing in the object of my
thought by reason of the fact that I am thinking of it or by reason of
the fact that my thought begins from it. Similarly, our speaking of
the Father as first, the
73. This is one of the very few allusions to the doctrine of the
circuminsession of the three persons. Cf. DS 1331 for the
authoritative formulation of this doctrine by Council of Florence
which, however, cites St. Fulgentius' De fide, ad Petram, c. 1, n. 4
(PL 65, 673). The Latin "circuminsession" is a translation of the
Greek "perichoresis." While St. Bonaventure uses the Latin
"circumincessio" which emphasizes active compenetration, St.
Thomas uses "circuminsessio" which places the emphasis on mutual
"in-existence.'' Cf. de Margerie, pp. 182-183.

Page 40
Son as second and the Holy Spirit as third does not imply that there
is something in them or that they are temporally ordered. Finally,
William discusses modes of signifying and of operation. Thus
when we refer to the Father by a pronoun and name him as Father,
the modes of signfying are different. But when someone acts
wisely, the same wisdom is the principle of the operation and its
mode.
Agreement in the Truth
In Chapter XXXVI William begins to explain that the three
positions that he gave regarding the notions all speak the truth,
though in different terms. First, he argues that Gilbert of Poitiers
and his disciples who said the notions are present to (adesse) the
persons are correct, since relatives are not in each other. When
asked whether the being of paternity is God or not, they reject the
question and insist that the being of paternity is being for (adesse)
someone, not being or having something in oneself.74
All agree, William maintains, that paternity as such is not
something and is not, therefore, something about which we can ask
whether or not it is God. To ask such a question is analogous to
asking whether this white thing is a substance or an accident. On
the counterfactual supposition that the Son was born in time, there
would have been no paternity before the Son was born, though
everything that can be said to be paternity would have been, since
the divine essence would have been. To illustrate this, William uses
the example of white things and their likeness. When there is only
one white thing, there is whiteness, but no likeness. When the
second white thing comes to be, the relation of likeness is not
something the first white thing receives in itself. So too, on the
supposition that the Father generated the Son in time, when the Son
came to be, the relation of paternity is not something that the
Father acquires in himself. Just as to speak of whiteness is not to
speak of likeness, so to speak of the Father is not to speak of
paternity, even though the paternity is the same thing as the Father,
just as the likeness is the same thing as the whiteness.
William holds that paternity and sonship are two notions, that they
are two relations, and that they are not predicated of each other.
Nonetheless, they are one insofar as they are the one divine
essence. Thus
74. This is not the interpretation of adesse that was taken by the
Council of Rheims; despite William's irenicism it does seem that
some of the followers of Gilbert, and perhaps even Gilbert himself,
held that the notions were realities added to the persons. Cf. DB 391
and also Aquinas who speaks of these men as holding that the
relations were "assistent" in Summa Theologiae I, q. 28, a. 2 and q.
40, a. 1

Page 41
the likeness of A to B can be said to be the whiteness of A, but not
the whiteness of B. And the likeness of B to A can be said to be the
whiteness of B, but not the whiteness of A. William speaks of
paternity and sonship as the giving and the receiving of the divine
essence; they are related as Aristotelian action and passion.75 To
the question why paternity should be the Father rather than the Son,
when Father and Son are identical in essence, William answers that
it is because the Father "has it from himself that he is Father" (p.
214).
Being a notion is not being something. Hence, we should not say of
a notion any of the things that belong to "true and determinate
being" (p. 214), and thus we do not say that paternity causes,
generates, or redeems or that sonship became incarnate and was
crucified. Though paternity and sonship have true being, such
intentions do not express the truth of being, just as the intention
"likeness" does not express the truth of an essence.
In Chapter XXXVII William argues that those like Praepositinus of
Cremona who hold that the use of the abstract term "paternity"
should be taken merely as a figure of speech for "father," are
correct, though not very profound. These men emphasize the
identity between paternity and the Father. Indeed, William claims
that "no one ever said that his paternity is really something other
than the Father" (p. 215). Men like Praepositinus intended, William
argues, to deny that the notions were something added to the
persons as a bond or a difference between them. Paternity is no
more something added to the Father than is likeness something
added to one white thing when another white thing comes to be.
Though these men can without any problem deny that paternity is
anything at all save the Father, they run into problems with
generation. For they can hardly deny generation, and yet William
argues that, if they identify the being of generation with the Father,
they confuse the persons of the Father and the Son. For the being of
generation is that by which the Father is the Father and that by
which the Son is the Son. Hence, they must distinguish active and
passive generation or paternity and sonship as well as common
spiration and procession. To illustrate how such notions add no
new reality to the persons, William again appeals to concrete
examples. As a ring's being the sign of authority adds nothing to
the shape of the gold, so paternity adds nothing to the Trinity. Yet
the moral form of the ring as a sign is something quite real and not
just the gold in a certain shape.
75. For someone approaching this doctrine from the viewpoint of St.
Thomas, it would seem that William is saying that paternity and
sonship differ by a distinction of reason, though they are one in
reality. William, however, is thinking in terms of another sort of
distinction that he does not -- unfortunately -- spell out.

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In Chapter XXXVIII William reminds us that in this whole
discussion only the name "father" has been imposed.76 Some call
what it signifies as a quality a notion; others refuse to do so. The
crux of the dispute lies in the fact that one group claims that, since
in God there is only the essence and the persons, there is nothing in
God for a notion to name other than the essence or the persons.
William argues, however, that there is not a single intention for the
person and for the difference of the person. If there were, all the
groups would agree. Furthermore, a person exists because of its
difference. Indeed, William maintains that "the persons and their
differences necessarily differ both in meaning and in reality,
although they are one in subject and essence" (pp. 218-219). Just
how they can differ in reality (re) when they are one reality (una
res) is difficult to grasp.77 "Father" names a person, and ''paternity"
names the difference of the person. William uses the example of a
ring made of gold and the gold made into a ring. One can truly say
many things of the ring that one cannot say of the gold, and vice
versa, even though the ring is the gold thing. So too one can truly
say many things of paternity that one cannot say of the Father, and
vice versa. For example, we can say that the Father gave birth to
the Son, but we cannot say that paternity did so.
William claims that we can resolve or analyze the intention of
"father" into the intention of the absolute being of the person as
"this one" and the intention of generation which is not that of
personal being, even though the Father and generation are one
reality. One can abstract one intention from the other, and such
abstraction of the one leaves the other whole and entire. William
again appeals to his example of the cloth which becomes a different
garment by a mere change in its folds; nothing is added to or taken
from the cloth when the cloak becomes an overcoat. In the same
way one adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the Trinity
in asserting paternity or denying it.
Why then, one might ask, assert paternity? It would seem to be a
vacuous assertion. William points out that things are in God just
the opposite of the way they are among us. For example, we think
of generation as a way or path by which something comes to be.
Yet in God there is nothing between the Father and the Son by
which the Son comes to be. In other words, generation in God has
to be identified with the Father.
76. In this whole matter St. Thomas, along with William of Auxerre,
maintains that one cannot be heretical, since the faith has not as yet
been definitively determined with regard to the notions. Cf. Summa
Aurea. Edited by Jean Ribaillier (Paris: Editions du Centre National
de la Recherche Scientifique; Rome: Editiones Collegii S.
Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1980), I, 7, 3, p. 119-121, and Summa
Theologiae I, q. 33, a. 4.
77. What William needs is an explanation of what counts as a basis for a
real distinction. Here he says that "Father" and "paternity" are one in
subject and essence, but differ in meaning and reality. Apparently for the
latter it suffices that one can say things of the one that one cannot say of
the other.

Page 43
Yet we continue to speak of the Father generating the Son. So too,
we speak of the paternity of the Father even though his paternity is
not something in him. Once again William appeals to the example
of the angle of a triangle and its area.
Chapter XXXIX begins with words of encouragement to those who
are intellectually overwhelmed by these matters. William admits
that they "surpass all understanding" and yet maintains that "the
reality itself has been well investigated" (p. 223). The assertion or
the denial of paternity adds nothing and takes away nothing in the
Trinity. So too the divine essence receives nothing from the
generation of the Son, and the divine essence as such would not
lose anything if the Son were not generated, though the Son would,
of course, not be. Rather by being born, the Son receives the
essence; he receives essential being in his personal being, which is
most bare.
William warns, however, that we must not understand the persons
of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as composed from the divine
essence and the relations of paternity, sonship and spiration
respectively. Not only would the essence not be one or simple, but
the essence would be the substance of the name "Father" so that the
relation "paternity" would be the quality of the name.78 But since
every name names its substance from its quality, paternity would
name the essence. Thus the essence would be paternal and filial.
Moreover, there is no order of priority or posteriority between the
persons and the essence or among the persons themselves.
William argues that we can abstract the intention by which the
Father is the Father, or the Son the Son, or the Holy Spirit the Holy
Spirit and we can name them respectively paternity, sonship, and
spiration or procession. Furthermore, the intention of paternity is
not the intention of father, although the Father and paternity are
one reality. William uses the examples of the angle and area of the
triangle, the garment and the cloth, the ring and the gold. Though
the angle of a triangle, for example, is the same reality as the area,
the intention of the one is not the intention of the other. So too, we
need not say that the intention of paternity is the intention of the
Father.
Chapter XL continues the discussion of the notion of paternity.
Those who say that paternity has no being (esse) are correct, for
paternity is a relation. Just as nothing is lost in one white thing
when it loses its likeness to another thing that ceases to be white, so
nothing substantial or accidental would be lost to the divine
essence or the persons, William claims, if we suppose that none of
the divine persons proceeded from
78. For the distinction between the substance and the quality of a
noun or name, cf. above, n. 70. One should not confuse the categories
of substance and quality with this distinction derived from the
grammarians.

Page 44
another or others. While William may be correct that "nothing at all
is thereby lost in God" (p. 226), it would seem that we would be
faced with three unrelated and utterly indistinguishable divine
beings in the one divine essence. Hence, we would, it seems, be
faced with a contradiction rather than with a mystery in the
Trinity.79
William asks whether the being of paternity is said of the Father
essentially or not. If it were, we could not abstract paternity from
the Father, but we can do so. Hence, if paternity is not said of the
Father according to the category of essence or substance, it must be
said of him according to one of the other categories. William
regards relation as the most likely category, though paternity seems
to belong to a father rather than be relation to something else.
Some, therefore, regard all talk about paternity as incorrect since
paternity seems not to fall within the ten categories. William,
however, points to his examples of the ring and the garment which
do not fit any of the categories either.
William then investigates the supposition that the being of a
relation is caused, but shows that we cannot assign any mode of
causation to paternity or sonship. For example, paternity cannot
proceed from the Father, or from the Son, or from the essence; it is
not caused, made, generated or spirated. So too sonship is not
caused, made, generated or spirated; rather the Son is generated
and as a consequence of this generation there is the sonship of the
Son. To illustrate this point William uses an analogy. When a vase
becomes the possession of someone, nothing new comes to be in
the vase; the vase's being owned is a consequence of its having
been sold, but it is nothing new in the vase itself.
The Number of the Notions
In Chapter XLI William points out that the sacred doctors disagree
about the number of notions in the Trinity. Some hold that there are
only three: paternity, sonship and spiration; others add innascibility
and the common spiration by which the Father and the Son breathe
forth the Spirit. William of Auxerre called the first three the
personal notions and the last two notions of the persons.80 William
first focuses his attention on the arguments of those who deny to
innascibility the status of a notion. Innascibility, they argue, either
denies that the Father is from another or denies that the Father is
born. But in the first sense
79. Later Catholic theology will advocate an understanding of the
faith which, in the case of strict mysteries, such as the Trinity, does
not attain a positive understanding, but simply that minimal negative
understanding that consists in showing that three persons in the one
divine essence are not impossible, that is, are not contradictory. Cf.
DS 3016.
80. Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea I, 7, 2, p. 117.

Page 45
innascibility is merely a negation, that is, nothing, and in the
second sense it is applicable to the Holy Spirit as well and, hence,
is not a property of the Father. If one adds to the negation of the
Father's being from another that he is also the principle of
everything else, William asks whether "everything else" is limited
to creatures or to the Son and Holy Spirit or includes all of these. If
it is limited to creatures, then innascibility applies to the divine
essence as well. If it is limited to the Son and Holy Spirit, it is not a
new notion besides generation and spiration. If, however, it
includes creatures as well as the Son and Holy Spirit, then by
innascibility the Father is the universal principle of all things.
William says that "[t]his view begins to turn away from error, but
only in appearance, not in truth" (p. 231). For by such a universal
being a principle he is the Father of the Son, and thus innascibility
is paternity.
Thus these men conclude that "innascibility is not a new notion
other than paternity" (p. 231). If the Father were principle of being
for the Son by innascibility as well as by paternity, many problems
would arise. The number of notions would grow to seven, since the
same argument would apply to the Holy Spirit. The Son would be
from the Father in another way than by generation. There would be
in all things a relation correlative to innascibility. Yet creatures are
from him only by creation, and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not
from him by creation.
To the objection that innascibility might refer to the Father's being
a principle of all things in general, but not in particular, William
points out that God is the principle and cause of individual things,
not merely of things in general. Moreover, God the Father began to
be the principle of all things in time, but he began to be nothing in
time save in relation to creatures. He was the principle of the Son
and of the Holy Spirit from eternity and, hence, is innascible from
all eternity.
Others claim that the Father's innascibility is his fontal plenitude in
virtue of which he is self-sufficient and sufficient to give to others.
William argues that the Father either gives being to the Son and
Holy Spirit in the same sense as he does to creatures, or he does
not. If he does, the previous problem recurs. If his fontal plenitude
is taken in the sense that the Father is a giver of being in general
besides being father and spirator and creator, one has simply added
a universal to the particular instances of being a principle.
However, a particular and its universal do not necessarily make
numerically two things.
William's position is that, though innascibility designates the Father
alone, it is not a notion if one understands by a notion "a certain
and individuated property, by which one person is distinguished
from another" (p. 233). Innascibility is simply absolute fontal
plenitude: in relation to the Son it is fecundity; in relation to the
Holy Spirit it is benignity; in relation to creatures it is creation.
Negatively innascibility is not being

Page 46
from another; positively it is the plenitude from which everything
else arises.
Innascibility, William claims in Chapter XLII, is not relative,
though the consequences of it are relative. That is, innascibility is
itself simply fontal plenitude; its consequences are the generation
of the Son, the procession of the Spirit, and the creation of
creatures. Many make the mistake of explaining innascibility in
relative terms. Though the Father is innascibility, just as he is
paternity and spiration, innascibility should not be called paternity,
since the latter is relative and an individuated property, while the
former is not. On the other hand, William allows that one might
claim that innascibility is fecundity with respect to the Son,
benignity with respect to the Spirit, and creation with respect to
creatures. Finally, William notes that there is no reason why a
privation cannot be a notion. Just as an unmarked sheep can be
distinguished by its being unmarked, the Father's not being from
another can distinguish him from the other persons. Indeed, he
concludes that there can be more than five notions, since the
notions add nothing to the Trinity.
In Chapter XLIII William argues that, though there are two
spirators, the spiration is one. The reason is that the Holy Spirit is
one and is breathed forth by the Father and the Son in one way.
Even a human father naturally wants the whole of his goodness and
generosity to be from his son no less than from himself. As
creatures proceed from both the Father and the Son by one
creation, so the Holy Spirit proceeds from them by one spiration.
As all the gifts given to creatures proceed from all three in common
by one procession, so the gift internal to the Trinity proceeds by
one procession, for proximity to the principle involves greater
unity. Yet the fact that the spiration is one does not entail that the
spirator is one person. In a figure of speech, however, Father and
the Son can be said to be one spirator, as they are said to be one
principle of the Holy Spirit. Again using the distinction between
the substance and quality of a term, William says that the substance
of "principle" is twofold, namely, the Father and Son, but the
quality of the term is singular, that is, the one principiation or
spiration. The situation is analogous to two persons who are the
one lord of a servant.
William admits that this position raises a problem for those who
claim that the persons are distinguished only by their notions. If the
Father and the Son are two persons only by the notions of paternity
and sonship, they should be one person by reason of the one
spiration. William has, however, already argued against the claim
that the persons are distract only by their notions.81
81. Cf. below, ch. 28, p. 180.

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The Father and the Son are said to love each other by the Holy
Spirit. Some interpret this to mean that the Spirit is the cause of the
love between them; others interpret this to mean that the Spirit is a
proof of the love between them. Following "all the sacred doctors
and expositors," William holds that the Spirit is the love of the
Father and the Son. However, there is a twofold communion
between the Father and the Son, a communion or sharing in the one
essence and a communion of love. In dealing with Jn 17:21-23
William asks who would be wild enough to claim that Christ
prayed that his followers have the unity of essence by which he and
the Father are one. Christ could not have prayed for such unity
which he would have known to be impossible; furthermore, he
prayed that his followers be many. Thus, he prayed that they have
the communion of love that the Father and the Son share.82 Hence,
William holds that the Father loves the Son by the love which is
their common essence and by the love which is the Holy Spirit who
is neither of them.
5. The Teaching on Language about God

William begins the long discussion in Chapter XLIV of the
categories and expressions we use in speaking about God by noting
that we transfer them to God from our ordinary usage. He aims at
being able "to guard and defend the rule of faith in discourses and
not only in realities" (p. 240). That is, he is no longer concerned
with the ontological constitution of the Triune God, but only with
the language requisite for speaking about God in accord with the
rule of faith.83
William takes up the categories and modes of expression we use in
speaking about God. If we speak of God apart from any relation to
creatures, we must speak of the divine essence, the three persons or
the notions. Thus there are essential, personal, and comparative or
notional expressions. Essential predicates state what God is; they
are said in the singular of the three persons taken together.
Accordingly, the three are one God and one Lord. William goes so
far as to say that "three Gods or three Lords" is "an empty and
vacuous intention" (p. 242), unless ''Gods" and "Lords" is taken
equivocally. When the Creed "Quicumque" (DS 75) says, "there are
not three gods . . . and . . . not three lords," the expressions "three
gods" and "three lords" signify nothing true, though they may seem
to signify something to a blind intellect that clings to external
82. William is alluding to Lateran IV's condemnation of Abbot
Joachim who appealed to this text to bolster his opinion that the
divine persons have only a unity of charity; cf. DS 803.
83. The distinction that William supposes is not entirely clear. Perhaps
he means that he has hitherto spoken about God and now he will speak
about the language used to speak about God.

Page 48
things. William sums up: every essential name is proper to the
essence, but said of the persons in common. As a name of the
essence, it cannot have a plural; conversely, whatever has a plural
is not an essential expression.
In accord with this position, William has to maintain that the
Manichees of old and the Cathars of his own time merely pretend
exteriorly that there are two gods or principles "though it is
impossible to do so interiorly" (p. 244). If there were two
principles, they would either share in being itself or not. If they do
not, they simply are not. If they do, their goodness and evil is either
essential or accidental to them. If their goodness or evil is essential
to them, each of them is composed of its being and of either
goodness or evil. In such a case, they cannot be true principles. But
if the goodness and evil are present accidentally, the evil one
cannot be essentially evil; yet the whole point of their asserting two
principles is that the one is essentially evil.
Substantive nouns or names, then, signify the highest essence and
name it properly and in the singular. But we can use the plural of
adjectives that signify the divine essence, provided the adjective is
not used substantivally, as it is in the Quicumque: "And yet the
persons are not three omnipotents" (omnipotentes: the Latin plural).
Thus we can speak of the omnipotent three or the omnipotent
persons, where the Latin is forced to use the plural form of the
adjective. In that case William claims that "omnipotent" is not a
name, but merely denominates.
Personal terms are plural and said of God in the plural. All plurality
predicated of divine essence is personal, as all singularity
predicated of the three persons is essential. Masculine pronouns are
used for the persons in the plural, while neuter pronouns are used
for the essence in the singular. So too we may use demonstrative
pronouns in the plural as well as ordinal numerals for the persons.
The names of the persons are personal terms, and "Trinity" is the
name of the three persons taken together. Once again William
applies the distinction between the substance and quality of a
name; the persons are the substance of this term, while its quality is
threeness.
William asks about the categories to which the personal names
pertain. Some of them add to the intention of a person the intention
of a relation; others signify just the person. Among the latter are
"person" and the personal pronouns; these are reduced to the
category of substance, along with "this one" and "that one." This
reduction, however, is problematic, since "this one" and ''that one"
are used to signify the persons. William resolves the problem by
saying that the abstract personal terms, such as "this one," signify
the logical essence of the persons, not the divine essence of which
the theologians speak. That is, he distinquishes the intention of
essence among logicians and philosophers from the intention of
essence among theologians. By "essence" the

Page 49
former mean the bare reality without any comparison. This
intention does not distinguish a person from the essence, but fits
both. For the theologians the intention of person includes
individuality and incommunicability; whereas, the intention of
essence includes individuality and communicability. For the
theologians, then, the essence is individual, that is, one in itself, but
can be shared by many. There cannot be another essence of the
same kind or of the same duration, but there can be many persons
of the same essence. Hence, the essence in God is that which the
three persons share perfectly and that which cannot have an equal
or a cause. The intention of person, however, includes
incommunicability and admits equality and causality in the sense
that one person can originate from another. Hence, though in God
both person and essence are equally bare and simple, we can say, in
accord with our manner of understanding, that essential being is
more bare and solitary than personal being.
In any case William insists that a person in the Trinity "does not
have personal being and essential being in the same way and that
there is not an identity in every way between the essence and the
person" (p. 251). The ground for this non-identity is that "not
everything said of anyone of the persons is said of the essence" (p.
251), and the converse. Yet each of the persons is the essence. Here
William once again sends his readers back to his favorite examples
of the ring and the gold, the angle and the surface of a triangle, the
garment and the cloth.
This discussion forces William toward a greater precision in
explaining what the essence in God is. The essence is that "which
is not out of another, out of which there is nothing else, and to
which just in itself non-being is opposed" (p. 252). It is what the
persons share perfectly and that to which every possible looks for
being. While the essence is utterly one and simple, personal being
admits a multiplicity. Personal being cannot be alone. William has
argued at length that the first Father cannot fail to generate a Son
and that the first duality cannot fail to love each other with the first
gift. The divine essence is one and indivisible and without another
like itself, but wholly shared by many; the persons in God are
many, not merely individual, but incommunicable in their being.
William explains that he has stated this position "on account of
those who make a strong demand for a certain differentiation and
distinction between essence and person" (p. 254).
William speaks of the personal being common to the three persons;
he means "being this one" or "being a person." Such common
being cannot be accidental; rather it must be essential, where
"essential" is taken in the logical sense. Such personal being is
essential insofar as it cannot be separated from any of the persons
in thought or actuality. "Someone,'' William explains, is like a
transcendental and does not determine in any way that of which it
is said. By reason of their bare simplicity

Page 50
the persons are not in a species or genus; we "necessarily
distinguish them by their mutual relations, until we see them face
to face" (p. 255). William calls these relations the external
properties that the persons have "as if from the outside and as
something following upon their personal being" (p. 255). This
common personal being is neither a genus nor a species. William
holds that "person'' is superior to "Father" only insofar as the latter
is an accident, that is, is relative to someone else. We should not
thing that a person is individuated by something added to this
common personal being; for that would destroy its simplicity.
Rather we know the individuation of the persons "only from the
relations which they have as if from the outside" (p. 256). Personal
being is not common and essential as a species or genus; for the
persons do not share a common genus or species and they are not,
consequently, true particulars or true individuals.
William takes up an objection based on Augustine's statement that
the Father generated the Son out of his essence -- an objection that
would seem to bring the Bishop of Hippo under the condemnation
of Lateran IV along with the Abbot Joachim. William allows that
one might say that the Son was generated out of the logical essence
of the Father, that is, out of Father bare and simple, understanding
"essence" in the intention of logicians and philosophers. But in
commenting on the Creed's expression, "God from God, Light from
Light, true God from true God," Augustine had given a rule that in
the formula, "X from X," we are forbidden to substitute for X only
what both persons are not. Since both Father and Son are the
essence, it would seem that Augustine would say that the Son is
essence from the essence. William claims that Augustine simply
meant the Father by the essence of the Father.
Another objection is that "person" fits the "X from X" formula,
though it is not an essential term. William responds that at the time
of Augustine "person" had been recently invented to provide an
answer to the question as to what the three are. When Augustine
says that "person" signifies the substance, William understands him
to mean the logical substance or essence or something non-relative.
The name "God" in its proper intention is essential and only names
the essence. Yet because of the identity of the essence and the
persons, we use it to signify the persons and call anyone of the
persons by the name "God." Thus God is triune, and the divine
essence is triune. William follows Isadore's etymologies for
"triune" and for "trinity" and concludes that in both cases there is
indicated oneness of essence and threeness of persons.
Of the names said of God apart from relation to creatures
everything relative is personal. William gives a list of twelve
names that belong to the Son apart from relation to creatures and
then another list of those that pertain to him in relation to creatures.
He provides similar lists for the Holy Spirit. William mentions that
some essential terms are

Page 51
appropriated to the persons, for example, power to the Father and
wisdom to the Son; others pertain to the divine essence, for
example, judge of all the living.
William follows Augustine in saying that, when we say that God is
angry or compassionate, we do not mean that there are such
emotional states in God; rather we are naming him from his effects.
He briefly deals with the verbs "predestines" and "reprobates,"
claiming that they signify God as the principal cause, but refer to
the merits of the creature by way of consequence.84 "God loves us"
signifies his effects, not some affection in God. So too the verb
"sent," whether referring to the mission of the Son or of the Spirit,
signifies only what is caused, not in, but by God. The verbs ''to
generate" and "to spirate" -- what Aquinas will call notional acts --
refer, according to William, to the notions, and we join to them
essential terms when we say that God generated or is generated.85
Finally, he notes that Augustine used "thing" (res) for both the
essence and the persons.
William turns to the other categories. Quantity and quality do not
preserve their intention when transferred to God; God is great or
good not by having something, but by being his greatness or
goodness. Predications according to place or time suggest God's
presence, but do not limit or measure him. William asks whether
paternity reduces to substance or to quality. He says that it is
neither an essential intention nor a personal one. He says that being
paternity is not being this one and that paternity does not seem to
be a genus, species or difference. He concludes that being paternity
is being a "this something," just as being the essence is "this
something" in the logical sense. Here I take him to mean that both
paternity and the essence are neither abstract nor universal, but
concrete and individual. On the other hand "notion" is a universal
with respect to paternity, sonship and spiration; it is said univocally
of each and is in some respects like their genus or species. William
brings this long chapter to a close with a discussion of the meaning
of one and the various ways in which things can be one and many;
he notes that the philosophers have sufficiently determined what
needs to be said about numbers and applies what they have
determined to the divine persons and the divine essence.
84. That is, the creature's merits are not the cause of God's act of
predestining him, but rather the consequence of the divine causality.
85. Cf. Summa Theologiae I, q. 40, a. 4 and q. 41.

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IV.
William's Style
Gilson says of William's writings that they "follow the patristic
style of continuous exposition."86 It is true that William work is
one of continuous exposition and argumentation. It is not a
commentary on another philosophical or theological text, and it is
not in the question-and-answer format of the Summa Aurea of
William of Auxerre. The Magisterium Divinale, however, does not
follow a patristic style so much as the style of the Latin translation
of Avicenna's Metaphysics. Even the phraseology of William's
Latin reproduces that of Avicenna's translator.87
Unlike the De trinitate of Richard of St. Victor, William's work is
heavily influenced by Aristotelian philosophy and is genuinely
philosophical in its concern with rational proof.88 This fact alone --
even apart from the many borrowings of content from Avicenna --
would seem to be a sure indication that William's attitude toward
Avicenna was highly favorable and not mainly hostile and
defensive. When Avicenna is opposed to the truth of the faith,
William certainly rejects the Avicennian position, but William's
whole metaphysics is a blend of Avicenna and Boethius, with the
great Arab philosopher as the dominant influence. William
explicitly mentions Aristotle and does not mention Avicenna in the
De trinitate; yet it would seem that he means Avicenna rather than
Aristotle or any of the other Aristotelians when he speaks of
Aristotle and his followers. It is Avicenna, above all others, who
has formed his philosophical thought, and it is the style of
Avicenna in Latin translation that has most influenced William's
writing.
Kramp has stressed the systematic sweep of William's plan for the
Magisterium divinale. "What distinguishes and marks William's
work as different from all the writings mentioned up to now is its
comprehensive systematic structure."89 Kramp ranks William with
such earlier systematic thinkers as Origen, Scotus Eriugena, and
Peter Lombard as well as with Alexander of Hales, Albert the
Great and
86. Gilson, History, p. 251.
87. Gilson noted that William referred to him whose being is his essence
as the First (primus); cf. "La notion," p. 75. He also said, "That Avicenna
exercised an influence on William is undeniable; one might even say
that it was decisive" (Ibid. p. 61). But one needs only compare the Latin
expressions of Avicenna's translator and of William to realize the
influence of the former upon William.
88. Richard of Saint Victor wrote his work on the Trinity probably late
in the third quarter of the 12th century; his thought is influenced by the
Augustinian tradition and by Neoplatonism, but is untouched by the
influence of Aristotle. Cf. Jean Ribaillier's introduction to the De
trinitate, pp. 11-13 for the date and pp. 20-33 for the influences upon
Richard's thought.
89. Kramp, II, p. 45.

Page 53
Thomas Aquinas who came after him.90
Certainly the plan of the seven volumes with the movement from
the triune God to creation and to man, and then to the Incarnation,
both the center of history and of the Magisterium, followed by the
return to God through faith and laws, sacraments and virtues,
indicates an awesome breadth of vision and anticipates the
movement of the great Summae that would follow.
Despite such a systematic vision William writes with great
informality. Often, in conscious imitation of Avicenna, he takes his
reader aside and speaking to him in the singular, "You should know
. . . "or "as you will learn in what follows."91 Gilson remarks that
William acted as a pioneer, using concepts that previous Latin
authors had not tried. "Furthermore," he adds, "one need not deal
with his works long to convince oneself that he thinks as he writes
and, so to speak, with the flow of his pen."92 Such spontaneity and
candor make his writings pleasing and fresh, but one also has to
expect to encounter ''impulsive statements born of the pressure of
the moment and made once and for all with no further explanation
ever to clarify them."93 Furthermore, the twofold aim of
philosophizing as William sees it explains both his hard-headed,
tightly rational arguments against error as well as his almost poetic
pleas that are meant to turn the reader's heart to praise and
worship.94 Yet even here William's spiritual piety is stamped with
an intellectual sobriety absent from many other thirteenth-century
masters. In his spiritual restraint he is far more like Thomas and
Albert than Bonaventure.
V.
The Significance of William's The Trinity
To appreciate the significance of William's The Trinity one needs to
know not merely its content, but also something of what had gone
before and of what was to come afterwards. Furthermore, The
Trinity is not all of one piece. It begins with a lengthy philosophical
study of being and possibility, goes on to a "proof" of the
Trinitarian dogma and an attempt to understand the mystery mainly
in the light of Avicennian metaphysics and psychology, confronts
the contemporary discussion of the differences of the persons, and
finally devotes a long summary chapter to the language used in
speaking about God. With regard to each of these areas one might
ask what William contributed and what subsequent gen-
90. Ibid.
91. Cf., below, the Prologue, p. 63 and ch. 1, p. 65.
92. Gilson, "La notion," p. 60.
93. Ibid.
94. Cf., for example, below, ch. 7, pp. 88-92, ch. 9, pp. 105-106, ch. 13,
p. 118, ch. 24, pp. 156ff., and ch. 26, pp. 172-173.

Page 54
erations found of value. Yet anything approaching definitive
answers to such questions would require book-length studies that
go beyond the limits of an introduction such as this as well as
beyond the limits of this author. Hence, this introduction will
somewhat self-consciously offer what is at most a personal
appraisal -- with the hope that it is not a wholly uneducated one.
In the area of being and possibility William is, to the best of my
knowledge, the first major thinker in the Latin West to make
extensive use of the Aristotelian metaphysics which he learned
chiefly from Avicenna. In order to appreciate William's concern for
metaphysics and for genuine philosophical argumentation, one
need but glance at the Summa Aurea of William's contemporary,
William of Auxerre, to find warnings against natural reasoning in
matters divine and to find four proofs for God's existence quickly
set forth with no concern for or awareness of the apparent
inconsistency of their metaphysical presuppositions.95 William, on
the other hand, takes his metaphysics or first philosophy seriously
and works out in the first fifteen chapters of The Trinity an
Avicennian first philosophy as a science independent from faith
that he uses to attain an understanding of the mystery that is God,
first as one and then as triune. David Knowles said of William, "He
anticipated Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas in valuing
philosophy and treating it as an autonomous science, as well as in
his insistence that philosophical argument can be met only by one
who is himself trained in philosophy."96
Yet to view William's openness to Greek and Arab philosophy and
his valuing it only as anticipating later greats fails to see the
intelligence and courage of having been the first to take steps in the
right direction. William's openness to Aristotelian thought and his
readiness to use it for the understanding of the faith (intellectus
fidei) that is theology manifests an intellectual confidence that was
far from universal among the masters at the University of Paris or
among William's successors in the see of Paris. Yet despite all his
openness to philosophy, William stood firmly by the rule of faith
(regula fidei) and rejected Avicenna's position -- with strong
philosophical argumentation -- whenever he stood in opposition to
the truth. Hence, for all his love of philosophy, he is first of all a
Christian. His Avicennian metaphysics provides him with a strong
intellectual weapon against Cathar dualism, but William has no
hesitation in turning some of his most determined and sustained
argumentation against Avicenna's doctrine of an eternal and
necessary creation.
95. Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, I, Prologue, pp. 18-19 and
tr. 1, pp. 21-24. In the latter William of Auxerre offers a proof from
causality, another from the flow (fluxum) of things from the first
source, a third from the intelligibility of the best, and finally the
argument of Anselm from the Proslogion.
96. David Knowles, "William of Auvergne," The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Vol. 8, p. 303.

Page 55
In the area of metaphysics William's emphasis upon being (esse)
has led some to claim that he anticipated the Thomistic real
distinction, though others have emphasized the difference between
William's teaching and that of the Angelic Doctor.97 In any case
William seems clearly to have been the first in the Christian West
to have developed a full-blown metaphysics with the sort of
emphasis upon being that is found in Avicenna. Others have noted
that William is the first to abandon the Augustinian doctrine that all
creatures contain matter as the principle of their mutability.98
There is, of course, a conceptual link between a doctrine of the
distinction of being and essence in creatures and the rejection of
matter as what differentiates the Creator from his creatures.99
Accordingly, William is also able to maintain that freedom from
matter is what renders a being capable of knowing and that
intellectual beings are utterly free from matter.100 Moreover,
William seems to have been one of the first to articulate and defend
a concept of divine freedom, not merely in the sense of a
spontaneity undetermined by anything external, but in the sense of
a choice free from any internal necessity from the divine
goodness.101 Linked to this view of divine freedom is a world
contingent in being and in acting so that creation is not the eternal
emanation of the pure goodness of God.
In the area of Trinitarian dogma William is thoroughly orthodox.
His main contribution to theological understanding would seem to
lie in his rethinking the Augustinian psychological analogies in
terms of Aristotelian or, better, Avicennian psychology. Marrone
has argued that William is significant for his curtailment of the role
played by divine illumination in ordinary human cognition; thus
William's account of knowing largely dispenses with the role
played by God.102 So too, the Augustinian triad of memory,
intelligence and will is replaced with the Avicennian life,
apprehension and affection, or material intellect, formal
97. Cf. Le "De ente et essentia" de s. Thomas d'Aquin. Texte établi
d'après les manuscrits parisiens. Introduction, Notes, et Etudes
historiques par. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin. Paris: Vrin, 1948, pp. 160-
166, for the claim that William taught the real distinction, and Gilson,
"La notion," pp. 81-90, for an argument that within the created being
there is not, according to William, a composition of being and
essence.
98. Cf. Roland-Gosselin, Le "De ente et. esentia," pp. xvii-xviii.
99. Augustine had made matter the principle of mutability; cf. Conf. 12,
6, 6 (CCL 27, 219). Furthermore, all creatures were mutable because
they were material. For Augustine God alone is immutable and, hence,
without matter, though human souls and angels are not corporeal, they
have matter. For William's metaphysics the distinction between God and
creatures does not lie in the former's immateriality, for angelic and
human intelligences are strictly immaterial as well. The distinction
between God and creatures for William consists in the latter having
being by participation.
100. Thus William holds that freedom from matter accounts for an
essence being intellectual; cf. below, ch. 9, p. 60 (63).
101. For the concept of divine freedom, cf. my "St. Augustine on the
Motive of Creation," TMS 65 (1988).
102. Marrone, pp. 46-49.

Page 56
intellect and will or love and with the analogy of habitual and
actual knowledge and their union. If one is going to use a
philosophical system as a means to understand the Christian faith,
he obviously should use a philosophical system that he regards as
true. Though William explicitly "corrects" Avicennian philosophy
at times, he perhaps too readily clings to what Avicenna teaches at
others. For example, he follows Avicenna's philosophy of relation
quite faithfully, and his having done so may well explain his
holding that the persons must differ by something other than the
relations as well as the complete absence of anything like the
doctrine of subsistent relations one finds in Aquinas.103 William's
orthodoxy is shown most clearly in his concern to render
intelligible the Trinitarian doctrine of Lateran IV, especially the
teaching on the oneness of the essence which neither generates nor
is generated, though that essence is the Father and the Son and the
Holy Sprat.104
The lengthy discussion of the notions, their nature and number
obviously took up the burning theological concerns of William's
day, however differently we might now view their importance.
Here William's irenic approach to one of the most warmly debated
questions of the preceding century makes William emerge as a cool
head in a dispute in which saints often remained far from cool.105
His endeavour to show that all three sides really held the same
truth, though they differed verbally, shows an amazing ability to
understand, articulate and reconcile opposing views, while
presupposing good will and good faith on all sides. Though
William could be a fierce opponent of heresy and error in non-
Christians, he was quite tolerant of diverging views within the
bounds of the regula fidei.2
The final chapter on the language used in speaking about God
seems endless, and at times one gets the impression that it may
well have seemed so to its author as well. Even here there are
moments of brilliance and insights that could well prove valuable
in dealing with the language of philosophical theology.
103. William's doctrine that the Trinitarian relations are
"supervenient," that is, that they come to the persons as already
distinct, ultimately -- though without his explicitly realizing it --
spells the failure of his theology to come to that minimal
understanding of the dogma that consists in grasping that there is no
contradiction in affirming three persons in one essence.
104. Cf. below, ch. 2, n. 2; ch. 16, p. 132-133 (99) and n. 2.
105. One need think only of Bernard's attacks on Abelard or even upon
Gilbert of Poitiers.
106. William's tolerance of different views certainly did not extend to
the Jewish Talmud; his role in the condemnation and burning of its
copies is one of the saddest aspects of his episcopal career. On this, cf.
Valois, pp. 118-137. So too, he argues fiercely against the Cathars,
though he tried unsuccessfully to dissuade Louis from a cruscade in
1247; cf. Valois, pp. 151-152.

Page 57
William died in 1249, probably on March 30th, and was buried in
the Abbey of St. Victor.107 Moody notes that "even the difficult
Roger Bacon speaks of him as 'Bishop William of Paris, of happy
memory.'"108 Jourdain explained William's not having had a
decisive influence upon subsequent philosophy and theology as due
to the lack of "the energetic support of a religious order interested
in spreading his writings and his renown."109 But even more
decisive than the lack of backing from an Order was the arrival on
the scene of the towering figures of Bonaventure and Thomas
Aquinas. By the time of William's death Bonaventure had
completed his studies in Paris under Alexander of Hales and had
begun his teaching there in 1248. By the time of William's death
Aquinas had spent three years as a student in Paris and had
followed Albert to Cologne. Within the next decade he had
completed his first period of teaching in Paris. While William does
not rank with such greats, he is a highly significant figure in the
encounter of the Christian West with Greek and Arab philosophy.
Even to come to a proper appreciation of Aquinas and Bonaventure
one has to know their predecessors, and among these William was
a giant -- "the first thinker to use with courage and insight the
rediscovered riches of Aristotle . . . ."110
Easter Sunday, 1988
107. Cf. Valois, p. 152, for the arguments in favor of March 30 over
March 28 or April 1.
108. Moody, p. 6.
109. Ch. Jourdain, Philosophie de saint Thomas. 2 vols. Paris: Hachette,
1858. I, p. 52.
110. Knowles, p. 303.

Page 59
SOME CONVENTIONS USED IN THE

TRANSLATION
We have enclosed in square brackets within the text references to
Scripture; we have used the abbreviations for the biblical books
used by the Jerusalem Bible. We have also enclosed in square
brackets the page numbers from Switalski's critical edition of the
text; these numbers are in bold type and placed as close to the page
breaks in the Latin as word order in English would allow. Words
enclosed in square brackets were inserted to remove ambiguity, for
example, the ambiguity of reference that Latin can handle by
gender. We have retained the angle brackets from Switalski's text.
The Latin expressions for being -- the infinitive esse and the
participle or noun ens -- provide a challenge for translators,
especially when the distinction in usage seems to carry
philosophical weight. In general we have translated ens as being or
as a being, and we have enclosed in parentheses the Latin ens only
when it was important to distinguish it from esse. On the other
hand, we have enclosed esse in parentheses in almost every case,
the exceptions being those in which esse was clearly used in a quite
unphilosophical sense, such as a form of the verb "to be" in indirect
discourse. When it seemed significant, we enclosed in parentheses
forms, such as the gerund essendi and the participle existens and a
few other key terms. We hope that these moves prove helpful to the
readers; to the extent that they do not prove helpful, we ask them to
follow the advice Bradley offered his readers regarding the Index
to Appearance and Reality and regard them as non-existent.
We have tried to keep capitals to a minimum. We have used them
for the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, but have not used them
for generator, only-begotten, word and gift. William's use of "the
First" as a name for God seemed to require an initial capital.
We obviously are indebted to Bruno Switalski's critical edition not
only for the text, but for the introduction and many of the notes to
the text. With regard to William's sources we have in some cases
come to conclusions different from those of Switalski; in many
cases we have expanded the annotation of the text in the hope that
it would prove more useful to the readers. In some cases we were
able to use critcal editions that appeared only after Switalski's work
was published.
On the assumption that readers who used our translation would find
it helpful, we have provided translations of various texts quoted in
the notes and introduction. Unless otherwise noted, the translations
of such material are our own.

Page 60
Finally, our translation is deliberately literal and close to the Latin
original, though it is less painfully close to the Latin than it had
been before the wise, but firm exhortations of the external
reviewers. William's prose is far from the easiest Latin we have
encountered; he challenges his reader on every page and his
translators in every paragraph. We hope that we have met his
challenge well enough that our readers may get a clear grasp of
what William wanted to say.

Page 61
THE TRINITY, OR THE FIRST PRINCIPLE

Page 63
<The First Treatise of the Master of Theology,

William of Paris Namely On the Trinity, Notions and
Categories in God Prologue>
[15] You should know beforehand that for those who are engaged
in this sacred and divine teaching there are three ways of gaining
knowledge.
First, by prophecy or revelation. Second, by virtue, for Aristotle
said that "metaphysics is more a virtue than an art."1 Through these
two modes divine knowledge is handed on, not as an art and
discipline, but as law. For the first mode of knowing by which one
believes in prophetic revelation is the more common,2 and the
second mode by which one knows through the obedience of faith
what is beyond human knowing is more salutary. For by prophetic
authority both the learned and the unlearned are helped. By the
obedience of the intellect, which is faith, the divine authority is
given its proper glory, and human knowledge is subjected to the
same [authority] by the obedience of faith. The third mode is that
of knowledge acquired by way of proof and inquiry. The divine
authority did not choose this mode, because by means of it only the
learned can be advised of their errors. The untrained cannot be
satisfied by way of proofs.
1. Switalski suggests (p. 15) that, though this is not a quotation from
Aristotle, the idea expressed "can be derived from comparing
Nichomachean Ethics 2, 6, 1106b15 with 6, 6, 1140b24f. and
Metaphysics 1, 2, 983a1-11."
2. William may mean that belief in prophetic revelation is more common
or vulgar, that is, suited to the masses. He may well be thinking of
Avicenna's discussion of the role of the prophet who communicates only
the basic truths to the masses, though he instructs others in more
intellectual matters; cf. Metaphysics 10, 2, pp. 533-534, 19-44; in
Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina.
Edition critique de la traduction latine médiévale par S. Van Reit;
introduction doctrinale par G. Verbeke (Louvain: E. Peeters; Leiden: E.
J. Brill, 1977, 1980, 1983). Though the correct title for this work is: The
Book on First Philosophy or The Divine Science, we have continued to
refer to it as Metaphysics, following the lead of Simone Van Reit, to
whose critical edition of the Latin text we refer by page and, where
possible, lines. In confirmation of this interpretation of "common," cf.
De universo I, 2, Opera Omnia I, p. 594, where William glosses "the
vulgar authors and inventors" of the Manichean heresy as "men of little
intellect and slight training."

Page 64
Thus the first mode is that of the prophets; the second is that of
sincere subjects of the divine law. By the first two modes one
knows by divine inspiration, that is, by a divine gift. But the third
mode is that of those who philosophize.3 [16] It is only with these
that we propose to deal, not because belief of this sort, that is,
belief persuaded and incited by proofs, has no merit or favor before
God. Rather in going along with their customary procedure, we
shall try to satisfy them to the extent that the gift of the divine
goodness will help us in this matter, that sins, whether ours or
theirs, do not impede us, that our daily tasks permit, and that our
small talent will be up to the magnitude and difficulty of these
matters. You should know, then, that in other doctrines and
disciplines you are exercised as on a training ground for natural
abilities and carry on, as it were, the preparatory exercises of the
beginner in philosophy. Here, you are engaged in a very dangerous
combat against the errors of impiety, and a glorious victory, in very
truth, the crown of eternal glory is hoped for, if the most salutary
truth is in some cases wrested from the hands of impious nay-
sayers and in others is dug out as a kind of iron, lead, or brass. In
this subject are found superlative riches and the most precious
treasure which by themselves are sufficient to make their owners
rich. In the hunting of other things the prey captured is ignoble and,
in comparison with such, our task should not be called hunting.
Here the kingdom of truth is gained by overcoming errors; for only
the truth of divine things makes its discoverers kings and the rulers
of others. To unearth this treasure logic prepares the instruments of
discovery, like mattocks and spades; to seize or pursue this prey
logic prepares the spears of proofs and weaves the little holding
nets; to subdue this kingdom logic makes and sharpens the arrows
of syllogisms.4
3. Switalski claims (p. 15) that William uses the expression "those
who philosophize: philosophantes" for theologians who used
philosophical speculation in theology as well as for pagan and
Moslem philosophers, whereas "philosophers: philosophi" refers only
to the latter, especially Aristotle, Alfarabi and Avicenna, though he
uses the singular for Boethius. William refers to Avicebron, a Jewish
thinker, though one William thought to be Christian, as "the most
noble of those who philosophize;" cf. below, ch. 12, p. 115 (77-78).
[In referring to the text of De trinitate we have given first the page
number of the translation, then the page number of the Switalski's
Latin edition in parentheses.] For "those who philosophize:
philosophantes," cf. Etienne Gilson, ''Les 'Philosophantes,'"
AHDLMA 19 (1952) 135-140. Gilson examines the use of this
expression in Roger Marston and Roger Bacon and finds that they use
the term to qualify certain theologians -- and generally in a pejorative
sense. William's usage of the expression is earlier than those Gilson
examines, and the expression does not have any pejorative tone. For
"philosophers," cf. M.-D. Chenu, "Les 'philosophes' dans la
philosophie chrétienne médiévale," Revue des sciences
philosophiques et théologiques 26 (1937) 27-40
4. Gilson says of this passage, "William of Auvergne warns us here that
he will approach all problems as a logician, as if there did not exist an
order of argumentation that is proper to metaphysics and that, while
supposing that of logic in the strict sense, is nonetheless distinct from it"
("La notion d'existence ehez Guillaume d'Auvergne,"

Page 65
Chapter I
Know that a being (ens) and being (esse) have many intentions and
that they do not have an account or definition, as you will learn in
what follows.1 They seem to have intentions similar to what men
assign to good. For they speak of good either by substance or by
participation. [17] In this way a color is said to be white
substantially or essentially because its essence is whiteness, but the
surface is said to be white by participation, that is, in having or
participating in whiteness, not in being whiteness itself.2 In like
manner something is said to be good essentially, because its
essence is goodness itself in virtue of which it is said to be good.
Something else is said to be good by participation insofar as it has
or participates in goodness, which is not the essence of that which
participates in it.
In this way there is also the being whose essence is for it being
(esse) and whose essence we predicate, when we say, "It is,"3 so
that it itself and its being (esse), which we assert when we say, "It
is," are one thing in every way. Something else is said [to be] by
participation, insofar as it has something which is in no way one
with the essence of the being
AHDLMA 21 [1946] 65).
1. From the first page William's debt to Avicenna, Boethius and the
Bible are apparent. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics I, 5, p. 35, 59-61 and p.
40, 46-49, as well as I, 6, pp. 43-47. For William's use of "intention," cf.
The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy from the
Discovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, ed. by
Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 479-480. The Latin "intentio"
translated two Arabic words in the writings of Al-farabi and Avicenna
"ma'qul'' and "ma'na." Avicenna used the latter "to signify the reality of
the known considered as known" (p. 479). Given William's indebtedness
to Avicenna, it would seem likely that he is using the term in much the
same way.
2. Boethius, De Hebdomadibus, or The Hebdomads, lines 60-64. This is
a common title, stemming from Boethius himself (PL 64, 1311A), for
the theological treatise, "How Substances Can Be Good in Virtue of
Their Existence Without Being Absolute Goods." References to the
Boethian theological treatises will be to the lines of the Loeb Classical
Library edition by H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand. William may also have
used the commentaries of Gilbert of Poitiers on Boethius' theological
works. Cf. N.M. Häring, The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of
Poitiers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966) in
Texts and Studies 13, Expositio in Boecii Librum de Bonorum
Hebdomade, nos. 95-119, pp. 208-213.
3. William may here be alluding to Exodus 3:14, where God tells Moses
that his name is, "He who is." Augustine used "Is" (Est) as a name for
God. Thus in Confessions 13, 31, 46 (CCL 27, 269-270), he says, "We
see that whatever is in any way is good, for it is from him who is not in
some way, but is Is." So too in commenting on Psalm 134, he says, "He
is Is, as the good of goods is good" (PL 37, 1341) and in commenting on
Psalm 101, he says, "Behold a great Is, a great Is" (PL 37, 1311). Cf.
below, ch. 4, p. 23 (32) for some more explicit biblical allusions. Cf.
also Dieu et l'être: exégèse d'Exode 3,14 et de Coran 20, 11-24 (Paris:
Etudes Augustiniennes, 1978) for a series of articles on God as being in
both the Christian and Moslem traditions.

Page 66
and does not pertain to its essence. In fact, it is utterly beyond the
account of the substance of the being.
Concerning this matter you read in the book, The Hebdomads of
Boethius4 that "every simple has its being (esse) and what it is as
one." Otherwise, the simple would itself be divisible into that
which it is and its being (esse). This being would be resolvable into
what participates and what is participated, since this being would
be other than its being (esse). Thus they would be participant and
participated as though joined together from the two, that is, the
being would not itself be simple in the ultimate degree.
You also find in the same book this division of the good.5 Now the
reason demanding that this be so is that everything that is said of a
thing is either essential to it or accidental to it. That is, either it is
its essence or part of the essence, or it is entirely beyond the
essence. This latter [18] is what we call accidental, and we say that
it is had or is said by participation. Being, then, is said of
everything either by substance or by participation. Or rather it will
be said of one thing substantially, of another accidentally.6 Since it
cannot be said of everything by participation, it is necessary that it
be said of something according to essence. For if it were said of
everything by participation, no intellect could grasp it, because
there would never be an end. For example, if good were never said
except by participation, there would be no intention for this name
"good." For on this showing something is said to be good by its
having a good which is good. If it itself is something that has good,
A will be good in having a good, which is B. But again B is good
in having a good: either the good which is A or another good which
is C. If B is good in having A, then A will be good in having a
good which has A. Thus it will be good by participating in that
which participates in A. The goodness of A will then be the cause
of its own cause, for it will be, according to this, the cause of the
goodness of B, but the goodness of B will be the cause of the
goodness of A, since A was good in having a good, namely, B.
Thus the same thing is the cause of its cause, and it will give to that
which gives to it naturally prior to its having what it gives. For it
will give it to this one before it will receive it from the same one,
because it is necessary that B receive the goodness before it gives
it. Thus it will receive it before it gives it to A. Thus A will have
the goodness before B, and the converse as well. This is manifestly
impossible and frivolous.
4. Boethius, De heb., lines 45f.
5. Ibid., lines 56-174.
6. Cf. Joseph Owens, "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being
in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," MS 20 (1958) 1-40, for an
excellent discussion of the senses in which being can be accidental and
yet essential to each created thing.

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Consequently, B is good in having the good, which is C, and this
goes on to infinity. Thus there is a complicated and involved
infinity of participateds and participants in the intention of this
word "good." For it says that "good" mean "having good." Explain
this second good, and its intention will be "having good," and this
goes on to infinity. Hence, [19] nothing is left in the intention of
the name "good'' except "having" infinitely repeated. This infinity
neither determines nor settles the intellect. If someone contends
that there is something left in the intention of the name "good,"
because it is called "having" an infinite number of times, this is
clearly false. The reason is that nothing falls within its intention
except the participating and the participated, and the latter is
"having" and "good." But it still includes in its intention the
"having," since it is said only according to participation. And so
"good" is not what is left apart from "having," but is the whole
intention of "having" and "good." Given, therefore, that every good
is good by participation, [the participation] is infinite, and there is
nothing that is called good. It is dear then that something is said to
be good according to essence. In the same way it will be shown
that being cannot be said of everything by participation. Thus, it is
necessary that it be said of something according to essence, so that
its intention and understanding have a limit.
Know that the modes of speaking which we have given, that is, the
modes of speaking according to essence and according to
participation, necessarily follow from each other. For the modes of
speaking according to essence and according to participation, as we
showed, cannot be one without the other, just as that which
participates, insofar as it is participating, cannot be without the
participated. To this mode of speaking are tied the modes of
speaking essentially (per se) and accidentally (per accidens), so
that the mode of speaking accidentally can in no way stand alone.
It is not possible that something be said of something accidentally
and said essentially of nothing; a subject that is a subject
accidentally is extraneons to everything and not a proper subject. If
it were a proper subject, a predicate would be due to it essentially
because it would be essentially and not accidentally the subject of
that predication. But if it is extraneous and not a proper and
primary subject, then something else is prior and proper. This is the
subject that is said to be the subject essentially, and of it the
predicate is said essentially. For example, [20] a white thing is not
the proper subject of healing; [healing] is said of it accidentally and
not primarily. Hence, there will necessarily be something else of
which it is said essentially and primarily, and this will be the
primary and proper subject of being healed. Therefore, the mode of
speaking that is accidental cannot stand by itself, just as an
affection cannot be without its proper and primary subject.

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In like manner, the qualified (secundum quid) mode of speaking
cannot be without the unqualified (simpliciter) mode of speaking.
If nothing is said unqualifiedly, it is impossible to speak qualifiedly
of something. For unless something were said unqualifiedly of the
First, it would be said qualifiedly of the whole. The reason is that,
if it were said qualifiedly of the First, it would not be more worthy
of such predication than the whole. Thus it should be said to have
been predicated of the whole according to it rather than according
to the whole. For it is no more said of the First than of the whole,
since it is said only qualifiedly of both. Thus it will not be true that
something is said qualifiedly of the whole unless it is said
unqualifiedly of that according to which it is said of the whole.
When you find one of the three modes of speaking, it is necessary
that you also discover the primary manner of speaking in that
mode. Otherwise the secondary manner of speaking cannot stand,
as we have shown, because the primary is like the roots and
foundations of the others, which I have already called secondary.
Chapter II
You should know that being (esse) has two intentions. One of them
is what is left from the variety of accidents that clothe it.1 This is
what is properly called the essence or substance, and in this
intention there is grasped along with this sort of determination the
intention that is all being (esse). In another determination it
signifies only that which is
1. William thinks of accidental and substantial forms as a kind of
clothing. He carries this metaphor throughout De trinitate and other
works. A passage from his De universo both provides an excellent
example of this metaphor and reveals much about how William
viewed the structure of created being and its relation to God. "The
Creator is most close and most present to, indeed he is interior to,
each created thing. This can become apparent to you by abstracting
and stripping off all conditions and accidental and substantial forms.
For when you have abstracted all these from each created thing, last
of all there will be found being (ease) or entity (entitas) and, hence,
its giver. For example, when you have stripped Socrates of his
singular form by which he is Socrates, and of his specific [form] by
which he is man, and of his generic [forms] by which he is animal,
body and substance, there will still remain being (ens). Hence, there
will remain for him his being (ease) and entity (entitas), like his inner
garment or undershirt with which the Creator first clothed him. When
you withdraw from him being itself (ipsum ease) and entity (entitas),
there will be withdrawn from him all causes of being (essendi) and
helps, except the Creator. Hence, it is clear that of all the helps and
aids toward being (essendi) the first and interior one is the Creator. I
have written you all these things in order that they might raise you up
in some way to ponder the sublimity of the Creator. Complete
knowledge of him is beatitude and the glory of our intellective
power" (De universo 1-1, 30, Opera Omnia, vol. 2, p. 625). The
imagery of forms as clothing is also found in Avicebron, Fons vitae 3,
10, p. 101, 9-10; 5, 8, p. 271, 7; 5, 26, p. 305, 15; 5, 42, p. 334, 21,
and Avicenna, Metaphysics 4, 2, p. 210, 98.

Page 69
signified by a defining expression [21] or by the name of a species.
This, then, is what is called the substance of a thing, its being (esse)
and its quiddity, and this is the being (esse) the definition signifies
and expresses. This is called the essence of a thing.
The second intention of that which is being (esse) is that which is
said of each thing by this word "is" (est), and it is beyond the
definition of each thing. Being (esse) is not included in any
definition; for whatever we imagine, whether a man or an ass or
anything else, we do not understand being (esse) in its definition.
To this there is one sole exception, where being (esse) is said
essentially, because its essence cannot be understood except
through being itself (ipsum esse) since the essence and its being
(esse) are in every way one thing.2
There is another way of showing these two modes of speaking of
being (esse) in the second of the intentions that we have just
pointed out. For everything that is either is its own being (esse) or
something else is being (esse) for it. This means that what is said of
anything by the word "is" is either the thing itself or something
else; it is, however, in each thing in one respect the thing itself, in
another respect something else. But if for each thing the being
(esse) is other than the thing itself, it is necessary that this proceed
in a circle or in a straight line, and it will go on to infinity.
If it proceeds in a circle, then A will be being (esse) for B, and B
for A. A then will be being (esse) for its own being (esse). Hence,
it will be before its own being (esse) and precede in being (in
essendo) its own being (esse), and it will have being (esse) before
its being (esse), and it will have being (esse) before it is. Also it
turns out that from the fact that it is the cause of being (essendi) to
its own being (esse), and the converse as well, being (esse) will be
prior to the cause of being (causa essendi).
2. Cf. Augustine, De doctrina christiana 1, 5, 5 (CCL 32, 9), where
he speaks of "one supreme reality: una quaedam summa res." This
phrase was used by the Fourth Lateran Council's condemnation of the
Abbot Joachim of Flora (d. 1202) who had accused Peter Lombard of
heresy for saying in his Sentences that "a supreme reality is the
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, and it is not generating, nor born,
nor proceeding." Joachim claimed that Peter Lombard had thereby
introduced a quaternity into the trinity. With the Council's approval,
Innocent Ill said, "we believe and confess, with Peter Lombard, that
there is one supreme reality . . . which truly is the Father, the Son and
the Holy Spirit, . . . "(DS 803-804). This extraordinary endorsement
of a theological doctrine seems to have -- at least in part -- been
aimed at the school of Gilbert of Poitier (d. 1154). Peter Lombard
was, after all, one of those who along with St. Bernard attacked
Gilbert at the Council of Rheims (1148), and Eugenius III had
approved only one decree of that council, thus permitting the
followers of Gilbert to continue; cf. DS 745. As we shall see in
dealing with the trinitarian notions, William is very much aware of
the Porretan doctrine and is fairly sympathetic to it in some respects,
though his insistence upon ''one reality: una res" shows his concern to
abide by Lateran IV's decree. Cf. Antoine Dondaine, Ecrits de la
petite école' porrétaine (Montreal: Institut d'études médiévales; Paris:
J. Vrin, 1962), pp. 9-11.

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Hence, it is prior to what is prior to itself. Much worse, it will be
before itself and after itself in one and the same respect, since [22]
it will be this whole [of A and B] to the extent it is. For, to the
extent it is, it is only if there is first part A, and this is only to the
extent that B is, for B is not the cause of being (essendi) for A
except to the extent B is. But B is only through A and to the extent
A is. Therefore, A will only be if it itself is and to the extent it is,
and thus the same thing will be the cause of itself, and both prior
and posterior to itself. And this is only one respect.
If this went in a straight line and to infinity, so that B is being
(esse) for A and C for B, and this has no end, the result of this is
that every being (esse) is both infinite and never closed off or
terminated by any thought or expression. For the being (esse) of A
is B, but not B absolutely and precisely, nor in just any respect and
intention, but to the extent it is a being (ens), for A cannot be by it
except to the extent it is already a being (ens). B is, therefore, being
(esse) for A, insofar as B already has being (esse), which is to say,
already having C. Thus in order to explain its being (esse), we
would say that it, as already having C and insofar as it has C, is
being (esse) for A. Then C will be being (esse) for B in the same
manner, namely, insofar as it already has the being (esse) which is
D. Thus the being of A is having B, which has C, C, I mean, having
D, and of D the same explanation will hold. Hence, the whole
being (esse) of A is not explained and explicated. An explanation
of this sort has no end, and on this account neither does the very
being (esse) of A. And so the being (esse) of A is infinite. Hence,
no thought or expression can attain it. But this is a whole, because
in the being (ens) A there is understood the being (ens) B, and in
the being (ens) B there is understood the being (ens) C, and this has
no end. Nor is the being (ens) of B understood unless this infinite
complication and convolution is understood.
Either infinity, then, will be grasped and encompassed in our
intellect -- a thing every intellect knows is impossible -- or it will
be impossible that anything be understood to be (esse), since every
being (esse) on this showing is infinite.3 But in no sense will we
enter into argument with those who destroy the intellect and the
limitation or determination of the intellect.4 [23] For in this way
they block the path to philosophizing and destroy the principle and
root of knowledge, which the
3. The language reflects that of Liber de causis 5 (6), pp. 59-61, but
William's point is quite different. References to this work are to Le
Liber de causis. Edition établie à l'aide de 90 manuscrits avec
introduction et notes par Adriaan Pattin (Leuven: Tijdschrift voor
Filosofie, n.d).
4. Switalski (p. 22) suggests that William is referring to Aristotle and the
Moslem philosophers who accepted matter as eternal and independent of
the first being. However, William is rather arguing that the intellect
cannot accept an infinite regress in causal dependence -- a point on
which he is in agreement with Avicenna.

Page 71
intellect truly is, while they posit infinities and unintelligibilities
and ineffabilities. Rather we will dismiss them to follow their own
devices, that is, the huge expanse of error and the darkness of
infinity and incertitude, and we will hold what the necessity of
knowing requires us to affirm, namely, that "is" (est) is said of
something according to essence and of something not according to
essence. The same holds for being (ens). We will bring you to see
that everything of which it is said according to essence is not
caused.5 (This is taken in the sense of external causation, which is
the only one philosophers consider. For they do not consider the
internal effective causation of which we shall say something later
and which we shall describe later.)6 On the other hand, it is
necessary that it be said of every created thing not according to
essence.
First, one should recall that those names which are said according
to essence are properly names, since they alone name. Accidental
predicates do not name, but are properly said to denominate. For
example, the name "man" is proper to the species and is common
to all men; consequently, it ought not to be said to belong to one
and it does not properly name one of them. "White" is the name of
nothing and does not name a white thing; rather it denominates a
white thing. For this reason, then, it should be said that the name
"man" names and is properly a name, but "white" cannot rightly be
a name, but rather a denomination.
Then let us go back and say that, when being (ens) is said of
something essentially, it is the proper name of that of which it is
said essentially, and it properly names its essence. Hence, it is the
essential name [24] of one or of many in common. It is said of that
according to the truth, because it is said according to the essence or
substance, which in each thing is said to be the truth of that very
thing. Likewise, it is inseparable from the same thing, since it is
said essentially of it; neither m actuality nor in thought is it
separable from it. For whether being (esse) is the essence of that of
which it is said or a part of the essence, it is inseparable both in
actuality or in thought from it. But the essential is either the whole
essence or a part of the essence of that to which it is said to be
essential. Hence, it is clear that there is some being (esse) which
not only cannot not be, but also cannot be understood not to be.
Likewise, affirmation is not only not receptive of negation, but
also, when the negation of something has been known by the
intellect, it is unintelligible for an affirmation to be made
concerning it. Hence, it is
5. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 1, 6, p. 43, 14-15 and p. 44, 24-37.
6. These philosophers are not Christians; cf. above, Prologue, n. 2.
Hence, they are not familiar with the internal or perfect causality by
which the Son and the Holy Spirit arise from the Father. For more on
this causality, cf. below, ch. 3, p. 72 (25); ch. 4, p. 77 (31) and ch. 14,
pp. 122, 125 (89-90).

Page 72
clear that a being (ens) of this sort cannot possibly admit the
negation of its own essence. For this reason it is impossible to
know a being (ens) of this sort as not a being (non ens) or not being
(non esse). Moreover, every caused thing, where "caused" and
"cause" are taken as we have explained them, has being (esse) that
is acquired and drawn by its cause from not being (non esse) into
being (esse) to the extent that it can. (For it does not exclude from
itself its not being (non esse), and it does not give to itself its own
being (esse), but it has and receives it.) Therefore, it is in itself
possible and receptive of both [being and not being].
For this reason being (esse) of this sort, of which being (esse) is
said according to essence, is not created, since from its side it
cannot admit affirmation and negation of being (essendi), as we
said, but it is its own being (esse) and is essentially opposed to its
not being (non esse), just as an affirmation is opposed to its
negation and, therefore, cannot admit negation, for no opposite can
admit its opposite insofar as it is opposed to it. Moreover,
affirmation has no being (esse) or becoming regarding negation or
in negation. Since they in no way admit each other in the same
thing, much less can one admit the other in itself.
[25] Being (esse) about which or in which affirmation and negation
have being (esse) and becoming is other than its affirmation and
negation. Thus everything caused is other than its own being (esse)
or not being (non esse), for it is necessary that receptive being
(esse) is other than what is received, and that which acquires is
other than that which is acquired. For this reason it is necessary
that everything caused is other than its own being (esse). Thus what
is the same as its being (being) necessarily is not caused.
Chapter III
It already begins to be dear to us that an essential being is
necessary, eternal and incorruptible. It is not caused. I mean that it
is not caused by an external cause, that is, a cause external in the
sense of not sharing an essence with it and thus not causing out of
itself or through itself alone. This latter sort of causality is called
perfect.1 It is, then, ungenerated and simple in the highest degree of
simplicity, that is, in every way. For were it composed or resolvable
in any way, it would necessarily be caused as well, for every
composite is the effect of the component parts and of what brings
them together, conjoining and ordering the parts in the composite.
1. The Son and the Holy Spirit are produced by such perfect causality.
Cf. above, ch. 2, p. 71 (23) and below, ch. 4, p. 77 (31) and ch. 14,
which contains a lengthy discussion of such causality.

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In what follows we shall in many ways bring you to the knowledge
of such being (esse), when we speak of possible and acquired being
(esse).2 In the meantime, then, let us hold that this is the first being
(ens) and first being (esse) to which there is nothing prior or
superior. The reason is that, if there were anything prior or
superior, it would necessarily be more simple and its cause. For the
prior things are the causes of those that follow, if they are prior in
the same order. But we have already shown that it is not caused. If
there is something superior and prior to it in another order, it is
frivolous and vain, since priority and superiority are said according
to the same order, [26] and this would be, so to speak, from another
domain. We shall bring you to see in what follows that neither
being (esse) nor being (ens) belong to another domain and that
there is no order or ordering apart from that which begins from it
and ends in it.
Also it is already clear to you from what went before, that this
being (esse) and this being (ens) is most bare, since it has no
essential clothing whatsoever. For such clothing is a composition,
and we have excluded from it all composition and essential
causation. I mean clothing such as there is in a species which
contains the essence of its genus cloaked with the differences. If
someone should say that nothing prevents such being (esse) from
being clothed by the variety and adornment of accidents, he ought
to know that between accidents and a being (esse) of this sort there
must be substances in the order of being (essendi). Thus no
accident is naturally suited to be joined to this sort of essence or
this sort of being (esse), since substances necessarily stand in
between in the order of being (essendi). For example, accidents,
which are naturally suited to come to be in Socrates and follow
upon Socrates, cannot possibly be joined to the species or genus
under which Socrates stands.3 This is so because Socrates comes in
between and receives this union and excludes it from more remote
subjects. The reason for this is that an accident demands a subject
as close as possible for its own congruence and order. Thus no
accident can be joined to the first and second being (esse) because
of the excessive distance and disagreement with them in being (in
essendo); for example, knowledge is not naturally suited to come to
be in a body nor white in the soul. This will become clearer when
we speak of the being (esse) of accidents in what follows.
2. Cf. below, ch. 6, pp. 83-84 (39-40); ch. 7, pp. 87-88 (43-45) and ch.
8.
3. That is, forms must come to a being in the proper order. Cf. above, ch.
2, n. 1, for William's view of the polymorphic structure of created being.

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Chapter IV
We have already made it clear from what has gone before that the
kind of being (esse), about which we were speaking, is simple in
the ultimate degree of simplicity [27] stripped bare of all essential
clothing. Hence, it ought to be evident that this being (esse) is in no
sense common.1 It cannot be common and essential because then it
would be either a genus or a species or a difference. Each of these
can be broken down and is cloaked with essential clothing and is
composed; each of these is definable or in some other way
explicable. Thus it is not common in one of these three ways. If it
is common and accidental, it will be caused and not the first being
(esse).2 It would be the lowest and most feeble of all essences and
of all things, for this is clearly an accident's order and manner of
being (essendi).
Further, in what is one and simple in every way, one in the ultimate
sense, there cannot be found any plurality. I mean an essential
plurality, because another kind of plurality can be found in it.
Appropriately enough we call this [other] plurality personal, and in
what follows we shah show that it is present in the essential unity.
For the common and universal cannot possibly be one and be
unqualifiedly in every way. Since man is universal and actually
predicated of many,3 it is not one and indivisible in every way, but
only in the way they call "in reason," that is, it is not one
numerically. If man were one and indivisible in every way, there
could not be many [men] in an essential plurality. Everything in it
would be united in an essential union. This is the way it goes in
everything common of this sort.
We have already shown that a being through its essence is one in
every way and indivisible, that is, simple in ultimate simplicity.4
And so it is necessary that it not be common and that it be
numerically one and a "this something" (hoc aliquid).5 For by
reason of the fact that it is a being through its essence, it is
indivisible and inseparable in every way. But universality [28]
excludes this sort of inseparability. Thus it is impossible that it be
universal or common, and it is necessary that it be singular and a
"this something."
1. Switalski suggests (p. 26) that "[s]ome of William's ideas (and
terminology) contained in this chapter can be found in Avicenna,
Metaphysics 1, 8," though it would also seem that William is using
vocabulary and ideas from Avicenna's discussion of the problem of
universals in Metaphysics 5, pp. 227-290. Cf. also, below, chs. 6-8.
3. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 5, 1, p. 227, 7-8.
4.Liber de causis, 20 (21), 163, p. 92.
5. Switalski refers (p. 27) to Boethius' discussion of simplicity and
composition in De trin. 2, lines 31-51, though the expression "this
something: hoc aliquid" does not occur there. It is rather the Aristotelian
tode ti, which refers to a singular being. In any case William uses the
expression to refer to the divine essence; cf. ch. 27, p. 177 (155).

Page 75
Furthermore, everything essential and common is prior in the order
of being (essendi) to any one of its particulars and is more bare
than it and is its cause. It is like an essential part of the particular
insofar as it is particular. But we have already shown that this being
(esse) has nothing more bare beyond it, no cause, and nothing prior
to it in the order of being (essendi), for [something] is a cause
because it precedes in the order of being (essendi). Thus it is not
possible that something which is a being (ens) through its essence,
as we have said, be ordered or counted under anything essential
and common. A being through its essence, then, is not something
essential and common, under which there is a plurality ordered
after it and counted under it.
[Such being], then, cannot be common and essential, though it is
essential. Since in this intention being (ens) is said "through its
essence" as singular, it will be incommunicable to an essential
plurality. Also, the first unity is numerical unity, not unity in
reason. Unity in reason cannot be first, since it is potentially
multiple and potentially a plurality. Hence, it is impossible that the
first one be universal; the first one ought to be indivisible in act and
in potency. What is indivisible in both act and in potency, and not
merely in act, is one in a more primary and greater sense. The first
one, then, cannot be only indivisible in act; therefore, it has to be
indivisible in both act and potency. Hence, it cannot be universal
and common.
Besides, every one is said in relation to the numerically one, as
everything the same [is said in relation to the numerically same].
Thus the numerically one is the first one, and it precedes every
other one. Hence, it precedes every one in reason only. So too [29]
the first one precedes every thing universal or common. Therefore,
it does not stand under something universal or common; for what is
under anything universal or common necessarily follows after it.
And so nothing universal or common is said of the first one, which
is one and indivisible in every way. We have already shown that
being through its essence is said of it; therefore, being through its
essence is not common or universal.
Someone might object and say that on this showing the singulars,
which are counted under something common and follow after it in
order, ought to precede their own common. For the particulars are
one in number, whereas the common is one in reason. [Such an
objector] ought to realize that these sorts of ones are united and are
not one in every way. But we are speaking of the first one which is
not united in any way and than which nothing is found to be
simpler either in reality or in the intellect. I also say that nothing
prevents things numerically one that have been united from being
posterior to some of those that are one in reason. For concrete
things have in themselves a plurality beyond their whole essence or
definition of what is common to them. Thus they are more multiple
and more composite than their common.

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We have already shown that neither the common nor the singular
can be more bare or simpler than the first one, beyond which there
is no one higher or simpler. We will add another proof for this. I
say that, if there is going to be an essential plurality under this kind
of being (esse), it is necessary that each one of that plurality be
most bare. For it is clear from what preceded that everything which
is a being through its essence is most bare so that there is not
something bare before or higher than it. Hence, each one of this
plurality will be just as bare as its common, which is a being
through its essence. This is patently impossible, since only by some
new and further addition can what is common be individuated. For
if [30] each one of this plurality has in no respect anything more
than the common, in which they are united, they do not differ from
each other as they do not differ from the common. Likewise,
according to this each one will be in every way the same as its
common, because none of them has anything more than thin
common in any respect. Thus they will be the same among
themselves in every way. For if Socrates had nothing more than
what is man, they would certainly be the same in every way, since
he cannot differ from that except by something more or an
addition.
Someone might say that accidental conditions and clothing are
added to what is common and that by means of these a plurality
begins to be in actuality under what is common. Yet we have
already excluded this, namely, that it is cloaked by this sort of
accidental conditious. Otherwise, it turns out that each thing in its
singularity is potentially and not through its essence, since their
being (esse) is composed and united from what is common and
these conditions. For we have already made it dear that every being
(esse) united from a plurality is not through its essence. Therefore,
this plurality on the part of the plurality will not be through its
essence. There will be in that case acquired, that is, singular and
individual, being (esse), and in this way it is necessary that every
singular being (esse) is acquired.
It is easy to refute this position, since singular being (esse) cannot
be acquired except through singular being (esse); for the common,
to the extent it is common, does not make being (esse) have to be
singular. For it must have some new addition by which it may in
descending from it arrive at singular being (esse), which cannot be
acquired otherwise than through singular being (esse). Therefore,
there will either be a circle, or it will go on to infinity. We have
already refuted a circle in what we said before.6 We shall later in
its proper place refute an infinity in a straight line.7
6. Cf. above, ch. 2, pp. 69-70 (21-22).
7. Cf. above, ch. 2, p. 70 (22) and below, pp. 77-78 (31-32); ch. 6, pp.
81-83 (37-39); ch. 7, pp. 87-88 (44).

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Thus not every singular being (esse) is acquired, but every singular
being (esse) that follows upon common being (esse) is acquired, as
we have shown, [31] from new conditions which individuate the
common being (esse). Therefore, there is some being (esse) which
does not follow after common being (esse) and thus is not under it.
It is certain that this is a being through its essence, since its being
(esse) is not acquired, that is, not educed from potency or
possibility into actuality. The reason is that what is caused by the
first cause, caused, I mean, by perfect causality, is necessarily pure
act, unmixed with potentiality and imperfection, since it is purely
from pure act. But it is impossible that something mixed be in this
way from what is pure and purely from it. Therefore, being through
its essence is not common.
You ought by now to hold it as certain that being through its
essence is the first singular and that it does not have something
essential and common superior to it. For, were that the case, its
singularity would be acquired and would be possible for it. Thus, it
would not be being through its essence in every way or one in
ultimate unity. But if its singularity were acquired by it, then its
singularity would not be first, and the reason is that the common is
not sufficient for singularity to be acquired through it either for
itself or for another. Hence, its singularity would not be acquired
except through a singular whose singularity would precede it. Also,
on this showing all singularity would be acquired if there were no
first. From this it would follow that no singularity is acquired, since
there would be no certain origin and source of singularity and
appropriation. Also, the universal or the common would precede
the truly one; and potential being (esse), which is common being
(esse), would precede even in act and actuality what is singular.
Another reason is that true unity is not in any way united out of a
plurality. It is clear that true unity would not be united out of a
plurality unless there were a true plurality, since there would not be
a true plurality unless there were also a true unity. But a true one
has no common beyond it or before it. This was made clear from
what was said; for every singular that is under a common or after a
common has a unity made one from the common and the
conditions by which it is individuated. It is necessary, however, that
all resolution and division have an end; otherwise, [32] the intellect
would never come to an end. For if a plurality were resolved into a
plurality and this had no end, the intellect would not be determined
in knowing a plurality. For the intellect makes unity the source of
plurality, and knowledge of a plurality rests upon it. For a plurality
is not constituted so as in itself to settle or to determine the
intellect, but only to the extent that it itself ends in unity. Similarly,
the resolvable, to the extent it is resolvable, does not settle or
determine the intellect except insofar as it is determined in its
limits and indivisibles. Thus a plurality leads those

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who resolve it to a true unity, which is not divided in any way, and
resolution leads to the true indivisible, which is not broken down.
It is, however, impossible that the term of a division or resolution
be something common to a plurality, because the common would
either have a singular under and after it or not. If it did, whatever is
said of the common would be said also of the singular. Thus the
singular which is after and under the common would be the
ultimate term of the plurality and the resolution. We have, however,
already excluded that possibility. For every singular that is under
something common is necessarily resolved into what is common
and what is more than the common, whether that more is essential
or not. If it did not have a singular under it, then it is not common,
and this is what we had in mind, namely, that the first bare one is
not under any essential common.
Since, then, being through its essence is said of [the first one] in
this intention, it is singular and the proper name of what we are
seeking. Thus it is not without reason that he gave his name to
Moses in Exodus III as "He Who Is" [Ex 3:14],8 and this testimony
of the faith surely suffices for certitude about what we have said.
Likewise, in Wisdom XIII [Ws 13:1] he is called "He Who Is"; also
Job says of him, "You who alone are" [Jb 23:13; cf. Jb 14:4].9 He
is, therefore, one in the way we have said.10 We usually call him
[33] God and Lord of the universe or God and Lord of the ages.
These terms rather express for us his praise and his glory in our
way of speaking and understanding.
Being expresses his essence to such a degree that by it he wanted to
make himself known to the sons of Israel. With knowledge of that
alone, everything is known that can be said of his essence. It
follows that he is the first being, true, one, and pure, whose purity
is not darkened in any way by plurality and in whose truth there is
nothing composed, nothing united and nothing in any way twofold.
His essence in the order of essences is the highest and the first,
fixed and remaining in itself, in repose and most undisturbed by the
tumult of changes. Notice that it is more noble in itself to be one in
every way than to be many in some way. Moreover, in the order of
being (essendi) that is simply prior which is simple in every way.
What is in no way resolvable is more noble as such than what is
composed. And what is resolvable in some way is more known and
more closely understood, since the resolvables and the many are
not known to our intellect except in this way. Thus they are
8. Cf. Augustine, De trin. 1, 1, 2 (CCL 50, 29); 5, 2, 3 (CCL 50, 207-
208); 7, 5, 10 (CCL 50, 260-261). Cf. also, above, ch. 1, n. 3.
9. There are two possible sources; Jb 23:13 reads, "He alone is," and Jb
14:4 says, "Are not you who are alone?"
10. Cf. above, ch. 1, p. 66 (17) and ch. 4, p. 74 (26-27).

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necessarily prior for the intellect, since they are prior in being
(esse), for intellect is the exemplification (exemplum) of things.11
Also, it has no quiddity and no definition.12 For everything
definable and explicable in any way is in some sense resolvable
and covered. Thus by way of the intellect it is not naturally suited
to be known except by itself; by way of the senses it is known
everywhere by the testimony of sensibles. Therefore, as being, it is
impressed through itself on our intellect, but as God and Lord it is
not among the first [34] impressions. This is how those
intellectually untrained13 err concerning him.
Chapter V
That he is the cause and author of all things ordered after him is
clear from the fact that everything that follows after him is caused
and composed. For every being that is not such through its essence
is composed and has being (esse) acquired from something other
than itself. We shall show that this is so in what follows. For
everything caused is caused by something prior to it in the order of
being (essendi), and each is immediately caused by what
immediately precedes it. For a cause is necessarily the immediate
cause of what immediately follows it in the order of being (essendi)
and is cause of the other things following in order by the fact that it
is the cause of their causes. Thus in whatever way being (esse)
comes to each caused thing, it is clear that it alone is the first
source of being (essendi). For every being (esse) that follows upon
this one arises from it, because there is no source of being (essendi)
apart from it.
It can now be seen how blind they were who erroneously and
stupidly proposed two first principles.1 For we have already shown
that its being (esse) is solitary in every way, both because there is
nothing equal to it or of the same duration and because it has no
contrary. Being (esse) has no opposite but not being (non esse). Not
being (non esse) is absolutely
11. Switalski says (p. 33) that the text here seems corrupt.
12. Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 4, pp. 402, 48-73.
13. Switalski notes (p. 34) that William is here referring to ''the neo-
Manicheans of [his] time, i.e., the Albigensians and Cathari, who
maintained that the material world is a visible effect of the principle of
evil; the spiritual world is a creation of the principle of good." Cf.
William, De Universo 1-1, 2-10, Opera Omnia, vol. 1, pp. 594-604. For
a brief but excellent account of the Albigensians and Cathars, cf.
Bernard Hamilton, The Albigensian Crusade (London: The Historical
Association, 1974) = Monastic Reform, Catharism and the Crusades
(900-1300) (London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), 8. William, of course,
knew of the Manichees from the writings of St. Augustine; the
relationship between the Manichees and the dualists of the 12th and 13th
centuries is disputed.
1. William is again referring to the Cathars.

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nothing, and it cannot be the principle of being (essendi) for
anything. Given a root, no branch is found that does not come from
the root, and given a source, all water necessarily is from it, if one
supposes that there is one source of water. In the same way, given
one root and one source of being (essendi), it is impossible to find
being (esse) [35] that is not from it. For a being can flow from
nothing but a being, insofar as it is. And if a being is from a being,
so too being (esse) is from being (esse).
Thus every being owes its own being (esse) and every being owes
itself to the first being, since there is not a being save from it and
through it. In this way it is clear that the universe is an outpouring
and overflowing of that being (esse), which is the universal source
of being (essendi). Therefore, all things, to the extent that they are,
are the outpouring and the overflowing of this first, most pure and
most abundant source. For this reason many of the nobler
philosophers have held that all things are good, insofar as they flow
down2 from the most pure spring of being (essendi).
We have not yet arrived at the point where it is necessary to clarify
the intention of what is good and what is evil. It is sufficient for us
at this point to have found the first and purest spring of being
(essendi), whose outpouring and overflowing is the continuity of
generation and the whole series of the ages with all of their
marvels, their magnificence and universal beauty. The possibility
of the universe is like the recipient of its outpouring. Just as the air
in the whole interior of its capacity receives the light that has been
shed and that penetrates it wholly, so the abundance and strength of
this first and originative being (esse) penetrates and fills the
possibility of the universe more or less according to the capacity of
the recipients, as it flows into this whole through its essence, which
is pure goodness3 and abounding generosity.
Chapter VI
Next we will discuss secondary and caused being (esse), which is
named distinctly and properly: being (esse) in need, possible being
(esse), false being (esse), flowing being (esse) and dependent being
(esse).1 Eve-
2. Avicebron, Fons vitae 3, 13, p. 107, 11-12 and p. 108, 1-12;
Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 4, p. 398, 70-72; 8, 7, p. 423, 85-87.
3.Liber de causis, 8 (9), 78, p. 66, and Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 6, p.
413, 77-78.
1. Such terminology seems to have been common to Avicebron and
Avicenna; for a sampling of possible sources, cf. Avicebron, Fons vitae
3, 10, p. 100, 20; 3, 13, p. 107, 11-21 and p. 108, 1-12; 5, 24, p. 302, 18-
21 and p. 303, 1-3; 5, 25, p. 303, 21-25, as well as Avicenna,
Metaphysics 6, 3, pp. 317, 68 -- 318, 76; 6, 3, p. 318, 78-82; 8, 4, p. 402,
48-49; 8, 5, p. 410, 19-24; 1, 8, p. 55, 63-64. For Avicebron's work, cf.
the Latin translation from the Arabic done by John of Spain and
Dominicus Gundissalinus Avencebrolis Fons Vitae, edited by Clemens
Baeumker (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des
Mittelalters [Münster: 1892-95]).

Page 81
rything that [36] has a beginning is of this sort. Thus being (esse) in
need is what needs another for it to be, and it does not come into
being (esse) unless another gives it being (esse) or in some way
helps it to come about. Possible being (esse) is that for which,
considered in and through itself, nothing is found that excludes its
being (esse). Still in this consideration it is not yet found to have
being (esse), but it is found close to having being (esse). This
closeness is called the possibility in it.2 False being (esse) is
something merely external. When it is considered internally, it is
found not yet to have being (esse), just as false silver is said of
what externally lays claim to the truth of the form, that is, the form
and essence of silver, though internally it will not be found to have
it. So also when a false being is considered internally, that is, in the
quiddity and definition of its essence, being (esse) is not found in
it, but it has it superficially, as misrepresenting and imperfectly
portraying its quiddity. Flowing being (esse) is what is due to the
overflowing and abundance of another since the fact that it is arises
only from the superabundant wealth of another. Dependent being
(esse) is that which for its own part falls back into not being (non
esse); that it stands firm is due to another.
These, then, are the names of secondary being (esse), which is
caused, and these are the definitions of the names. Its remaining
names whose definitions, that is, expositions and explanations, we
are now giving, are these: derived, given or only received, covered,
owed, subjected, composed, resolvable, many or unified, mixed,
shared, caused. Each of these intentions is a most certain path
leading the knower's inquiry to the first being (esse).
We shall show this in individual cases. Being (esse) in need is not
[37] so constituted as to be alone, but needs another for it to be.
This is clear from the account of its intention that we have given it.
If you said it was infinite, it will still not have a completeness in
itself, since its intention includes the need of another and a lack so
that it is not sufficient unto itself. If you said that nothing prevents
something of this kind, which is being (esse) in need, from needing
another and this other again needing a third, and so on to infinity,
this very infinity of such beings will need another beyond itself.
For it makes no difference whether this infinity has a first or does
not have one. Thus this infinity is no more sufficient unto itself
than any one of its members.
Also, the needs are multiplied in this infinity just as the aids are.
For as many aids as you believe you have discovered through that
infinity, you have also gathered the same number of needs and
equal ones. Each of them equally needs something aiding it, just as
the one it aids needs it.
2. William's definition of possible being as what is "near to being"
will allow him later to argue that something can be near to being
solely by reason of its agent principle; cf. below, ch. 8, p. 96 (53).

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Therefore, an infinity of this kind is no more sufficient in itself
than each one of those in it, for equals remain equal when equals
are added to them. Thus the need and aid in this infinity remain
equal, as they were before in each one that was in that infinity.
Hence, the infinity needs another outside itself equally as much as
each one of them in that infinity. Thus you have made no progress
wandering through the wilderness of infinity.
Notice too that in the order of causes, an intermediate cause is not
sufficient to bring it about that an extreme that follows upon it must
be. Rather it needs a cause preceding it, namely, its proper cause
from which it receives what it gives to its effect. I am speaking of a
cause, insofar as it is intermediate, because to this extent it is
receiving and giving, receiving from what is prior and giving to
what is subsequent. Therefore, an intermediate cause, from the very
intention of its being intermediate, is not sufficient by itself to
bring it about that its effect, to which it is only intermediate, must
be. Being (esse) in need, whether it is said to be finite or infinite,
has, from the fact that it is being (esse) in need, only the intention
of an intermediate in the order of causes. For it cannot be the first
cause, since it does not, in accord with this [38] intention, have on
its own what it gives to the effect. An intermediate cause from the
intention of intermediate in the order of causes cannot be sufficient
to cause another. Therefore, an infinity in need cannot cause
anything by itself, just as an intermediate infinity cannot cause an
effect by itself.
We shall show in a clearer fashion that being (esse) in need,
whether it is said to be finite or infinite, cannot possibly be
sufficient for something else to be. For suppose that B is a being
(esse) in need that suffices for C to be: whether B is finite or an
infinity, B needs A. Because then B is sufficient for C to be and
because it is sufficient so that nothing more is required, then
nothing more than B is required for C to be. Thus, on the
supposition that A is not, nevertheless, C will be. This is false,
because, when A is not, B will not be and when B is not, C will not
be. Hence, on the supposition that A is not, C will necessarily not
be. Therefore, B is not all that was needed for C to be, because for
this it would not be required that there be A. Thus A is required for
B and C to be. B alone does not suffice for C to be. Therefore,
being (esse) in need cannot be alone, whether it is supposed to be
infinite or finite, and cannot alone suffice for something else to be.
It is necessary, then, that there be a being (esse) beyond being
(esse) in need, and this is what we call being (esse) that is
sufficient, which is opposed to the other as affirmation to negation.
This must be the case, because each of the things caused must have
a sufficiency either from one cause or from many causes, and this
cannot be merely being (esse) in need, as we have explained.

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Again, being (esse) in need necessarily demands being (esse) that
is sufficient. For, since it is caused, it would not otherwise be
sufficiently, and it could not be caused sufficiently by a being
(esse) in need. Hence, it is necessary that it be first caused by being
(esse) that is sufficient. Therefore, being (esse) in need necessarily
leads a diligent inquiry to the being (esse) that is sufficient, and the
definition of this [39] is being (esse) that needs nothing. Along a
like path possible being (esse) leads us to being (esse) necessary
through itself.3 The reason is that the possible insofar as it is
possible is not able to have being (esse) or come into being (esse).
For the possible from its essence and its intention does not have
being (esse) in actuality, because possibility alone does not of itself
suffice for actuality. If it did, it would not be the case that
possibility would precede actuality.
Likewise, in comparison to being (esse) in actuality, the possible is
said to be what is able to receive the actuality of being (essendi).
The intention, however, by which it is only able to receive does not
bring it about that it has to be, but only makes it need a giver of its
being (esse). Therefore, the possible does not come from nor is it
drawn from the possibility of being (essendi) into actuality through
its own power, but through another that draws it and adds to it the
actuality of being (essendi). The cause that draws it from
possibility into actuality necessarily has more than mere possibility.
For, if it had nothing more, it could not be an agent in actuality,
because possibility alone is not of itself sufficient for being (ad
essendum) in actuality or for acting in actuality. Thus beyond this
possibility it has also the actuality of being (essendi) and the
actuality of acting; it did not have all this through possibility only.
There was, then, a third cause that draws it in the way in which we
said that it had to be. For if the second cause is supposed to have
been drawn from its own possibility into the actuality of both being
(essendi) and acting, it will need another that draws it. In this case
it will also be necessary, from what we have said, to arrive at a first
cause, in which possibility and actuality are not distinct. For, if we
consider the universe in itself, we will not find anything but
possibility in it. Once we posit only possibility in the universe
taken in itself, the universe in itself is only possible. But beyond
the possible universe there is no being. Therefore, the universe is in
actuality neither from itself [40] nor from another. In itself it is not
being in actuality, and outside it there is nothing that gives it being
(esse) in actuality, since there is nothing outside the universe. Thus
the universe is in no way being in actuality. Hence, if we suppose
that everything is possible,
3. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 1, 7, pp. 54-55, 44-55.

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the result is that nothing actually is.4 Thus it follows that
something is that is not possible. But this will necessarily be
necessary being (esse) through itself, for, as affirmation and
negation are opposed, so are possible [being] and being (esse)
necessary through itself. For necessary being (esse) is what, when
considered in itself, is found to have being (esse) in actuality, while
also excluding its not being (non esse). Hence, even its name says
this, namely, that considered through itself it is something not
ceasing being (esse).5
In almost the same way we will explain true being (esse), or the
being (esse) that is true through itself. For, if there is not something
true in itself, but all that is is false in itself, the universe is false in
itself, and it cannot become true from something else, since outside
it there is nothing, For there is nothing outside the universe of
beings. Hence, the universe will be false both in itself and outside,
and it will have being (esse) neither intrinsically nor extrinsically.
It will not have it intrinsically, because in itself it is false; it will not
have it extrinsically, because there is nothing from which it might
have it, since there is nothing outside it. In the same way, since
there is no existing source of being (essendi), there also will be no
flowing being (esse). For, if the whole were flowing, it would have
nothing from which it could flow. For it would not flow from itself,
either in a circular manner, or in an infinite manner -- for we have
excluded both of these already -- and it would not flow from
something else, since there is nothing else. In the same way it is
clear that the universe would sink into non-being (non esse), unless
the foundation of the universe were standing by itself, sustaining it
by its might and power, for a dependent whole must collapse
without its support. Thus the universe would collapse and sink into
not-being (non esse), unless there were a power that stands through
itself and supports the universe. Since the universe stands firm, it
necessarily stands only by the power of the one sustaining and
supporting it. For, what comes into being (esse) from non-being
(non esse) or after not-being (non esse), sinks back into that from
which it was drawn, insofar as its own power goes. For its
possibility does not suffice to keep its being (esse) from vanishing,
for the union of it and its being (esse) does not come from the
necessity of its possibility. The union [41] of it is the union of the
possible, of which there are two elements, namely, the power and
being (esse) itself.
4. The argument that it is impossible for all being to be possible being
clearly depends upon Avicenna and anticipates the third way of St.
Thomas. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 1, 6, pp. 43-47 and St. Thomas,
Summa Theologiae I, 2, 3.
5. William links "necesse: necessary" with "non cessans esse: not
ceasing to be," a similarity of sound that the English can preserve.

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In this way derived being (esse) leads you back to the primary, that
does not have another source, and flowing being (esse) leads you
back to the most copious source. Otherwise the whole would dry
up, and there would be nothing derivative since there would be no
source. Likewise, borrowed being (esse) leads you to the absolute,
namely, to what owes itself to nothing. For if the whole is
borrowed, there is nothing to which it is in debt, since there is
nothing outside the whole. Thus the being (esse) of the universe
would be borrowed, and the universe itself will be like a borrower
without a lender. In the same way, subject being (esse) leads you to
free being (esse) that is subject to nothing. For if the whole were
subjected and nothing were over it, there would not be anything
subjected either, since there would not be anything that would be
over it, either in the manner of a circle or that of an infinity. Thus,
clothed being (esse) is a path for coming to the most bare being
(esse); otherwise there would be covering or clothing alone without
what is clothed. For all things in some manner clothe the first being
(esse), but [they do so] from a distance, since it is interior to all that
is, though it is not the subject of these things or a part of them.6
Just as we would say that the sun is covered by the cloud behind
which it is seen, so the author of the universe is seen by the
intellect behind the cloud, as it were, of the universe.
According to this, both the composed leads to uncomposed and the
resolvable to the indivisible, beyond which there is neither
resolution nor composition. For all composition comes to a stop in
the simple, and all resolution comes to a stop at the indivisible.
Thus the united leads to the single being that alone is truly one, for
there would be no true plurality unless there were also true unity.
There would not be a last which is truly multiple and united, unless
there were a first that is simple and in no sense united. Likewise the
recipient leads to the giver; for if the whole were receiving, the
whole would be empty.
The root of the proof in these and similar matters involves moving
from the lesser and from opposites, since the [42] appropriate
predicates belong first to what is prior and more to what is greater.
Thus if there is what is united, much more is there what is one; and
if there is the composite, much more is there the simple. As in the
order of understanding the prior things are greater and more
worthy, so it is in the order of being (essendi), because the way it is
in images is the way it ought to be also in things, and the way it is
in things that exemplify (exempla) is also the way it ought to be in
the exemplars (exemplaria), for images are
6. Though one comes to the being of the Creator, which is pure and
most bare being, by stripping away the accidental and substantial
forms that clothed it (cf. above ch. 2, note 1), God is not the subject
or a part of clothed being, though he is interior to every being and is
the being by which each created thing exists. William changes the
image and goes on to say that he is seen behind the universe by our
intellect as the sun is seen behind a cloud by our eyes.

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proportional to things and things that exemplify to their exemplars.
But our intellects are images and exemplifications of things.7
Nothing more absurd can be said than to affirm what comes later,
to which being (esse) belongs less, and deny what comes earlier, to
which it is more due.
These then are the proper intentions and names of first being (esse)
by which it is and is named: being (esse) most truly, essential being
(esse), for which being (esse) and sufficient being (esse) are the
same; necessary being (esse), either of necessity or actual; first; the
being (esse) which is true; then stable being (esse); uncaused being
(esse); primary being (esse); being (esse) as source; absolute being
(esse) which owes nothing to anything else; being (esse) utterly
free and unsubordinated; being (esse) most bare in the ultimate
degree of nakedness and, thus, the most clean; then simple being
(esse) in the ultimate degree of simplicity;, unresolvable being
(esse) and, as it were, the indivisible point of all resolutions coming
after all else, not as a part but as the first principle and ultimate
end; finally, being (esse) in no way united, or what is only one;
having nothing composed, nothing double; nothing mixed; pure;
solitary; finally, being (esse) that gives.
These names are sixteen in number, proper and, so to speak,
essential to the first being (esse). But the opposite names are
common to all other things and are ways evidently leading to it, for
the giver [43] to which the received gift necessarily leads is not
what is received. If there were only received being (esse), the
whole world would be empty, since there would be only receptive
being (esse), and that means that there would be nothing but an
empty place. For the receptive precisely as receptive is only like an
empty place. If then all being (esse), which is the universe, were
merely received and given, and nothing were giving in itself and
according to itself, there would be nothing given or received.
According to the analogy of opposites, giving and receiving are by
their nature opposites, just as giving and non-giving, and again
receiving and non-receiving. If we want to make some
combinations here, the following occur to us: something giving and
not receiving, something receiving and not giving, and also
something both giving and receiving. Since, therefore, all the
intermediate states undoubtedly are, one of the extremes has also to
be, as well as the other. For there is undoubtedly something
receiving being (esse) and not giving it, and something receiving
and giving, as in the intermediate states, through which the others
are caused. Again there will be something neither receiving nor
giving. Therefore, there will also be something giving and not
receiving. In the same way one can reason about a cause and the
caused. For if there is found something neither causing nor caused
and also something causing and
7. Cf. below, ch. 9, p. 105 (65).

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caused and also something caused and not causing, there will
necessarily be found a cause, or something causing and not caused.
Chapter VII
We have established the richest source pouring forth from its own
superabundance the series of ages that follow one after the other
and the might that carries all things and the root firmly fixed
through itself, by which all things are supported and upon which all
things depend. Now we are left with the investigation of the way of
being (essendi) of the possible universe. Since possible being (ens)
is not being through its essence, it and its being (esse), which does
not belong to it essentially, are really two. The one [44] comes to
the other and does not fall within its definition or quiddity.1 Being
(ens) in this way is, therefore, composite and also resolvable into
its possibility, or quiddity, and its being (esse). From this it is clear
that it is caused by something that draws its possibility into the
actuality of being (essendi) and by something that joins its being
(esse) with its possibility. For the possible does not come to
actuality through its own power alone, as we showed above, but
through participation.2 But from what we have said it is not yet
certain whether this is by participation in the first being (esse) or in
another that flows from the first.
We shall bring you to know that it is only by participation in the
first being (esse) and that nothing at all is being (esse) except the
first being (esse). For the being (esse) that is participated in either
is or is not. If it is not, it is neither participated in, nor will there be
some being by participation in that which is not. But if it is, it will
be through its essence or through participation. If it is through its
essence, it is the first being (esse). Thus possible being (esse) will
be by participating in the first being (esse), and this is what we
were aiming at. But if it is by participation, it is necessary that what
is participated in by it is either in a similar manner or
1. Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 4, pp. 402-403, 48-70, where he
maintains that the First "does not have a quiddity, but being flows
from it over things that have quiddities." He claims that the First does
not have a genus or a difference and, consequently, has no definition.
2. William here comes to a formulation of the causal principle. He
argues that the being of possible beings is not the possible being and
does not fall within its definition or quiddity. Such a being is composite
and can be resolved into its quiddity and its being. Hence, such being is
caused by something else that brings its possibility into actuality and
joins its being with its possibility. Cf. Joseph Owens, An Interpretation
of Existence (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1968) p. 83, where he formulates the
principle of efficient causality as: "Wherever a things's existence is
accidental to its nature, the existence, because it is prior to the thing's
nature, is dependent upon something other than the thing itself." Cf. his
articles, "The Causal Proposition -- Principle or Conclusion?" TMS 32
(1955) 1590-171; 257-270; 323-339, and "The Causal Proposition
Revisited," TMS 44 (1967) 143-151.

Page 88
through its essence. If it is by participation, this will not go on to
infinity. Therefore, either we will come to a non-being, so that by
participation in it something is said to be -- a point we have already
refuted -- or we will come to a being through its essence. Thus we
are not deprived of our goal, for it is as if A were said to be by
participating in B and B is by reason of its immediate cause. It is,
nevertheless, true that possible being (esse) is only by participation
in the first being (esse), either mediately or immediately.
This then is the reasoning that makes it certain that the being said
of the possibles makes known [45] the first being (esse). For the
being (esse) that participates comes only from what is participated,
and by itself it is something only to the extent it has the first being
(esse). Thus the first being (esse) through itself and alone is
primarily and principally the being (esse) of all things, and all
things are said to be by participation in it.3 But it is the essence of
nothing except its own first [essence], from which come all the
things there are. From this it is clear how it fills all things, as is said
in Jeremiah XXIII: "I fill the heaven and the earth" [Jr 23:24].4 It is
also clear how it penetrates all things, since it is the fullness and
perfection of all the fullness of actuality. For [its] fullness is the
perfection of its own possibility. Possibility is like the container
receiving its abundance and like a deep void that only the
overflowing abundance of divine fullness fills. Let not the identity
of the participated disturb you, as if this forced you to say that
everything is equally and univocally, for it is one health that is
predicated of man, of urine, of medicine and of food, though not
univocally or equally. It is this way in the case of the first being
(esse), for though it is participated by all, yet it is not participated
by all equally or in one way.5
3. William's doctrine here verges on pantheism; he avoids it,
nonetheless, by clearly distinguishing between created things and the
first being by which they are. Cf. A. Maurer's, note 4, pp. 60-61 in his
translation of St. Thomas's On Being and Essence (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968). When St. Thomas
says, "If we say that God is pure being, we need not fall into the
mistake of those who held that God is that universal being by which
everything formally exists" (On Being and Essence 5, 2), he is
referring to the position of Amaury of Bène (d. 1206-1207) whose
doctrine was condemned in 1210; cf. DS 803.
4. Cf. Augustine, De trin. 2, 5, 7 (CCL 50, 88, 16-26).
5. The example of non-univocal predication stems from Aristotle,
Metaphysics 4, 2, 1003a33-b5 and 11, 3, 1060632-1061a10. William
says that each created thing is by participation in the first being (esse)
which is the being (esse) of all things and is thus intimately present to
each created being. However, he does not want to say that everything is
equally and univocally. Though everything created participates in the
first being, not everything has an equal share. This should lead him to
see that the being of each created thing is not the first being, but a
created being, Yet William does not explicitly take that step.

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Thus the first being (esse) is for all things the being (esse) by
which they are, but not what they are,6 for tt is none of those things
which are by participation in it. It is one essence, pure, solitary,
separate from and unmixed with all things, yet filling all things like
light cast over the universe. By this filling or outpouring, it makes
all things reflect it. This is their being (esse), namely, to reflect it,
and they can do so only through it, that is, by possessing it, just as
air reflects its source of light by possessing its source of light
insofar as it is possible for the air. It does not have numerically the
same splendor that sun has, for this is not possible even for the sun
because its splendor is tied to matter. Hence, it can only be in one
matter. The first being (esse), however, is absolute and [46] free
through all things, filling and illuminating them by its
omnipresence, because no place or matter holds it bound and
adhering to it.
An example of this is that, just as the soul is the life of the body, so
God is known to be the being (esse) of all things.7 Just as to be
separated from the soul is death for the body, so to be separated
from God is destruction for things. Also, as the soul is first of all
the life of the spirits,8 then of the tendons, the flesh and the bones,
so God is first the
6. For a history of the terminology ''quod est" and "quo est," cf. Pierre
Hadot, "La distinction de l'être et de l'étant dans le 'De hebdomadibus'
de Boëce," Miscellanea Mediaevalia 2: Die Metaphysik im
Mittelalter (Berlin: De Graylet, 1963), pp. 147-153, as well as his
"Dieu comme acre de l'être dans le néoplatonisme. A propos des
théories d'E. Gilson sur la méaphysique de l'Exode," in Dieu et I'être:
Exêgès d'Exode 3,14 et de Coran 20,11-24 (Paris: Etudes
Augustiniennes, 1978), pp. 57-63, and his "Forma essendi.
Interprétation philologique et interprétation philosophique d'une
formule de Boëce," Les études classiques 38 (1970) 143-56.
7. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 9, 4, pp. 476-477, 40-52, for his use of the
phrase "the being of all things (esse omnium)." Avicenna says that the
being of all things is from the necessary being, while William rays that
God is understood as the being of all things. It may also be that William
has in mind Augustine's reference to God as "life of my life" (Conf. 7, 1,
2; CCL 27, 93) or his statement that "as the soul is the life of the flesh,
so God is the happy life of man" (De civ. dei 19, 26; CCL 48, 696).
8. Cf. Avicenna, De anima 5, 8 (Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Anima seu
Sextus de Naturalibus, ed. by Simone van Reit, with an introduction by
G. Verbeke [Louvain: Editions Orientalistes; Leiden: Brill, 1972 and
1968], vol. 2, pp. 174-185). Avicenna speaks of these "spirits" as subtle
bodies, and William mentions them in his De Anima 2, 14 (Opera
Omnia vol. 2, Suppl., p 195b) as having the function of conveying the
soul's orders to the body. He expresses puzzlement over their nature, but
claims that the name comes from the philosophers; cf. De anima 7, 35
(Opera Omnia 2, Suppl., pp. 84-85). William uses "spirits" here in a
sense which has a long history. "In Aristotle pneuma (spirit) was the
name for matter more 'divine' than the four elements, matter which
mediated between soul and body. The Stoica used the same word for a
fiery and subtle, albeit material, substance, which formed the vital
principle in man, while ancient medical theorists emphasized the notion
of 'breath of life,' a material substance which was considered part of the
human organism" (William Schumacher, Spiritus and Spiritualis: A
Study in the Sermons of Saint Augustine [Mundelcin, IL: St. Mary of the
Lake, 1957], p. 23). Cf. G. Verbeke, L'évolution de la doctrine du
Pneurna du Stoicisme à saint Augustin (Paris: Desclée; Louvain: Institut
Supérieur de Philosophic, 1945). Cf. J. H. Taylor, "The Meaning of
Spiritus in St. Augustine's De Genesi XII," TMS 26 (1949) 211-218.

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being (esse) of the first things and, through them, of the others. Just
as if one soul would be the life of many bodies though the plurality
of the bodies were preserved, so the one highest essence, which is
God, is the one being (esse) of all things, namely, that by which
they are, not what they are. Yet things preserve their essential
diversity, since, as we said, the being (esse) by which they are is
not essential to them, but accidental, so to speak. This is the
understanding and explanation of the statement insofar as I grasp it.
For this statement comes from theologian of old who were at the
same time philosophers.9
For some things God is the being (esse) by which they immediately
are, but through these God is the being (esse) for other things. Just
as if one were to say that the soul, in the first place and
immediately, is the life of the spirits and through them the life of
the other parts, so God is the being (esse) of the first beings, which
are immediately from him, namely, the effects which exist by the
will of God alone and not through some mediate causes. As a result
of participating in the first being (esse) the [mediate causes] are the
being (esse) of those things which are as a result of their union with
them. [47] For example, the human soul is of this sort, since it is
created by God without any intermediate things caused by him.
Thus the being (esse) by which it exists is of this kind, and in this
way we say that the life by which I live is God. But because the
human body both exists and lives by its conjunction with the soul,
we will say that God through the soul is the being (esse) of the
human body, since the body can only participate through the soul,
as through a medium and a conduit, in the first being (esse), as it
now participates in life.
Whether it is this way or otherwise, it cannot be doubted that
everything is either by participation in the first being (esse), as we
have mentioned, or by participation in something that flows from
that, as light is spread out over everything. A proof of this is that all
things so love and seek being (esse) that each seems to neglect and
risk itself on account of being (esse), as every whole does its parts.
It encircles with greater love those parts in which its being (esse)
seems more to consist, as the hand is subjected to dangers to
protect the head. If one believed that his being (esse) was in
another part, he would right off risk the head and even all he is for
this part. For he risks his total possibility in order to preserve his
being (esse) or not to lose it. By the favor and choice of all things
that are,
9. William speaks here of "theologians who were at the same time
philosophers: theologorum simul et philosophorum." He classifies
them as "antiqui: of old." It is not perfectly clear to what statement
(sermo) he is referring, though the most likely candidate would seem
to be the the claim made twice in the last two paragraphs, namely,
that the first being is for all things the being by which they are, but
not what they are. On this theme he surely relies on Boethius, De
heb., p. 42, lines 41-48, as well as Augustine, perhaps such texts as,
De trin. 1, 1, 2 (CCL 50, 29, 54-59); 5, 2, 3 (CCL 50, 207-208); 7, 5,
10 (CCL 50, 260-261).

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being (esse) is shown to be both something other and better than all
the things that are. Thus being (esse) cannot according to itself be
an accident, but is necessarily better than every substance and
accident. Instead of the loss of it each thing will disregard harm to
its essence.10 The universe cannot be universally in error in those
things which are through nature or by nature. By its own love and
desire and by its own choice the universe cries out that this being
(esse) is best since the universe prefers it to everything else. One is
incredibly deaf if he does not hear the cry of the universe. There
can be no doubt that [this being] is everywhere and essentially
whole, since wherever there is a being, the being (esse) of the First
is necessarily there also.
[48] Again, from the fact that it is the being (esse) of each and
every thing, it is necessary that it is wherever there is one of those
things that are -- for being(esse) names its bare and pure essence by
its proper and express name.11 Hence, it is clear that it is
everywhere present essentially. What the Apostle says in Romans,
"All things truly are from him, through him and in him" [Rm
11:36], is sufficiently explained as follows: "from him" as from the
author; "through him" as they are through being (esse) itself; ''in
him" as in being (esse) itself. For there is no difference in saying
"in him" and in saying "in being (esse) itself," since he is only
being (esse). So much are all things in him that to be torn away
from him is for them to be destroyed and to fall or to be forced into
not-being (non esse). Thus the love of the universe stretches forth
for the universal and most common good, which as a whole is
attained by all and by each
10. The preferential love of each thing for being (esse) indicates that
being is other than and better than any substance or accident. Hence,
though being is accidental to each thing, since it is not part of its
essence, being cannot be an accident and must be better than every
substance and accident. Gilson says of this passage, "At least once, in
one of those visions that are his wont, William has disclosed his true
thought, in saying that to exist is far more than a simple accident. In
fact, it is in his eyes the very heart of the real, that which each thing
has first of all, as in virtue of a first participation, from the supreme
existing to which every thing owes its existing in turn" (E. Gilson,
"La notion," p. 61). I wonder whether Gilson takes seriously enough
William's statements that "the first being is for all things the being by
which they are, but not what they are, . . . . "Cf. above, p. 39 (45).
That is, does he not move too rapidly from William's claim that being
is not essential to any created thing, but comes (accidit) to it, to the
conclusion that it is a participated existence that each thing has?
Could William not simply be speaking of each created being's love
for God, who is being? After all, he does say that being is superior to
any substance or accident, and the passage certainly reflects
Avicenna's statements in Metaphysics 8, 6, p. 412, 62-68, where he is
clearly speaking of the love of pure goodness, who is being.
Furthermore, cf. below, ch. 13, p. 85 (83) where William speaks of
the love of the universe for the divine essence in strikingly similar
language.
11. Cf. Augustine, De trin. 1, 1, 2 (CCL 50, 29, 54-59).

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singly.12 This highest love declares that he is the highest good of
all, and this pure love declares by a sure sign that he is pure
goodness.13 I say pure love, because he is loved by all neither
along with another nor because of another; rather they seek pure
and bare being (esse). Because of it they disregard everything that
follows after this being (esse), that is, to be well and magnificently
and delightfully and anything else of this sort, if the danger of the
loss of this being (esse) should threaten them, etc.
Chapter VIII
In this teaching we have to explain how the things that come from
him proceed from him, whether by nature, as light from its source,
or by wisdom and will, which in him are called benignity.1 [We
have to explain] whether it is proper to say of him that he is the
maker of the universe and not just its creator2 and whether he is
powerful above all things and how he is so. [We have to explain]
also whether his wisdom is he himself or something else and
whether it is necessary for him to know all things and himself in
his wisdom. Finally, [we must explain] whether his goodness
forces him to make whatever he can, as some men of weak minds
have thought. On this question [49] they have argued that, unless
he made all he could and knew how to do, he would by thin very
fact prove himself to be greedy or envious. They argue that his
potency and his will are different things, if he can do something
that he does not will or wills something that he cannot do.3
First, we will consider power or first potency and, hence, potency
absolutely and power and their difference. Then we will consider
omnipotence and what it is to be omnipotent. After that, we will
consider the first and universal wisdom, which is the sun and light
of all intellects,
12. Cf. Augustine, De lib. arb. 2, 13, 36 and 14, 37 (CCL 29, 261 and
263), where Augustine leads Evodius to see that "the highest good is
known and possessed in the truth" and that the truth will not become
the property of anyone, but "is at the same time common to all as a
whole."
13. Cf. above, ch. 5, n. 2.
1. At times William uses "benignity: benignitas" as if it were
synonymous with "goriness: bonitas." Cf. below, chs. 12, p. 81 (79) and
21, p. 126 (114), 129 (116), 130 (117). When he is speaking more
carefully, he distinguishes between God's goodness and his benignity.
Cf. below, ch. 23, p. 138 (123). In the latter case goodness refers to
God's being an object of our desire and love; whereas, benignity refers
to God's wisdom and good will toward creatures. In English we could
translate both terms by "goodness," but to do so would lose the
distinction William makes.
2. William is probably alluding to the Cathars who did not distinquish
between making (facere) and creating (creare); cf. René Nelli, Le
phénomène cathare (Toulouse: Privat, 1964), pp. 27-28, for references to
this position.
3. Cf. Peter Abelard, Theologia christiana 5, 30-31 (CCLCM 12, 358-
359). Cf. DS 726 for the condemnation of Abelard's doctrine by the
Council of Sens (1140 or 1141).

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the art, the mirror and exemplar of the universe, the image and
mirror for the first observer, as Wisdom VII [Ws 7:16] says, and
the word of the first speaker, in which he speaks himself and all
things and which is called the Son of the omnipotent Father. So we
will also consider the sweetness or love which both of them pour
forth or, more accurately, breathe forth (spirent), as they embrace
each other.4 On such matters we shall try to speak persuasively
and, by philosophizing, to get a preview of them, even though true
faith entirely rejects such persuasion -- a point we shall discuss
more fully in the treatise on the virtues.5
For the present, then, we shall say that potency is called the
principle of operations, and it is the overflowing or ray of being
(esse) itself, from which operations come forth.6 This is also called
power and is called agent or active potency. In this way we say that
fire has the potency to warm, to dissolve, to render subtle and to
break down heterogeneous elements. For from its overflowing and
force, or from the intensity of its being (esse) or of its nature, it
extends these operations over the contingent matter it encounters,
as if by a certain radiantness by which the bounty of its nature
flows out in it.
Secondly, superiority or domination is called potency. [50] This
happens only by the obedience or the consent of another will and is
in common speech called power. For the will or obedience of
subjects determines what kings and other rulers can do. This is
called power, that is, the obedience or consent of those through
whom there must be done that which one is said to be able to do.
4. Power is associated with the Father, wisdom with the Son, and love
with the Holy Spirit. Thus the whole discussion is trinitarian in this
and the following chapters. The doctrine of appropriation of common
attributes to individual persons was still very much in flux; cf. below,
ch. 25, p. 151 (132). Abelard was condemned for identifying the
Father with power, the Son with wisdom and the Spirit with
goodness; cf. DS 721-722, 734, 737.
5. Switalski refers to William's De virtutibus 20 (Opera Omnia vol. 1, p.
184b); a better source would seem to be William's De gratia (Oxford,
Merton College, ms. no. 136, f. 205v); where he says, "Not all
knowledge of God is saluatary, nor is it all meritorious or acceptable to
God. We say then that belief that is persuaded or extorted by proofs or
signs is not only not acceptable to God and meritorious before God, but
also is not the belief by which one believes him. This is clear from one
example. As a seller who is concerned over the security given by the
buyer for paying the price of the merchandise does not rely on his word
or promise, but believes, if I may say this, the security, so he who does
not believe God's words precisely and without qualification, but seeks
guarantees through proofs and signs should not be judged to believe
God" (quoted and translated from Valois, Guillaume d'Auvergne, pp.
232-233.
6. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 4, 2, pp. 193-196. William's move from
the discussion of being to the discussion of potency, power and
possibility, along with the various kinds of power, reflects the order of
Avicenna's work, though William has simplified Avicenna's treatment
considerably.

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Thirdly, we customarily call potency that quality by which a thing
resists being modified, such as hardness in a stone. For a stone
resists many actions upon it either partially or entirely. Either it is
not at all harmed by the actions of agents upon it, or it is not much
harmed unless the actions upon it are vehement and strong beyond
its strength to resist.7
Of these potencies there are some which are accompanied by
deliberation and will, such as the power of walking in us, and these
are called rational, because they do not pour forth their acts and
operations except by a command of another [power]. There are
other potencies which are not accompanied by deliberation and will
and are called irrational, such as the potency of fire, as we
mentioned. For, when fire has set before it matter that is possible
and suitable and fitting for its action, it pours forth into it, so to
speak, the flow of its operation, as when it comes into contact with
burnable wood, wax, lead or tin.8
Potency and suitableness to receive the impressions of active
potencies are called possibility. The possibility of the egg is said to
be such. By it the egg is suited to receive the impressions which are
the formation of an animal from it. Possibility of this sort is
commonly said to be in the egg from which the animal would
emerge. In common usage such possibility is called a power and a
weak potency for its operations, since, from it, insofar as in it lies,
it is possible that its operations proceed or not. The reason is that it
itself is not by nature the principle of operations of this sort.9 In
this sense we are accustomed to say that any man has the
possibility of being king, but not [51] the potency or power. For
nothing that is in a man is by nature the principle of his being king.
But the principle of being king can be or come to be through other
factors, when he attains those things which by their presence make
a king. Thus a man has the possibility of becoming king, that is, a
weak and feeble potency and one not naturally geared to his being
king. It is, nonetheless, by nature one of those things from which a
king may come to be. But being king is not due to it, since the
possibility is by nature the first among those things that are needed
for being king. Being king is, however, due to those things which
causally or possibly accrue to him, and this possibility differs from
the former only insofar as it receives a perfection from what comes
to it and not from the fact the possibility was by nature geared to
this.
Here we should recall that some possibilities are remote, so that
they come to their final impressions only through many
intermediate steps.10 Such is the possibility in seeds to be the
source of other seeds of the same species. For grain is generated
from grain through many inter-
8. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 4, 2, p. 196, 34--p. 200, 94.
10. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 4, 2, p. 200, 11--p. 201, 16.

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mediate steps, a nut from a nut, an apple from an apple, an animal
from an animal, and [so it is with] all recipients that are not
completely prepared. Such is the possibility of stones in a stone
quarry and of wood in trees for receiving the perfection of being a
house. For it is necessary that an active potency first intervene in
many ways and by its intervention prepare the wood for the final
perfection and ultimately to receive the ordering and joining
together before a house comes about.
Some of the better philosophers insist that possibility is a relation
that matter possesses and that, for this reason, everything that
begins to be is made out of something.11 For in everything that
begins to be non-being (non esse) precedes being (esse), and thus
possibility precedes actuality. If [52] this possibility, they say, is
nothing, it does not precede actuality. But if it is something, it can
only be a relation that matter possesses.12 For matter is in some
way a principle of the being (esse) in actuality that comes to be in
it. Thus they necessarily have to hold that matter is eternal.13
Otherwise it would be necessary that the possibility in it precede
the actuality of being (essendi). Thus the possiblity itself would
likewise be made out of something. Either this would have no end,
or it would be finally necessary to come to some eternal matter. But
they do not in that way escape [the problem].14 For it is necessary
that possibility precede its actuality, if not in time, still by nature.
And, hence, [this holds for] the possibility that is already in the
actuality of its own being (esse), and this is the being (esse) of a
relation. I do not mean its being (esse), in comparison to which and
in respect to which there is said to be another preceding possibility.
This will have no end. Hence, let the possibility not be said to be
eternal; for, granted the priority of possibility to actuality, it is
necessary that the same thing happen in the order of nature that
would happen in time, if that priority were granted.
In second place, such matter will not have being (esse), since it
possesses possibility, and it really will not have that being (esse)
for which it has the possibility.15 Just as seed necessarily has the
being (esse) of seed, which possesses the possibility that it has for
being (esse) an animal, so also matter through its own being (esse)
that it has possesses its own possibility. But if someone says that its
being (esse) is possibility, he
14. Here William breaks with Avicenna's teaching and argues that these
who claim that matter is eternal are still faced with the same regress in
the order of nature which they tried to escape in the order of time by the
assertion of an eternal matter.
15. William's second argument is that such eternal matter is possible and
is not that for which it is the possibility. If matter is said to be possibility,
matter cannot be a substance, since possibility is a relation, according to
Avicenna. And as a relation it is an accident and requires an existing
subject. Hence, William concludes that one should not speak of
possibility as being in matter at all.

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clearly denies that it is a substance, since possibility by its essence
is a relation. But who can doubt that an accident necessarily
requires an existing (existenti) subject, before the accident comes to
be? For [the accident] is supported by it, and by the presence of
[the accident] its being (esse) is perfected and completed.
Therefore, truth requires that possibility not be said to be in matter
at all apart from that which, as we said, is by its nature receptive or
which is by nature a principle accidentally.
[53] Hence, a possible being (ens) is understood as proximate to
being (esse). It is not only proximate to being (esse) through the
material principle, if it should have this, but also through the agent
principle. For each of these renders its effect proximate to being
(esse). Things made out of something are indeed proximate to
being (esse), proximate to being (esse) through their matters which
are suitable for receiving the being (esse) of these things in
themselves, and also through their agent principles. Who can doubt
that a house is closer to the actuality of being (essendi) when its
matter and its agent principle, that is, the builder, both are, than
when there is only the matter, that is, stones and wood? But even if
there were no stones and wood, though the builder had the potency
of causing them, would it not be possible that there be a house? It
certainly would.16
What then is that possibility and in whom is it except the maker
himself, since there is nothing else that possesses it? Therefore, the
possibility of material things is the potency of the maker or creator.
Or perhaps an absence in them of anything that excludes their
being (esse) should be called possibility. For some things exclude
their being (esse), such as a chimera, whose intention embraces a
contrariety of natures not mutually compatible. But when man is
considered in himself, you will not find in his intention something
that excludes his being (esse) because the intention of the natures
that come together in him does not reveal any discrepancy or
repugnance in them. Thus we have made it perfectly clear that the
possible is possible in virtue of the possibility possessed by
matter.17 The truth of the faith confirms this. For it was possible
for the world to be before the world was, but this possibility was
the potency of the creator, as you have already learned, since it is
true of both the first matter and form that it was possible for them
to be before they were.
16. Ultimately, before the world was created, its possibility lay in the
power of the Creator, since he was able to produce any materials he
needed for its creation. Cf. Jan Rohls, Wilhelm yon Auvergne und der
mittelalterliche Aristotelismus (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1980), pp. 119-
120.
17. We have translated the text that Switalski has established; however,
the variant readings he gives would seem to allow one to translate the
sentence as follows: "Thus we have made it clear that not everthing is
possible in virtue of the possibility possessed by matter." Given that
translation, the following sentences would then make more sense.

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If someone should say, "This is not true because [matter and form]
always were or [54] matter always was," he does not get away from
the truth. For having a beginning in time does not give them a new
possibility or take away the prior possibility. Hence, the same thing
accrues to them from this possibility if they come to be, as comes
to the same things if they do not come to be. For it is necessary that
the possibility of being (esse) in them precede the actuality of
being (essendi), I mean, by the order of being (essendi) without
qualification and not by the order of being (essendi) in time. But
that geometers call the power of a line its square is a metaphor in
that a square is a flowing or motion of a line to a depth equal to
itself and across a width equal to itself. These, then, are the powers
and possibilities we have spoken of.18
Some have assigned potency to natural things, power to moral
matters, possibility to rational things, more according to euphony
than analogy.
Chapter IX
On the basis of what we have already said, we must still investigate
the first potency. We shall say, then, that the first potency must be
that which no other precedes and which is furthest from
powerlessness and weakness. For the more pure are prior to the
mixed, the perfect prior to the diminished, the sufficient to the
more needy, and the mightier to the weaker, because the weak
necessarily rest upon the strong. A potency that extends only to one
of two opposites is diminished in comparison to one that extends to
both opposites. For example, fire only has power to heat and not
not to heat.1 For it is not able to heat or not to heat, when it
encounters what can be heated, but it necessarily has only the
power to heat. If fire had power over each of the opposites, it
would necessarily be more powerful since it would always have
both of the opposites in its power and would not necessarily have
to do one. This lessening, then, prevents the potency of fire from
being the furthest from powerlessness. This limiting and
diminution is its turning toward and approach to powerlessness.
Consequently, it is impossible for a potency of this sort to be first.
[55] It is another lessening and imperfection of a potency that it can
be prevented or impeded from its operation. Fire is once again such
a potency, since it can be checked by the strength of its contrary,
and thus it
1. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 4, 2, p. 201, 17-19; cf. also Le Livre de
science: I. Logique, Métaphysique, trans. Mohammed Achena and Henri
Massé (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1955), p. 134.

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is not perfectly sufficient for its operation. There is a certain
imperfection and lessening of a potency insofar as it is not
sufficient for its own operation unless it is aided by another, that is,
either by a recipient or by a means or by an instrument. A potency
that needs none of these is more perfect and, if I may say so, more
powerful, that is, farther from powerlessness, since the former can
do nothing through itself alone, but the latter can. In the same way,
a potency that can be forced is not the mightiest, because coercion
is always from a mightier one. Therefore, the best, most perfect and
mightiest potency is that which by itself has power over both
opposites and whose total operation flows from itself alone and
through itself alone and which in its own strength can neither be
forced nor checked. For a potency of this sort has no admixture of
powerlessness, but is most pure and furthest from powerlessness,
which can do nothing by itself alone.
Likewise, power through itself is prior to power through another.
Lest we go on to infinity, it is necessary that the first powerful one
be powerful through himself and be powerful through his own
essence. For if he were not powerful through his own essence, his
potency would be something acquired. Because a potency is prior
to whatever is from the potency, that potency will be prior to that
by which it is acquired. This is impossible, because it necessarily is
the cause of this potency. Therefore, the ability of the first powerful
one is the first powerful one, and his potency is his essence.
Coercion and prevention come from one more powerful. But there
is nothing mightier than he, since all things are supported by his
essence. Thus his power can neither be forced nor checked by any
external power.
It is clear that he is the mightiest, since he is mighty through his
essence; otherwise, he would not be first in [56] might. Thus the
first potency and the first might are necessarily essential to the first
powerful and the first mighty one. For, if they were acquired, they
would not be first and essential. But if they were not essential, they
would be acquired; for all that is not essential is acquired by its
possessor, since [what is not essential] belongs to it only
accidentally. The reason is that, if the possessor is caused, then its
might and its potency will be caused too. But if the possessor is not
caused, then its might and its potency will either be the same as it,
and they are themselves essential. Or they will be other than it, and
then they will necessarily be caused. For it is necessary that there
be only one uncaused being (esse), as we have shown above.2
Because, then, the power sustaining all things is most mighty and
that which fills all things and from which all things come is most
abundant, this is necessarily, by its potency and might, the first and
highest affluence.
2. Cf. above ch. 4, p. 74 (26-27).

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Thus it can neither dry up in its influence nor tire out in its
generating; it cannot be stopped or meet with any compulsion or
check. It pours forth its operations completely from itself; unless it
had power over its operations and their opposites, it would by no
means be first or pure, as we said.
Thus the first potency, essential to the first powerful one, has
already become clear for us. It would not be first if it were not
utterly unmixed with powerlessness or weakness. Powerlessness is
of the three kinds we have named: lessening or limitation of the
potency to only one opposite, the cessation of the potency by
coercion, and its being subject to prevention. This is the intention
of what is called omnipotence, that is, potency of every sort which
has no injury or diminution from any side, since injury refers to
coercion and prevention and since diminution refers to restriction
to one of two opposites. For it is impossible that the intellect assert
another power that is prior or mightier or more distant from
powerlessness. But if the intellect should assert another power
which does not have this intention, its might and amplitude will
necesarily be less. Omnipotence, as we have already said, consists
in these two.
[57] The fact that the first powerful one is powerful through his
essence explains why he has to be wherever he can do anything.
Similarly, if a king could act only through his essence, he would
undoubtedly be wherever he had power. However, a king is not
prevented from being able to do something where he is not,
because his power is the obedience of his subjects. Thus, he has
power where there are obedient subjects. But there is no doubt he
can only act through his essence where he himself is.
That becomes clear from what has gone before, because the first
powerful one cannot become more or less powerful or powerless in
any way, since he cannot be more or less or otherwise than he is.
For his potency is he himself, and it is also his essence. But nothing
of his essence can become less or worse or increase further.
Therefore, neither can his potency in itself do so. The reason is that
his power in no way depends on other things; rather other things
depend on it, because they are from it. But no injury can befall his
essence so that it should be less or worse, since it itself is most
mighty being (esse). These, then, are the points that had to be set
forth in order to make known that his power is above all and that it
is the most ample and most mighty. It is most ample since it
extends to both opposites, namely, to make and not to make. These
two indicate choice and will on his part, so that, when he wills, he
can make or not make. For if he were in every way indifferent
toward making or not making, then either both would come from
him or neither. But it cannot be that both come from him, because
he would then make and not make the same thing.

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Besides power, then, we must assert will and choice in him in the
manner appropriate for him, for power is in itself indifferent toward
making or not making. Thus the fact that making flows from it at
one time and at another does not is necessarily the result of choice,
since we have already excluded coercion and prevention from him,
and it is impossible [58] to find any other cause in his case. Means
and aids and recipients can be found externally. But we are
speaking of those operations which are his operations not through
another, but immediately from the powerful one himself in general.
Were there no such immediate operations, there could be no
mediate ones from him either, for it is impossible that infinite
intermediates intervene, which are all intermediate causes. For by a
descent into infinity the effect would fade into non-being, like light
passing through an actual infinity.
But now let us return to what we were dealing with and say that a
potency, which can both make and not make, since it is not in itself
more inclined toward making than not making, and which operates
through itself alone, that is, not through something higher or from
another in any way, is necessarily inclined to making through
choice, and likewise to not making. Also, because making and not
making cannot possibly proceed from the same power alone and
through itself, it is not merely power, but it necessarily has with it
that by which it can of itself sometimes not make rather than make,
and the converse. But that which draws this power at times to
making and at times to not making, since it is not drawn causally or
from the outside, is what is called choice or will. It is not permitted
that the first powerful one be drawn causally or from the outside to
making something, since it is necessary that the maker of all things
intend the best end. Notice, however, that a recipient or an
instrument or an aid does not force a potency over each of two
opposites to operate; it is still free in itself since it also has within
itself all that it needs from the outside for the completion of its
operation. If it had necessarily to operate, then, when the aids are
present to it for its operation, it would surely not be a power over
each of the opposites. The same thing happens in that potency
which [59] is determined to only one, for when there are present
the external things which it demands for its operation, it will
operate necessarily, but it will not operate where their addition is
lacking. Therefore, a power that behaves in this fashion does not
extend over both opposites. For a power over each of two opposites
is free to operate or not operate, even when there is not present to it
what is needed from the outside. Thus choice and will, by which
the potency chooses at times to operate and at times not to operate,
makes it operate or not operate. Hence, the operations of the first
powerful one are through choice or will, insofar, I mean, as they
are through the first potency. Only someone irrational will fail to
see how irrational it is to assert that the first potency is irrational.3

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The omnipotence, then, of the first powerful one me-aria that he
can neither be forced to do what he does not will nor be prevented
from doing what he wills, and this is the liberty of his
magnificence. But it is impossible that there be will and choice
where there is no knowledge. Therefore, the first potency
necessarily has with it knowledge and will Though the
wonderfulness of things and their most beautiful order and great
numbers that we see in the changing of the seasons should
sufficiently persuade rational beings that there is a first wisdom, we
shall nonetheless try to establish this in another way. For there is no
doubt that wisdom is either with him or with another, either in act
or in potency at least. It is manifest that it is either all acquired or
some is not acquired and that the posterior is acquired, while the
first is essential, if there is any of this sort.
Let us inquire first whether the will, through which the first
powerful one has produced all things, is acquired or is essential to
him. For, when he wills, his knowledge cannot be subsequent to his
willing. Indeed, if one were to precede the other, knowledge would
by right precede will, especially since the will itself is understood
as the power of choice by which he chooses that things be rather
than not, and to make them rather than not. [60] Thus the order can
be such that deliberation precedes choice in all cases. Therefore,
wisdom is not present to him subsequent to the will itself. But it
would be present to him subsequently, if it was acquired by him
and was not his by essence. Hence, wisdom will be in him
essentially. But if his will is acquired, it is necessary that it came to
him from his essence or from the outside from another. It is not
possible that his will came to him from his essence. For then the
same thing would be agent and recipient, giving to and undergoing
from itself in the same respect, because by its will the essence
would indivisibly pass outside itself in an essential manner. As a
result, in one respect it gives itself will and in another it receives
will, although there can be no distinction in it, as there is in one
doctoring oneself, where what acts is in his soul and what receives
health is in his body.4
Second, who can doubt that every [act of] willing is acquired
through apprehension from what is willed? But if it took place in
this manner, then apprehension already preceded will in him.
Wherefore, the apprehension or cognition of everything is in this
way found to be in him. But it follows from this that the will is the
cause of itself. For, since in this respect his will is derived from
things, which are derived from it and
3. Cf. Augustine, Retractationes 1, 3, 2 (CCL 57, 13), where he says
that Plato ''called the eternal and immutable reason by which God
made the world the intelligible world. It follows that one who denies
this reason says that God made what he made irrationally or that he
did not know what he was making when he was making it or before
he made it."
4. William borrows the image from Avicenna; cf. Metaphysics 4, 2, p.
195, 99-07.

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through it, the will will be derived from itself through these things.
Moreover, when the things themselves were not, the maker of them
chose that they be rather than not be; then their being (esse) was
necessarily apprehended and known and chosen and willed. They
themselves were utterly not, and a non-being can in no sense be the
cause of what is. Therefore, they cannot be the cause of the
cognition and choice concerning them. Hence, cognition and
choice were not acquired through them, nor were they acquired by
the first maker through his essence; therefore, they are not acquired
by him. Hence, they are essential to him.
But someone might say that these things could not be known until
they are. Therefore, the production of them was not according to
choice and will, but [61] was only by chance. However, we have
shown that the first potency does whatever it does by choice and
will. It is manifest that, in order to make, a maker does not need the
very things which he makes in order that he may make them. But
after he has made them, he could have need of what he had already
made, so that they be models for him or instruments or aids
towards other things. Likewise, in this fashion, his willing would
be acquired through apprehension. Therefore, his apprehension is
either acquired by him or it is not. If it were acquired by him, then
it is acquired through the things themselves, but they were not then
in any sense. Hence, this apprehension comes into being (esse)
through what is completely non-being. But, if the apprehension
were acquired by him through himself, the same thing will have to
be said of the will. But we have already excluded this.
It follows, then, according to what we have said, that his cognition
and will are not acquired by him; thus it is necessary that they are
essential to him. Therefore, his knowing and willing are his
through his essence, that is, they are essential and not acquired.
Thus his potency, his wisdom, and his will are essential to him. But
nothing apart from him is essential to him, as we have already
shown; hence, he is his potency, his wisdom and his will. Just as
there is no cause of his essence, but rather the essence is the cause
of all things, so there is no cause of his potency, his wisdom and his
will, but rather he is the one cause of all things. And just as his
essence cannot receive more or less in itself and according to itself,
so neither can his willing. But just as what he is is not related to
one thing more than to another, but he stands equally toward all
things insofar as he is, so what he can do does not regard one thing
more than another, but through himself alone and in himself he is
able to do what he can. The reason is that his potency is completely
free in itself and through itself so that it is not bound more to one
thing than to another. Hence, he can do all things equally.
In the same way we shall show that he knows all things equally.
The reason is that his wisdom is absolute and free, not bound in
any way to things, nor dependent upon them, but he is through
himself wholly wis-

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dom. Because it is through itself, it is the wisdom of all things
equally, and [62] all things are equally known in it. For a thing is
not known in it in such a way, and this wisdom does not through
itself regard some determined things so that it is only of them or
more concerning them. The reason is that, by the very fact that he
is, he is wisdom. Hence, by his being (esse) that is free and
absolute in every way he is wisdom and, therefore, equally the
wisdom of all things. In this way, the same thing will also be said
of his will in itself and through itself. However, we do not deny
that some things are more willed by and more pleasing to God, but
we shall state in the proper place the intention of these things. This
will, however, is generally called benignity and goodness, though
we have not yet come to explaining these matters.
These three, however, are one perfection of the artisan, and every
production is praiseworthy on these grounds, namely, power,
wisdom and will. Of these the will has the role of one
commanding; potency has the role of one supplying the abundance
of things to be done; and wisdom has that of one making and
forming. Hence, the artisan of all things is rightly called wisdom:
"and all things were made through him" [cf. Jn 1:3]. For to show
all these things it would have sufficed for a thinking person to
recall that the essence of the first being is pure and free and most
bare, not bound to matter or its appendages.5 An example of this is
the essence which is the perfection of plant life, which is so bound
to the matter of plants that it is not able to move it from one place
to another. But the essence, which is the perfection of beasts, is
more master of its matter and thus less bound to it; for this reason it
has been made capable of the lowest knowledge.6 The rational soul
is still less tied to the matter in which it is and is capable of still
higher cognition.7 But the souls of holy men are even less tied to
matter and, therefore, are still more lofty in knowledge. And the
prophets in ecstacy are, we read, at times so separated from their
bodies that they see [63] visions. And so also, because they have
souls nearly separated from their bodies, those in madness or
rapture become more lofty in knowledge.
These then are the proofs by which it can be argued that every pure
and free essence is intellectual, because immersion in matter is a
darkening of its being (esse). Hence, some of the philosophers have
called matter the river Lethe.8 Therefore, the nakedness of being
(esse) is its
5. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 1, 2, pp. 15-16, 89-03 and 8, 6, p. 414,
95-07.
6. Cf. Aristotle, De anima 2, 12, 424a33-425a4.
7. Cf. Aristotle, De anima 3, 4, 429a18-429b4.
8. Lethe is the river of the underworld of Greek mythology that brings
forgetfulness to the souls that cross it. Cf. Plato, Republic 10, 621c and
Phaedrus 248. In dealing with original sin in De vitiis et peccatis 5 and
8 (Opera Omnia vol. 1, pp. 271a-b and 280a-b), William mentions that
philosophers and poets, especially Plato, "seem to have glimpsed
original sin as if in a dream."

Page 104
luminosity and its freedom or liberation from the bonds of matter.
For it is the freedom of knowing itself and other things, but
especially of knowing itself, that is made clear by the example of
the human soul. Perhaps our discussion on this matter will be fuller
when we speak of the gifts in the treatise on the virtues.9 Here we
must not delay on such matters.
It is necessary that the first being (ens) that is the principle for all
others be first in every way and that whatever is in it or said of it is
said of it primarily and to the highest degree. Just as it is the first
and greatest, so it is necessary that everything that belongs to it is
first and greatest, for there is a proportion between it and what
belongs to it and between each of the other things and what belongs
to them. Hence, these will be mutually proportional, so that just as
it is in relation to the other things, so what belongs to it is in
relation to what belongs to the others. Therefore, as it is first and
greatest in relation to the others, so it is necessary that what
belongs to it is first and greatest in relation to what belongs to all
other things. Therefore, his wisdom and goodness and everything
else of his are in the ultimate degree; otherwise they would be
neither first nor greatest. Likewise, if they were not his essentially,
they would be neither first nor greatest, since the things that are
present essentially are both greater and more present than those that
[64] are not present essentially. Just so fire is hotter and heat is
more present in it than in what is not essentially hot.10 Therefore,
everything that belongs to the first and highest is first and greatest,
both primarily and to the highest degree. This is its nobility and
ultimate excellence, that it has nothing secondary or lesser or
diminished, but everything in the ultimate degree of perfection,
beyond which no perfection can be thought.
Power, then, and knowledge and will belong to him in the ultimate
degree of nobility and in the highest degree of perfection. Imagine,
therefore, if you can, his potency as an unlimited source that is
inexhaustible and pouring forth magnificent and marvellous works,
which are without number. In the same way also imagine his
wisdom as an unlimited source of light, of the sciences, of the arts
and of the other spiritual illuminations. Likewise, imagine the
goodness or will or love, by which he loves all good things, as a
vast furnace of spiritual fire, which is love. Along these paths seek
for yourself ways to imagine from bodily likenesses his
magnificence and wondrousness and how he has the ultimate
nobility in all its modes and primacy and greatness and abundant
richness in every way.
But let us return to what we were about and say that all things are
subject to the first power and domination. The reason is that
nothing comes from him except through his will, and he only holds
in being (esse)
9. For example, William, De Virtutibus 11 (Opera Omnia vol. 1, pp.
130b-131b and 135a).
10. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 2, 1, 993b23-26.

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what he wills and when he wills and how he wills; nor can he be
prevented or forced. We will explain in the proper place whether
things which are called evil are from him and in what way.11
Therefore, this power is universal rule and dominion encompassing
all things. Similarly the first wisdom is also, as we have already
shown, the first light and first source of light through itself,
revealing itself and all other things, for this is the property of light.
[65] Our wisdom is a wisdom, as it were, impressed after the
manner of an exemplification (exemplum), and like light infused
and illuminated, and like a book inscribed with the likenesses of
things, and like the appearance of forms reflected in a mirror. For
our intellect is like a mirror in which the appearances of the
intelligibles are reflected. The first wisdom, however, is necessarily
like the exemplar of all things through itself, not inscribed or
engraved from the outside, but through its essence it is the art and
exemplar of all things. Hence, it is the intelligible world and what
some call the archetypal world.12 It should be called the wisdom
and art of the universe, likewise the mirror and image and
intelligibility, since in it there are the intelligible contents and the
exemplar ideas of all things essentially, not impressed or infused or
adventitious or acquired in any way, but essentially. Hence, all
things are one in it because its being (esse) and its essence are one
in every way.
This wisdom is brilliant light, beyond which there is no light.
Hence, it is the light of all lights, since every other light is but
illumined light, not giving light through its essence.13 For if there
were something other than it which is light through its essence,
whose luminosity is essential to it, then its giving light and its
being (esse) will be one reality. Therefore, to give light is essential
to it, and its being (esse) will be essential to it. But we have already
excluded there being something else to which being (esse) is
essential.
This, then, is the reason why this wisdom is called true light [cf. Jn
1:9] and essential light, giving light and illuminating by its essence.
For this reason it is called the book of life [cf. Rv 3:5] and the
scripture of truth, because in it one can read the series of all ages
and in it all things are inscribed essentially, not because there are in
it all essences, but the exemplar ideas of all things, in the manner
we have stated. In this way we can philosophize concerning his
will, which is called pure benignity, and which nothing external can
move. It [66] is for itself the whole that it loves; hence, there was
no end moving from the outside, since his will is
11. Cf. William, De bono et malo, 7, in J. Reginald O'Donnell,
"Tractatus Magistri Guillelmi Alvernensis De bono et malo," MS 8
(1946) p. 256-257; also cf. below, ch. 44, pp. 261-262 (250).
12. William is referring to Plato; cf. William, De universo, 2-2, 8,
(Opera Omnia vol. 1, p. 852b). Augustine called this wisdom an
intelligible world; cf. above, note 3.
13. Cf. Liber de causis 5 (6), 57-58, p. 59.

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not acquired. In this way, then, he willed that there are the things
that are, just as he more generously wills that there be the works of
his generosity, or freely pours them forth from the abundance of his
sweetness, which is his generosity. Thus he freely and gratuitously
willed them, knowing that no advantage accrues to him from
things. And if some praise and glory were to come to him
externally from things, it redounds not to his advantage, but to the
advantage of those praising and glorifying him. Otherwise, his
benignity would be negotiable and for sale, and it would have
undertaken its works as if for the reward of some end. Because he
willed freely that things should be and willed only by his essence,
he is, therefore, benign by his essence, since this is the meaning of
benignity, a will that is free from every advantage whatsoever from
another, or a good will. Far from him be any simoniacal venality!
Chapter X
The power of the first powerful one and the wisdom of the first
wise one and the benignity or will of the first one who wills are not
acquired by him, but are essential to him. Hence, the foremost
among the philosophers, namely, the Peripatetics, have thought that
the operations of the same one are eternal.1
For external things do not induce him to will at a particular time in
a certain way, and he did not become capable of something, as we
already know. Since the full sufficiency of his operations lies in
these three things we have named, nothing more is needed for the
artisan to proceed to his works, except possibly some extrinsic aids,
such as the [67] receptivity of the patient or his proximity to acting
or the means. But the universal artisan did not need even these aids,
insofar as his first operations are concerned; otherwise, they would
not be first. For it was necessary that such aids be made first. And
so the making of such aids came first. Consequently, the first
operation of the first maker is not helped by something else. Hence,
the first maker is the entire sufficiency of those things that are
required for them to be. Thus, because from eternity he was the
entire sufficiency of those things that are required for their being
(esse), they are also necessarily from eternity.
Thus it seems to be neccessary that there was something eternal
besides the first maker, and this is so, whether something is made
by him immediately or also by a means. For one has to reason in
the same way
1. The Perpatetics referred to are Alfarabi and Avicenna, though
William relied chiefly upon Avicenna. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 9,
2, p. 462, 54, for a similar allusion. The argument seems to be drawn
from Metaphysics 9, 4, p. 478, 66-84; cf. also Metaphysics 8, 7, p.
426, 60 and p. 428, 81-89.

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about a means and about other aids, because all those exterior
things which his operation could need are necessarily derived from
him. Hence, they are either immediately from him and, therefore,
eternal, or they are mediately from him, and the same reasoning
applies to the means. This path leads them to the point of being
forced to say that everything is eternal.
We shall say, then, that the divine will, absolutely and under any
consideration, is not a <necessary> cause that something is
(essendi). For example, the fact that God wills something to be,
does not make it have to be now, but the fact that he wills it to be
now does without a doubt necessarily make the thing to be now.
Therefore, the willing it to be without qualification makes it be
without qualification, and the willing the thing to be now makes it
be now, and the willing that it be always makes it be always. The
divine will, however, wills that there be an order in things and that
one thing be after another. Thus it is not necessary that the heaven
or the world be eternal, because he only willed that it should be in
time and from time. It is necessary that each of these be as long as
it is his will and that they begin to be when it is his good pleasure
that they begin. Hence, it is clear that the world is not eternal, [68]
because we must admit that it was created or made or drawn from
its possibility into actuality.2 It is necessary that its creation took
place, and according to our adversaries it was neither in time nor in
eternity. But it is then necessarily eternal and has no beginning of
its existence (existentiae) and will have no end. Therefore, there
will be a creation of the world, though it is uncreated, and this is
utterly frivolous. But if its creation were in time or in an instant,
then the world necessarily was created in time or from time.
Again, the first maker either acted so that the world would be or he
did not. If he did not, how may he be called its cause or maker? If
he did, his operation either had some extent in time or it did not. If
it had some extent, it was either finite or infinite. If finite, this is
time, and thus in time or from time it acquired being (esse). If the
extent is infinite, it seems impossible that the world was created,
because the infinite is also not transversible. But if there were no
extent, then necessarily it was instantaneous and accomplished in
the moment, since according to this the world was made instantly.
Further, either the whole of time that has flowed by up to now is by
itself infinite or it is not. If it is, how is it infinite, since the whole
has already passed? For the infinite without qualification cannot be
transversed; the infinite in number cannot be transversed by
counting. Then, if its infinity has not prevented the whole from
having passed, it will not prevent what is still future in it from
passing. Thus the whole of it will
2. William says that the world was drawn from its possibility into
actuality, but its possibility was in the power of the first agent. Cf.
above, ch. 8, p. 96 (53)

Page 108
pass, and it will also be true at some time that that whole has
passed, just as it is true now that the whole of time which has
flowed by up to the present moment has passed. But if it will be
true at some time that the whole of time that is future has passed,
then what is future in time is not infinite, since it is determined at
both ends. For what is future in time has as its initial limit the
present moment and has as its final limit that point at which it will
first be true that the whole has passed. Someone might say that its
infinity should prevent its being ended, just as [69] it prevents the
already past part of time from having begun, but this does not solve
the problem, unless the whole future is prevented from having
elapsed, as before.
What [the Peripatetics] especially rely on and use as a principle in
their proofs is this proposition: A pure and true intellect testifies
that, if the one essence is now as it was before when nothing came
forth from it, something will not now come forth from it.3
This is the source of the whole error they have made in this matter.
We show that it is false as follows. Either God can create
something that in no way depends on the things that are, or he
cannot. We understand by "the things which are" things which are
other than him. If he cannot do this, it is the same as saying that he
could not cause more than one sun, and the things that are set a
limit to his potency, as if he could not create another world than he
created, or another sun or another moon. But we have already
shown, and in this they agree with us, that the first powerful one
acts through choice and will.4
What then was his first choice if he could not create other things,
since he was not free to create or make another world, either a
greater or a lesser or a better one? What, I ask, would have limited
his potency to this way of acting?5
Or was he perhaps not able to make a greater or a better world?
This, however, appears to be impossible from the fact that the first
power is absolute power and power without qualification, not a
power for this or that, as is the power in us to run or not to run.
But if someone should say that his power is power for the world or
over the world, or for the universe or over the universe, he means
either the universe without qualification and in general or this
universe. If he means the universe without qualification, then he
means the universe that is possible in itself. Then God will be
powerful over everything that is
5. In his discussion of omnipotence; cf. above, ch. 9, p. 97 (54). William
argues that a power is diminished if it is able to do only one of two
opposites. Hence, the first powerful one is able to act or not to act and to
do this or that.

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possible in itself. We have already explained what is possible in
itself.6 Hence, he will be able to create something new that does
not depend on any of those things that are. But if someone should
say [70] that the power of the first powerful one holds only for the
universe which is, then he is not able to make anything new. This,
however, is false, since a man can generate, even if he will not
generate, and there can be men from his generating, even if there
will not be, and their souls could be created even if they will not be
created.
Let us go back and say that a potency for a certain and determinate
end is tied in some way either to an instrument or to a subject by
which it is drawn to that end. Thus the potency of walking is in the
feet and in the other things which by their form and nature are
suited for walking and by which walking is accomplished. In
general, this limitation to some one end prevents the potency from
being free and absolute in every way; for that it can accomplish
nothing beyond a prescribed end is due to something that prevents
it or to its powerlessness. For the fact that strong and copious
waters flow forth in both variety and abundance is due to the
richness and bounteousness of the spring, and that they are rare or
few or weak is due to some defect.
Again, since the possible in itself is said without qualification and
not for something or determinately in relation to someone, the one
powerful through himself will not be powerful for something
precisely and determinately, but he will have power over the
possible absolutely. For the possible is able to receive being (esse),
and the one powerful through himself is absolutely able to give it
absolutely. But what is able to give through itself is not more able
to give to one rather than to another. For then it would not be able
to give through itself alone, but its potency would be tied in some
way to things or dependent on them. For whoever is through
himself alone is essentially; therefore, the one able to give through
himself looks only to what is able to receive through itself
absolutely.
The absolute and first potency, then, is necessarily power over the
absolutely possible. Hence, it is over every possible, as we have
said. It is certain [71] that something of the sort that in no way
depends on things that are is possible in itself. Therefore, the first
powerful one has power over it. He can then give being (esse) to it,
since it is in itself able to receive it. Therefore, granted this is
possible, namely, that he give being (esse) to it, nothing impossible
occurs.
Suppose that it is now being created. Either the first potency and
essence is entirely as it was before, or it is not. If it is, then nothing
prevents the one essence from being as it was, when there was
nothing from
6. Cf. above, ch. 8, p. 96 (53).

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it. Therefore, a true and pure intellect does not testify to the
contrary. If, however, this essence is not as it was before, then there
is some variation or change in it, and they rightly do not accept
this. But it is also not necessary that there be any variation and
change in things, since that essence does not in any way depend on
them. Therefore, it is not necessary that something new come to be
from the creation of that thing, either in the creator or in things.
The source of the error that they call the evidence of a pure and
true intellect has already been destroyed. For there is no doubt that,
just as the giver is to the receiver, so one able to give is to the one
able to receive, because the first powerful one has power over the
possible absolutely and is said to be somehow in relation to it.
We shall also destroy that error in another way and say that either
there is something new or all things are eternal. If all things are
eternal, then generation and corruption and other changes are
nothing, time or motion is nothing, and there is no need for us to
delay in this sort of refutation. But if there is something new, let us
call it A. Either there was the whole sufficiency of those things
which were required for the being (esse) of A, or there was not. We
call a sufficiency that to which nothing is lacking, neither a part,
nor a mode, nor an operation, nor any other of those things which
in some way aid the operation insofar as [72] the operation requires
it for its being (esse). If there was at that point the whole
sufficiency of those things which the being (esse) of A required,
then A itself already was. Hence, it is not new. For we call new
what was not before and now is. But if this sufficiency was not
whole, then something was lacking for its being (esse). Let us call
that B. Concerning B we ask the same question, whether that whole
multitude beyond which nothing was required for its being (esse),
already was or not. If it was, then B was; yet it has just been
asserted that B was not. But if that whole multitude was not, then
something of it was not. And so this will go on to infinity, or in
something there will be said to be its whole sufficiency. Yet B is
not through this sufficiency -- and afterwards it will be through it --
and it will be true that, when the new essence arises from it, this
multitude is exactly the same as before, and yet it did not arise
from it before. If it is not completely as before, then one of its
modes is lacking that had to be created first. Hence, the whole
multitude is not, because that mode, as we have determined,
obviously pertains to the multitude, but we said that the whole
multitude already was. Hence, they must either admit that this goes
on to infinity, or what they attributed to a pure and true intellect is
false.
If they say this reasoning goes to infinity, according to them each
created thing that is not eternal will require an infinity of things.
For there is question here only of things that something created
needs in order to be, and each one of them will need infinite others.
Thus it is clear that this

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is false, because the causes of each thing are finite, the aids are
finite, and the operations are finite that the efficient cause in each
case needs for operating. For it will be impossible that something
begins to be anew, since for a thing to come to be, it is necessary
that all the other things come to be. Hence, an infinity of operations
will accompany every operation, and an infinity of motions every
motion. For it is necessary that B come to be in order that A may
come to be, since A needs [73] B. Likewise, in order for B to come
to be, it is necessary that C come to be, since C is what was
previously lacking in order for B to be or to come to be. Thus it
will be necessary that an infinity of things come to be in order that
any one thing may come to be. It is clear that this is impossible,
since in each creation or generation there are finite things that
operate. All the causes are finite, just as the aids and means and
those things according to which the operation occurs are finite, as
well as what is intended.
Chapter XI
We have already established it with certainty that the one cause,
whether there is one thing or many, is as it was before when it was
not doing something, and yet it now is doing something and before
was not.1 Otherwise it would be impossible to find a cause for
doing something; I mean, a cause which before did nothing and
now does something. This is an indication of the governance and
providence of the most high God. It is by his sign and will that
those things which previously were not doing anything eventually
do something, though there is in them no change or additional aid,
for they have all that is necessary for doing something. His will,
however, as he does something is exactly the same us it was before
when he was commanding and willing. From all eternity he willed
that this begin to be now and not before, and [he did not will it
only] on the condition that something new be added by his will to
the agents intermediate between him and the last effect. For what
he previously gave them is sufficient for them to do these things.
Who can doubt that the weight of a heavy body does <not> suffice
for acquiring something other than what is natural to it?
Nevertheless, it only attains [what is natural to it] if it has attained
the intermediate places. It is certain that fire produces burning; yet
Moses saw that the flaming bush [cf. Ex 3:2ff.] was not burned.
Water naturally flows, though the waves of the Red Sea [cf. Ex
14:15-29] and the waters of the Jordan [Jos 3:14-17] stood still for
the passage of the children [74] of Israel. Therefore, either the
potency of fire was changed, or a new potency was given the bush
for resisting. Then it was no miracle that
1. Cf. above, ch. 10, pp. 108-111 (69-73); cf. also Avicenna,
Metaphysics 9, 1, p. 440, 23-25.

Page 112
the bush was not burned up, since either the fire did not have
sufficient potency for this or the bush had received a new potency
of resisting by which it protected itself unharmed. Thus it would be
an illusion, not a miracle. Either it would not be a real fire that was
seen, or it would not be a real bush which had lost its combustible
nature. Then Moses would have been deceived, since the bush that
he thought was combustible was not then combustible, or the fire
that was not consuming seemed to be consuming. This same
reasoning can be used concerning the water.2
Thus it is more correct to say that the fire was in the bush with its
nature completely intact, and the bush continuing in its natural
passivity survived completely unharmed. The fire is by its nature
sufficient for burning something combustible presented to it. It is
certain that, if later it had burned the bush, the essence of the fire
would be exactly the same as it was when it did not burn the bush.
For it was not necessary that a new power or an addition of power
be given to it to accomplish the burning, since its nature would
suffice for this and would remain fully preserved and intact in all of
its dispositions, as we have shown. Thus the miracle would not be
thought a deceitful illusion. Therefore, there is a single essence of
fire just as at first when no burning up proceeded from it, and [the
bush] is receptive as before. But the first cause in itself is
immutable in every way, and it does not change the fire in any way,
since it neither confers something new on it nor takes away
something that it had before. But if someone should say that God
held in check the potency of the fire, I ask whether that holding in
check is something or nothing? If it is nothing, then what we said
above is true, because the essence of fire is completely as it was
before. But if it is something that would make the fire actually
soothing,3 though it is yet consuming by its power, that miracle
would be an imaginary illusion, not the truth.
[75] From these examples it is clear that [the Aristotelians] have
attributed false testimony to the pure and true intellect.4 They have
forgotten what they rightly said, namely, that nature does not
operate according to choice and will, but in the manner of a
servant,5 because nature really depends on the sign and will of the
lordship that gives orders
2. William argues that for the miracle to have been real the fire and
the bush must have retained their natures as burning and combustible.
Otherwise Moses would have been deceived. Cf. below, ch. 12, p.
116 (79), where William accounts for the darkness during the
Passion, not in terms of a decrease in the sun's luminosity, but in the
Creator's not allowing this luminosity to flow forth.
3. Le Feron, the editor of the Supplementum in the 1674 Orléans-Paris
edition of William's works, adds in the margin that this is an unusual
word which describes a weakening of the power of fire.
4. William is referring to Avicenna, Metaphysics 9, 1, p. 440, 23-25.
5. Avicenna said, ''A natural [cause] does not act through choice, but in
the manner of one who serves . . . " (Metaphysics 9, 2, p. 448, 71-72).

Page 113
to all things. For, since nature depends in its whole being (esse) on
this will,6 it is impossible that it operate absolutely and freely
without the sign and good pleasure of this will.7 In this they erred,
attributing more to nature than it can do and not realizing that
nature's total power is completely subject to divine choice. For it is
impossible for the light to emit light from itself without any
lessening and diminution of itself and with no harm whatever to its
essence; otherwise, it would seem to create light through itself. The
reason is that light in itself is only [being] in need. Thus light has it
from another source that it is so abundant that it overflows. And so
light is not by itself the cause of light, but owes it to another that it
is a cause, just as it owes to the giver of being (esse) that it is.8 It
receives from the universal source its being the cause of light
without any change of it or another. An example of this is the
eclipse of the sun during the Passion of the Savior, when the sun is
said to have withdrawn its rays. But as the sun could not by itself
do that, so it cannot shed them. What then was the cause of the
light of the sun not shedding light by its rays, except that its
shedding its rays was totally a matter of heaven's choice? For it is
from the good pleasure of him who falls all that the source of light
is filled to overflowing, and it is subject to the same good pleasure
that it moderates its untiring overflow of its benefits according to
his will.
These others, however, speak as if God left these natures to
themselves and does not restrain, control and order them by the
care of his governance and as if they could do something by
themselves.9 But if that were the universe, [76] it would hardly last
with natures fighting and mutually destroying one another. It is
undoubtedly true that the power of natures is only the will of the
maker and that they are able to do nothing against his will or
beyond it or other than it. These natures are quiet and peaceable
among themselves in every way. This is the principle and law of all
natural movements and changes. For if these natures were left to
themselves, they would necessarily slip into non-being (non esse),
but by the will that created them they continue and are held in
being (esse) until now. He who holds and preserves them directs
and rules their operations, whether or not we understand this mode
of governance. Natures have certain and limited powers, whether
or not we are up to comprehending
6. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 8, 4, pp. 397, 55-398, 62.
7. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 9, 4, p. 477, 56-58: "For all being that
comes from him does not arise according to the way of nature so that the
being of all things arises from him neither through knowledge nor
through his good pleasure." When William uses "sign: nutus," he has in
mind Augustine's statement that the beauties of creatures are signs or
expressions of God's will; cf. De lib. arb. 2, 16, 43 (CCL 29, 266) and
below, ch. 42, p. 234 (218), where William attributes this expression to
Augustine.

Page 114
them. Hence, there is absolutely no necessity in a nature,
considered in itself, that it operate and pour forth something from
out of itself. What forces this and makes it happen is the strength
and, so to speak, the torrent of the first flowing. An example of this
in the sensible world is specially apparent in the sun. Its strength
and abundance of light forces its rays to flow out further and
illuminate what is near it and other things near them. Another
example of this same thing is a torrent or a stream flowing
unceasingly, where one wave impels another and forces it to flow
further. Thus the stream of goods and the torrent of sweetness
flowing from the first source forces the single streams and the
outpourings to flow forth further. That stream is the universe, and
the single streams are individual members of the universe.
However, flowings of this sort mutually impel one another, since
they mutually receive from one another, and one mutually flows
over another. This sort of alternation flourishes in the sensible
world, but in the intelligible world, that is, in the universe of
spiritual things, the higher do not seem to receive from the lower,
but rather the converse. There is another example in the human
soul. From it ceaselessly flowing life enlightens the whole body
somewhat like light. This flow is unceasingly restored by the
abundant overflow of its own source, since the universal source by
its unceasing influx of life continually forces it to overflow into the
body as long as the body is capable of life and suited to receive
life.
[77] Natures, therefore, are not of themselves sufficient to pour
forth other things from themselves, except to the extent that their
possibility is filled to overflowing by the influx of the first source.
The most copious strength of the first flowing causes them to pour
forth and overflow into other things. It is completely subject to the
good pleasure of this influencing source that he makes the flow
stop and holds it back whenever he wishes, without any change
whatever in himself. The flowing, however, comes from some
nature, but not out of its plenitude, since it is impossible for it to
give being (esse) through itself. Perhaps this only says that, after it,
as their creator and governor ordered essences, so he should also
fill them in an orderly way so that the order of illuminations
imitates the order of essences. The reason is that all fullness and all
perfection can only flow from the first source; even though it is
necessary that it flow through intermediate things, it cannot be due
to any other than the first. Someone might perhaps say that the
lighting of a house is due to the window, but one should not say
this even though the lighting of a house needs a window. Rather
one should say that illumination is due to the sun which is
comparable to what is first, just as it is due to the window which is
comparable to what is second. For intermediate natures are certain
paths and windows of all the outflowings descending from the first,
but not causes,

Page 115
unless we use the name of cause somewhat improperly.10 For just
as a stream fills the low spots through which it passes and, having
filled them, pours into others so that it fills them too, so the
abundance of the first source fills first the essences closer to it and
makes the fullness of these a means for the filling of others. So too,
a stream uses the valley it has filled as a way of filling other places
and smoothes it out as a way for itself to fill other places, for it had
no way by which its flowing might pass on to others.
Chapter XII
That the power of creatures has extended beyond their legitimate
boundaries and prescribed limits is manifest, and the most noble
[78] of all the philosophers saw this.1 For he said that the proof of
the generosity of the giver of goodness is the obedience of all
things to him. That is, each thing is compelled to offer itself. It
cannot belong to things by nature that they give themselves. But
the most copious generosity of the universal giver forces this
giving of self. Or one might prefer to say that the nature of each
thing is the sign and good pleasure of the universal ruler, and
nothing more correct can be said, for all that they either can do or
are is the good pleasure of the creator.
It pleased the creator to bring to a halt this flow of his goodness in
each single thing. Hence, each thing itself has no power for a
further influence. It will have neither more nor less of the flow on
this account, that is, on account of the stopping of the flow in it.
Suppose light would stop in the window; from the fact, I say, that it
would stop in the window, it would not have either more or less
light. For the sun would not on that account flow forth either more
or less. Nor should the reflection and bouncing back of light throw
you off, because it causes a multiplication as happens in concave
mirrors; it is not the stopping that makes the reflection but the flow.
An example of this is the overflow of water from a full container. It
is not the stopping of the water in the full container that causes the
overflowing, but the abundance of it and its flow. As it is with
light, so is it also in natures, so that they do not receive either more
or
10. William's images reduce the role of creatures in the production of
things to that of conduits of the divine causal flux which pours
through them like water through a river bed or light through a
window. Indeed creatures are not causes in the proper sense, but
merely in relation to our sense knowledge; the creator alone is a cause
in the strict sense. Cf. below, ch. 12, pp. 116-117 (79).
1. CL Avicebron, Fons vitae 2, 21, p. 62, 22-23; 3, 13, pp. 107ff; 3, 46,
p. 184, 9ff; 5, 32, p. 316, 18-23; 5, 33, p. 318, 10-14; 5, 43, p. 338, 25ff.

Page 116
less of the influx from the first source on the account of the fact
that they are paths of further influence and filling, than if it pleased
the creator to stop in them the flow of his abundance. Hence, they
are in themselves the same when there is a flow out from them or
through them to other things and when it is the good pleasure of the
creator that there not be, but that it stop in them, as in the case of
the flaming bush that was not burned up. Thus it is said to be
aflame, but it is impossible that the creator is changed in any way.
From the fact, then, that he sometimes holds back the flow of his
abundance and sometimes pours it forth, there is no need that
something new comes to him. For the strength and abundance and
freedom of his power is such that [79] he can do everything
through himself alone and through his essence. His goodness and
benignity are such that he wills everything without being induced,
persuaded, enticed, or forced by something else. He sees
everything without being illumined, because he himself through his
essence is light brilliant and most pure, besides which there is no
other light; rather he himself is light in the highest degree and
illumining through himself.2
By reason of the fact that in the Passion of Our Savior the
luminosity of the sun did not flow forth, it was not necessary that
there be an extinction and lessening of the light in the sun; though
this was possible. Rather, with the luminosity of the sun preserved
and intact in every way, the creator was able to cause the
luminosity not to flow through the air.
This is what we intended to make clear, namely, the error of
philosophers insofar as they located in natures the necessity of
causing and influencing other things. For, if that influence and
causing are considered clearly, they are rather the compulsion of
the first generosity. For it is in no way possible for a thing that
itself receives being (esse) to give being (esse), I mean, to give out
of itself. But if it gives, not out of itself and not out of what it is its
own, then it is a path for other things tO get being (esse), not as a
giver, but as a messenger in some way conveying being (esse),
especially if it receives it in order to give it. For that is the
definition of one who gives as a servant, that is, bearing the gift of
another. Therefore, there is no cause except the prior and no
intention for causality except the ordering of priority, but this
should be understood of a cause giving being (esse), one that gives
out of itself and out of what is its own. It is manifest that besides
this first universal cause there cannot possibly be another, except in
the manner we have said.
2. Cf. Liber de causis 5 (6), 58, p. 59.

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Therefore, the creator is the cause of natures and of natural
dispositions. Though in the strict meaning and in truth, he alone is
a cause, the intermediate things, and what [the philosophers] have
called causes, are causes for sense knowledge.3 For these things
which flow out of the first source do seem to operate, though its
outpouring and beginning are not noticed. Thus following their
sense knowledge, they called these things causes. Because, then,
the creator alone is the source in himself, alone abundant in
himself, and alone giving out of himself and out of what is his, it is
manifest that he alone is a cause worthy of the name.
Chapter XIII
[80] It has already become clear from what has gone before that the
highest essence is the being (esse) sufficient through itself and that
it has no equal or other things of equal duration. The universe is
subject to it absolutely, not only in order of posteriority, but by the
necessity of obedience. That essence is the most powerful ruler of
the ages, and his every wish is a certain spontaneous necessity for
the universe. In his empire there is no rebellion or any
contradiction of his power and will, but all is completely subject to
his good pleasure, so that nothing changes or directs it, using it in
aid of its own goods. Thus every evil will serves his will, even if
unintentionally and unwillingiy. The universe is like his word and
sign by which he speaks his power and wisdom and goodness to
rational beings, and the whole universe is like a book or tablet
written by the marvelousness and beauty of the creator for those
who correctly philosophize to read and like a book open and
explained for learning his mighty works. That essence is in a sense
the summation of the whole book, and the whole intention of the
same book aims at opening and clarifying it.
From this we can see the vanity of those erring men for whom the
truth of philosophy is thought to reside in the words of this book.
Individual creatures are individual words and also signs of the
creator who speaks of himself through his creatures, indicating his
power and wisdom and goodness.1 The intellect that is uneducated
and just beginning needs this book, while philosophizing in the
body. But the perfect and free intellect reads the book in its creator
the more openly and lucidly, the more
3. William refers to the Aristotelians, especially Avicenna. He
certainly does not deny that things seem to be causes for our sense
knowledge, but if "to cause" is understood in the strict sense, that is,
as to give being (esse) out of oneself and from one's own, then only
the First can be a cause.
1. William's language echoes Avicenna's triad of knowledge, power and
will; cf. Metaphysics 9, 4, p. 478, 79.

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[81] the truth is perfectly and truly known in itself rather than in his
sign or expression.
The universe attests by its obedience that this essence is universal
power. Its whole harmonious and most ordered beauty attests that it
is universal wisdom. That it is universal sweetness or goodness is
testified to, not only by that sweetness, by whose diffusion the
universe delights its users, but by the most tenacious and strong
love by which the universe adheres to it, embraces it and by its
choice prefers it to all else and in a way neglects all else on account
of it.2 Hence, each thing conserves and defends its being (esse)
with all its power. For the being (esse) in each creature is a kind of
clinging to the creator, and it cries out that this essence is the good
of all goods and that it is powerful through its own essence, a
potency whose extent has no constraint. It cries out that this power
is utterly free from force or interference in every way, and that it is
wise through its essence, which is essentially light, and the mirror
of the universe, and art, and book, and intelligible world or
archetype of the world, brilliant light and the light of all lights, pure
light free from all darkness and shadows, to which all is open and
equally known. Since it itself is willing or beneficent through its
essence, it is benign by essence with vast benignity and essential
and gratuitous generosity. It bestows its gifts without having been
persuaded or forced, not for gain, but in absolute freedom.
Chapter XIV
[82] There remains, then, that we take up these matters [to see] if
we can perhaps convince you that three somehow share this first
essence, even though it is itself one in every way, and that they
share it and in it essentially and not by participation.1 In this matter
we necessarily have to loosen the art and circumscribed reference
of words since we are stammering to those who are still little ones
intellectually until they become capable of learned discussion.2 We
say, therefore, using the priv-
2. Here the preferential love of each thing in the universe for its being
is clearly seen to be a love for the divine essence. Cf. above, ch. 7, pp.
90-91 (47).
3. William's phrase, "the good of all goods," recalls Augustine's "good
of goods" in his commentary of Psalm 134. Cf. Enarr. in Ps. 134, 4
(CCL 40, 1940).
1. With this chapter William begins to discuss the three who share the
first essence. The three share this essence essentially, not by
participation. That is, each of them is this essence; whereas, created
beings are by participating in that essence which is not what they are.
Cf. Augustine, De trin. 1, 4, 7 (CCL 50, 824) and Boethius, De trin. 1,
lines 7ff.
2. St. Paul speaks of the little ones who are not able to take the solid
food of the spirituals, but required milk; cf. 1 Co 2 and 3. St. Augustine
also used these Pauline terms to refer to those who could not rise up to a
spiritual understanding of God. Cf., for example, Contra epistolam
fundamenti 23 (CSEL 25, 219-220).

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ilege of those holding disputations and teaching, that they are
somehow three, and three things, though the faith declares this
same understanding of ours in more circumspect and fitting terms.
Thus we say that the three, or three things, share the first essence;
of these one has the essence as source and primordially; the second
has it by generation from the first; the third by such procession as
befits the being (esse) of the first gift from the first giver.
Concerning the First we have removed any doubt, for it is clear
from what we have said that it is one as source and as having
primordially the highest essence. I mean by "as source" "in no way
from another" and by ''primordially" the same thing. Therefore, this
is the source and principle for all the things that come after him.
The first emanation of this source necessarily proceeds according
to its abundance, not according to the capacity of the recipient; for
each thing has what is according to itself prior to what is according
to another. Therefore, the first source has emanation according to
itself, or according to its abundance, prior to that according to
another.
Likewise, that which needs only one is prior to what needs two.
Therefore, the emanation that needs only the source is prior to what
needs the source and something else.
Likewise, if there were not an emanation from the first source
which did not need both the source and something else, the first
source would not be capable by itself of the first [83] emanation.
But because it is certain that, just as power is to power, so action is
to action, power through oneself necessarily precedes power
through another or with another, and thus action through oneself
precedes action through another. Therefore, the first action comes
from the first agent through itself alone. In this way it is necessary
that the First must emanate through itself something from the first
source; otherwise, it will not be the First, for what needs fewer
things is necessarily prior and more perfect.
Likewise, everything that gives according to itself necessarily gives
what it has or such as it has. Therefore, the first one emanating
from the first source through itself receives from the first source
the being (esse) which the first source has or such as it has.
Therefore, this first one receives from the first source being (esse)
necessary through itself, since the first source has that alone and
only such [being], for it does not have any of another kind. An
example of this sort is that, if the luminous were to give light
according to itself, it would give either as much as or the same kind
as or the very light that it has. But if it gives according to the
capacity of the recipient, it will give according to what the capacity
of the recipient requires. An example of this is found in the air,
water and glass, which receive from the source of light different
illuminations according to their varying capacities.

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Again, from the same thing, as suck, there does not proceed
something diverse or a diversity. Just as from white as such, or
from black as such, so too from the one as such there arises neither
many nor a multitude.3 From something of a certain kind as such
there come neither things of another kind nor a variety nor an
unlikeness. In general from one of a pair of opposites as such, it is
impossible that the other arise. Therefore, it is impossible that from
the first source according to itself there proceed either something
else or of another kind, because to the extent it emanates according
to itself, it is one and the same and of the same sort in every way.
Therefore, the first emanation from the first source is neither
something else than nor of a different sort from the first source.
Likewise, what is less distant from unity necessarily is a lesser
plurality, and what is more distant from plurality is a truer unity,
because it is more a unity. Therefore, the plurality closest to the
true and first unity is [84] the least plurality and least a plurality.
But it is impossible for it to be the least plurality, if it is essential.
Therefore, it is impossible that the first plurality is essential. Thus
the first duality, or trinity, is not essential. But the first source and
the first emanation from it are the first duality. Hence, it is
impossible that these are essentially many. No one can possibly
doubt that those whose essence is utterly one are less many than
those whose essences are diverse. Therefore, the first plurality is
either relative or of reason or something of this sort, but by no
means essential.4
Again, where giving and receiving are according to the same thing,
what is received is necessarily the same thing that the giver has, for
no other cause of diversity underlies it. Since, then, the first
emanates the first emanation according to itself and the first
emanation receives from it according to it -- otherwise it would not
be necessary that the emanation receive only what the First has --
the emanation thus receives the being (esse) the First has and in the
same way it has it.
Also, whenever the effect is from a cause according to itself, there
is necessarily a first and essential likeness and agreement between
3. Though, as one would expect, the influence of Avicenna is
considerably diminished in the strictly trinitarian parts of this work, it
has not altogether disappeared. Cf. Metaphysics 9, 4, p. 479, 92-94,
where Avicenna argues that what is first from God cannot be many.
According to Avicenna what is first produce is a pure intelligence, but
it is created, not of the same essence as the First; cf. Metaphysics 9, 4,
p. 481, 39-42.
4. The absence of an essential plurality means that each of the three is
God; yet there are not three gods, but one God. That is, there is a
numerical sameness of essence, not merely a specific sameness as there
is in three men. For the moment William leaves unspecified the sort of
plurality there is in the one essence. Cf. Boethius, De trin. 3, lines 1-55;
cf. also Augustine, De trin. 5, 5, 6 and 7 (CCL 50, 210ff.).

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the cause and effect.5 For from each thing according to itself there
proceeds only what is most similar. Unlikeness, however, is not
from one thing according to itself. Hence, the first source and its
first emanation are similar by the first and highest likeness, since
between them no cause of unlikeness intervenes, since the one
emanates and the other is emanated according to the same thing.
Therefore, since between the highest and primary essence and any
other there is no agreement whatever, neither in genus, nor in
species, nor in number,6 it is impossible that the first emanation is
of a different essence from the First. Thus, the first emanation is
one essence with its primary source, though it differs in mode from
it.
Again, every plurality shares essentially in the one that is
immediately prior to it. For example, a plurality of singulars [85]
necessarily shares in the one universal, from which they
immediately proceed. Otherwise it would not be a true plurality if
they did not share in and did not divide among themselves
something one. For one by reason and one by number do not make
a plurality by their conjunction, except perhaps under the common
one that they divide and share. Hence, it is necessary that the first
plurality shares essentially in the one that is immediately prior to it.
But if that one were a one by reason, then the first plurality will not
be brought to an end in it. Therefore, there will necessarily be a
plurality beyond it. Hence, it will not be the first plurality that is
united in that one. Therefore, it must be one in number; thus what
precedes the first plurality according to the manner of our
understanding is the first one. Hence, the first plurality shares in
the first one essentially, and the first one is thus somehow many or
plural.
Again, what is most distant from the first source of being (essendi)
is least in actuality, but most in potency, such that potentiality is at
the maximum and act at the minimum. This is time and every non-
permanent disposition, which is in actuality as if for a moment, but
is essentially in potency and in a sense totally so. Therefore, what
the greatest separation from the First and the least approximation to
it do in that, the greatest approximation and the least separation do,
in turn, for the other. Therefore, the first emanation has the most
actuality and the least potentiality. But if its essence were not
necessary being (esse) through itself, but was possible being (esse)
in itself, then the first emanation will have in itself no necessity or
actuality at all. It is, however, impossible to see how from what is
necessary in itself there is only the possible in itself, since those
two share in neither species nor genus; in fact, the two are in some
sense opposed. Therefore, the one will not cause the other accord-
5. William here returns to the perfect causality that he mentioned
earlier, cf. above, ch. 2, p. 71 (23); ch. 3, p. 72 (25); ch. 4, p. 77 (31).
6. Boethius, De trin. 1, lines 10-31.

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ing to itself. Hence, the first emanation will not be [86] possible in
every respect, but is necessarily. To the extent it is an emanation, it
is possible because to that extent it is caused. But its essence is the
first necessary being (esse). These words, "necessary" and
"possible," are philosophical terms.7 Be cautious in applying
"possible'' to that being (esse) which is pure act. For it is certain
that pure act will not emanate a mixture, so to speak, of the
possible and the necessary by the outpouring which is out of itself
and according to itself alone. This would be the case if we held that
the first offspring and first gift were possible being (esse) through
themselves or according to themselves, but necessary being (esse)
through their essence. For everything that is possible from one
viewpoint and is necessary from another is a mixture, so to speak,
of the possible and the necessary. But where does this mixture
come from, since this [being] emanates from the purely necessary
alone and according to that? Thus you should not assert its
possibility on the basis of the likeness to other caused things, for
the causing of the first offspring by the first parent and of the first
gift from the first giver is very different from other causations.
Therefore, although the first offspring is caused, it is still not
something possible, just as it is in no way less than its cause. We
say the same of the first gift. The First, then, is necessarily both the
first most noble offspring and the first most magnificent gift. Let
us, then, put it this way: like those engaged in disputations, we
argue from what our opponent concedes, namely, that the first-born
offspring as well as the first giveable gift is called "possible."
Again, I say that the first emanation from the first source is one in
every way and simple in the ultimate degree. For if it were many in
itself so that the intellect should find in it "this and this,"8 then
from the one there would be a plurality through itself and from the
same one a diversity -- something only a nodding mind accepts.
Then those things from which the emanation is composed either
share in a species or not. If they do not share in a species and yet
are from the first source immediately and according to itself, where
does the diversity in them come from? Not from the side of the first
source, since they are immediately from this source according to
the same thing, that is, [87] according to itself. From their own side
there is no diversity, since all they have they received from the first
source, but from the First according to itself there can be no
diversity. If they share in a species, the whole does not differ in
species from them, though perhaps in number or size. Since, then,
simples are
7. William warns that "possible" and "necessary" are philosophical
terms and that caution must be exercised in their use. For example, he
has just said that the first emanation is possible insofar as it is caused,
though he insists that the first emanation is in itself necessary being,
since it is caused by perfect causality.
8. That is, a composition; cf. Boethius, De trin. 2, lines 32-42.

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necessarily prior to composites and parts to their whole, the parts of
the first emanation are necessarily prior in the first emanation
itself. Hence, something that is not the first source precedes the
first emanation, but what is not the first source is necessarily an
emanation from it. Therefore, if what we asserted as first is not
first, but another comes before it, some other first will show up
which necessarily emerges as one in every way. Nothing, however,
is one in every way that is not the highest essence. Therefore, the
first emanation is the highest essence, not because the essence itself
emanates from some sort of source, but because the very emanation
from the first source shares with the first source in the first essence,
which is the first and highest essence.
This naming it a source and an emanation is found in the seventh
chapter of Wisdom [cf. Ws 7:25] and nicely fits the first duality.9 It
also aids somewhat the weak intellect, since every source and its
emanation are necessarily one water, and water is not from water
insofar as it is water. Water does not emanate insofar as it is water;
nonetheless, the emanation is only water and is from the source and
emanates. The source as source emanates its emanation or
stream.10 It is, then, in some way water for the visible spring in
which it is and for the stream in which it is. That which comes
from the source, which is the highest essence, is related to that
which has [the essence] as a source and primordially, and to that
which is the first emanation from it and has the same <essence>
through emanation. Therefore, this first source would not emanate
abundantly if it only flowed downwards, but it necessarily
emanates toward two sides and necessarily not toward more,
making them equal to it by its plenitude.
[88] Note, however, that the essence can emanate nothing at all out
of itself. That which it would emanate out of it would necessarily
be it and would not cease to be it. And that which would receive
the essence from it would, of course, receive only the essence,
because nothing else would be found in it. Because, therefore,
nothing proceeds out of it but the essence, since nothing else is
found in it, the essence would necessarily
9. Ws 7:25 calls wisdom "a certain pure emanation of the glory of the
almighty God," but does not use the term "source" or "fountain."
Perhaps William has in mind Si 1:5, "The word of God on high is the
fountain of wisdom," or Pr 18:4, "And the fountain of wisdom [is] an
overflowing stream.''
10. William uses the image of a source and a stream or river, each of
which has the same water. Later in ch. 27, p. 178 (156) he adds a pond,
or lake, into which the source and river pour the same water, thus
completing the trinitarian image. Cf. St. Anselm of Canterbury, De
incarnatione verbi 13, in S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera
Omnia. vol. 2. Ed. F. S. Schmitt. (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons,
1946), pp. 31-32. Anselm speaks of the source, river and lake of the
Nile. Peter Abelard, however, points out that the image is unsatisfactory,
since the three have the same water only successively; he also suggests
that Anselm derived the image from St. Augustine in his writing to Pope
Laurentinus; cf. Theologia christiana 4, 83 (CCLCM 12, 304). In his De
fide et symbolo 8 (9), 17 (CSEL 41, 17-20) Augustine speaks of a
source, a stream and drink.

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be an emanation out of itself. Thus it would be generating itself and
generated by itself.11 We do not, however, deny that from it and by
reason of it the light of being (essendi) is shed over the universe,
but it is impossible that this light arises out of it; for it is more to
say out of (de) it than from (ex) it or by (ab) it.12 For we
understand the essence, insofar as it is essence, as most peaceful
and quiet, completely in itself and with itself, having in itself
neither in act nor in potency anything but itself. Hence, nothing at
all can arise out of it except being (esse), because neither itself nor
something else can emerge out of it, since it is in it neither in act
nor in potency. For no essences of creatures come forth out of it
(de), but by it these essences receive being (esse). For it would be
impossible that there be the many things that there are, if it were
the case that they came forth out of (de) it. Things are many of and
in themselves, but in the first essence in itself they have no
diversity whatever. Therefore, there is no turning of the highest
essence onto itself, or flowing out of (de) itself and into itself.
Rather it is for itself the most peaceful and quiet light of all things,
not illuminating itself, seeing all things, but most peacefully and
quietly, beyond every kind of generation in itself, to which no
operation is at all fitting, except to create and to give being (esse)
after it.13
For a being, just as being, has power only over non-beings because,
just as being, it is understood only to have power over them and
only to overflow onto them. Hence, a being just as being is utterly
sterile and infecund with regard to generation. I mean that, as a
being, it has nothing with itself or in itself, but is most naked and
bare. Hence, nothing comes from it through itself except in the
manner we have said. But everything generative that is generative
and fecund through itself alone necessarily has with itself and in
itself that of which it is generative and fecund, and it is [89] as if
pregnant and heavy with it. For, if the earth were generative
through itself alone of some things, either plants or animals, it
would necessarily be heavy with them and would have them as in
some secret place either in the bosom or in the heart of its
fecundity. Therefore, it would give birth out of itself and would
bring them out of
11. If the essence generated, it would generate itself, and thus it
would be both generating and generated in the same respect. Cf. DS
804, where the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) declared that the
essence "is not generating, nor born, nor proceeding, but it is the
Father who generates, and the Son who is born, and the Holy Spirit
who proceeds so that there are distinctions in the persons and unity in
nature."
12. Augustine said, "What is out of (de) him is what he is; what were
made by (ab) him are not what he is" (De natura boni 1; PL 42, 551).
Later in the same work, he explains that "from (ex) him" is a more
general expression so that one can say that the Son is from the Father as
well as that creatures are from him; cf. De natura boni 27 (PL 42, 560).
13. Cf. DS 804, where the Council declared that the divine essence "is
the sole principle of all things, besides which none other can be found."

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the hidden bosom of its fecundity into the light. This would
doubtless be a fuller and more copious potency if it were fecund in
this way than it now is since it now receives from elsewhere what it
receives and does not give birth out of itself or through itself, but as
receiving from another. For there is no doubt that he who can act
out of himself is more powerful than he who can act only with
another or out of another and that he who is able to produce an
equal is more powerful than one able to produce only a lesser.14 He
who can act out of himself and through himself alone is also more
capable than one who acts out of another or through another.
Because the first potency is apart from every imperfection and need
and is understood to be abundant in itself and most full, it is
impossible that it be sterile and infecund; rather it is more
generative and fecund. For it is clear that of all the potencies the
generative is the more abundant and more perfect and more
generous. For a generative potency assimilates and makes equal to
itself in every way what it generates. For it is a greater abundance
to be able to give out of oneself than to be able to give only out of
another, and it is greater generosity to give out of oneself than to
give out of another, so too to give out of one's own rather than out
of another's. Therefore, generation is the first and the most perfect
of causations; for what causes out of itself is necessarily prior and
more a cause than what causes out of another or with another or
through another.15
Likewise, the generated is more perfectly caused by a generator
than some other effect by its cause; this is shown by the
assimilation and adequation of it to its cause. For a causing or
making or producing does not make the effect like its cause in an
ultimate and complete assimilation, but generation necessarily does
this. Hence, generation is the first and most perfect of causations,
and the cause of it is the first and most perfect of all. Thus it is
necessary that [generation] precede causation and that the generator
precede the cause. Here understand these as generator and as [90]
cause. Since fecundity is either the excellence of abundance or the
perfection of the potency or the highest abundance itself, it is
neces-
14. Cf. Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, q. 50 (CCL 44a, 77)
and Contra Maximinum 3, 7 (PL 42, 743), where he argues that if the
Father did not generate a Son equal to himself, he was either unable
or unwilling, that is, either weak or envious. For other patristic
sources of this argument, cf. Olivier du Roy, L'intelligence de la foi
en la Trinité selon saint Augustin: Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire
jusqu'en 391 (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1966), p. 475. Du Roy
mentions that Richard of Saint Victor borrows the argument from St.
Augustine; cf. Richard's De trinitate. Texte critique avec introduction,
notes et tables. Edited by Jean Ribailler (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958) 3, 4, p.
139. William, as we shall see, borrowed from Richard the mode of
incommunicability as a necessary element to be added to the
Boethian definition of person.
15. Generation is the most perfect sort of causation because it arises out
of the cause alone and produces an effect of the same essence as the
cause. On perfect causality, cf. above, note 5.

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sary that the first potency be most fecund and be generative
through itself, be most heavy and pregnant, if it is permissible to
say what he himself says about himself in the last chapter of Isaiah:
"Shall I who give generation to others be sterile?" [Is 66:9].
It is already certain for us that the child of the same one ought to be
above all creatures and above all <children> insofar as to generate
is more than to create, and to bring into being (esse) from oneself is
more than to do so from nothing. For he received in the heart or
bosom or womb of his generative fecundity only what he found in
it. Therefore, it is necessary that the first child or the first offspring
be similar to the first generator in every respect, for to generate
one's own kind means this, namely, to give the mode of being16 out
of oneself. Try to understand, if you can, from where any
unlikeness or essential diversity between them might come. For the
generator only gives out of himself to the generated what he has in
himself. If he gave it another essence than his own proper one, he
certainly did not give it out of himself, but out of another and
different one. For every other essence is different. Then how did he
give out of himself, if he did not give either his essence or a part of
his essence? But it has already been made clear that his essence
cannot be divided in any way. Therefore, the first generator or first
parent gave the whole of his own essence to the first child or
offspring; otherwise, there would be no generation or child there,
that is, among them.17
Again, if the child who came forth from it is in proportion to the
fecundity and the abundance of the generative potency, then the
offspring, just in itself, will necessarily be equal to [91] its parent,
most similar in all respects and its clearest image. For if this
mother would essentially generate a son out of herself alone and
through herself alone, who can doubt that she would necessarily
give the whole of her own essence or a part of it? Otherwise, she
would not generate out of herself, but out of another, if she gave
not what is her own, but what is another's.
Therefore, you ought not to shrink from calling the first potency
the first parent or first father and from calling the first one
proceeding from it the first son or first offspring, and from calling
the first father the womb of the first generation and the bosom of
the first fecundity and the fullness of the first utterance. For he
calls himself all of these in David: "You are my son, from the
womb before the light of day have I begotten you" [Ps 2:7; 109:3].
From the womb, that is, of course, from himself.
16. The term, 'maneries,' is derived according to Le Feron from the
French manière (manner, mode). Switalski says (p. 90) that William
equates it with genus. Cf. W. H. Principe, The Theology of the
Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century 1 (William of
Auxerre). Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963, p.
214, n. 38, for more on this term's usage.
17. William frequently uses "there: ibi" to refer to God or the three
persons. We have generally made the reference explicit.

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Again, "My heart uttered a goodly word" [Ps 44:1]. The Son
himself says in John: "The only-begotten who is in the bosom of
the Father, he has made him known" [Jn 1:18] that is, the Father.
But the Greek has "in the heart'' in place of "in the bosom." The
Son himself calls the Father the mouth of the first expression in
Solomon: "I, wisdom, came forth from the mouth of the most high,
the first-born before all creatures" [Si 24:5].18 Therefore, the first
offspring is wisdom, and it can only have proceeded from the
highest parent or father, as we have shown.
Chapter XV
Thus he is the "mouth of the most high." It is clear that the first
offspring is wisdom, not only because he is the first essence which
is wisdom in itself, as we have shown, but also because every
spiritual potency and power that in itself is pure intellect does not
act or operate except by way of will or intellect. All this is to say
that it acts by means of wisdom; for it does not act corporeally, that
is, by corporeal motion and action, but by spiritual motion and
action, if one may speak this way. Spiritual motions and actions act
only upon the essences themselves which are moved or arise from
them. They do not act upon external things or arise from external
things, because [92] operatious of this sort, if I may so speak, need
only their agent. The intellect needs nothing, except perhaps its
illuminator, and that when it is not in itself light.1 Let us go back
and say that a spiritual power can be pregnant only with wisdom,
that is, wisdom in act, or with will. So too, when the human
intellect has acquired the
18. Cf. Augustine, De trin. 7, 3, 4 (CCL 50, 251).
1. William, following St. Augustine, holds a doctrine of divine
illumination. Though the precise meaning of the doctrine in St.
Augustine is still very much debated in its details, it seems clear that
Augustine maintained that, just as the light of the sun was needed to
illumine sensible things so that the eyes of the body could see them, so
the light of God's truth was needed to illumine intelligible things so that
our inner eyes, the mind, could see them. Some of the principal texts in
Augustine are: De trin. 12, 15, 24 (CCL 50, 377f); Solil. 1, 1, 3-4 (PL
32, 870f.); In loan. Ev. 35, 8, 3 (CCL 36, 318f) and De Gen. ad lit. 8, 12,
26 (PL 34, 383): Cf. also Liber de eausis, 5 (6), 58, p. 59. For an account
of William's interpretation of St. Augustine's doctrine of illumination as
explaining the origin of concepts, cf. Etienne Gilson, The Christian
Philosophy of St. Augustine (London: Victor Gollancz, 1961), p. 296, n.
82. For a more recent study of William that limits very much the role of
divine illumination in his theory of knowledge, cf. Steven P. Marrone,
William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste: New Ideas of Truth in the
Early Thirteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
Marrone claims, "In terms of the development of medieval thought,
what William had done was to reduce the doctrine of divine illumination
from its all-embracing significance and limit it to a small section of the
cases to which it once applied" (p. 51). He argues that in ordinary
knowledge William allows divine illumination a role only in the
acquisition of certain ideas and in the knowledge of the first principles
of science (pp. 111-112).

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habit of some art, it is pregnant with the art in act, that is, with
thoughts and words, and these are the words of those things in
which the art confists or with which it deals.
The first of the spiritual operations or actions is intellectual
understanding, for willing follows understanding. Hence, the first
agent is necessarily intellect. The first agent is the generator, as we
showed, and the generative is the first of all powers; hence, its act
is first of all. Thus the first agent of all is the intellect, generative
and fecund, or pregnant. But the intellect is not pregnant with will,
since will or love or desire cannot be its offspring. The reason is
that they are in themselves neither in one power nor in the same
genus. Yet parent and offspring are necessarily in one genus or
kind, for the parent gives both its genus and its name to the
offspring. But if intellect and will are considered as intellect and as
will, they share neither the same name nor the same genus, that is,
kind, but fall under different species, namely, apprehension and
affection. Yet one species never arises from another by generation.
Note carefully that love cannot be born and that it cannot in any
sense be caused by birth.2 The reason is that to be (esse) love is to
be (esse) a gift, and for this reason to cause love is to cause a gift,
precisely as gift. But to be caused as a gift is to be caused for
another, not for oneself, while to be generated is to be caused just
for oneself. Since love [93] can only be caused for another, it is
clear that it cannot be generated or born, and thus it Cannot be a
son.
Furthermore, because to be (esse) love is to be (esse) a gift, to love
will necessarily be to give a gift. But giving a gift and giving are
essentially a path for obtaining or having what is caused, not a path
toward being (essendi), whereas generation is essentially a path
toward being (essendi) for what is generated.
Moreover, the giver, precisely as giver, intends the recipient, not
the gift. But the generator intends the offspring and moves toward
it alone by the fact that he is a generator. Also that is the goal of
generation: to be (esse); the giver has the goals of giving and
giving a gift. But where the intentions and goals of actions are
diverse, the actions are diverse.
Thus the difference between the generation of the first offspring
and procession of the first gift appears evident. For the generative
power, as you learned in the natural sciences, preserves the species.
There is no generation [of a member] of another species. Hence,
the first generative intellect is not pregnant with will, nor is will its
offspring. Thus its offspring is wisdom, and this is what
Ecclesiasticus says: "Wisdom was
2. William offers three arguments to show that love does not proceed
as an offspring. He is concerned to show that the procession of the
Holy Spirit is not generation. Cf. below, ch. 19, n. 4.

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created first of all, and understanding of prudence from all eternity"
[Si 14:4].3 He calls the offspring of the first generator
"understanding," that is, [understanding] most pregnant and most
fecund in itself, wisdom and understanding of prudence. He called
him created not because he is out of nothing, but because he is in
no way out of matter.4
You can easily see that the first intellect is most pregnant and
fecund in itself, if you consider that our intellects are in some way
impregnated by the acquisition of forms and become pregnant and
acquire for themselves fecundity from the forms acting on them
from the [94] outside. It is so natural for the intellect to generate
and to pour forth from itself another light that it devotes itself
wholly to seeking by the senses to fecundate and fill itself. From
this it is apparent that the first intellect is necessarily most perfect
and most pregnant and most fecund in every manner and mode.
Consider that the habits of the sciences that we acquire are certain
fecundities and impregnations of our intelligences, from which we
in some way bring forth the offspring of the sciences and
discourses and utter them as from their fullness. For the habits are
the sources of the sciences overflowing in act, as the fullnesses of
this sort of utterances and as mothers bringing forth this sort of
offspring. But the first and original and most fecund intellect
necessarily has out of itself what our intellect acquires from
elsewhere. You do not marvel at offspring of this sort and the
generations of the sciences in act in our intellect, when it has
acquired a habit, which is a sort of fecundity and pregnancy in it,
and when it has filled itself by eating the bread of truth and by
tearing and grinding it with the teeth of investigations and
definitions. Yet our intellect is necessarily impregnated and
fecundated in some sense from the outside by external things or the
forms of things. If you do not marvel at utterances of this sort, then
stop marveling at the birth of first-born wisdom in an intellect most
fecund in itself and most pregnant and at the utterance of the first
thought or first word from a womb most packed and filled with all
the treasures of wisdom. You will be helped more by this example,
if we have brought you to understand that the habit of science and
science in act do not differ in essence. Rather there goes forth from
the bosom or heart of the habit one and the same science according
to essence, which was in it a potency most ready for act. For
science in a potency most ready for act is a habit. Hence, the habit
and its offspring are one and the same according to essence.
3. Switalski notes (p. 93) that the Vulgate has "prior: before" where
William's text has "primum: first."
4. Wisdom is said to be created, though William interprets it as referring
to the Son. He explains that wisdom is created in the sense that it is not
made out of (de) matter, not in the sense that it is made out of nothing,
for it is out of the Father.

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[95] We shall add to this another explanation. It is clear that the
intellect understands itself, because our intellect, that is, our
intellective power, is a generative power and, so to speak, a mother
of science or wisdom. It is not able to complete this generation
through itself alone; rather it needs, so to speak, a kind of
cultivation by study and a seeding by teaching and experience. I
want you to understand that teaching is a seed that is cast into the
womb of the intellect through the ears and eyes. Likewise, the
experiences of the senses are also like a kind of seed that the
intellect receives from external things through the senses.
Afterwards, if it is fertile or fruitful with wisdom, and if
impediments have not interfered, the intellect brings forth wisdom
as a noble offspring. But since the seeds are sown individually,
whether through experience or through teaching, it brings forth
piece by piece as if by miscarriages not wisdom itself, but parts of
it. For this reason we say that these sciences have need of
generation and time. Thus in order to complete this generation of
wisdom it needs these helps. But the removal of need and the
addition of a perfection do not destroy the intellect, but rather help
and perfect it. And so let us suppose that our intellect is of such
perfection that it can attain by itself alone and through itself alone
everything that it can attain through itself along with these helps.
Then cultivation and seeding of this sort will not be necessary for
it. Of itself alone and through itself alone it will generate and give
birth to wisdom, and not piece by piece, nor in parts nor at different
times, but the whole of it at once, since it has in itself
simultaneously everything that is necessary for bringing forth
wisdom. And so wisdom brings forth in one birth all that it is
naturally capable of, [96] since it will complete in one perfect birth
what it was doing previously by many miscarriages. But the
wisdom generated in this way is necessarily of the same essence as
its parent, namely, the intellective power, since the intellective
power does not pour into it through this generation anything but the
essence it has, nor can the offspring derive from the parent
anything but the being (esse) that the parent has. Notice too that the
generated wisdom or knowledge is one word that speaks spiritually
all that is naturally knowable by it; it is at the same time the
intellective power and one thought, or vision, by which it sees or
thinks all things, and it is one exemplification of all such knowable
things and, so to speak, the intelligible world of all these things.
Our intellect has only potentially and also partially what the first
and abundantly overflowing intellect has in most perfect act and
completely, namely, for generating the most perfect universal
wisdom. Hence, it is necessary that his wisdom be according to his
immensity and excellence, just as it would be with us, if it were, as
we supposed, according to our smallness and indigence. Since the
first potency has no need of any thing else, by which it is brought
into act, but is itself entirely sufficient for itself, it is clear that it
never was and never will be anything but in act.

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Hence, the first generation is eternal, and the first Son is coeternal
with the eternal Father. For a potency that acts from itself alone and
through itself alone, having no need of anything other than itself,
and that is in itself simple in every way and whose act is simple,
necessarily has no delay in its going into act. Who is going to doubt
that all generation that can possibly be in the intellect is simple and
instantaneous, that is, beyond all delay and measurement in time? I
mean the generation of something one and simple, for it cannot
bring forth by parts what is indivisible in every way.
From what you have already learned, what is said in the book of
Wisdom, chapter seven, is clear, namely, that the first-born wisdom
is "the warmth [97] of the power of God" [Ws 7:25]. Warmth,
indeed, arises from the abundance and fecundity of fire and is of
the same power as its fire. But you are certain that generation
makes the generated wisdom equal and like to its generator in
everything, since it is generated out of himself and through himself
alone. Hence, they are both equal in power. Or let him be called the
warmth that the power of God the Father sends forth from out of
himself as the offspring of his fecundity and the overflowing
abundance of his fullness. This cannot be something other than that
whose fullness it was or out of which it was. For nothing flows out
from what is full except that which is in it and that of which it is
the fullness. So also is it the "genuine emanation of the brilliance of
God" [Ws 7:25]. For what does the brilliance of God mean but that
the Father himself is so luminous that he is pregnant with light? I
mean that he is luminous with wisdom, for this is his brilliance and
it is so abundant in itself that he emanates and pours forth a light
equal to himself in all respects with no lessening or loss. In the
same way he is called the "splendor of the eternal light" [Ws 7:26],
that is, the most pure splendor radiating and darting forth and
flashing out from the original light. This is the same thing that the
Apostle says in the Letter to the Hebrews [Heb 1:13], calling the
Son the splendor of the glory of God the Father, where the glory of
God the Father is understood to be brilliance. And so he is the
splendor of God the Father; he is the gleaming or effulgence or the
radiantness of the paternal brilliance. Also, he is "the mirror
without blemish of the divine majesty" [Ws 7:26], because in him
there is reflected most purely and fully the majesty or greatness of
God the Father. For in him one can see the Father, as he himself
says in John: "Who sees me, sees also the Father'' [Jn 14:9], not
merely through a likeness, because he is the image and likeness of
the Father, but also according to essence, since his essence is the
same as the Father's, as you have already learned. He is then the
mirror of the paternal majesty because he is of the same majesty as
the Father and of the same greatness in every respect. He is the
image of the same goodness, that is, of the same essence, for
goodness is the essence of

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both, and with that name it is named most appropriately. Thus even
the philosophers5 call his individuality [98] pure goodness or the
reality of goodness, because the paternal goodness shines forth in
him to such a degree, because the perfect Father does not begrudge
him complete equality. Thus he did not generate one less good than
he himself was. For goodness is not able to begrudge goodness to
another.6 Thus he is the image of the goodness of God the Father,
insofar as the paternal goodness poured forth the whole goodness it
possessed, yet without any lessening of itself. Thus as a result of
the birth the great paternal fecundity rightly shines forth and is
reflected in the offspring.
Chapter XVI
Now let us go back and say that to have intellectual knowledge is
the first and most perfect of all operations, because to have
intellectual knowledge needs nothing beyond the one who knows
for its completion. I mean this, insofar as the knower is concerned.
For the fact that our intellectual knowing needs the intellect that
illumines and writes upon the mirror of our intellectual power is
due to the fact that our power is not in itself an intellectual light,
but rather a darkness, though it is able to be enlightened. Thus the
intellectual power that is light for itself and in itself does not need
another source of illumination in order to know intellectually.1
Likewise, it is the conversion and reflection of the intellect's light
back on itself. This is the reason why it is the most perfect of all
operations (if we may use the freedom of those who hold
disputations in common and philosophize in such terms) and,
therefore, the most simple of all operations. For it needs only the
most simple one and does not flow forth outside the agent himself.
Even though to know intellectually is to operate, intellectual
knowing is only the generation of the intellectual knowledge. I say
this, because the intellectual knowing or cognition befitting the
highest essence is not its operating on itself. In no way can it have
a motion or operation which would be [99] its conversion upon
itself, from which something is supposed to arise through
generation or another mode of being (essendi). We have already
made this clear. The divine essence in itself and according to itself
is necessarily known to be most
5.Liber de causis, 8 (9), 91, p. 70: "and its individuality is pure
goodness, pouring out all goodnesses upon the intelligence and upon
other things by mediation of the intelligence." Cf. also Avicenna,
Metaphysics 8, 6, p. 417, 77-78.
6. Cf. above, ch. 14, n. 14.
1. Cf. ch. 15, n. 1 for William's use of Augustine's doctrine of divine
illumination.

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quiet and peaceful in itself, although it overflows outside itself and
flows out over what is possible, as we have already said.2
The first of all operations is intellectual knowing. I mean
"intellectual knowing" taken as operating other than in the way
befitting the divine essence. For to know intellectually in this way
is only the generation of intellectual knowledge, and intellectual
knowledge is an interior word. So it is manifest that the first of all
operations is the generation of the first word, and the generation of
the word is uttering or speech. Hence, uttering or speech precedes
operations and acts of making. You now have the basis from which
what is written in sacred Scripture should begin to be clear four
you: "God indeed spoke and it was so done," which is said many
times,3 as well as: "By the word of the Lord the heavens are made
firm'' [Ps 32:6]. All of these will easily become clear from this.
You should not now have to be taught whether intellectual
knowledge ought to be an image of him from whom it is born,
since you have no doubt that all intellectual knowledge is an image
of what is intellectually known; otherwise it could not be a natural
sign of it. But what is most known intellectually or apprehended is
necessarily being (esse) itself, which is the generator of intellectual
knowledge, for it in some way impresses itself by its intelligibility
through its image. Thus it is the most known and the first [known]
of all the things which are known intellectually through it.4 It is
certain that apprehension is the principle of all operations which
are done by choice and will. For apprehension necessarily precedes
willing, and will is present in an agent as a result of it; otherwise he
does not operate. Hence, whatever ought to be from the will or
through it, necessarily owes its being (esse) to what is
apprehended, which by itself moves the agent in the first place.
This indeed is most obvious in us humans. For the form [100] that
is first generated in the imagination or the mind of the artist is the
first thing that moves the artist, internally, of course, and by his
will and desire for it to be (essendi) externally in matter. Then by
the will he moves his members externally, and by the motion of his
members he moves the tools, and by the motion of these he moves
the matter. You see, then, that the principle of all these motions is
the
2. Cf. DS 804. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) declared that the
essence "is not generating, nor born, nor proceeding, but it is the
Father who generates. . . . "Some of the Fathers of the Church had
spoken as if the essence or nature generated or was generated. Cf.
Bertrand de Margerie, The Christian Trinity in History (Still River,
MA.: St. Bede's Publications, 1981), p. 139, n. 52. De Margerie cites
St. Hilary as speaking of "a nature generating or generated" (De
synodis seu de fide Orientalium 4 (PL 10, 494) and adds that such is
precisely "the kind of formulation which Lateran IV wanted to
eliminate and which leads in the last analysis to making the person of
the Father come forth from an impersonal nature!"
3. This seems to be a reference to Gn 1, where God by his word
produces the various works of the six days of creation. It could refer also
to Ps 32 (33):9 or Ps 148:5.
4. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 1, 5, pp. 31-32, 2-4.

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first form existing (existens) in the mind of the artist which moves
him by a desire that it be (essendi) in external matter, such as befits
it. For the same form numerically is not imprinted, that is, received
by impression and motion in the matter of the statue, because that
which imprints is necessarily distinct from that which is imprinted.
Yet what do you think that form is but the mental word of the artist,
by which he was speaking the external statue in himself intelligibly
or imaginably before he made it? And because he spoke it so, he
afterwards made it so; he, of course, first spoke and afterwards it
was made.
And so by considering this example it can in some way become
clear for you how the first Father "spoke" and "they were made"
[cf. Gn 1 and Jn 1:3]. But beware lest by our words we think of
him or in him what belongs to us. For by our words about him we
never want to express what belongs to us, but what belongs to him.
For we mean by the form about which we want to speak the first-
born intellectual knowledge and image of God the Father, not a
form derived externally from things. These are by no means
impressed or inscribed upon the Father, since we know that he
cannot be acted upon in any way. Rather we mean a form out of the
Father himself, as if from an observer there leapt forth the image of
the first beauty and elegance in the ultimate degree, as if
intellectual knowledge proceeded from one who knows
intellectually and a word from one who speaks and wisdom or
offspring from a mouth most pregnant.
Chapter XVII
Since the first-born intellectual knowledge is the fullest and most
perfect image of God the Father and is of the same essence in every
way, it is necessary that he be wise equally to the Father and
powerful equally to the Father. Similarly, for the same reason he is
equally good. That is, it is all the same to say [101] that he is equal
to the Father in all respects and that he should be equally named
and, hence, equally praised and magnified, the same in honor and
glory in all respects. For he is first in honor and ultimate in glory;
beyond this there is no honor or glory in any way. He has equally
with the Father the very ultimate of glory in all respects.
Unless images should have completely subverted and overwhelmed
it with errors, no mind can doubt that every maker necessarily
operates with and in himself before he operates externally or in
another and that he is necessarily moved in himself before he
moves another. Indeed, with human makers, there is no doubt about
this. For it is necessary that every maker actually has in himself an
exemplar; otherwise he would be operating by chance. There is no
doubt that the exemplar is

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begotten in the mind of the human maker before he operates.
Likewise it is certain that the maker is moved and operates in
himself before he moves or operates exteriorly. But just as human
makers act in a way befitting them, so it is necessary that the Father
of all, the first and original maker, act in a manner befitting him.
For what human makers get by acquisition, the first maker
necessarily has in himself and from himself.
There is a handy image for this. It is certain that a habit does not
lose its essence because it pours forth knowledge in actuality. Nor
does any potency lose being (esse) by its act, because the essence
of its act flows forth from it. If we were to suppose in our intellect
a habit of knowledge so perfect and abundant that it naturally is
always in act and cannot but be in act, you will see that the habit
and the knowledge that flows from it are of one essence. For it is
certain that the habit is essentially knowledge and [knowledge] of
the same things as the act of knowing, and [it arises] from them in
exactly the same way. If someone should say that there is this
difference in the mode of knowing, that in the habit there is
habitual, not actual knowledge, [102] we have already removed
that objection when we said that the habit is of such perfection and
abundance that it is naturally always in act. Secondly, to know
habitually, as you understand it, is nothing but to know in potency,
though in potency most prompt and ready. That it is called potency
is a lessening of its perfection and is some separation of it from
actuality. Hence, it does not give its essence to the most perfect
habit nor does it contribute to its essence. But we have completely
removed this imperfection from the habit that we are considering.
Thus knowing according to both of these is the same, and the habit
and the knowledge that flows from it are the same knowledge.
Notice then that the habit is utterly of the same essence with its
emanation, but the habit has that essence as a source and
primordially, whereas the emanation has it by derivation from the
habit. If the habit were an essence whose being (esse) was not
acquired, it necessarily would be the intellect of the first generation
and fecundity and its overflow would be the first Son. The first
generator and the first Son are related in this way; for the first
Father is like a source and habit, and the Son flowing from him is
wisdom or knowledge.
Chapter XVIII
Let us say, then, that it was either possible for the first intellect to
speak himself in a way befitting him, or it was not. The way
befitting him is the perfection of spiritual speech, so that the more
perfect the intellect is in knowing intellectually and understanding,
the more perfectly it can speak itself and other things -- first itself,
then other things. But perfect speech is the perfect generation or
spiritual utterance of the perfect word.

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Hence, it was possible for the first intellect to speak itself and other
things by a perfect speech, which is a perfect spiritual word. This is
the full image of the thing or things known intellectually, of the
thing or things said. If it was possible for the first intellect to speak
itself, our reasoning returns to the point where we were. That is,
because that power pregnant of itself and fecund of itself is
necessarily, it is also necessary that [the generation] occurred
necessarily. What is necessarily is actual from eternity. Hence, the
generation of the first word is from eternity. But if it was not
possible for [the first intellect] to speak itself [103] except by an
external word, which we previously called the universe, then there
will be an external word, behind which there was no interior word,
and this is as though a mere sound were uttered, behind which
there is no word of the intellect, and that is frivolous. For it is
called a word (verbum) because it calls a thing (vocat rem) to the
mind of the hearer.1 Hence, the interior word is most fully and
properly a word; whereas, the exterior word is only such
accidentally. We have already made it clear in what went before
that accidental predication cannot stand alone, but necessarily
requires that which is essential.2 Hence, a word that is accidentally
a word necessarily demands a word that is essentially a word.
The universe, then, is an exterior word only because the interior
word lies behind it. Thus [the exterior word] deserves to be called a
word because of [the interior word]. Since it conveys the interior
word, which by itself conveys the reality, it conveys in this way the
first conveyer, namely, the intellect, which is the image of the
reality, and for this reason it conveys the reality to the minds and
into the minds of the hearers. If it were not possible for him to
speak himself and other things through a word which is his own
clearest image and which ought to be called the first word, beyond
which there is no word prior in act or in thought, then he is
necessarily mute and, therefore, blind. For his speaking is his
seeing, but he would see in something else. And this is properly
blindness in a power, namely, seeing in something else, either in a
sign or image. For a blind man sees interiorly in himself, but sees
nothing at all exteriorly in the visible image. It seems most absurd
that he does not have before all others what he gave to them. Each
thing speaks itself by its image; for those who can see, the face of
one looking in a mirror speaks itself by a very clear image to the
one who is looking. So too all sensible things speak themselves by
their images to our senses in the organs of sense which are like
mirrors of sensible things. Thus all intelligible things by their
intelligible images also speak themselves to our intellects.
1. The suggested etymology is without foundation.
2. Cf. above ch. 1, p. 67 (19-20).

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Each thing speaks itself by its image as if by a kind of word and is
in some sense generative of its image. Since all things speak, will
the author of all speech be mute? And since all things [104]
manifest themselves through their images, will the author of all
manifestations alone be hidden? Will there be no clear and proper
imprint of his majesty? Will he not have with him or in him
anything by which he becomes known? While the universe cries
out, will he alone not be heard and alone be silent? And while the
universe shines forth and is reflected in the mirrors of our senses
and intellects, will he alone never shine forth?
If one said that all images are lesser and inferior things derived
from the things of which they are the images, he should know that
the visible image in a perfectly clear and clean mirror has exactly
the same beauty as the face of the one looking into it whose image
it is. The image, however, of the first viewer is necessarily the
essence which is not received in another, but remains in itself. The
reason is that thin image is most similar to that viewer by an
ultimate likeness and ultimate beauty, for it cannot reflect outside
the essence of the viewer. For if the image were received in another
essence or if it were another essence than the first, there would not
be any likeness whatsoever between the first image and the first
viewer. For the first essence does not share with other things either
in genus or species or any accident, since it is most bare.3 And so
the first image would not correctly be called an image if it were of
a different essence from the first viewer, since it is not similar to
him in essence or in accident. Therefore, the true first [intellect]
will alone not have what it has bestowed upon all things.
Notice that it is natural for an intellect, as is obvious in us, to speak
and generate words. It is not content with its own proper interior
speech, but also speaks in external and exterior words through the
body. And as soon as it conceives words from things, the intellect
either utters them interiorly in itself or externally clothes the
interior word with exterior words and conveys them through
hearing to listeners. Since it is the mark of the most intelligent to
speak the most and of the most perfectly intelligent to speak most
perfectly, it is also necessary that the first and most perfect intellect
has spoken first and most perfectly the most perfect word. For who
doubts that all speech is an expression of the intellect?4 Otherwise
it should not be called speech. It is evident, [105] then, that speech
arises from the intellect. Hence, the greatest speech arises from the
greatest intellect, and the first speech from the first, and the most
perfect from the most perfect, and the unique from the unique.
4. Cf. Augustine De trin. 9, 7, 12 (CCL 50, 303).

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Also, since the first intellectual potency is always in act, it is
necessarily always speaking interiorly. For interior speech or
speaking is the first and essential and immediate effect of the
intellective power.5 Hence, no effect has ensued if that speech did
not precede, and subsequent effects necessarily owe their own
being (esse) to it. For the interior speech of the first intellect is the
principle of all things that come after it. Make sense, if you can, of
an intellectual power in act and in silence. With us this is surely
impossible in accord with our kind of intellect; hence, with the first
intellective power it will likewise be impossible in accord with his
kind. For the act of knowing intellectually can only be understood
as internal speech or speaking, and this is the generation of an
intelligible form or image.
If one should say that the first intellective power is entirely without
interior speech and is necessarily and eternally silent, he will
deprive it of its own first act. For there is no doubt that intellect in
act is the first effect of the intellective power. But if one removes
the first effect which is the path to what follows, what follows is
necessarily excluded. Hence, if one takes away the generation of
the first word, it will be impossible for there to be (esse) the things
that are. For the whole order of things that follow is necessarily due
to the first effect. What other difference is there, relative to being
(esse) in act, between our intellective power and the first, except
that it does not need something else to draw it into act, while our
power needs [something of the sort]? Our power, which is
receptive from elsewhere, speaks because, though not fecund
through itself, it is able to become fecund. The former [power] is
most sufficient to draw out of itself its effect, namely, its word.
And so the first [power] does by itself with no need of help what
our power cannot do by itself, unless helped.6
Again, who has any doubt that what proceeds most of all and
primarily from an intellective power is intellectual knowledge in
act, just as what proceeds most of all and primarily from a habit is
knowledge in act? It will certainly not be first, if it is not generative
of an intellective form or image. For it is impossible [106] for the
intellective power to come into its first act except in one of two
ways. That is, it comes into act either through another, and this is
due to need and imperfection, because without the other it cannot
be brought to its first act, and thus what is so brought into act
cannot be first. Or it is sufficient of itself, namely, for bringing out
of itself its first act. And then it is necessarily generative and not
merely fecund, but generative through itself of intellectual
knowledge in act, which is called and is an intelligible image and a
true word. Hence,
5. The Latin "effectus" seems to demand that one translate it in this
and the following paragraph at times as "effect" and at other times as
"act.''
6. Note that our intellect too is active and generates knowledge out of
itself, while it is merely helped by the senses.

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the first act of the first intellective power is necessarily the first
word to which it gives birth through itself and out of itself. Thus,
because it could never happen that the same potency would be
brought to act7 save through the First, it is clear that the First is the
principle of all other things created or generated or made and that
its generation preceded the whole series of the ages. Everything
which arises from art or wisdom is necessarily an exemplification
(exemplum) of that art or wisdom, from which and according to
which it arises. Everything that comes from the First comes from it
through wisdom and will. Therefore, it is necessary that everything
that comes from it is an exemplification of that wisdom, from
which and according to which it comes from him. But it is
impossible that the first exemplification of the first agent be
exterior to his being (esse), for the intellect cannot first operate
outside itself. No intellect whatever that is operative is made to act
first outside itself and not to do anything first in itself. For just as
the passive intellect naturally receives an intelligible image first, so
likewise the intellect which does not need to be acted upon or
receive anything from another naturally generates an intelligible
image first. For it is certain that the intellective operation only
needs the active intellect.8 Hence, the first operation of the intellect
will not come from itself so as to act upon something else; rather it
necessarily stays in itself. For if it went out to something else or
upon something else, then the first operation of the intellect
through itself would actually need two things: that [107] upon
which it acts and the intellect from which it arises. And so the first
operation of the intellect through itself actually needs only what
acts or operates. What should arise first from the intellect but the
exemplification of the intellect, namely, of the intellect of the first
agent, and the exemplar of things to be made exteriorly? Hence, it
is true that between the first agent and his external operation which
arises from him through wisdom and will, there is necessarily the
interior exemplar of his exterior operation, the exemplification of
the first agent. And this is what we have above called the word of
the first agent, by which he speaks in himself the exemplification,
of which he is the exemplar.
If someone should say that, since the first agent is in himself
wisdom perfect in every way, he does not need another exemplar,
but is himself the sufficient exemplar of all his exemplifications,
we answer him that, whether he needs another exemplar or not, it is
still necessary that there be an order of due fittingness in the things
that come from him. For that
7. Switalski states that the first part of this sentence is corrupt in all
the manuscripts.
8. Marrone maintains that William explicitly rejected the idea of an
agent intellect in any form (William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste,
pp. 58, 59, 64). Cf. De anima 7, 4 (Opera Omnia. vol. 2, Suppl., 209b).
Hence, William's talk of passive and active intellect(s) should not be
read as endorsing the Aristotelian position which William thought to
entail a tenth celestial intelligence responsible for producing images in
the human mind. Cf. De anima 7, 5 (Opera Omnia. vol. 2, Suppl, 210a).

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which is only an external exemplification cannot come from him
first, since our intellect necessarily ranks the internal
exemplification first, and it is more similar to its exemplar and is
more perfectly caused and, hence, necessarily closer to it.
Therefore, the internal exemplification necessarily comes between
the exterior exemplification and the first agent, who does not
operate from another.
Chapter XIX
It will become clear from what follows that the first word by which
the first speaker speaks himself and all else has to be one. If the
first speaker has another first word like the one we have
determined, which is the image of his ultimate expression and first
likeness, both words will be of the same essence with the first
speaker and, consequently, with each other. Thus they will be the
same in every way [not only] according to their essence, but also in
themselves, because they are the image of the same thing and in the
same respect. Because each of the two images is most perfect, each
according to the whole of itself will be the image of the first viewer
[108] and according to the whole of himself. But what is the same
both in essence and signification is the same word. Thus these two
are the same word.
Also, according to this view, God the Father would have acted
foolishly, saying fully and perfectly the same thing twice. For the
repetition of the same word or its equivalent is foolish, that is,
useless. That is useless which adds nothing to the signification
either in the thing or its mode. But all of this is present here since
he would have spoken everything equally and in every way by each
of the two [words]. Also, on this basis he would have spoken what
would be of no profit, something he forbids in us [cf. Mt 12:36]. If
we return to what has gone before, it will become clear that
between these words there is mere diversity, because from the same
thing and in the same way and in the same respect there can be
only the same thing. Therefore, from the same speaker in every
way in the same respect and in the same way, there can only come
the same word. Hence, there is necessarily only one first and most
perfect word.1
Again, what is one word but the expression of one truth, or the
utterance or image of one intention? Therefore, since the first
speaker has one truth and one intention in every way, there is
necessarily one word, the expression of himself. For the first
speaker intended to say only
1. William's arguments against a plurality of words that are merely
diverse implicitly rest upon the principle of the identity of
indiscernbiles, namely, that there cannot be a mere diversity without a
difference.

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himself. But how is a plurality of utterances intelligible where he
spoke neither many times nor many ways and where the essence of
the words is one in every way? How are two names intelligible,
which have an essence one in every way, one signification and one
mode of signigying?2 But notice that one of two opposites does not
arise from the other according to itself. Therefore, from the first
one according to itself there comes neither a multitude nor a
plurality. Where, then, does the plurality of words come from? The
positions that we presented above come to the same thing.
Again, the first word is the exemplar of all those things that have
been produced through it by the first maker. However, what agent
is not content with one exemplar that is utterly sufficient in every
respect? According to this position there would be incomparably
more exemplars than things exemplied. What reason is there for
asserting two words rather than many and a finite number rather
than an infinite number of words? For the first speaker would have
spoken one word and many words with equal ease and could have
[109] spoken a finite or infinite number of words with the same
facility. For, according to this position, he would have spoken more
things than he made, and there would have necessarily been more
arts than works of art, although it is clear that the opposite should
be the case. In this manner we are going to be laboring to no avail,
because the first unity is not through itself generative of a
multitude, especially since it only generates insofar as it is one, that
is, out of itself and according to itself; it is, however, one for itself
in every way.
That the first word is the final term of divine generation will be
clear from the fact that a word is generatire only of a word. This is
clear from the very definition of generation. If [the first word] were
generative of a word, it would certainly be generative of one equal
to itself in every way, and [it would be generative] either out of
itself or out of another. It cannot be generative out of itself, since it
does not have in itself an original abundance; rather it has all that it
has derivatively. If it were generative out of the fecundity of the
Father, then it will be the same word from the same fecundity, and
then the generation will be from the first Father. Hence, it will be
the same word, as [we said] before, because out of the same bosom
of the same fecundity there cannot by itself be a multitude or
plurality of generations.
Again, the word of the word will be equal in all respects to the
word out of which it is born. Hence, the word will on this showing
be in itself the utterance of all things and the utterance of the very
word out of
2. William distinguishes between the signification of a name and its
mode of signifying. An example might be "God" and "deity" which
have the same intention; cf. below, ch. 30, p. 192 (172). Though they
signify the same reality, their modes of signifying, namely, concretely
and abstractly, are different.

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which it was born. And it is equally the utterance of all things with
that [word] out of which it is generated. Therefore, the first and
second word will be the same, as we said above, because they are
of the same essence and signification in all respects.
Again, a word has from the speaker, insofar as he is speaking, only
its being the word of the speaker. The one speaking, insofar as he is
speaking, is only the generator of the word as word. Therefore, the
word has from its speaker or generator only its being a word.
Therefore, it does not have from him that it should speak by a
speaking which is the generation of another word. For the word has
from him only what it has from him insofar as he is its generator or
speaker. But the word does not have it from itself that it also speaks
or is the speaker of another [word], as its first speaker, because on
[110] this showing [the word] would be precisely the first speaker.
Moreover, everything that the word has, it has from its speaker. For
if it had in itself or from itself an original hermenensis,3 that is,
interpretation, it would necessarily be the first speaker, not the
speech of the first speaker. Without a doubt it is impossible for the
first word to be the first speaker. Hence, [the word] by no means
has in itself or from itself an original hermenensis, but neither does
it have a derived one, since it has from its speaker only what it has
as a word. Therefore, no generation of another word arises from it.
In addition there is the previous foolishness that we pointed out,
since the second word adds nothing whatever to the signification or
the mode of signifying. There follows an infinity and useless
repetition to which there is no end. For that infinity of words and
endless genealogy would be the speaking of the first speaker. For
every word and word of a word are the words of the same one, just
as the word of the mind and the spoken word are words of the same
speaker, and the same man speaks both of them. Therefore, that
endless repetition of words of the same first speaker is nothing
whatever but an infinite foolishness. Second, if we consider the
word and image in itself, we shall find it does not turn one to itself
or toward itself, but to the speaker, that is, to what is said by the
word, and the image turns one to that of which it is the image. Thus
you see that the word and the image in and through themselves
have a power to turn around rather than to pour forth, or to
withdraw and turn back rather than to go forth and to generate.
Therefore, the first image brings to a halt in itself the process of
generation and turns itself and those seeing it back to the generator.
This was due to the first generation so that it might be [111] one in
every way, that is, a generation of one and from one
3. 'Hermenensis' is a transliteration from the Greek; Switalski notes
(p. 110) that 'hermenia' and 'hermenium' are also found.

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in every way.4 If, however, the first-born were generating and
generated, this would be either in the same respect or in different
respects. It cannot be in the same respect because of the opposition
between generator and generated. It cannot be in different respects,
since in him there is no diversity whatever; for it is necessary that
in himself he is one in every way.
Chapter XX
Up to this point we have tried to persuade you that the first
generator and the first-born necessarily share the highest essence
and that the first-born is also the only-begotten for his first
generator and that they are necessarily the first duality in the way it
is fitting for them to be two. Now, we shall try to show that they
have another communion1 than that which is essential, or in that
highest essence, and that they necessarily share a third, which is
neither of them. Thus the first duality is not alone, but necessarily
requires a third unity, which is their communion or society. This is
what is called by those who profess the true faith the most blessed
covenant of the first society and the first fruit of the first love, the
joy and delight of the first embrace, the bond of the first peace, the
first friendship, the first shared happiness. But it can also be called
by the more usual and common names: the Holy Spirit, the first
and eternal gift, the treasure house of all gifts and source of graces,
the love by which the first generator and his only-begotten son
embrace and from which there flows forth into the universe a vast
wealth of sweetness, pouring over everything, by which they
delight all who use it. However, the first and highest dignity of love
in each of them and the first and highest dignity of goodness in
each of them [112] and the ultimate certitude of mutual knowledge
clearly shows that the first generator and his only-begotten
embrace each other in the highest love. Just as we use the term
"knowledge" in a way suited to them, that is, beyond its customary
meaning for us, transferring it to them in a way proper and suited to
them, so we wish to use the term "love" according to their mode.
And so the best cannot fail to love the best when it is known with
the clearest knowledge. Even if a father could fail to love a son, the
best still cannot fail to love the best. Therefore, the most lovable
necessarily loves the most lovable and will not love him less than
he ought to be loved. Hence, the most lov-
4. William goes beyond Augustine on this point insofar as he offers
much stronger arguments against there being more than one
generation in God. Cf. De trin. 9, 12, 17-18 (CCL 50, 308-310),
where Augustine asks why we do not say or believe that the Holy
Spirit is generated as well as the Son.
1. Augustine, De trin. 15, 19, 37 (CCL 50a, 513, 139-143).

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able loves most highly or with the highest love the most lovable
and first loves the first lovable, Hence, each one loves the other
equally, since each clearly knows the other should be loved equally
to himself.
Again, if there ought to be a love between a father and a son,
because they are father and son, then between one most fully a
father and one most fully a son there will be the greatest love.
However, there is no doubt, from what we have already said, that
he is most fully father who is father out of himself alone and
through himself alone and father in the first instance. Hence, it is
manifest that the first-born is most fully son. For if one of two
correlatives is said to be the highest, the other is necessarily so too.
For the same reasons that the one is most fully father, the other will
necessarily be most fully son. Hence, the mutual love of the one
toward the other and for the other will be the first and highest love,
and on these matters we need not trouble ourselves. No one can
doubt that between these two, each of which is best, there is the
first peace and the first friendship and that between the first Father
and the first Son, since each is said to be lovable primarily and to
the highest degree, there is present the first natural love in the
manner that it is fitting that love be found there.2 For just as the
true Son and the true Father are in God, so it is necessary that there
be love there such as befits them, not such as we are accustomed
to. So also there is the first covenant, for the first mutual lovers are
necessarily mutually bound in the first covenant and embrace each
other by the first love. Even though these matters exceed our
customary understanding, it is still necessary that, when there
really are two, each of which is best, there necessarily be the
highest unity of will, the highest peace, the highest harmony, [113]
the mutual embrace of the highest goodness. For as the first Father
is the source and principle of all generations, and the first-born
wisdom is somehow by appropriation the principle of all cognitions
and lights that come after it, so it is necessary that the first society
is necessarily the principle of all friendships, harmonies or
societies. As the first word and first speech is the principle of all
words and all speeches, and the first-born wisdom is the origin and
principle of all sciences and knowledges that come after him, so
too the first love is the origin of all love. How will the first-born
understanding be the principle for every understanding and the first
love, if I may say so, not be the principle for every love? How will
every light of knowledge have the first-born light us its principle
and all the sweetness of love not have the first sweetness of love as
its principle by appropriation?
2. Cf. above, ch. 14, n. 17.

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Chapter XXI
Since there can be no doubt at all about [the existence of] the love
between them, let us go on to say something about the manner of
this love. I say that nothing is humanly loved by itself and on
account of itself except what is or appears to be good, of whatever
kind its goodness might be. For good is said in many senses: the
necessary good, such as food or a sufficiency of food or
nourishment or our life itself; the pleasant or delectable good, such
as the savor of this food; the useful good, such as the healthiness of
this food; the magnificent or lofty good, such as its expensiveness
which the nobles love so that they might be considered splendid
feasters. However, it is certain that the lovable is only loved if it
has also been apprehended, and its goodness, that is, that which is
loved in it, or through which it is loved, penetrates through
knowledge into the desire of the concupiscible power or of that
power, whatever it be, in accord with which this love exists.
Hence, love is like a hollow of the heart and a kind of hunger in us
for the sweetness of which we have a foretaste through desire and
which is, so to speak, transferred from the mouth of the intellect to
[114] the belly or palate of love. That love is profit-making and
mercenary that shows itself for sale for one of the four
aforementioned ends as for a price or recompense. None of these
loves is love, if we speak truly and properly, but a business deal
and money-making venality. It is not really fitting that one should
be said to love himself; for all love is a relation and looks to
another.1 But whatever may be true here, love of this kind still
ought not be called a gift of the lover, but rather the price of the
beloved paid someone because of the recompenses already
mentioned. For every gift is a gift because it is given and not paid
as a price for merchandise. Therefore, only what proceeds
gratuitously out of benignity is a gift. What then is most gratuitous
is most a gift, and what first goes forth is the first gift. However,
what first goes forth from benignity precisely as benignity is the
most pure and most gratuitous love. Therefore, gratuitous love, free
from all taint of profit, is the first gift both primarily and at the
highest level.
Again, every external gift, which is a gift in the true meaning of the
word that we gave above, arises from love. [A gift] does not
naturally proceed first and immediately from benignity but
necessarily needs love intervening and calling it forth. Thus love
proceeds first from benignity. Hence, love is the first gift, and even
in ordinary speech love is said to be given, but it is also the most
welcome and most rare of all gifts. Thus it is both desired for itself
and sought after by those who love rightly and apart from any
profit-making venality. For, if love is given, all things are given,
1. Cf. Augustine, De trin. 9, 2, 2 (CCL 50, 294).

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and if it is withheld, all things are withheld. Hence, true and sincere
lovers are said to have mutually given themselves to each other and
to possess each other mutually, and love is the lovers' mutual
possession of each other. Since, therefore, the benignity, or
goodness, of the first and highest Father is not less than his
fecundity, his love or favor and the first gift proceeding from him
will necessarily be no less than his offspring.
Again, love must intervene between his benignity and the external
gifts that [115] proceed from him, and if love were not first given,
it would be impossible that external gifts be given. It is necessary,
therefore, that from the first benignity, as benignity, there proceed
in the first place love of the sort appropriate to such great benignity
and then, through love, the external gifts.
Again, what is given by the greatest giver according to himself,
must necessarily be the greatest given or gift. But the greatest giver
is the greatest giver precisely because he is the most benign and the
converse as well. Hence, what the most benign gives according to
himself is the greatest of all gifts. But it is clear that this is love, for
the benign person, insofar as he is benign, first gives his love and
then afterwards other things from his love. Hence, it is necessary
that love be the greatest and first of all gifts.
Again, it is clear even to those who are deceitful that the source and
principle of all gifts, however they come about, is love. For
whether the giving is done freely or from a profit-seeking love, still
there is no doubt that it is done from love. For without question
either he is loved to whom the gift is given or that thing is loved on
account of which the gift is given. Hence, it is necessary that love
be the source and principle of all gifts. Thus it is clear that the first
and highest love is the whole principle of all the gifts of the first
and highest giver. For as love among us stands to gifts among us,
so love in God stands to the gifts which are from him. However, it
is clear from this that love cannot be from itself, because love is
necessarily a gift proceeding from benignity, by a procession
toward another, not a relation to itself.
Again, because our love arises from our goodness, his love
necessarily arises from goodness or the first good, I mean, the first
good, insofar as it is good.
Again, who can doubt that knowledge is the principle of love and
precedes it in the order of our intelligence?
Again, who can doubt that all who love each other are mutually the
principle [116] of their love or their friendship? Therefore, by all of
these it is clear that all love is necessarily from another. And if the
love is completely gratuitous and in a subject in no way able to be
affected, it will necessarily be from the lover himself, and the lover
will be the giver and the principle of it.

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Again, every lover among us is the principle of the love by which
he loves, but is not the first principle. For the beloved is the first
principle of love by its action on the lover, first upon his
apprehensive power and then through that upon his motive power.
Thus love is a passion inflicted by the beloved. Love is often called
a wound, even when it is holy and most chaste (Canticle of
Canticles, 4: "You wounded my heart" [Sg 4:9]). Thus it is true
among us that love is a passion and a wound inflicted by the
beloved on the lover. But in God, where each exists (existente)
utterly incapable of being affected, the lover receives absolutely
nothing from the beloved. Therefore, love is not brought against or
inflicted upon the lover and, consequently, it proceeds from the
pure goodness of the lover.
If we shall have understood that a human lover is not affected and
does not receive anything from the beloved, there is no doubt that
love in God is from the pure benignity and goodness of the lover
and is his gratuitous gift freely given to the beloved. Nor would he
love less because he received nothing from the beloved, just as one
knowing by his own light does not for this reason know less
because he is not illumined by the thing known. So too one who
sees through himself and has no need to be illumined by an
extrinsic light or color does not for this reason see less, but rather
just the opposite. For one sees less because he needs extrinsic
illumination. Thus in proportion to its brightness and perfection for
knowing, everything that knows through itself alone knows more
fully and more truly than what needs another external source of
illumination. It has to be this same way in the case of love. Thus he
loves so much more truly and more perfectly because he does not
need another to persuade or draw or move him to love. But the love
is the more gratuitous or more voluntary, the more the love
proceeds purely and solely from a pure benignity or goodness of
the lover. The love will be called more truly a gift, and it will be
more truly and more properly love [117] to the extent that an
extrinsic mover neither buys nor attracts nor extorts it. Thus for
anyone considering these things, it does not seem improbable that
the first friendship is most truly friendship to the highest degree
and is most gratuitous and pure and that there is none comparable
to it. Rather it is equal to its knowledge and proportional to its
goodness, that is, love is in proportion to the goodness of the lover
and of the beloved and in proportion to their mode of knowing.
With us, indeed, two things make us love the good, namely,
knowledge of it and our goodness. Because, then, each of these is
present in God in the highest degree, that is, goodness and mutual
knowledge in the lover and the beloved, it is necessary that the love
between them be in the highest degree in the manner befitting each
of them.
Again, if it was necessary that the first intellect be pregnant with
the first-born intellect as the luminosity of the Father is pregnant
with a light equal to himself, it is also necessary that the paternal
goodness or

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benignity abound with love. For as the intellect is related to interior
speech, which is its first-born offspring, so benignity is necessarily
related to grace, which is most pure and most holy love. They are
alike in this respect: just as from the first intellect there proceeds
another which is its first-born, so it is necessary that the grace of
love proceeds from benignity abounding as a source, though in
another manner. For we do not say that love is the son of goodness,
but the gift. This is what the beloved necessarily obtains as his own
from the first lover. It is not this way in the first-born son of every
creature; for a son is not a gift just because he is born. Yet love, by
the mere fact that it proceeds, is a gift that is given to the beloved,
and the first [gift]. Every beloved as beloved has this gift in the
manner in which one is said to have the favor or love of the one
loving him, not because it is necessarily poured out upon the
beloved, though this sometimes happens, as we shall later explain.
By its first procession the first love is not poured out upon the first
beloved. It is, nonetheless, the love for the first beloved, and the
beloved possesses it in the first lover, as we said of favor and love,
using a common and well-known example.
Chapter XXII
[118] Here is the explanation that clearly establishes the offspring
of the first generation and the gift of the first giving: It is necessary
that there be two outpourings from the first source. Since it is
already certain that this source is the first and the greatest in every
way, it is necessary that it be abundant in the highest and the
greatest degree and thus that it pour forth in the highest and
greatest degree. For abundance is either fecundity (and from this
there is the outpouring of generation) or is benignity and liberality
(and from this there is the outpouring of giving). Just as holding
back arises from emptiness and avaricious want, so giving comes
from the fullness and abundance of bountifulhess and liberality.1
Because the first source has abundance in the highest degree in
every way, he will have each of the outpourings in the highest and
greatest degree in every way. Hence, the first generation and giving
will be in him in the highest and greatest degree and, hence, will be
essential. The offspring of the first generation and the gift of the
first giving are in all their respects in the highest and greatest
degree, and for this reason the first offspring is in the highest
degree of nobility and of every kind of perfection, and the gift of
the first giving is in the highest degree of magnificence. If the first
giving were not essential, it would not be the first or the
1. The theme of goodness not being envious or grudging goes back to
Plato's Timaeus 29E-30A and runs through the whole Neoplatonic
tradition. Cf. above, ch. 14, n. 14.

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greatest, just as the generation would not. For generation in the
animal world is not essential, but from something superfluous to
animals, as you have learned elsewhere.
Moreover, if each of these outpourings were not from the source
itself and not from what is its own -- as in animals the outpouring
of generation does not arise from them nor properly from what is
their own, but from what is superfluous -- each would not be first
or greatest. Nor is it surprising that there is essential diversity
between Abraham and Isaac, since he did not generate him out of
himself, but out of what was superfluous to him. He was not born
solely from him, because the mother contributed something. Even
the two of them did not generate the whole of Isaac, but only his
body, for his soul was infused from above. But if Abraham had
generated the whole of Isaac out of himself alone and through
himself alone, he would necessarily in some sense be one with him,
I mean, one in number and otherwise. Nevertheless, he would have
remained other than Abraham because it is necessary that parent
and offspring differ in some way. Otherwise the same one would be
the cause of himself [119] and would generate himself. He would
not pour into him a part of his essence, because on this showing he
would not generate him out of the whole of himself but from a part
of himself. Among believers there can be no doubt concerning the
essence of the first love, that is, whether the love of the first
generator for the first-born and of the latter for the first generator
has to be numerically the same.2 That the first love has one essence
with the first generator and with the first-born can easily be shown
by those arguments which showed the essential unity of the first-
born with his generator. It becomes readily apparent by their
equality: the Son is as good as the Father, and the converse is true
as well. Hence, they are equally lovable. Since they are just as
good as they are lovable and also just as loved by one another as
they are lovable, they are just as loved as they are good. Thus the
goodness of both has equal love. But anything other than each of
them is less than each of them, and by other I mean other according
to essence. And so the love by which they embrace each other is
not something other than each of them in essence and is, therefore,
of the same essence with each of them.
Again, since the first gift is necessarily from the first generosity or
benignity or goodness according to itself, it will necessarily be of
the
2. On the basis of an analogy with two human lovers, one would
expect that the love of the Father for the Son would be a distinct love
from the love of the Son for the Father. Yet William knows that the
faith demands that the love between them be one love, namely, the
Holy Spirit. The divinity of the Holy Spirit was defined by the First
Council of Constantinople in 381. Cf. DS 150, as well as the Pseudo-
Athanasian Creed (Quicurnque) in DS 75.

Page 150
same essence and equal to its giver in all respects.3 But from what
has already been said arguments of this sort are easily adapted to
the Holy Spirit.
Chapter XXIII
Let us go back and show that it is not possible for there to be
numerically two loves between the first mutual lovers. Because
every cause of unity is necessarily more one in itself than are those
things which are united through it or in it, the first friendship is
necessarily more one in itself than the lovers. But they are
essentially one. Thus it is not [120] only one according to essence,
but is also one insofar as it is friendship. And so there is one
friendship and one love between them.
Again, if there were two loves, then for their society and union they
would equally need another bond by which they would be joined
together as the first Father and the first Son, and there would be no
end of loves on this showing, since there could not be numerically
one love between two.1
Again, since both have the same goodness which each loves in the
other and by which each loves the other, there can only be the same
love out of the same goodness, for the same goodness, and of the
same goodness. For they love each other only because they are
good and insofar as they are good. But they are good by the same
goodness; hence, the one's love for the other is out of the same
goodness. When two love each other for the same reason and love
in each other the same thing, the love is necessarily the same. For
those loved have the same love from the same [source] and
according to the same [goodness]. We have seen in a fuller
consideration that everything that the first Father loves for himself,
he loves also for the Son, because the whole of honor and glory
that the Father loves for himself, this whole he loves for the Son,
the whole of power, the whole of wisdom, the whole that is at all
lovable. We find this also in true human friends, namely, that in
every respect they love for
3. Cf. Augustine, De trin. 1, 6, 13 (CCL 50, 42-43); 4, 20, 29 (CCL
50, 199-200); 6, 1-5 (CCL 50, 228-229); 15, 19, 36 (CCL 50a, 512-
513); 15, 20, 39 (CCL 50a, 516-517).
1. William argues that, if the love needs a further bond to tie it to the
Father and to the Son, one is launched on an endless series of relations
relating the relations. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 3, 10, pp. 178-179, 4-
25, where Avicenna rejects a bond which relates the relation to its terms.
Avicenna's discussion of paternity and sonship has heavily influenced
William's understanding of the Trinitarian relations and the notions. Cf.
F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1893), p.
28, for a similar argument. William is probably arguing against the
school of Gilbert of Poitiers, for if, as Gilbert seems to have held,
relations are something present to the terms, these will need something
else to relate them to their terms. For more on Gilbert, cf. below, ch. 30,
n. 3.

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each other the same thing and in the same way. How much more,
then, will this be the case with the first and greatest and truest
mutual lovers! Because the two first [lovers] love each other to the
highest degree, they are joined together and united by the greatest
love. They are most united in love, when there is not only a unity
of loved ones (those, namely, who are loved) but also a unity of the
love. For there is greater unity in each of the two, that is, in the
love and the loved ones, than in either alone. Because that is the
first and highest union of love, it is necessary that [the unity] be
[found] not only in the ones loved, but also in the love itself. Thus
the love by which the first mutual lovers embrace each other is one.
Otherwise, in what way would the first lovers enjoy a greater union
[than other lovers]?
When we attend to the fact that the Son is the first word, it will
become clear to us that nothing can proceed from him unless it
proceeds from the Father. For from a word just in itself there
proceeds only what proceeds from [121] the speaker, and from an
image reflected in a mirror there proceeds only what proceeds from
the viewer, and from a stream only what proceeds from the source.
Hence, the love that proceeds from the Son also proceeds from the
Father. And so these two loves do not differ from the side of the
Father, since each is primarily and immediately from the Father. If
there is any ground of difference present, it is because the Son
seems to intervene, as though <the gift of love> proceeds primarily
and immediately from the Son and through him from the Father.
This is, however, something that should not make any difference,
for the Son has it from the Father that love proceeds from him. But
if he has from the Father only what the Father himself has (for the
Son was born from him according to that), then he received from
him precisely what he found in him. Hence, he has it not only that
the gift of love should proceed2 from him as [it proceeds] from the
Father, but also [that it should proceed] as the same gift.
Again, who can doubt that exterior gifts of the Father and the Son
are completely the same and the Father shares totally in them so
that nothing is the gift of one that is not the gift of the other?3 And
so it is necessary that the first gift be from both. For, if there can be
no diversity in exterior gifts, they will share much more in the first
interior gift; for exteriority produces plurality, whereas interiority
joins and unites. The
2. Cf. Augustine, De trin. 15, 17, 29 (CCL 50a, 503-504) and 15, 27,
48-50 (CCL 50a, 529-533).
3. William is appealing to the doctrine that the external operations are
common to all three persons of the Trinity. Cf. DS 415 and 501, as well
as 800 and 804. If the external operations were not common to all three,
then the persons would differ one from the other by something other
than their relations of opposition; thus one would have something that
another would not. Cf. Augustine, De trin. 5, 13, 14 (CCL 50, 220-222)
and Contra sermonem Arianorum 15 (PL 42, 694).

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universe is like a sphere; the greater the distance from the center,
the greater diversity and plurality of parts appear in it. But they are
united around the center. Thus the more universal <are> more
unified and simple, but the more sensible and more multiple
singulars are multiplied and thickened as if by the clothing of
forms and conditions. And so the interior and intelligible things are
closer to the principle, while more remote exterior things proceed
from the principle as if more dispersed. Thus, if there is unity of
any sort in those things which are subject to multiplicity by the
very distance from the first unity, so much the more is it in things
close to the first unity, that is, to the first interior gift.4
[122] Again, it is necessary that a diversity either of lovers or of
those loved produce a diversity of love. But a plurality of those
loved, where they are not principles of their own love and do not
move the lovers in another way, cannot multiply love.
Again, the longing of true love by which we love the Father and the
Son is one. For there is one knowledge of one truth, just as of one
sensible color or light there is necessarily one sensible vision,
whatever might be seen in that vision [which is] one in every way.
Because, then, the truth is one under which the Father and Son are
known and seen by those who have been allowed to glory and
rejoice in the vision of them, the knowledge or vision of them,
namely, of the Father and the Son, is one. In the same way, because
the goodness is necessarily one by which and in which they are
loved, the love by which they are loved is necessarily one. For as
truth is to knowledge, so goodness is to love. Thus the plurality of
the loved ones, whose lovability is still one, does not multiply the
love. If [there is a diversity] on the part of those loving, then there
will be something [arising] out of the Son which was not out of the
Father and thus something from the Son that is not from the Father,
and we have already disproved this. For if they differ in proximate
matters, they will necessarily and proportionally differ in distant
matters, since the closer things that arise from them are to the
principle, the more they are unified in themselves, and the more
remote [they are from the principle], the more they are multiplied
and dispersed.
Again, joy and delight are only love at rest. It is at rest when it
possesses its beloved; otherwise it cannot be at rest. Love is like a
weight drawing the lover to the beloved; the beloved is related to
the lover as its natural place.5 Because, then, the love of the Father
for the Son and of the Son for the Father is the highest, the one's
possession of the other is
4. The external gifts of the Trinity are common to all three. But if
external gifts are common, an internal gift must be so all the more,
since the more interior anything is, the more unified it is. William's
image of the universe as more simple at the center and with greater
multiplicity in proportion to the distance from the center may be
derived from Plotinus' Ennead 6, 5, 5.
5. This is a paraphrase of Conf. 13, 9, 10 (CCL 27, 246-247).

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also perfect. The Father has the Son most perfectly and is most
perfectly joined to him whom he always has in his bosom or heart.
For joy consists in the joining of the lover and the beloved, and this
is indeed pleasure. Therefore, the Father's joy in the Son and the
Son's in the Father is the highest. But it is not the highest unless the
Son shares in it, for it is impossible that a private joy that [123]
another does not share be common; hence, it cannot possibly be the
greatest. For a common joy is necessarily greater than a private
one, and a generally communicable good is greater than an
incommunicable one; the greater the good, the more
communicable, for communicability increases the goodness.6 For
benignity is in itself more a good than goodness insofar as it is
goodness. For benignity is like goodness overflowing onto others;
it overflows, however, only by its communicability. Hence, the first
joy has to be communicable or common, or it will not be the
highest, since a commumicable joy is greater in itself than a private
one. However, one should not be surprised that a single love unites
those who are essentially one in every way. Nothing like this is
found among us, because our lovers cannot be of one essence and
thus cannot love a single thing in each other. But in what follows
we shall look for a likeness of the Trinity in created things,
especially in the human mind, which, we read in Scripture,7 was
made to the image and likeness of the blessed Trinity.
In the meantime, then, it seems that we must believe that the first
bond is undivided in itself and needs no other bond and that the
first binding is not bound and that the first society is not linked
together and that the first alliance is not in itself brought together
by an alliance. Also we consider that it is necessary that the first
gift be given by both and proceed from both, lest there should
result a diversity of this sort in secondary and exterior gifts.8 This
gift is in no sense a creature because it is not fitting that a creature
come between Father and Son, lest it should seem to be closer and
more joined to each of them than they are to themselves. This love,
then, <is> the Holy Spirit, like a holy breathing forth, [124] like a
mutual good will toward each other, a sweetness breathed, not
generated, towards each other. For love proceeds in order that it
might belong to another and makes the lover the possession of the
beloved. Therefore, love is the gift in which the lover gives himself
and what is his to the beloved.
6. William again takes up the Neoplatonic theme of the good as
generous. Cf. above, ch. 14, n. 14 and ch. 22, n. 1.
7. There is no Scripture text in which the image and likeness of the
Trinity is said to lie in the human mind, though Augustine had from
early on interpreted Gen. 1:26 as meaning that the image and likeness of
God was found in the mind. Cf. De Gen. Man. 1, 17, 28 (PL 34, 186).
8. Switalski notes (p. 123) that the text for the last clause is corrupt in
the manuscripts.

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Thus the Son proceeds from the Father so that by his own
procession he might be the heir and lord of all the Father's
possessions, not by gift, but by heredity and natural right. But by
his procession the Holy Spirit is made another's gift; he is not made
the beloved's, I mean, by right; he makes the lover the possession
of the beloved and also all that belongs to the lover by right he
makes the beloved's by gift. Thus the Son is the lord of the ages in
two ways. First, by hereditary right from the Father, not only
because he is of one essence with the Father -- because of which
universal and undivided rule over the ages without doubt belongs
to him -- but also by the hereditary right of birth, as we said. By the
gift also of the love by which he is loved ineffably by the Father,
the law of true and perfect love, which is observed even among
those who love each other in the world, doubtless makes him also
owner and lord of all the Father's possessions. For even if universal
dominion did not belong to the Son by hereditary right, still the
ultimate perfection of love necessarily makes him possess all the
Father's possessions by his own integral dominion. This holds for
friendship among us, and love or friendship is merely the voluntary
sharing of all goods. Hence, in virtue of the truth of ineffable
friendship all the goods of the Father are necessarily common to
the Son.
Chapter XXIV
After what has been said, it ought to be clear that all things have
been made subject to the first-born Son of all creation [cf. Col
1:15] in three ways. First, because he is the one creator and lord of
the ages with the Father, for the Father is not the creator alone and
the Father is not God alone. Second, by right of inheritance and of
primogeniture, as we said. Third, by the gift of friendship. On any
one of these grounds he fully possesses [125] universal empire and
the kingdom of all ages. For even if he were not made the heir of
all things, all things are his by right of creation, because all ages
were made through and by him. Then by right of inheritance he is
heir of all things, even if the ages had not been made through him.
For even if a son does not acquire the inheritance, it is nonetheless
due to him and prepared by the father. Third, even if both of these
were absent, yet the love which shares all that is the Father's with
the beloved Son subjects everything to him in full dominion equal
to the Father's. For the best Father would not love the Son as much
as he should be loved or as much as himself or as such [a Son] and
so great a Son unless the Son possessed in the Father absolutely
everything that the

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Father has, just as a true friend possesses in a true friend, that is,
through him, everything which his friend has.
What has been said casts light to some extent upon the gift of the
first love that proceeds from both. For lovers who in no way
undergo anything from each other, either through apprehension or
affection, are necessarily the source of the love by which they
embrace each other. There is no doubt they are the source in the
same way; it is most clear that they, moreover, love each other in
the same way. Also, there is no doubt that [the love] proceeds as
the first grace or first gift from the lover to the beloved. But this
love for each other does not need to have any other binding, if by
itself it holds each of them bound, both the lover and the beloved.
From this it ought to be most clear that, if the beloved is loved just
in himself, the love is necessarily for him just in himself; hence,
between the lover and beloved only love mediates by that union, I
mean, [the union] by which they are joined or linked with each
other through the gift of love. For the one loves just in himself and
the other is loved just in himself. Thus this love is immediate to
each of the two, not inhering in each by another bond, but by itself,
as we have elsewhere taught concerning a relation.1 Since it is in
itself the binding of the terms of the relation, it has no other
relation that would be its binding to its related terms [126] or
extremities. We mentioned many such principles above when we
said that the first society, as well as other things of this sort, was
not joined together [by something else]. That it is neither necessary
nor true that another love proceeds from the love of the primary
grace is clear from the fact that love proceeds in order to be the
first gift of the lover to the beloved, which the beloved obtains
from the lover through himself. If, then, a second love would
proceed from the first, the first would be obtained in and through
the second and not through itself. This is what love just in itself
rules out, namely, that love be a gift through another and be given
through another or in another. For on this showing the love would
not be the first gift and most a gift, since it would be given through
another and in another.
Second, this procession either would or would not have an end. If it
had an end, the last in it would most be a gift, since it alone would
be in itself both gift and given, while all the rest are given in other
things and through other things. This last one alone would not be
given in another following love, since it would not have a
following love in which and through which it would be given. Thus
the first gift would least of all be a gift and the last would be most a
gift, and the grace which ought to decrease by this sort of descent
would increase. For it is grace, because it
1. Cf. above, ch. 23, pp. 150-151 (120) and pp. 153-154 (123-124), as
well as ch. 23, n. 1.

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is in and by itself a gift. But if this procession would have no end,
it would not be possible to find pure grace, one that is in and by
itself a gift, since the first would be given in the second and the
second in the third. Hence, there would be found neither a true nor
a pure gift, and thus no gift; for if it is not possible to find
something truly white, neither can there be found white without
qualification. What we have said about this above will be sufficient
for you.2
The goal of all we have said so far is that you know that the first
generator from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is
named [Cf. Ep 3:15] is the bosom or heart or womb of original and
primordial delight or generation, the mouth most perfect in all
respects of the first speech, the first and most abundant power of
the first act (and it is necessary that it is always in its first and most
perfect act), the light fontally and primordially pouring forth the
first splendor, the ever-flowing plenitude [127] of the first
utterance, the first exemplar, the first and manifest interpreter and
speaker of himself. And that the Son is truly the first-born offspring
of the first fecundity, by whose generation the bosom of the first
fecundity unfolds itself totally, while out of it the Son springs forth
equal in all things to the generator, the interpretation3 of the first
intellective power and the first word of the first speaker, and all the
remaining [titles he has] in the relative opposition to the Father, as
the result of which he is the first exemplification of the first
exemplar, the exemplar of the universe, into which the full beauty
of the first exemplar springs forth and is reflected. And that the
Holy Spirit should be understood to be the sweet breath of the first
love of the first lovers loving each other, the gift of the first grace,
the confirmation of the first generosity, by obtaining which all the
first benignity is drawn off, by which all the gratuitous and most
pure goodness is poured forth, to whom there belongs primarily
and by itself and most fully the notion of gift of oneself, which is a
gift in which its giver is most fully and first and in a singular way
possessed or received. A creature is rightly prevented from being
something that by its giving forces the creator to be given and by
its possession [forces him] to be possessed. However, it is
impossible that the creator be first given in the gift of a creature
lest the creature be thought to be given before the creator. But
every giver necessarily gives himself first, if he is a giver in the
true sense of the word.
It was fitting, however, that the source of goodness first bring forth
from itself the most excellent light of knowledge and then the
sweetness of love. In these two consists the whole of blessedness,
and the universe of all things depends on these two. For from the
exemplar form and from its love of being (essendi) there
necessarily arises by the
2. Cf. above, ch. 1, p. 68 (20).
3. Cf. above, ch. 19, n. 3.

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impression of its image on things external [to it] the whole that is
made by the art and wisdom of the maker. These two, however, are
the first word and the first love. For it is out of love of the
apprehended form that the exemplifications of it are loved
externally, and these are what are impressed by the form and are
certain images of it. You see, [128] then, that all things have been
made through the Word and love of the Word. Therefore, God did
everything through the Son and the Holy Spirit. Thus all things are
from the Father, flowing forth from him originally and fontally, as
from a most copious and most untiring source of power. All things
are through the Son forming and sealing each with his own form
and beauty. All things are in the Holy Spirit as in some heart and
bosom of love cherishing, feeding and preserving all things. The
Book of Wisdom XVI says, ''It served your grace that is nurse to
all" [Ws 16:25]. This grace has to be understood as the Holy Spirit,
according to Romans XI: "All things are through him, in him and
from him" [Rm 11:36]. Nothing, however, prevents each of these
from pertaining to any of all the others.
From this it will readily become clear that the blessed Trinity, the
one and only true God, is properly life, light and joy in the ultimate
degree of each of these. It is life in the ultimate degree, which has
nothing at all in common with death, but is utterly unadulterated
with it in the purity of the first peace. It is this life that death does
not approach in any way, nor does any destruction, either according
to essence or according to accident, either in act or in potency or in
thought; otherwise <life in the ultimate degree> would not be the
most remote from death or the most unadulterated with it in a
purity beyond which there is no other and by a separation most
separate from death and corruption, beyond which there is no other
in act or understanding. Therefore, <it is> necessarily intellective
and not acquired life, for all bodily life is acquired and proceeds
from the spiritual life that illuminates and rules the body. Thus it is
necessary that this life be always in act; otherwise it would not be
possible for it to be the first and the most perfect. The life of the
intellect in the actuality of living necessarily lies in the
interpretation and utterance of what has been understood, for they
<are> similar spiritually. By itself the conscious intellect [129] is in
potency only, living in the mode of a habit of knowledge, its
conscious actuality. Hence, it is necessarily in act always in
spiritual speech <of the intellect> and in its shining forth out of and
in itself and in its utterance from its proper plenitude in itself, as
appears in a bountiful habit, when it is in act, as we have shown
above.4
Therefore, it is life with light coeternal to it which it radiates and
pours forth out of itself. This is the fullest and most perfect
spiritual interpretation of this life, and the word, beyond which
there is no other, and
4. Cf. above, ch. 17, p. 135 (101-102).

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thus image and son. Therefore, from the union of these there pours
forth joy and their mutual pleasure in each other [that is] of
ultimate sweetness. By this joy or sweet love they necessarily have
all things in common, and undivided rule in the manner of those
most truly and most sincerely loving each other. Therefore, the
holy Trinity in itself is original life and light shining forth and
uttered from its plenitude, and the joy of mutual aspiration and
reciprocity, so to speak, of every form of good will. Hence, it is the
spring of life and light and joy, and this is its appropriate
designation so that we call it the spring of life and light and joy,
and life and light and joy in itself and for itself and according to
itself. Still in a marvelous way these three are in themselves both
one life and one joy; for it cannot be doubted that to rejoice in
oneself is to live and not only to live but also to live blessedly.
Hence, joy is not only life in itself, but the blessed life. Indeed one
who rejoices, insofar as he is rejoicing, is living and living
blessedly. Hence, joy of this kind is the blessed life. Likewise, to
speak spiritually, as we here understand it, is to live, though one
may more strictly consider it the very living of the intellect in act.
Hence, in the same way, the speaking is life, and the speech too.
Concerning this life there is no doubt but that it is life in itself.
You should not, however, be surprised that three or four kinds of
life are found among us: first -- bodily life which is preservation of
the body through the continuous restoration of nourishment; second
-- apprehensive life according to which we say [130] that sight was
dead or lifeless and is now living in act, when it is in the act of
apprehending; third -- affective life, according to which we say that
desire or the generative power is dead or deadened in the naturally
cold, who are dead to the actions of generation. But if there should
be no doubt that bodily life is life, which is a sort of compensation
for or a restoration from death, there should be no doubt about the
others. For who can doubt that to see in act is the very life of vision
and so also to desire is the life of the appetite? Thus, just as both to
see and to know in act are the life of sight, so also to desire is the
life of appetite.
In this way, then, both to rejoice and to know in act is to live in act.
For this reason we say that the reasoning power is dead in
melancholy people and that the sensitive power is dead in lethargic
people. Thus it is clear in itself that each of the three is life. It is
clear that it is one life because in God there is composition5 neither
in act nor potency but unity and simplicity in the ultimate degree.
For nothing which is not one in the ultimate degree can be said of
the first one; otherwise it would be both truly one and truly many, I
mean, one in every way and many in some way. This is so because
the first one is life. If it were a life that is compos-
5. William is again using the Boethian expression for composition; cf.
above, ch. 14, p. 122 (86) and n. 8; cf. also below, ch. 44, 252 (240).

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ite, it would be composite by the very fact that it is life, because it
is life in itself and not from another. Otherwise it would have life
and being (esset) from another -- something we have already
excluded from it. Hence, from the fact that it is, it would be many
and composed. But we have already shown that it is one in the
ultimate degree and, therefore, it is necessarily one life in itself in
every way; and it is both light and joy in the same way. Since light
and joy are both life, they are either the same life or not. But if they
are not the same life, each is still the first life, since each is the first
and highest essence. Thus the first life will not be one, solitary and
singular. From this it will follow that the highest essence is not
single. For the first essence is by itself and essentially one, and
hence the first life is single and solitary; thus these three are one
and the same life [131] in every way. In the same way it will
become clear that they are the same light. For anyone of them is the
light of the divine essence, which is essentially and by itself light.
In the same way it will be clear that these three things or three
persons are one joy or beatitude. For one cannot deny by any kind
of impudence that God is most happy. One cannot doubt that his
beatitude is most pure and most true joy perfect in every way. Joy
perfect in every way, than which a greater cannot be thought,6 is
the greatest enjoyment of the greatest good. It is clear that with him
there is the highest good and joy in no way comparable to others.
But see whether he can be happy by something other than himself,
for he has in himself every good to a greater degree than he has
given it to others, and he himself is a greater good than another can
be; for example, he is greater power, greater wisdom and greater
goodness for himself than something else could be for him.
Again, the first joy cannot be joy in another rather than in itself.
For first there is joy in oneself, then in what is one's own, and
finally in others. Thus, by the first joy he rejoices in himself, just as
he has from himself the vision of his own beauty, beyond which
there is no other, and the awareness of his own goodness, beyond
which there is no other. He has both of these in the highest degree,
namely, the vision of his own beauty and the awareness of his own
goodness -- and these are at the ultimate and greatest degree in
themselves. Therefore, he has the greatest joy in himself, but the
joy he has in himself cannot be something other than himself.
Hence, he is joy itself. He should not be thought to be happy by
reason of something other than himself and thus, when he has
attained that, be judged to be happy, not <from himself>. Thus
happiness would come to him from elsewhere, that is, from
outside.7
6. Cf. Augustine, De lib. arb 2, 6, 14 (CCL 29, 246); Boethius, De
Consolatione Philosophiae 3, 10 prose (CCL 94, 53, 22-23); Anselm,
Proslogion, chs. 2-4, in Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia. Ed. F. S.
Schmitt (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1946), vol. 1, pp. 101-104.
7. In Conf. 10, 23, 33 (CCL 27, 173), Augustine came to the definition
of happiness as "joy

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Again, the highest and first essence just in itself is beatitude. For by
it just in itself God is happy, and he should not be thought to be
happy by a lesser good than he himself [132] is. Thus the first
essence is beatitude; hence, the first joy and the first glory, hence,
the first life and the first light proceeding from it and the first joy
from the union of them both are simultaneously and singly there.
Hence, there is one joy and one beatitude and one and the same
glory in the highest and ultimate degree beyond which <essence>
there is neither beatitude, nor joy, nor glory.
Chapter XXV
See, then, as far as we have led you, that they are somehow three
and yet one in every way. Thus, that he is life or light or glory is
necessarily appropriated to each of them in one way and intention
and is necessarily common in another way and another intention.
Hence, we have to clarify these intentions in these and other
matters lest we seem to confound the Trinity.
First, we shall try to search out how the most blessed Trinity is
reflected in individual things and how each and every thing is a
kind of shadow or likeness of it and even its footprint and back, as
Scripture says. Indeed God himself talking to Moses said, "My
backs you will see, but you will not see my face, because no man
sees me and lives" [Ex 33:20, 23].1 Of these backs we shall first
consider the last. These are sensible things. I mean that in all
sensible things we find a certain variety and clothing about with
natural accidents. This variety and clothing is a certain facet of the
sensible thing, but an exterior facet by which each sensible [thing]
makes itself known to the senses. Hence, [this variety] is like its
exterior word by which [the thing] speaks itself to the senses. I call
it an exterior word because it is not just of itself an image of its
essence. Hence, it is like a spoken word since it is not a sign of
likeness, but perhaps a sign of a relation or comparison.
Thus we refrain from determining whether this variety [of
accidents] is one with the subject or not, [133] considering it
sufficient that this variety is like the word of the subject, of the
subject that speaks itself to the senses through it in some way and
perhaps properly. For the subject speaks itself through [this variety]
and is its parent, since the whole variety of natural accidents
undoubtedly proceeds from the essence of the
in the truth: gaudium de veritate." William is working with that
definition throughout the preceding paragraph.
1. The Latin "posteriora: back" is plural, and though it would normally
be translated in the singular, William proceeds to speak of many "backs"
of God, such as sensible things, matter and form, and geometrical
figures.

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subject. For we call those accidents natural to each thing which
arise for it and in it from its nature. The motions and changes of the
nature itself reveal the sort of love there is between a thing and its
natural accidents, which are its external beauty and its seemly face.
Notice first how all bodies naturally flee from the places contrary
to their nature and seek out those places that agree with their
external nature. You will find this in animals and in all living
things. Indeed, concerning living things notice with what care
nature seeks out what is externally necessary to them for
conserving their exterior beauty. It is easy to see how they strive to
adorn themselves externally in some way: branches and leaves and
the bark of trees, the skins of animals and the arrangement of
shapes and colors in them show this. Ravens get rid of their young
if they do not look black. Peacocks admire the beauty of their tails.
Water immediately gets rid of its muddiness, when it can. Every
sensible thing so loves the beauty with which it is clothed that it
tries to clothe all other things with its beauty and strives to make
them like to itself. This is the cause of all the struggles in which
contraries in the world of nature do battle.
There ought to be no doubt about the love which this beauty has for
its proper subject, since it does not at all allow itself to be separated
from it, and its separation is the destruction of the subject.
However, we are concerned with that love of nature which
philosophers have claimed there is between matter and form.2
Without a doubt this ought to be the greatest of natural loves, [134]
because the union of matter and form is the greatest and first, as the
composition of nature reveals. Notice, then, these three in every
sensible thing, namely, its beauty clothing it about, the subject, and
the love by which they embrace each other. You will find the
essence of the subject like one who speaks, its beauty by which it is
clothed like a word, and [their union] like a gift of love between
them. By [this love] they embrace each other, and by it they also
impart what they have to exterior things. Think of the generosity of
the sun, which so copiously sends forth the rays of its luminosity.
If perhaps among these three there is not found a pure unity
corresponding in every way to the first unity, recall that the shadow
need not be proportioned in every detail to the truth and that the
farther some things are from the first principle, the less they
preserve a likeness of the true unity and Trinity. For a shadow does
not exactly keep the shape of the body that casts it, and a footprint
does not keep the shape of the foot that imprints it, and an image
reflected in a mirror cannot be in all respects like the face of the
viewer. Indeed, we have shown in the preceding sections that no
creature can be a perfect likeness of the creator and that it is not
possible that creatures share with him in genus or
2. Cf. Avicebron, Fons vitae 5, 32, p. 316, 18-23 and p. 317, 13-24; 5,
34, p. 319, 20-26 and p. 320, 12-19.

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species or number or accidents, which alone bring about [such] a
likeness. The likeness that we have here assigned is the last of all
likenesses in both order and slightness of imitation. Thus it is not
surprising that there is much discrepancy where there is least
agreement. Those who say that this kind of clothing is the same as
the subject -- I mean, the same according to essence -- speak of the
clothing not as abstract, but rather as inhering in some way in the
bosom and the heart of the subject. For by way of abstraction there
is not this sort of variety, clothing and beauty of the subject, since it
does not in any sense accrue to the subject. Rather it is the abstract
form of the absolute essence and of the quiddity separated [135]
from the quiddity of the subject, and not the radiantness of the
subject shining forth and speaking itself.
Hence, the likeness will be clearer in this way. If we say the word
of the brass is its figure, that is, the statue3 or image, this was
indeed in the bosom of the potency of the brass, and hence [was
there] potentially, before it was reduced to act. Then its reduction
to act was the uttering of its potency that pours itself forth into act.
There is no doubt that this brass and this statue are utterly one in
essence and in subject. For there should be no doubt that the brass
is like a parent and that the statue is the offspring of the brass. With
the help of the sculptor, [the brass] brings forth [the statue] like
some child from the bosom and heart of its potency. If we say with
Aristotle4 that it obtains the figure by nature <as an accident of the
brass>, then it is clear that the parent and the offspring, and the
speaker and the word, that is, the brass and the statue, are equal to
each other. Although there is no doubt that the one is from the
other, I say that they are equal to each other according to the order
of being (essendi) in time, not of being (essendi) absolutely. As one
is from the other, so they are the same according to essence, both
the same in the subject and the same in number, though the one is
in the other. A person who sees one sees the other, for the brass is
in the statue and the statue is in the brass, and both have the same
brassiness, which is the essential and specific form of each of them.
Therefore, brass bare and precisely as brass is the bare essence
common to both, but the parent or speaker is sensible or formable,
and the offspring (and word) -- the statue or image -- is sensible or
form <able>. Through formation it is the word of the brass
speaking itself and the offspring of the same one bringing forth the
child of its fecundity. In matter and form and their mutual joining
and love there is the clearest, but most powerful, exemplification of
the Trinity because it is obvious that these three are one according
to essence.
4. Switalski says (p. 135) that "Aristotle speaks only in general terms of
figure as belonging to the accident of quality." He refers to Categories 8,
9b11-16 and Metaphysics 5, 30, 1025a; 11, 9, 1065b.

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[136] Let us look at this in the universal first matter that supports
everything and in the first form.5 Since they both are so related, let
the former be matter because it is not produced and let the form
that it has be what is not formed. For matter in itself has no being
(esse), just as the human seed in itself does not have the power to
be either Socrates or Plato. And a seed or a nut does not of itself
have the power to be this nut tree rather than another, or this grain
rather than another. But first matter, which is in itself not formed in
any way, is related in this way to all formed and produced things.
Thus first matter does not have the being (esse) of those things that
come after it. All being (esse), however, that comes after it I call
made or created being (esse). For [this matter] is the first support
while the sensible form is the last thing supported, and it is the first
recipient while the sensible form is the last thing received.6 Hence,
it has of itself no being (esse) at all, since all being (esse) that is
after the first true and pure being (esse) is received by it in some
way. Hence, since matter of itself is neither receiving nor having,
but only receptive,7 it is clear that it does not of itself have being
(esse) and that it is not something and does not have a quiddity
since, if it were such that it had being (esse) in itself, it would also
be intelligible in itself. For it is a principle of first philosophy that
everything that is is intelligible and that, as it is, so it is intelligible.
Since it is not intelligible in itself, it will not be something and it
will not have being (esse) in itself. If it were intelligible in itself,
the intellect could become like it through the form which it would
receive. For this is to know intellectually, namely, to become like
and to become an exemplification of the intellectually known in
act. But it is impossible that form be impressed by something that
does not have it, and it is impossible to become an exemplification
of another except through form. As in a visible mirror nothing can
appear except form and what has form, so it is also in [137] the
mirrors of our intelligences. Just as only a sensible form or a
formed sensible strikes a sense, and does so through [the form], so
it has to be this way in our intellect as well. Hence, matter in itself
is not intelligible and thus is not in itself, and it is not something in
act in itself, but something in potency.8
5. For the doctrine of first matter and first form, cf. Avicebron, Fons
vitae 3, 26, p. 142, 25 and 3, 49, p. 189, 8.
6. William holds Avicebron's doctrine of a plurality of corporeal forms;
cf., for example, Fons vitae 5, 20, p. 295, 10-16.
7. Switalski reports (p. 136) that the medieval translations of Avicenna's
Metaphysics use the terms "receptivus" and "receptibilis"
interchangeably; cf., for example, Metaphysics 2, 3, p. 86, 9 and 2, 4, p.
97, 31.
8. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 2, 3, p. 92, 22-25 and 2, 4, pp. 101-102,
10-14. For Augustine's account of matter, cf. De Gen. ad lit. 1, 15
(CSEL 28, 21-23); De vera religione 18, 35 (CCL 32, 208-209); Conf.
12, 6, 6 (CCL 27, 218-219) and 12, 8, 8 (CCL 27, 220).

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Someone might say that it is a sort of bare substance, receptive of
forms, potentially indeed each of the things that can be made from
it, though actually none of them, but that it is still in and by itself a
substance of sorts. In this way wax in and by itself is actually wax,
though potentially each of the images formable from it. You should
know that wax is not actually wax because it is matter, but rather
because it is something formed by the certain specific form,
namely, that of wax. But we understand first matter as what is
matter only, so that in itself and just of itself it is in no sense
formed; otherwise it would not be first if in itself it were formed
and produced. Thus first matter is only matter in all of its modes.
Matter, however, just because it is matter, would be no being (esse)
in act of the things which can be formed from it, and it does not
have in itself another being (esse) of itself and in act. Therefore, its
being (esse) in act and the being (esse) of form in act are one and
the same being (esse), since bringing matter to the actuality of
being (essendi) and bringing form are one action because it is one
generation or creation or other sort of making. Hence, matter and
form have the same being (esse) in act. Note, then, that matter and
form differ in potency and with respect to reason, but they do not
differ in being (esse); indeed they are necessarily one thing in act.
For they cannot be diverse things in act, since their actuality is one
in every way. Perhaps we have here another way by which one can
be persuaded that every [138] potency and its actuality are one in
act and in actuality, even though another mode of difference can be
found in them. There is no doubt, however, that every act is the
word and child and offspring of its potency. If first matter did not
need another helper, but gave birth out of itself to the first form,
what else would you call the generation of the first form but first
matter's giving birth and speaking, and a real, not a merely vocal
speaking. For it would bring forth not a vocal sign of something,
but the thing itself, which it held potentially enclosed in the bosom
or heart of its potency. By this, its word, matter is understood and
known, though otherwise it is, as we have said, not intelligible
except in the way darkness is visible and silence is audible.9
But if someone should say that first matter adds nothing to the
being (esse) of form, but rather the converse, let him consider this
in instances of second matter. He will find each of them is like the
parent of that which can be formed or made from it, as one can see
in an egg and in seeds and fruits. He will find in them not only a
receptive power, but also a generative one,10 for in seeds there is
the power generative of the seeds
9. In De Gen. Man. 1, 4, 7 (PL 34, 177) Augustine says of the
Manichees, "They suppose that darkness is something, and they do
not understand that darkness is only perceived when we do not see, as
silence is perceived only when we do not hear."
10. Cf. Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. 6, 10 (CSEL 28, 183), where he
speaks of living things having "a certain hidden power of generating."

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for their own species both of grasses and plants. The generative
power, however, is the power to which the form that is received in
matter owes its being (esse). Hence, in matters of this kind it is
clear that [the form] has been generated by them, and to be
generated and, hence, to be (esse) arises from them. They are
children and offspring and real words of their second matters.
Hence, I ask whether it is true that a plant is potentially in its seed.
The usage and common language of the philosophers says this.11
Because the seed is present potentially in the matter, that is, in the
plant, just as we say that the seed is potentially the plant, you can
see that they are potentially one, since particular propositions
concerning the possible and the contingent are simply converted.
Thus matter generally in the way that it is [139] matter is by its
possibility one thing with what is produced from it, with its child,
its offspring and its real word. This ought to be the case with first
matter and first form, just as in instances of second matter. For
second matter ought not to be able to do more for its form than first
matter can for its; rather they should be related proportionally.
Therefore, both in act and in potency they are one thing generally,
though they are two in mode. Matter is parent and bosom and heart
generally of form, and its speaker or interpreter, while form is the
offspring, the child and the real word.
Their inseparability reveals the nature and greatness of the love by
which they embrace -- in the manner in which we can say that there
is love between them. We understand this love as natural, not
cognitive, as natural and necessary, not voluntary. This love is not
insignificant, since it is essential to each, for form is not bound to
matter nor matter to form by something other than each of them. I
mean something other according to essence, since matter has it
from the fact that it is matter that it desires form and embraces
mightily and inseparably -- according to its ability -- the form it has
acquired and permits itself to be separated from it only by violence.
Likewise the form of itself has the same character. Hence, this love
is not acquired by either of them, but is innate and natural, if we
may so speak. It is also a gift by which they freely possess and
embrace each other. Some among the most noble philosophers12
assert that this friendship is one of the principles, because by this
love matter in a sense draws forth from the agent in every
generation a form fit for itself. For that matter receives in
generation the form of the generated is not so much due to the
generosity and abundance of the agent as to the fecundity of matter
and to the attraction of strong desire. The same friendship
preserves everything that has been generated and wards off, as far
as it can; corruption from them. But let us see if the love by which
they embrace each other is something other than the two of them. I
say [140] that matter only loves
11. For example, Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. 5, 7 (CSEL 28, 150-151).
12. Cf. above, n. 2.

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form because of what form is and that matter is only loved because
of what form is. For the matter loves the form as its perfection and
act, and the form loves in the matter only itself. It does not love in
matter the imperfection, but rather the perfection which it is. For
there is nothing lovable in matter insofar as it is not -- I mean, is
not in act, but in potency. This [perfection] is the form; hence, the
form loves only itself in matter. Thus the same thing is loved from
each side and in the same respect, because the form [is loved] just
in itself and by the same thing in act, as we showed above. Hence,
it is the same love.
Therefore, the common subject of possibility and perfection is here
like the common essence of the deity. For the same thing that is
possible will be in act; the same thing that is possible will be
perfect. For potency and act are generally of the same essence, I
mean, of the same essence as a subject, not that they have the same
essence or quiddity. But that love by which the possible as possible
loves its own perfection cannot possibly be adventitious to the
possible; by the very fact that it is possible, it loves its own
perfection. Hence, this love proceeds for it from its own possibility
and is of equal duration in the order of being (essendi) with the
possible as possible. It does not love another possible than itself,
since it loves its own perfection or itself as perfect (I mean not
another according to essence, even if another according to reason).
But it is not possible to separate this love from those two by the
intellect. But what the intellect cannot separate, essential unity
necessarily unites. You see, then, how a certain shadow of the first
Trinity is reflected in every created thing whose unity has been
brought together from matter and form and their mutual embrace.
The imperfection of possibility which is in [a creature] belongs to it
from its own side. Thus matter does not express the full likeness of
the highest Father. In those things which creatures <have> from
their own side, creatures can in no sense be likened to the universal
[141] creator, for they are not an exemplification of him, except
according to what they receive from him. It is generally true for an
exemplification of anything that it is only an exemplification of its
exemplar by what it receives from it. For this reason the
imperfection of possibility does not help the likeness; in fact it
lessens it. But insofar as matter has form potentially as if hidden in
its possibility and always carries it as if conceived and in the womb
of its potency, it is doubtless a shadow of sorts and a footprint,
though slight, of the highest Father. Yet its imperfection somewhat
lessens the footprint and thickens the shadow and inclines it to its
own side, which is the side of the darkness. For it can only reflect a
likeness from the side of the light and from the light. That it lessens
the reflection to that light belongs to it from the side of its own
darkness, into which it would continually fall back if form did not
illumine and restrain it from this sort of fall. But if one asks why it
is that matter reflects the Father less than form reflects the Son and
why it is more imperfect, he is asking

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why there is matter and why there is form. That matter has being
(esse) is <from> the form. Therefore, it was not possible that
matter should be without form. Likewise, once it pleased the
creator to create form, he necessarily created [matter] in the being
(esse) of form.
As for figures, the likeness of the blessed Trinity shines forth in the
equilateral triangle, which is the first distinct plane figure closed by
a plurality of lines. For there should be no doubt that an angle is the
area which two lines mark off by their mutual meeting on one side.
This is clearly shown by the division of angles, their equality and
inequality, their being greater or less and other modifications of
this sort, which geometry renders certain concerning the angle as
the proper subject of these modifications. We will not delay here,
but hurry on to the other cases. If someone says that the point of
the area is the angle and calls the point [142] of the angle A, then
the divisions of angles and their largeness or smallness are nothing
at all. Either he calls the point a part of the area or all of it; let him
say either of these, he does not interfere with our aim. For if he
calls the whole area enclosed on one side by the line A-B and on
the other by the line A-C the angle A, we draw under the angle A
the line BC. Then, the angle C will for the same reason be the area
enclosed by the lines A-C and B-C. Hence, the three angles are one
and the same area, which is the triangle A, B, C. But if someone
calls part of the area the angle, we will close off this part by a line
drawn under the angle and a triangle will be enclosed. Thus the
same thing will happen as before. Notice, then, that A, B, C are
truly three angles, though they are one and the same area in every
respect, since each of them is the area. Hence, the area is like the
common essence of the three angles, just as the three whom we
have named share the highest essence. But the triangle is like the
Trinity itself. For just as the blessed and most high Trinity is no one
of the three taken alone, so we do not call a triangle an angle in
order that you may know that a triangle is a trinity of angles, not
the triangular area. Still, because the area is called triangular, the
term can be understood either as the name of a triangle or as [the
name of the angles] taken separately. And so the area may be called
triangular, as the divine essence is called triune. Yet no one doubts
that the triangle is not an angle, even if they are the same area, or
that the angles are truly three, even if they are the same area, each
individually and all together.
Chapter XXVI
Next, the exemplification and image of the first Trinity is the more
evidently found in the rational human soul for the Scripture of truth

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expressly testifies that it has been made to the image and likeness
of God,1 [143] while it is completely silent about other things. First
of all, it is both widely and well known with what power [the soul]
governs the body, so that it fills the body with the overflowing
abundance of life (this power or potency so fecund and abundant
with life and operations is a kind of exemplification of the
omnipotent Father). It is also well known with what providence
and natural wisdom it both provides and distributes nourishment to
the body and moves and rules it (and anyone can see that this
wisdom is an exemplification or image of the first-born wisdom).
But what sort of love and how great a love does the soul have for
the body and what belongs to it, namely, its strength, agility,
soundness and beauty? No one can, it seems, doubt that this love is
a certain exemplification and image of the first love. These
[exemplifications] are certain shadows or rays, by which there is
reflected in the body the trinity which is in the human soul and
[which is] in the body from [the soul]. But the soul itself is a
shadow or vestige or ray of the first Trinity. Hence, the three that
we have already mentioned are a shadow of this shadow and, thus,
closer to the darkness of our cognition, though more unlike the
truth itself. Thus in the body there clearly enough appears a shadow
of the shadow of the first truth, as we have said. Hence, the first
shadow necessarily preserves a clearer likeness of the first truth.
And so I say that in the human soul there is necessarily life and
apprehension and affection. The life by which the body lives and
by which the animal lives and by which man lives is a shadow and
lessening of this sort of life. Thus the three lives are its shadows:
vital which you find in plants, animal which you see in beasts, and
human by which the soul lives present to itself, the shadow of a
clearer likeness -- and this by its multiple perfection.
I say, then, that the life by which the soul lives as present to itself is
the parent of apprehension and the giver of affection. For life
precedes apprehension, which is present potentially in life. It is like
its matter or parent, for the material cause is that in which the other
is present [144] potentially and from which it can be drawn out and
extracted by action. Who can doubt that apprehension proceeds
from life? We understand apprehension here not according to act,
but rather apprehension as power or habit or potency. Thus,
because this life precedes apprehension in the order of being
(essendi), it is necessarily its cause. That the cause is like a parent
is clear from the following. Though we do not doubt that this life is
actually in the souls of children, yet intellectual apprehension is not
actually in them and is not fixed. Still we hold with highest
certainty that in everyone who understands, understanding oneself
is first and that the power of understanding and the presence of its
truth comes to it before
1. Despite what William says, Gn 1:26 does not say that the human
soul was made to the image and likeness of the God. Cf. above, ch.
23, n. 7.

Page 169
the things that are outside it can possibly reach it through their
likenesses. And so it first has understanding and reason in act at the
point when [the intellect] understands that it has [itself and its
truth]. Hence, it is from this power and not from the sensible power
that the apprehensive power went into act, because this was really
done by its operation.
Further, the sensitive power was not capable of something greater
and more noble than itself so that [the apprehensive power] should
proceed from it. Besides, [the sensitive power] is not absolutely
prior in the order of being (essendi), but in the order of time, that
is, as [the apprehensive power's] assistant in some way. Also the
apprehensive power is far nobler than the sensitive and mortal
power, because it is immortal. Consequently, it proceeds from a
power proximate to it because it proceeds from one prior in order
and immortal as it is. This is the life that we mentioned, because it
was without doubt present in it potentially, and that life was as if
pregnant with what it brought to birth as a mature child, at the time
we said. Because, then, the intellective power apprehends that it is
and lives and apprehends its essence or life before it apprehends
any other likeness it has, the intellectual power necessarily
apprehends the life from which it necessarily came forth as a child.
This intellective power, [145] as we said, is either the truth or
image of the life from which it proceeds. This is what we are
aiming at, because this intellectual understanding that proceeds
from life is truly its offspring, since it is an image proceeding from
it as from a womb or heart. Nor is it doubtful that it apprehends in
the proper order its own life or its living before its understanding,
since this is prior or more proximate to it. Hence, since it
apprehends its life by itself and in itself, it is necessarily the word
and the understanding of its life.
We will pass this by and say that these three, that is, life, intellect,
and affection, are necessarily one essence. For since they are in the
human soul, they are necessarily in it either as parts or as the whole
that is the soul, or as accidents. If they are in it as the whole, we
have our main point, namely, that the whole is the rational soul, of
which we speak. But if they are in it as parts, then there ought to be
one operation formed from their operations. But it is clear that from
living and understanding and affection a single operation cannot be
composed in any way; rather they are ordered among one another
as cause and effect. But if someone should say that there need not
be one operation composed from many operations just because one
power is composed from many powers, he is out of his mind and
not one with whom we should hold a philosophical discussion. For
with things proportional to each other, if one is present, so is the
other. Powers and operations are reciprocally proportional to each
other, so that as the powers stand to each other, so do the
operations. Hence, the powers are not in the soul as parts.
Consequently, they are in it as accidents, and in that case the soul
of the brute is different from the

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human soul only accidentally, since it only differs as such a soul by
such powers. But this is something that ought to be known from the
other sciences. Hence, each of these three is in the soul as a whole,
and thus they are certainly one according to their essential subject,
even though they are three. When you have considered the life of
the intellect in itself precisely as the life of the intellect or
intellective or intellectual life, you will find [146] that it is clearly a
power pregnant with intellectual understanding and, as we said,
bearing it in its womb.
If you would look to the more profound notions of philosophy,
know that to act [upon something] is nothing more than to draw out
the form from the womb of the matter in which the form was
potentially. Thus to act is rightly understood as to bring into act
what was only in potency. Thus sensible forms first act upon the
soul through the organs of the senses so that intellectual
understanding in act might be formed in it. This is what is drawn
out from it through many such actions upon it, and on account of
this it is the the word of the intellect which is the fecund and
pregnant source. For it is not bodily life, but the life by which the
intellect lives that is only the source, before it gives birth to the
intellect that it bears as in a womb.2 The former is the intellect
which should be called material, but the other, which is the
offspring of the former, should be called formal, since it is drawn
out as if from its matter in the manner of a form, as we said.
See that you do not make a mistake by reason of the fact that we
called this original power of the human soul life and think of the
bodily exterior life. For we are not talking about that bodily and
nearly sensible life, but about that life of which this life is the far
different shadow and lessening. This will be clear from the order of
operations. For the order of operations of the soul through the body
and in the body is quite evident. First of all, there is the very living
of the body; then bodily knowing, which is sensible; third, its being
affected by bodily love and bodily desire. These are rays or
shadows of things that are in the soul just in itself. But just as
shadow is to shadow, footprint to footprint, lessening to lessening,
and overflow to overflow, so also is truth to truth and source to
source. Hence, the same order and variety is necessarily in those
things that are in the soul according to itself, that is, intellectually.
Thus you see that the very living of the intellect is like the parent of
intellectual understanding and that the very being affected is the
gift of each of them, as we shall make clear. But if this power
stands toward the second as a parent, the third also stands toward
both of them as the gift [147] of each. For if you consider the
intellectual soul, you will find that it is possible in relation to
2. The Latin ''intellectus: intellect" can mean both the power and
intellectual knowledge. The first or material intellect stands to the
second or formal intellect as potency or habit to actual knowledge.

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intellectual understanding. For life of this sort naturally stands
precisely as possible in relation to intellectual understanding, and it
carries enclosed as if in the womb of its potentiality that which is
known by the birth of the same [intellectual understanding], when
it brings it forth at the time we said into light of actuality. This is
certain by reason of the fact that the life, whose shadow and
lessening is the life of plants, is not able to bring forth intellectual
understanding from its own power or potentiality. Likewise, the
sensible life of an animal is by itself unable to do so. Hence, this
life is without doubt both more sublime in order and more fecund
in abundance. Nonetheless, the life of an animal brings forth a sort
of learning from the womb of its abundance, for some animals con
be taught, though a potency of such commonness as theirs does not
bear an offspring of such nobility and perfection. And so this life or
material intellect, according to the intention which we defined
above, is the original and first intellect and the first interpretative
power. The second intellect is the word of the first interpretation,
the potential word of the things which are outside it, the word
always in act of that power out of which it is born. Thus it is
necessary that everyone who understands intellectually understand
that he has the power of intellectual understanding, even though he
is not free to think as long as he is pressed down by phantasms. For
it is necessary that one who understands intellectually understand
himself, but it is not free or easy for him, while he is overshadowed
and covered and inscribed with phantasms, to know and see
himself as he is, that is, his bare essence. For this he must transcend
the phantasms that necessarily draw him to the things of which
they are likenesses and by which they are impressed. For it is the
nature of intelligible signs by which the things that are outside
write upon our minds that they always draw our minds to the things
by which they are impressed or inscribed and do not permit them to
think of anything else. Hence, when some things are more firmly
impressed on us, they exclude other impressions from us, and they
necessarily draw us to those things of which they are likenesses,
even while we are sleeping. This becomes clear from the emotions
of love and hate and envy and fear which, [148] when they attack
in strength and are firmly fixed in us and penetrate to our inmost
self, exclude from us worries and other emotions.
With what love and how great a love they embrace each other will
become evident from the fact that those things that assist the
intellect are bound together by a marvelous love. On this point the
example of the eyes and sight is sufficient for us. For we love sight
beyond the other senses because of our desire to know and
understand intellectually in act, because it is freer and more
extensive in searching out things outside us. Certainly this love
exists only on account of understanding in act. For if our
understanding in act were perfect without the benefit of sight, we
would not love sight at all. So too, if our sight in act were perfect in
those

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things which concern the sun and moon and stars, the science of
astronomy would not be necessary for us, and we would not love it.
But if the love of the original intellect for this sense and others is so
great, and this on account of the intellect, how great is the love for
the intellect! This affection of love is strictly gratuitous, for it does
not love the intellect for profit or gain, but freely and equally, and it
loves it so that it considers it all the same to lose it and to lose
itself. For without it its being (esse) would be utterly empty and
useless for itself, since it would not even be able to know itself.
What benefit or pleasure would the being (esse) of first intellect
have without it? What we went through earlier about matter and
form becomes once again pertinent. For that primary and original
[intellect] is just like matter, when we have removed from it the
perfection of the second [intellect], and in loving it it only loves
itself in act. On the other hand, it is evident how much the intellect
loves its source and to what extent it is bound to it from its care in
providing and searching out its second perfections and removing
from it all imperfection. For who is unaware of the ardor with
which [the intellect] drives out the darkness of errors and pursues
the light of truth? Thus you see the zeal with which it burns to
drive out the imperfections in its matter and seeks its perfections.
But if someone should say that it seeks this for itself and not for
that material [intellect] from [149] whose potentiality it goes forth,
we answer that it seeks it for this material [intellect] from whose
potentiality it arises and it loves in it only itself. Because it truly
loves the perfection of the material [intellect], it necessarily loves
itself, since it is the perfection of it. And this is the reason why the
love of both of them for each other has to be the same. But this
love cannot be essentially other than each of them. For, if it were
other, it would necessarily come between the first power, the
original intellect, and that intellect which is the first derivation of it
or from it, since the love would be a binding of them to each other
and, hence, closer to each of them than they are to each other -- and
this is impossible. For they are necessarily as close as possible to
each other, since the former intellect is the immediate power for the
latter, while the latter is the immediate act from the former. By this
path we will return to what we covered above concerning the first
generator and the first son. For all those comparisons and
likenesses of a maker and of art and of their love for each other
come to mind here, and they really should come to mind. When
these appear obscure and weak to you, have recourse to the former.
In its ultimate glory and ultimate beauty and in the happiness
promised it, the human soul will be similar to its creator. The
reason for this is that because of its immediate union it will reflect
him as a mirror of the highest purity that reflects the face of the one
looking at it, as the true faith most clearly knows. We say that its
perfection is without any doubt

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the completion or perfection of its possibility. I mean the ultimate
completion and perfection so that it necessarily is at rest and it is
impossible for it to seek something beyond that perfection. For that
would not be the ultimate perfection or perfection absolutely, if
there were something else beyond it. Who can doubt that the
possible intellect is naturally able to understand and understand all
things and is the mirror and intelligibility of all things in act? Thus
it is the intelligible word, [150] and we previously called the first-
born word a sort of archetypal universe in act and the first
intelligible world.3 And so you see that our intellect in its ultimate
perfection is a perfect image or perfect exemplification of the first-
born Word. But as act stands to act, so potency stands to potency.
Hence, that potency which is the bosom and parent of our
intellectual understanding will necessarily be the perfect image and
likeness of the first generator. Thus the bonds or loves which occur
will necessarily be proportional. See to what point we have led you
so that you may understand what the faith proclaims: "When he
shall appear," understand here: in the mirrors of our intellects, "we
will be similar to him" [1 Jn 3:2]; hence, it is necessary that the
human soul be a perfect likeness and exemplification of the first
Trinity. It is, of course, true that "God created man in his image and
likeness" [cf. Gn 1:26f.]4 precisely so that he might be his image
and likeness, in his perfection and act. For only someone
uneducated and confused could doubt that all potency is created.
Thus this likeness or image is potentially in the human soul. But it
is brought to its ultimate act by philosophizing, that is, by doing
battle against the errors and darkness of falsity and depravity and
against the wickedness of its loves -- by pursuing with a chaste and
other-worldly desire and love the light of truth by the light of the
true and salutary faith and by pursuing the sweetness of goodness
by the trace of its scent which is hope.
We will also add another clarification to this. We will suppose that
a bare intellect, separated from the body, understands itself barely
and sees itself by itself and in itself and is not checked by the noisy
images of phantasms. I say that to understand itself is for it to
speak itself, for the word of the intellect is spiritual and spiritual
intellective speaking is first and true speaking, from which exterior
speaking even gets its name. Hence, to understand itself is to speak
itself spiritually. But to speak is to generate or bring forth a word.
Hence, this intellect gives birth to a spiritual word out of itself. But
the [151] spiritual word is an image of that whose word it is. And
so it gives birth to an image out of itself and in itself by speaking or
uttering [it] out of itself in this way. For its understanding itself is
necessarily more than its being (esse), since it always has being
(esse) in act, but it seldom understands itself in act. Yet what more
can
3. Cf. above, ch. 9, p. 105 (65); ch. 13, p. 118 (81); ch. 15, p. 130 (96)
and p. 131 (97).
4. The matter within quotation marks is a composite from two verses of
Genesis.

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understanding oneself have than being (esse) except the generation
of the word, as we mentioned, and this is its flashing forth out of
itself? And so there is necessarily a generation there.
This image cannot be something other than its generator, the
intellect, because another essence cannot emerge from it by itself
and just in itself. We have already laid down many reasons for this.
A new essence cannot be received from one agent acting upon
itself and according to itself, because no cause of essential diversity
is present. For this whole action comes from one agent insofar as it
is one and acts upon itself. If indeed it were upon something else,
the thing acted upon could bring an element of diversity to what is
generated from the action, just as something cold acted upon by
something hot does not immediately receive heat, but mixes part of
its own disposition with the disposition it receives. Thus warmth is
first received.
Secondly, if a word having a new essence were brought forth, there
would be two intellects of diverse essences, and one of the two
would be received through the other. Contraries would be present
in the same thing in the same respect, since the acting intellect
would receive and give to itself the generated intellect in the same
respect and thus would be receiver and giver of the same thing in
one and the same respect. That is, it would act according to itself
alone and through itself alone. It is clear from this that the word
born from its generator cannot be of a new and diverse essence and
that to give birth to such a word is not to give birth to it as
something that is essentially other and that has to be of a new and
diverse nature. Otherwise, it would be understood as the giver and
receiver of the same thing in the same respect, that is, according to
itself, and in itself there is understood no diversity in this
consideration and comparison. From this it would also follow that
the same thing would have more and less just in itself, because this
relation of giver and receiver by itself [152] and in itself requires
that one has more and the other less of what is given or received,
and the reason is that everything given is more present to the giver
by reason of the fact that he is giver. Likewise, it would happen
that prior and posterior are said of the same thing and in the same
respect. In the same way it is shown by this manner of
understanding that the love by which the speaker embraces his
word is not of a new essence. I ask whether the intellect loves its
own beauty upon which it gazes in this way. There is no doubt that
it loves it, and concerning this love I send you back to what we said
earlier about such things.5
All of this is most evident in the glorified intellect, that is, one
whose whole potentiality has gone forth into its ultimate act and
5. Cf. above, p. 172 (148-149).

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perfection, as we have said.6 For there the knower sees his own
word as an exemplification in act of the first-born word and as the
intelligible world in act and, hence, as the word by which it speaks
the whole of itself according to its power and at the same time all
things along with itself. In the same way it feels itself bound by
ultimate love to this same word of its own, and this freely and by
gift. And so when the intellective power, apart from all its
possibility, far off in the ultimate degree of its freedom and fullness
and in the ultimate degree of its perfection and actuality (after the
bonds of death and mortality are broken and the snares of all the
passions by which it is fettered and held captive in the body are
torn), delivered and freed in every way, when it has shaken off the
yoke of this present bitter servitude and the corruption of the body
that weighs it down like a burdensome mass, and [when it is]
transformed into the incorruption of glory and has escaped the
darkness of phantasms, overflowing in its ultimate fullness, like a
mirror of perfect cleanness and purity, it utters forth from the object
of its brilliant light an exemplification and image of the first-born
word. There the first-born word stamps and seals it with its own
likeness and its own immediate union. There the love of the first
sweetness like a furnace blazing nearby inflames our love by a
sweetness that can be felt rather than expressed in words. There the
original abundance of the first generator loads the possibility of our
first power [153] as if by rivers of those gifts we have mentioned,
and thus the full reaches of our possibility and capacity pour forth
into the body the four gifts of glorified bodies.7
Because in the ultimate perfection of the human soul there is
reflected a certain facet of the Trinity in the actuality of the
ultimate likeness, it is necessary that it be potentially and radically
reflected in this potentiality and darkness. In this way what is
written in the book of Genesis is clear: "And God created man to
his own image" [Gn 1:27]. The image refers to the power, and the
likeness to the ultimate act. Learn to respect Scripture; though it is
written in a simple and humble way, profound, difficult and hidden
truths are contained in it. That the human mind is one and also a
trinity is the point I am explaining. The speaking intellect and the
spoken intellect and and the love of the one for the other are three,
and each of these three is the whole essence of the mind, as in their
root and potentiality. This readily becomes quite clear from the
proportionality of the potential roots and acts, unless perhaps we
have engaged in a dispute about the light of the sun with blind men.
With such it is necessary first to find out if they can see or look at
the light. The light of spiritual eyes, that is, of intellect and reason,
is the truth. But the blind
6. Cf. above, pp. 172-173 (149-150).
7. The four gifts of the glorified body are impassibility, gloriousness,
agility and subtility. They are implied in St. Paul's words in 1 Co 15:42-
44.

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man does not know this, for he does not know the light and what
light is. One should shrink from asserting that the soul is like an
aggregate composed of its powers as if from accidents, especially
since absolutely no conjunction, no mode of coming together can
be thought between them, just as none can between their
operations. If that is the case, then three souls will necessarily be
asserted to be in the human body.
We know that what has the act necessarily also has the power. Thus
the same one who had the power to understand will have
understanding in act. And thus the first original intellective power,
[154] which blessed Augustine called memory,8 and the intellect in
act necessarily have the same essence. The same one knows and
loves, for one loves only as a knower and because he knows.
Hence, love and knowledge necessarily belong to the same one,
and their passions are necessarily in the same one; otherwise one
who does not know would love the wholly unknown. It would also
happen that a lover would not love with his whole [being],
although every lover knows and even feels that the whole of him
loves and he feels that nothing of him does not love. For the
separated and purified soul confesses of itself: I who know and to
the extent that I know am the one who loves. But it would not
experience this in itself unless love and knowledge were essentially
in the same one. Thus the experience of both of them in one and
the same [being] reveals that these two powers are one thing
according to the essence of the mind. For the mind says of itself: I
sense, I understand -- I myself and not something else. I suffer the
wound of this love; its wound has pierced me; it is I who suffer this
pain, not something else and not something belonging to me. The
mind alone knows what is present to and in the soul; hence, it alone
should be trusted. It has been most truly said: "No one knows what
pertains to man except the spirit of man" [cf. 1 Co 2:11].9 This is is
understood, of course, of spiritual beings; for concerning bodily
beings we know many things better and more certainly than they,
and we know many things they do not know.
If someone should say that I have to be rendered certain by
argument whether I am happy or not and whether I am sad or not,
then no problem is to be settled by sensation. For the first matter is
much more certain for me than that snow is white. The interior
sense is the most certain sense, and [155] that problem will be
settled by our interior sense, as we said. It has now become clear
that the essence of the first generator and of the first-born and of
the first grit or first love is one, and by appro-
8. Augustine, De trin. 10, 17, 18 (CCL 50, 329-330).
9. Despite the quotation marks this is not an exact citation of St. Paul's
Letter.

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priated terms we have above called them life and light and joy of
the first happiness.10
Chapter XXVII
We shall try to make you certain of how the first generator and the
first-born are one 'this something,'1 though the first generator is not
the first-born, nor is the converse true, and of how the situation is
similar with the first gift. An intellect still blinded and wrapped up
in the darkness to which it has become accustomed is amazed at
how one speaks of a thing one and the same in every way, that is,
of the highest essence and how this very essence is said of all of
them and of each individually, though they are not said of one
another. But we shall try to make you certain about the identity,
number and character of their differences and determine whether
they are in reality something besides their essence or are certain
modes of our apprehensions to which no realities correspond.2
It seems that the example of the triangle we gave above ought to
suffice.3 In that example it is clear that the three angles are one and
the same area and that the area is said of each of them, though they
are not in any sense said of each other. Thus the three angles are
the same 'this something' according to essence, namely, the area
which is enclosed by three lines; nonetheless, this one is not that
one, nor is the converse true.4
We shall add another example as well. For those who can see one
another in a single day there is no doubt that from the same cloth
there can at once be an outer garment and a cloak and likewise a
scapular. We set this forth on the basis of visual evidence. Thus you
see the one essence of cloth [156] is said of each of these pieces of
clothing, for the cloth is the common essence of the three pieces of
clothing, and they agree and share in it, and it is said of each and
all of them. But there are in this case three pieces of clothing which
differ from one another and are not predicated of one another; in
fact, they differ in species. Only a blind person can doubt
10. Cf. above, ch. 24, p. 157 (128) concerning "life," "light," "joy."
1. "This something" translates the Latin "hoc aliquid," which is in turn a
translation of Aristotle's "tode ti." William is using it to refer to the
divine essence, that one supreme reality (una quaedam summa res) of
which Lateran IV speaks; cf. DS 804.
2. The differences of the persons are the notions. Like William of
Auxerre, William spends what strikes us as a disproportionate amount of
time in dealing with the notions. Cf. Magistri Guillelmi Altissiodorensis
Summa Aurea. Ed. Jean Ribaillier (Paris: Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique; Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras
Aquas, 1980) vol. 1, pp. 109-175. The explanation for this surely has
something to do with the emphasis upon grammar and its use as a
metaphysical tool as well as with the popular and controversial writings
of Gilbert of Poitiers, which were in some sense the result of the
application of grammatical rules to metaphysical questions. Cf. below,
ch. 30, nn. 3, 4 and 6.
3. Cf. above, ch. 25, p. 167 (141-142).

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the kind of species that is found in such things, for an outer
garment is not a cloak -- nor is the converse true -- or a scapular.
Rather they differ in species and are truly three species of pieces of
clothing. Piece of clothing is the genus of all of these and similar
things. But the species that proximately divide a genus are not
predicated of one another.5
The same point is made by the image of a spring and its stream or
of a river and a pond.6 Here there is no doubt that they are the same
water, and yet the spring is not the stream nor the river the pond,
nor is the converse true. The water is in this case like the common
essence. The source and the stream are the first generator and first-
born; the Spirit, like the pond containing all outpourings of the
gifts, receives all intelligible spirits, as we read in chapter seven of
Wisdom [Ws 7:26], the Spirit, of course, as the one in whom the
whole abundance of the goodness of both the Father and the Son is
poured forth.
If you understand that a ring and a clasp were both produced from
the same gold so that this craft has produced both what can suitably
hold the borders of a headcovering and what can suitably rest on a
finger, you will be helped by this example. In this case the gold
will be the common essence, which the ring and the clasp share,
even though a ring and a clasp differ in species and cannot be
predicated of each other. Although they are identical with the same
thing, that is, the ring and the clasp are the same as the gold, yet
they are not the same as each other; indeed they differ in species.
Though gold is predicated of each of them, yet many things are
predicated of the gold that are not predicated of either of them, and
likewise many things are said of each of them which, nonetheless,
[157] cannot possibly be said of the gold. We shall make all of this
certain by the evidence of examples. The ring is indeed golden, and
the ring is truly said to be golden, and there is no question about
the gold in any way by this expression, because if there were a
question about the gold when we say, "This ring is a golden thing,"
what we say by this <utterance> would not be true. The term
"golden thing" can in no way take the place of "gold." For "gold''
and "golden thing" are opposed to each other in name and
intelligibility as matter and the product of the matter so that they
can in no way be predicated of each other. Note, however, that the
term "ring" in no sense names the gold and does not signify it as a
subject, if we may say so, but it is really imposed upon an
ornament of the finger. The matter and that produced from the
matter are never named together by the same name so that the same
name is given them by rea-
5. The use of genus and species to provide examples of the relation
between the divine essence and the persons, even when the genus is
thought of in Neoplatonic fashion as one and as more real than the
species, ultimately fails. There are three pieces of clothing:. the outer
garment, the cloak, and the scapular, but there is only one God: the
Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
6. The image is found in St. Anselm; cf. above, ch. 14, n. 10.

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son of the same nature. Similarly, "gold" and "golden thing" are
never applied to the same thing, and one does not deal with the
same thing by means of them. However, ''ring" and "golden thing"
are applied to the same thing, and one deals with the same thing by
means of these two. Hence, they are predicated of each other. For
the ring is this golden thing, and the converse is true as well. The
ring is golden absolutely, not merely this golden thing. Thus it is
clear that one is not dealing with the same thing when he says, "this
ring," and when he says, "this gold." The same thing is not named
by them, and they are not applied to the same thing. Nor is this in
the mode of what is said to be the same by accident. Socrates is this
sitting person and this musical person. One is dealing with the
same person; each name, that is, "musical" and "sitting," are
applied to Socrates, though for different reasons. Thus Aristotle's
proof on this matter is reasonable.7 Though we doubtless want to
speak of Socrates, we speak of the one sitting or the musical one,
knowing that we are dealing by means of those accidental names
with the same person, because we are dealing with Socrates
himself. By means of the names, [158] "gold" and "golden thing,"
or their consequences or antecedents, we never intend to deal with
the same thing. In general it is one thing to sell this ring, another to
sell this gold, and generally still another to speak of and to deal
with any gold whatsoever. Though there is no doubt that this ring is
this gold, we still do not deal with the ring when we say, "this
gold," and we do not deal with this gold when we say, "this ring."
The reason we are not dealing with the same thing is that there is
no one thing with which one deals in each case, because one deals
neither with the same gold nor with the same ring.
The same thing holds in all the examples we gave above regarding
the angles and the area. The reason is that, if by the term "angle"
one were dealing with the area itself, it would also be true by
accident that this angle would be that one, just as it is true that this
sitting man is this musical one. Then the same angle would be
greater and less than a right angle, and also right and half-right, and
obtuse and acute, and all these things would have to be admitted in
three triangles: a right-angled, an obtuse-angled and a six-angled
triangle.8 On such matters there is no need for us to delay further.
7. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5, 6, 1015b17-34; 5, 9, 1017b27-37; 5, 29,
1024b; 5, 30, 1025a.
8. William is, I believe, pointing out the absurd consequences that
follow from identifying an angle with the area. If the angle of a triangle
equaled the area, then each angle would be equal to the other two, since
each is equal to the same area. Hence, if one angle were a right angle,
then all three angles would be right angles. So too if one angle were an
obtuse angle, all would be obtuse. If in a triangle one angle was right
and one obtuse, each would be right and each obtuse, but since the right
angles cannot be the obtuse ones there would have to be a triangle with
six angles. Switalski claims, however, that William is "thinking of the
six acute angles into which a hexagon can be divided" (p. 156).

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By now it should not seem strange that the first-born is not said of
the first generator, or the converse, even if they are the same
according to essence. For they are the same most high essence,
though they are not said of each other. One cannot deal with the
same thing in any sense by means of the names of first generator
and first-born, because the first generator and the first-born are
necessarily two; otherwise the same one would be generator of
itself and born from itself. They are one essentially, as we said, and
are most truly this one which is the first essence, and they differ
from each other so that they are not in any way predicated of each
other.
Chapter XXVIII
It is right to ask what kind of difference it is that is present with an
essential unity in every respect. Since [159] an essential unity in
the manner of the divine nature prevents this difference from being
essential, it is necessary that it be accidental or perhaps of a sort
unmentioned by philosophers. Where there is present no accidental
variety in any way, one can neither think nor imagine that the
differences are accidental. Hence, we shall try to find and assign
some other sort of difference. If someone says that they differ by
relation, he certainly speaks the truth, but a relation alone does not
suffice to exclude mutual predication of each other, nor does any of
the other accidents. For "white" and "sitting" are predicated of the
same person and of each other, even though this predication is
accidental and not essential. But in no sense is it true that the
Father is the Son, nor is the converse true. In this way nothing
prevents "like" and "equal'' from being the same thing and from
being said of each other, though they differ by relation. Among us a
father is also a son, that is, a father of one and a son of another.1
Thus the difference between the Father and the Son is necessarily
other than a difference of relation, since a difference of relation
admits mutual predication of one another at least according to
accident. But the relation that is between the first generator and the
first-born by no means admits such predication.2
1. Gilbert of Poitiers, as Switalski notes (p. 159), puts the idea in
negative terms: "For the father of anyone cannot be the son of that
person;" cf. his commentary on Boethius' De trinitate in N.M. Häring,
The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers in Studies and
Texts 13 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966).
2. William argues that the Father and the Son differ neither essentially
nor accidentally. Moreover, they do not differ by relation, for one and
the same thing can have different relations. For example, the same thing
can be like and equal, and the same person can be both father and son --
though not of the same person. William lacks the doctrine of St. Anselm
that the Council of Florence (1442) summed up in the principle that in
God "all things are one unless the opposition of a relation precludes this"
(DS 1330). Cf. De processione Spiritus Sancti, c. 1 in S. Anselmi Opera
Omnia, Vol. 2, pp. 180-181.

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Again, it is clear that no cause depends on its effect and that the
generator does not depend in any way on what is born of him,
except perhaps insofar as the generator is said to be related to the
generated because he is the generator. Thus it is possible for us to
think of the first generator as not having generated the first-born.
On this supposition the first generator is doubtless not really
generator or father, and yet he exists because the fact that he exists
does not depend on his generating, but rather the converse is true.
In the same way our intellect accepts this idea, namely, that we
suppose that the first-born was never born, but nonetheless exists.
And so this one will never be that one, perish the thought. Paternity
and sonship do not suffice to produce something else or someone
else, especially since relation is almost the most extrinsic of all
among the accidents. But if these supervenient relations would in
no way prevent this identity, [160] the Father is thus still the Son.3
Since these relations are supervenient, we can also imagine that
this generation began and even took place in time. If, then, the
Father generates, either one who is and was or one who is not yet
generates what is. But if the one generated does not yet exist, the
generator still does; he who is generated will begin or begins to be
(esse) absolutely. He does not merely begin to be as related (esse
ad aliquid) or in some way, but begins to be (esse) absolutely. And
so he necessarily has that being (esse) to which being related (esse
ad aliquid) is added, when he is generated and first receives from
the Father the first [being] and then receives the other in an order, I
mean an order of being (essendi), not of time.
Again, who can doubt that a relation necessarily has as its subject
either a substance or a quantity or a quality and that it can in no
way be (esse) except after they have come to be?4 For every
relation is accidental and is separable in act and in thought. Hence,
it is necessarily accidental to the Father -- beyond the
understanding and intention of his necessity -- that he be the
Father, and similarly to the Son that he be the Son. For it is
impossible that what is said relatively be in any way essential,
since every being (esse) is necessarily limited by what is essential
to it and necessarily has nothing beyond that. Thus whatever is
beyond [the essence] is necessarily accidental, and for this reason a
relation is necessarily accidental; otherwise, the terms would be
essential to the thing related. For whatever is essential is essential
to the essential, since whatever is inseparable is
3. William claims that paternity and sonship are supervenient
relations in the sense that they come to what already exists. As such
they are unable either to prevent the Father from being identical with
the Son or to distinguish the Father and Son.
4. Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics 3, 10, pp. 173-174.

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inseparable to the inseparable.5 Thus every relation is necessarily
accidental to that which it denominates. And so Father and Son are
accidental, insofar as it is permissible to say this in the case of the
blessed Trinity. Hence, they are accidental to the First.6
But if someone says that they are accidental to the highest essence,
it follows that it is father and son of itself and has generated itself.
This [161] collapses of itself by reason of the indubitable evidence
of its own falsity, and so I pass over its destruction. Thus we have
to assign something else as the first subject of a relation. When we
have considered the subject as stripped of the relation, we shall
necessarily find another difference than the relation between the
subject of fatherhood and the subject of sonship.
Moreover, he who generates insofar as he is this one either differs
from him who is born insofar as he is this one, or he does not. If he
does not differ, then we are dealing with the same one when we
say, "he who generated" and "he who was generated." For, when
the differences are removed, there necessarily remains the same
thing. Each of them is stripped bare and the difference is entirely
removed when I say, "this one,'' referring to him who generated,
and "this one," referring to him who is generated. Because there
was no difference at all except that which is relative and that has
been completely removed from each of them, one necessarily deals
with the same one by each reference. And so it will be true that this
one generated this one, since reference is made to the same one,
and the same one generated himself, which no intellect can
interiorly accept. Consequently, between the first-born and the first
generator there is a difference besides what is relative.
Also, what is the basis for the denomination which occurs by the
fact that he is called the Father and that is made from paternity and
for that denomination which occurs by the fact that he is called the
Son and that is made from sonship? If the essence is the basis for
this, we have already destroyed that idea, since it is impossible for
the essence to receive both of those denominations or even one of
them. It is not possible for the essence either to generate or to have
generated.7 But if the essence is not the basis of each of these
designations "Father-Son," either the same thing is the basis of both
of them or it is not. If the same
5. William sees that if relations are essential to their terms, everything
becomes essential to everything else. Unlike F. H. Bradley, William
sees the monistic consequences of a doctrine of internal relations as
sufficient grounds for the rejection of the internality of relations.
6. The Father and the Son are accidental to the First, but they are not
accidental to the essence, as William insists in the following paragraph.
William seems to have followed Avicenna's doctrine that every relation
is an accident. Cf. Metaphysics 3, 10, p. 173, 12-17.
7. Cf. DS 804.

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thing is, we have the same problem; I understand the same thing in
itself, apart from those relative comparisons, [that is, the thing] that
would remain the same if both of these relations were removed.
Then there are necessarily at the basis of those two relations [162]
subjects which are in themselves, that is, apart from those relations.
And so between the first generator and the first-born there is not
merely that difference, that is, only the difference which is relative.
For in that way the same thing would be said to be related <to>
itself by the different relations. In that case there would not be true
paternity or sonship, since it is impossible that the same thing have
genuine paternity and sonship with respect to itself. It would also
be the case that only the relation was generated in God, since the
basis of the relation is, of course, the same in each case, that is, of
each relation. So too the change of alteration brings about only the
accident in accord with which the alteration occurs, while the
subject remains under each term of the change. But in this case
paternity and sonship are asserted in generation in the same way as
white and black are in alteration, since in each case one subject for
both of them is asserted, while the only difference is the terms of
the changes. Thus we should say that there is alteration, not
generation, between the Father and the Son, since by that ineffable
change there came to be in act only the relation.
Again, on this showing generation would be generation of itself,
since nothing would be born in that case but the generation. This
will become clear, if we think of that generation as temporal. For
what is subject to this generation was prior to it. It was not in any
way generated by this generation and did not come into being
(esse). It is only the generation which newly came into being
(esse). Thus it alone is generated along with its correlative. On this
showing the Son is no more generated than the Father is. For if on
account of his relation, namely, sonship, the Son was born because
sonship came into the actuality of being (essendi), there also came
about, if I may speak this way, not that the Son began to be
absolutely, but that the Son began to be the Son, and this was his
being generated or having been generated. The same thing will
necessarily be true of the Father, since his paternity was similarly
acquired by him. For if the generation of sonship was generation
for the Son, that generation will necessarily also be the generation
of paternity for the Father. And so one who holds that, if the
relations are removed, [163] the Father and the Son differ in no
way, is necessarily forced to say that each has been born and that
each is the Son. For who could explain why the acquisition of his
relation will be the generation of the one and not of the other?
Either each of them has been generated, or neither. From this it
ought to follow that the First is generator of himself just as much as
of the Son, for he acquires his proper relation for himself just as
much as for the Son. Hence, if this is his giving birth to the Son,
this will also be his giving birth to himself.

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Again, who can understand that generation terminates in generation
and not in something else? That is impossible! It is necessary
beyond any doubt that every motion be directed toward something
else before it be directed toward itself. For motion is a path for
acquiring something other than what the thing is. It is a path, not a
goal; otherwise, it would involve rest. For all motion rests from
motion in its goal, and thus the very motion would involve rest
from [motion]. And thus there would have to be at the same time
motion and rest, the contrary of motion, [or] even the cessation of
motion. And so it is clear that no motion is directed to itself or
toward itself, lest the same thing be both the path toward and the
goal of the same acquisition and lest the same thing be at the same
time in potency and in act. Motion would be sought by motion
when it already exists in act, and there would at the same time be
motion and rest into the same thing and in the same thing and from
the same thing. Holy faith shrinks from thinking of any motion in
God at all; nonetheless, we speak of generation in God in a way
that fits the first generator and the firstborn. Hence, by the same
freedom of those who hold disputations and philosophize, they are
permitted to speak of a supermundane and unutterable motion, as
someone says,8 while preserving the healthy and pure grasp of the
holy faith.
From all these considerations the consequence for us is that
generation is not directed toward itself or into itself and that
souship is not in any way the term or goal of generation, but a
consequence. Every generation aims at being (esse) and quiddity,
not principally at an accident, even though [164] in every
generation an accident is necessarily acquired. Yet this is accidental
to generation, and it does not have the acquisition, namely, of the
accident, whether a relation or another kind of accident, as essential
or as a goal or as a principle.
Other problems and absurdities follow upon this error. For
something can only be said to be in relation to something else after
it is with respect to itself. A relation cannot be in any way the first
predicate; rather it necessarily follows upon one that is absolute.
Thus it is necessary that the Father first be something in his own
right in himself and with respect to himself and then be for and be
related to another.9 And the same holds for the Son. For when we
consider certain relative predicates, we will find that one of them is
not more worthy of being the cause of the other than the converse.
For this reason we will find them of equal duration in every way,
and one of them is not prior to the other when they are
8. It was a commonplace to refer to contemporaries in this fashion,
that is, without specifically naming the person.
9. Cf. Augustine, De trin. 7, 1, 2 (CCL 50, 247-248). Though Augustine
says this, he does not say this of God and certainly does not allow that
there are such accidental relations in God as William seems to admit.

Page 185
compared and considered relatively. For this reason the Son insofar
as he is the Son will not be any more from the Father than the
converse, since the Son no more has it from the Father that he is
the Son than the Father has it from the Son that he is the Father.
Sonship obviously is no more dependent upon paternity than
paternity is upon it. Those who said this did not notice that the
category of relation cannot be the first between two or in two
things, but that it must have before it a substance or a quantity or a
quality.
Let us go back and say that the Father is really a father because he
has a son, but he would still be even though he had no son. He does
not exist because he has a son. For he would in that case be as
much from the Son as the Son is from him. Hence, he would be
even if he did not have a son; he would, of course, have a son in
potency. Thus he would not be merely God or the divine essence,
since it is generative neither in act nor potency. Consequently, apart
from being (esse) the Father and being (esse) the highest essence
we must assign to him another being (esse), in virtue of which and
according to which he is generative. He is not generative by reason
of his essence, since on this showing both the essence would be
generative and the Son would be generative by reason of the same
essence.
There remains for consideration appropriated being (esse
appropriatum), incommunicable [165] in all respects, singular in
all respects and of ultimate individuality. This is what they call
personal being (esse personale), because they call a person "by
itself" (per se), so that there is not united in it any plurality in any
way.10 But the highest essence, even though it is "by itself"
incommunicable by an essential incommunicability and
indivisibility, is still not absolutely incommunicable to a plurality
and does not naturally exist by itself absolutely and simply; indeed
its nature is to be in many and to be said of many. But in no way is
the person of the Father naturally said of many, but is by itself most
removed in predication from all multitude or plurality. This is the
point of placing "individual substance'' in the definition of a
person. "Individual substance" ought indeed to be predicated only
of a thing one in every way. In this way it does not fit the highest
essence, since it is predicated of many. For there is necessarily true
plurality between the first generator and the first-born and the
common gift of both. Otherwise the second
10. On the definition of "person" as "per se una: one through itself,"
cf. Alan of Lille, Regulae de theologia sacra 32 (PL 210, 637) and
Gilbert of Poitiers, "Expositio in Boecii librum contra Euticen et
Nestorium," 3, 17, in The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of
Poitiers, p. 274. Cf. also N.M. Häring, "The Case of Gilbert de la
Porrée Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154)," MS 13 (1951), 1-40. Häring
says that "Gilbert's definition of person as per se una was . . . novel
and discredited in its application to the Trinity" (p. 20). Gilbert's
anonymous opponent proposed "the definition of person as quasi per
se una after an unsuccessful attempt to explain: 'Augustinus: Persona
dicitur a se.'"

Page 186
would not be a true son, nor the first a true father, nor the third the
true gift of each.
Yet one should not deny that the divine essence is a person; indeed
the divine essence is without any doubt each of the three persons.
Since person is said of the divine essence, its meaning and
definition necessarily applies to the divine essence as well. Thus
the divine essence is also an individual substance of a rational
nature.11 Although this definition is said of the highest essence, it
is nonetheless not the definition of that essence, for it is not said of
it primarily and of itself, but is said of a person and, for that reason,
said of the highest essence.
Moreover, the first substance is individual, and thought of it
excludes there being something under it or after it in substantial
coordination. But the thought of the highest essence according to
the manner of our understanding does not exclude there being three
persons ordered under it, though they do not follow upon it in the
order either of being (essendi) or of time. Hence, the highest
essence should not be called absolutely and simply individual;
rather it only excludes other essences. [166] The thought of its
individuality excludes its being predicated of other essences. But it
not only does not exclude its being predicated of many persons, but
even requires it, if what has gone before is kept in mind.
Chapter XXIX
It has already become clear to us from what we have said that there
is necessarily found essential being (esse essentiale) in the highest
and blessed Trinity. We are accustomed to refer to it by nouns
denominating the neuter gender, because they are the most abstract
and have the least signification. This is appropriate to the essence
because in the intention and the mode [of being] of essence the
essence is understood in its truth and bare purity stripped of every
clothing and condition. There is also found in this blessed Trinity
personal being (esse personale) of ultimate individuality and
incommunicability, in which
11. William adopts the classical definition of person from Boethius:
"an individual substance of a rational nature." Cf. Boethius, Liber
contra Eutychen et Nestorium 3, lines 4-5. However, in the previous
paragraph William spoke of the incommunicable being of a person,
thus incorporating this further element from Richard of St. Victor into
his definition of person. Richard defined person as "incommunicable
existence: existentia incommunicabilis" and insisted that
"incommunicable" had to be added to the Boethian definition of
person. Cf. Richard's De trin. 4, 18 and 21, pp. 181 and 186-187. Cf.
below, ch. 29, n. 1 and ch. 44, p. 250 (237), where William speaks of
person having two modes: individuality and incommunicability.

Page 187
plurality is not united or shared in any manner.1 We have grown
accustomed to refer to it by demonstrative pronouns of the
masculine gender, which have more certain demonstrative power
for us than those of the neuter gender, because they are less abstract
when they are employed. We will also find relative being (esse ad
aliquid), such as being (esse) the Father and being (esse) the Son,
the Word, image, character, source, stream, and many others of this
kind. Since "father" is said of God, both paternity and sonship are
also necessarily said of him, and all abstract terms for relations of
this sort. Since to be (esse) paternity is not to be (esse) this thing
essentially, as we shall bring you to understand, nor to be (esse)
this one personally nor to be in relation (esse ad aliquid), we have
necessarily to assign [to it] a fourth [mode of] being (esse), if we
may now be allowed to speak this way. This necessity has led us to
four kinds of terms. These things and modes of being (essendi) of
things have given rise to what we say and our modes of speaking.
They are not vacuous or empty [167] words or modes of speaking,
as some have said in their folly,2 but the truest signs of the truest of
things, provided we hold fast to the fact that it is not as yet certain
how it can be truthfully and faithfully said that there are both one
and many things in God.
We necessarily had to refer to the highest essence by terms
appropriate and suited to it. These terms could not in any sense be
common to it and the persons, as is obvious from the definition of
essence and from the definition of person. Also, we had a true need
to refer to appropriated and absolute being (esse) as personal and
abstracted from all comparison and respect or relation, and to refer
to the same thing as compared or related. This could not be done by
the same words, because one and the same understanding cannot be
absolute and comparative or dependent upon another. There
emerged from this two kinds of absolute terms, namely, personal
and comparative terms. Also, from these comparisons we
necessarily had to make considerations abstractly and to predicate
them and employ them as adjectives. From this there emerged for
us another class of terms, which are called notional, because the
comparisons and differences of persons are called notions. Notice
the source from which so many modes of speaking have derived
their origin, namely, so that the realities might be distinctly and
clearly signified. This is the reason for the invention of all words.3
1. Cf. Richard of Saint Victor, De trin. 4, 18 and 21, pp. 81 and 186-
187. Cf. above, ch. 28, n. 11 and ch. 44, p. 250 (237).
2. Switalski argues (p. 167) that "William is probably referring to the
nominalists of the eleventh century and particularly to Roscelin. . . . "
3. William distinguishes (1) terms proper to the essence that cannot be
common to it and to the persons. This is puzzling, since whatever one
can say of God, one can say of each of the persons. Perhaps he is
thinking of expressions, such as "unrelated" or "communicable to
many." He mentions (2) terms that are personal and non-relative.

Page 188
We must first investigate as far as we can whether these
comparisons or differences or notions are more than the persons of
which they are the comparisions. [We must investigate], that is,
whether they have their own being (esse) that is joined or added to
the persons and is not one of the persons, but of a separate essence,
as some [168] have dared to imagine,4 or whether the persons
themselves, in subject and essence, that is, in some consideration,
are the notions. If then paternity is something other than God, it
will either begin to be in time or be eternal, not having a beginning.
If it began to be in time, it is necessary that God began to be Father
at the same time. For he could not be Father before there was
paternity or without paternity. Hence, the Son was not generated
from eternity, but there was a time when he was not.5 But we have
no doubt that the Son is coeternal with the Father. If paternity is
something eternal, since it is not God, it necessarily has to be said
to be a creature, and in this way a creature would be said to be
eternal, although it is necessary that every creature began to be and
had being (esse) after not being (non esse), because possibility and
potentiality in creatures necessarily precede the act of existing
(actum existendi).6
Perhaps he means terms, such as "person," "this one" or "he,"
where a person is referred to without any relation being mentioned;
cf. below, ch. 44, pp. 248-249 (235-236). There are also (3) personal
comparative terms, such as Father. Finally, (4) these can be referred to
abstractly in terms, such as paternity or sonship which are notions.
The notions or notional properties are terms that are not common to
the three persons and make the Trinity or a person known. Later
William says that a notion is "the comparison or the difference of the
persons with respect to each other." Cf. ch. 44, p. 240 (226).
Traditionally there were five notons: paternity, sonship, active and
passive spiration and innascibility. Active spiration is common to the
Father and the Son. Innascibility is negative insofar as it denies any
source for the Father. Some theologians held only the three personal
notions: paternity, sonship and spiration. The Greeks spoke of
notional properties or idiomata gnoristica; cf. St. John Damascene,
De fide orthodoxa III, 5 (PG 94, 1000).
4. Switalski (p. 168) interprets this as referring to Roscelin. However,
the doctrine that William regards as quite wrong-headed seems to hold
that the notions are something other than the persons. According to
William, these men held that paternity was something by which the
Father was the Father. Now that is the position -- rightly or wrongly --
taken to be that of Gilbert of Poitiers. The third error of Gilbert's
condemned by the Council of Rheims was "that the three persons are
three by three unities and distinct by three properties, which are not the
same as the persons, but are three eternal [realities] differing
numerically both from one another and from the divine essence." It
would seem to be this same doctrine that William of Auxerre discusses
in the Summa Aurea, 7, 1 (pp. 127-128), though he does not identify
who held the position. For more on Gilbert's position, cf. N.M. Häring's
articles referred to below, ch. 30, nn. 3 and 4.
5. In his argument William shows that the supposition that paternity is
something other than God leads to the conclusion that "there was a time
when the Son was not," the classical formula of the Arian heresy
condemned by the Council of Nicea; cf. DS 130.
6. In using the expression "act of existing," William foreshadows the
Aquinas's doctrine that being (esse) is "the act of all acts and the
parfection of all perfections" (De potentia 7, 2 ad 9). Cf. above, ch. 1,
pp. 65-66 (16-17) and ch. 7, pp. 90-92 (47-48).

Page 189
Moreover, paternity will either be God or from God. But as they
assert, it will not be God, and thus it will be from God, or it will
not be created. If it is from God alone, not through something else,
but through itself immediately from him, it will arise so
immediately from him that the Son does not arise from the Father
prior to it, since it is the way by which the Son proceeds from the
Father. We state this universally: generation is the way that a son
proceeds from a father. Hence, the Son proceeded from the Father
in this way, and thus something preceded the Son in his going forth
from the Father, and his way of being born or going forth from the
Father was something that derived from him. For everything which
is not God, if it is from God, is necessarily from the Son, as we
have already shown.7 But what is from the Son comes after him
through creation. Thus the Son's generation will be posterior to the
Son. The Father's generation [169] by which the Father generates
and the generation of the Son by which he is generated are, of
course, of equal duration. Neither is a creature, and neither is not
God. Otherwise one might think that between the Father and the
Son there intervenes something that is a creature and not God in
order that the Son might be born.8 But if [the Father's generation
and the the generation of the Son] are not of equal duration with
the Son, they are still of equal duration with each other, and they
could not precede the Son. Thus they follow him in the order of
being (essendi). You have, then, something that precedes in the
order of being (essendi) its own generation and thus is before its
generation is and before it is generated, although it arises only
through generation and has only the being (esse) it received by
being born. Thus it will be before it is born, because it precedes its
birth. Therefore, it will not be that wisdom of God the Father who
is the firstborn before all creation [cf. Si 24: 5], because its birth is
said to be a creature before which it can in no way be.
Furthermore, this paternity will be either a substance or an
accident. If a substance, how will being (esse) the Father be
relative being (esse ad aliquid)? Just as a substance is in itself not a
relation, so it ought not cause something to be said to be relatively.
How will the birth of the Son be said to be a substance which the
Son himself created? Let us put this aside, since by itself it eludes
all thought. If paternity is an accident, how will the Son owe to it
the fact that he was born, that he was generated? For if a white
thing owes to whiteness the fact that it is white, surely the Son of
God will owe to sonship the fact that he is the Son of
7. Since the external actions of God are common to the three persons
(cf. ch. 23, n. 3), if the generation of the Son is not God, but from
God, then the way the Son proceeds from the Father is something that
is from the Son as well as from the Father.
8. Cf. Hilary, De trin. 12, 21 (CCL 62a, 595-596, 21-24). William seems
to refer explicitly to this passage in Chapter 38, p. 221 (203-204).

Page 190
God. Thus he will owe to a creature the fact that he is the Son of
God and will have it from a creature that he is the Son of God.
Then a creature will be the cause of his being the Son of God -- and
nothing more absurd than this can be thought, since he was the Son
before there was any creature. We have shown above that this
generation precedes all creation, whether it be creating or making
or forming, and that the first-born is necessarily the cause that
comes between and mediates between the first generator and all
that is from him. From this it is clear that what is generated is
necessarily prior to what is created and that what is created only
[170] comes into being through what is generated. And so
generation precedes all creation and thus every creature.
Chapter XXX
Some men of no small authority have held that such comparisons
or notions do not agree with the truth, and they interpret
metaphorically and figuratively all authentic talk about them.1
They say that the language is metaphorical whenever one speaks of
paternity or sonship by way of abstraction, like the common
expression by which we often say, "I beg your paternity." Surely
this is correctly understood as only metaphorical, because its
interpretation is necessarily: "I beg your paternity," that is, you,
father.2 But others more ancient, yet of no less authority, said that
1. The Latin "authenticus: authentic" would seem to mean
"authoritative," or perhaps "found in the Fathers." Cf. M.-D. Chenu,
Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, tr. by A.-M. Landy and D.
Hughes (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), pp. 129-132.
2. For example, Praepositinus of Cremona who was born between 1130
and 1135 at Cremona and died in 1210 in Paris. He had been chancellor
of the University of Paris 1206-1209. Switalski cites (p. 170)
Praepositinus' Summa Theologica from an article by F. Stegmüller, "Die
Summa des Praepositinus in der Universitätsbibliothek zu Upsala,"
RTAM 15 (1948) 171-181. Praepositinus says that, "when one says that
paternity is in the Father or that the Father is distinguished from the Son
by paternity, these are ways of speaking, and the meaning is that
paternity is in the Father, that is, the Father is Father, as when I say, 'I
ask your kindness,' that is, you who are kind, and the like" (p. 178f.). In
his Summa Aurea 1, 7, 6 (p. 126) William of Auxerre speaks of the
opinion of Praepositinus as very probable (multum probabilis) and cites
him as saying, "as paternity is the Father, so when paternity is spoken of,
the Father is spoken of, nor is there any difference except in the mode of
speaking or in the mode of signifying" (cf. Praepositinus, Summa
Theologica I (Paris B.N. lat. 14526, f. 83d-84a). For more on
Praepositinus, cf. G. Lacombe, La vie et les oeuvres de Prevostin (Kain,
1927); O. Lottin, Psychologie et Morale au XIIe et XIIIe Siècles
(Gembloux, 1957) 1, pp. 50-53.

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they are not (esse), but are related (adesse) to the three persons.3
Still others, [171] better known by reason of the number of their
followers, have held that they are real, though not truly accidental
to the persons. They held rather that they are the persons in such a
way that the Father is the paternity by which he is father and the
Son the sonship by which he is son.4
We shall first attempt to explain how the truth stands; then we shall
try to make it clear how these men express the truth and agree with
one another in it, though they seem opposed to one another and
unable to express the one truth. First, it is necessary that God the
Father be or not be the Father for the same reason that he is or is
not this one, when someone [of the persons] has been pointed out.
If he is, then being (esse) this one is for him the same as being
(esse) the Father. For who could possibly doubt that, if by the fact
that he is this one, he is the Father, then, conversely, being (esse)
the Father and being (esse) this one are for him the same thing? It
is clearly impossible that a relation or comparative term and an
absolute term are the same. For who does not see that there is one
point in saying, "This one is this one" and another in saying, "This
one is the Father?" An absolute intention and one dependent upon
another cannot be the same, for one who says, "This one is this
one," by no means says, "This one is the Father." It is surely
necessary that what is said is other than what is not said (I do not
mean in the subject, but in thought, whether by relation or in some
other way. For by the grace of God we now have no doubt that the
divine essence is one in every way).5
3. This is possibly the view of Gilbert Porreta, Bishop of Poitiers.
Gilbert was born around 1085 and died in 1154. For a fine biography
of Gilbert, cf. Lauge Olaf Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the
Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta's Thinking and the
Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the
Period 1130-1180 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), pp. 25-39; cf. pp. 115-
163 for Gilbert's view of theology and his doctrine on God. Whether
Gilbert actually held this position or not is disputed; in any case this
view was attributed to him and was condemned by the Council of
Rheims in 1148. On this question cf. N.M. Häring, "A Treatise on the
Trinity by Gilbert of Poitiers," MS 39 (1972) 14-50, where the author
argues that Gilbert did hold the doctrine condemned by the Council.
For his earlier view that Gilbert had not held the condemned doctrine,
cf. the article cited in the following note. William himself presents a
benign interpretation of the position and claims that all three positions
express the same truth. Cf. below, p. 218 (200).
4. This last view is in accord with the Council of Rheims (1148) and is
the one that is more commonly accepted by theologians. Cf. DS 745 for
the charges brought against Gilbert. Cf. DB 389-392 for the profession
of faith that the Council drew up against Gilbert. Eugenius III defined
only the first chapter which condemned the view that "the divine
essence, substance or nature, which is called God's divinity, goodness,
wisdom, greatness and such like, is not God, but the form by which God
is." For an excellent study of what occurred at the Council, cf. N.M.
Häring, "The Case of Gilbert," MS 13 (1951) 1-40.
5. Whatever sort of distinction William is arguing for between the
intention of "this one" and the intention of "father," it is not a question of
a difference in the subject, but in

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If his being (esse) this one is other than his being (esse) the Father,
then the intention of "father" adds something beyond the intention
of "this one," since the intention of "father" is broken down into
"this one," that is, into the intention of "this one'' and the added
intention beyond the intention of "this one." It is not helpful for
you to find fault with the term "something," as if it were not proper
that a comparative intention be called something, for we do not
wish to use that term for naming as one pleases. It is also not right
to find fault with our saying that the intention of [172] "father" is
broken down into the intention of "this one" and the intention of
the comparison, since for this the intention of the subject, that is,
the Father, is sufficient for us. This intention is the ultimate matter
of that whole intention of "the Father" and underlies somehow or
other the comparative intention. This is what is called by
grammarians the substance of a name, and every name is said to
signify a substance along with its quality.6 Here there is no doubt
that the substance is that on which the name is imposed and the
quality is the comparative intention by reason of which the name is
imposed on it. Because the name is not imposed upon it from the
subject, it is necessary that that from which it is imposed be
something else in some way or other, since there are beyond doubt
two intentions. It should not upset anyone that God and deity are in
every way one intention, though father and paternity are not. The
reason is that "father" has an intention that is concrete and
composed and resolvable into two intentions, as we have shown.
"God" in the mode and intention by which it is the name of the
divine essence has the same intention as the name "deity." We have
not yet sufficiently examined this, but only as was required while
hurrying on to other things. From this it seems that paternity is
something added to him beyond the intention by which he is this
one and that it is not this one.7
thought.
6. N.M. Häring says, "In order to understand Gilbert's system and
method of argumentation, it is indispensable to begin with a
grammatical rule which, in and before Gilbert's time, caused occasional
embarrassment to the theologians, . . . . In their study of grammar
students were told that a nomen signifies both substance and quality" (cf.
Häring, "The Case of Gilbert," [above, n. 4], p. 5). Häring quotes a rule
from Gilbert: "Every name (nomen) signifies diverse things, namely, a
substance and a quality, as "white [thing] (album)" signifies that which
(id quod) is called white -- this is the substance of the name -- and that
by which (id quo) it is called white -- and this is the quality of the same
name" (p. 7). Gilbert illustrates his point with two sentences: (1) "Man is
capable of laughter" and (2) "Man is the form of individuals." In the first
sentence "man" signifies the "id quod," or the substance; in the second it
signifies the "id quo," or the quality, in this case, humanity. In all created
things there is such a real distinction between the substance and the
quality; Gilbert's problems arose when this distinction was applied to
God. He was -- rightly or wrongly -- understood to have held that
divinity, or the divine essence, is not God, but a form by which God is.
Cf. above, n. 3 and n. 4. For William's use of the distinction, cf. below,
ch. 39, n. 2 and ch. 44, p. 248 (235).

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Secondly, if a relation is a comparison, it is added as if from the
outside and is in some way for the subject, for it comes or is
present when the subject is already complete and established, and it
does so from the outside and with respect to something else. Thus
it is necessary that it be other than its subject; for it is necessary
that God be called father either from what is within or from what is
external. Indeed all relative terms seem to predicate from the
outside and seem to have something from the outside rather than in
themselves, as Boethius says in his book, The Trinity.8 Because the
Father is the Father, he certainly has a Son as from the outside, but
he does not seem to have on this account something in himself, as a
grammarian necessarily has something in himself and is called by
this name. "Grammarian" asserts something in the subject, for it
says that the art of grammar is in him.
[173] "Similar" does not seem to assert something in a subject, but
rather that something is related to it. In fact Boethius says that
relations neither add anything to nor take anything away from the
subjects which are related to each other by them.9 In many cases
there is no doubt about this, as in the example that Augustine used
in his book, The Trinity,10 where he says that money is a price,
though it acquires nothing at all when it becomes a price, and this
holds generally in all things. For none of the relative terms which
predicate knowledge or love add or take away or assert something
in a subject to which they are attributed passively, as "beloved" or
"known" asserts nothing in the one loved or known. The reason is
that they are said equally of beings and non-beings. For nothing
prevents one who is not from being loved and known. Quite the
contrary, only a blind intellect can fail to know that the beloved
undergoes nothing from the lover or the known from the knower.
The situation is the same also in those relative terms which have as
their root knowledge or love, such as utterings or praisings or
predicating or being subjects and things of this sort. Indeed nothing
comes to the one who is praised from the fact that he is praised; he
receives nothing at all from the one who praises him. It is the same
way with the others. Boethius says that, though God is great
without quantity and good without quality, he
7. God and deity have the same intention, though one is concrete and
the other abstract in its signification. "This one," when referring to the
Father, and "paternity" differ in their intentions, since the former is
not relative and the latter is. How "father" and "paternity" differ in
their intentions, while God and deity do not, is indeed subtle. William
of Auxerre holds, it seems, the same position; he claims that the
diversity of notions in the Father brings it about that when one speaks
of the Father, he does not necessarily speak of a particular notion. Cf.
Summa Aurea 1, 7, 1, p. 116.
9. Ibid., lines 17-22.
10. Augustine, De trin. 5, 16, 17 (CCL 50, 226).

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is still not related without a relation.11 It is difficult or impossible
to see how this can be true if relations add to or subtract from their
subjects. For if he is said to be great or of a certain quality
metaphorically, because he is his own quantity and his own quality
by which he is said to be good or great, he will then be necessarily
related metaphorically, since he is his own relation by which he is
related.
Moreover, God is great without quantity and good without quality
because these categories, namely, quantity and quality, when they
are transferred to God, do not preserve their proper sense and our
customary mode of predicating, but relation is an exception. Only
the category of relation preserves and retains in the case of God its
proper sense and customary mode [of predicating]. [174] In the
case of God it is necessary that a relation assert nothing at all in
him as in a subject. If a relation did assert something, it would have
no reason at all for its being an exception. For the two categories,
quantity and quality, are undoubtedly excluded from the divine
categories precisely because they add something and assert
something in a subject. But in those subjects nothing is truly said to
be that is other than them. Therefore, if the category of relation has
such a mode [of predicating] that it adds something to a subject or
asserts something in it, it will have no place in God for the same
reason. Thus, "father" seems to assert nothing at all in the Father,
but rather that something is relatively to him, not in him, and "son"
seems to assert that something is relatively to the Son, not
something in the Son. In this way "similar" says that something is
related to what is white, not that there is something in what is
white, and "equal" says something is related to two cubits, not that
there is something in two cubits. This seems to have been the
certain intention of Boethius in his book, The Trinity.12
11. In De trin. 5, 1, 2 (CCL 50, 207) Augustine says that God is
"good without quality, great without quantity." He claims that, though
nothing is said of God according to accident, there are some things
said of God according to relation. Augustine holds that such a relation
is not an accident, however, because it is not subject to change; cf. De
trin. 5, 5, 6 (CCL 50, 210). Switalski (p. 173) gives the reference to
Boethius (cf. De trin. 5, lines 24-28), but William seems to be closer
to Augustine than Boethius. William of Auxerre, on the other hand,
says, "God is such without quality, so great without quantity, though
he is not related without relation." He attributes this to Boethius, but
the critical edition notes (p. 123) that it is more correctly a citation of
Gilbert of Poitiers, In Boethium, De trinitate et De persona et duabus
naturis (PL 64, 1283, 1361). Cf. Summa Aurea I, 7, 5, p. 123.

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Chapter XXXI
We can clearly show those with intelligence that this is the way the
truth is. First of all, if a relation were something created, it would
necessarily, as far as concerns its being (esse), be through itself of
the same essence as what creates it.1 For every operation of
causation of nature -- one, that is, which is a causation or operation
through itself -- is [effected] by means of a likeness, and everything
which gives being (esse) necessarily gives the being (esse) it has, I
mean, if it gives being (esse) through its own being (esse). Thus
from heat there comes only heat, I mean, through itself; that is,
where heat acts through its own essence. This is the way it is in
other things, for nothing at all is naturally able to give the being
(esse) it does not have; I mean, to give it through its own essence.
If then the thing [created] is a likeness of two whitenesses, it would
necessarily be of the same essence according to species [with the
whitenesses].
Furthermore, how will one white thing act on another white thing
through whiteness, since a white thing can in no way be acted on
through a white thing by whiteness? How on this showing could
whiteness act on its own subject? Indeed [on this showing] the
likeness of its own subject is received from the whiteness and
insofar as it is already white. Hence, there is received from the
whiteness in its own subject something beyond the whiteness and
after it. Thus the subject [175] acts and receives action upon itself
both in the same respect and with respect to the same thing, since
this takes place through its own whiteness and insofar as it is white.
Hence, contraries will enter into the same thing and in the same
respect. How could it be true that this whiteness by itself poured
forth out of itself or from itself an essence so different from itself?
The correlative whiteness without doubt contributes to the fact that
the essential effect is a likeness of the two whitenesses.
Again, how will a white object in the east act on a white object in
the west or an object under the earth act on one above the earth? It
is manifest that nothing whatever happens by nature to this white
thing by reason of the fact that there is another white thing. For this
whiteness is equally untouched by every operation and action and
motion, when the other thing is white or becomes white and when
the other thing is not or does not become white. How is one
supposed to believe that [this whiteness] acts on its proper subject,
when something is or becomes white, as if it were then awakened
by the arrival of its companion whiteness?
1. In Switalski's critical text (p. 174) the last clause reads: "quantity or
quality would by themselves be necessarily of the same essence with
what creates them." That does not seem to make sense. Hence, we
have followed Le Feron's reading.

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Again; one who makes the first thing white does only one thing,
namely, the whitening. But he who makes the second thing white
does two things, whether he wants to or not, namely, the whitening
and the likening [it to the other], which the intellect recognizes
here. But if two whitenesses cause a likeness by no natural
operation or motion, then their subjects are made alike by no action
upon them or change. Hence, they are made alike by receiving or
losing nothing at all, for to be acted upon is nothing else than to
receive or lose something. Thus to be made like to something does
not mean that something has come to be in the subjects. Therefore,
"like" posits nothing in the subject, and this is what we were
looking for.
Again, nothing prevents one from abstracting mentally the efficient
cause and separating it from its effect, or the converse. The
abstraction and separation of absolutely all things that have
separate or diverse essences is possible. Hence, it is possible for us
to abstract and separate a likeness from its causes, and the
converse, just as we can understand an eclipse on account of the
sun, and the converse as well.2 Nothing prevents us from
understanding the day as due to the sun, and the converse. Indeed it
is possible for us to imagine that the air remains illuminated by the
same light it receives from the sun, even when the sun [176] has
gone; and conversely, nothing prevents us from imagining the sun
present above our horizon while the air remains in its darkness.
In this way, if these two whitenesses and these two likenesses have
separate essences, nothing prevents us from separating them
mentally from each other. Causality is surely not able to prevent
this, since there was no less causality in the examples we gave,
where it was not able to prevent the mutual separation of cause and
effect. But no other joining or communion holds between them.
Hence, it will be possible for us to imagine a likeness between two
subjects, in a case where one of its causes has been destroyed, that
is, in a case where there has been destroyed one of the whitenesses
or one of the qualities of the same kind which together cause the
likeness. Thus we understand that A and B are similar or that A is
similar to B and yet A is not such as B, when one of the qualities in
virtue of which there was a likeness is no more. Surely no intellect
can accept or imagine that A is similar to B, but that A is still not
such as B, since this is to say that A is dissimilar to B, namely, that
A is not such as B. Thus it is clear that the intellect does not divide
or separate the likeness from the two qualities of one kind, or the
converse. For no intellect accepts the statement that A is such as B
and is yet not similar to it. Nor does the intellect assert an order and
admit a likeness between them, so that it first holds that A is such
as B and then afterward that A is similar
2. William may be referring to Aristotle's two sorts of demonstration;
cf. Posterior Analytics 2, 8, 93a.

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to B, or the converse. For who can imagine for himself that A is
first such as B and later is similar to it, as if the order were of such
a nature that A and B first share qualities of the same kind and that,
after these have come about, they are then similar?
If there is neither an order of priority between them nor a mutual
separability of the essences from one another, all of which are
necessary between efficient causes and their effects, they are not
related to one another as efficient causes and their effects. Hence, it
necessarily follows that they are related to one another in the
manner we have said. For those things which the intellect does not
separate and divide or order with respect to one another are
necessarily the same.
This can be shown through identity. For what identity is in [177]
essential matters, likeness is in accidental matters. Nothing,
however, can be thought to be an identity unless one essence is
repeated. For what other intention is there by which A is said to be
the same as B, unless it is said to be what B is? If the account
Aristotle3 gives of the same in number is true, namely, that they are
the same in number whose names are many, while their reality is
one, then identity will be the oneness of essence under different
names, as in the case of synonyms. But if someone should say that
the plurality of names does something to the being (esse) of the
identity, let him note that no name whatsoever can do anything to
that whose name it is. Nothing happens or accrues to the thing
named from its being named or from its name, since being named
happens equally to being and non-being, and the converse. What
then will the name name? If it names the spoken word, it is obvious
that either it does not exist at all most of the time or now one exists
and later another which certainly does not affect the thing named.
If it names the reality named, how will whiteness and music bring
it about that this white person is the same as this musical one?
Indeed they seem more apt to cause diversity than unity.
Moreover, neither "same" nor "diverse" is said according to
accidents. But if diverse accidents would by their diversity produce
an identity in the same subject, then the same accident by its
identity or unity will produce a diversity in the subject, because
contraries are the causes of contraries. Ultimately then it will
necessarily be true that this white person insofar as he is white is
the same as this musical person, since whiteness and musicalness
are the causes of this identity, and this is silly. Hence, it remains
that identity has none of these as a cause.
Again, there is no difference between saying the same in number
and one in number. Hence, identity in number will be oneness in
number, though in a different mode. If identity is taken as a relation
of the same thing to itself and according to itself, then there will be
an identity from
3. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5, 9, 1018a4-9.

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the essence of the thing in itself and according to itself. But this is
not properly the being (esse) of a relation, since it lacks the nature
of a relation. The being (esse) of a relation is to be in some sense
with respect to another, but this does not seem to be true in what
we call the same.
Chapter XXXII
[178] Let us go back and note almost narratively that of things said,
some express the essence of the thing, others something in it, still
others express something by something else, others something of
something else. Others say that one thing is from something else or
that from one thing there is another. In this way it is possible to
discover many intentions in speaking. In order for there to be some
unity of expression, some terms express the thing itself, such as
essential names, namely, genera and species; others say that the
thing has something in itself, such as quantity and quality. There
can be no change of quantity or any alteration of quality, or even
the change of names of the sort that "how much" and "of what sort"
express, without something being added to or taken away from the
subject. The names may not be changed in such a case without
some passion or motion. For a thing does not in such a case come
to be called white or black without something either added to or
taken away from the subject, and a thing does not come to be called
two- or three-cubits long when there has been no addition or
subtraction made in it or when the subject remains completely
unchanged.
But in relative terms it necessarily has to be otherwise, as Boethius
says in his book, The Trinity.1 For if A is equal to B, it is still
possible that it become unequal to B apart from any change in A.
This is so, because when B is changed, it is not necessary that A be
changed, and when the size of B is destroyed or lessened, it is not
necessary that A be changed in any way. One who says that there is
a change is regarded as senseless and silly. His reason is clearly
that from the change which occurs in B it is necessary that
something be destroyed in A, namely, the relation of equality by
which it was related to B. In the same way and for the same reason
it is necessary that infinite relations be destroyed by the same cause
if anything whatever is destroyed. For can anything be or be
thought that is not related to all things, at least by the relation of
diversity? Nothing stranger than this can be thought. Look, my
father dies and, therefore, there also dies the sonship by which I am
his son. In this way innumerable other things die in me, by which I
was related to him.

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In such matters, then, we need not delay. For if it is clear that on
the grounds that a cause or a principle acts, nothing whatever [179]
has to accrue to or come to it, it will be clear that on the grounds
that it is a cause, no relative being (adesse) is present in it.
Concerning some things there is no doubt, for God surely is most
truly and most fully said to be the principle and cause of all things.
This would not be properly or truly said if something were said to
be in him because he is called cause or principle. But it is clear that
a principle in virtue of the intention by which it is a principle is not
in any sense a principle for itself or a principle of there being
(essendi) something in itself, but rather for something else and [of
there being something] in something else, for it is called a principle
for something else and with respect to something else, and it is the
same with a cause.
If, then, its being a principle (principalitas) or a cause is something
besides the essence of that which is said to be a principle and
besides the power according to which it is an acting principle or
cause, or besides the disposition aiding it to be operative, it is
necessary that either it or something else be for it the principle of
being (essendi).2 But whatever is for it the principle of being
(essendi) is necessarily the principle of being (essendi) for it either
by its being a principle or not. If by being a principle, this is either
by its being a principle or by something else being a principle. If it
is by itself being a principle, then that will come between its cause
and itself as a link, and in this way it will be a cause. Thus its own
cause is caused by the cause. And so it will be the cause and
principle of itself (since it will be the cause for its own cause so as
to cause it). It will necessarily precede its own being (esse), since it
is necessary that a cause be a cause before it operates. But
operating comes before the essence which occupies the path of
being (essendi) toward operating. Hence, by itself this eludes all
understanding and thought.
If, however, it is the principle of its being cause or principle by
some principle or cause other than itself, infinity necessarily will
follow upon its being a principle and cause, since there will be the
same question about the second one, and this will go to infinity. It
will be impossible for one thing to be the principle of another, since
it will be impossible to come to a final principle or cause by which
there is the cause or principle of B, for it is impossible to pass
through an infinite number. For if it were necessary that an infinite
number of things come to be in order for something to come to be,
it would be impossible for something to come to be. But if
something comes about that is a principle and cause, but not by a
2. William uses the term "principalitas: principality" which in Latin is
analogous to "causalitas: causality." We have chosen to use the
periphrastic expression "being a principle" to translate
"principalitas."

Page 200
principle or by a causality which is something in it, as these men
assert,3 then it is necessary [180] that it be the same way in
everything which is said to be a principle or that "principle" and
"cause" are used equivocally. Indeed it is impossible for "cause" or
"principle" to assert something in anything in one intention. But it
is clear that [cause] asserts nothing at all in what is most truly and
fully said to be a cause. Hence, according to the truth of its
intention it asserts nothing in a thing, for its most true and proper
intention is that in virtue of which it is most truly and fully said.
Let us go on and say that according to this to act upon would be to
be acted upon. For the agent by the very fact that it is an agent
would be the recipient of the action, just as the patient by the very
fact that it is a patient is the recipient of the action upon it, whether
the agent receives this from itself or from something else. Then by
the very fact that it is an agent, it will be acted upon by itself or by
something else, since it receives the action upon itself.
Again, if action were something in the agent, it is necessary that it
have a cause and principle of being (essendi). But this will be its
principle and cause of being (essendi) by action or not (I mean, by
the action which is something in what is its principle of being). If it
is its principle by action, it will be impossible without this going to
infinity. Thus it will turn out to be impossible ever to arrive at the
point that there is a principle for it, since it has of necessity to
perform an infinite number of actions before one comes to the last.
According to this it turns out to be impossible for one thing to be
the cause and immediate principle of something else, since it is
necessary to pass through an infinity of things to come to the
production of each one of them. But if it necessarily has a principle
and not by an action which is something in it, still it cannot be
denied that that principle is the efficient cause of the action and that
it brings it about. Yet the production is not something in the thing
that produces, though "to produce" is most truly affirmed of it. For
nothing is said to be in that principle by the word "to produce," and
the action is no less and does not receive less from its principle
than that which is [brought about] by that action. Hence, why do
they not admit the same thing in the final effect? For if A is the
effect of B through action, and cannot be but by that action, how do
they suppose that the action was caused by its principle and not by
[181] an intermediate action? How will the action be a medium or
path toward B's being (essendi), since it is farther from each of the
extremes than they are from each other? For it does not share either
a genus or a category with either one of them, that is, with A or
with B. How does the second emanate or in any way proceed from
the essence of A, when the essence of the action is so distant and
foreign to
3. Cf. above, ch. 30, p. 191 (170). William seems to refer to those
who held the third position, namely, that of the Council of Rheims.

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the principle? Indeed, by its nature no essence pours out from itself
an essence other either according to species or according to genus
than is present in the essence that pours it forth. For the shoot, the
stalk, the ear of grain and the chaff comes from the seed not
because of the seed's essence alone, but because of the moist matter
upon which the generative power of the sown seed first operates
and because of the power of the earth. If the seed alone operated
through its essence alone, there could not intervene any diversity of
other species, just as in the production of light from its source and
of heat from heat.
Thus it ought to be clear that action need be nothing in the agent.
Aristotle also saw this; for he said that action and passion are the
same in their subject, but the relation differs in thought, just as the
road from Athens to Thebes [differs from] the road from Thebes to
Athens.4 And so the act or action of fire is the same as the passion
of the air, but it is the action of fire insofar as it is from the fire and
the passion of air insofar as it is in the air from elsewhere or from
something else. For who would say that something happens to the
sun because I now receive its light with my eyes, although I did not
previously receive it? If I open my eyes to its light, I do, of course,
receive its light, but this has never made a change in it. It certainly
does not attain or gain a new action. I stretch out my hand to the
fire to warm it; surely there is no new action thereby impressed on
the fire, is there? Or is it necessary for everything that gives to
receive simply because it gives, since it was not previously giving?
Is it necessary for everything that moves or changes to be moved or
changed simply because it moves or changes something else?
Surely every action falls within motion and every motion within
action. But to struggle over these points belongs to another
undertaking and one of no use to intelligent people.
Thus we shall set forth those things that are clear and say that some
principles are principles for other things without any change in
themselves, such as God [182] is, and such as those things of which
we have given examples. It is not necessary for fire to be moved in
order that it warm the air next to it by the motion of alteration or in
order that it burn matter coming into contact with it. But other
things do not act unless acted on, and they do not give unless they
first receive or move unless moved. Water is such a principle for
the action of a mill. For it does not immediately move the mill by
its essence or any power of its own. Likewise, an ax is also a
principle of the cutting of wood, though it can do this only if
moved. Similarly the soul is a principle of voluntary motion for the
animal, but only if moved by some motion. The reason is that it
does not move the body of the animal to motion by its essence or
immediate power, but by will. It is necessary for it first to acquire
this will, either by
4. Aristotle, Physics 3, 3, 202b5-14.

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apprehension or by some other means. For every principle of acting
is necessarily a principle of acting on another, not of turning back
its action upon itself. According to this error every principle of
acting would be a principle of acting first of all and especially on
itself. The reason given is that every agent first receives from itself
its own action and thus first of all acts upon itself and is acted upon
by itself, and this in the same respect, because in the same respect
what is its principle of acting receives and gives to itself its action.
But what, according to them, will this giving and receiving be? See
with what madness they heap up and multiply for themselves an
infinity of dispositions and relations and actions and passions. It is
obvious then that action is not something in the agent, but
[something] from the agent. Not every relation asserts something in
the subject by the very fact that it is a relation, that is, insofar as it
is with respect to something, and not every relation asserts
something in the cause in which it is and according to which it is
with respect to something.
Moreover, nothing is said to be in a subject by the prepositions ''to"
(ad) and "from" (ab) and "in" (in) aside from what is said by
relative terms, though in a different way. At the very least we have
no doubt about the fact that by these prepositions nothing is
asserted in their subjects, since whatever [the subject] might be, it
would necessarily be from something and in something and
through something and after something and because of something.
Thus an infinite number of similar things would spring up for us
from any one thing. For it is impossible to find something that is
not [183] from something and because of something and so on for
other things of this sort. Since being (esse) from another, which is
indicated by the preposition "from," is once again from another,5
this will have no end. Because it is impossible for infinity to grow
in this manner from one, it is impossible that something be in any
way asserted to be in a subject by prepositions of this sort or in the
related terms. By reason of the fact that something is said to be
from another, the latter is said to be a principle. What the term
"principle" does by itself, that the ablative does with a preposition.
From this there has grown up the correct usage whereby we say
that the preposition "from" indicates a principle, that is, the thing in
the ablative is the origin or principle, but not because something is
asserted to be in it as the origin or principle, but rather because
something is found in something else, that is, in that for which it is
said to be the principle.
Let this then be held firmly, namely, that what is a principle,
inasmuch as it is a principle for something, does not necessarily
have in itself something that has to be called its being a principle
(principalitas) and that is something new in it besides the powers
and dispositions by which it
5. Switalski notes (p. 183) that the text of the first clause seems
corrupt.

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is an acting principle, as we have determined in the case of fire. For
there is nothing in the fire inasmuch as it is a principle of heat in
the air beyond the heat, which is undoubtedly the source and
principle of heat for other things. But there really is something in
the air inasmuch as the air is a principle of heat, namely, the heat
whose principle of being (essendi) is the heat of fire. For this
reason it is said to be the source of heat and a principle of acting,
but it is not a source for itself because nothing flows from it into
itself, but into the air. Therefore, these predications are rightly said
by Boethius6 to be not according to reality (secundum rem) and to
add or take away nothing from their subjects and to be utterly
unable to change the divine essence. For if carnal fathers or
mothers would generate without any change or motion of
themselves or any lessening whatever of their substance, nothing at
all could be found in them that could be called paternity. The
reason is that nothing new would come to such a one, since he
would have generated apart from every change and motion of
himself and apart from any lessening of his substance. For if
anything new had come to him from this, he would not have
generated apart from all change and motion of himself and
lessening of his substance.
[184] Consequently, there is nothing new [in the divine essence]
besides the Son, and the Father neither has nor has acquired
anything new besides the Son. But he really has the Son whom he
did not have before, and he is the Father though he previously was
not. He is the Father, not by having something other than the Son,
and he is equal, not by having something new in himself, but by
having an equal as from outside and [he is] like him, not by having
something in himself, but [by having something] as from outside.
"Father," therefore, does not assert something in the Father, but by
way of consequence says that something is for the Father or that he
is Father for someone. For when I say, "This one is the father of
that one," I do not say what the father is or what he has in himself,
but what he is for another and that he has a son or that the son has
him. But no one says or intends that he has something in himself as
a form. When someone is said to be white or good or tall he is said
and is intended to have something in himself and not something
from the outside. When, however, someone is said to be a father, he
is not said to have anything but a son.
6. Boethius, De trin. 4, lines 99-108 and 5, lines 17-22, 30-38.

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Chapter XXXIII
The holy faith has no doubt that the first generator generated the
first-born without any change in any way and that nothing at all
was added to or accrued to him as the result of the generation
except the Son, if even this can be said, for accession and addition
in any fashion has no place in God. It is clear in the case of the
Father that by reason of the fact that he is Father nothing at all is
said to be in the Father and that the Father does not have anything
in himself, but he has a Son. Each of these is and is said by way of
consequence.1 This will become clear, if we think of this
generation as temporal. For the holy faith permits us to do this for
the sake of investigation, and it is possible for our intellect.2
Let us suppose that the first generator gave birth to the first-born
Son in time, just as we believe that he gave birth to him from
eternity, that is, we remove only eternity from the generation. It is
certain that no change in any way accrued to the first generator,
[185] but that he gave birth to the first-born apart from any sort of
change and motion. Thus it is clear that only the first-born came
about anew. But [on this supposition] it is certain that the Father
himself was previously not the Father but began to be the Father.
Thus paternity either was previously or was not. If paternity was
previously and was necessarily, the Father was and, hence, the Son
was as well. If the Father was and paternity was not, but paternity
was something that accrued to him, the result will be the same as in
the case of "father." Since no change occurred in the Father, neither
"father" nor "paternity'' asserts anything in him, except perhaps the
Son. Hence, what we are aiming at is clear, namely, that the Father
is the Father, not by having anything in himself, except perhaps by
having the Son, whom he, of course, has eternally in himself. If
paternity once was not and yet now is in the Father, then the Father
did not give birth to the Son apart from every sort of change, since
he was changed in acquiring the paternity that he did not have
before and paternity accrued to him.
On the this basis paternity will either be the Father or not. If it is
the Father, the result is impossible, since paternity would have
begun to be. Since it began to be, it will necessarily be from the
Father, and thus it is not the Father himself. Otherwise, the Father
would have become one of the things that arise from him. But if
[paternity] is not the Father, it will either be God or not. If it is
God, it did not begin to be for the same reason. For everything that
begins is from him and, hence, is not he. Therefore, on this basis,
paternity will not be God. But if it is not God, it will
1. Switalski (p. 184) attributes these influences to St. Hilary, though it
is not clear which influences he means. He refers to De trin. 3, 2, 50
(CCL 42, 74).
2. That is, William uses a contrary-to-fact supposition to develop a
complicated reductio ad absurdum argument.

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not be in God and thus not in the Father, since it is not the Father.
There is no doubt but that God the Father is the Father. Therefore,
there is no doubt that by the intention, "father," nothing whatever is
said to be in the Father since neither that which is the Father can be
said to be in the Father through the intention "father," nor that
which is not the Father, nor what began to be, nor what did not
begin to be. For if it began to be, it is impossible that it be the
Father and, therefore, impossible that it be in the Father, lest he
should be thought to have been changed in generating the first-
born. But if paternity did not begin to be, paternity by the very fact
that it is paternity will necessarily be the Father or not. If it will be
the Father and did not begin to be according to that being (esse) by
which the Father is paternity, then he was previously and so was
the Son, which we already denied. But if it did not begin to be
according to its own being (esse) by which it is what it is, but
began to be paternity just as he began to be Father, he did not,
according to this position, begin to be what he is, but to be the
Father. Then there will be the same [186] question about it as about
the Father. The question arises whether by the intention ''paternity,"
something is said to be in it or not. If something is said to be in it,
there will be the same doubt about it as about paternity. Hence, this
solution is not an escape from the difficulty, but a doubling of the
same difficulty and a shift to a new one, and not the introduction
and grasp of a lesser one. Then, according to thin, "father" will
assert the very same thing in the Father that the Father is, but in
another way or as something else since paternity is the Father. For
if it did not assert the very same thing, it would never be truly said
of the Father that he is the Father, since it is impossible for there to
be something else in the Father than what the Father is. We are not
causing a difficulty when we call a relation "something else" or
"something," as we do the Father and the Son. For we are no longer
able to observe this distinction for the reason that we are generally
or commonly forced to argue about these.3
Perhaps what inclines someone to claim that paternity is something
in a carnal father is that a son is not generated without motion and
change and many bodily and spiritual passions on the part of a
father and finally by an outpouring of his substance. His paternity
seems to be a sort of vestige of that sort of action. But nothing at all
of this sort should be thought to be the case, and there should not
be thought to be any sort of change whatsoever, because nothing
whatever of this sort would be said to be in a carnal father, if the
son arose from him apart from any sort of change. Nonetheless,
nothing at all should be said to be in the first generator. Hence,
paternity seems to be said neither to be the Father nor to be
3. Since we have to speak about them, we refer to relations as
something that we are discussing. That is, we transfer the most
general term from the category of substance to our speaking about
things in the other categories.

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the Son in any way, just as we determined above in the case of
action and passion. For the air's being acted upon is the same as the
action of the fire. But it is in the fire actively, while [it is] in the air
as in a subject. Thus paternity and sonship could seem to be the
very same thing, that is, paternity in relation to the Father and
sonship in relation to the Son. For active generation (and this is
paternity) and passive generation (and this is sonship) necessarily
seem to be the same thing. In the same way, according to all, both
being a cause and being an effect seem to be the very same in their
subject. Priority and posteriority seem to explain the idea of
diversity in cause and effect. So perhaps one should say that in
those things which [187] operate through their essence, causality is
nothing other than the essence itself. If everything else were taken
away, a cause that is a cause by its essence remains a cause. For if
it needs nothing else in order to operate besides its own essence, it
will need nothing else in order to be a cause. For if it owes the fact
that it operates only to its essence, then it will owe to nothing but
its essence the fact that it is a cause. Likewise, if "cause" asserted
something to be in it, then it would be utterly impossible that one
thing be the cause of another by its essence, as it would be
impossible that something be white or a grammarian essentially.
Again, just as it is impossible that something can owe it to its
essence alone that it is white or a grammarian, so it is necessarily
not impossible that something owe it to its own essence that it is a
cause so that it operates.
Chapter XXXIV
Consequently, causality is absolutely nothing in what is called a
cause. It does not impose something on the subject, but rather gains
something for the subject as if from elsewhere. This is what
Boethius teaches.1 If this is true, then causality will not be
something imposed upon, but rather gained for the subject as if
from elsewhere. This is what we all along had in mind. Thus the
causality is necessarily the effect, though gained for or held before
[the cause]. In this way effectiveness (effectivitas) will, according
to its substance and essence, be nothing but the cause or the
principle in comparison to which the effect is said to be posterior. It
is as though the effect is called an effect by reason of the fact that
cause comes first and the cause is called a cause by reason of the
fact that the effect follows. Here it seems that there should be no
doubt that coming first and following are the same in their subject,
just as the road from Athens to Thebes and the road from Thebes to
Athens, and enter-

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ing and leaving one place for a contiguous one, for before and after
are this way. So also are height and depth, and right and left are
something in [188] the right hand and left hand, but wherever they
are, they are necessarily one thing in number.
Whether or not one claims that paternity is [something] in a carnal
father, it seems that paternity should by no means be said to be
something in the first generator. In a carnal father the motions and
many changes and the part of the substance which he pours forth
into the son seem to be further reason for saying that paternity is
something in such a father. But in the Father there is no motion and
change. The Father alone brought forth the first-born from himself
and by himself alone without anyone else in any way. We do not
suppose any kind of motion or change when we say, "He brought
forth." If the first generator poured forth his whole substance into
the first-born, he nonetheless retained the whole of it. For it is
characteristic of the first fecundity that in pouring forth his whole
substance into the first-born he still retained the whole of it and that
without loss to his substance he poured forth his whole substance
into his first-born offspring.2
Just as no motion at all, no change of any kind is understood when
I say, "He poured forth," so he is understood to have generated
without any sort of change and motion. Nothing was present to him
as he generated that would not have been present to him also as not
generating, if he had not generated. But he alone and bare is
understood to have generated the Son alone and bare from himself
alone and bare with nothing else intervening.3 Thus he alone and
bare must necessarily be understood to be the Father by himself
and from himself alone and bare, with nothing intervening between
himself and the Son which would be like a bond between them of
nature or essence. There is only that one most high essence, which
they share equally and by the communion of grace and love, which
we above called the Holy Spirit. Hence, paternity ought not to be
understood in God as a relative bond coming between the Father
and the Son, even though between a carnal father and son
something of the sort could more suitably be thought to intervene,
and this is the part of the father's essence that the carnal son has in
himself. This seems to be their bond and could be understood as
both carnal paternity and sonship. For only that portion of the
paternal essence, which the carnal father transmits to the son,
remains after generation has been accom-
2. Cf. DS 805; William's language and thought seems to reflect the
doctrine of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215).
3. This denial of anything coming between the Father and the Son may
simply refer to Hilary's denial of any such intermediary; cf. De trin. 12,
21 (CCL 62a, 595-596, 21-24). However, it may also refer to the
position of Gilbert of Poitiers who was, it seems, understood to have
held that the persons were distinct by properties which were not the
persons; cf. DS 745.

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plished. Thus this portion alone, without communion with the
other, seems alone to be the son. Hence, it is sonship insofar as
from it the son is, but insofar as it is transmitted by the father, [189]
it seems to be paternity, just as Aristotle agrees is the case with
action and passion.4 According to this, it will be the father insofar
as there is from him a portion of his essence in the son, but the son
insofar as he has a portion of the father's essence.
Thus nothing prevents our being able to say that the highest
essence is both paternity and sonship as their subject. Nearly all
admit this, but they do not explain the reason, as we intend to do.
For [the highest essence] is paternity in one way and sonship in
another. Insofar as it is in the Son from the Father, it is paternity;
insofar as it is in the Son, or the Son has it, it will be sonship. The
reason is that, where there is no sort of change at all, generation
can only be understood as the essence without any sort of change,
but the essence as really from one of them, that is, as it is referred
to, when the preposition "from" (ab) is employed. Paternity, of
course, indicates the essence, but adds to it the manner of reference
of the preposition "from." Likewise, sonship indicates the essence,
but adds to it the preposition ''in." This is shown by active
generation and passive generation, which are necessarily one in
their subject, just as action and passion are.5 What we have said
can be clarified in this way: for the first generator to generate is
merely to give the essence to the Son and for the Son to be
generated is merely to receive it. But to give and to receive cannot
in this case be taken according to the literal intentions to which we
are accustomed, for the phrase "to receive" can only be suitably
understood in that intention in which it means "to have from
another." But to have an essence from another is merely to be
(esse) from another. If, however, to have an essence from another is
only to be (esse) from another, then the possession of the essence is
of necessity only the essence, and the possession of the essence
from another is only the essence in one from another. Hence,
sonship is only the highest essence, which can be thought of as "to
be" (esse), but insofar as the Son has it from another. Paternity is
the same way, but insofar as it is out of (de) or from (a) the Father
in another. For what is the Son's being (esse) the Son but having his
essence from the Father? If this is so, then sonship will be the
possession of the essence from the Father, that is, [190] the essence
given by the Father to the Son, but in the manner that befits him
which we explained above. Although we say that sonship is the
Son, we are not
4. Aristotle, Categories 9, 11b1-7.
5. William's conclusion that active generation and passive generation are
related like the Aristotelian categories of action and passion would seem
to entail that they are really identical, though different in the way they
are considered. Yet the traditional doctrine is that the relations are the
persons, which are really distinct.

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thereby required to say: the essence is, therefore, the Son, although
sonship is the essence. For the essence is not sonship in the way
that it is the essence, but as received or given and, hence,
accidentally. Everyone, of course, admits that generation is the
essence, and yet being (esse) generation is not being (esse) the
essence except perhaps accidentally and extrinsically. But this
whole difficulty arises from transferring our customary speech to
those things that are above us. Among us, of course, "to give"
generally signifies some motion. But we may not think of motion
in God. And the situation is similar with generation.
Chapter XXXV
The prepositions "from" (a, ab) and "in" (in) confuse many people.
We have satisfied them, as far as we can, by showing that they
assert nothing at all in the things which they govern, but rather lead
the knower and refer him to something else. Still we do not deny
that the preposition "from'' (ab) somehow points out that the thing
in the ablative case is the principle of what follows upon the thing.
For when the Son is said to be from the Father, the Father is
indubitably shown to be the principle of being (essendi) for the
Son. But nothing is said to be in him by reason of the fact that the
Father is said to be a principle; rather something is said to be for
another, namely, for the Son by reason of the fact that the Father is
said to be his principle, and it is undoubtedly shown that the Son
has being (esse) from the Father.1
Hence, something is found to be in the Son, but nothing in the
Father; rather something is from the Father, and this in another. It
should not seem that, because something is said to be from the
Father, something is thereby said to be in the Father, just as
conversely no one is surprised that, because something is said to be
in the Father, it is not necessary that we understand something to be
said to be from the Father. For no reason demands that "in" follow
upon "from" rather than the converse. No one doubts that, when we
say, "I am thinking of someone," nothing whatever is said to be in
the one thought of by the preposition "of." Again, if I should say,
[191] "My thought begins from that," there is no need for
something to be in that from which my thought began on account
of the fact that "from" is said. Indeed, if I should say, "This is the
first or the last thing in my thought," I assert nothing at all in the
first or the last thing.
1. Once again it would seem that William is arguing against Gilbert of
Poitiers or what he was taken to have held. Cf. DS 745.

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Thus you see clearly from these examples that prepositions ought
not to confuse anyone. In a similar way it is not necessary that by
reason of ordinal numerals something is said to be in their subjects
or in what they denominate. Hence, the first generator is shown to
be a principle and like a terminus in the order of being (essendi) for
the Son, though it is wrong to think of a temporal order in that case.
Rather this is said in accord with our mode of understanding, by
which we judge that he who has being (esse) as a source and
primordially has it before him who has it derivatively and in some
sense consequently. Hence, according to our customary mode of
understanding we regard the Father as first, the Son as second and
the Holy Spirit as third. Yet we do not understand that the primacy
is in this case something except maybe a privation, and so we say
the Father is a principle, since according to our mode of
understanding we are necessarily forced to call and understand a
father as such.
Something else that confounds and confuses many is mode
(modus).2 For they regard it as very well known and most certain
that the name "father" and the pronoun indicating the person of the
Father signify the same thing, but in a diverse mode. When I name
the Father or when I use a pronoun or a demonstrative for him, I
signify both the thing and the mode. But they do not know whether
this mode is something or what it is. When they are asked whether
the mode is something or nothing at all, they are confused, not
knowing how to explain or extricate themselves. We shall not
belabor this point. At least it ought to be certain for reasonable men
that every mode is a reality (res) and that it is a reality in itself.
Among realities a mode is also a circumstance different from itself
in a second consideration.3 For does anyone doubt that the right
way is something? Yet the right way is the mode by which one is
said to move rightly; for it is the same thing to say that someone
works rightly and works in the right way. For what is it to say that
someone works wisely or artfully but to say that he works by
wisdom or by art? By this it is clear [192] that one and the same
wisdom is the principle of operation and is its mode.
An operation also is commonly called wise from its principle or
from its mode. Similarly one is said to work badly because he
works evil or from evil or for evil. In this example it is manifest
that the mode by which one is said to work badly is nothing but
either the principle or the end of the operation or the thing done. It
is this way in other cases wherever a mode is understood or
mentioned. Thus the mode of generation or the mode by which he
is the Father is only the reality itself. For the Son is
2. By "mode" William seems to mean simply the answer to the
question, "how" (quomodo). Thus the mode is the same whether one
acts wisely or by wisdom, and so on. This is another example of
William's taking grammar as a key to the structure of being.
3. Switalski states (p. 191) that the part of this sentence after
"circumstance" is corrupt in all the manuscripts. The Latin reads "alii
autem sibi ipsi altera consideratione."

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the very mode of his generation from the Father or the very essence
which he has from the Father. We signify this mode as often as we
say that the Son is naturally or essentially born of the Father. For
we do not have to think up something in God that may be
designated by this adverb "essentially." For what can be designated
by the adverb "wisely" except wisdom itself and by the adverb
"rightly" except rectitude? Hence, from these examples it seems to
be clear concerning the mode and modes. But if in the examples it
should be otherwise, still in the Trinity it is necessarily just as we
have now said.
Chapter XXXVI
From these many and weighty matters that we have already treated,
one can see the truth about the notions as well as how all the
opinions we have given concerning them state the truth, though in
different ways and in different words. For those who say that the
notions are relative (adesse) assert or say this correctly and truly.
Relatives are, of course, for each other, but they are not in each
other, unless perhaps one is referring to their definitions. For one
relative is really understood to be and is necessarily in the
definition of the other. But when they are asked whether the being
(esse) of paternity is or is not God, they answer that one should not
ask about this insofar as it is paternity, because in this mode it is
not, but rather is for [someone].1 For paternity by the intention of
paternity is not a thing and is not, but it is rather for [someone].
Hence, the being (esse) of paternity is not being (esse), but rather
being for (adesse) [someone]. This [193] would be reasonably said.
For if being (esse) the Father insofar as he is Father (that is, from
the side of the relation) is not being (esse), but being for (adesse)
[someone], paternity insofar as it is paternity will not be a thing.
And if being (esse) the Father is not being (esse) or having
something, being (esse) paternity will not be being (esse) or having
something. For if being (esse) white is not something and is not
having something, then whiteness insofar as it is whiteness will not
be something, since being (esse) white is having whiteness.
1. Again it seems to be Gilbert and his followers with whom William
is dealing. At least part of the problem seems to have to do with the
force of the verb "adesse." It can mean: to be for, to be relative (to), to
be present (to). When Aquinas speaks of Gilbert as holding that the
relations were "assistentes, sive extrinsecus affixae: assistant, or
externally affixed" (cf. Summa Theologiae I, q. 28, a. 2), he seems to
give the strongest possible force to adesse; whereas, William tries to
soften its force so that he can have everyone in agreement. Cf. below,
ch. 37, n. 2.

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Hence, it is said subtly, though not with much profundity, that
paternity insofar as it is paternity is not something. All agree on
this point, namely, that being (esse) paternity is not being (esse)
something. Thus paternity as paternity is not a subject concerning
which it is fitting to ask whether it is God or not God. It is just as if
one should want to ask whether this white thing is a substance or
an accident. For this white thing as this white thing is neither a
substance nor an accident, nor is it something absolutely and
precisely. Still it is different in this case, since by the intention "this
white thing" one refers in part to a substance as substance and adds
beyond this the covering of an accident. Hence, this white thing as
this white thing is perhaps correctly said to be a substance whether
its quality is white or colored. But it is not possible to assign it a
genus or species, and the reason is that this white thing as this
white thing falls under neither a genus nor a species. Its
signification is like the names of genera and species and
individuals, as happens also in other things. For cloth and garment
have a kind of essential likeness in their signification. Thus I am
able to say that gold is shaped or formed or fabricated. Yet I cannot
truly say, "The gold is made," as often as I can say, "A ring is
made." Likewise, I can truly say, ''A garment is made," when I
cannot truly say, "The cloth is made," though no one doubts the
garment is the cloth or the ring the gold.
In the same way, if we suppose that the first-born was born in time,
we cannot truly say that paternity was prior to him, though the
whole [reality] which can be said or thought to be paternity would
have been previously, because the essence given [194] to the Son
really was previously, though the Son was not. If someone wants to
say that paternity is the Son, it would have been before, but in a
different way, as we have said above. Nevertheless, if it is true that
the Son was previously, it would, of course, be true that paternity
as paternity was previously. But the form of the inference would be
fallacious. Hence, the ring as ring and the garment as garment
cannot truly be and properly be said to be the gold or shaped gold,
and the vestment cannot be said to be the cloth. So too paternity as
paternity cannot be said to have been. This will become clearer by
the example of related things, for a white thing as a white thing and
the whiteness as whiteness were previously, when there was only
this white thing. But the likeness as likeness was not previously, for
surely nothing comes to this white thing from the fact that
something else became white. While it remained completely
unchanged, it became like that other white thing. Hence, the
likeness is said to have come to be in this case, though nothing at
all came to be in [the first while thing]. A is said to become like B,
though nothing new has come to be in A. But as A became like B,
there came to be the likeness of A to B. Still it is certain that
nothing new came to be in A in that case. Hence, being (esse) a
likeness is not being (esse) something; therefore, it is accidental to
something,

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since of whatever it is said, it is said of that either essentially <--or
not--> and we have already excluded this, since in A nothing at all
has come to be essentially. The likeness is truly said to have come
to be there, as A is truly said to have become like B. Hence, a
likeness insofar as it is a likeness is not anything essential, and
being (esse) a likeness is not being (esse) something. Therefore,
being (esse) a likeness is accidental to something. But since this
intention "likeness" signifies in the manner of essential and specific
terms, there is said to have come to be a likeness between A and B
or of A to B. Though the likeness is according to substance and
essence, the whiteness is not named by the name of the former, and
to speak about the latter is not to speak about the former.
As we explained in the example of the gold and the ring, if the
same gold were worked upon so that it is a ring and a collar and a
clasp and a bracelet, or if the same cloth was at the same time an
overcoat, a garment and a scapular, though each of them is one in
its subject, nonetheless to speak about these is not the same. And
being (esse) this is not being (esse) that, and something beginning
to be in this one is not something beginning to be in any [195] of
the others. This is the way it is with whiteness and likeness, since
coming to be or being (esse) a likeness is not coming to be or being
(esse) whiteness, and to speak about the latter is not to speak about
the former, and to affirm or deny the latter is not to affirm or deny
the former. Because, then, likeness is not something, and being
(esse) a likeness is not being (esse) something, a question about
likeness is not a question about something. Just as it is truly said
that the likeness was not, though the whiteness was, so it is truly
said that that which is paternity was, though paternity was not; just
as that which is the ring or the garment was, though the garment or
ring was not. Just as A became like B without any change of itself
and without the acquisition of anything, so God became Father
without receiving anything in himself, according to that
supposition whereby we considered the generation of the first-born
[as being] in time. In this way no problem arises if we say that
paternity is the same thing as the Father, though to speak of the
Father is not to speak of paternity, and that sonship is the same
thing as the Son, though to speak of the Son is not to speak of
sonship and being (esse) the former is not being (esse) the latter.
Again, nothing keeps us from saying that paternity and sonship are
one numerically and that the one is, nonetheless, not the other, just
as we admit with Aristotle2 that action and passion are one in their
subject and essence and that one is, nonetheless, not the other. We
admit that the ring and clasp and bracelet are one, though the ring
is not the bracelet or the clasp.
2. Aristotle, Metaphysics 9, 6, 1048b3-34; 5, 21, 1022b15-21.

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Thus I admit that paternity and sonship are two notions and two
comparisons and that there are two relations and that neither of
them is predicated of the other and that they are, nonetheless, one,
as we grant in the examples we have given. For paternity is the
Father and the Father can also be truly said to be the divine
essence, but he cannot truly be called the Son. So too the likeness
of A to B can be truly said to be the whiteness of A, but not the
whiteness of B, though the latter can really be said to be the
likeness of B to A, as it is the likeness of B to A. Of course, giving
the essence is more fittingly and better understood as the giver than
the receiver, and receiving the essence is better understood as the
receiver. Still we do not deny that the giving and the receiving of
the same essence are one in their subject. But giving and receiving
necessarily differ as paternity [196] and sonship or as action and
passion -- the way of showing this is the same. Thus we join in this
case giving to the giver. For, though giving pours forth the gift
upon the receiver, it does not pour forth itself, and it does not pass
into the receiver, but the gift does, while the reception takes place
in the receiver. So it seems that one should approve the statement
that paternity is not said to be the Son, but rather the Father,
although it is the same thing as the Son. Whiteness should not be
said to be the likeness which is according to it. And the Son should
not be said to be the Father though he is the same thing as the
Father according to his essence. For this identity does not entail
mutual predication, as is obvious in the Father and the Son,
between whom there is every sort of essential unity, though no
mutual predication of each other.
Someone might ask why paternity is more the Father than the Son.
Since each of them is identical in subject and essence, why does
paternity pertain more to the Father than to the Son? The reason is,
of course, that the Father is the Father from himself and is not
Father in virtue of being assisted or of receiving something from
elsewhere. His paternity in no way has being (esse) for him as from
the outside. His paternity is the Father and is in him. Thus paternity
pertains to the Father more than to the Son because the Father has
it from himself that he is the Father. Whatever he has from himself
he necessarily is. We do not say that he has a Son as he has
paternity, since his paternity is his otherwise than his Son is his,
just as a likeness in one way belongs to that which is like and in
another way to that to which that which is like has the likeness.
Since being (esse) a notion is not being (esse) something and, if we
pay close attention, is not even like being (esse), none of those
things which belong to true and determinate being (esse) are said of
the notions. Thus, for example, paternity is not said to cause or to
generate or to heal or to redeem, and sonship is not said to have
become incarnate and crucified. For these are predications [made]
of a being that is truly and by itself, as they are beings truly and by
themselves. Though we admit that sonship truly is and has true
being (esse), nonetheless, this intention

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"sonship" does not express that truth of being (essendi), just as this
intention "likeness" does not express the truth of an essence,
though it expresses some truth, namely, that by which a likeness
[197] is a likeness. But this truth is something else; hence, it is not
the truth of being (essendi) properly and absolutely. For that being
(esse), namely, being (esse) the likeness, comes about after the true
and natural being (esse), which is the being (esse) of whiteness.
Thus it comes about in a sense that the Father is after the true and
first being (esse), and paternity in a way comes to him. Yet we say
this in the sense in which it is permissible to say such things of
God, for that paternity comes to him as already having the fullest
and truest being (esse). But paternity does not have true and first
being (esse) by reason of the fact that it is paternity, but because it
is the same thing as the Father or God, just as a ring does not have
the being (esse) of gold by reason of the fact that it is a ring, but
because being (esse) a ring comes to it as having that being (esse)
properly and by itself.
Chapter XXXVII
Those who interpret metaphorically those things which are said
abstractly about the notions and call paternity the Father,
undoubtedly speak the truth, but not with much profundity.1 For
they do not name the Father by the name of paternity or the
converse, but they look to the identity, which, as we have said,
exists between paternity and the Father. Hence, they say that these
notions are nothing, and they, of course, say this truly in accord
with their intention. For no one ever said that his paternity is really
something other than the Father.2 This is their intention, namely,
that the notions are nothing added to the persons which might be
like a bond and a difference of the divine persons in relation to
each other. For some have asserted relations in things in this way
so that they might be like something added on to the things for
comparing and relating them to each other. It is certain, however,
that there can be nothing at all besides the highest essence -- which
is one in every way -- and the three persons. Thus paternity is
really nothing added to the Father or added on in order that he
might be the Father. For I do not say that something is added to a
white thing in itself in order that it might
1. Praepositinus of Cremona; cf. above ch. 30, note 2.
2. William apparently did not believe that Gilbert said what the Council
of Rheims accused him of saying. Yet William uses throughout this
chapter the verb adesse: to be present to, which appears in the profession
of faith from that Council. "We believe (and confess) that only God the
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is eternal and that there are not
present to God some things -- whether they are called relations or
properties or singularities or unities and other things of this sort, which
are from eternity and which are not God." Cf. DB 391.

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become similar, but rather that something is added externally.
There came to be a likeness between them, and yet it is not
something new insofar as it is a likeness, nor is it something old.
Rather it arose and came to be as a likeness, though its being (esse)
or becoming is not being (esse) or becoming something, and its
addition is not the addition of something. The reason is that the
[198] subject did not become similar by receiving something in
itself, but something was really added to it from elsewhere. And so
to the eternal Father the coeternal Son is related, and between them
there is paternity and sonship, though the being (esse) of [paternity
and sonship] is not properly and truly being (esse) something or
some things, and their coming about, if they come about in time, is
not the coming about of something or some things. Thus their
intention is true and does not depart from the common path, since
paternity is not something new joined to the essence of the Father
and, even as paternity, is not some determinate being (esse). For
paternity, when it is called paternity, does not derive its name from
a genus or a species or from first and true being (esse), and being
(esse) paternity is not being (esse) in determinate and stable being
(esse). It is rather only what comes subsequently to stable and
determinate being (esse) and is present (adest) in the order of our
understanding. For this reason they denied that paternity exists,
unless someone would perhaps be willing, along with them, to call
paternity the Father.
These men easily get themselves out of difficulty. For when
someone mentions paternity to them, they immediately ask what it
is that is called paternity. If it is the Father, then everything is
solved for them; if, however, it is something else, they correctly
say that this something else is absolutely nothing. If, however, they
are told that that whereby the Father is the Father is called
paternity, just as we all call whiteness that whereby something
white is white, they say that the Father is not the Father by
anything other than himself and is the Father only by himself. They
are right in saying this, since from himself alone and bare and
through himself alone and bare he gave birth from himself alone
and bare. Thus he is Father by himself and from himself, and there
is no doubt about this. For besides himself there was nothing
present to him so that he might give birth except the Son, and there
was nothing present to the Son so that he might be born except the
Father. Hence, paternity is nothing unless we understand paternity
to be the Father. Nevertheless, they bring themselves back to the
same path, when they say that the Father generated out of himself.
For generation is said to be "that by which" there is either
something or nothing. If that by which there is nothing, the word
seems empty and meaningless. If that by which there is something,
either being (esse) generation is being (esse) the Father or it is not.
If it is, it will, according to them, be by the same reasoning being
(esse) the Son. Hence, being (esse) the Father will be being (esse)
the Son, and the Father will be

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the Son -- away with this! But if being (esse) generation is not
being (esse) the Father or being (esse) the Son, though the
generation is the Father or the Son, they have already come back to
us, since they do not now call [199] generation the Father. For if
being (esse) active generation is being (esse) the Father, they
certainly call active generation the Father. But if in this way they
say that being (esse) active generation is being (esse) the Father,
then being (esse) generation taken passively is being (esse) the
Son. Then being (esse) spiration will be being (esse) the Father.
Hence, being (esse) the Father and being (esse) the Son will be the
same thing; thus according to them being (esse) the Father will be
being (esse) the Son. Spiration will, of course, name the Father and
the Son together; and so, to speak about spiration will be to speak
about the Father and the Son. Hence, to speak about the Father will
be to speak about the Son. Thus the Father will be the Son.
They have necessarily to maintain that spiration is a common
intention for the Father and the Son, since, if the Father and Son
were denominated by one singular intention, it would seem to be
impossible for them to be two. Hence, just as "spirator" is the
common [name] of both, that is, of the Father and the Son, so
"spiration" will be a common intention that names both of them in
common. According to them this is no problem, and in this matter
they do not disagree with us. For we do not add something when
we assert paternity, and they do not take anything away when they
do not assert paternity. To assert paternity is, of course, not to assert
something, and to take it away is not to take away something. In
this way some have asserted a ring as a moral form, and others
have asserted a moral person. They do not, on this account, assert
anything new besides what the others assert. For the former were
not asserting anything new in the gold, since they held that there
was nothing at all in the ring besides the substance of the gold and
the shape by which the ring is a ring. Those men also agree on this
point who assert that an instrument of this sort, a ring or some
decoration of this kind, is a moral form, for they assert nothing new
beyond what the others also did. Yet these latter say that the form is
nothing at all. The former contend that the form does exist and say,
as we have more fully discussed it above,3 that the ring does not
name the gold essentially or accidentally, but names something
golden. In the same way something golden in no sense names the
gold, and the matter does not name what is produced from it.
Rather they stand towards each other in a relation of opposition.
Do these positions now disagree with one another in such a way
that one [200] affirms something and the other does away with the
same thing? No, because one position says the moral form is
composed from a
3. Cf. above ch. 27, pp. 178-179 (156-157).

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natural form and a moral or civil form (and this is the ring), and
neither position destroys this and neither takes anything at all away
from this. For there is no question between these groups about
whether a ring is none or some of those things which belong to the
ring. There is no disagreement among them about the combination
of those things from which a ring is made or about the mode [of its
being], but the latter also call a ring a form, while the former
contend that nothing at all can be composed of a substance and an
accident and deny that the ring is anything insofar as it is a ring.
The latter say that the ring is something, not, it is true, something
natural, but something civil or moral, and they say that it is a form
of ornament, which no one doubts. The others have nothing to say,
except that, although a ring is commonly and usually called and
taken to be a form of ornament, it still cannot be understood as a
genuine form, since nothing truly one can come to be from a
substance and an accident; a composite of this kind could be
neither a substance nor an accident.
Chapter XXXVIII
This, then, is how the opinions stand regarding the notions. In this
matter only this name "Father" has been imposed, and some are
unwilling to call a notion what it signifies as a quality, while others
are.1 Concerning this and concerning the basis of the name's
imposition, there is no disagreement or argument between them.
But some contend that the notion can in God truly name only the
person or the essence because there seems to be absolutely nothing
else there in any way whatsoever. For those who speak of notions
or differences of persons do, nevertheless, name by this intention
"difference" a person or a difference of a person. But the latter,
seeing that the reality is one, which is at once the person and the
difference of the person, want there to be in every way one notion
of the person and of the difference. If the reality were in all its
respects one, the groups would agree, and it would be necessary
that there be one notion. This would have to be the way things
stand with the gold and the ring, or in the gold and the golden
thing; however, we have made it clear in the foregoing that this is
not so.
[201] Again, it is certain that a person is by reason of his difference
and each person by his own difference. This is clear from the
meaning or definition of person. But if the meaning is different, the
notion will necessarily be different. A difference of the notion is a
difference according to reality and not merely nominal. Hence, the
persons and their differences necessarily differ both in meaning and
in reality, although they are
1. Cf. above, ch. 29, pp. 186-187 (167-168); ch. 30 and ch. 31, pp.
190-198 (170-177); ch. 37, pp. 214-215 (197-198).

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one in subject and essence. They do not differ in what we are
accustomed to call the immediate subject, where one thing is given
both names, that is, by two people (as "white" and "musical" name
the same thing), though not on the same grounds. For paternity and
father in no sense name the same thing, not the person which both
are, not the notion, not the essence which both are. For both do not
name the essence, or the person, or the difference of the person, but
one names a person and the other the difference of the person. Both
are really the one person of the Father and the one divine essence
and the one notion or difference of the Father. In the same way
"ring" and "gold'' do not both name either the natural form or a
form of ornament, but one names a form of ornament and the other
a form of nature. Both are, nonetheless, a form of ornament and a
natural form, since both of them are the gold and the ring. Thus we
answer those who ask whether the ring and the gold differ in reality
or only in mode or in name alone, although they are one thing, and
we say that the ring differs in reality, since it differs in its notion
from the gold even as shaped in this way. For being (esse) gold
shaped in this way is not being (esse) something golden, but being
(esse) a ring is being (esse) a golden ornament. For shaped gold
can in no sense be called [something] golden, though it is a golden
ornament. Hence, it is clear that the one subject is not the other. For
if the gold were named by the intention "ring," the gold would at
least accidentally receive every predication that could be given to
the ring; however, it can in no sense receive the predication which
is given by the intention of what is called gold. "Golden [thing]"
can, of course, in no sense be truthfully said of gold. It is clear,
then, that there is really a difference between the ring and the gold,
and this is the way it stands with paternity and the Father, because
many things are truly said of paternity, which cannot be said of the
Father, and the converse too. Although the Father is, of course,
truly said to have given birth to the Son, still paternity cannot be
said to have given birth to the Son. And although the incarnate Son
of God is said to have redeemed the [202] world by his death, still
it is not fitting that this should be said of sonship. Nor should
sonship be said to have been born, though this truly applies to the
Son. No one, however can deny that in the same way the
denomination that is made by this intention "father" abstracts from
the subject that is there as the substance of the name (whether that
denomination is in any way something other than the Father or not)
and that it is named and it is fitting that it be named paternity. It is
not necessary on account of this abstraction that the subject be
abstracted because, when those two have been explicated, they will
be seen to have nothing in common. For example, if we analyzed
the intention "father," there would necessarily occur to us the
person of the Father, precisely because this one or this person
either is not yet or is not yet understood as generating, since the
intention "this one" and the

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intention "generator" are in no sense the same, but one differs from
the other as the richer.
In the analysis of "generator" or "father," we find the intention of
the person, whose personal being (esse) is absolute being (esse),
and also the intention of generation, which is not the intention of
that which is "this one" and whose intention is not personal being
(esse). For generation does not name a person from his personal
being (esse) or from the being (esse) which is "this one." Hence, it
is clear that, when we have abstracted generation from the intention
"generator,'' we will be left with the intention of the person from its
personal and absolute being (esse). When we have abstracted the
person from the analyzed and explicated intention of generator, we
will be left with the entire and in no sense diminished intention of
generation. The intention that is abstracted and that which is not
abstracted cannot be the same. The intentions of this one from his
being (esse) or in his personal being (esse) and of generation as
generation are diverse. Hence, being (esse) this one will not be
being (esse) that one, and this one will not be that one, even though
[the Father] and the generation are one reality, because they really
are both the divine essence and the person of the Father.
You see, then, that, though they are one, nothing prevents one from
abstracting the one from the other and, when the one has been
abstracted, nothing prevents the other from remaining integral and
unharmed in every respect, just as it is in the examples of the ring,
the pin and the bracelet, where [203] nothing prevents making
alternate abstractions and separations. It is, of course, possible for
us to abstract the ring from the bracelet and pin, and the converse
as well. Nor does that essential unity entail their destruction or
generation. It is the same way with the cloak and overcoat, for it is
possible that the overcoat be destroyed while the cloak remains,
and the converse as well. Indeed by a slight fold or gathering of the
sides the cloak is only an overcoat, and nothing is destroyed,
although they are one thing and nothing whatever seems destroyed
by that gathering. It can be clearly seen that, though it is an
overcoat, it is not necessary that anything be added to the essential
and inner subject that is the cloth. In this way, when we assert
paternity, we add nothing either to the highest essence or to the
trinity of persons, and those who do not assert it take nothing away,
since to take the paternity away is not, as we have often said, to
take something away, just as neither taking a likeness away from
something white nor asserting it is asserting something new in the
white thing. So the assertion of paternity is not the assertion of
something in the Father. When paternity is asserted, one really
asserts the Son of the Father and nothing else by the assertion of
which one ought to say that something is asserted for the Father or
the Son, except that, as we have already said, as a result of the
assertion of sonship the Father is said to be for the Son, but not in
the Son.

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Someone might ask: why, then, is paternity asserted, since to assert
it is to assert nothing? For when paternity is taken away, nothing
whatever is taken away from the Father, nothing whatever from the
other persons, nothing whatever from the divine essence, and when
it is asserted, there is nothing more here whatsoever. Thus such an
assertion seems to be utterly vacuous or no assertion at all. This
argumentation is as is fitting: everything asserted in God is other
than that for which or in which it is asserted, since it is necessary
that things in God are just the opposite [of what they are with us].
In God it is necessary that the three persons are one essence. But if
the Son is from the Father alone and bare, and not in any way
through a means, but from him merely and purely and solely, why
is there generation? Generation is the path or means for something
else to be (esse). A path is a means between potential being and
actual being; by generation as by a path one comes from one to
another. It is most certain that nothing whatever comes between the
Father and the Son in order that there be a Son from the Father and
[204] out of the Father.2 Hence, generation would in no way seem
to be able to be anything in God in any sense. For if it were
something in some way, it would be there as a path by which the
Son comes from the Father. This indeed is most frequently on the
lips of everyone, namely, that the Son is from the Father by
generation. In this way a cause seems somehow to be referred to;
true generation is, of course, somehow a cause of there being
(essendi) the Son. Generation indeed seems to be a kind of cause
for everything that is generated. But the Father alone is principle
and cause for the Son, if it is permissible to use the term "cause" in
this case. Thus either generation will be said not to be genuine
generation, or it will be said to be the Father. If it is said to be the
Father, since only the Father is said to be the principle and cause
for the Son, generation will not be excluded, since the generation is
the Father.
There was once a similar controversy about the triangle, the angle
and the triangular area, about which we have said something above
by way of example.3 For when pressed and troubled by arguments,
some asserted that the angle was nothing at all. They admitted no
talk about an angle unless they had previously determined that the
angle which they intended was nothing at all. But if some others
said that the angle was the angular point or determined a particular
area or its size, these men already had their defenses up so as not to
fall into a difficulty they intended to escape. They certainly did
away with nothing in doing away with the angle and removed
nothing at all from the triangle. They, of course, conceded to the
triangle the three sides and whatever is contained in the scope of
the sides, while they constantly asserted that the angle was
2. Hilary, De trin. 12, 21 (CCL 62a, 595-596, 21-24).
3. Cf. above, ch. 27, pp. 177 (155) and 179 (158).

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utterly nothing. They were brought to this point only because they
did not dare to call the whole area the angle lest they be forced to
admit that the angle was the triangle, and they did not dare to say
that the angle was any part of the triangular area, because they did
not seem to be able to say this of one part more than of another.
We should have recourse to this example whenever we seem to be
pressed for the reason why we assert paternity. Just as we add
nothing to a triangle by asserting an angle, so by asserting paternity
we add [205] to the Father nothing in the Father. And just as those
who have done away with the angle have destroyed nothing at all
in the triangle either in its intention or in reality, so it is here. For
an angle as an angle is neither an essence nor something essential.
It is not being (esse) a triangle or being (esse) an area, since being
(esse) this angle is not being (esse) this area, however it is referred
to. The reason is that the angle remains the same, when a part of its
area is cut back. Indeed whatever baselines are drawn under the
same angle, the angle is the same. For the angle A is necessarily
common and one for the whole triangle ADE and for part of that
triangle ABC. And if the same area were again cut back toward A
by the line FG, the angle A would still be common to the three
triangles AFG, ABC, ADE.4 Thus no matter how much or how
often there is this sort of resection, the angle would always remain
the same, though the area would not remain the same, since it
would be at the same time a part and the whole. Hence, there is no
area at all in this case which would be there if you said the angle A
was there, or the converse. In this way it can be shown that being
(esse) an angle is not being (esse) something. Hence, to assert it is
not to assert or to remove something. For it is not possible to
designate anything essential in a triangle that is not either a point or
a line or an area. For these are essential and the being (esse) of an
area. The angle, however, as an angle has none of these essentially.
An angle as an angle is not a thing, and its being (esse) is not being
(esse) something, and the intention of an angle is not an essential
intention -- neither
4. Switalski notes (p. 205) that three manuscripts provide the
following figure in the margin:

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specific nor generic nor common, as an intention that is something,
as we said above concerning the intention of the ring and the
garment.5 It is dear that there is an angle and that it does not add a
substance, that is, a part to a triangle, since it does not seem to add
a point or a line or an area, or a part of any of these or even an
accident. Indeed the point is on the outside what the angle is inside.
One who sharpens [206] a part of a body does not seem to add, but
rather to remove something, and to be said to be sharp seems not a
matter of having, but rather of not having.
Chapter XXXIX
We have mentioned all these things so that these men do not shrink
back from similar things and are not overwhelmed by intellectual
matters that in any case surpass all understanding. Some think that
everything they do not know and have not heard of is new, even
though we find them very familiar topics of discussion, and not
merely of discussion, for the reality itself has been well
investigated. And so let them not shrink back if they are able to see
that the assertion of paternity asserts or adds nothing in that highest
and blessed Trinity and that its denial takes away nothing. For the
divine essence gains nothing from the generation of the Son,
though it would be true that the Son would not be otherwise, that
is, if the only-begotten were not or were not born. For [the divine
essence] does not receive [anything] in order that the Son might be;
rather it was received, though not in time. If the Son were not,
nothing would have been taken away from it insofar as it is the
essence, except, of course, that the Son would not be it nor it the
Son. For being (esse) the Son is being (esse) someone. Though it is
not something essential, it is, nevertheless, equally inseparable in
actuality and in thought, and [it is] also by means of the generation
it received, through which nothing accidental is received or
acquired except according to accident. Thus Hilary says that
whatever the Son has he received by being born, though not in
time.1 Understand "he received" in this way as well as similar
expressions, as often as we use them, because he has it through
generation that he is. Indeed, he is born in order that and so that he
might be someone, for he first comes into personal being (esse)
through generation. Essential being (esse) is thus like a consequent
since it was given to the Son in the personal being (esse) and with
it and through it, as it is permissible to understand those things in
those discussions.
5. Cf. above, ch. 25, p. 167 (141-142); ch. 27, p. 177 (155).
1. Hilary, De trin. 3, 3-4 (CCL 62, 74-76).

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Let it be held as most certain that the being (esse) acquired
essentially and primarily by genuine generation cannot possibly be
being (esse) that is accidental or separable in reality or in thought,
but being (esse) most bare and most stripped. For the person of the
Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit must not be understood as
composed or unified from the highest essence and the relation of
paternity or sonship or spiration. For [the person] would not be
truly one or simple, and [207] on this showing the highest essence
would in a similar way be the substance of this name "Father" and
of the remaining [names]. But the quality of the same names would
be the relation. Since every name names its substance from its
quality, those names would only name the essence. Then the
quality of names of this sort would be asserted in the essence, and
as a result of this the essence would be fatherly and filial.2 We have
extensively dealt with this matter above, when we showed that
personal being (esse) is necessarily of the ultimate bareness and
that personal being (esse) does not have any order of priority and
posteriority with respect to the essential being.3 For in no way is
the Father a person before he is the essence, nor the converse. It
can in no way be said that the highest essence is in any way prior to
any one of the persons, nor the converse, just as it is not true to say
that the essence of the rational soul is prior to any one of the three
powers: the rational, the concupiscible and the irascible. For those
who diligently consider all this, it is readily apparent that no order
is found among them, I mean, an order of being (essendi) and, thus,
of operation. Even though there were no awareness of food, there
would still be hunger, and though there were no awareness in an
infant, I mean, awareness of the female, there would, nevertheless,
be motion toward those things which pertain to the generative
power. The situation is similar with the irascible power, since it
would be enkindled even though there were no awareness. But it
does not light upon something of determinate individuality except
when there is awareness of a particular. For we see many angry
men, and their anger is not determinately focused on something,
unless they encounter it through awareness; nonetheless, they are
burning like a flame which consumes only itself until it encounters
something which it immediately sets ablaze. As it is with flames,
so it
2. Switalski suggests (p. 207) that William's use of the term "quality:
qualitas" should be interpreted in the light of what Gilbert of Poitiers
says in commenting on Boethius' De trin. 2, 1, 1, "I ask 'whether the
Father and Son and Holy Spirit,' that is, the things signified by these
names, which for diverse reasons the grammarians call 'qualities,' the
dialecticians 'categories,' that is, predicaments, are predicated
substantially. . ." Cf. N. M. Häring, The Commentaries on Boethius by
Gilbert of Poitiers, p. 163. William seems to be employing the
grammatical distinction between the substance and the quality of a
noun, which was the common doctrine of the period. Cf. N. M.
Häring, "The Case of Gilbert,'' MS 13 (1951), p. 5, and above ch. 30,
n. 3.
3. Cf. above, ch. 28, pp. 185-186 (165-166); ch. 29, pp. 186-187 (166);
ch. 38, pp. 218-220 (200-202).

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is with either beasts or men who immediately set ablaze those they
encounter by awareness, when they are burning with passion
against them.
[208] Let us go back and admit that the order which seems to us to
hold between these three powers of our souls is accidental, and in
particular cases they do not seem to have the same duration just in
themselves. Let there be no doubt, however, that in that sovereign
Trinity there can be absolutely no priority or posteriority in
comparison to the highest essence, such that, for example, the
Trinity is prior to the essence common to the three persons, or the
converse. Likewise it is not possible for there to be such an order
between any one of the persons and the highest essence. It is, of
course, impossible for there to be an order of priority or
posteriority between two, each of which is most stripped. For what
is most stripped and bare cannot have anything prior to itself,
except perhaps in the mode of a cause. But the highest essence is in
no sense the cause for those three persons, nor for some one of
them, although the person is from it or out of it. Let this be held as
certain. Hence, that essence cannot precede them in the mode of a
cause, nor in the mode of something more simple and stripped
down, since both the essence and the persons are simple and
stripped down in the ultimate degree, and no other mode of
precedence can be discovered.
Let us now admit that nothing should prevent us from abstracting
the intention by which the Father is the Father, or the Son is the
Son, or the Holy Spirit is the Holy Spirit, and naming it paternity,
or sonship, or spiration or procession, and let us say that the
naming or intention of paternity is not the naming or intention of
the Father. We are not forced to say [that the one is the other] by
reason of the fact that paternity and Father are one reality, as we
showed in examples of the angle and the area, and of the cloth and
the garment, and of the gold and the ring, and they are not one in
number in the way in which the musical person and the medical
person are.4 For "this white one" and "this seated one" name one
thing, though the denomination is different.5 ''Musical" does not
properly and truly name the medical one. And its intention should
not be called naming, but rather designation as if by accident.
Being (esse) musical or white is not being (esse) or being (esse)
anything, but rather having [something]. Thus the intention of
"white" and "musical" is the intention of one who has something,
not of the quiddity or of such like. For one who says [209]
"musical" does not say something, but having
4. Cf. above, ch. 25, pp. 166-167 (141-142); ch. 27, pp. 177-179
(155-158); ch. 36, p. 212 (193) and pp. 212-213 (194); ch. 37, pp.
217-218 (199-200); ch. 38, p. 219 (201), p. 220 (202-203) and pp.
221-222 (204-206).
5. Switalski says (p. 208) that this comparison was anticipated by
Abelard, Theologia Christiana 4 (CCLCM 12, 266-268). The example
goes back to Aristotle, Metaphysics 5, 8, 1017b26.

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something. The intention of paternity is an intention in the fashion
of a quiddity, and one who says paternity does not essentially say
someone who has something, and the being (esse) of paternity is
not the being (esse) of an individual thing, but is really being (esse)
and indeed being (esse) something in some sense and not without
qualification.
Those who say the intention of paternity is the intention of the
Father seem to be swayed by insufficient reason. For the fact that
paternity and the Father are one reality ought not to compel them,
as we have shown by examples and arguments. Nor should they be
moved by the fact that the Father alone and bare, from himself
alone and bare, through himself alone and bare, gave birth to the
Son without anything else in any way. For, when we say paternity
or generation was present, we do not say anything other than the
Father was present. On this point alone, then, they seem to
disagree, that they call paternity the Father, persuaded only by the
argument that the Father and paternity can only be one reality.
Chapter XL
Others are unwilling to be asked about paternity as paternity. They
say that paternity has no being (esse), and they are right about this.
For if paternity is destroyed, that does not mean that something or
some being (esse) is destroyed, as we have often said in the case of
likeness. If we mentally suppose that each of the three persons
proceeded from no one--something we hold for certain with regard
to the Father, certainly nothing at all is thereby lost in God. It is
just as we said in the case of a likeness. Nothing at all is lost in a
white thing when the likeness it had to another white thing is lost,
and it acquires nothing when the likeness comes about. I mean that
it loses or acquires nothing in itself. The situation is similar
because the one was really not the Father and the other not the
Son.1 But is there anything lost that would be either essential or
accidental to either of them? Banish the thought! The Son would
have absolutely nothing in himself that he did not have a moment
before, nor would the Father. Yet the Son has the Father that he did
not have a moment before, and the Father the Son. But this does
not mean that he has something more or less in himself. So too,
when the white thing B comes to be, the white thing A has neither
more nor less [in itself] than when there is no other white thing,
though [210] it has something like it that it would not otherwise
have had. But to have something like it is not for it to have
something in itself.
1. On the supposition, that is, that there is no procession of one
person from another in the Trinity.

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Someone might ask whether being (esse) paternity is said of the
Father essentially or not essentially. If it is said essentially, it will
not be separable from him in reality or by reason. But this is
manifestly false, since nothing prevents us from abstracting and
separating paternity from the person of the Father. If it is not said
of the Father essentially, then it must be said of him by another of
the tone modes [of predicating].2 None of them seems to suit him
better than relation, and thus he is said to be Father and paternity
by the same mode. Paternity, however, seems to be a relation only
insofar as paternity is said to be the paternity of someone. A
relation seems to be something else, for paternity does not seem to
be for something, though it is perhaps of something. Hence, a mode
of predicating apart from the ten categories must necessarily be
assigned to paternity. But if paternity, insofar as it is paternity, is
not a thing, or a quality, or a quantity and so on for the rest, but is
none of these insofar as it is paternity, then, insofar as it is
paternity, it stands outside the universe, if it is at all insofar as it is
paternity. Thus some seemed unwilling to admit for themselves any
correct talk about paternity, and this position can easily be refuted
by the examples given above, for being (esse) a ring or a garment
seems to fit none of the ten categories.
Even though the being (esse) of a relation can rightly seem to be
caused being (esse), if we are asked whether paternity is from
something else or not from something else, it is not possible, it
seems, to say from what it is. For if it is from the Father, it will not
be the Father; otherwise he would be his own cause. If it is from
something else, it will, of course, be either from the Son or from
the essence, and thus paternity will owe its being (esse) by which it
is paternity to the Son or to the divine essence. Thus the Father will
owe to the Son the fact that he is the Father, and he will have from
the Son that on the basis of which he is the Father. Hence, he has it
from the Son that he gave birth to him, and generation will be due
to the Son. Thus the Son will be the cause for his own being born,
and it will be necessary that he be his own cause. But if the Father
owes it to the divine essence that he is the Father, it seems, that he
[211] gave birth out of it and not out of himself. Finally, if
paternity is from the Father, it is certainly either caused or made or
generated or spirated, and thus it will be a Son if born, a gift if
spirated, or a creature or a product if either caused or made.
Whatever is the case with paternity, it seems necessary that sonship
be said to be from another. For if it is said not to be from another,
how will it be true that the Son is from another? There is nothing in
God that is not from another except the essence or the Father or
perhaps paternity. Hence, one of these would necessarily have to be
said to
2. William is clearly referring to Aristotle's categories which are
modes or ways of predicating and of being.

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be sonship as sonship. Then how could the personal being (esse) of
the Son be said to be from another, namely, the Father, and sonship,
which is like its consequent and result and sequel, not be said to be
from another? But if it is from another, a mode of being (essendi)
has to be assigned to it.
Hence, it would seem that it is born or made or created or spirated
by the other from which it has its origin. But if its being (esse) as
sonship is neither created nor made nor born nor spirated, it is
necessary to assign it a fifth mode of being (essendi) from another.
For we have necessarily to assign the mode of causation, if there is
genuine causation in this case.
Furthermore, if sonship as sonship is present according to the being
(esse) by which sonship arises from or out of the Father, it will be
either in the same way as the Son or not in the same way. If it is in
the same way, it will obviously be from the Father and out of the
Father just as the Son is, and it will, therefore, be the Son. For if
the Holy Spirit were from the Father and out of the Father in
absolutely the same way as the Son, it would necessarily be the
Son. Indeed, only the difference in the way of being (essendi) from
the Father kept each of them from being a son. Hence, if there were
complete identity in the way of being (essendi) or of proceeding
from the Father, each of them would necessarily be a son. If in
paternity or sonship there is the same way of being (essendi) from
or out of the Father, each will necessarily be a son. Hence, sonship
will be an offspring or son. If, however, they are not from and out
of the Father in the same way, then a way of proceeding will be
assigned it. If we should say that sonship was from the Father, we
still will not dare to say that it is out of the Father or from the
Father in the same way as the Son, because it is not from the Father
immediately, but rather as a consequence and through the Son.
Sonship clearly follows upon the person of the Son and is after him
in the order that we may think of in God. You must know that,
where there is sonship, the being (esse) of sonship must not be
caused in such a way that what is caused could be thought of as
either made or born. For these are modes of causation that specify
being (esse), and [212] [modes] of substantial and personal
[beings], which certainly are being (esse) according to reality and
the truth of things, not of those things which are in some way
accidental to and consequent upon things.
Thus we say that a golden vase is the possession of someone. Yet
we do not say that the being (esse) by which it is a possession is
true being (esse) and that it should called being (esse); rather it is
accidental, although the intention of possession is not the intention
of an accident in every respect. For the intention of possession is
not to have something; rather having follows upon it. Also owning
a vase does not seem to be the vase itself, because to be owned is
not its being (esse) just as to own it is

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not the being (esse) of the owner. From the fact that the vase is
owned, it does not follow that it has acquired something in itself,
except perhaps ownership or possession. For it is really now said to
have ownership and to have possession, and this could not have
been said before. Thus we hold it as certain that ownership can in
that ease be called a right--whatever some might wish to call a
right. For the owner of the vase has nothing in the vase except the
vase itself and has nothing in the gold except the gold itself, though
he has a right to the gold and the vase. Thus there is nothing there
to imagine that is really called a right in this case except the gold
and the vase, unless perchance some cause such as buying or
something of the sort.
We are helped by this example when we are asked about sonship
since no mode of causation can properly be assigned to ownership
or a right in themselves. [Sonship] seems neither something created
or made, nor something born, if anyone would consider it like
ownership. The reason is that the being (esse) of ownership is
neither determined nor having determination. But all modes of
causation are due to these two. But we will add a clearer and fuller
explanation to these when we speak of the categories as they are
transferred to the true Trinity.3
Chapter XLI
[213] The sacred Doctors also seem to disagree about the number
of the notions. Some say there are five, others only three. Some
assign two notions as proper to the Father, namely, innascibility
and paternity; one proper to the Son, generation taken passively or
sonship; one proper to the Holy Spirit, namely, procession; and
one, the fifth, common to the Father and the Son, namely, spiration.
For by one spiration they commonly and harmoniously breathe
forth the Holy Spirit.1 Others, however, say that there is paternity,
sonship, and spiration. They strive to support this entirely by
arguments and say that innascibility is nothing new besides one of
the three others or that it is absolutely nothing except perhaps a
privation or a negation, which no one doubts is utterly nothing.2
3. Cf. below, ch. 44, pp. 240-241 (225-227) and pp. 248-260 (235-
248).
1. This is the general view of the theologians. Cf., for example, William
of Auxerre's Summa Aurea 1, 7, 2, p. 117. He says, "There are three
notions, namely, paternity, sonship and spiration, which universally and
properly distinguish the three persons, and thus they alone are called the
three personal notions . . . . the others are not called personal, though
they are notions of the persons." Cf. also St. Thomas, Summa
Theologiae I, q. 32, a. 3.
2. These admit only the three personal notions. They reject innascibility
and active spiration. The latter is common to both the Father and the
Son, not proper to a single person. William struggles over the meaning
of innascibility through much of this chapter.

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These are the reasons on which they rely: the intention of
innascibility is one of the following: Either it is only not being (non
esse) from another, and this is nothing, or it is not having been
born. But this again is nothing and also fits the Holy Spirit; thus it
will not be a property of the Father. Or it will be not being (non
ease) from another along with some addition. But if one should say
that he is innascible who is not from another and who is the
principle of being for others, he either understands by "others" only
creatures, or only the person of the Son or the person of the Holy
Spirit, or he understands "others" in general. But if he understands
creatures only, then the meaning and definition of innascibility fits
the divine essence, for it is from no one and it is the common cause
of all things, the principle of being (essendi). Hence, innascibility
will not be a notion proper to the Father. If, however, he
understands the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Spirit
in saying "others" and understands only these, he refers to no new
notion. For the Father is the principle for the Son and for the Holy
Spirit only by generation and spiration, which are referred to by the
intention of principle taken generally. Therefore, as it is and [214]
insofar as it is, innascibility is only paternity and spiration; insofar
as it is a notion, namely, insofar as it is such as not to be from
another, it is neither something nor of some [other] mode.
If it should be said that in virtue of this definition innascibility is
"paternity" or "spiration," there is no reason why it is one rather
than the other, and so it will be neither or both. If it is both, they are
one and the same notion. Further, according to this, innascibility
will not be a numerically different notion; for the principle of the
Son and of the Holy Spirit is expressed in common in the definition
of innascibility, and it is not determined that it is a principle of this
one or of that one. Hence, from the fact it is the Father, it is a
principle in common. Therefore, it does not have a singular notion,
and so innascibility will not be another singular notion, since its
definition does not make and in fact does not permit it to be
singular. For being a principle (principalitas), precisely as such, is
not to be another principle, that is, neither that which the Father has
for the Son in being (essendo) the principle of being (essendi) for
him nor that which he has for the Holy Spirit. It is rather a principle
in common, and being a principle lies in the definition of
innascibility. Hence, innascibility is, in accord with this, neither
numerically one notion, nor two, nor numerically anything.
The term "innascibility: innascibilitas" stems from St. Hilary; cf.
his De trin. 1, 34 (CCL 62, 34, 37-38); 4, 6 (CCL 62, 105, 8); 9, 54
(CCL 62a, 433, 33); 9, 57 (CCL 62a, 436, 3 and 4).

Page 231
But someone might say that he understands by "others" all things
universally so as to include the Son and the Holy Spirit, and that its
intention is that the Father is innascible, that is, he is the principle
of all things, even of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. This being a
universal principle fits the Father alone; and it has as a kind of
consequence the negation, that is, not being (non esse) from
another or not to have a principle, though it is not a part of it. In no
way, not even as a part, does it enter into the explanation or
definition of innascibility, that is, insofar as it is a consequence, and
quite rightly so. Rather innascibility is according to its most true
and proper and examined definition this being a universal principle.
This view undoubtedly begins to turn away from error, yet only in
appearance, not in truth. For either by this same being a universal
principle, that is, by which the Father is a principle, he is a
principle of all things, or not. If he is, then by this being a principle
he is the Father, or not. If he is, then it is paternity; indeed the
Father is Father only by paternity. [215] Hence, it will be this
universal principle, and this was innascibility in its examined
definition!
By this path, then, one comes to the conclusion that innascibility is
not a new notion other than paternity. By that being a principle he
is the principle for the Son, since it has already been granted that
by this being a principle he is principle for the Son. He is also the
principle of being (essendi) for the Son by paternity. Hence, he will
be the principle of being (essendi) for the Son in two ways, since
the Father is the principle of being (essendi) for the Son by
generation. Since then according to these two modes of being a
principle there are two senses of being a principle in the Father, and
these are also two notions and two relations, there will necessarily
be two correlative notions in the Son. However, many absurdities
follow upon this. First, the number of notions will grow to seven,
since it is possible to argue the same thing in the case of the Holy
Spirit, and the same path will, of course, lead to the conclusion that
there are notions in him. For it is necessary that the Father is his
principle in two ways for exactly the same reasons. Second, it will
be necessary that the Son be from the Father by another way than
generation. And finally, since there is for the Father one being a
principle for all things, I mean, one in every way, there will
necessarily be a correlative relation in all things. Hence, all things
will have the same way of being (essendi) from the Father.
However, it is certain that creatures have no way of being (essendi)
except by creation. Hence, it follows that the Son and the Holy
Spirit necessarily have this way [of being]. But if the relation in
created things is different from that in the Son and Holy Spirit, I
mean, different as not sharing the same species or genus, then the
relation of being a principle in the Father for the Son and for the
Holy Spirit will be different from that for creatures, I mean,
different as not sharing the same species or genus. But if by that
universal being a principle he is not the principle

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of the Son and is likewise not the principle of the Holy Spirit, he
will either be the principle of all creatures by it or not. If he is, and
by it he is not the principle of the Son nor the Holy Spirit, as we
have said, then he will be only the principle of creatures by it.
However, this being a principle belongs to both the Son and the
Holy Spirit and the essence common to the three persons.
Therefore, innascibility belongs to the Son and will not be proper
to the Father. It also belongs to the Holy Spirit. Hence, will this be
a notion in which the three [216] persons and the essence are
confused? "Notion," indeed, is derived from "becoming known,"
but by this one nothing is known distinctly.
Someone might say that the Father by his being a principle is
related to the universe of all things, but not to the individual things
of the universe. Thus it happens in some places that a servant is
servant of the university or of some college, though he is the
servant of no one from the university. For a part is said to be
related to the whole, but not to one of the parts, and a part of the
university is said to be related to the university, but not to a part (I
mean, a particular part of the university). However, this cannot
apply here, since it is the same thing for God the Father to be the
principle of all things and to be the doer of all things. Yet we
cannot say that he is not the doer and principle of individual things.
It is clear that we should not doubt that God is the principle and
doer of all things, and thus that there is no [other], since it is the
faith that he is principle of each and every thing. We have made
this certain in what went before. For this reason all creation and
operation is singular and deals with the singular and the particular.
Furthermore, it is certain that God the Father was not from eternity
the principle of all things, but only of the Son and the Holy Spirit,
just as he was only creator or conserver in time. Hence, he began to
be the author and principle of all things in time, but God began to
be nothing except by relation and with respect to creatures. Hence,
that being a principle began in time. Innascibility, however, is from
eternity; the Father is, of course, innascible from eternity.
Someone might, however, say that the innascibility of the Father is
his perfection and his fontal, most copious plenitude, by which he
is sufficient for himself and all others, and that from this
sufficiency it follows that he has nothing from another and is able
to give to others. If so, there will be the same way of handling this
person's saying "give," because to give either will be univocal for
the Son and the Holy Spirit and creatures or it will not be. The
reason is that the Father really gives to the Son his being and
likewise to the Holy Spirit; he also gives being (esse) to creatures.
Either the mode of giving will be the same in each case, or [217] it
will not, and the reasoning will revert to the point where we were
before. If it is taken universally, that is, in the sense that he is giver
in general or the principle of all things, he has a certain being a
principle, which is general and is not the being a principle by
which he is the principle of the Son

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or the Holy Spirit, but by which he is principle of all things in
general. But this is not the case. It is, first of all, to assert a man
who is not a particular man among others, since this being a
principle is not a particular one among others determined by some
particularity.3 But by paternity the Father is, nonetheless, the
principle for the Son in particular, and, moreover, he is the
principle for him by this being a principle in common with the
Holy Spirit for all created things. In this way, then, from being a
particular and determinate principle he is determinately Father, and
from the correlative relation the Son is determinately the Son. But
from that being a common principle the Father is a principle in
general, and the Son by the correlative relation will be principiated
or created in common with the Holy Spirit and created things.4
However, to assert this is an error and a weakness of the intellect,
since universality and particularity by no means multiply things
numerically. For Socrates and man are not necessarily two, I mean,
numerically two, although they are perhaps [two] in thought or in
some way. Thus it is not necessary that being a principle taken
without qualification and universally and being a principle taken
individually are numerically two.
You should, however, know that not every designation that belongs
to the Father and can be said of the Father alone refers to a notion.
To be the principle of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, of course,
really belongs only to the Father; yet this designation does not refer
to a notion. For a notion is a certain and individuated property, by
which one person is distinguished from another. The intention,
therefore, by which the Father is called the principle of all things, is
not the intention of a notion. It is already manifest from what we
have said that innascibility is not a notion according to the
intentions that we have investigated. One who wishes to explain
the intention of innascibility will call it the absolute source or
fontal plenitude or primary plenitude. In relation to the Son this is
fecundity or paternity or generation; in relation to [218] the Holy
Spirit it is generosity or benignity or spiration; in relation to
creatures, however, it is simply creation. His fecundity and
generosity is one reality in number and in subject, because it is he
himself. But in relation to the Son it is,
3. William points out that to assert this universal principalitas is
analogous to the Platonic assertion of another man, that is, the ideal
man, to explain the existence of individual men. William is strongly
opposed to the idea that the archetypal Forms are the real world. Cf.
Marrone, William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste, for William's
insistence that Plato had gone too far in "calling the supersensible
archetypes the truth of things in the created world . . ." (p. 44).
4. Just as William uses "principalitas: principality" by analogy with
"causalitas: causality" so he uses "principiatio: principiation" by
analogy with "causatio: causation" and ''principiare: to principiate" by
analogy with "causare: to cause." "Principiation" is meant to express
mere origin; it can be viewed actively and passively. Thus actively the
Father principiates the Son, and the Son is passively principiated by the
Father. Cf. below, ch. 43, n. 5 and ch. 44, p. 254 (242).

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nonetheless, fecundity; in relation to the Holy Spirit it is generosity,
and the same reality is creation in relation to creatures. Indeed from
the one fontal and paternal plenitude both the Son and the Holy
Spirit draw, and they draw off all of it. Indeed each of them obtains
the whole which this fontal plenitude had, for they drew from it
and out of it. Creatures, however, though they are from it, are not,
nonetheless, out of it, but out of nothing. This plenitude is indicated
negatively by the expression, not being (non esse) or having
anything from another, and affirmatively by the expression, to give
to others. But giving is not the intention of innascibility, though
they are one reality, since both are the Father and both are the
divine essence. Also innascibility is not relative, because fontal
plenitude is not and is not said to be in relation to something else,
except perhaps when it is said to be someone's, for it is said to be
the plenitude of someone, that is, of the one having it. Therefore,
according to the order of our understanding, innascibility seems to
precede giving and to be a sort of cause for it; indeed giving seems
to be and to begin to be out of plenitude.
Chapter XLII
This difficulty which ensnares many comes from the fact that they
explain innascibility through its consequences which are relative,
although it is itself not relative. Then they use these [consequences]
in argumentation, as if they were essential predicates. This
[innascibility] is the fontal plentitude which prevents the Father
from being an emanation or stream. From it the Son is an
emanation of the Father and stream, the Holy Spirit a torrent, and
creatures signs, as St. Augustine says.1 The Father is innascibility,
just as he is both paternity and spiration. Yet [innascibility] should
not be called paternity, since it is not relative, as we have said, and
[219] it seems to precede paternity and to be a cause for it,
according to our order of understanding. Its being a principle
(principalitas) either would necessarily be divided into paternity
and creation, or it will be one in subject with these three. Thus we
have to distinguish between innascibility and paternity. For, the
latter is relative, while the former is not, and the latter is an
individuated property, while the former is something common to
the three we are discussing. This way is better suited for preserving
uniformity of judgment about matters concerning the notions.
1. William uses "nutus: nods," which we have translated as signs, that
is, expressions of God's will. Cf. above, ch. 11, n. 7. Solil. 1, 1, 5 (PL
34, 872), Augustine says, "Heal and open my eyes that I may see your
signs." So too in De lib. arb. 2, 16, 43 (CCL 29, 266) he says, "You
do not cease to indicate to us your greatness, and your signs are all
the beauty of creatures."

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Still if one said that this plenitude is with respect to the Son
fecundity, with respect to the Holy Spirit benignity or spiration, and
with respect to creatures creation or some other intention
appropriate to it in relation to creatures, he will not go wrong and
he will not thereby be forced to say that paternity and innascibility
are the same notion, since the being (esse) of a relation is to be
with respect to something. Therefore, because being with respect to
something is characteristic of paternity, since it is with respect to
the Son or sonship, and since being with respect to something is
characteristic of spiration, since it is with respect to the Holy Spirit,
the being (esse) of the one is necessarily distinct from that of the
other. If the being (esse) is distinct, then a being (ens) according to
that being (esse) is also distinct. This then will be the way to
distinguish innascibility from the other notions, and this will be the
way of joining and uniting it with the others, and it is in no one of
them, as we have many times repeated.
Contrary [characteristics] follow upon the person of the Holy Spirit
from these consequences that we have assigned to innascibility. For
it follows that his person is a derivation or a stream or emanation
from another, and [there follows] the negation, namely, not to give
in the way in which the Father gives to him and to the Son, that is,
not by generation or spiration. Hence, it could seem to someone
that a notion contrary to innascibility should be assigned to the
Holy Spirit. It must be noted that derivation or emanation or
spiration do not follow upon the Holy Spirit so that he is their
cause or has their cause in himself. Rather as generation is in itself
the cause among us for those generated among us and is a way for
them to the being (esse) that is acquired by generation, so too is
giving in relation to gifts among us. For [220] giving is in a way a
kind of generation of the first gift among us and of the first given,
which is our gratuitous love. The giving of love is, of course, the
loving itself; the loving is either the spiration or the generation of
love, according to its wide intention among us. Hence, suppose we
understand spiration in the Holy Spirit after the manner of
generation in the Son, not that spiration can in any sense be
understood to be generation--for we have gone over this in what
went before--but as the way, insofar as it may be thought or said
there, as the way, I mean, of the Holy Spirit's going forth from and
out of the Father. Hence, by the intention according to which
spiration or generation ultimately lies in motion, the latter precedes
the Son and the former the Holy Spirit, in accord with the order of
our understanding, rather than following upon them. Procession,
therefore, does not seem to follow in any way upon the person of
the Holy Spirit, just as generation does not follow upon the person
of the Son. I mean sonship considered as a motion, not sonship
considered as at rest; this latter, of course, seems to follow upon the
person of the Son and in a sense to be added to him.

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But if someone should say that procession or givenness considered
passively and at rest follows in the same way upon the Holy Spirit,
this is, of course, true according to the order of our understanding.
Procession taken in this way does not follow upon the Holy Spirit
for any other reason than because [the Spirit] is this person, that is,
by reason of his personal being (esse). In a like manner we say of
the Son that sonship does not follow upon him except by reason of
his personal being (esse). For, because he is from the Father and
out of the Father by generation, he is the Son. Because the Holy
Spirit is from the Father and the Son and out of the Father and the
Son by way of giving, he proceeds. But because he is most fecund
and fertile, the Father generates and is the Father. Hence, although
he does not have his fecundity from anything else and he is fecund
in himself, nonetheless, generation is expressly due to fecundity
and emanation to plenitude. Hence, by the intention of his personal
being (esse), which he has most similar in all respects to the Son
and the Holy Spirit, that is, by the natural fecundity which he
himself is, paternity or generation is due to him. According to the
order of our understanding fertility or fecundity undoubtedly
precedes generation and seems among us and in God to be its
cause, according to the order of our understanding. But even if we
suppose that fecundity is paternity, even in the intention which is
paternity and by which fecundity is fontal [221] fecundity, still it is
paternity and it is not innascibility, as we have said. But if one
attends to its correct definition, which is the basic notion and
intention, nothing prevents a privation from being a notion. For by
means of it a thing whose knowledge is sought can be
distinguished, just as in that common example of an unmarked
sheep, which by being unmarked is distinguishable from the
marked sheep in not having what the others have, not in having
something different [from what] the others have.
Distinguishing is done in two ways: by the differences which are
diverse in the things to be distinguished, as in a white thing and a
black thing, and by the fact that something is in or present to one
thing in a way in which it is not present to or in the rest. We do not
any the less differentiate or distinguish a thing by privation and
possession, or by affirmation and negation, than by possession
alone or affirmation alone. Nothing then prevents privations and
negations from being just as much notions as possessions and
affirmations. This is detested by those who can neither distinguish
nor differentiate the ways and means of distinguishing and
differentiating, although they are taught, albeit against their will, by
common and crude examples that it is so. Hence, nothing prevents
there being more notions than the five which we have determined,
since a greater number of notions adds neither more nor less than a
smaller one, nor does a smaller number take anything away. But
this matter will have to be more carefully examined when we deal
with the categories.

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Chapter XLIII
We shall try to show in brief why spiration is one, though there is
not one spirator. There is one spiration by which the Father and the
Son breathe forth the Holy Spirit because the Holy Spirit is one and
is spirated in one way in every respect, commonly and
harmoniously by both. So too the external giving of the Father and
the Son is common in every way. Everything the Father gives, the
Son gives, and by one and the same giving. For the unity of both
nature and love between the Father and the Son is necessarily so
great that everything that is from the Father [222] is necessarily
from the Son as well. There is nothing at all from the Father that he
does not will to be equally from the Son and in precisely the same
way.1 Nature causes this in a carnal father and son, so that the
father wills the whole generosity or the whole goodness that is
from the father to be from the son and no less than from himself.
Indeed, if he can and wherever he can, he prefers that it be
attributed to the glory of the son rather than to himself. For this
reason, the first and highest Father necessarily wills that the Holy
Spirit be equally from the Son and from himself and in precisely
the same way. For, if every exterior procession from the Father and
the Son is one, it proceeds from them by a procession that is
numerically one. By one creation there is created every thing that is
created by both, and it is not created by one creation from the
Father and another from the Son, for it is not possible that there be
two creations of the same thing according to the same being (esse).
This is the way things stand also in the other exterior processions.
For all gifts which proceed to creatures proceed from both
commonly and harmoniously by a procession that is numerically
one. Hence, it is much more strictly necessary that the first gift that
proceeds from them most commonly and most harmoniously
proceed from them by a procession that is numerically one. Indeed,
it is necessary that things closer to the principle be more united.
For separation is productive of manyness and of heavy wrappings
and of many conditions; whereas, proximity strips them away and,
I might say, makes them subtle and brings them back to the
principle. Concerning this we recall having said something earlier.2
Because the Son has it from the Father that the Holy Spirit
proceeds from him, while the Father has it from no one that the
Holy Spirit proceeds from him, it is not necessary that there be one
mode of procession by which he proceeds from the Father and
another by which he proceeds
1. Cf. Hilary, De trin. 8, 20 (CCL 62a, 331-333); Augustine, Contra
Maximinum 2, 14 (PL 42, 770-771); In Ioan. ev. 99, 6 and 7 (CCL 36,
585-587); De trin. 4, 20, 29 (CCL 50, 199-200); Boethius, De trin. 2,
lines 47-48.
2. Cf. above, ch. 23, pp. 151-152 (121-122), as well as n. 4.

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from Son.3 For vision is not produced by the body in one way and
by the surface in another, nor [223] is there one production by a
white body and another by a white surface. The numerically one
production of vision takes place in the eye by the body and by the
surface and by the whiteness. The surface does not have it from the
whiteness that it is derived by another derivation or in another way.
For the eye is informed by one derivation and in one way by the
whiteness and by the white thing, whether by the body or by the
surface, though the surface and the body have this from the
whiteness. The fact then that whiteness informs out of itself or by
itself does not bring it about that there is another derivation or
another way of derivation for the whiteness than for the white
thing. [The latter], of course, has this same thing, that is, this same
derivation from the whiteness. This is generally the case, whenever
there is one operation of something that gives or receives being
(esse). Thus in the sun and in its light there is one illumination and
one way of illuminating, and the one day and sort of day comes
from both of them in every way; so from fire and heat there is one
burning and utterly one way of burning in wood. These examples
concerning the Father and the Son are from St. Augustine;4 as light
is from the sun, and as heat is from fire, so the Son is from the
Father. Likewise many more appropriate examples can be found
concerning these matters.
Spiration's being numerically one does not entail that the Father
and the Son are one spirator. I mean one spirator as one person, just
as from the previously mentioned examples the one illumination of
air, or one day, does not by any means entail that the sun and its
light are one in any way, or fire and its heat. But perhaps in a figure
or a mode of speech, just as both the Father and the Son are said to
be one principle of the Holy Spirit, so they can be said to be the
one spirator of him. But, as the unity there refers to principiation,5
so here it refers to spiration, just as it is customarily said that two
persons are one lord of the same servant that they both have in
common. There it is clear that the unity refers to the lordship or
lord,6 and not to those who are exercising lordship. Hence, the
meaning of the relation is one lord, that is, one lordship that solely
and singly lords it over their one servant. This is the way
"principle" is, that is, the one principiation, which is understood as
the twofold substance of the term, "principle," though as a quality
it would remain in its singularity.
3. Cf. Augustine, De trin. 15, 26, 47 (CCL 50a, 527-529).
4. Cf. Augustine, Solil. 1, 8, 15 (PL 32, 877); Quodvultdeus, De symbolo
2, 9, 6-9, (CCL 60, 346). The latter work was regarded as a second book
of Augustine's De symbolo ad catechumenos; cf. PL 40, 651-660.
5. William uses "principiation" by analogy with "causation" to speak of
the originating activity of a principle. Cf. above, ch. 32, n. 2 and ch. 41,
n. 4.
6. The text has "lord: dominum." Switalski suggests (p. 223) that it be
taken in an abstract or collective sense.

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[224] Hence, the substance is plural according to this intention,
while the quality is singular.7 For by its substance it embraces
under one principiation the two persons, as appears more
manifestly in the name "lord," when we say that the two are one
lord of the servant.
Let it not be doubted that this is the truth, whether someone wishes
to express it in our words or in others. Still this causes more
troubles for those who believe that the persons differ only by the
notions. Against them we have argued more extensively in what
has gone before.8 For if the Father and the Son are two persons
only by the duality, so to speak, of their notions which are paternity
and sonship, then it is necessary that they are one person and that
this person is the spirator in virtue of the unity of the notion which
we call spiration. For how do the former notions distinguish them
by their diversity if the latter does not make them one by its unity,
since it cannot be doubted that opposites have opposite causes and
effects? Hence, it will seem to them that the Father and Son are one
person in the second way and for the second reason.
The Father and the Son are said to love each other by the Holy
Spirit, although to love is for them to be (esse). Granted that many
and important ones among the holy doctors9 do not interpret the
ablative causally, but probatively or for the purpose of proof so that
they say that the Holy Spirit is certain evidence or reason. Still it is
clear that the Father loves the Son with that which commonly and
harmoniously proceeds from them and on account of this being
(esse) of the common love of both, that is, of the essence. They
speak the truth according to the intention of the relation, but they
do not seem to explain this perfectly and clearly. Since there is no
doubt that the Holy Spirit is the love of Father and Son and since
all the sacred doctors and expositors call him by this name, it is
certain that nothing prevents his being mentioned by the word
"love," when we say "the Father loves the Son." If this is so, then
all the difficulty of the doubt is removed. For who would doubt that
there is a twofold communion between the Father and the Son and
that they are one naturally or by essence and that there is the
communion of love between them? Indeed, [225] in John, Christ
prayed for this unity or communion for his own: "Father, keep
them, that they may be one, as you and I are one!" [cf. Jn 17:21-
23]. Let them, I say, be one by the unity and communion of love, as
you and I are. Who would make the wild claim that he prayed for
the prior, that is, the essential unity by which he and the Father
7. For William's use of the distinction between the substance of a
noun and its quality, cf. below, ch. 44, p. 248 (235).
8. Cf. above, ch. 28, p. 180 (159).
9. For example, Ambrose, De Spiritu Sancto 1, 12 (CSEL 79, 70-71); 3,
1 (CSEL 79, 149-152); Augustine, De trin. 6, 5, 7 (CCL 50, 235-236); 7,
3, 6 (CCL 50, 254); 15, 17, 28 (CCL 50a, 502-503); 15, 19, 37 (CCL
50a, 513-514); St. Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia 40, 30 (PL
76, 1219-1227).

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are one and are the one and only true God? For he would know this
is impossible, and [on that supposition] he would want, so to speak,
to blend together into one along with the Father those many whom
he had distinguished into many and for whom he had prayed that
they might be many. But there is no reason that he should be named
"love" and that one should deal with him by this name "love,"
while the verb "loving" does not signify him as well. Neither art
nor reason permits that by the one conjugate the one is signified,
but not the other, since it is necessary that the one conjugate be said
as often as the other. Let us say, therefore, that the Father loves the
Son by the love which is the common essence of both of them and
is indeed both of theirs and by the love which is the Holy Spirit and
is neither of them. Hence, the Father and the Son are truly said to
be one in two ways and to have a twofold communion, and they
thus love each other in two ways, namely, naturally and essentially,
which is the same thing, and gratuitously, so to speak, if this can
yet be said in some way. Therefore, what is said when the Father is
said to love the Son by the Holy Spirit is the love of grace which is
the common gift of both of them to each other and the common
embrace of each other and is in each and yet is neither of them.
Therefore, the bond of gratuitous love is mentioned when the
Father is said to love the Son by the Holy Spirit, and that this is a
bond is determined by use of the ablative.
Chapter XLIV
Let us now turn to the categories and expressions which we use
when talking about God and which we transfer to him from our
customary usage so that we may know how to guard and defend the
rule of faith in discourses also and not only in realities. It must,
first of all, be said [226] that those who speak of God must either
speak of him by himself, that is, without comparison to creatures,
or in some comparison to them. If we speak of God without
relation or comparison to creatures, it is necessary that something
of his be signified. However, it is not possible that those things
which are his exceed three. For, everything which is his is either
his essence or one of the persons or the comparison or the
difference of the persons with respect to each other, which we have
said is called a notion. Hence, everything that we use in speaking
of God in the way we said, that is, without comparison or relation
to creatures, signifies either the divine essence or a person or a
notion. The reason is that it is not possible for us even to imagine
that something pertains to God in himself apart from what we have
determined.
If it is permitted to show this in another way, we will say that
everything which is in God, that is, in the highest Trinity, is either
common to the three persons or is proper to one of them. It is
absolutely necessary

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that whatever is said of God in this way be said either commonly or
properly. What is said of God commonly is the essence alone, for
neither two nor all three of the persons share anything else with one
another except the essence, save perhaps some common notion, as
the Father and Son share spiration. We say that the persons just in
themselves share nothing whatever except that highest essence.
Spiration and the other notions are not just in themselves shared by
the persons, because they are not present just in themselves. For
this one, if we may refer to the Father, is not the spirator of the
Holy Spirit insofar as he is this one, that is, just in himself. The
reason is that by the fact that he is this one, he is the essence. That
is, whatever this one as this one, when the Father is being referred
to, whatever, I say, this one has in common with the Son [taken] in
the same way is the highest essence. For we must admit that the
Father, as this one, is God, and the Son, as this one and as this
person, is God. Otherwise it would be accidental to him that he is
God. For if he is God as this one, he is no less God as the Father;
the intention of Father, of course, seems more remote from the
intention of the essence. Hence, if it does not belong to him in
accord with the more proximate intention [227] that he is God, it
does, nonetheless, in accord with the intention that is more remote.
Banish this from the hearts of the faithful!
Let us return to where we were and say that everything that they
share just in themselves is the one essence. If they share something
that they do not share just in themselves, it is some comparison of
them with each other. If they have something proper, there are two
possibilities. Either it is proper to them just in themselves, and this
can be only the personal being (esse) of each of them, or it will be
proper to them not just in themselves, and this will necessarily
belong to them in the manner of a relative comparison. For it is
impossible that other predications about them be made of either the
persons or of their common essence -- be made of them, I mean,
just in themselves, except in the way which we will determine in its
proper place. Hence, it is necessary that all the predications and
expressions which we use when speaking of God just in himself,
that is, without reference or relation to creatures, be included in the
three we mentioned. Thus it is necessary that all utterances of this
kind be either essential or personal or comparative and notional. It
is clear that all essential predications pertain to the first category
and determine the substance (quid est), which is said by its
predication. For to one asking what anyone of the persons is, we
will respond with complete correctness that he is God and that he is
creator and that he is Lord or omnipotent. But we say this
according to the principal intention and according to what is
named: "For there is one God and Father of us all" [cf. 1 Co 8:6;
Ep 4:6]. If these did not pertain to the essence, nothing would
prevent us from saying three Gods or Lords, just as we are not
prevented from saying

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three persons.1 These essential predicates are recognized because
they alone are said of the three persons taken together in this way:
the three persons are one God, one Lord, and absolutely none of
these can be predicated in the plural. What is more, perhaps none
of them has a plural; indeed what belongs to them is only proper
and, I say, for that reason is not communicable to any other. Hence,
"three Gods or three Lords" is a vacuous and empty intention. For
since he who is called God and Lord is numerically one in every
way, [228] saying "Lords" has absolutely no intelligible intention.
Indeed from one no increase can be made in actuality or in thought,
since the one is understood to be one in every way. When we say,
"God and Lord," if each of them refers to the same one, there is no
increase either in actuality or in thought by reason of this intention
"Lord," since absolutely no addition may be understood to have
taken place. It is impossible that the same thing is added in
actuality or in a figment of the mind to the same thing in the same
respect in every way, unless one would say that repetition is an
addition or increase. Thus he might say that the same thing taken
three times becomes an increase or addition of the same thing to
itself, unaware that it is one thing to mention the same thing three
times and another thing to make a mention or an increase of
something.2
Similarly, it is impossible to suppose in imagination or thought
plurality in a one that is understood to be one in every way. For
when it is said to be one in every way, it is necessarily many in no
way. Hence, if a plurality is supposed in any way whatever in that
which is said to be one in all its respects, it is supposed that the
multitude or plurality is in no way many. Hence, you would
suppose a contradiction about one thing and in what is one in every
way. But the intellect that can admit this supposition has not yet
been created. No one can doubt this, and no intellect can form this
idea within itself.
Hence, when one says "lord and lord," whether he is counting or
adding, if the same one is referred to, it is dear that not only is there
no plurality in any sense, but that none can be imagined. Hence, if
this same thing is understood to take place by the word "lord,"
there is no intellect which can imagine that any understanding
comes about by that utterance in this way. If one is not dealing with
the same one in every way by means of this name "lord," then,
when one says, "lord and lord," he understands
1. It might seem strange that William says the "lord" and "creator" are
said of each of the persons just in themselves, since both would seem
to be relative expressions. However, he cites the Pauline "Father of us
all," which he understands as referring to the essence rather than to
the first person. Hence, he says that these refer to the essence
according to their principal intention and according to what they
name; however, they require, as a consequent, a change in creatures.
Cf. below, p. 262 (250-251), for what he says below with regard to
the verbs "predestines" and "reprobates.''
2. Boethius, De trin. 3, 11. 1-55.

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it of each of them, that is, <of> [what is] first and second.
Therefore, one will be dealing with the creator and the creature at
the same time. If these can be spoken of univocally, that is, agree in
the same name and definition, nothing prevents this name "lord"
from having a plural. But it is impossible that they agree in one
name and definition. The reason is [229] that the lordship of the
creature is one of three things. Either it is only as an instrument of
God, and this is the case when the creature is legitimately lord. Or
it is tyrannical and violent, and this is the case as often as he
proceeds violently and rages against his subjects. Or it is only
vanity, and this holds wherever the one said to be lord is content
with only the name of lordship. None of these, however, agrees in
one intention with divine lordship. But let the testimony of the
prophets who say so frequently, "Lord is his name," [Jr 12:2; Am
5:8, 9:6; cf. Jr 23:6, 48:15] be sufficient for us. Finally, let there
suffice the testimony of the Lord himself, who says, "I am the
Lord, this is my name'' [Is 42:8]. He would, of course, not have
said this truly unless this were his proper name. Of some common
name no one can truly say, "This is my name."
Someone might ask whether something is signified by the
expression, "And yet there are not three gods, but one God and yet
not three lords," and so on.3 We answer that this is the intention,
namely, that the words "three gods" or "three lords" should be
understood to signify nothing true, because it is not possible that
something true can be signified by this or some other such
expression or utterance. This can be seen by one who can see only
the surface, but those who can see interiorly see clearly that
nothing at all is signified by the utterance which is denied in this
case as if by an affirmation.4 This utterance seems to signify
something to an intellect that is blind and still clinging to external
things owing to the custom in which it is still involved. For it does
not discern the intention of "lord" among us in the correct intention
in which it must be taken when it is transferred to the most lordly
majesty. God absolutely and without qualification is and is said to
be lord. But a creature is not lord either absolutely or without
qualification, but only by delegation, that is, he should be said to be
lord only in the manner in which he is more a servant. Indeed to
rule legitimately is more to serve God and also one's subjects than
to be lord and ruler. The faithful, however, [230] are subject to the
same one as to a physician or a guardian, but not as to a lord; rather
on account of the one Lord they are subject, if I may say so, to the
3. This is a quotation from the Pseudo-Athanasian creed; cf. DS 75.
4. It is not entirely clear what William means; however, it is perhaps
something like this. The expression "three lords" is affirmative, but it
does not signify anything in reality, for there are not three lords. Hence,
the expression has no truth; rather its truth is denied by saying "not three
lords." Cf. Marrone, William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste, pp.
40-43, for William's claim that truth in simple understanding is the
reality signified.

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Lord in [the person of] their protector and overseer. As a result he
who is said to be in charge is like a conveyer or an interpreter of
the divine will, but not one who commands his own will. If some
are subject to him from fear, they are not really subject to him, but
to the punishment that they fear. As a result, all of their obedience
is a kind of purchase of freedom from the punishment which they
are trying to escape by means of obedience. If the purchasing is
done in a friendly manner or with a hope that cloaks itself with
obedience, the goal of that love or of such hope is bought, as it
were, by such acts of obedience. Thus, interiorly there is a denial of
the obedience or servitude that is falsely claimed on the exterior.
Let us put this aside and hold it as certain that absolutely every
essential name is proper to the essence, but common to the persons,
that is, it can be said of the persons in common. If it is proper, then
it is a name of the essence and it will necessarily be without a
plural, precisely for the reason that it is a name of the essence.
From this, then, one will know that what has a plural in any way is
not an essential [name].
Those who said there were two gods or principles, externally
pretend there is a plurality, though it is impossible to do so
interiorly.5 For if they understand "principle" in its absolute
intention, they necessarily understand that it is pure and most bare
and simple in the ultimate degree, or the most bare and most
simple, which cannot possibly be divided in any manner. For it
cannot be resolved into what is more simple and more bare, since it
is bare and simple in the ultimate degree. And it cannot be resolved
into particulars, since a division of this kind necessarily involves
some addition, for things that divide necessarily have more than
what is divided. Hence, neither of them is stripped down or bare in
the ultimate degree. Yet it is necessary that both of them be such,
since each of them is asserted to be a principle according to the
absolute meaning. [Such a principle], however, is that prior to
which there is nothing. For, it is necessary that they either share or
do not share being itself (ipsum esse). If they share this then good
and evil, which are necessarily subsequent to their being (esse),
either are accidental to them or are present essentially. But if they
are present essentially, then neither is according to the perfection of
its own being (esse) a principle, since it is essentially united from
being (esse) and one of the differences, which are good and evil.
Yet if [231] these differences are accidental, the principle of evil
will not be essentially evil, and yet this is what they assert. Hence,
it is clear that they do not speak interiorly since they do not assert
what is interior
5. William is referring to the Manichees, whom he knew through
Augustine, as well as to the Cathars who represented a revival of the
Manichean dualism in the 12th and 13th century. Having denied that
any intellect can really accept two first principles, William is now in
the awkward position of having to claim that such dualists were
pretending to maintain such a position. Cf. above, ch. 4, n. 14.

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to their words. For if they spoke in accord with what is interior to
their words, they would certainly see that the being (esse) prior to
which there is no other is not just in itself many or multiple. It
cannot be made many through the addition of essential predicates,
since it is said to be a principle absolutely, and not as a part, but in
the manner of an acting principle. It is not understood to be
composed in any way, that is, neither in act nor in potency. Hence,
it can in no way admit an essential composition.
But good and evil cannot, in accord with the errors of these men,
be in these principles in the manner of accidents. For they say that
the one is essentially good and the other evil. It is thereby dear that
they hold this position only externally and fail to see the matter as
it is interiorly. But whether they see it or not, it is necessarily true
that a principle cannot be multiplied in this way and that an
intellect capable of seeing interiorly cannot imagine this. But if this
supposition is impossible to that intellect, how much more
impossible will it be for an intellect that sees badly and has dreams
empty of the truth! Thus it ought to be clearly stated that one who
affirms two Gods or three Gods, speaks exteriorly and not
interiorly, and he says this without understanding, if he intends to
say "Gods" according to the true meaning of "God." If he intends to
say this according to another meaning, this is perhaps possible, and
we do not deny what he says. Since it is not possible that many
principles or many Gods or many Lords exist, or that they can be
thought or imagined, the signification by which they are referred to
is thoroughly useless, as it is impossible. Hence, these names
signify absolutely nothing in accord with the truth. Therefore,
singulars of these names are proper in meaning and essential, that
is, names of the highest essence that name it singularly and
properly. This is the rule for substantives.
As for adjectives by which the divine essence is spoken of
adjectivally, perhaps it is possible that they both be plural and be
predicated plurally according to the analogy of adjectival names.
Adjectives are unclear as far as their predication goes, so that they
do not distinguish the number from what I call plural, unless the
principal signification forces them to do this, as in numerals which
[232] necessarily determine the number by their principal meaning.
As a result "white" and "grammatical" do not predicate one
whiteness or grammaticalness rather than many, both in the plural
and in the singular. As a result even a group of philosophers is
called grammatical [the singular form in Latin] not from a
numerically one grammaticalness. For <if> grammaticalness were
by nature able to become <one and> common in many, it would
truly be said, ''These men are grammatical [the plural] from a
numerically one grammaticalness."
In this way some hold that the three persons are correctly said to be
omnipotent [plural], when the expression, "omnipotent," is taken
adjectivally, although it predicates omnipotence, which is, of
course, the

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divine essence. There is no problem with the divine essence
receiving plural predicates, although it is one in every way, just as
there was no problem in the example we gave. Thus the three
persons are truly said to be omnipotent [plural] in this way. When
the Symbol of Faith says, "Yet the persons are not three
omnipotents, but one omnipotent,"6 This expression, "omnipotent,"
is understood substantively. Let no one shrink back from this, since
it says in the canticle of Exodus, "Omnipotent is his name" [Ex
15:3], for "omnipotent'' cannot be a name unless it is taken
substantively. Taken as an adjective, it should not be said to be the
name of anyone, or even to name something. It should rather more
suitably be said to denominate. Therefore, "omnipotent three," it
seems, should be admitted, when "three" is taken substantively and
"omnipotent" adjectivally, since if "omnipotent" were used
substantivally, it would be admitted substantivally with regard to
the persons also. But this sort of use as a substantive is neither
necessary for us, nor should we accept it, for we should avoid
every bad appearance and avoid not only being disproved but also
seeming to be disproved. When the words we use are sufficient for
us to express our intentions, it is quite pointless to assert and make
up new words. No expression is so clearly and obviously false that
no true signification [233] can be given it; nonetheless, we who
were commanded by the Apostle, "Keep free from profane
novelties in speech" [1 Tm 6:20], should not [make up new words].
If an evil person insists that we impose new meanings on words
when we are dealing with things, for whose explanation and
clarification the established ones suffice, he shows he is not
pursuing the intention of truth. Rather he is pursuing either the
subversion of his hearers or the appearance of wisdom, which he
undoubtedly shows that he does not have in this case. In the
meantime, let this suffice to persuade you that "God" and "Lord"
cannot univocally be said in one case essentially and in another not
essentially or according to participation. There are said to be many
gods and many lords. But this is said either by participation -- as in
the Psalm: "I said you are gods" [Ps 81:6], and so on, and in
Exodus, chapter VII: "Behold I have made you god of Pharaoh"
[Ex 7:1] -- or by some imitation of divinity or the divine nature, as
the good angels and the evil gods, as we read in Wisdom XIII:
"And they considered the sun and the moon as rulers of the world
and gods of the earth" [Ws 13:2], because they seemed to imitate
the divine nature by their immortality or by prediction of future and
hidden things.
6. Again William cites the Pseudo-Athanasian creed (DS 75), though
he has added, "persons." The Symbol intends to say that there are not
three omnipotent substances, but one omnipotent substance. By
adding "persons" William seems to say that there are not three
omnipotent persons, though what he says can perhaps be saved by
saying that the persons are not three omnipotent substances.

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Personal terms, however, are distinguished in the opposite manner
from essential ones; for they are plural and are said in the plural of
God, that is, of the divine essence. That is, they cannot be said in
the singular of all three persons or of two of them. The reason is
that the three persons are many only as persons and are one only as
the essence. Hence, all the plurality that is predicated of God is
personal, and all the singularity predicable of the three persons is
essential. God is surely many in no way but personally; he is one in
no way but essentially. Hence, whatever is predicated of him, if I
may say so, as many, is personal, and whatever is predicated of
God as one is essential, since no other sort of plurality or other sort
of singularity can be found in God. Pronouns of the masculine
gender are completely personal. As a result the three persons say
"us" [234] in the third chapter of Genesis: "Behold Adam has
become as one of us" [Gn 3:22].
We correctly say, "these three" and "those three" and "these and
those are" and "this one, that one and the third." Ordinal adjectives,
such as first, second and third, are, of course, not treated as
substantives. We correctly say the first and second and third
person. But pronouns of the neuter gender refer to the essence. As a
result, when the essence is referred to, neither the ones nor the
others can be said in the plural, if the pronoun is retained. They
cannot point out many essences in God, since there are not many
essences present in God. The rule for expressions of the faith does
not use them for distinguishing the persons. Suppose someone
asks, ''Why is this?" In this matter of sacred expressions the
authority which taught us this rule of speech and the learning of the
sacred doctors who distinguished these words ought to be sufficient
for us. Still the following seems to be the reason for such a
distinction: Even in common discourse the masculine pronouns are
not used except to point out individual rational substances, which
are called persons. For we are accustomed to say "this one" or "that
one" [in the masculine gender] when we are pointing out an ass or
some other brute animal only with the addition of a general or
specific noun, if there is no grammatical addition. We correctly say
"he," when we point out some man or angel, and "she," when we
point out a woman, but not when we point out an ass or a stone.
This is a privilege of rational substances or of persons, which is the
same thing. This has been granted to rational substances who alone
have the gift of speech, so that they can more easily and readily
speak of themselves than of other things and for mutual speech
about one another by names (per nomina), as if by antonomasia for
the substantives.7 [Rational substances] surpass all other things,
and they alone are known to one another by
7. Antonomasia is a figure of speech which employs an epithet in
place of a name; here William says that the pronouns (pronomina) are
used in place of the names (per nomina).

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speech. As a result they need fewer words for mutually referring to
one another, because they are very much aware of their mutual
differences and of one another. But the neuter pronouns seem to be
more bare and abstract in themselves. For the former at least
determine the gender, but the latter, that is, the neuters, abstract
from gender, and not only from gender but also from every form
and accident. This is the reason why essences are very limited in
content.
[235] For the essence of anything whatever is the residue, bare of
all the clothing of accidents, and no essence is known except by
abstracting from the essence everything added to it in any way.
This, then, is the reason why the purpose of the neuters, as far as
concerns the force of their proper meaning, is to signify the essence
merely, that is, abstractly. But the masculine pronouns, because
they are more concrete and less abstract and more suited to any
divisions and distinctions and differences [derived] from forms,
have remained personal in expressions about God. Among us they
were and still are personal. There should be no doubt that the
names of the persons are personal; such are the names, Father, Son,
Holy Spirit, as well as generator, only-begotten, first-born and gift.
It is also certain that the name "Trinity" is personal, since it is the
name of the three persons together as a collective name. As a result
it is predicated of all of them together, but by itself of no one
singly, for of none of them can it be said that he is the "Trinity."
But suppose someone asks: ''What is the substance in this name?
What is the quality?"8 We say that the persons are the substance of
this name, but its quality is the same as the quality of the name
"three," though not in the name way. Thus the Trinity, from which
the three are denominated, is the quality of this name "Trinity." We
shall say something about what this is when we speak of the
signification of numerical names.9
At this point we must say that personal names are rendered many
by reason of the fact that there are many persons in the Trinity. It is
not only impossible, in accord with the meaning that belongs to
them, that essential names are truly said of God in the plural. It is
also impossible that they have plurals, because it is impossible that
the essence be in any way made many even in the intellect, unless
one should contentiously mean a crazed or dreaming intellect. It
does not seem without merit that we should investigate to which of
the categories personal names pertain and to which they should be
reduced. For some of the personal terms add beyond the intention
of the persons the intention of a relation, and there should be no
doubt that this latter pertains to the category of relation. Others,
however, add nothing at all, but signify the persons simply and
8. Cf. above, ch. 30, n. 6 and ch. 39, n. 2 for the distinction between
the substance and the quality of a name.
9. Cf. what William says on numerical names, below, p. 256 (253-254).

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absolutely and barely; [236] such is the noun "person" and the
personal pronouns. Thus we ask whether these signify substance or
quantity or quality. For they are in no way said in relation to
something and do not signify a relation in any way. Consequently,
they are reduced to substance or quantity or quality. Individual
names are necessarily reduced to the category of their generic and
specific names; for the species is not in one category and the genus
in another. Thus "this one" and ''that one" seem, when one is
dealing with persons, to pertain to the category of substance. For
how will "this one," when referring to Socrates, pertain to the
category of substance any more than when referring to one of the
divine persons? For it seems to be the [same] mode of predication
in both cases.
Moreover, being (esse) "this one," when one is referring to one of
the persons, is either essential to him and substantial being (esse
'quid'), or not. If it is, then personal names will signify the essence
and signify substance. But if it is not essential, it will not signify
substantial being (esse 'quid') either. Thus it can be separated in
actuality or in thought. But this is impossible; for being (esse) this
one is, surely, in no way separable from "this one." Moreover, how
will it fail to signify the substance and to signify the substance
essentially, since it names something purely and barely and
uncomposed by anything in any way? But in accord with this it
turns out that the essence is said essentially of the persons and that
it is said more of them than it is of itself. But this is impossible. For
it is not possible that something be said of anything [else] more
proximately or in a prior way or more than it is said of itself since
it is necessary that nothing stand between a thing and itself. This
holds in beings simple in every respect; in composite beings, of
course, the matter necessarily is otherwise. For the genus is prior to
every species, and it is necessary that every part of a definition is
prior to the definition. The definition is, of course, merely the
species explained and broken down in thought, but not in actuality.
Likewise, the Son was born so that he is this one and so that he is
this person. This is being a substance (esse quid) through
generation first and most of all. Yet he does not have the divine
essence first through generation since it is unborn in every respect.
But he surely has essential being (esse) through his personal being
(esse). Hence, he without a doubt first has the former according to
the order that we are permitted to think in this case, namely,
according to the order of our understanding. [237] He has personal
being (esse) first and, therefore, essentially, for nothing is more
sublime or intimate than [what one has] essentially. We shall not,
however, delay longer, but simply say that the personal names with
which we are dealing here, that is, abstract ones, undoubtedly
pertain to the first logical category and signify a logical substance
(quid), though not substance as we intend it here. Rather they
undoubtedly signify the logical essence because they signify the
bare reality purely and without any of the

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modes of comparison. This is the intention of essence among
logicians and philosophers for whom essence is a bare reality that
is stripped and abstracted from every condition and comparison
and that is understood to be somehow united and composed apart
from the nature of its species. But this is not the intention of
essence according to theological speculation, since this intention
does not in any way distinguish person from essence, nor is the
converse true. Indeed it equally fits both of them. But the intention
of essence is one thing, and the intention of person is another. For
the intention of person has two modes: individuality and
incommunicability;10 whereas the essence has only one of these.
For person is in all its respects by itself (per se). That is, it does not
by itself in any way admit a multitude; it is not able to be in any
way united to a multitude; it is not able in any way to be said of a
multitude, but has solitary and singular predication in every
respect. Though the essence is understood to be one in itself in
every way, it can, nonetheless, be shared and united with many. It
cannot admit another of its own kind, whether one that is its equal
or one that is of the same duration, if I may put it this way, and in
general it cannot admit another that is not from it. Hence, it is
companionless or unable to admit like companionship in any way.
But the persons can be social; they are necessarily capable of
society with one another and of communion and of mutual likeness
and equality. Concerning these we have been at pains to persuade
you that no one of them was able to be or can be or will be able to
be alone. We have also assisted the intellect toward the faith, trying
[to do so] as best we could, though perhaps not as much as we
ought, by likenesses found among us. [238] In God, then, the
essence is said to be what those three persons share perfectly and
integrally and what they are perfectly and integrally and singly and
altogether and equally in every way. Therefore, the essence in God
is not only what is the most stripped and bare of all addition and
clothing and what is prevented from having an equal or one of the
same duration or a cause in any way. It is also necessary that it be
possessed by many wholly and equally and that in this way it be
many because it is each of them. "Person" has a different intention,
since person excludes plurality and communicability from itself in
every way. It does not shun, but embraces equality, and it can either
be a cause for another by way of [the other's] being (essendi) out of
it or it can have such a cause. The reason is that it is not possible to
understand that there is a
10. Cf. Richard of Saint Victor, De trin. 4, 18 and 21 (pp. 181 and
186-187), where he adds the mode of incommunicability to the
Boethian definition of person; cf. above, ch. 28, n. 11 and ch. 29, n. 1.
In Summa Theologiae I, q. 29, a. 3 ad 4, St. Thomas mentions that
some have added "incommunicable" to Boethius' definition of a
person to make it applicable to the Trinity.

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one in this way before being (esse), and after being (esse) there is
not being (non esse) or non-being (non ens).11 This, then, is the
reason why the essence can be neither from something else nor out
of something else, and there can be nothing out of anything that has
nothing apart from itself. But a person has the essence and has it
just in itself, not in any way after the manner of an accident. For
each person by the very fact that he is himself, whichever of the
persons is referred to, is by this very fact this thing itself (hoc
ipsum), referring to the essence. It is not that being (esse) this one
is being (esse) that thing, but the essence is like the interior of this
person. It is not that the person is thought of as less stripped in its
own personal being (esse) than the essence, or that it is not
necessary that it be equally simple in the ultimate degree, but for
the manner of our understanding essential being (esse) is more bare
and more solitary than personal being (esse). Yet the one has
nothing whatever more or less than or different from the other. As
we have often said, this gold has nothing more or less than this
ring, although being (esse) this gold is not being (esse) this ring.
Certainly this gold has the shape by which the ring is a ring in the
same way as this ring does. For this shape exists only in one way in
whatever it is, and it is impressed only in one way, whether it is
impressed by nature or by art.12 But the intention of the ring is not
the same as the intention of this gold shaped in this way. What
happens in this case either from the shape or from the way of
having the shape must be the way it is in God, as the faith [239]
will show. It cannot be doubted that the essence is not said in the
same way of itself and of each one of the persons and that each one
of the persons has itself in one way and the essence in another, if it
should be said to have itself in any way.
If someone were to claim this is false, he would gain no advantage.
For he necessarily has to admit that a person does not have
personal being (esse) and essential being (esse) in the same way
and that there is not an identity in every way between the essence
and the person. For it is necessary that not everything that is said of
anyone of the persons be also said of the essence. Indeed, it is
impossible that there be said of the essence what must, nonetheless,
be said of a person, indeed, of any person, and the converse is true
as well. Hence, the only remaining cause for our reason to wonder
on this point is how it is true that anyone of the persons is the
essence, since it is clear that many things can be said of the essence
which cannot be said of a person. On this point we refer you to the
examples we have given about the gold and the ring, the surface
and
11. Switalski notes that the preceding sentence is corrupt in all the
manuscripts. Nonetheless, William's point seems clear. He is denying
a One prior to being, for there is nothing prior to being. And he also
insists that beyond being there is simply nothing. Hence, being, or the
divine essence, cannot proceed from a One beyond being, and the
divine essence cannot generate anything, since apart from being there
is nothing.
12. Cf. above ch. 27, pp. 178-179 (157).

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the angle, the garment and the cloth, or the bracelet and the clasp
and the ring, and whatever else we said on the same point.13
The objectors, however, return to the attack more vigorously and
ask: What is it in God that the holy faith calls the essence? What
[does it call] a person? To them we answer that in God that is
called essence which is not out of another, out of which there is
nothing else, and to which just in itself non-being (non esse) is
opposed. It is, furthermore, that which the three persons share most
perfectly and singly and all together and that to which every
possible looks directly and of itself. For [a possible] is called
possible in relation to it, just as what can be illumined looks to the
source of light, not in the way that what can be illumined looks to
the sun, but in the way it looks to the light itself. For even though
the sun is the source of light, it is [the source of light] from the
light and through the light. In this way the essence is just in itself
the source of being (essendi) and flows and shines on every
possible, which is illumined in act and reflects it, as air reflects not
the sun but the light. Therefore, though each of the persons is most
rightly and properly the source of being (essendi), yet this seems
more to fit the essence insofar as it is essence. For the Father is just
in himself the source of being (esseneli) for the Son and the Holy
Spirit. The first essence is [240] just in itself the source of being
(essendi) for possibles that have been created or are able to be
created; yet the Father is not more true or abundant than the
essence, just as the Son does not have lesser abundance or richness
of being (essendi) than the Father, because he is not able to
generate, though the Father can do so. The same is to be said of the
Holy Spirit, for iron is not more precious or better than gold,
because it has strength and can do as a saw or sickle what gold
cannot.
Let it suffice for us to have indicated this concerning essential
being (esse), namely, that it is that which is not divided in any way
and. in which there is not found composition, but only simplicity.14
Personal being (esse) is necessarily divided in the way we have
said and necessarily has a plurality or multitude as befits it. Its
singularity necessarily entails that in the manner of something
common it is divisible into many and more. The reason is that it
has the first and highest individuality that can in no way be alone.
For we showed this for each of them, because the first fecundity,
which is understood to be the Father, could not be without an
offspring, and the first generator and the first-born could not be
without a third, namely, the first gift. For how could the best Father
and the best Son be without mutual love, since without love of the
good even goodness itself
13. Cf. above ch. 39, n. 4.
14. Once again William is using the Boethian "hoc et hoc: this and this"
and "tantum hoc: only this" to speak of what is composed and what is
not composed in any way. Cf. above, ch. 14, p. 122 (86) and ch. 24, p.
158 (130).

Page 253
cannot be understood? For we are happy by that fact alone that we
are lovers of the good. Who could be so insane as to say that love
could fail to exist even among good people? Although love such as
we know should not in any way be thought to exist between the
first generator and the first-born, still it is necessary that love be in
them in the manner that is fitting and appropriate to them. If it is
necessary that the first is the generator of those things that can be
numbered and multiplied, that the second is the offspring or Son,
and that the third is the gift of mutual love, it is clear that personal
singularity cannot exist alone. This is clear from the fact that the
first addition to the first unity that is multipliable and numerable is
necessarily the result of generation. For generation is necessarily
the first of all multiplications, since generation is the first of all
causations and every causation is a multiplication. For what turns
unity into number is a cause, and causation is the multiplication of
particulars. For multiplication is nothing other than the causation or
production of a multitude. [241] But generation is the first of all the
causations of a multitude. For generation is what first produces
many. The first production of many is out of the one producing the
many; first there is the multiplication of oneself and then of others,
and first there is the unfolding of a multitude out of oneself and
then out of another. Hence, the first and highest unity is necessarily
able to become many; otherwise, whence is the multitude? Hence,
it can become many through generation.
Thus the divine essence is a principle absolutely; it does not have a
principle equal to it or of equal duration with it. As the source of
being (essendi) and the principle for creatures alone, it is
necessarily communicable to many and multipliable in this manner
into many. It is not divided or particularized in any way. It is
singular and solitary, as we have said.15 It is not shared after the
manner of genus and species, but is totally and integrally one in
number in the many taken singly and altogether. (A genus or a
species is not one in number, but in thought, and thus it is in many,
but not totally and integrally in every respect, but in thought. It is
whole according to its parts, which are its parts precisely because
the intelligibility of a species or of a genus is in each of the
particulars.) [The divine essence] is unmixed and pure, most
stripped in every way, regarding, as an object of its irradiation, the
creatable possible. As a result it is also said to be "being" (esse),
because it is the source of being (essendi) by reason of the fact that
it is being (esse). This is its being (esse) the source of being
(essendi) of <that> which is empty being (esse), namely, the being
(esse) of a creature alone. It is also called essence, because we are
accustomed to call the essence of each thing the bare thing stripped
of the quiddity of its species. But a [divine] person
15. Cf. above, ch. 4, p. 74 (26-27); ch. 14, pp. 118-119 (82).

Page 254
necessarily has an equal and one of equal duration and similar by
the first and highest likeness and by the first and highest equality,
and [a person] is necessarily either out of another or another is out
of it. This involves speaking of mutual multiplication so that a
person is necessarily either the source or the result of
multiplication. For it is necessary that personal being (esse) is
accompanied by a plurality that arises only through multiplication.
It is either the multiplication of one into two, as the Father
somehow multiplied himself into two, when he gave birth to the
Son, or of two into three, as both, namely, the Father and Son,
somehow multiplied themselves into three by spirating the Holy
Spirit. This is the production of a multitude or the unfolding of a
plurality out of [242] oneself. In this way, then, multiplication or
communication follows upon personal being (esse), since
multiplication is nothing but causation, or it is principiation [taken]
either actively or passively.16 We have already shown how the
essence is not multipliable in this way.17 Personal being (esse) has
ultimate individuality in both respects; it is neither divisible nor
communicable, as we have often said. In the second respect it
differs from essential being (esse), since every essential being
(esse), though it is indivisible, is nonetheless communicable and
necessarily belongs to many perfectly and integrally.
We have inserted this on account of those who make a strong
demand for a certain differentiation and distinction between
essence and person. For it is necessary that the first principle be
both one and the principle of the first multiplication in itself. It
must first of all and from eternity have made itself many in itself in
the way the holy faith prescribes, that is, by generation and
spiration. The most obvious proofs for this are the generation that
takes place in things and the generosity of created things by which
all of them communicate their dispositions to other things,
scattering them about with such great profusion. The clearest
example of this is light that sheds itself upon everything else with
such great generosity. From these examples one should note the
detestable avarice that the whole of nature abhors, while it
embraces generosity with all its strength. We are here using the
name "principle" imprecisely and the name "multiplication" in
accord with the license of those who teach and hold disputations.
We intend thereby to satisfy as far as we can, even in a small
matter, those who make such demands and to prop up the shaking
head of the old man.
With regard, however, to the personal being (esse) that is common
to the three persons, whether one is dealing with "person" or with
"someone," what sort of particulars are "this one and that one?"
Not without reason does one ask what sort of common [being] the
three per-
16. Cf. above, ch. 41, n. 4.
17. Cf. above, p. 253 (241).

Page 255
sons have, namely, whether it is common and essential or common
and accidental. But it is impossible that personal being (esse) is
common and accidental being (esse), since being (esse) this one, as
we have said,18 is not accidental being (esse), but logically or
physically essential, as we have said.19 Hence, because each of the
particulars that by analogy is under it is essential, the personal
being (esse) is also essential in this way.
Likewise, [personal being] is not separable from anyone of the
persons either in actuality or in thought. Thus it is not common and
accidental. Hence, it is common and substantial [243] according to
the logical mode, and so it is a genus or a species or a difference.
Again, "someone" or "person" is predicated of many that differ in
number, like "something" according to the logical mode, and thus it
is a species. Hence, the persons will be of the same species.
Therefore, they will not be one in number. Also, according to this it
will turn out that this species is under some genus. To this it must
be said that ''someone" is in no sense a species since it is infinite;
every species is determined and limited by a certain and specific
form. "Someone" does not determine anything in any way, but is
like a transcendental. For "this" is said of all things, but neither
essentially nor according to accident. At least it is true that one
asked, "Who?" or "What?" about anything whatever cannot
appropriately answer, "This." For what sort of answer is it, when
one is asked what something is, if he answers that it is someone or
something? For each of them is infinite, and thus neither of them
appropriately answers a question of this sort. The persons,
however, are prevented from being in a species by their bareness
and simplicity, which are both in the ultimate degree. As a result,
when we want to distinguish them, we necessarily distinguish them
by their mutual relations, until we see them face to face. For then
there will be no need to distinguish them from one another by
something external; rather we shall discern their external properties
from them. We call their relations their external properties, because
they have them as if from the outside and as something following
upon their personal being (esse).
The fact that no genus is contained under a single species also
prevents this same thing. For the genus, to which the species is
subject, would necessarily contain the highest species opposed to
it. Thus the genus would be divided into opposites, and they would
be naturally simultaneous. Thus there would be something that is
necessarily caused and yet of equal duration with the Trinity. But
there should be absolutely no doubt that the blessed Trinity
precedes all things, since it alone is the creator of all things.
"Person" is only superior to "father" insofar as [the latter is] an
accident. This is clear from the fact that "father" is relative to
someone else. Therefore, neither is subordinated to the other,
except per-
18. Cf. above, p. 251 (238).
19. Cf. above, p. 247 (233).

Page 256
haps as "this" is subordinate to "one" and "this colored thing'' to
"the colored."
[244] But someone might ask how personal being (esse), since it is
specifically common, is either particularized or individuated, that
is, whether it is this one insofar as it is this one. [The persons] have
this common being (esse), namely, personal being (esse). Let them
have something more, and let there be a union of that addition and
this common being (esse), just as happens in other particulars and
individuals. Then this one insofar as it is this one, whichever of the
persons is referred to, is not simple in the ultimate degree. Rather it
is united from that common being (esse) and the intention of
"person" or "someone" or "personal being" (esse) and from some
addition to complete the individuation or particularization, by
which this one is this one. Thus it is not personal being (esse)
simple in the ultimate degree. We have already responded to this by
saying that the individuation or particularization of the persons is
known by us only from the relations they have as if from the
outside. As a result, there is not in this case a union or a relation in
this one as this one. Nor do we say that personal being (esse) is, as
it were, common and essential, just as we do not say that person is.
For the intention of person insofar as it is person is like an extrinsic
intention from privations and negations, as we explained above.20
If someone says that the persons share nothing logically essential,
since they do not share a genus or a difference or a species, he
speaks correctly. Consequently, just as there is no essential
communion between them in this way, there is no true
particularization or individuation. For true particularization is a
partition of what is essential and common. By the addition of
something proper it makes one individual to be a composite from
the common intention of the proximate essential content, which is
and is called the species, and from what is proper that is added onto
the intention of the species. Where there is not a true species, there
is not a true individual, and where there is not a true universal,
there is not a true particular. Indeed, where there is not a true
whole, it is not possible that there be a true part.
Someone might want to call the essence personal because of the
personal being (esse), in order to avoid the objections which arise
about God from the words of blessed Augustine. He says that the
Father generated [245] the Son out of his essence.21 I do not much
approve of expressing this intention in these words. For not every
profane novelty, even of words, may be safe in such difficult
matters. Someone might want to interpret those words so that he
says that Augustine understood this of
20. Cf. above, p. 255 (243).
21. In De trin. 15, 13, 22 (CCL 50a, 495) Augustine says, "And so our
word which is born out of our knowledge is unlike that Word of God
which was born out of the essence of the Father."

Page 257
the logical essence of the Father, that is, of the Father bare and
pure, just as we said above that [the essence] was also called by
logicians and philosophers. I do not disapprove, because pious faith
both holds in the heart and proclaims in words the same intention
apart only from the mention of the logical essence. Still Augustine
says that in God only what both [persons] are is said to be "that out
of that."22 Thus in God the Son is not said to be out of the Son,
because both are not sons or son, and in God the Father is not said
to be out of the Father, because both are not father. But the Son, he
says, is said to be essence out of essence and light out of light and
wisdom out of wisdom, because both are one essence, both one
wisdom, both one light -- not two essences, not two wisdoms, not
two lights.23 Thus it seems that, when he says that the Son is
essence out of essence, he later explains himself and says: I said
that the Son is essence out of essence, because both are one
essence, and only what both of them are not is in God not said to be
"that out of that."24 But there is nothing in God that both are except
the essence; there is nothing in God that both are not except the
person. Therefore, the essence is said to have been taken in this
case only essentially, and thus the mind and intention of blessed
Augustine seems to be that the Son is out of the common essence
of the three persons. Since he is out of something, it can seem that
he is born, [though] not by generation, from the essence or out of
the essence and thus is Son of the essence. But without any doubt
the holy faith teaches that the Son is born out of the person of the
Father alone and by no means out of the essence or from the
essence. Hence, there should be no doubt but that Augustine called
the Father the essence of the Father, in accord with our custom by
which we call each thing among ourselves its essence for the
reason we have given.25
Someone might want to insist upon that rule of blessed Augustine,
by which he teaches that essential terms are distinguished, where
he says "that out of that," as we have explained. I mean, he might
want to insist on the name "person," [and ask] why this name
"person" is said in this way and is still not essential? For the Son of
God is truly [246]
22. In De trin. 6, 2, 3 (CCL 50, 231) Augustine is commenting on the
words of the Nicean Symbol (DS 125) "God from God, light from
light, true God from true God." In summary he states a rule, "Only
what the two of them are not cannot be said of them in the formula,
'that' from 'that.'" Since the Father is the essence and the Son is the
essence, the Son is essence from essence.
23. In De trin. 15, 14, 23 (CCL 50a, 496), Augustine says, "God from
God, light from light, wisdom from wisdom, essence from essence, . . .
."
24. Cf. De trin. 6, 2, 3 (CCL 50, 231), above n. 21.
25. Augustine does use the expression, "from the essence of the Father."
Cf. De trin. 15, 13, 22 (CCL 50a, 495), above n. 21. In that passage he
goes on to say, "It is as if I said, 'From the knowledge of the Father, from
the wisdom of the Father,' or to be more precise 'From the Father who is
knowledge, from the Father who is wisdom.'" Hence, he seems to mean
that the Son is born from the Father who is the essence.

Page 258
person out of person, because this person, that is, of the Son,
becomes a person out of the Father; yet both are not one person but
two. To this we answer that the name "person" had been recently
discovered so that one might somehow satisfy with it all those who
asked about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit what the
three are or how they are three. Thus Augustine did not care about
the fact that it was borrowed and brought in from elsewhere.26 But
with regard to the fact that Augustine says that the name "person"
signifies the substance,27 we can reply that it really signifies the
logical substance or essence and that of our customary usage, as we
mentioned earlier,28 or substance as something absolute, that is,
not as relative, because all the categories that are truly predicated
of God, are reduced to substance, that is, not to a relation.
Therefore, we shall mean substance, that is, what is with respect to
itself. Led on by the authority of Augustine, many have said that in
the time of Augustine "substance" was a common [term] for
essence and for person. If this is so, how did it come about that it
was transferred from our customary usage to signify the persons?29
For if it was transferred to signify the essence also, it would have
made a confusion of the persons and the essence rather than a
distinction and a differentiation. We hold it as certain that it was
invented because of the persons alone. It would seem that we
should agree that being (esse) a person is being (esse) someone and
being (esse) the essence is being (esse) something and that being
(esse) someone is in itself of greater distinction and certitude than
being (esse) something. As a result someone and something are the
most general categories containing essential and personal names
according to the theological
26. In De trin. 5, 9, 10 (CCL 50, 217), Augustine confesses that he
uses the term "person" in order to have some answer when asked
what the three are. "And yet when the question is raised as to what the
three are, human speech indeed labors under a great poverty. Still we
say, 'three persons,' not so much in order to say something as to avoid
saying nothing." Augustine was aware that the Greek Fathers used
"ousia" for essence and "hupostaseis'' for the three; however, when
this was transliterated, one was left with the formula, "One essence,
three substances," despite the apparent equivalence of essence and
substance. Hence, the need in Latin for a term for the three was acute.
Cf. De trin. 5, 8, 9 and 10 (CCL 50, 216-217).
27. In De trin. 7, 6, 11 (CCL 50, 261-262) Augustine points out that
"person" is not said relatively. "For being is not one thing in God and
being a person another, but utterly the same thing." He shows that, if
"person" were relative, as "friend" is, we would wind up speaking of the
Father as the person of the Son. "But we are not used to saying person
anywhere in that way, and in the Trinity we do not call the person of the
Father anything other than the substance of the Father."
28. Cf. above, pp. 249-250 (237) and pp. 256-257 (244-245).
29. William may be referring to the fact that the Greeks used
"hupostasis" instead of "persona," though "hupostasis" in Latin becomes
"substantia"; cf. De trin. 5, 8, 9 and 10 (PL 50, 216-217). Or he may be
referring to the Boethian definition of person as an individual substance
of a rational nature; cf. above, ch. 28, n. 11.

Page 259
modes [of expression], as we have often said.30 The essential
names, then, are predicated of something, and the personal names
of someone, as we can now determine.
Some have wondered whether the name "God" was essential or
personal. If it is only essential, how is it true that the Son or the
Holy Spirit is God out of God? Furthermore, how is God said to be
three and one? For either it will be true of the essence that it is
triune or it will be true of no one. [247] Indeed it cannot be truly
said that any of the persons is triune, but only that he is one. But if
it seems that we should admit that it [is said] of the essence, what
will be predicated by the word "triune"? If there is said to be a
threefold distinction, what is said is impossible, since the essence is
undivided in any way. It is undivided, I mean, in those ways in
which it might somehow be divided into three. Also, there are no
notions in the essence. The name "God" is, furthermore, a name of
the essence, and so its intention is like the intention "divine
essence.'' In accord with this God neither generated nor was
generated, since the divine essence neither generated nor was
generated. Either it is the name of a person, and then its intention is
like the intention "this divine person." But then there is no truth
behind the expression "triune God," since a divine person cannot
be triune. Or it is common in its intention to the essence and to the
person, and then its intention is like the intention "essence" or
"divine person." It might be common, as if it were under some
distinction convertible in potency, but not in act. If this is the case,
then it is true that there are three gods, just as it is true that there
are three divine essences or persons. Let us banish this in both
word and thought.
We shall say, then, that the name "God" in its proper intention is
only essential and is only a name of the essence. But on account of
the identity of the essence and the persons, we frequently use it to
signify the persons, just as gold is often taken to signify gold
vessels or silver [is taken to signify] silver ones. Indeed, we often
call gold and silver vessels gold. Thus we call God what is divine,
that is, everything in which there is deity or divinity. For this
reason we commonly call any one of the persons by the name
"God" and say that he is God. It is one thing, however, to say that
each of the persons is God and another that each is called by the
name "God."
On the topic under investigation, namely, how it is true that God is
triune, some answer that nothing prevents one from saying this of
the essence, and they clearly and without hesitation admit that the
highest essence is triune. The intention of "triune," according to the
etymology of the name, is this: one of three or one for three, just as
Isidore [248] gives
30. The term "modes" here means the categories; cf. above, ch. 40, n.
2.
31. Isidore, Etymologiae 7, 4 (PL 82, 271).

Page 260
the etymology of "trinity" as "the unity of three."31 Therefore, the
divine essence is triune, that is, one and common to three. This
expression does not indicate the unity precisely and absolutely, but
a unity of three, which is called trinity according to Isidore.
According to this it is true that the Trinity is a unity, not, however,
a unity opposed to the Trinity, but an essential identify. For this is
the intention of the expression as they interpret it: trinity is the
unity of three, that is, an essential identity, but not a personal unity,
because personal trinity is opposed to personal unity. Hence,
neither of them is the other. But someone might want to go on to
claim that numerical adverbs and numerical nouns are divisive and
multiplicative and multiply the suppositions of the substantives to
which they are joined. Then, if someone said threefold cape or
threefold mantle, he would be speaking of three mantles or capes;
in the same way, if one should say "threefold God," he would even
more be speaking of three persons, since ''threefold" is
multiplicative of essences. In the same way this term "triune" is
multiplicative of the persons. As a result by this intention "triune
God" one is dealing with three persons, and similarly, if one should
say, "God is triune," there is the same multiplication of persons.
This will not cause problems and will perhaps be better suited to
the intention of the one speaking.
One should know that in God everything relative is personal. The
name "Lord" does not present an objection, for it is not said
without some relation to and comparison with creatures. We do not
intend to speak at the moment of other names than those which are
said of God apart from relation to and comparison with creatures.
Likewise, we are not now discussing these names: merciful and
compassionate, and the like, because Father, Son and Holy Spirit
are in God said to be all of these relatively in relation to and in
some comparison with creatures. It is similar with: word, light,
image, power, character, splendor and gleam which, according to
its definition, is a flowing out or breaking forth of light, as
someone said.32 It is similar with hand, arm, right hand, mouth and
figure. These twelve pertain to the Son without any reference or
comparison to creatures.
There are other names that pertain to him in relation and
comparison to creatures. These are art, exemplar, intelligibility of
the universe, law, heir of [249] all things, mediator, redeemer,
angel, high priest, priest, vine, victim, door, foundation, stone,
rock, bridegroom, husband, defender, advocate, and any others
there may be, such as judge,
32. Switalski refers (p. 248) to Augustine, De trin. 5, 14, 15 (CCL 50,
222-223), though it is not clear why he does so, especially since
"quidam," the indefinite someone, was the mark of a reference to a
contemporary. The Latin term "eructatio" recalls Psalm 44:2, "My
heart brought forth a goodly word," which Augustine clearly saw as
referring to the generation of the Word. Cf. Enarr. in Ps. 44, 4 (CCL
38, 496)

Page 261
prince of peace, peace, lawgiver and king. All of these are relative
and pertain to him in comparison to creatures.
The following pertain especially to the Holy Spirit with no relation
or comparison to creatures: love, gift, delight, charity, connection,
bond, unity, covenant, harmony, embrace, sweetness, grace, peace,
the breath of life, fire, ardor, charism, finger of God--these are
without relation to creatures.
But in relation and in comparison to creatures the following pertain
to the Holy Spirit: paraclete, consoler, advocate, giver of life, spirit
of sanctification, living font, spirit of grace, anointing. The ones
that pertain to the Holy Spirit and the Son in common are river,
stream, torrent, emanation, power ("until you are clothed with
power from on high," Luke, the last chapter [Lk 24:29], and, "I say
Christ who is God's power and God's wisdom," the First Epistle to
the Corinthians; the first chapter [cf. 1 Co 1:24]), font of grace,
font of living water, peace and covenant.
Some essential names are appropriated to the persons and become
personal by transference, as power when it is attributed and
appropriated to the Father and wisdom when it is attributed and
appropriated to the Son. Some are said to make known the divine
essence (among which we must also include "judge of all the
living").33
The names that signify emotional states from our perspective
indicate the effects of emotions in creatures; they indicate nothing
in God, but rather something from him. We have worked hard to
make this point above.34 For Augustine says in The Trinity that
God is said to be angry not because of affective turmoil, but
because of the effective vengeance.35 In this way being
compassionate and merciful and willing, on this showing, all have
one interpretation: in the manner of one who wills he produces
something and is compassionate and is angry. It is not [250] fitting
that the divine essence be called by any name such that, when one
predicates the verb "is angry," he is said to be angry and such that,
when one predicates the verb "is compassionate," there is said to be
compassion [in
33. Though Switalski chose the reading, "verborum: words," we have
decided to follow the less difficult reading, "vivorum: the living,"
which seems to make more sense in the context.
34. Cf. above, ch. 20, p. 144 (113); ch. 24, pp. 154-155 (125); ch. 26, pp.
176-177 (154-155); ch. 30, pp. 193-194 (173).
35. William may, as Switalski suggests (p. 249), be referring to
Augustine's De trin. 5, 16, 17 (CCL 50, 224-227). In the end of that
passage, after dealing with things said of God in relation to creatures, he
says, "So too when he is said to be angry toward the bad and gentle
toward the good, they change, he does not." On the other hand, De trin.
13, 16 (CCL 50a, 411) reads, "The anger of God is not like the
disturbance of the mind of man, but it is the anger of him to whom
Scripture speaks elsewhere, 'You, Lord of hosts, judge in tranquillity.'
Hence, if the just punishment of God bears that name, what is God's
reconciliation rightly understood to be save the ending of that anger?"
However, both sources lack the snappy contrast between "affectus:
affection" and "effectus: effect." Augustine does use this pair in the De
civ. dei 11, 14 (CCL 48, 335).

Page 262
him]. But those that indicate either substance or power necessarily
indicate the divine essence. They seem to regard God more than
things and to predicate something in him rather than from him.
Likewise, the verbs "predestines" and "reprobates" regard God in
their principal predication. Still they make reference in creatures,
by way of consequence, to final grace and glory for one, final guilt
and damnation for another. As a result, it is truly said that God
predestined this one as a result of grace because both final grace
and glory are, of course, a result of grace. The causality mentioned
refers to this, and not to the principal reality signified and referred
to. For nothing is the cause of the principal reality signified by this
verb "he predestined." Rather on account of what is referred to by
way of consequence the one is said to be predestined by grace and,
therefore, finally good and eternally happy. Thus the principal
reality signified is shown to be the cause of these two states. Still
the fact that this is true does not prevent one from being reprobated
for his merits so that the causality refers to what is spoken of by
way of consequence. For the merits are not the cause of the
principal reality signified, but are truly the cause of the things
signified by way of consequence. These latter are final malice and
eternal damnation; for by reason of his merits the one to be
eternally condemned was evil in the end or he will be or he was
about to be as a result of those same merits. One who wanted to
deny expressions of this sort: "Someone is reprobated as the result
of his merits," could do so on the basis of bad form, since the
causality seems to refer to the principal reality. Still such a one
necessarily has to face many questions, such as: Why does God
love him? Because he is good or from his merits? These would, of
course, not be questions that should be admitted unless the
causality referred to the effect of the love and not to the principal
reality signified, if we still say that something else is signified in
this case than the effect of the love. For we say that God does not
love by an affection but by his effect. According to this
interpretation, ''he loves" means that he behaves like one who loves
in giving, conserving, protecting, multiplying his gifts, helping and
promising more, just as we say God wills all men to be saved [cf. 1
Tm 2:4], that is, by reason of his effects.36 Certainly he behaves
like one who wills this, when he exhorts, moves and [251]
counsels, or when he offers the help of grace by which salvation is
obtained, when he hedges the paths which are dangerous and walls
off hell itself, lest we fall into misfortune. Nonetheless, in the case
of certain people he is truly said to will their salvation more,
because he gives them greater help. If someone should say, "God
loves
36. William attempts to account for the Pauline text in terms of
metaphor. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 11:
"Similarly that which is usually in us a sign of will is at times said to
be will in God metaphorically." Cf. Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 6
ad 1, for Aquinas's interpretation of the text.

Page 263
this person because the man is good; the man is not good because
God loves him," there is no need to object. Both are properly true.
Because he loves him in giving and conserving or doing other
things that lovers do, the man is thereby good. And again, because
the man is good, God loves him, conserves his goodness or
increases or nourishes it, and anything else of the sort.
The situation is the same with the term, "sent," whether it signifies
the mission into the flesh or the mission to enlighten the hearts of
the faithful. For it suffices to say that it signifies only what is
caused, not indeed in God, but by him or as if by him. Just so
"incarnate" indicates only the flesh, not the Son of God as a part of
its meaning, or if it indicates the human nature, it does not indicate
it as his, but in time, and it does not in any sense indicate the divine
essence in some common fashion. Likewise, according to this, it
indicates the mission--which is called the rise of the morning star
in the hearts of the faithful. That is, it indicates a new grace in
those he is said to be sent to enlighten.
It is clear which are the verbs that indicate the notions, such as the
verb "to generate" or the verb "to spirate." Along with them
essential names are transferred to the persons, as when one says,
"God generated, or God is generated," as if to say that the one who
is God generated or is generated. In all these expressions we must
note what is demanded by the truth of the expression and by the
rule of faith which points out the words. ''Thing," however, is
found to be used both for the essence and for the persons, as, in
Augustine in On Christian Doctrine,37 the Father and the Son and
the Holy Spirit are called three things and one most high thing.
Hence, it is common just as many others.
It is certain that, when those things which among us determine
quantity and quality are transferred to God, they do not preserve
their intention. For the intention of quantity and quality is the
intention of an accident and of its being something in itself [252]
by participation, not by essence. For in accord with our customary
way of speaking something is said to be great or of a certain quality
by having something in itself. But God is said to be great and just
not by having, but by being.38 So too a man is said to be white by
having whiteness in himself, not by being white; the color,
however, is said to be white not by participation or by having
something in itself, but by being whiteness. In this way we should
also speak in the other cases.
37. In De doctrina christiana 1, 5, 5 (CCL 32, 9) Augustine says,
"Therefore, the things which we should enjoy are the Father and the
Son and the Holy Spirit, and the same Trinity is one supreme reality
common to all who enjoy it."
38. Thus in De civ. dei 11, 10 (CCL 48, 330) St. Augustine says, "Thus
[the Trinity] is said to be simple, because it is what it has, apart from
what each person is said to be relatively to some other."

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Those predications that pertain to place and time do not place any
temporal or local measurement in him but they suggest a local or
temporal presence of God of the sort that it is fitting to think of
concerning him. For we say that God is always and everywhere; we
do not say this by limitation or measurement, but by the presence
of the sort that befits him. He cannot be located in place or marked
off by limits, just as we say that life is not in the body in a way that
it can be located or marked off, but by its presence and by its
unifying activity.
It seems a matter of doubt whether paternity indicates a substance
or a quality. It is clear that the intention of paternity is not an
essential theological intention, but in the same way it is not a
personal intention. Indeed being (esse) paternity is not being (esse)
this one, no matter which of the three persons is referred to.
Paternity does not seem to be a logical substance either, since it is
neither a genus nor a species for there is no individual under it.
Hence, being (esse) paternity will be being (esse) this something
(hoc aliquid), and being (esse) the essence will be being (esse) this
something in the same way. In this way there are said to be in God
two "this somethings," since the essence is also a "this something"
logically.
Further, "notion" is like a universal with respect to [paternity] and
the other notions and is not said according to an accident that is
above or common to them, as "colored" is to this one, but it is in
correct order above an ordered community and limited and
determined by a certain limitation. For this reason "notion" is a
universal by the correct definition. Further, it is said univocally of
them. Hence, a notion is not in the manner of an accident, and it is
also not in the manner of a difference, since it may in no way be
said to be a quality. Therefore, it is necessarily in the manner of a
species, since there are only singulars under it.
Furthermore, being (esse) a notion either is accidental to paternity
or it is not. But if it is accidental, it will be separable either in
actuality or in thought. But [253] this by no means seems to be
true. If it is not accidental, it will necessarily be its species or genus
or difference. Hence, being (esse) a notion will be a substance
(quid) logically, namely, both being (esse) a person and being
(esse) the essence. Similarly it seems that they may be mutually
predicated of each other, since their being (esse) falls under one of
the others. For, although being (esse) man is being (being) a
substance (quid) and being (esse) an animal, it would be similarly
impossible for them to be predicated of each other, or one of the
other, unless one were under the other either as a whole or in part.
Thus I believe we have presented reasons why a notion is not one
of the three things that we have enumerated, but should be
determined as

Page 265
the sacred doctors determine it.39 Thus it may be said to be
common, and it may be like a certain genus and a certain category
containing the abstract notional names. The notion behaves only to
some extent after the manner of a genus, because it does not signify
essential being (esse), which is the mark of a genus. On these
matters, then, we will refer you to what has already been said
concerning them.40
It seems that nothing else needs to be determined about numerals
than what the philosophers have determined. Thus one should
know, first of all, that in accord with a careful examination of its
definition one is what is undivided in itself and divided from
others, just as we say that this tree is one when and as long as it is
undivided in itself and divided from others. In this way we must
consider the persons and the essence. For each of the persons is one
in itself, that is, undivided in every way and divided from others in
what is predicated or denied of it. This is the true art of knowing
the divisions and conjunctions that are appropriate to individuals
and of adopting and knowing the ways of saying "one." Thus you
will know that it is possible to divide in as many ways and as often
as it is possible to unite. Thus some things are one by some
continuity, some by the conjoining of what is bound together, some
by origin, some by place, some by law, some are conjoined under a
head, some by mutual identity and predication. We say one tree,
one piece of tin, one water or stream, one nation, one people, one
race, and each thing is said to be identical with what is many. Thus
two [254] persons are one by union, and one people two by the
division appropriate to them. This [division] is mutual negation or
division from each other, since this one is not that one, nor is the
converse true. One should note how one and many are said in each
case. For no other division is found in the persons except that of
negation and of the comparative differences which we have
indicated. Therefore, they are diverse by their personal being
(esse), though united in their essential being (esse). Just as they
share one and the same reality integrally and perfectly and equally,
so too they divide it among themselves, and from it each claims for
himself in a different way what is his own. This is the intention of
one and many everywhere. Thus ends the First Treatise of the
Master of Divinity, William of Paris, namely, On the Trinity, the
Notions and the Categories in God.
39. Switalski refers to Augustine De trin. 7, 4, 6 (CCL 50, 255-267).
40. Cf. above, ch. 29, pp. 187-188 (167-168); ch. 30, pp. 190-191 (170-
171); ch. 36, p. 211 (192-193) and pp. 214-215 (196-197); ch. 37, pp.
215-217 (197-199); ch. 38, pp. 218-219 (200-201).

Page 267
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INDEX OF NAMES
A
Abelard, Peter 19, 26, 36, 56, 93, 123
Theologia christiana 36, 92, 123, 225
Achena, Mohammed 97
Al-farabi cf. Alfarabi
Alan of Lille 185
Albert the Great 19, 52-54, 56
Albigensians 8, 79
Alexander of Hales 3, 52, 57
Alfarabi 64-65, 106
Amaury of Bène 8, 88
Ambrose of Milan 239
Anselm of Canterbury 10-11, 34, 54, 123, 178, 180
De incarnatione verbi 123
De processione Spiritus Sancti 34, 180
Proslogion 10, 54, 159
Apostle, The cf. Paul of Tarsus
Aquinas cf. Thomas Aquinas
Arianism 188
Aristotelians 16, 18-20, 22, 52, 106, 108, 112, 117
Aristotle 3-4, 6, 8, 15, 18, 38, 41, 52-54, 63-64, 70, 88-89, 139,
162, 177, 179, 196-197, 201, 213, 227
De Anima 103
Categories 162, 208
Metaphysics 88, 104, 162, 179, 197, 213, 225
Nicomachean Ethics 63
Physics 201
Posterior Analytics 196
Augustine 4, 9, 22, 28, 33-34, 37, 50-52, 55, 65, 69, 79, 89-90, 101,
105, 113, 118, 123-125, 127, 132, 143, 163-164, 176, 184-185,
193-194, 234, 238, 244, 256-258, 260-261, 263
Confessiones 55, 65, 89, 152, 159, 163
Contra epistolam fundamenti 118
Contra Maximinum 125, 237
Contra sermonem Arianorum 151
De civitate dei 89, 261, 263
De diversis quaestionibus 83 125
De doctrina christiana 9, 69, 263
De fide et symbolo 123
De Genesi contra Manichaeos 153, 164
De Genesi ad litteram 127, 163-165
De libero arbitrio 92, 113, 159, 234
De natura boni 124
De symbolo ad catechumenos 238
De trinitate 34, 78, 88, 90-91, 118, 120, 127, 137, 143, 150-151,
176, 184, 193-194, 237-239, 256-258, 260-261,265
De vera religione 163
Enarrationes in Joannis evangelium 127, 237
Enarrationes in Psalmos 118, 260
Retractationes 101
Soliloquiae 127, 234, 238

Page 276
Aurillac 1
Avicebron 5, 23, 31, 64, 68, 80, 163, 165
Fons vitae 68, 80, 115, 161, 163
Avicenna 3-5, 8, 13, 15-16, 18-19, 21-22, 24, 28, 32-33, 52-56, 63-
65, 68, 70-71, 74, 80, 84, 89, 91, 93, 95, 106, 112, 117, 120, 150,
182
De anima 89
Le Livre de science 97
Metaphysics 71, 74, 79, 80, 84, 87, 89, 91, 93-95, 97, 101, 103,
106, 108, 111-113, 117, 120, 132-133, 137, 150, 163, 177, 181,
182
B
Baeumker, Clemens 80
Bartholomaeus 1
Berkeley, George 25
Bernard of Clairevaux 56, 69
Blanche of Castille 2
Boethius 8, 9, 35, 37, 52, 64-66, 74, 89, 125, 158, 186, 193-194,
198, 203, 206, 224, 250, 252, 258
De consolatione philosophiae 159
De hebdomadibus 65-66, 89-90
De trinitate 74, 118, 120-122, 162, 180, 193-194, 198, 203, 206,
224, 237, 242
Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium 186
Bonaventure 39, 53, 57
Bradley, F. H. 59, 150, 182
C
Cathars 12, 48, 54, 56, 79, 92, 244
Chartres 20
Chenu, M.-D. 64, 190
Clarke, W. Norris 11
Cologne 57
Constantinople, Council of 149
D
Damascene cf. John Damascene
Dod, Bernard 3
Dominicans 2
Dominicus Gundissalinus 80
Dondaine, Antoine 12, 69
Du Roy, Olivier 28, 125
E
Eugenius III 69, 191
F
Farber, Marvin 11
Florence, Council of 34, 39, 180
Franciscan school 5, 34
Frederick II 2
Fulgentius of Ruspe 39
G
Geach, Peter 38
Gerhoh of Reichersberg 35
Gilbert of Poitiers 35-37, 40, 56, 65, 69, 150, 177, 180, 185, 188,
191-192, 194, 207, 209, 211, 215, 224
Gilson, Etienne 3, 5, 10-11, 22, 24, 34, 52-53, 55, 64, 89, 91, 127
Goichon, A.-M. 13
Gregory IX 1, 2, 3
Gregory the Great 239
Grosseteste cf. Robert Grosseteste
Guillelmus Altissiodorensis cf. William of Auxerre
H
Häring, N.M. 35, 37, 65, 180, 185, 188, 191, 192, 224
Hadot, Pierre 89
Hamilton, Bernard 79
Handy, Rollo 11

Page 277
Heinzmann, Richard 1
Hilary of Poitiers 133, 189, 204, 207, 221, 223
De synodis seu de fide Orientalium 133
De trinitate 204, 207, 221, 223, 230, 237
Honorius III 1
Hotot, F. 5
Hughes, D. 190
I
Innocent III 69
Isidore 259, 260
J
Joachim of Flora 9,47,50,69
John Damascene 188
John of Spain 80
Jourdain, Charles 57
K
Kenny, Anthony 1, 65
Knowles, David 54, 57
Kramp, Josef 4, 8, 52
Kretzmann, Norman 1, 65
L
Lacombe, G. 190
Landy, A.-M. 190
Lateran Council, Fourth 9, 26, 47, 50, 56, 69, 124, 133, 177, 207
Le Feron, Blaise 5, 112, 126, 195
Liber de causis 28, 70, 74, 105, 116, 127, 132
Lindberg, David 3
Lottin, O. 28, 190
Louis IX 2, 56
M
Madden, E. 11
Magisterium divinale 4, 6, 8, 52, 53
Maimonides cf. Moses Maimonides
Manicheism 7, 63
Manichees 48, 79, 164, 244
Margerie, Bertrand de 27, 39, 133
Marrone, Steven 4, 24, 55, 127, 139, 233, 243
Martinich, A. P. 26
Masnovo, Amato 19
Massé, Henri 97
Maurer, Armand 88
Moody, Ernest 1-2, 57
Moses 9, 12, 22, 65, 78, 111-112, 160
Moses Maimonides 20
N
Nelli, René 92
Neo-Manicheans 12, 79
Nicea, Council of 188
Nicean Symbol 257
Nielsen, Lauge O. 191
Notre Dame 1
O
O'Donnell, J. Reginald 1, 5, 105
Origen 52
Owens, Joseph 37, 66, 87
P
Paris 1-2, 54, 57, 265
Pattin, Adriaan 70
Paul of Tarsus 91, 118, 131, 175-176, 262
Peripatetics cf. Aristotelians
Perrauld, William 5
Peter of Corbeil 3
Peter Lombard 52, 69
Pinborg, Jan 1, 65
Plato 101, 103, 105, 148, 163, 233
Plotinus 152
Praepositinus of Cremona 36, 41, 190, 215

Page 278
Prestige, G. L 34
Principe, Walter 126
Pseudo-Athanasian Creed cf. Quicumque
Q
Quicumque 47, 48, 149, 243, 246
Quodvultdeus of Carthage 238
R
Rahman, F. 13
Rand, E. K. 65
Rheims, Council of 40, 69, 188, 191, 200, 215
Ribaillier, Jean 42, 52, 125, 177
Richard of St. Victor 35, 52, 125, 186, 187, 250
Robert Grosseteste 4, 127, 139, 233, 243
Roger Bacon 5, 57, 64
Roger Marston 5, 64
Rohls, Jan 20, 96
Roland of Cremona 3
Roland-Gosselin, M.-D. 55
Rome 1
Roscelin 187, 188
S
Schumacher, William 89
Scotus Eriugena 52
Sens, Council of 19, 92
Socrates 10, 38, 73, 163, 179, 233
St. Paul cf. Paul of Tarsus
Stegmüller, F. 190
Stewart, H. F. 65
Stoics 89
Switalski, Bruno 1, 3-4, 59, 63-64, 70, 74, 79, 96, 126, 129, 139,
142, 153, 162-163, 179-180, 187-188, 194-195, 202, 204, 210, 222,
224-225, 238, 251,260-261
T
Talmud 56
Taylor, John H. 89
Thomas Aquinas 4, 10, 19, 24, 27, 35, 39, 40-42, 51, 53-57, 66, 84,
88, 188, 211, 250, 262
De ente et essentia 55, 88
De potentia 188
Summa Theologiae 40, 42, 51, 84, 211, 229, 250, 262
U
Ulgerius of Angers 36
University of Paris 1-3, 54, 190
V
Valois, Noël 1-2, 56-57, 93
Van Reit, Simone 21, 32, 63, 89
Verbeke, Gerard 21, 32, 63, 89
W
William of Auvergne
De anima 4, 6, 23, 89, 139
De bono et malo 5, 105
De causis cur Deus homo 4
De fide et legibus 4
De gratia 6, 93
De immortalirate animae 5
De rhetorica divina 5
De sacramentis 4
De trinitate 4, 6, 8, 24, 52-54, 64, 68
De universo 4, 6, 10, 12, 24, 68, 79, 105
De virtutibus et moribus 4, 93, 104
De vitiis et peccatis 103
William of Auxerre 19, 42, 44, 52, 54, 177, 188, 190, 193, 229
Summa Aurea 42, 52, 54, 177, 188, 190, 193, 194, 229
Z
Zedler, Beatrice 13

Page 279
INDEX OF SCRIPTURE REFERENCES

Gn 1 133, 134 Is 42:8 243
Gn 1:26 168 Is 66:9 126
Gn 1:26-27 33, 173
Gn 1:27 175 Jr 12:2 243
Gn 3:22 247 Jr 23:6 243
Jr 23:14 88
Ex 3:2ff 111 Jr 48:15 243
Ex 3:14 9, 12, 65, 78, 89
Ex 3:20, 23 31 Am 5:8 243
Ex 7:1 246 Am 9:6 243
Ex 14:15-29 111
Ex 15:3 246 Mt 12:36 140
Ex 33:20 160
Lk 24:29 261
Jos 3:14-17 111
Jn 1:3 134
Jb 14:4 78 Jn 1:18 127
Jb 23:13 78 Jn 14:9 131
Jn 17:21-23 47, 239
Ps 32:6 133
Ps 32:9 133 Rm 11:36 91, 157
Ps 44:1 127
Ps 44:2 260 1 Co 1:24 261
Ps 81:6 246 1 Co 2 and 3 118
Ps 148:5 133 1 Co 2:11 176
1 Co 8:6 241
Pr 18:4 123 1 Co 15:42-44 175
Sg 4:9 147 Ep 3:15 156
Ep 4:6 241
Ws 7:16 93
Ws 7:25 25, 131 Col 1:15 154
Ws 7:26 131, 178
Ws 13:1 78 1 Tm 2:4 262
Ws 13:2 246 1 Tm 6:20 246
Ws 16:25 157
Heb 1:13 131
Si 1:5 123
Si 14:4 128-129 1 Jn 3:2 33,173
Si 24:5 27, 127
Rv 3:5 105

Page 280
INDEX OF TERMS
A
abstraction, 162, 196, 219-220, 225, 227
abundance, 116, 148, 165
original, 141, 175
accident, 40, 73, 96, 137, 162, 169, 176, 179, 182, 184, 189, 194,
197, 212, 218, 223, 228, 248
natural, 160-161
act, 124, 130, 166, 188
and potency, 163, 165
first, 156
of existing, 188
pure, 12, 77, 122
action, 19, 27, 39, 119, 127, 147, 195, 200
external, 189
nothing in the agent, 38, 201
action and passion, 201-202, 206, 208, 213-214
actuality, 5, 18, 83, 107, 121, 164, 171, 175
of being (essendi), 13, 83, 87, 95-97, 183
addition, 204
adjectives;
said of divine essence, 245
ordinal, 247
affection, 55, 168-169, 211
affirmation, 71-72, 82
agent; first, 27, 119, 128, 139
secondary, 21
alteration, 183
analogy, 28, 44, 56
of opposites, 86
angle, 179
antonomasia, 247
apprehension, 27, 32, 55, 101-102, 133, 168
intellectual, 168
appropriation, 27, 30-31, 34, 51, 93, 144, 160, 176
archetypes, 233
art, 18, 63, 93, 172
authority, 247
divine, 63
prophetic, 63
B
back of God, 31, 160
beatitude, 159-160
beauty, 7, 33, 161-162, 172, 174
external, 161
first, 134
ultimate, 137
beginning, 21
in time, 97
of existence, 107
being (ens), 8, 65-66, 70-72, 235
composed, 79, essential, 72
eternal, 72
first, 73, 104
incorruptible, 72
proper name, 71
said essentially, 71
through its essence, 74, 77-78, 87
true and determinate, 214
being (esse), 8, 14, 16, 23, 26, 53-55, 65, 68, 70, 79-80, 84, 87, 89,
91, 93, 95-96, 102-105, 107, 119, 124 163, 174, 184, 216, 226,
232, 235, 251, 253
absolute, 42, 85, 89, 103, 220
accidental character, 66
actual, 221
acquired, 73, 77, 79
all, 10, 68
appropriated, 185, 187
bare, 73, 75-76, 85, 92
beyond definition, 69, 79
by participation, 66
by substance, 66
by which things are, 89-90
borrowed, 85
caused, 80
clothed, 85
common, 49, 77, 255-256
created, 68, 88, 163
dependent, 80-81
derived, 85
determinate, 41, 216
essence or its part, 71
essential, 12, 49, 186, 223-224, 251-252, 254, 265
false, 80-81
first, 14, 73, 80, 87-90
first and true, 215
flowing, 80-81, 84-85
free, 85, 89, 103
from another, 202
has no opposite, 79
in act, 138, 164
in actuality, 83-84
in need, 81-83
intentions of, 10, 68
itself, 69, 91, 133
most mighty, 99
names his essence, 91
necessary, 13, 21, 25, 83-84, 89, 119, 121-122
not an accident, 91
not common, 74-75
of all things, 88-89, 91
of a relation, 95, 198
of paternity, 187, 211, 212, 227, 264
participated, 87-89
personal, 35, 49-50, 185-186, 220, 223-224, 228, 236, 241, 249,
251, 254-256
preferred to all else, 14, 91
possible, 13-14, 73, 80-81, 83-84, 87-88, 96, 121
potential, 77, 221
primary, 85
quiddity or essence, 69, 79
said essentially, 69, 71-72
secondary, 13, 80-81
signified by definition, 69
singular, 77
simple, 74, 76
someone, 258
something, 258
stripped of clothing, 74
subject, 85
substance of a thing, 69
substantial, 249
that is sufficient, 83
the essence, 258
the Father, 35, 191-192, 211, 216-217
the Son, 216
this one, 49, 191-192, 249, 264
through itself, 114
through its essence, 87-88
to give, 195
uncaused, 11-12, 98
which things are, 89-90
being a principle (principalitas) 199, 202, 230, 233-234
belief, 64
believers, 149
beloved, 147, 148, 153-155
benignity, 30, 45, 92, 103, 105-106, 116, 118, 145-146, 148, 153,
233, 235
first, 149
pure, 18, 147
birth, 189

Page 281
blessedness, 156
blindness, 136
body, 101, 149, 168
glorified, 175
bond, 39, 41, 153-154, 173, 215, 240
book; of our intellect, 105
of truth, 18
bracelet, 213, 220, 252
C
categories, 37, 44, 47-48, 51, 63, 194, 224, 227, 229, 240, 248-249,
258, 265
causality, 21-22, 38-39, 116, 196, 200, 206, 233, 262
efficient, 87
perfect,, 12, 25-26, 71-72, 77, 121, 125
causation, 125, 195, 228, 253
essential, 73
external, 71
internal, 71
of nature
cause, 14, 21, 47, 72-73, 102, 184, 190, 199, 200, 214, 221, 225,
227, 230, 234
and effect, 34, 120-121, 169, 181, 196, 206
by its essence, 39, 206
efficient, 111, 197, 200
external, 72
first, 22, 83, 112, 116
for sense knowledge, 22, 117
immediate, 79
intermediate, 82
material, 168
of all things, 79
of being (e ssendi), 23, 69-70, 107
of itself, 101
unchanged, 22, 111
change, 110, 198, 203-205, 208, 213
change and motion, 161, 204, 207
choice, 19, 55, 100, 113
and will, 17, 19, 22, 99-100, 102, 108, 112, 133
clasp, 178, 213, 252
cloth, 42-43, 49, 177, 212, 213, 225, 252
clothing, 68, 73, 162, 177-178
of forms and conditions, 152
with accidents, 76, 160
coercion, 98, 100
collar, 213
common, 152
communion, 30, 47, 143, 208, 240, 250
essential, 256
of grace and love, 207
of love, 47, 239
comparative
comparisons, 172, 183, 187-188, 190, 193, 214, 240-241
composition, 72-74, 85, 122, 158-159, 161, 252
consequences, 234
controversy, 221
correlatives, 144
covenant; first, 144
most blessed, 143
conversion, 132
creation, 20, 31, 45-46, 111, 164, 189, 190, 231-232, 234-235, 237
in time, 18-19, 54, 107
creator, 15-16, 20, 23-25, 85, 114-118
and conserver, 232
D
darkness, 164, 166
definition, 79, 81, 87
of cause, 186
of innascibility, 230-231, 236
of one, 265
of person, 35, 185-186, 218
deity, 192
deliberation, 94, 101
demonstration, 196
denomination, 11, 24, 71, 182, 219, 225
derivation, 238
difference, 41-42, 74, 87, 164, 180, 182, 187-188, 215, 228, 248,
255, 264
of persons, 34, 218
of relation, 35, 180
disciplines, 64
discovery, 64
dispositions, 202
disputations, 132, 184
distinction, 191, 224
of being and essence, 55
of person and essence, 254
distinguishing, 236
diversity, 120, 122, 124, 152-153, 197, 239
mere, 140
essential, 90, 126, 174
of notions, 193
divinity, 191-192, 246
division, 78
doctrines, 64
dominion, 93, 154
dualism, 7
duality, 239
first, 49, 120, 123, 143
E
emanation, 25, 124, 135, 235
first, 119-123
embrace, first, 30, 143
emotions, 51, 171
equality, 149, 254
errors, 6-7, 23, 45, 63, 108, 110
essence, 9, 17, 27-29, 31-32, 39, 41-42, 47, 49, 51, 66, 68, 91, 103,
105-106, 116, 124, 126, 137, 150, 174, 178, 180, 186, 191, 196-
198, 200-201, 208-209, 211, 213, 218-219, 221-222, 232, 240-241,
247-248, 251, 256-258
absolute, 162
according to, 149, 177
bare, 103, 171
common, 162, 166, 240-241, 257
divine, 14, 19, 23, 25, 35, 40, 43-45, 47, 91, 132-133, 159, 185-
186, 191-192, 203, 214, 223, 227, 230, 240, 245-247, 250, 252-
253, 260, 263, 265
first, 20, 26, 118-119, 123, 127, 137, 159-160, 180
highest, 25, 30, 34, 48, 78, 90, 117, 119, 121, 123-124, 132, 143,
167, 177, 182, 185-187, 208, 215, 224-225, 241, 245, 259
logical, 50, 250, 257-258
not generated, 26, 124, 182, 259
not generating, 26, 124, 133, 182, 259
of the being, 65
of the Father, 257
of the same, 135, 140
one, 89, 149
same, 131, 149, 166, 176
triune, 259-260
eternity, 29, 45, 106, 111, 129, 136, 188, 232

Page 282
etymology, 50, 136
examples, 115, 179, 236, 238
exemplar, 18, 29, 105, 134, 139-141, 156, 166
first, 156
interior, 139
of the universe, 15, 93
exemplars, 24, 85-86, 141
exemplification, 79, 85-86, 105, 156-157, 162-163, 166-168, 175
external, 140
first, 139
internal, 140
perfect, 33, 173
expression;
of one truth, 140
ultimate, 140
F
faith, 5-6, 8, 38, 54, 93, 96, 119, 143, 149, 173, 184, 204, 240, 250-
252
obedience of, 63
fecundity, 30, 45, 125, 131, 141, 146, 148, 162, 233-236
first, 126, 156
paternal, 132
figure, 162, 167
First, the, 14, 17-18, 23, 68, 119, 139, 183
first-born, 30, 34, 127, 143-144, 148-149, 176-178, 180-184, 190,
204-205, 207, 212-213, 248, 251
footprint, 160-161, 166, 170
form, 24, 73, 105, 129, 134, 157, 162, 164, 191, 248
cf. also matter and form; accidental, 68, 85
archetypal, 233
first, 31, 163-164
moral, 217-218
natural, 218-219
of ornament, 219
sensible, 163, 170
substantial, 68, 85
freedom, 28, 55, 104, 116, 175
friend, 155
friendship, 146, 150, 154, 165
first, 143-144, 147
G
garment, 43-44, 49, 177, 212-213, 223, 225, 227, 252
gender, 248
masculine, 187, 247
neuter, 186, 247-248
generation, 21, 25-28, 31, 34, 38, 42-43, 45-46, 111, 119, 124-126,
128, 130-131, 133, 136, 139, 141-143, 148, 149, 156, 158, 164-
165, 181, 183-184, 189-190 203-205, 208-213, 216-217, 220-221,
223, 226-227, 233, 235-236, 249, 253
active, 39, 41, 206, 208, 217
divine, 141
first, 126, 129, 131, 148
genuine, 221, 224
of intelligible form or image 138
of the first word, 138
passive, 39, 41, 206, 208, 229
perfect, 135
true, 221
generator, 27, 33-34, 128, 131, 142-143, 174, 181, 220, 248
first, 26, 126, 135, 143, 149, 156, 172-173, 175-178, 180, 182-
184, 190, 204-205, 207-208, 210, 252
generosity, 12, 46, 80, 106, 115, 118, 125, 233-234, 237
first, 23, 116, 149, 156
genus, 50, 74, 87, 126, 128, 137, 161, 177, 212, 216, 231,253, 255,
264-265
geometry, 167
gift, 27, 34, 128, 145, 148, 154, 156, 170, 175, 186, 214, 227, 248,
253
common, 240
divine, 64
external, 146, 151-152
first, 25, 30, 49, 122, 146, 149, 151-153, 155, 176-177, 235, 237,
252
first and eternal, 143
free, 145
gratuitous, 147
interior, 151
of love, 151, 155, 161
giver, first, 122
of being (esse), 13, 113
of goodness, 115, 146
giving, 236
glory, 7, 33, 63, 150, 160, 237, 262
good, 8, 66, 194
accidentally, 8, 65
as generous, 153
by participation, 8, 65, 67
by substance, 65
essentially, 8, 65
first, 146
communicable, 153
kinds of, 145
good and evil, 245
good pleasure, 21, 116
good will, 106, 153, 158
goodness, 6, 15, 23, 46, 48, 66, 92, 103-104, 115-117, 118, 131,
143, 145-149, 152-153, 156, 159, 178, 191, 237
divine, 64
highest, 30, 144
paternal, 132, 147
pure, 12, 14, 28, 80, 92, 132
the same, 150
governance, 111, 113
grace, 24, 148, 155-156, 262
grammarian, 193
grammarians, 36, 224
H
habit, 27, 29, 56, 128, 135, 138, 168
of knowledge, 27, 135, 157
of sciences, 129
happiness, 7, 159, 172, 177
harmony, 144
heart, 145
heir and lord, 154
honor, 150
I
identity, 197, 214
essential, 260
of indiscernibles, 140
illumination, 24, 27, 55, 104, 114, 127, 132, 238
extrinsic, 147
illusion, 112
image, 8, 33, 85, 105, 133, 136-137, 140, 142, 151, 157-158, 160-
161, 164, 169, 173-175, 178, 187
first, 137, 142
for the first speaker, 93
intelligible, 138-139
of the Trinity, 32-33, 123, 167
perfect, 33, 134
visible, 137
image and likeness, 33, 131, 168, 173
imagery, 153
imagination, 133
imitation, 162
incommunicability, 49, 125, 185-186, 250

Page 283
individuality, 35, 132, 186, 224, 250, 252
individuation, 77, 256
infinite series, 67
infinity, 19, 70-71, 81-82, 107-108, 110, 142, 199, 200, 202
innascibility, 44-46, 188, 229-230, 232-236
intellect, 27, 32, 70-71, 77-79, 127-128, 130, 136, 139, 148, 163,
166, 169-170, 172-174, 177, 196, 248
active, 139
agent, 24, 139
first, 28, 129, 135-138, 147-148
first-born, 147
formal, 32-33, 55
free and perfect, 24
glorified, 174
in act, 138, 158
material, 33, 55, 170-172
original, 172
passive, 139
possible, 33, 173
pure and true, 19-20, 22, 108, 110, 112
second, 171
weak, 25, 123
intellective power, 138, 175
first, 138-139, 156, 176
intellectual knowing, 133, 135
intellectual knowledge, 27-28, 32-33, 132-134, 138
intellectual understanding, 170-171
intelligence, 55, 120
intelligible, 163
intention, 36-37, 65, 141, 191-192, 205, 214-216, 219-220, 222,
225-226, 228, 230, 233-235, 241, 243, 246, 248, 264
common, 217
comparative, 192
empty, 242
principal, 241-242
interpretation, 142, 156-157, 171, 190
J
joy, 31, 34, 152-153, 157-160, 177
private and common, 153
K
know intellectually, 138, 163
knowledge, 29, 101, 104, 143, 146-147, 152, 156, 176, 193
divine, 63
mutual, 143
of being, 73
of God, 6
salutary, 93
of the universe, 6
L
life, 31-32, 34, 55, 157-159, 168-171, 177
kinds of, 158
of the intellect, 170
light, 22, 31, 34, 123, 131-132, 157-159, 166, 177
first, 105
intellectual, 132
likeness, 32-33, 37, 40-41, 121, 131, 137, 161-162, 166, 173, 195-
197, 212-216, 220, 226
essential, 120, 212
first, 121, 140
of true unity, 161
of the Trinity, 153, 167
ultimate, 137, 175
likenesses, 169, 171-172
logic, 64
logicians, 48, 64, 249, 257
lord, 154, 238
lordship, 30, 243
love, 26-27, 32, 47, 56, 128, 143, 145-146, 148, 150, 152, 154-155,
161, 166, 171, 174-176, 193, 235, 240
common, 239
first, 143-144, 148-149, 157
gratuitous, 30, 145, 172, 240
greatest, 144, 151
highest, 143-144, 146
like a weight, 152
mutual, 15, 30, 33, 144, 253
natural, 161, 165
of being, 14, 25, 90-91, 118, 156
of the original intellect, 172
single, 153
true, 30, 152, 154
lover, 147, 154, 155
first, 148
human, 147
lovers, 152
first mutual, 144, 150, 151
human, 149
mutual, 151
true, 30, 146
M
maker, 16, 102, 172
first, 19, 106-107, 141
firs and original, 135
human, 134, 135
matter, 95-96, 129, 178
contingent, 93
eternal, 16, 70, 95, 97
external, 134
first, 164
freedom from, 18, 103-104
second, 31, 164-165
universal first, 31, 163
matter and form, 31, 97, 161-167, 172
memory, 33, 55, 176
metaphor, 27, 68, 97
metaphorical, 36, 190, 194, 215
metaphysics, 63-64
mind, 33, 176
human, 153
of the artist, 133, 134
miracle, 22, 112
mirror, 105, 136, 137, 151, 161, 173, 175
of intelligences, 163
of the universe, 93, 118
visible, 163
miscarriages, 27, 130
missions, 263
mode, 210, 227
of being (essendi), 36, 132, 228
of signifying, 40, 141
modes;
of causation, 44, 228-229
of comparison, 250
of expression, 47
of predicating, 227
of speaking of being, 10, 67-69, 238
motion, 127, 184, 201, 203, 209
supermundane, 184
multiplication, 253-254
multiplicity, 49, 152
multitude, 110, 141, 185, 242, 250, 254
N
name, 224, 243, 248
proper, 78
names, 212
absolute, 260-261
accidental, 179
appropriated, 261
essential, 48, 198, 258-259, 261
of first being (esse), 86
notional, 265
numerical, 248
personal, 248, 258-259
plurality of, 197
relative to creatures, 260-261
signifying emotions in God, 261
taken adjectivelly, 246
taken substantively, 246
nature, 91, 113, 191, 246

Page 284
natures, 16
left to themselves, 113
not causes, 114-115
necessity; none in nature, 22, 114
negation, 71-72, 82, 235
not being (non ens), 72, 81, 100, 251
not-being (non esse), 26, 72, 84, 95, 102, 113, 251
notion, 42-43, 51, 214, 218-219, 233, 235, 240-241, 264
notions, 34, 40-41, 44-46, 56, 63, 150, 177, 187-188, 190, 211,
214-215, 218, 229, 231-232, 234-235, 239, 241, 263, 265
number, 162
numerals, 265
ordinal, 210
numerically one, 213
numerically same, 149, 197
O
obedience, 23, 25, 93, 115, 244
of subjects, 15, 99
offspring, 27, 30, 39, 128-130, 149, 162, 165, 171, 228
first, 25-26, 122, 126-127, 148, 156
omnipotence, 17, 92, 99, 101, 108, 168
only-begotten, 26, 143, 248
operation, 17, 93, 100, 110-111, 195, 210, 232
external, 151
intellective, 139
most perfect, 132
natural, 196
single, 169
spiritual, 128
opposition, 180
relative, 156
order, 25
of being (essendi), 73, 75, 78, 85, 97, 162, 166, 168-169, 181,
189, 224
of causes, 82
of operation, 170, 224
of priority, 224-225
of our understanding, 85, 234, 236
of time, 169
organs of sense, 136
origin of all love, 144
ornament, 219
overcoat, 42, 213, 220
P
pantheism, 88
parent, 28, 126-128, 149, 160, 162, 164-165, 168, 170
participation, 8-9, 14, 65-67, 87, 89-91, 118, 246, 263
particularity, 233
particularization, 256
particulars, 75
passion, 147
paternity, 35-36, 38-44, 46, 51, 150, 181-183, 185, 187-190, 192,
203-208, 211, 212-217, 219-227, 229-231, 233-234, 236, 264
peace; first, 143
highest, 144
perfection, 18, 88, 103, 114, 166, 172-175, 232
final, 95
ultimate, 33, 173
person, 37, 49-50, 125, 178, 185, 218-219, 224, 228, 235-236, 240,
242, 250, 256-257
moral, 217
persons, 25, 30-31, 42-43, 186-188, 191, 215, 221, 225, 232, 239-
242, 247-248, 251, 255, 258, 265
phantasms, 33, 171, 173, 175
philosophers, 3, 5, 7, 16, 23, 28, 48, 51-52, 64, 71, 80, 90, 95, 103,
115-117, 161, 165, 249, 257, 265
philosophize, 5-8, 11, 23-24, 33, 64, 93, 105, 117, 132, 173, 184
philosophy, 6, 23, 32, 52, 54, 56-57, 64, 117, 163, 170
pin, 220
plenitude, 45-46, 232-236
plurality, 75, 77-78, 120-121, 151, 152, 185, 187, 242, 244, 252,
254
essential, 25, 74, 76
of forms, 163
of generations, 141
of utterances, 141
knowledge of, 77
personal, 247
source of, 77
polymorphic structure, 73
pond, 178
possession, 228-229, 236
mutual, 146
possibilities, remote, 94
possibility, 12, 14-16, 18, 54, 80-81, 83, 87-88, 94-95, 97, 107,
114, 166, 173, 188
a relation of matter, 13, 16, 95-96
possible, 20, 109, 133, 166, 252
potency, 15, 17, 19, 21, 26, 33-34, 92, 94, 97-98, 100, 102, 108,
112, 124, 131, 135, 162
active, 15-16, 95
first, 16, 92, 97-99, 109, 125-126, 130
first intellectual, 138
generatire, 26, 125-126
imperfection of, 97-98
most perfect, 98
not prevented, 16, 97
over absolutely possible, 109
over two opposites, 16, 97
principle of operations, 93-94
spiritual, 127
weak, 94
potentiality, 121, 175, 188
power, 15, 18-20, 23-24, 26, 33, 84, 92-94, 97-98, 100, 104-106,
109, 112, 116-119, 127-128, 150, 159, 168, 176, 201, 202
agent or active potency, 15, 93
apprehensive, 147, 169
first, 104, 172, 175
generative, 165, 224
intellective, 32, 130, 138, 169, 175
intellectual, 132
interpretative, 171
mortal, 169
of a line, 15, 97
of creatures, 23, 115
of nature, 113
of the soul, 224-225
political, 15
reasoning, 158
sensitive, 32, 169
without qualification, 108
powerful one, first, 17, 98-99, 106, 109
free, 100
mightiest, 98
rational, 100
through his essence, 98
powerlessness, 17, 20, 97-98
predestination, 51, 262

Page 285
predicates;
accidental, 71
essential, 242
relative, 184
predication, 37, 68, 180, 203, 214, 241, 264
accidental, 136
mutual, 180, 214
non-univocal, 88
principal, 262
preposition, 38-39, 202, 208-210
prevention, 100
principiation, 238-239
principle, 46, 55, 113, 152, 199, 200-201, 206, 209-210, 221, 230-
233, 238, 245
absolute, 253
acting, 203
agent, 16, 96
causal, 87
first, , 22, 161
material, 16, 96
of acting, 202
of all generations, 144
of all gifts, 146
of all things, 45, 104, 124, 138-139, 231-233
of being (essendi), 12, 80, 95, 199, 203, 209, 230-231
of intelligibility, 11
of love, 147
of knowledge, 70
of operation, 15, 94, 210
only one first, 12, 48, 79, 244-245
universal, 231
privation, 46, 236
procession, 15, 25, 30, 34, 41, 43, 46, 119, 128, 154-156, 226, 228,
235-236, 239
exterior, 237
of things from God, 92
pronouns, 48, 247
masculine, 48, 248
neuter, 48, 248
personal, 249
proofs, 6-7, 63-64, 85, 90, 103
properties, 36, 215
external, 255
individuated, 233-234
notional, 188, 230
proportionality, 175
prophecy, 63
prophets, 64
providence, 7, 111, 168
Q
quality, 37, 42-43, 181, 185, 192-194, 218, 224, 227, 239, 248-249,
263
qualities, 196-197, 224
quantity, 37, 181, 185, 193-194, 227, 249, 263
quiddity, 14, 79, 81, 87, 162, 166, 184, 225
R
reality, 223, 228
reflection, 132
of the Trinity, 160
regress
not circular, 9, 11, 69, 76, 84-85
not infinite, 9, 11, 69-70, 76, 82, 84-85
relation, 37-38, 40, 50, 56, 145, 155, 178, 180-181, 183-184, 187,
189, 191, 193, 195, 197-198, 202, 211, 227, 231-233, 240, 248
accidental, 182
category of, 185
relations, 35, 37, 50, 56, 150, 183, 187, 193-194, 231
accidental, 35, 184
assistant, 211
infinite, 198
internal, 150, 182
most extrinsic, 35, 181
of opposition, 34, 151
supervenient, 181
relative being, 187, 189, 199
relative bond, 207
repetition, 140, 142
resolution, 78, 85
revelation, 24, 63
right, 30, 229
hereditary, 154
ring, 41-42, 44, 49, 178-179, 212-213, 215, 217-220, 223, 225,
227, 251-252
root, 80
rule;
grammatical, 192
of faith, 47, 263
undivided, 158
universal, 105, 154
S
scapular, 177
senses, 160, 176
separation, 196, 237
servant, 116
shadow, 24, 31, 161, 166, 168, 170-171
sign, 21-23, 115
intelligible, 171
natural, 133
of a relation, 160
of likeness, 160
vocal, 164
sign and will, 22, 111-113
signification, 140-141, 193, 246
signs, 187, 234
simplicity, 9, 72-74, 158, 252
singularity, 252
singulars, 75, 152
society, 143
first, 153, 155
something essential, 222
son;
first, 172
first-born, 148
sonship, 35-36, 39-41, 43-44, 46, 150, 181-184, 187-188, 190, 206,
208-209, 213-216, 224-225, 228-229, 235-236
soul, 7, 14, 24, 32, 89-90, 101, 103-104, 114, 149, 168-170, 172-
173, 176, 224
source, 77, 87, 104, 119, 170, 187
fecund and pregnant, 170
first, 25-26, 30, 105, 114-116, 119-120, 122-123, 148
of being (essendi), 12, 79-80, 84, 121, 252-253
of error, 110
of power, 157
speech, 138, 158
author of, 137
first, 156
interior, 137-138, 148
perfect, 135, 136
spiritual, 29, 33, 135, 157
speaker, 29, 142, 162, 165, 174
first, 140, 141, 142, 156
speaking, 173
species, 50, 74, 122, 128, 137, 162, 178, 212, 216, 231, 253, 255,
264
spiration, 41, 43-44, 217, 224, 227, 229-230, 233-236, 238, 241
active, 188, 229
passive, 188
spirator, 46, 239
spirits, animal, 14, 89
spirituals, 118
splendor, 156
spring, 25, 178
of being, 80
statue, 31, 162
stream, 25, 123, 178, 187

Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation No. 28 Richard C. Taylor, Editor

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Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation No. 28 Richard C. Taylor, Editor

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Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation

The Trinity, Or, The First Principle = :

Chapter II: What has being according to essence is 68

Chapter XXXII: Being the Father does not indicate 198

Chapter XLV: The predication of personal terms2 247

2. The Paris-Orléans edition splits Chapter XLIV into three parts.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE WORK

2. The Teaching on Power, Potency and Possibility

Avicenna refuses to allow that the first being began to create by

He goes on to mention his youthful presumption that he could

4. The Teaching on the Differences of the Persons

5. The Teaching on Language about God

SOME CONVENTIONS USED IN THE

THE TRINITY, OR THE FIRST PRINCIPLE

<The First Treatise of the Master of Theology,

INDEX OF SCRIPTURE REFERENCES

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