Uganda Martyrs University

School of Arts and Social Sciences

Department of Governance, Peace and International Studies

Master of Arts in Human Rights

Course MHR 5201: International Humanitarian Law

Final Assessment (Take-home Exam)

QUESTION 1

Since the Occupied Palestinian Territory of the West Bank is divided into three areas with
different jurisdictional arrangements: Area A (around 18 percent), is administered autonomously
by the Palestinian Authority (PA), Area B (22 percent) is under PA civil control and Israeli
security control while Area C (60 percent) is under full Israeli control. This is not possibly an
international armed conflict

However, the central rule on the use of force, the prohibition of the threat or use of force
contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, is the subject of fundamental disagreement. It
provides: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’ The International Court of Justice
in Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo proclaimed that Article 2(4) is a cornerstone of
the UN Charter1

The judgment in Nicaragua distinguished between, on the one hand, the arming and training of
armed opposition forces, which could amount to an unlawful use of force, and on the other hand,
the supply of funds, which could not. The recent arbitral award in Guyana v Suriname
pronounced briefly and controversially on the distinction between threat of use of force and mere
law enforcement2

In Tadić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that ‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is a
resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State.’ This
represents a relatively wide interpretation of internal armed conflict, requiring neither territorial
control nor compliance with humanitarian law on the part of the non-state party. Nor is there any
requirement that governmental troops take part in hostilities. As such, the ICTY definition falls
well short of the threshold set in Additional Protocol II. Indeed, the sole requirements of
protracted armed violence involving organised non-governmental armed groups ensure that even
common Article 3 applies to a broad range of situations. Despite subsequent reliance by both the

1
ICJ Reports (2005) 168 at para 148, 45 ILM (2006) 271
2
Award of arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to Article 287 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 17
September 2007, para 425–447, available on PCA website;
ICTY and ICTR on the Appeals Chamber’s definition, however, the ICTR Trial Chamber has
cautioned that it is still ‘termed in the abstract, and whether or not a situation can be described as
an “armed conflict”, meeting the criteria of Common Article 3, is to be decided upon on a case-
by-case basis’3

A distinction has historically been drawn between international and non-international armed
conflicts, founded upon the difference between inter-state relations, which was the proper focus
for international law, and intra-state matters, which traditionally fell within the domestic
jurisdiction of states and were thus in principle impervious to international legal regulation.
However, this difference has been breaking down in recent decades primarily because of the
tremendous increase in the number of non-international armed conflicts and the rise in situations
of mixed international and non-international armed conflicts. In the sphere of humanitarian law,
this evolution can be seen in the gradual application of such rules to internal armed conflicts.4

The notion of an armed conflict itself was raised before the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in its decision on jurisdictional issues
in the Tadic´ case5.It was claimed that no armed conflict as such existed in the Former
Yugoslavia with respect to the circumstances of the instant case since the concept of armed
conflict covered only the precise time and place of actual hostilities and the events alleged before
the Tribunal did not take place during hostilities. The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal correctly
refused to accept a narrow geographical and temporal definition of armed conflicts, whether
international or internal. It was stated that:6

International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and
extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or,
in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment,
international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring states
or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or
not actual combat takes place.

3
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal on Jurisdiction, paragraph 70
4
Case No. IT-94-1-AR 72; 105 ILR, pp. 453, 486 ff
5
This decision was cited with approval by the ICC Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case, ICC-01/04-01/06, 2012,
paras. 531 ff.
6
ICC-01/04-01/06, 2012, paras. 531 ff
The clarification arose in the specific context of the Former Yugoslavia, where it was unclear
whether an international or a non-international armed conflict or some kind of mixture of the two
was involved. This was important to clarify since it would have had an effect upon the relevant
applicable law. The Security Council did not as such classify the nature of the conflict, simply
condemning widespread violations of international humanitarian law, including mass forcible
expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and abuse of civilians and deliberate
attacks upon non-combatants, and calling for the cessation. The Appeals Chamber concluded that
‘the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have both internal and international aspects’7

This development has arisen partly because of the increasing frequency of internal conflicts and
partly because of the increasing brutality in their conduct. The growing interdependence of states
in the modern world makes it more and more difficult for third states and international
organisations to ignore civil conflicts, especially in view of the scope and insistence of modern
communications, while the evolution of international human rights law has contributed to the end
of the belief and norm that whatever occurs within other states is the concern of no other state or
person8

Therefore the international community is now more willing to demand the application of
international humanitarian law to internal conflicts. In the Tadic´ case, the Appeals Chamber (in
considering jurisdictional issues) concluded that Article 3 of its Statute, which gave it
jurisdiction over ‘violations of the laws or customs of war In its decision, the Appeals Chamber
noted that:

It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between two or more
States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a
State, it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in
character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict
through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict
act on behalf of that other State

7
Case No. IT-94-1-AR; 105 ILR, pp. 453, 494. This was approved by the ICC Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case,
ICC-01/ 04-01/06, 2012, paras. 539–40
8
General Assembly resolutions 2444 (XXV) and 2675 (XXV), adopted in 1970 unanimously
The Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac case discussed the issue of the meaning of armed conflict
where the fighting is sporadic and does not extend to all of the territory of the state concerned.
The Chamber held that the laws of war would apply in the whole territory of the warring states
or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party to the
conflict, whether or not actual combat takes place there, and continued to apply until a general
conclusion of peace or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.
A violation of the laws or customs of war may therefore occur at a time when and in a place
where no fighting is actually taking place

The laws applicable in such an instance are as such cited in Appeals Chamber of the Tadic Case
cited several elements of international practice – including national military manuals, national
legislation implementing the Geneva Conventions, and unanimously adopted Security Council
resolutions as evidence of opinio juris – to demonstrate that states did, indeed, intend that
serious breaches of the laws and customs of internal armed conflict should be treated as war
crimes, entailing criminal responsibility, despite the fact that they are not grave breaches. Such
violations are not subject to the grave breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions, whereby all
states are required to exercise jurisdiction over offenders or else to surrender them for trial in
another state, but that does not in any way serve to negate individual criminal responsibility. The
Appeals Chamber therefore concluded that:

... customary international law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of common
Article 3, as supplemented by other general principles and rules on the protection of victims of
internal armed conflict, and for breaching certain fundamental principles and rules regarding
means and methods of combat in civil strife

The position was confirmed in subsequent jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR for
example, Prosecutor v. Delalić9, where the ICTY Trial Chamber held, in paragraph 308, that the
failure of common Article 3 to explicitly mention criminal responsibility ‘does not in itself
preclude such liability’ and, in paragraph 316, that ‘the substantive prohibitions in common
Article 3 ... constitute rules of customary international law which may be applied by the
International Tribunal to impose individual criminal responsibility’. Likewise, in Prosecutor v.

9
Judgment of 16 November 1998
Jean-Paul Akayesu10, ICTR Trial Chamber I held, in paragraph 617, that the violation of
common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II ‘entails, as a matter of customary international law,
individual responsibility for the perpetrator.’ In a pleasing example of symmetry, having relied
on the 1958 UK Military Manual as evidence of war crimes in internal armed conflict, the Tadić
Case itself is cited as authority for the same point in the latest version of the UK Manual (UK
Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 397-398) and also Henckaerts
and Doswald-Beck11, where Rules 156 and 151 state that serious violations of humanitarian law
constitute war crimes in both international and internal armed conflicts, and that both types of
war crimes carry individual criminal responsibility

The inclusion of internal armed conflict in the ICC Statute was justified, and jurisdiction over
such violations was duly provided for in Article 8(2), subparagraphs (c), dealing with violations
of common Article 3, and (e), dealing with other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable to internal armed conflicts

Therefore on the Legal Norms applicable under such an instance Article 3 represents customary
law, and that the ICC should accordingly have jurisdiction over violations of its provisions.
12
Delegates also agreed, however, that several of the provisions of Additional Protocol II were
customary, and should therefore be included in the Statute, as were a number of humanitarian
law provisions found in neither common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II (and therefore
drawn from the rules of international, rather than internal, armed conflict).

The biggest question on the applicability of legal norms was asked in, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber asked:

Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction
of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe weapons causing
unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from
enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted
‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign State? If international law, while of course duly

10
Judgment of 2 September 1998,
11
Customary Humanitarian Law, 551-555 and 568-603,
12
‘War Crimes’, 269, who states that China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey were not in favour.
safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the protection of human
beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should gradually lose its weight 13

On that Note however Additional Protocol II sets out a number of conditions in Article 1(1)
which must be met before the Protocol is applicable which is that the armed conflict must take
place between the ‘armed forces [of a High Contracting Party] and dissident armed forces or
other organised armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a
part of [the state’s] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations and to implement [the] Protocol’..

In addition, Article 1(2) provides that ‘internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature’ are not covered by the
Protocol, as they are not armed conflicts. Protocol II, although designed to develop and
supplement common Article 3, does so ‘without modifying its existing conditions of
application’14. The end result is that Additional Protocol II is narrower in scope than common
Article 3, with a higher threshold for its application. Some conflicts will meet the standards for
common Article 3, but not Protocol II, whereas other conflicts will meet the more restrictive
requirements of Protocol II. Common Article 3, its application unchanged by Protocol II,
nonetheless continues to apply even to these conflicts

The ICC Statute takes a similar approach to that of the ICTY. Article 8(2) sets out the scope of
application for subparagraphs (c) and (e) in subparagraphs (d) and (f ). Article 8(2)(d), outlining
the material scope for violations of common Article 3, provides that: Paragraph 2(c) applies to
armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated or sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a
similar nature.

However although an offence is set out Article 8, and carried out whilst an armed conflict is in
progress, it will not accordingly fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 15
Some element of
knowledge on the part of the perpetrator is required, although this need not be detailed or

13
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995,
paragraph 97
14
Additional Protocol II, Article 1(1).
15
William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (second edition, Cambridge, 2004), 56-
57
extensive, and is accepted as being lower than that required by Article 30 of the Statute
Respectively, the majority of those delegations responsible for drafting the Elements of Crimes
believed that an objective determination would mean that ‘in most situations, it would be so
obvious that there was an armed conflict, that no additional proof as to awareness would be
required

Accordingly, this requirement does not mean that offences must be committed during, or at the
scene of, hostilities. Where an internal armed conflict exists, humanitarian law applies to the
whole territory of the state concerned, and not just to the specific region(s) where combat takes
place. 16As the ICTY has stated: It is

... sufficient that the crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of
the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict. The requirement that the act be closely
related to the armed conflict is satisfied if ... the crimes are committed in the aftermath of the
fighting, and until the cessation of combat activities in a certain region, and are committed in
furtherance or take advantage of the situation created by the fighting.17

Article 8(2)(c) of the Statute asserts jurisdiction over violations of common Article 3 committed
during internal armed conflict. In doing so, it reproduces – almost exactly – the prohibitions
contained in (a)-(d) of common Article 3, paragraph (1). Before assessing the particular acts
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, however, it is important to note that Article 8(2)(c) of the
Statute limits itself to ‘serious violations’ of common Article 3.

Both the ICTR and ICTY, and also with Article 5 of the ICC Statute itself, which limits its
jurisdiction to those ‘most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.
It could, of course, reasonably be argued that any violation of common Article 3 would be
‘serious’. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has, after all, stated that an act would be serious where it
constituted ‘a breach of a rule protecting important values, ... [involving] grave consequences for
the victim. Since common Article 3 has been held to represent those ‘elementary considerations
of humanity’ applicable to any armed conflict, it is difficult to see how a violation of its terms
could fail to be an armed conflict.

16
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal on Jurisdiction, paragraph 70
17
Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, Judgment of 22 February 2001, paragraph
568
Under Common Article 3, protected persons are either civilians or else those persons not
otherwise actively participating in hostilities, i.e., those placed hors de combat. The Elements of
Crimes adopted for the ICC Statute accordingly require that all violations of Article 8(2)(c)
involve a victim or victims who ‘were either hors de combat, or were civilians, medical
personnel or religious personnel taking no active part in the hostilities’, and that the perpetrator
‘was aware of the factual circumstances that established this status’

ICTY Trial Chamber I accepted that violence to life and person in the context of common Article
3 is ‘a broad offence which, at first glance, encompasses murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture and which is accordingly defined by the cumulation of the elements of these specific
offences’. It proceeded to hold that the requisite mens rea is satisfied ‘once it has been
established that the accused intended to commit violence to the life or person of the victims
deliberately or through recklessness.

In determination of the issues and the status of victims, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY has used
the test of ‘whether, at the time of the alleged offence, the alleged victim of the proscribed acts
was directly taking part in hostilities’

In conclusion therefore when, that an offence is sufficiently closely linked to the armed conflict,
it would be a war crime and the ICC would have jurisdiction. This will inevitably fall to be
decided on a case-by-case basis. A direct connection is not always necessary, and an offence
need not ‘be part of a policy or practice officially endorsed by one of the parties to the conflict’,
nor ‘in actual furtherance of a policy associated with the conduct of the war or in the actual
interests of a party to the conflict’.
Question 2

From the UN Protection Analysis Update of August 2022 that from January to June 2022 the
country of Niger was characterised by incursions by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) resulting
in new population movements and serious violations of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law. As of June 8, 2022, Niger reported 307,407 internally displaced
persons in four regions of Tahoua, Tillabéri, Maradi, and Diffa.

Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions were concerned with international armed conflicts,
common article 3 did provide in cases of non-international armed conflicts occurring in the
territory of one of the parties a series of minimum guarantees for protecting those not taking an
active part in hostilities, including the sick and wounded also the Court in the Nicaragua case18, ,
declared that common article 3 also applied to international armed conflicts as a ‘minimum
yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to international
conflicts’.

Non-international armed conflicts could, it may be argued, range from full-scale civil wars to
relatively minor disturbances. This poses problems for the state in question which may not
appreciate the political implications of the application of the Geneva Conventions, and the lack
of the reciprocity element due to the absence of another state adds to the problems of
enforcement. The International Committee of the Red Cross in its 2016 Commentary to the First
Geneva Convention 1949 reaffirms that in order for common article 3 to apply a situation of
violence must have reached a certain level of intensity, characterised by recourse to arms by non-
state armed groups that are capable of being parties to an armed conflict, while non-international
armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed
forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the
territory of a state.

The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the
conflict must show a minimum of organisation. Uncertain when the ‘minimum level of intensity’
has been reached is unclear, although it does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and

18
ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 3, 114; 76 ILR, pp. 349, 448
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature,
not being armed conflicts

Common article 3 lists the following as the minimum safeguards:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities are to be treated humanely without any
adverse distinction based on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth.

To this end, the following are prohibited:

a) violence to life and person, in particular murder, cruel treatment and torture;

b) hostage-taking;

c) outrages upon human dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions in the absence of due process.

2. The wounded and the sick are to be cared for.

The International Court in the Nicaragua case stated that the rules contained in common
article 3 reflected ‘elementary considerations of humanity’:.19And also the Tadic´ case20,
Common article 3 was developed by Protocol II, 1977,which applies by virtue of article 1 to
all non-international armed conflicts which take place in the territory of a state party between
its armed forces and dissident armed forces. The latter have to be under responsible
command and exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and actually implement Protocol II

The Protocol lists a series of fundamental guarantees and other provisions calling for the
protection of non-combatants and that in non-international armed conflicts the domestic law
of the state in which the conflict is taking place continues to apply and that a captured rebel is
not entitled to POW status nor is he/she entitled to combatant immunity (i.e. immunity for
lawful acts of war from domestic criminal law), unlike combatants in international armed
conflicts for example in Crawford, Treatment of Combatants, pp. 52 ff. Furthermore in

19
ICJ Reports, 1986, pp. 14, 114; 76 ILR, p. 349
20
IT-94-1-AR; 105 ILR, pp. 453, 506.
 Khurts Bat v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 21 However,
persons captured from either the government or rebel or opposition side are entitled to
humane treatment: see e.g. UK, Manual, pp. 387 ff.

In particular, one may note the prohibitions on: violence to the life, health and physical and
mental well-being of persons, including torture; collective punishment; hostage-taking; acts
of terrorism; outrages upon personal dignity, including rape and enforced prostitution; and
pillage22.

Further provisions cover the protection of children; 23the protection of civilians, including
the prohibition of attacks on works or installations containing dangerous forces that might
cause severe losses among civilians; the treatment of civilians, including their displacement;
and the treatment of prisoners and detainees, and the wounded and sick.

Article 10 provides that that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has jurisdiction
to try violations of common article 3 and Protocol II. These are defined in article 4 of its
Statute as including: ‘(a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of
persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any
form of corporal punishment; (b) Collective punishments; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of
terrorism; (e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (f) Pillage; (g) The
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples; and (h) Threats to commit any of the
foregoing acts.’

The Appeals Chamber in its decision on jurisdiction in the Tadic´ case noted that
international legal rules had developed to regulate internal armed conflict for a number of
reasons, including the frequency of civil wars, the increasing cruelty of internal armed
conflicts, the large-scale nature of civil strife making third-party involvement more likely and

21
[2011] EWHC 2029 (Admin).
22
Bílková, ‘Belligerent Reprisals in Non-International Armed Conflicts’.
23
Bílková, ‘Belligerent Reprisals in Non-International Armed Conflicts’.
 the growth of international human rights law. Thus the distinction between inter-state and
civil wars was losing its value so far as human beings were concerned24

It is noteworthy that the principles governing internal armed conflicts in humanitarian law
are becoming more extensive, while the principles of international human rights law are also
rapidly evolving, particularly with regard to the fundamental non-derogable rights which
cannot be breached even in times of public emergency for example under Article 15 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 1950; article 4 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 1966; and article 27 of the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights, 1969

A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards was adopted by a group of experts in

1990. 25
This Declaration emphasises the prohibition of violence to the life, health and
physical and mental well-being of persons, including murder, torture and rape; collective
punishment; hostage-taking; practising, permitting or tolerating the involuntary
disappearance of individuals; pillage; deliberate deprivation of access to necessary food,
drinking water and medicine; and threats or incitement to commit any of these acts

Additionally, the Declaration provides inter alia that persons deprived of their liberty should
be held in recognised places of detention (article 4); that acts or threats of violence to spread
terror are prohibited (article 6); that all human beings have the inherent right to life (article
8); that children are to be protected so that, for example, children under fifteen years of age
should not be permitted to join armed groups or forces (article 10); that the wounded and sick
should be cared for (article 12); and medical, religious and other humanitarian personnel
should be protected and assisted (article 14).

Furthermore, the Declaration for the Protection of War Victims26 In addition, the ICRC
published the following statement with regard to non-international armed conflicts, positing
the relevant general rules:

24
Case No. IT-94-1-AR; 105 ILR, pp. 453, 505 ff. But see Moir, Internal Armed Conflict, pp. 188 ff.,
25
This was reprinted in the Report of the UN Sub-Commission: see E/CN.4/1995/116 (1995) and UN Commission
on Human Rights resolution 1995/29 and E/CN.4/1995/81 and 116. See also T. Meron and A. Rosas, ‘Current
Development: A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards’, 85 AJIL, 1991, pp. 375–7
26
1993, A/48/742, Annex
 (1) The obligation to distinguish between combatants and civilians is a general rule
applicable in non-international armed conflicts. It prohibits indiscriminate attacks.

(2) The prohibition of attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual
civilians is a general rule applicable in non-international armed conflicts. Acts of violence
intended primarily to spread terror among the civilian population are also prohibited.

(3) The prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is a general rule applicable
in non-international armed conflicts. It prohibits, in particular, the use of means of warfare
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable.

(4) The prohibition to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy is a general rule
applicable in non-international armed conflicts; in a non-international armed conflict, acts
inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or obliged
to accord protection under the rules of international law applicable in non-international
armed conflicts, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy.

(5) The obligation to respect and protect medical and religious personnel and medical units
and transports in the conduct of military operations is a general rule applicable in non-
international armed conflicts.

(6) The general rule prohibiting attacks against the civilian population implies, as a corollary,
the prohibition of attacks on dwellings and other installations which are used only by the
civilian population.

(7) The general rule prohibiting attacks against the civilian population implies, as a
corollary, the prohibition to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to
the survival of the civilian population.

(8) The general rule to distinguish between combatants and civilians and the prohibition of
attack against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians implies, in order
to be effective, that all feasible precautions have to be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage
to the civilian population 27

27
International Review of the Red Cross, Sept.–Oct. 1978, p. 247. See also Green, Armed Conflict, pp. 395–6
 Furthermore, in 1995 the UN Secretary-General described Article 4 of the ICTR Statute –
asserting jurisdiction over individuals accused of violating Article 3 common to the 1949
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II of 1977 – as a provision which ‘for the first
time criminalises common Article 3’. It is not surprising, then, that the defence in the Tadić
Case before the ICTY argued that, even if certain rules were applicable in conflicts of both
internal and international character, no individual criminal responsibility resulted for those
violations committed during internal conflict .

Nonetheless, the ICTY held in Tadić that the alleged crimes did indeed involve individual
criminal responsibility, regardless of whether they had been committed in an international or
internal context in Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction.28 In coming to its decision, the Appeals Chamber relied heavily on
the reasoning of the Nuremberg Tribunal that a finding of individual criminal responsibility
is not barred by the absence of treaty provisions on punishment of breaches

In Conclusion for the Non State Armed Groups in Niger to ensure protection of Civilians ,They
must guard against(a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in
particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal
punishment; (b) Collective punishments; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of terrorism; (e)
Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced
prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (f) Pillage; (g) The passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised
peoples; and (h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.’

28
2 October 1995, paragraph 129
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Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental

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Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and
Pesticides in International Trade 1998

Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialised Agencies 1947

Award of arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to Article 287 of the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 17 September 2007, para 425–447, available on PCA website;

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal on Jurisdiction, paragraph 70

General Assembly resolutions 2444 (XXV) and 2675 (XXV), adopted in 1970 unanimously

Customary Humanitarian Law, 551-555 and 568-603,

‘War Crimes’, 269, who states that China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey were not in
favour.

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2
October 1995, paragraph 97

Additional Protocol II, Article 1(1).

William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (second edition,

Cambridge, 2004), 56-57

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal on Jurisdiction, paragraph 70

Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovać and Zoran Vuković, Judgment of 22 February
2001, paragraph 568

Bílková, ‘Belligerent Reprisals in Non-International Armed Conflicts’.

Bílková, ‘Belligerent Reprisals in Non-International Armed Conflicts’.

Moir, Internal Armed Conflict, pp. 188 ff.,

UN Sub-Commission: see E/CN.4/1995/116 (1995) and UN Commission on Human Rights

resolution 1995/29 and E/CN.4/1995/81 and 116. See also T. Meron and A. Rosas, ‘Current
Development: A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards’, 85 AJIL, 1991, pp. 375–7

1993, A/48/742, Annex

International Review of the Red Cross, Sept.–Oct. 1978, p. 247. See also Green, Armed Conflict,
pp. 395–6