Full Text Midterm Cases Evidence 2022

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1164. September 17, 1903. ]
MANUEL ALDEGUER, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HENRY

HOSKYN, Defendant-Appellant.
Jose M. Gay for Appellant.
Palma, Gerona & Mercado for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CONTRACT; EVIDENCE; LOST WRITING; VESTED RIGHT. — Under the provisions of

the present Code of Civil Procedure, after proof of the loss or destruction of a written
instrument, its contents may be shown by parol evidence, even if such testimony would
have been incompetent when the right of action accrued, there being, as a general rule,
no vested light of property in the rules of evidence.
2. ID.; ID.; RECITALS IN PUBLIC INSTRUMENT. — The recitals in a public instrument

can not be used as evidence to the prejudice of a stranger to the deed not related to
either of the parties by privity of contract or estate.
3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. — The defense of the statute

of limitations, not having been set up in the answer, can not in this case be availed of in
this court.
4. ID.; NEW TRIAL; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. — To warrant the granting of a

new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence offered must be of
such a character that its introduction would probably change the result.
DECISION
WILLARD, J. :
The only exception in this case was to the judgment, and the only question before us
on the bill of exceptions is whether that judgment is supported by the findings of fact
stated in the decision.
It appears from the decision that Doña Petrona Inarda bought the land in question in
1855 from Don Pablo Garcia. Doña Petrona lived on the land until her death, in 1876,
when Don Manuel Aldeguer, their grandfather, was appointed guardian of Doña
Petrona’s four children, the present plaintiffs. In 1884 Don Manuel sold the land to one
Martinez, who sold it to the defendant, Henry Hoskyn, in 1887. In the deed to Martinez,
Don Manuel stated that he acquired the property by purchase from Don Pablo Garcia
twenty-four years before. The court finds that this declaration was the only evidence in
the case that Don Manuel had any title to the land.
1. The appellant defendant below assigns as error that the court found from parol
evidence alone the existence of the contract of sale between Don Pablo and Doña
Petrona. It is true the court says that no documentary evidence was received on this
point, but it is also stated that the existence of a written contract was proved, as also
its record in the registry of property, its attachment to a complaint filed in court by the
plaintiffs in 1892, its subsequent destruction with other papers in the case, and the
contents thereof.
After such preliminary proof had been made, parol evidence of the contents of the
document was properly received (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 284). Such a ruling does
not infringe section 795, par. 6, of said Code, which provides "that nothing in this act
contained shall be so construed as to divest or injuriously affect any property right that
has already become vested under existing law," even if under article 1221 or other
provisions of the Civil Code, after the destruction of the instrument, such parol evidence
of its contents could not have been given. The general rule is that there is no vested
right of property in rules of evidence.
2. The recital in the document of sale by Don Manuel to Martinez proves nothing against
the plaintiffs, either according to the former law (Civil Code, art. 1218) or according to
the new Code (secs. 277 et seq.) , and the claim of the appellant to the contrary can
not be sustained.
3. It is claimed by the appellant that he has acquired title by prescription, but the
defense of the statute of limitations, to have been available to the defendant in this
case, should have been set up in his answer. This was not done. The court, therefore,
made no finding thereon.
4. The appellant has moved for a new trial in this court under section 497, par. 2, of the
Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground of newly discovered evidence. This evidence is
to the effect that one Bonifacio Garcia was never the owner of the land in question and
never sold it to the mother of the plaintiffs.
Waiving all questions as to the sufficiency of the showing of due diligence by the
defendant, and as to the failure to procure the affidavits of the proffered witnesses, the
motion must be denied on the ground that such evidence is not "of such a character as
to probably change the result." The court finds that the mother of the plaintiffs bought
the land from Don Pablo Garcia. Evidence that Bonifacio did not own it would he
immaterial. Such evidence would merely strengthen the decision of the court. It would
not overthrow it.
But the appellant says that the plaintiffs in their :complaint alleged that the mother
bought the property of Don Bonifacio. What took place during the trial we do not know,
but it is certain that evidence was introduced showing that the purchase was made
from Don Pablo, because the court has so found. We must presume that this was done
without objection on the part of the defendant, for no exceptions relating to the matter
appear in the record. If such objections had been made, the court had power to allow
the plaintiffs to amend their complaint by striking out the name of Bonifacio and
inserting that of Pablo.
The motion for a new trial is denied and the judgment of the court below affirmed, with
costs of this instance against the appellant, and after the expiration of twenty days,
reckoned from the date of this decision, judgment shall be rendered accordingly, and
the case is returned to the court below for compliance therewith.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa and McDonough, JJ., concur.
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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1164. September 17, 1903. ]
MANUEL ALDEGUER, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HENRY

HOSKYN, Defendant-Appellant.
Jose M. Gay for Appellant.
Palma, Gerona & Mercado for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CONTRACT; EVIDENCE; LOST WRITING; VESTED RIGHT. — Under the provisions of

the present Code of Civil Procedure, after proof of the loss or destruction of a written
instrument, its contents may be shown by parol evidence, even if such testimony would
have been incompetent when the right of action accrued, there being, as a general rule,
no vested light of property in the rules of evidence.
2. ID.; ID.; RECITALS IN PUBLIC INSTRUMENT. — The recitals in a public instrument

can not be used as evidence to the prejudice of a stranger to the deed not related to
either of the parties by privity of contract or estate.
3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. — The defense of the statute

of limitations, not having been set up in the answer, can not in this case be availed of in
this court.
4. ID.; NEW TRIAL; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. — To warrant the granting of a

new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence offered must be of
such a character that its introduction would probably change the result.
DECISION
WILLARD, J. :
The only exception in this case was to the judgment, and the only question before us
on the bill of exceptions is whether that judgment is supported by the findings of fact
stated in the decision.
It appears from the decision that Doña Petrona Inarda bought the land in question in
1855 from Don Pablo Garcia. Doña Petrona lived on the land until her death, in 1876,
when Don Manuel Aldeguer, their grandfather, was appointed guardian of Doña
Petrona’s four children, the present plaintiffs. In 1884 Don Manuel sold the land to one
Martinez, who sold it to the defendant, Henry Hoskyn, in 1887. In the deed to Martinez,
Don Manuel stated that he acquired the property by purchase from Don Pablo Garcia
twenty-four years before. The court finds that this declaration was the only evidence in
the case that Don Manuel had any title to the land.
1. The appellant defendant below assigns as error that the court found from parol
evidence alone the existence of the contract of sale between Don Pablo and Doña
Petrona. It is true the court says that no documentary evidence was received on this
point, but it is also stated that the existence of a written contract was proved, as also
its record in the registry of property, its attachment to a complaint filed in court by the
plaintiffs in 1892, its subsequent destruction with other papers in the case, and the
contents thereof.
After such preliminary proof had been made, parol evidence of the contents of the
document was properly received (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 284). Such a ruling does
not infringe section 795, par. 6, of said Code, which provides "that nothing in this act
contained shall be so construed as to divest or injuriously affect any property right that
has already become vested under existing law," even if under article 1221 or other
provisions of the Civil Code, after the destruction of the instrument, such parol evidence
of its contents could not have been given. The general rule is that there is no vested
right of property in rules of evidence.
2. The recital in the document of sale by Don Manuel to Martinez proves nothing against
the plaintiffs, either according to the former law (Civil Code, art. 1218) or according to
the new Code (secs. 277 et seq.) , and the claim of the appellant to the contrary can
not be sustained.
3. It is claimed by the appellant that he has acquired title by prescription, but the
defense of the statute of limitations, to have been available to the defendant in this
case, should have been set up in his answer. This was not done. The court, therefore,
made no finding thereon.
4. The appellant has moved for a new trial in this court under section 497, par. 2, of the
Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground of newly discovered evidence. This evidence is
to the effect that one Bonifacio Garcia was never the owner of the land in question and
never sold it to the mother of the plaintiffs.
Waiving all questions as to the sufficiency of the showing of due diligence by the
defendant, and as to the failure to procure the affidavits of the proffered witnesses, the
motion must be denied on the ground that such evidence is not "of such a character as
to probably change the result." The court finds that the mother of the plaintiffs bought
the land from Don Pablo Garcia. Evidence that Bonifacio did not own it would he
immaterial. Such evidence would merely strengthen the decision of the court. It would
not overthrow it.
But the appellant says that the plaintiffs in their :complaint alleged that the mother
bought the property of Don Bonifacio. What took place during the trial we do not know,
but it is certain that evidence was introduced showing that the purchase was made
from Don Pablo, because the court has so found. We must presume that this was done
without objection on the part of the defendant, for no exceptions relating to the matter
appear in the record. If such objections had been made, the court had power to allow
the plaintiffs to amend their complaint by striking out the name of Bonifacio and
inserting that of Pablo.
The motion for a new trial is denied and the judgment of the court below affirmed, with
costs of this instance against the appellant, and after the expiration of twenty days,
reckoned from the date of this decision, judgment shall be rendered accordingly, and
the case is returned to the court below for compliance therewith.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa and McDonough, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO,

Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, Respondent.
E. M. Banzali for petitioner.

Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari for respondent
TUASON, J.:
chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion

with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been
bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the
case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the
court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony,
on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the
accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject
matter of this proceeding. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's

attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the
accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary
investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace
informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or
not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his
counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that
she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in
the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private
prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel
announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence,"
and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first
instance.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing

his right to present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was
committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are
of the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his
jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the
accused's motion to return the record for the purpose set out
therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336,
recently promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the
peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to
recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary
investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained
the justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108
does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on
the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the
bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation,
there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority,
inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action
reasonably calculated to bring out the truth." chanrobles virtual law library
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of

right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his
presence what they had said at the preliminary examination before
the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact
that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the
witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor
will the absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of
his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary
investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a
fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The

minority went farther than the majority and denied even any
discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding
the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his
witnesses to testify anew. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed

with costs against the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERIA, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library
I am sorry to dissent from the decision. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary

investigation before the Justice of the Peace of Masantol,
Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against
him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded not guilty.
"Then the counsel for the petitioner moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that her witnesses could be examined and
cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal
and the private prosecutor objected to petitioner's motion invoking
section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view
thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence, and the case
was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court
of First Instance praying that the record of the case be remanded to
the justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner
might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in
connection with their testimony. The motion was denied, and for
that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was
instituted. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present
his evidence during the investigation in the justice of the peace, was
not a waiver of his alleged right to be confronted with and cross-
examine the witnesses for the prosecution, that is, of the
preliminary investigation provided for in General Order No. 58 and
Act No. 194, to which he claims to be entitled, as shown by the fact
that, as soon as the case was forwarded to the Court of First
Instance, counsel for the petitioner filed a motion with said court to
remand the case to the Justice of the Peace of Masantol ordering
the latter to make said preliminary investigation. His motion having
been denied, the petitioner has filed the present action in which he
squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11, Rule
108, on the ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted
with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary
to the provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution.
In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336,

we did not discuss and decide the question of validity or
constitutionality of said section 11 in connection with section 1 of
Rule 108, because that question was not raised therein, and we
merely construed the provisions on preliminary investigation or Rule
108. In said case the writer of this dissenting opinion said:
It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of this
dissenting opinion, then a practising attorney, was the one who
prepared the draft of the Rules of Court relating to criminal
procedure, and the provisions on preliminary investigation in the
draft were the same as those of the old law, which gave the
defendant the right to be confronted with and to cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution. But the Supreme Court approved and
adopted in toto the draft, except the part referring to preliminary
investigation which it modified, by suppressing said right and
enacting, in its stead, the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 in its
present form. I prefer the old to the new procedure. But I can not
subscribe to the majority decision, which is a judicial legislation and
makes the exercise of the right of a defendant to be confronted,
with and cross-examine the witnesses against him, to depend
entirely upon the whim or caprice of a judge or officer conducting
the preliminary investigation.
But now the question of the validity of said section 11, Rule 108, is
squarely presented to this Court for decision, we have perforce to
pass upon it.
Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the

Supreme Court shall have power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, but said rules shall
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." The
constitution added the last part of the above-quoted constitutional
precept in order to emphasize that the Supreme Court is not
empowered, and therefore can not enact or promulgate substantive
laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules which diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights, are substantive and not adjective laws or
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the right

granted by law upon a defendant to be confronted with and cross-
examine the witnesses for the prosecuted in preliminary
investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a substantive right.
It is based on human experience, according to which a person is not
prone to tell a lie against another in his presence, knowing fully well
that the latter may easily contradict him, and that the credibility of
a person or veracity of his testimony may be efficaciously tested by
a cross-examination. It is substantive right because by exercising it,
an accused person may show, even if he has no evidence in his
favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are
not sufficient to indicate that there is a probability that a crime has
been committed and he is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused
is entitled to be released and not committed to prison, and thus
avoid an open and public accusation of crime, the trouble, expense,
and anxiety of a public trial, and the corresponding anxiety or moral
suffering which a criminal prosecution always entails. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law

to an accused outside of the City of Manila because of the usual
delay in the final disposition of criminal cases in provinces. The law
does not grant such right to a person charged with offenses triable
by the Court of First Instance in the City of Manila, because of the
promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are
tried and disposed of in the Court of First Instance of said city. But
this right, though not a constitutional one, can not be modified,
abridged, or diminished by the Supreme Court, by virtue of the rule
making power conferred upon this Court by the Constitution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this

Court in several cases, (in which the question of constitutionality or
validity of said section had not been squarely raised) do away with
the defendant's right under discussion, it follows that said section
11 diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in criminal
case, and this Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and
therefore is null and void.
The fact that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above cited
case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, that the inferior or
justice of the peace courts have discretion to grant a defendant's
request to have the witnesses for the prosecution recalled to testify
again in the presence of the defendant and be cross-examined by
the latter, does not validate said provision; because to make the
exercise of an absolute right discretionary or dependent upon the
will or discretion of the court or officer making the preliminary
investigation, is evidently to diminish or modify it. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petition is therefore granted.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library
In our concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Dequito and

Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we said:
In our opinion, section 11 of Rule 108 must be read, interpreted,

and applied in a way that will not contravene the constitutional
provision guaranteeing to all accused the right "to meet the
witnesses face to face." (Section 1 [17], Article III.) chanrobles virtual law library
Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said

reglementary section, the defendant is entitled as a matter of
fundamental right to her the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution and to cross-examine them. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Although in such preliminary hearing the accused cannot finally be
convicted, he is liable to endure the ordeal eloquently depicted in
the decision, and the constitutional guarantee protects defendants,
not only from the jeopardy of being finally convicted and punished,
but also from the physical, mental and moral sufferings that may
unjustly be visited upon him in any one of the stages of the criminal
process instituted against him. He must be afforded the
opportunities to have the charges against him quashed, not only at
the final hearing, but also at the preliminary investigation, if by
confronting the witnesses for the prosecution he can convince the
court that the charges are groundless. There is no justice in
compelling him to undergo the troubles of a final hearing if at the
preliminary hearing the case can be terminated in his favor.
Otherwise, the preliminary investigation or hearing will be an empty
gesture that should not have a place within the framework of
dignified and solemn judicial proceedings.
On the strength of the above quoted opinion the opinion should be

granted and so we vote.
Petition dismissed.
RESOLUTION
March 8, 1949
TUASON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This cause is now before us on a motion for reconsideration. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito

and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336: "The constitutional
right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him
does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a
preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront
witness. As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done
away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an
accused under the due process clause to a fair trial." We took this
ruling to be ample enough to dispose the constitutional question
pleaded in the application for certiorari. Heeding the wishes of the
petitioner, we shall enlarge upon the subject. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of

Court 1 infringes section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. 2 It is
said that the rule in question deals with substantive matters and
impairs substantive rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section
11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a
substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates
substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to
be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those
rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is
that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of
action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for
their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.) chanrobles virtual law library
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares

what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing
them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be
punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently
and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal
prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural.

Evidence - which is the "the mode and manner of proving the
competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" - is identified
with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights
are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law
transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading,
evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La.,
462.) the entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the
Rules of Court. We can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on
constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of
evidence embodied in these Rules. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United
States Supreme Court said:
Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect

that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations
in the rules of evidence or procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall.
386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650; Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277,
326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228,
232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Ct. Rep., 443. And there may be
procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense
available under the laws in force at the time of the commission of
his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and
arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional prohibition.
Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, 42 L. ed., 1061, 18 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 620. But it is not well settled that statutory changes in the
mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the
accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and
unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited. A
statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class of persons who
may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification of
persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto law. Hopt vs.
Utah, 110 U. S., 575, 28 L. ed., 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4 Am.
Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the rules of
evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the
accused evidence previously held inadmissible, Thompson vs.
Missouri, 171 U. S., 380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or
which changes the place of trial, Gut. vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19
L. ed., 573; or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal appeals,
creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U. S.,
377, 382, 38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 sup. Ct. Rep., 570.
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of

the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-
examine the witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is of
such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As
we have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an
essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely,
and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly
enjoyed thereunder can not be held to fall within the constitutional
prohibition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to

cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to
present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional
right to be informed of the charges against him both at such
investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the
proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process
comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be
confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The
degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused
may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently
waived.
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is

incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question
of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs.
Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case
beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure can
pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties
affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general
condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being so, it is
inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on
substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to
tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the
accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a
defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to
his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to compile,
revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the
Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is
a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of
procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their
source and discarding old ones. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The motion is denied.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Montemayor, JJ.,

concur.
FERIA, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library
I dissent.
The motion for reconsideration must be granted. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to the resolution, the right of a defendant to be

confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution in a preliminary investigation granted by law or
provided for in General Orders, No. 58, as amended, in force prior
to the promulgation of the Rules of Court, is not a substantive right
but a mere matter of procedure, and therefore this Court can
suppress it in section 11, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court, for the
following reasons: chanrobles virtual law library
First. Because "preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially

remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution." . . . "As
a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural." . . .
"The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules
of Court." And therefore "we can not tear down section 11 of Rule
108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole Code
of evidence embodied in these rules." chanrobles virtual law library
Secondly. Because, "preliminary investigation is not an essential

part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this
may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed
thereunder can not be held to fall within the constitutional
prohibition." chanrobles virtual law library
Lastly. Because, "the distinction between remedy and 'substantive

right' is incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a
question of degree" . . . It is difficult to draw a line in any particular
case beyond which legislative power over remedy and procedure
can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties
affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general
condition. . . . "This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court
in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the
Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such
incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary
manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited
and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage." chanrobles virtual law library
Before proceeding it is necessary to distinguish substantive law from

procedure, for the distinction is not always well understood.
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines, and
regulates rights as opposed to objective or procedural law which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights. What constitutes practice
and procedure in the law is the mode or proceeding by which a legal
right is enforced, "that which regulates the formal steps in an action
or judicial proceedings; the course of procedure in courts; the form,
manner and order in which proceedings have been, and are
accustomed to be had; the form, manner and order of carrying on
and conducting suits or prosecutions in the courts through their
various sages according to the principles of law and the rules laid
down by the respective courts." 31 Cyc. Law and Procedure, p.
1153; id., 32, section 405; Rapalje & Lawrence's Law Dictionary;
Anderson Law Dictionary; Bouvier's Law Dictionary. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Substantive rights may be created or granted either in the

Constitution or in any branch of the law, civil, criminal,
administrative or procedural law. In our old Code of Civil Procedure,
Act No. 190, as amended, there are provisions which create, define
and regulate substantive rights, and many of those provisions such
as those relating to guardianship, adoption, evidence and many
others are incorporated in the Rules of Court for the sake of
convenience and not because this Court is empowered to
promulgate them as rules of court. And our old law of Criminal
Procedure General Orders No. 58 grants the offended party the right
to commence a criminal action or file a complaint against the
offender and to intervene in the criminal prosecution against him,
and grants the defendant in the Court of First Instance (except in
the City of Manila) the right to bail, and to a preliminary
investigation including his rights during said investigation, and the
rights at the trial, which are now reproduced or incorporated in
Rules 106, 108, 110, and 111 of the Rules of Court, except the
rights now in question. And all these, and others not necessary for
us to mention, are obviously substantive rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(1) As to the first argument, the premise "the preliminary

investigation is eminently and essentially remedial is not correct.
Undoubtedly the majority means to say procedural, in line with the
conclusion in the resolution, because remedial law is one thing, and
procedural law is another. Obviously they are different branches of
the law. "Remedial statute" is "a statute providing a remedy for an
injury as distinguished from a penal statute. A statute giving a party
a mode of remedy for a wrong where he had none or a different one
before. . . . Remedial statutes are those which are made to supply
such defects, and abridge such superfluities in the common law, as
arise either from the general imperfections of all human law, from
change of time and circumstances, from the mistakes and
unadvised determination of unlearned (or even learned) judges, or
from any other cause whatsoever." (Black's Law Dictionary, third
edition, pp. 1525, 1526.) chanrobles virtual law library
It is also not correct to affirm that section 11 of Rule 108 relating to

right of defendant after arrest "is a rule of evidence and therefore is
also procedural." In the first place, the provisions of said section to
the effect that "the defendant, after the arrest and his delivery to
the court has the right to be informed of the complaint or
information filed against him, and also to be informed of the
testimony and evidence presented against him, and may be allowed
to testify and present witnesses or evidence for him if he so
desires," are not rules of evidence; and in the second place, it is
evident that most of the rules of evidence, if not all, are substantive
laws that define, create or regulate rights, and not procedural.
"Rules of evidence are substantive rights found in common law
chiefly and growing out of reasoning, experience and common sense
of lawyers and courts." (State vs. Pavelich, et al., 279 P., 1102.) "It
is true that weighing of evidence and the rules of practice with
respect thereto form part of the law of procedure, but the
classification of proofs is sometime determined by the substantive
law." (U. S. vs. Genato, 15 Phil., 170, 176.) How can the law on
judicial notice, conclusive as well as juris tantum presumption,
hearsay and best evidence rule, parol evidence rule, interpretation
of documents, competency of a person to testify as a witness be
considered procedural? chanrobles virtual law library
Therefore, the argumentative conclusion that "we can not tear down
section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing
out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules," is
evidently wrong, not only for the reason just stated, but because
our contention that the defendant can not be deprived of his right to
be confronted with and cross-examine the witness of the
prosecution is a preliminary investigation under consideration would
not, if upheld, necessarily tear down said section. Our theory, is
that said section 11 should be so construed as to be valid and
effective, that is, that if the defendant asks the court to recall the
witness or witnesses for the prosecution to testify again in his
presence, and to allow the former to cross-examine the latter, the
court or officer making the preliminary investigation is under
obligation to grant the request. But if the defendant does not so ask
the court, he should be considered as waiving his right to be
confronted with and cross-examine the witness against him. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(2) With respect to the second argument or reason, it is true that

the preliminary investigation as provided for in the General Orders,
No. 58, as amended, is not an essential part of due process of law,
because "due process of law" is not iron clad in its meaning; its
does not necessarily mean a particular procedure. Due process of
law simply requires a procedure that fully protects the life, liberty
and property. For that reason the investigation to be made by the
City Fiscal of the City of Manila under Act No. 612, now section
2465 of the Administrative Code, before filing an information, was
considered by this Court as sufficient to satisfy the due process of
law constitutional requirement (U. S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil., 1; U.
S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122). But it is also true that we
have already and correctly held that: "The law having explicitly
recognized and established that no person charged with the
commission of a crime shall be deprived of his liberty or subjected
to trial without prior preliminary investigation (provided for in
General orders, No. 58, as amended) that shall show that there are
reasonable grounds to believe him guilty, there can be no doubt
that the accused who is deprived of his liberty, tried and sentenced
without the proper preliminary investigation having been made in
his regard, is convicted without the process of law," (United
States vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil., 564). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The ruling in Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 Law. ed., 216,

quoted in the resolution, has no application to the present case, for
the question involved therein was the power of Congress to alter the
rules of evidence and procedure without violating the constitutional
precept that prohibits the passing of ex post facto law, while the
question herein involved is the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure, which
diminish the substantive right of a defendant, expressly prohibited
by the same provision of the Constitution that confers upon this
Court the power to promulgate said rules. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(3) The last reason or argument premised on the conclusion that

"the distinction between remedy and 'substantive right' is incapable
of exact definition;" indeed "the difference is somewhat a question
of degree," (Dexter vs. Edmonds, 89 F 487), is immaterial, because,
as we have already said in refuting the majority's first reason,
remedy and procedure are two completely different things. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As above defined, substantive law is clearly differentiated from

procedural law and practice. But even assuming arguendo that it is
difficult to draw the line in any particular case beyond which the
power of the court over procedure can not pass without touching
upon the substantial right of the parties, what this Court should do
in that case would be to abstain from promulgating such rule of
procedure which many increase, diminish or modify substantive
right in order to avoid violating the constitutional prohibition above
referred to. Because as this Supreme Court is not empowered by
the Constitution to legislate on or abrogate substantive rights, but
only to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure which
"shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights," this
Court can not step on them in making the rules, and the
Constitution must be presumed not to tolerate nor expect such
incursion as would affect the substantive rights of the accused in
any manner. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Besides, depriving an accused of his right to be confronted and
cross-examine the witness against him in a preliminary investigation
would affect the accused not in a limited and unsubstantial but in a
harsh and arbitrary manner. The testimony of a witness given in the
absence of the defendant and without an opportunity on the part of
the latter to cross-examine him is a hearsay evidence, and it should
not be admitted against the defendant in a preliminary investigation
that is granted to the latter as a protection against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecutions (U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, supra).
Otherwise, an accused who is innocent and should not be arrested,
or if arrested should be released immediately a short time after his
arrest after the preliminary investigation, would have to be held for
trial and wait for a considerable period of time until the case is tried
and acquitted after trial by the Courts of First Instance in provinces
on account of the admission of such evidence in the preliminary
investigation, evidence not admissible at the trial. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is granted, and after the

necessary proceedings the decision of the majority reversed or
modified in accordance with my dissenting opinion.
PERFECTO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
We dissent. Our opinion in the Dequito case still stands. The motion
for reconsideration should be granted.
Endnotes:
TUASON, J.:
1 Rights of defendant after arrest. - After the arrest of the

defendant and his delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the
complaint or information filed against him. He shall also be informed
of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against
him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence
in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the
witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant
shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2 The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The National Assembly shall have the power
to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Philippine Supreme Court

Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2019 > September 2019 Decisions >
G.R. No. 230642 - OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE,
EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E.
CACHO, AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON,
ARIANNE C. ARTUGUE, CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE R. LIU, ALYANNA
MARL C. BUENVIAJE, LANA PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS, IRENE A. TOLENTINO AND
ALTREA I. GRUYAL, PETITIONERS, v. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, AS REPRESENTED BY
ITS CHAIRPERSON, HON. EMERSON B. AQUENDE, AND LEB MEMBER HON. ZENAIDA N.
ELEPAÑO, RESPONDENTS; ATTYS. ANTHONY D. BENGZON, FERDINAND M. NEGRE,
MICHAEL Z. UNTALAN; JONATHAN Q. PEREZ, SAMANTHA WESLEY K. ROSALES, ERIKA
M. ALFONSO, KRYS VALEN O. MARTINEZ, RYAN CEAZAR P. ROMANO, AND KENNETH C.
VARONA, RESPONDENTS-IN-INTERVENTION;APRIL D. CABALLERO, JEREY C.
CASTARDO, MC WELLROE P. BRINGAS, RHUFFY D. FEDERE, CONRAD THEODORE A.
MATUTINO AND NUMEROUS OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ST. THOMAS MORE
SCHOOL OF LAW AND BUSINESS, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT RODOLFO C.
RAPISTA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS FOUNDER, DEAN AND PROFESSOR, OF THE COLLEGE
OF LAW, JUDY MARIE RAPISTA-TAN, LYNNART WALFORD A. TAN, IAN M. ENTERINA,
NEIL JOHN VILLARICO AS LAW PROFESSORS AND AS CONCERNED CITIZENS,
PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS; G.R. No. 242954 - FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L.
ABAYATA,GRETCHENM. VASQUEZ, SHEENAH S. ILUSTRISMO, RALPH LOUIE SALAÑO,
AIREEN MONICA B. GUZMAN, DELFINO ODIAS, DARYL DELA CRUZ, CLAIRE SUICO,
AIVIE S. PESCADERO, NIÑA CHRISTINE DELA PAZ, SHEMARK K. QUENIAHAN, AL JAY T.
MEJOS, ROCELLYN L. DAÑO, MICHAEL ADOLFO, RONALD A. ATIG, LYNNETTE C.
LUMAYAG, MARY CHRIS LAGERA, TIMOTHY B. FRANCISCO, SHEILA MARIE C. DANDAN,
MADELINE C. DELA PEÑA, DARLIN R. VILLAMOR, LORENZANA L. LLORICO, AND JAN
IVAN M. SANTAMARIA, PETITIONERS, v. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, AND LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRPERSON, EMERSON B. AQUENDE, RESPONDENTS:
G.R. No. 230642 - OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE,
EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E.
CACHO, AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON,
ARIANNE C. ARTUGUE, CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE R. LIU, ALYANNA
MARL C. BUENVIAJE, LANA PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS, IRENE A. TOLENTINO AND
ALTREA I. GRUYAL, PETITIONERS, v. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, AS REPRESENTED BY
ITS CHAIRPERSON, HON. EMERSON B. AQUENDE, AND LEB MEMBER HON. ZENAIDA N.
ELEPAÑO, RESPONDENTS; ATTYS. ANTHONY D. BENGZON, FERDINAND M. NEGRE,
MICHAEL Z. UNTALAN; JONATHAN Q. PEREZ, SAMANTHA WESLEY K. ROSALES, ERIKA
M. ALFONSO, KRYS VALEN O. MARTINEZ, RYAN CEAZAR P. ROMANO, AND KENNETH C.
VARONA, RESPONDENTS-IN-INTERVENTION;APRIL D. CABALLERO, JEREY C.
CASTARDO, MC WELLROE P. BRINGAS, RHUFFY D. FEDERE, CONRAD THEODORE A.
MATUTINO AND NUMEROUS OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ST. THOMAS MORE
SCHOOL OF LAW AND BUSINESS, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT RODOLFO C.
RAPISTA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS FOUNDER, DEAN AND PROFESSOR, OF THE COLLEGE
OF LAW, JUDY MARIE RAPISTA-TAN, LYNNART WALFORD A. TAN, IAN M. ENTERINA,
NEIL JOHN VILLARICO AS LAW PROFESSORS AND AS CONCERNED CITIZENS,
PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS; G.R. No. 242954 - FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L.
ABAYATA,GRETCHENM. VASQUEZ, SHEENAH S. ILUSTRISMO, RALPH LOUIE SALAÑO,
AIREEN MONICA B. GUZMAN, DELFINO ODIAS, DARYL DELA CRUZ, CLAIRE SUICO,
AIVIE S. PESCADERO, NIÑA CHRISTINE DELA PAZ, SHEMARK K. QUENIAHAN, AL JAY T.
MEJOS, ROCELLYN L. DAÑO, MICHAEL ADOLFO, RONALD A. ATIG, LYNNETTE C.
LUMAYAG, MARY CHRIS LAGERA, TIMOTHY B. FRANCISCO, SHEILA MARIE C. DANDAN,
MADELINE C. DELA PEÑA, DARLIN R. VILLAMOR, LORENZANA L. LLORICO, AND JAN
IVAN M. SANTAMARIA, PETITIONERS, v. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, AND LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRPERSON, EMERSON B. AQUENDE, RESPONDENTS
EN BANC
G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019
OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R.

SANDOVAL, VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E.
CACHO, AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, LEIGHTON R.
SIAZON, ARIANNE C. ARTUGUE, CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE
R. LIU, ALYANNA MARL C. BUENVIAJE, LANA PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS,
IRENE A. TOLENTINO AND ALTREA I. GRUYAL, PETITIONERS, v. LEGAL
EDUCATION BOARD, AS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, HON. EMERSON
B. AQUENDE, AND LEB MEMBER HON. ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO, RESPONDENTS;
ATTYS. ANTHONY D. BENGZON, FERDINAND M. NEGRE, MICHAEL Z. UNTALAN;

JONATHAN Q. PEREZ, SAMANTHA WESLEY K. ROSALES, ERIKA M. ALFONSO,
KRYS VALEN O. MARTINEZ, RYAN CEAZAR P. ROMANO, AND KENNETH C.
VARONA, RESPONDENTS-IN-INTERVENTION;
APRIL D. CABALLERO, JEREY C. CASTARDO, MC WELLROE P. BRINGAS, RHUFFY

D. FEDERE, CONRAD THEODORE A. MATUTINO AND NUMEROUS OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, ST. THOMAS MORE SCHOOL OF LAW AND BUSINESS,
INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT RODOLFO C. RAPISTA, FOR HIMSELF
AND AS FOUNDER, DEAN AND PROFESSOR, OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW, JUDY
MARIE RAPISTA-TAN, LYNNART WALFORD A. TAN, IAN M. ENTERINA, NEIL
JOHN VILLARICO AS LAW PROFESSORS AND AS CONCERNED CITIZENS,
PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS;
G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019
FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L. ABAYATA, GRETCHENM. VASQUEZ, SHEENAH S.

ILUSTRISMO, RALPH LOUIE SALAÑO, AIREEN MONICA B. GUZMAN, DELFINO
ODIAS, DARYL DELA CRUZ, CLAIRE SUICO, AIVIE S. PESCADERO, NIÑA
CHRISTINE DELA PAZ, SHEMARK K. QUENIAHAN, AL JAY T. MEJOS, ROCELLYN
L. DAÑO,* MICHAEL ADOLFO, RONALD A. ATIG, LYNNETTE C. LUMAYAG, MARY
CHRIS LAGERA, TIMOTHY B. FRANCISCO, SHEILA MARIE C. DANDAN,
MADELINE C. DELA PEÑA, DARLIN R. VILLAMOR, LORENZANA L. LLORICO, AND
JAN IVAN M. SANTAMARIA, PETITIONERS, v. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, EMERSON B. AQUENDE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
On the principal grounds of encroachment upon the rule-making power of the Court
concerning the practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom and violation
of a law school aspirant's right to education, these consolidated Petitions for Prohibition
(G.R. No. 230642) and Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 242954) under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assail as unconstitutional Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7662, 1 or the Legal
Education Reform Act of 1993, which created the Legal Education Board (LEB). On the
same principal grounds, these petitions also particularly seek to declare as
unconstitutional the LEB issuances establishing and implementing the nationwide law
school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhiLSAT.
The Antecedents
Prompted by clamors for the improvement of the system of legal education on account
of the poor performance of law students and law schools in the bar examinations, 2 the
Congress, on December 23, 1993, passed into law R.A. No. 7662 with the following
policy statement:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift
the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy,
counselling, problem-solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of the
legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal
profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of
justice and to develop social competence.
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education
system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools,
and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
R.A. No. 7662 identifies the general and specific objectives of legal education in this
manner:
SEC. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. -
(a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;

(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
(3) to train persons for leadership;
(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the improvement of
its administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light of the historical and
contemporary development of law in the Philippines and in other countries.
(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:
(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields and of legal
institutions;
(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate and apply the
law effectively, as well as to allow them to have a holistic approach to legal problems and
Issues;
(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, [counseling], problem-solving and decision-
making, and to develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems of the present
and the future;
(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful employment or
sufficient as a foundation for future training beyond the basic professional degree, and to
develop in them the desire and capacity for continuing study and self improvement;
(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession; and
(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their profession and to
fully adhere to its ethical norms.
For these purposes, R.A. No. 7662 created the LEB, an executive agency which was
made separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but
attached thereto solely for budgetary purposes and administrative support. 3 The
Chairman and regular members of the LEB are to be appointed by the President for a
term of five years, without reappointment, from a list of at least three nominees
prepared, with prior authorization from the Court, by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC).4
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7662 enumerates the powers and functions of the LEB as follows:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act,
the Board shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with
the provisions of this Act;
(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions
as herein enumerated;
(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among
others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the
library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning;
(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and
compensation to faculty members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements
for admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses
of study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels
of accreditation status;
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a
law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or
legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the
Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose,
the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of
the Bar[;]
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may
provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for
such duration as the Board may deem necessary; and
(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary
for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.
On the matter of accreditation of law schools, R.A. No. 7662 further elaborates:
SEC. 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. - Educational institutions may not operate a law
school unless accredited by the Board. Accreditation of law schools may be granted only
to educational institutions recognized by the Government.
SEC. 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The [LEB] may withdraw or
downgrade the accreditation status of a law school if it fails to maintain the standards
set for its accreditation status.
SEC. 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The withdrawal or

downgrading of accreditation status shall be effective after the lapse of the semester or
trimester following the receipt by the school of the notice of withdrawal or downgrading
unless, in the meantime, the school meets and/or upgrades the standards or corrects
the deficiencies upon which the withdrawal or downgrading of the accreditation status is
based.
Bar Matter No. 979-B
Re: Legal Education
In July 2001, the Court's Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM),
through its Chairperson, Justice Jose C. Vitug, noted several objectionable provisions of
R.A. No. 7662 which "go beyond the ambit of education of aspiring lawyers and into the
sphere of education of persons duly licensed to practice the law profession." 5
In particular, the CLEBM observed:

x x x [U]nder the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State "shall
x x x require apprenticeship and continuing legal education." The concept of continuing
legal education encompasses education not only of law students but also of members of
the legal profession. [This] implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the
education of persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed to
practice law[, in violation of the Supreme Court's power over the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines].
x x x Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing

"awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived
and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place in the law
that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of ·law as they perform the task
of educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution
also provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules on
"legal assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A. No. 7662]
might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power.
x x x [Section 7(e) giving the LEB the power to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission and Section 7(h) giving the LEB the power to adopt a system of continuing
legal education and for this purpose, the LEB may provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB may
deem necessary] encroach upon the Supreme Court's powers under Section 5,
paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Aside from its power over the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Supreme Court is constitutionally mandated to promulgate
rules concerning admission to the practice of law.6
While the CLEBM saw the need for the LEB to oversee the system of legal education, it
cautioned that the law's objectionable provisions, for reasons above-cited, must be
removed.7
Relative to the foregoing observations, the CLEBM proposed the following amendments
to R.A. No. 7662:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift
the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy,
counseling, problem-solving, and decision-making; to infuse in them the ethics of the
legal profession; to impress upon them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal
profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of
justice; and, to develop socially-committed lawyers with integrity and competence.
system, require proper selection of law students, provide for legal apprenticeship, and
maintain quality among law schools.
xxxx
SEC. 3. General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education. x x x
xxxx
2.) to increase awareness among law students of the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of society;
xxxx
SEC. 7. Power and functions. - x x x
(a) to regulate the legal education system in accordance with its powers and functions
herein enumerated;
(b) to establish standards of accreditation for law schools, consistent with academic
freedom and pursuant to the declaration of policy set forth in Section 2 hereof;
(c) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(d) to prescribe minimum standards for admission to law schools including a system of
law aptitude examination;
(e) to provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools;
(f) to prescribe guidelines for law practice internship which the law schools may
establish as part of the curriculum; and
(g) to perform such other administrative functions as may be necessary for the

attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.8 (Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
In a Resolution9 dated September 4, 2001, the Court approved the CLEBM's explanatory
note and draft amendments to R.A. No. 7662. The Senate and the House of
Representatives were formally furnished with a copy of said Resolution. This,
notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7662 remained unaltered.
LEB Issuances
In 2003, the Court issued a resolution authorizing the JBC to commence the nomination
process for the members of the LEB. In 2009, the LEB was constituted with the
appointment of Retired Court of Appeals Justice Hilarion L. Aquino as the first
Chairperson and followed by the appointment of LEB members, namely, Dean Eulogia
M. Cueva, Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Dean Venicio S. Flores and Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) Director Felizardo Y. Francisco. Despite the passage of the enabling
law in 1993, the LEB became fully operational only in June 2010.
Acting pursuant to its authority to prescribe the minimum standards for law schools, the
LEB issued Memorandum Order No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011) providing for
the Policies and Standards of Legal Education and Manual of Regulation for Law
Schools.
Since then, the LEB had issued several orders, circulars, resolutions, and other
issuances which are made available through their website:
A. Orders
Number Title/Subject
LEBMO No. Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law Program
2
LEBMO No. Policies, Standards and, Guidelines for the Accreditation of Law Schools to
3-2016 Offer and Operate Refresher Courses
LEBMO No. Supplemental to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016
4-2016
LEBMO No. Guidelines for the [Prerequisite] Subjects in the Basic Law Courses
5-2016
LEBMO No. Reportorial Requirements for Law Schools
6-2016
LEBMO No. Policies and Regulations for the Administration of a Nationwide Uniform Law
7-2016 School Admission Test for Applicants to the Basic Law Courses in All Law
Schools in the Country
LEBMO No. Policies, Guidelines and Procedures Governing Increases in Tuition and Other
8-2016 School Fees, and, Introduction of New Fees by Higher, Education Institutions
for the Law Program
LEBMO No. Policies and Guidelines on the Conferment of Honorary Doctor of Laws
9-2017 Degrees
LEBMO No. Guidelines on the Adoption of Academic/School Calendar
10-2017
LEBMO No. Additional Transition Provisions to [LEBMO] No. 7, Series of 2016, on
11-2017 PhiLSAT
LEBMO No. LEB Service/Transaction Fees
12-2018
LEBMO No. Guidelines
13-2018 in the Conduct of Summer Classes
LEBMO No. Policy and Regulations in Offering Elective Subjects
14-2018
LEBMO No. Validation of the Licenses of, and the Law Curriculum/Curricula for the Basic
15-2018 Law Courses in use by Law Schools and Graduate Schools of Law
LEBMO No. Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the Academic Law Libraries of Law
16-2018 Schools
LEBMO No. Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic Requirement of Master
17-2018 of Laws Degree for Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law
Schools
LEBMO No. Guidelines on Cancellation or Suspension of Classes in All Law Schools
18-2018
LEBMO No. Migration of the Basic Law Course to Juris Doctor
19-2018
LEBMO No. Discretionary Admission in the AY 2019-2020 of Examinees Who Rated Below
20-2019 the Cut-off/Passing Score but Not Less than 45% in the Philippine Law School
Admission Test Administered on April 7, 2019
B. Memorandum Circulars
LEBMC New Regulatory Issuances
No. 1
LEBMC Submission of Schedule of Tuition and Other School Fees
No. 2
LEBMC Submission of Law School Information Report
No. 3
LEBMC Reminder to Submit Duly Accomplished LSIR Form
No. 4
LEBMC Offering of the Refresher Course for AY 2017-2018
No. 5
LEBMC Applications for LEB Certification Numbers
No. 6
LEBMC Application of Transitory Provision Under [LEBMO] No. 7 Series of 2017 and
No. 7 [LEBMO] No. 11, Series of 2017 in the Admission of Freshmen Law Students in
Basic Law Courses in Academic Year 2017-2018
LEBMC Guidelines for Compliance with the Reportorial Requirements Under [LEBMO]
No. 8 No. 7, Series of 2016 for Purposes of the Academic Year 2017-2018
LEBMC Observance of Law Day and Philippine National Law Week
No. 9
LEBMC September 21, 2017 Suspension of Classes
No. 10
LEBMC Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic Year
No. 11 2016-2017
No. 12 2017-2018
LEBMC Legal Research Seminar of the Philippine Group of Law Librarians on April 4-6,
No. 13 2018
LEBMC CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, s.2016
No. 14
No. 15 2018-2019
LEBMC Clarification to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016
No. 16
LEBMC Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the
No. 17 Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC PHILSAT Eligibility Requirement for Freshmen in the Academic Year 2018-
No. 18 2019
LEBMC Guidelines for the Limited Conditional Admission/Enrollment in the 1st Semester
No. 19 of the Academic Year 2018-2019 Allowed for Those Who Have Not Taken the
PhiLSAT
LEBMC Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the
No. 20 Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC Adjustments/Corrections to the Requirements for Law Schools to be Qualified to
No. 21 Conditionally Admit/Enroll Freshmen Law Students in AY 2018-2019
LEBMC Advisory on who should take the September 23, 2018 PhiLSAT
No. 22
LEBMC Collection of the PhiLSAT Certificate of Eligibility/Exemption by Law Schools
No. 23 from Applicants for Admission
LEBMC Observance of the Philippine National Law Week
No. 24
LEBMC Competition Law
No. 25
LEBMC Scholarship Opportunity for Graduate Studies for Law Deans, Faculty Members
No. 26 and Law Graduates with the 2020-2021 Philippine Fulbright Graduate Student
Program
LEBMC Advisory on April 7, 2019 PhiLSAT and Conditional [Enrollment] for Incoming
No. 27 Freshmen/1st Year Law Students
LEBMC April 25-26, 2019 Competition Law Training Program
No. 28
LEBMC Detailed Guidelines for Conditional Enrollment Permit Application
No. 29
LEBMC Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in AY 2019-2020
No. 30
LEBMC Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in AY 2019-2020
No. 31
LEBMC Reminders concerning Conditionally Enrolled Freshmen Law Students in AY
No. 40 2019-2020
C. Resolutions and Other Issuances
Resolution No. 16 Reportorial Requirement for Law Schools with Small Students
Population
Resolution No.7, Declaring a 3-Year Moratorium in the Opening of New Law Schools
Series of 2010
Resolution No. 8, Administrative Sanctions
Series of 2010
Resolution No. A Resolution Providing for Supplementary Rules to the Provisions of
2011-21 LEBMO No. 1 in regard to Curriculum and Degrees Ad Eundem
Resolution No. A Resolution Eliminating the Requirement of Special, Orders for
2012-02 Graduates of the Basic Law Degrees and Graduate Law Degrees and
Replacing them with a Per Law School Certification Approved by the
Legal Education Board
Resolution No. Ethical Standards of Conduct for Law Professors
2013-01
Resolution No. Prescribing Rules on the Ll.M. Staggered Compliance Schedule and the
2014-02 Exemption from the Ll.M. Requirement
Resolution No. Prescribing the Policy and Rules in the Establishment of a Legal Aid
2015-08 Clinic in Law Schools
Order Annual Law Publication Requirements
Chairman Restorative Justice to be Added as Elective Subject
Memorandum
The PhiLSAT under LEBMO No. 7-2016, LEBMO No. 11-2017, LEBMC No. 18-
2018, and related issuances
As above-enumerated, among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order

No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission" under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.
The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal
education by requiring all those seeking admission to the basic law course to take and
pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test, known as the PhiLSAT. 10
The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications

and language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning. 11 It was
designed to measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of
law.12 Exempted from the PhiLSAT requirement were honor graduates who were
granted professional civil service eligibility and who are enrolling within two years from
their college graduation. 13
Synthesizing, the key provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 are as follows:

(1) The policy and rationale of requiring PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal
education. The PhiLSAT shall be administered under the control and supervision of the
LEB;14
(2) The PhiLSAT is an aptitude test that measures the academic potential of the
examinee to pursue the study of law;15
(3) A qualified examinee is either a graduate of a four-year bachelor's degree;

expecting to graduate with a four-year bachelor's degree at the end of the academic
year when the PhiLSAT was administered; or a graduate from foreign higher education
institutions with a degree equivalent to a four-year bachelor's degree. There is no limit
as to the number of times a qualified examinee may take the PhiLSAT; 16
(4) The LEB may designate an independent third-party testing administrator; 17
(5) The PhiLSAT shall be administered at least once a year, on or before April 16, in
testing centers;18
(6) The testing fee shall not exceed the amount of P1,500.00 per examination; 19
(7) The cut-off or passing score shall be 55% correct answers, or such percentile score
as may be prescribed by the LEB; 20
(8) Those who passed shall be issued a Certificate of Eligibility while those who failed
shall be issued a Certificate of Grade;21
(9) Passing the PhiLSAT is required for admission to any law school. No applicant shall
be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law course leading to a
degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he has passed the PhiLSAT
taken within two years before the start of the study; 22
(10) Honor graduates granted professional civil service eligibility who are enrolling
within two years from college graduation are exempted from taking and passing the
PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to the basic law course; 23
(11) Law schools, in the exercise of academic freedom, can prescribe additional
requirements for admission;24
(12) Law schools shall submit to LEB reports of first year students admitted and
enrolled, and their PhiLSAT scores, as well as the subjects enrolled and the final grades
received by every first year student; 25
(13) Beginning academic year 2018-2019, the general average requirement (not less
than 80% or 2.5) for admission to basic law course under Section 23 of LEBMO No. 1-
2011 is removed;26
(14) In academic year 2017-2018, the PhiLSAT passing score shall not be enforced and
the law schools shall have the discretion to admit in the basic law course, applicants
who scored less than 55% in the PhiLSAT, provided that the law dean shall submit a
justification for the admission and the required report; 27 and
(15) Law schools, in violation of LEBMO No. 7-2016, shall be administratively

sanctioned as prescribed in Section 3228 of LEBMO No. 2-201329 and/or fined up to
P10,000.00.30
Effective for the academic year 2017 to 2018, no applicant to law school was allowed
admission without having taken and passed the PhiLSAT. The first PhiLSAT examination
was held on April 16, 2017 in seven pilot sites: Baguio City, Metro Manila, Legazpi City,
Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and Cagayan de Oro. A total of 6,575 out of 8,074
examinees passed the first-ever PhiLSAT. For the first PhiLSAT, the passing grade was
adjusted by the LEB from 55% to 45% by way of consideration.
Since the PhiLSAT was implemented for the first time and considering further that there
were applicants who failed to take the PhiLSAT because of the inclement weather last
April 16, 2017, the LEB issued Memorandum Order No. 11, Series of 2017 (LEBMO No.
11-2017).
Under LEBMO No. 11-2017, those who failed to take the first PhiLSAT were allowed to
be admitted to law schools for the first semester of academic year 2017 to 2018 for
justifiable or meritorious reasons and conditioned under the following terms:
2. Conditions - x x x
a. The student shall take the next scheduled PhiLSAT;
b. If the student fails to take the next scheduled PhiLSAT for any reason, his/her
conditional admission in the law school shall be automatically revoked and barred from
enrolling in the following semester;
c. If the student takes the next scheduled PhiLSAT but scores below the passing or cut-
off score, his/her conditional admission shall also be revoked and barred from enrolling
in the following semester, unless the law school expressly admits him/her in the
exercise of the discretion given under Section/Paragraph 14 of LEBMO No. 7, Series of
2016, subject to the requirements of the same provision;
d. The student whose conditional admission and enrol[l]ment is subsequently revoked

shall not be entitled to the reversal of the school fees assessed and/or refund of the
school fees paid; and
e. The student shall execute under oath, and file with his/her application for a Permit
for Conditional Admission/Enrol[l]ment, an UNDERTAKING expressly agreeing to the
foregoing conditions.31
The conditional admission and enrollment under LEBMO No. 11-2017 and the transitory
provision provided in LEBMO No. 7-2016 were subsequently clarified by the LEB
through its Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 7-2017).
On September 24, 2017 and April 8, 2018, the second and third PhiLSATs were
respectively held.
On October 26, 2017, the LEB issued a Memorandum reminding law schools, law
students, and other interested persons that the passing of the PhiLSAT is required to be
eligible for admission/enrollment in the basic law course for academic year 2017 to
2018. It was also therein clarified that the discretion given to law schools to admit
those who failed the PhiLSAT during the initial year of implementation is only up to the
second semester of academic year 2017-2018.
Because of the confusion as to whether conditional admission for academic year 2018
to 2019 may still be allowed, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of
2018 (LEBMC No. 18-2018). Under LEBMC No. 18-2018, it was clarified that the
conditional admission was permitted only in academic year 2017 to 2018 as part of the
transition adjustments in the initial year of the PhiLSAT implementation. As such, by
virtue of LEBMC No. 18-2018, the conditional admission of students previously allowed
under LEBMO No. 11-2017 was discontinued.
Nevertheless, on July 25, 2018, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of
2018 (LEBMC No. 19-2018) allowing limited conditional admission/enrollment in the
first semester of academic year 2018 to 2019 for those applicants who have never
previously taken the PhiLSAT. Those who have taken the PhiLSAT and scored below the
cut-off score were disqualified. In addition, only those law schools with a passing rate of
not less than 25%, are updated in the reportorial requirement and signified its intention
to conditionally admit applicants were allowed to do so. The limited enrollment was
subject to the condition that the admitted student shall take and pass the next PhiLSAT
on September 23, 2018, otherwise the conditional enrollment shall be nullified. Non-
compliance with said circular was considered a violation of the minimum standards for
the law program for which law schools may be administratively penalized.
The fourth PhiLSAT then pushed through on September 23, 2018.
The Petitions
Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhiLSAT on April 16, 2017,
petitioners Oscar B. Pimentel (Pimentel), Errol B. Comafay (Comafay), Rene B. Gorospe
(Gorospe), Edwin R. Sandoval (Sandoval), Victoria B. Loanzon (Loanzon), Elgin Michael
C. Perez (Perez), Arnold E. Cacho (Cacho), Al Conrad B. Espaldon (Espaldon) and Ed
Vincent S. Albano (Albano) [as citizens, lawyers, taxpayers and law professors], with
their co-petitioners Leighton R. Siazon (Siazon), Arianne C. Artugue (Artugue), Clarabel
Anne R. Lacsina (Lacsina) and Kristine Jane R. Liu (Liu) [as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers], Alyanna Mari C. Buenviaje (Buenviaje) and Iana Patricia Dula T. Nicolas
(Nicolas) [as citizens intending to take up law] and Irene A. Tolentino (Tolentino) and
Aurea I. Gruyal (Gruyal) [as citizens and taxpayers] filed their Petition for
Prohibition,32 docketed as G.R. No. 230642, principally seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be
declared unconstitutional and that the creation of the LEB be invalidated together with
all its issuances, most especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon the rule-making
power of the Court concerning admissions to the practice of law; 33 They prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the LEB from conducting the
PhiLSAT.
Respondents-in-intervention Attys. Anthony D. Bengzon (Bengzon), Ferdinand M. Negre

(Negre), Michael Z. Untalan (Untalan), Jonathan Q. Perez (Perez), Samantha Wesley K.
Rosales (Rosales), Erika M. Alfonso (Alfonso), Krys Valen O. Martinez (Martinez), Ryan
Ceazar P. Romano (Romano), and Kenneth C. Varona (Varona) [as citizens and
lawyers] moved to intervene and prayed for the dismissal of the Petition for
Prohibition.34
On February 12, 2018, petitioners-in-intervention April D. Caballero (Caballero), Jerey

C. Castardo (Castardo), MC Wellroe P. Bringas (Bringas), Rhuffy D. Federe (Federe) and
Conrad Theodore A. Matutino (Matutino) [as graduates of four-year college course and
applicants as first year law students], St. Thomas More School of Law and Business,
Inc., [as an educational stock corporation] and Rodolfo C. Rapista (Rapista), Judy Marie
Rapista-Tan (Rapista-Tan), Lynnart Walford A. Tan (Tan), Ian M. Enterina (Enterina)
and Neil John Villarico (Villarico) [as citizens and law professors] intervened and joined
the Petition for Prohibition of Pimentel, et al., seeking to declare R.A. No. 7662 and the
PhiLSAT as unconstitutional. 35
Thereafter, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 242954, was

filed by petitioners Francis Jose Lean iL. Abayata (Abayata), Gretchen M. Vasquez
(Vasquez), Sheenah S. Ilustrismo (Ilustrismo), Ralph Louie Salaño (Solaño), Aireen
Monica B. Guzman (Guzman) and Delfino Odias (Odias) [as law students who failed to
pass the PhiLSAT], Daryl Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), Claire Suico (Suico), Aivie S. Pescadero
(Pescadero), Niña Christine Dela Paz (Dela Paz), Shemark K. Queniahan (Queniahan),
Al Jay T. Mejos (Mejos), Rocellyn L. Daño (Daño), Michael Adolfo (Adolfo), Ronald A.
Atig (Atig), Lynette C. Lumayag (Lumayag), Mary Chris Lagera (Lagera), Timothy B.
Francisco (Francisco), Sheila Marie C. Dandan (Dandan), Madeline C. Dela Peña (Dela
Peña), Darlin R. Villamor (Villamor), Lorenzana Llorico (Llorico) and Jan Ivan M.
Santamaria (Santamaria) [as current law students who failed to take the PhiLSAT]
seeking to invalidate R.A. No. 7662 or, in the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional
the PhiLSAT. They also sought the issuance of a TRO to defer the holding of the
aptitude test.36
These Petitions were later on consolidated by the Court and oral arguments thereon
were held on March 5, 2019.
Temporary Restraining Order
On March 12, 2019, the Court issued a TRO37 enjoining the LEB from implementing
LEBMC No. 18-2018 and, thus, allowing those who have not taken the PhiLSAT prior to
the academic year 2018 to 2019, or who have taken the PhiLSAT, but did not pass, or
who are honor graduates in college with no PhiLSAT Exemption Certificate, or honor
graduates with expired PhiLSAT Exemption Certificates to conditionally enroll as
incoming freshmen law students for the academic year 2019 to 2020 under the same
terms as LEBMO No. 11-2017.
Subsequently, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 2019 (LEBMC No.
27-2019) stating that the PhiLSAT scheduled on April 7, 2019 will proceed and
reiterated the requirements that must be complied with for the conditional enrollment
for the academic year 2019 to 2020.
The Parties' Arguments
In G.R. No. 230642
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive
to the Court's power to regulate and supervise the legal profession pursuant to Section
5(5), Article VIII38 of the Constitution and that the Congress cannot create an
administrative office that exercises the Court's power over the practice of law. They
also argue that R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC additional functions to vet nominees for the
LEB in violation of Section 8(5), Article VIII 39 of the Constitution.
In their Memorandum, petitioners also question the constitutionality of the LEB's

powers under Section 7(c)40 and 7(e)41 to prescribe the qualifications and compensation
of faculty members and Section 7(h)42 on the LEB's power to adopt a system of
continuing legal education as being repugnant to the Court's rule-making power
concerning the practice of law. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic
freedom of law schools and the right to education.
Petitioners-in-intervention meanwhile contend that the PhiLSAT violats the right to

liberty and pursuit of happiness of the student-applicants. They posit that the PhiLSAT
violates the equal protection clause as it is an arbitrary form of classification not based
on substantial distinctions. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the right of all
citizens to quality and accessible education, violates academic freedom, and is an unfair
academic requirement. It is also their position that the PhiLSAT violates due process as
it interferes with the right of every person to select a profession or course of study.
They also argue that R.A. No. 7662 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers.
In G.R. No. 242954

Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 argue that certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies
either under the expanded or traditional jurisdiction of the Court. They also invoke the
doctrine of transcendental importance.
Substantively, they contend that R.A. No. 7662, specifically Section 3(a)(2) 43 on the
objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal
profession, Section 7(e) on law admission, 7(g) 44 on law practice internship, and 7(h)
on adopting a system of continuing legal education, and the declaration of policy on
continuing legal education45 infringe upon the power of the Court to regulate admission
to the practice of law. They profess that they are not against the conduct of law school
admission test per se, only that the LEB cannot impose the PhiLSAT as the power to do
so allegedly belongs to the Court.46
It is also their contention that the PhiLSAT violates academic freedom as it interferes
with the law school's exercise of freedom to choose who to admit. According to them,
the LEB cannot issue penal regulations, and the consequent forfeiture of school fees
and the ban on enrollment for those who failed to pass the PhiLSAT violate due process.
The Comments
Procedurally, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the LEB, argues
that certiorari and prohibition are not proper to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7662 either under the traditional or expanded concept of judicial power. For the OSG,
R.A. No. 7662 was enacted pursuant to the State's power to regulate all educational
institutions, and as such, there could be no grave abuse of discretion. It also claims
that the Congress is an indispensable party to the petitions.
Substantively, the OSG contends that the Court's power to regulate admission to the
practice of law does not include regulation of legal education. It also defends Section
7(e) on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission as referring
to admission to law schools; Section 7(g) on the LEB's power to establish a law practice
internship as pertaining to the law school curriculum which is within the power of the
LEB to regulate; and 7(h) on the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal
education as being limited to the training of lawyer-professors. 47 Anent the argument
that R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC additional functions not assigned to it by the Court,
the OSG points out that the Court had actually authorized the JBC to process the
applications for membership to the LEB making this a non-issue.
In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the argument that the
PhiLSAT is the minimum standard for entrance to law schools prescribed by the LEB
pursuant to the State's power to regulate education. The OSG urges that the PhiLSAT is
no different from the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which the Court already
upheld as a valid exercise of police power in the seminal case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez.48
It is also the position of the OSG that neither the PhiLSAT nor the provisions of R.A. No.
7662 violate academic freedom because the standards for entrance to law school, the
standards for accreditation, the prescribed qualifications of faculty members, and the
prescribed basic curricula are fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.
For their part, respondents in-intervention contend that R.A. No. 7662 enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality and that the study of law is different from the practice
of law.
In its Comment to the Petition-in-Intervention, the OSG dismisses as speculative the

argument that the PhiLSAT is anti-poor, and adds that the Court has no competence to
rule on whether the PhiLSAT is an unfair or unreasonable requirement, it being a
question of policy.
Respondents-in-intervention, for their part, argue that the right of the citizens to
accessible education means that the State shall make quality education accessible only
to those qualified enough, as determined by fair, reasonable, and equitable admission
and academic requirements. They dispute the claimed intrusion on academic freedom
as law schools are not prevented from selecting who to admit among applicants who
have passed the PhiLSAT. They stress that the right to education is not absolute and
may be regulated by the State, citing Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas.49
By way of Reply, petitioners-in-intervention emphasize that the doctrine in Tablarin50 is

inapplicable as medical schools are not the same as law schools. They further aver that
the decline in enrollment as a result of the implementation of the PhiLSAT is not
speculative.51
The Issues
After a careful consideration of the issues raised by the parties in their pleadings and
refined during the oral arguments, the issues for resolution are synthesized as follows:
I. Procedural Issues:
A. Remedies of certiorari and prohibition; and
B. Requisites of judicial review and the scope of the Court's review in the
instant petitions.
II. Substantive Issues:
A. Jurisdiction over legal education;
B. Supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police

power;
1. Reasonable supervision and regulation
2. Institutional academic freedom
3. Right to education
C. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the Court's jurisdiction over

the practice of law; and
D. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the academic freedom of law
schools and the right to education.
The Rulings of the Court
I.
Procedural Issues
A.
Remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition
The propriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition is assailed on the ground that
R.A. No. 7662 is a legislative act and not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
function. In any case, respondents argue that the issues herein presented involve
purely political questions beyond the ambit of judicial review.
The Court finds that petitioners availed of the proper remedies.
The 193552 and 197353 Constitutions mention, but did not define, "judicial power." In
contrast, the 1987 Constitution lettered what judicial power is and even "expanded" its
scope.
As constitutionally defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution,54 judicial power is no longer limited to the Court's duty to' settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, or the
power of adjudication, but also includes, the duty to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This innovation under the
1987 Constitution later on became known as the Court's traditional jurisdiction and
expanded jurisdiction, respectively.55
The expanded scope of judicial review mentions "grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" to harbinger the exercise of judicial review; while
petitions for certiorari56 and prohibition57 speak of "lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Petitions
for certiorari and prohibition as it is understood under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
traditionally regarded as supervisory writs used as a means by superior or appellate
courts, in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction, to keep subordinate courts
within the bounds of their jurisdictions. As such, writs of certiorari and prohibition
correct only errors of jurisdiction of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. 58
However, considering the commonality of the ground of "grave abuse of discretion," a

Rule 65 petition, as a procedural vehicle to invoke the Court's expanded jurisdiction,
has been allowed.59 After all, there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done
contrary to the Constitution, the law I or jurisprudence, or is executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will, or personal bias. 60 In Spouses Imbong
v. Ochoa, Jr.,61 the Court emphasized that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues.
That it is a legislative act which is being assailed is likewise not a ground to deny the
present petitions.
For one, the 1987 Constitution enumerates under Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII, 62 the
Court's irreducible powers which expressly; include the power of judicial review, or.the
power to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation.
For another, the Court's expanded jurisdiction, when invoked, permits a review of acts
not only by a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. "Any branch or
instrumentality of the Government" necessarily includes the Legislative and the
Executive, even if they are not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.63 As such, the Court may review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts
of legislative and executive officials, there being no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.64
The power of judicial review over congressional action, in particular, was affirmed
in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,65 wherein the Court held:
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial
review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled
that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether
the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
In Tañada v. Angara, where petitioners sought to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate
on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raised a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is alleged
to have seriously infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, [this
Court] declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing
the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the
House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution.
In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in
the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to
judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives
in removing - the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial
review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the
legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from
the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it exercised its power of judicial review to determine
which between the Electoral Commission and the National Assembly had jurisdiction
over an electoral dispute concerning members of the latter. (Internal citations omitted;
emphases supplied)
This was reiterated in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,66 as follows:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation;
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application
is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise

constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials. (Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied)
Consistently, in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,67 the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition were regarded as proper vehicles to assail the
constitutionality of curfew ordinances, and in Agcaoili v. Fariñas,68 to question the
contempt powers of the Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of
legislation.
The consistency in the Court's rulings as to the propriety of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, but also to correct, undo, or restrain any act of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the legislative and the executive, propels the Court to
treat the instant petitions in the same manner.
B.
Requisites for Judicial Review
The power of judicial review is tritely defined as the power to review the
constitutionality of the actions of the other branches of the government. 69 For a proper
exercise of its power of review in constitutional litigation, certain requisites must be
satisfied: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.70
These requisites are effective limitations on the Court's exercise of its power of review
because judicial review in constitutional cases is quintessentially deferential, owing to
the great respect that each co-equal branch of the Government affords to the other.
Of these four requisites, the first two, being the most: essential, 71 deserve an extended
discussion in the instant case.
1. Actual Case or Controversy
Fundamental in the exercise of judicial power, whether under the traditional or

expanded setting, is the presence of an actual case or controversy. 72 An actual case or
controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights and an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The case must not be moot or academic,
or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice.
To be justiciable, the controversy must be definite and concrete, touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be shown from the pleadings
that there is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof on the other. There must be an actual and substantial controversy and
not merely a theoretical question or issue. Further, the actual and substantial
controversy must admit specific relief through a conclusive decree and must not merely
generate an advisory opinion based on hypothetical or conjectural state of facts. 73
Closely associated with the requirement of an actual or justiciable case or controversy

is the ripening seeds for adjudication. Ripeness for adjudication has a two-fold
aspect: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to
the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. The first aspect requires that
the issue must be purely legal and that the regulation subject of the case is a "final
agency action." The second aspect requires that the effects of the regulation must have
been felt by the challenging parties in a concrete way. 74
To stress, a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the challenged

governmental act has a direct and existing adverse effect on the individual challenging
it.75 While a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to a
constitutional interest may provide basis for a constitutional challenge, it is
nevertheless still required that there are sufficient facts to enable the Court to
intelligently adjudicate the issues.76
In this regard, the Court's pronouncement in Philippine Association of Colleges and

Universities (PACU) v. Secretary of Education 77 deserves reiteration:
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant
to consider petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid,
[e]specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrong - nor
allege any - from the enforcement of the criticized statute.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is
one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of human judgment, will shrink from
exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and
official oath decline the responsibility. x x x
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become
dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. x x x
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the
extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. x x x
xxxx
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of

sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has
merely a general [interest] to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of
executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or [has an] interest
common to all members of the public. x x x
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who
fails to show that he ii1 injured by its operation. x x x
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of
litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. x x x
Bona fide suit. - Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and
controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the
decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a
legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital
controversy between litigants. x x x
xxxx
An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and
positive relief. x x x Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions
to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem
may be. This is [e]specially true where the issues "reach constitutional
dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid
decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." x x x
(Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
Ultimately, whether an actual case is present or not is determinative of whether the
Court's hand should be stayed when there is no adversarial setting and when the
prerogatives of the co-equal branches of the Government should instead be respected.
As ruled in Republic v. Roque: 78

A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they
have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to
sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of
RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases,
private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and
infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the
said law would remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose, private
respondents' fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government
officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show
how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action
geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words,
t ere was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held
in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility
is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step
in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. (Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Concededly, the Court had exercised the power of judicial review by the mere
enactment of a law or approval of a challenged action when such is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre:79
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred
and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with
administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and
constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect
involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function."
This is a rather novel theory - that people should await the implementing evil to befall
on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it
remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are
contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts
implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that
when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere
enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x, it becomes a legal issue which
the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
xxxx
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy:
x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also
the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not
only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void.
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the
laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa,80 the Court took cognizance of the petitions despite
posing a facial challenge against the entire law as the petitions seriously alleged that
fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed legislation:
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law
and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.
xxxx
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a
speech regulating measure.
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.
These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After
all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful
assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction; the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld
the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded
its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying
reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law
not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with
its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged

that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual
case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the
Filipino people. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied) 81
Likewise in Belgica v. Ochoa,82 the Court held that the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is satisfied by the antagonistic positions taken by the parties:
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the
questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged
funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization-such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund - are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of
these public funds.
1(a). Scope of Judicial Review
To determine whether petitioners presented an actual case or controversy, or have

seriously alleged that R.A. No. 7662 suffers from constitutional infirmities to trigger the
Court's power of judicial review, resort must necessarily be had to the pleadings filed.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 allege that R.A. No. 7662 and the LEB issuances relative
to the admission and practice of law encroach upon the powers of the Court. 83 It is their
position that the powers given to the LEB are directly related to the Court's powers. 84 In
particular, they argue that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal
education under Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 falls within the authority of the
Court.85 In their Memorandum, they additionally argue that the LEB's powers to
prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members under Section 7(c)
and 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, Sections 50-51 of LEBMO No. 1, and Resolution No. 2014-02
intrude into the Court's rule-making power relative to the practice of law. 86 They also
argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to
education.87 It is their contention that the LEB is without power to impose
sanctions.88 They also question the authority of the LEB Chairperson and Members to
act in a hold-over capacity.89
For their part, petitioners-in-intervention allege that the PhiLSAT requirement resulted
to a reduced number of law student enrollees for St. Thomas More School of Law and
Business, Inc. and constrained said law school to admit only students who passed the
PhiLSAT which is against their policy of admitting students based on values. 90 Their co-
petitioners are students who either applied for law school, failed to pass the PhiLSAT,
or, were conditionally enrolled. Thus, they argue that Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 and
the PhiLSAT violate the law school's academic freedom.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 allege that they are current law students who failed to
pass and/or take the PhiLSAT, and who are therefore threatened with the revocation of
their conditional enrollment and stands to be barred from enrolling. Twelve of the 23
petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 were not allowed to enroll for failure to pass and/or take
the PhiLSAT.
It is their argument that the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to
prescribe minimum standards for law admission, Section 7(g) to establish a law practice
internship, Section 7(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education, and Section
3(a)(2) on the stated objective of legal education to increase awareness among
members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed
sectors of society usurp the Court's rule-making powers concerning admission to the
practice of law.91 In addition, they argue that the PhiLSAT issuances violate academic
freedom, and that the LEB is not authorized to revoke conditional enrollment nor is it
authorized to forfeit school fees and impose a ban enrollment which are penal sanctions
violative of the due process clause. They also argue that the classification of students to
those who have passed or failed the PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to law school is
repugnant to the equal protection clause.
The petitions therefore raise an actual controversy insofar as they allege that R.A. No.
7662, specifically Section 2, paragraph 2, Section 3(a)(2), Section 7(c), (e), (g), and
(h) of R.A. No. 7662 infringe upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning
the practice of law and upon institutional academic freedom and the right to quality
education. Necessarily, a review of the LEB issuances when pertinent to these assailed
provisions of R.A. No. 7662 shall also be undertaken.
2. Legal Standing
Inextricably linked with the actual case or controversy requirement is that the party
presenting the justiciable issue must have the standing to mount a challenge to the
governmental act.
By jurisprudence, standing requir.es a personal and substantial interest in the case

such that the petitioner has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the
violation of its rights,92 thus:
Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." To possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct
injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 93 (Emphasis
supplied)
The rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth doctrine,
taxpayer suits, third-party standing and the doctrine of transcendental importance. 94
Petitioners-in-intervention Caballero, Castardo, Bringas, Federe and Matutino, being

graduates of a four-year college course and applicants as first year law students, as
well as petitioners Abayata, Vasquez, Ilustrismo, Salaño, Guzman and Odias, as law
students who failed to pass the PhiLSAT and were denied admission to law school for
the academic year 2018 to 2019, and petitioners Dela Cruz, Suico, Pescadero, Dela Paz,
Queniahan, Mejos, Daño, Adolfo, Atig, Lumayag, Lagera, Francisco, Dandan, Dela Peña,
Villamor, Llorico and Santamaria, being law students who were conditionally enrolled,
possess the requisite standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7(e) of R.A.
No. 7662 and the implementing LEB issuances, as they were, in fact, required to take
the PhiLSAT, or to comply with the terms of the conditional enrollment and failing
which, were denied admission as regular students to law school.
Petitioner-in-intervention St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., likewise
sufficiently alleges injury that it has sustained in the form of reduced number of
enrollees due to the PhiLSAT requirement and the curtailment of its discretion on who
to admit in its law school. Under the specific and concrete facts available in this case,
these petitioners have demonstrated that they were, or tend to be directly and
substantially, injured.
Meanwhile, petitioners Pimentel, Comafay, Gorospe, Sandoval, Loanzon, Perez, Cacho,

Espaldon, Albano, Siazon, Artugue, Lacsina, Liu, Buenviaje, Nicolas, Tolentino, and
Gruyal; and petitioners-in intervention Rapista, Rapista-Tan, Tan, Enterina and Villarico
commonly anchor their standing to challenge R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as
citizens.
Standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able
to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is
involved.95
Legal standing may be extended to petitioners for having raised a "constitutional issue
of critical significance."96 Without a doubt, the delineation of the Court's rule-making
power vis-a-vis the supervision and regulation of legal education and the determination
of the reach of the State's supervisory and regulatory power in the context of the
guarantees of academic freedom and the right to education are novel issues with far--
reaching implications that deserve the Court's immediate attention. In taking
cognizance of the instant petitions, the Court is merely exercising its power to
promulgate rules towards the end that constitutional rights are protected and
enforced.97
Now, to the core substantive issues.
II.
Substantive Issues
A.
Jurisdiction Over Legal Education
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law necessarily includes the power to do
things related to the practice of law, including the power to prescribe the requirements
for admission to the study of law. In support, they point to Sections 6 98 and 16,99 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the Congress cannot create an
administrative body, like the LEB, that exercises this rule-making power of the Court.
They emphasize that the LEB belongs to the Executive department, and, as such, is not
linked or accountable to the Court nor placed under the Court's regulation and
supervision.
For their part, petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the Court exercises
authority over the legal profession which includes the admission to the practice of law,
to the continuing requirements for and discipline of lawyers. 100 According to them, the
rule-making power of the Court is plenary in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law. They argue that the Court's power to admit members
to the practice of law extends to admission to legal education because the latter is a
preparatory process to the application for admission to the legal profession, which
"residual power" of the Court can be inferred from Sections 5 101 and 6, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. They also emphasize that under Sections 1 102 and 2103 of Rule 138-A,
non-lawyers are allowed to have limited practice of law and are held to answer by the
Court under the same rules on privileged communication and standard of conduct
pursuant to Sections 3104 and 4105 of Rule 138-A.106
Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over
legal education. Neither the history of the Philippine legal education nor the Rules of
Court invoked by petitioners support their argument. The supervision and regulation of
legal education is an Executive function.
1. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and

consistently exercised by the political departments
Legal education in the Philippines was institutionalized in 1734, with the establishment
of the Faculty of Civil Law in the University of Santo Tomas with Spanish as the medium
of instruction. Its curriculum was identical to that adopted during the time in the
universities in Europe107 and included subjects on Civil Law, Canon Law, ecclesiastical
discipline and elements of Natural Law. 108
In 1901, Act No. 74 was passed centralizing the public school system, and establishing
the Department of Public Instruction headed by the General Superintendent. 109 The
archipelago was then divided into school divisions and districts for effective
management of the school system. It was through Act No. 74 that a Trade
School110 and a Normal School111 in Manila and a School of Agriculture in Negros were
established.112
In 1908, the legislature approved Act No. 1870 which created the University of the
Philippines (UP). However, English law courses were not offered until 1910 when the
Educational Department Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA),
through the efforts of Justice George Malcolm, offered law courses in the English
language. In 1911, UP adopted these classes by formally establishing its College of
Law,113 with its first graduates being students who studied at YMCA. 114 The curriculum
adopted by the UP College of Law became the model of the legal education curriculum
of the other law schools in the country. 115
Private schools were formally regulated in 1917 with the passage of Act No.
2706116 which made obligatory the recognition and inspection of private schools and
colleges by the Secretary of Public Instruction, so as to maintain a standard of
efficiency in all private schools and colleges 117 in the country. As such, the Secretary of
Public Instruction was authorized to inspect schools and colleges to determine efficiency
of instruction and to make necessary regulations. Likewise, under Act No. 2706, the
Secretary of Public Instruction was specifically authorized to prepare and publish, from
time to time, in pamphlet form, the minimum standards required of law schools and
other schools giving instruction of a technical or professional character. 118
In 1924, a survey of the Philippine education and of all educational institutions, facilities
and agencies was conducted through Act No. 3162, which created the Board of
Educational Survey. Among the factual findings of the survey was that schools at that
time were allowed to operate with almost no supervision at all. This led to the
conclusion that a great majority of schools from primary grade to the university are
money-making devices of persons who organize and administer them. Thus, it was
recommended that some board of control be· organized under legislative control to
supervise their administration.119 It was further recommended that legislation be
enacted to prohibit the opening of any school without the permission of the Secretary of
Public Instruction. The grant of the permission was, in turn, predicated upon a showing
that the school is compliant with the proper standards as to the physical structure,
library and laboratory facilities, ratio of student to teacher and the qualifications of the
teachers.120
Consistent with these statutory precursors, the 1935 Constitution expressed in no

uncertain terms that "[a]ll educational institutions shall be under the supervision and
subject to regulation by the State."121
This was followed by several other statutes such as the Commonwealth Act No.
578122 which vests upon teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision
of public or duly-recognized private schools, colleges and universities the status of
"persons in authority" and Republic Act No. 139123 which created the Board of
Textbooks, mandating all public schools to use only the books approved by the Board
and allowing all private schools to use textbooks of their choice, provided it is not
against the law or public policy or offensive to dignity. 124
In 1947, the Department of Instruction was changed to the Department of

Education.125 During this period, the regulation and supervision of public and private
schools belonged to the Bureau of Public and Private Schools. The regulation of law
schools in particular was undertaken by the Bureau of Private Schools through a special
consultant who acted as a supervisor of the law schools and as a national coordinator of
the law deans.126
The Department of Education, through its Bureau of Private Schools, issued a Manual of
Instructions for Private Schools which contained the rules and regulations pertaining to
the qualifications of the faculty and deans, faculty load and library holdings of private
learning institutions.127 Meantime, a Board of National Education was created 128 with the
task of formulating, implementing and enforcing general educational policies and
coordinating the offerings and functions of all educational institutions. The Board of
National Education was later renamed as the National Board of Education. 129 In 1972,
the Department of Education became the Department of Education and Culture, 130 and
was later on renamed as the. Ministry of Education and Culture in 1978. 131
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution remained consistent in mandating that all educational
institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. 132
With the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang 232133 (B.P. Blg. 232) or the Education Act
of 1982, the regulatory rules on both formal and non formal systems in public and
private schools in all levels 6f the entire educational system were codified. The National
Board of Education was abolished, and instead, a Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports (MECS) was organized to supervise and regulate educational institutions. Part
and parcel of the MECS' authority to supervise and regulate educational institutions is
its authority to recognize or accredit educational institutions of all levels. 134
Accordingly, the MECS was given the authority over public and private institutions of
higher education, as well as degree-granting programs, in all post-secondary public and
private educational institutions.135 In particular, a Board of Higher Education136 was
established as an advisory body to the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports with
the functions of making policy recommendations on the planning and management of
the integrated system of higher education and recommending steps to improve the
governance of the higher education system. Apart from the Board of Higher Education,
a Bureau of Higher Education was also established to formulate and evaluate programs
and educational standards for higher education137 and to assist the Board of Higher
Education. Law schools were placed, under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Higher
Education.138
The MECS later became the DECS in 1987 under Executive Order No. 117 139 (E.O. No.
117). Nevertheless, the power of the MECS to supervise all educational institutions
remained unchanged.140
The Administrative Code141 also states that it shall be the State that shall protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all; and that the DECS shall be
primarily responsible for the formulation, planning, implementation, and coordination of
the policies, plans, programs and projects in the areas of formal and non-formal
education. The Administrative Code also empowered the Board of Higher Education to
create technical panels of experts in the various disciplines including law, to undertake
curricula development.142 As will be discussed hereunder, the 1987 Constitution
crystallized the power of the State to supervise and regulate all educational
institutions.143
2. DECS Order No. 27-1989 was the precursor of R.A. No. 7662
Pursuant to its mandate under B.P. Blg. 232, the DECS promulgated DECS Order No.
27, Series of 1989 (DECS Order No. 27-1989),144 in close coordination with the
Philippine Association of Law Schools, the Philippine Association of Law Professors and
the Bureau of Higher Education. DECS Order No. 27-1989 specifically outlined the
policies and standards for legal education, and superseded all existing policies and
standards related to legal education. These policies were made applicable beginning
school year 1989 to 1990.
"Legal education" was defined in DECS Order No. 27-1989 as an educational program
including a clinical program appropriate and essential in the understanding and
application of law and the administration of justice. It is professional education after
completion of a required pre-legal education at the college level. For state colleges and
universities, the operation of their law schools was to depend on their respective
charters, and for private colleges and universities, by the rules and regulations issued
by the DECS. Nevertheless, it was made clear under DECS Order No. 27-1989 that the
administration of a law school shall be governed primarily by the law school's own
policies and the provisions thereof apply only suppletorily. 145
Likewise, in generally permissive terms, DECS Order No. 27-1989 prescribed the
preferred qualifications and functions of a law dean, as well as the preferred
qualifications, conditions of employment and teaching load of law faculty members. It
also prescribed the general inclusions to the law curriculum, but gave the law schools
the prerogative to design its own curriculum. The DECS also drew a model law
curriculum, thus, revising the 122-unit curriculum prescribed in 1946 by the Office of
Private Education, as well as the 134-unit curriculum prescribed in 1963. The law
schools were also given the option to maintain a legal aid clinic as part of its law
curriculum. It also prescribed the need for law schools to have relevant library
resources. Applicants for a law course are required to comply with the specific
requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Court.
Such was the state of the regulation of legal education until the enactment of R.A. No.
7662 in 1993. In 1994, R.A. No. 7722146 was passed creating the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) tasked to supervise tertiary degree programs. Except for the
regulation and supervision of law schools which was to be undertaken by the LEB under
R.A. No. 7662, the structure of DECS as embodied in E.O. No. 117 remained practically
unchanged.
Due to the fact that R.A. No. 7662 was yet to be implemented with the organization of
the LEB, the CHED, meanwhile, assumed the function of supervising and regulating law
schools. For this purpose, the CHED constituted a Technical Panel for Legal Education
which came up with a Revised Policies and Standards for Legal Education, which,
however, was unpublished.
3. Legal education 1s a mere composite of the educational system
As recounted, the historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects

the consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise and
regulate all levels and areas of education, including legal education.
Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is

perhaps unique because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is
not reason in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory
and supervisory powers of the political branches.
Notwithstanding, petitioners maintain that legal education, owing to its specialized

"legal" nature and being preparatory to the practice of law, should fall within the
regulation and supervision of the Court itself. Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 went as far
as professing that they are not against the creation of an administrative body that will
supervise and regulate law schools, only that such body should be placed under the
Court's supervision and control.
Two principal reasons militate against such proposition:
First, it assumes that the Court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate
legal education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate the admission to
the practice of law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary to the
above-recounted history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal
anchorage.
Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not,
arrogate upon itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to void R.A. No. 7662 and
thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and place it under its
supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate a highly
improper form of judicial activism.
4. Court's exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the
study of law
The Constitution lays down the powers which the Court can exercise. Among these is
the power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law.
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court had been uniformly granted under the
1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. The complexion of the rule-making power,
however, changes with the promulgation of these organic laws.
Under the 1935 Constitution, existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure were
repealed and were instead converted as the Rules of Court which the Court can alter
and modify. The Congress, on the other hand, was given the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules on pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law promulgated by the Court. 147
This power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and
admission to the practice of law is in fact zealously guarded by the Court.
Thus, in Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,148 the Court asserted its "exclusive"

and constitutional power with respect to the admission to the practice of law and when
the act falls within the term "practice of law," the Rules of Court govern. 149
In In Re: Petition of A.E. Garcia,150 the Court withheld from the executive the power to
modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law as the
prerogative to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law belongs to the
Court and the power to repeal, alter, or supplement such rules is reserved only to the
Congress.
Even then, the character of the power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law under the 1935 Constitution was held not to be absolute and that any
law passed by the Congress on the matter is merely permissive, being that the power
concerning admission to the practice of law is primarily a judicial function.
The 1973 Constitution is no less certain in reiterating the Court's power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts and the admission to
the practice of law. As observed in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,151 the 1973
Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving it the
additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 152
The ultimate power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar remains to be with the
Court under the 1973 Constitution even when the power of the Batasang Pambansa to
pass laws of permissive and corrective character repealing, altering, or supplementing
such rules was retained.
The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic laws in the sense
that it took away from the Congress the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law,
and the integration of the Bar and therefore vests exclusively and beyond doubt, the
power to promulgate such rules to the Court, thereby supporting a "stronger and more
independent judiciary."153
While the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions "textualized a power-sharing scheme" between
the legislature and the Court in the enactment of judicial rules, 154 the 1987 Constitution
"textually altered the power-sharing scheme" by deleting the Congress' subsidiary and
corrective power.155
Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted
as vesting upon the Court the authority to define the practice of law, 156 to determine
who will be admitted to the practice of law, 157 to hold in contempt any person found to
be engaged in unauthorized practice of law,158 and to exercise corollory disciplinary
authority over members of the Bar.159
The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of
law is a judicial function because it requires "(1) previously established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles."160
Petitioners readily acknowledge that legal education or the study of law is not the
practice of law, the former being merely preparatory to the latter. In fact, the practice
of law has a settled jurisprudential meaning:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involved appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. 161 (Internal citations
omitted)
The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged
as to cover the study of law.
5. The Court exercises judicial power only
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he Members of
the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions." The Court exercises
judicial power only and should not assume any duty alien to its judicial functions, the
basic postulate being the separation of powers. As early as Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay
Transportation Co.,162 the Court already stressed:
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of
power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court
and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or
to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected
with the administering of judicial functions. (Emphases supplied)
Neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise
of the Court's "residual" power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of the
two co-equal branches and which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise consistent
with its functions. Regulation and supervision of legal education is primarily exercised
by the Legislative and implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the
judiciary.
It is with studied restraint that the Court abstains from exercising a power that is not
strictly judicial, or that which is not expressly granted to it by the Constitution. 163 This
judicial abstention is neither avoidance nor dereliction - there is simply no basis for the
Court to supervise and regulate legal education.
Court supervision over legal education is nevertheless urged164 to the same extent as
the Court administers, supervises and controls the Philippine Judicial Academy
(PHILJA).165 The parallelism is mislaid because the PHILJA is intended for judicial
education.166 It particularly serves as the "training school for justices, judges, court
personnel, lawyers and aspirants to judicial posts."167 Court supervision over judicial
education is but consistent with the Court's power of supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.168
Still, petitioners insist that the Court actually regulated legal education through
Sections 5, 6, and 16 of Rule 138 and Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Rule 138-A of the 1997
Rules of Court. On the contrary, the Rules of Court do not intend nor provide for direct
and actual Court regulation over legal education. At most, the Rules of Court are
reflective of the inevitable relationship between legal education and the admissions to
the bar.
6. The Rules of Court do not support the argument that the Court directly and
actually regulates legal education
While the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice
of law exists under the 1935 Constitution and reiterated under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, the Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and actually
regulates legal education.
Instead, the 1964 Rules of Court concerned only the practice of law, admission to the
bar, admission to the bar examination, bar examinations, and the duties, rights and
conduct of attorneys. The 1997 Rules of Court is no different as it contained only the
rules on attorneys and admission to the bar under Rule 138, the law student practice
rule under Rule 138-A, the integrated bar in Rule 139-A and disbarment and discipline
of attorneys in Rule 139-B.169
In the exercise of its power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law, the Court has prescribed the subjects covered by, as well as the
qualifications of candidates to the bar examinations. Only those bar examination
candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade are admitted to the bar and
licensed to practice law.170 The regulation of the admission to the practice of law goes
hand in hand with the commitment of the Court and the members of the Philippine Bar
to maintain a high standard for the legal profession. To ensure that the legal profession
is maintained at a high standard, only those who are known to be honest, possess good
moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set
by the Court by passing the bar examinations honestly and in the regular and usual
manner are admitted to the practice of law.171
Thus, under the 1997 Rules of Court, admission to the bar requires: (1) furnishing
satisfactory proof of educational, moral, and other qualifications; (2) passing the bar
examinations;172 and (3) taking the; lawyer's oath,173 signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court a certificate of the license to practice. 174 An applicant
for admission to the bar must have these qualifications: (1) must be a citizen of the
Philippines; (2) must at least be 21 years of age; (3) must be of good moral character;
(4) must be a resident of the Philippines; (5) must produce satisfactory evidence of
good moral character; and (6) no charges against the applicant, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 175 It is beyond
argument that these are the requisites and qualifications for admission to the practice
of law and not for admission to the study of law.
In turn, to be admitted to the bar examinations, an applicant must first meet the core
academic qualifications prescribed under the Rules of Court.
6(a). Sections 5, 6, and 16, Rule 138
Section 5 provides that the applicant should have studied law for four years and have
successfully completed all the prescribed courses. This section was amended by Bar
Matter No. 1153,176 to require applicants to "successfully [complete] all the prescribed
courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent, in a law school or
university officially recognized by the Philippine Government, or by the proper authority
in foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted." Bar Matter No. 1153 further
provides that a Filipino citizen who is a graduate of a foreign law school shall be allowed
to take the bar examinations only upon the submission to the Court of the required
certifications.
In addition to the core courses of civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law,
public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical
jurisprudence, taxation, and legal ethics, Section 5 was further amended by A.M. No.
19-03-24-SC or the Revised Law Student Practice Rule dated June 25, 2019 to include
Clinical Legal Education as a core course that must be completed by an applicant to the
bar examinations.
Notably, Section 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is not directed to law
schools, but to those who would like to take the bar examinations and enumerates the
academic competencies required of them. The Court does not impose upon law schools
what courses to teach, or the degree to grant, but prescribes only the core academic
courses which it finds essential for an applicant to be admitted to the bar. Law schools
enjoy the autonomy to teach or not to teach these courses. In fact, the Court even
extends recognition to a degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent obtained abroad
or that granted by a foreign law school for purposes of qualifying to take the Philippine
Bar Examinations, subject only to the submission of the required certifications. Section
5 could not therefore be interpreted as an exercise of the Court's regulatory or
supervisory power over legal education since, for obvious reasons, its reach could not
have possibly be extended to legal education in foreign jurisdictions.
In similar fashion, Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an applicant
to the bar examinations must have completed a four-year high school course and a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. Again, this requirement is imposed upon the
applicant to the bar examinations and not to law schools. These requirements are
merely consistent with the nature of a law degree granted in the Philippines which is a
professional, as well as a post-baccalaureate degree.
It is a reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the qualifications in order to take
the bar examinations, had placed a considerable constraint on the courses offered by
law schools. Adjustments in the curriculum, for instance, is a compromise which law
schools apparently are willing to take in order to elevate its chances of graduating
future bar examinees. It is in this regard that the relationship between legal education
and admissions to the bar becomes unmistakable. This, however, does not mean that
the Court has or exercises jurisdiction over legal education. Compliance by law schools
with the prescribed core courses is but a recognition of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction
over admissions to the practice of law - that no person shall be allowed to take the bar
examinations and thereafter, be admitted to the Philippine Bar without having taken
and completed the required core courses.
Section 16, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that those who
fail the bar examinations for three or more times must take a refresher course.
Similarly, this is a requirement imposed upon the applicant. The Court does not impose
that a law school should absolutely include in its curriculum a refresher course.
6(b). Revised Law Student Practice Rule
Neither does Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC on
law student practice manifest the Court's exercise of supervision or regulation over
legal education. The three-fold rationale of the law student practice rule is as follows:
1. [T]o ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or
inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional
competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act [as] counsels on their own;
2. [T]o provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to
protect itself from any potential vicarious liability' arising from some culpable action by
their law students; and
3. [T]o ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to
practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a
license, as required by law.177
Consistently, the Revised Law Student Practice Rule is primordially intended to ensure
access to justice of the marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student
practitioner's limited practice of law pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules
on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged.
In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student
practitioner, what the Court regulates and supervises is not legal education, but the
appearance and conduct of a law student before any trial court, tribunal, board, or
officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic - an activity rightfully falling
under the definition of practice of law. Inasmuch as the law student is permitted to act
for the legal clinic and thereby to practice law, it is but proper that the Court exercise
regulation and supervision over the law student practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has
the power to allow their appearance and plead their case, and hereafter, to regulate
their actions.
In all, the Rules of Court do not support petitioners' argument that the Court regulates
and supervises legal education. To reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not
towards legal education or law schools, but towards applicants for admission to the bar
and applicants for admission to the bar examinations - consistent with the Court's
power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, the same being
fundamentally a judicial function.
Having, thus, established that the regulation and supervision of legal education do not
fall within the competence of the Court and is, instead, a power exercised by the
political departments, the Court now proceeds to determine the extent of such police
power in relation to legal education.
B.
Reasonable Supervision and Regulation of Legal Education as an Exercise of
Police Power
The term police power was first used178 in jurisprudence in 1824 in Gibbons v.
Ogden179 where the U.S. Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, held that the
regulation of navigation by steamboat operators for· purposes of interstate commerce
was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress, thus, negating state laws
interfering with the exercise of that power. Likewise often cited is Commonwealth v.
Alger180 which defined police power as "the power vested in legislature by the
[C]onstitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
[C]onstitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
Closer to home, early Philippine jurisprudence pertain to police power as the power to
promote the general welfare and public interest; 181 to enact such laws in relation to
persons and property as may promote public health, public morals, public safety and
the general welfare of each inhabitant; 182 to preserve public order and to prevent
offenses against the state and to establish for the intercourse of [citizens] those rules of
good manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights. 183
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel [Operators] Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of

Manila,184 the nature and scope of police power was reaffirmed as embracing the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. It is negatively defined as the authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare185 and the State's inherent power to prohibit all that is hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society, 186 and flows from the recognition that salus
populi est suprema lex.187 It is described as the most essential, insistent and
illimitable188 of the powers of the State. It is co-existent with the concept of the State
and is the very foundation and one of its cornerstones, 189 and therefore even precedes
the written Constitution.
1. Enactment of education laws is an exercise of police power
The State has a "high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens" 190 and has an
interest in prescribing regulations to promote the education, and consequently, the
general welfare of the people.191 The regulation or administration of educational
institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest. 192 Thus, the
enactment of education laws, implementing rules and regulations and issuances of
government agencies is an exercise of the State's police power. 193
As a professional educational program, legal education properly falls within the

supervisory and regulatory competency of the State. The legislative history of the
Philippine legal educational system earlier recounted evinces that the State, through
statutes enacted by the Congress and administrative regulations issued by the
Executive, consistently exercises police power over legal education.
The exercise of such police power, however, is not absolute.

2. Supervisory and regulatory exercise, not control
The 1935194 and 1973195 Constitutions plainly provide that all educational institutions

shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. These reflect in
express terms the police power already inherently possessed by the State. Making
express an already inherent power is not a superfluous exercise, but is rather
consequential in case of conflict between express powers. As elucidated in Philippine
Association of Colleges and Universities:196
In this connection we do not share the belief that [now Article XIV, Section 4(1)] has
added new power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power.
An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For
instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power
to control private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the
former - conflict of two express powers. But if the power to control education is merely
implied from the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express individual right[.] x x
x
The 1987 Constitution under Section 4(1), Article XIV, even when expressly recognizing
the complementary roles played by the public and private schools in education,
reiterated that these educational institutions are subject to State supervision and
regulation, thus:
SEC. 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private
institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision
and regulation of all educational institutions. (Emphasis supplied)
As much as possible, the words of the Constitution are understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. 197
As worded, the Constitution recognizes that the role of public and private schools in
education is complementary in relation to each other, and primordial in relation to the
State as the latter is only empowered to supervise and regulate. The exercise of police
power in relation to education must be compliant with the normative content of Section
4(1), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. 198 The exercise of police power over
education must merely be supervisory and regulatory.
The State's supervisory and regulatory power is an auxiliary power in relation to

educational institutions, be it a basic, secondary or higher education. This must
necessarily be so since the right and duty to educate, being part and parcel of youth-
rearing, do not inure to the State at the first instance. Rather, it belongs essentially and
naturally to the parents,199 which right and duty they surrender by delegation to the
educational institutions. As held in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)
v. Quezon City,200 the right and duty of parents to rear their children being a natural
and primary right connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing
of their children. The responsibility to educate lies with the parents and guardians as an
inherent right,201 over which the State assumes a supportive role. 202 Withholding from
the State the unqualified power to control education also serves a practical purpose - it
allows for a degree of flexibility and diversity essential to the very reason of education
to rear socially responsible and morally upright youth and to enable them, also, to
come in contact with challenging ideas.
In this sense, when the Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is understood
that what it enjoys is a supportive power, that is, the power of oversight 203 over all
educational institutions. It includes the authority to check, but not to interfere.
In addition to supervision, educational institutions are likewise made subject to State

regulation. Dispensing a regulatory function means imposing requirements, setting
conditions, prescribing restrictions, and ensuring compliance. In this regard, the
political departments are vested with ample authority to set minimum standards to be
met by all educational institutions.204
Starkly withheld from the State is the power to control educational institutions.
Consequently, in no way should supervision and regulation be equated to State control.
It is interesting to note that even when a suggestion had been made during the drafting
of the 1935 Constitution that educational institutions should be made "subject to the
laws of the State," the proponent of the amendment had no totalitarian
intentions,205 and the proposal was not meant to curtail the liberty of teaching, 206 thus:
I think it only insures the efficient functioning of educational work and does not limit
liberty of administrators of schools. The gentleman will notice that my amendment does
not tend to curtail which he used in asking the question [sic]. I want the power of
the State to be supervisory as supervision in educational parlance should be of
the constructive type in the matter of help rather than obstruction. 207 (Emphasis
supplied)
3. Reasonable exercise
To be valid, the supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police

power must be reasonable and not repugnant to the Constitution. 208
As held in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.,209 the exercise of police power, in order
to be valid, must be compliant with substantive due process:
[T]he State, x x x may be considered as having properly exercised [its] police power
only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise[;] and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method. (Emphases supplied)
In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,210 the Court held that:
Notwithstanding its. extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations.
For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. (Emphasis supplied)
Obviating any inference that the power to regulate means the power to control, the
1987 Constitution added the word "reasonable" before the phrase supervision and
regulation.
The import of the word "reasonable" was elaborated in Council of Teachers,211 as

follows:
x x x Section 4(1) was a provision added by the Framers to crystallize the State's
recognition of the importance of the role that the private sector plays in the quality of
the Philippine education system. Despite this recognition, the Framers added the
second portion of Section 4[1] to emphasize that the State, in the exercise of its police
power, still possesses the power of supervision over private schools. The Framers were
explicit, however, that this supervision refers to external governance, as opposed
to internal governance which was reserved to the respective school boards, thus:
Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the addition of the word
"reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and regulation"; two, the addition of the
word "quality" before the word "education"; three, the change of the wordings in the
1973 Constitution referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant
to the goals of national development, to the present expression of "relevant to the
needs of the people and society"; and four, the explanation of the meaning of the
expression "integrated system of education" by defining the same as the recognition
and strengthening of the complementary roles of public and private educational
institutions as separate but integral parts of the total Philippine educational system.
When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external

governance of educational institutions, particularly private educational institutions
as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards of directors or
trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on external
governance, the State would still have the inherent right to regulate educational
institutions through the exercise of its police power. We have thought it advisable to
restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it necessary to
add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our Supreme Court in a
decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. The
Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court
said, and I quote:
It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides
for control of education by the State.
The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means
power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to
prove that State control of private education was intended by organic law.
The addition, therefore, of the word 'reasonable' is meant to underscore the
sense of the committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State
supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only
to the power of the State to provide regulations and to see to it that these
regulations are duly followed and implemented. It does not include the right to
manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to
dominate. (Emphases in the original; underscoring supplied)
The addition of the word "reasonable" did not change the texture of police power that
the State exercises over education. It merely emphasized that State supervision and
regulation of legal education cannot amount to control.
4. Academic freedom
Fundamental in constitutional construction is that the Constitution is to be interpreted

as a whole, and that all provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought
into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the purposes of the Constitution. 212
Accordingly, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is not a stand-alone
provision, but must be read in conjunction with the other Constitutional provisions
relating to education which include, in particular, the clause on academic freedom.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar· provision was found
in the 1973 Constitution providing that: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy
academic freedom."213 Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions provide for a broader
scope of academic freedom compared to the 1935 Constitution which limits the
guarantee of academic freedom only to universities of higher learning established by
the State.214
In fact, academic freedom is not a novel concept. This can be traced to the freedom of
intellectual inquiry championed by Socrates, lost and replaced by thought control during
the time of Inquisition, until the movement back to intellectual liberty beginning the
16th century, most particularly flourishing in German universities. 215
Academic freedom has traditionally been associated as a narrow aspect of the broader
area of freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press. It has been identified
with the individual autonomy of educators to "investigate, pursue, [and] discuss free
from internal and external interference or pressure."216 Thus, academic freedom of
faculty members, professors, researchers, or administrators is defended based on the
freedom of speech and press.217
Academic freedom is enjoyed not only by members of the faculty, but also by the
students themselves, as affirmed in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong:218
x x x. After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none
too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as
found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what
aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S.
Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand
the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the
courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of
the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,'
do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna
replied: "Not only that, it also includes x x x" Gascon finished off the broken thought,
"the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Jurisprudence has so far understood academic freedom of the students as the latter's
right to enjoy in school the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. For instance, in Villar v.
Technological Institute of the Philippines219 and in Non v. Dames II,220 it was held that
academic standards cannot be used to discriminate against students who exercise their
rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, in Malabanan v. Ramento,221 it was ruled
that the punishment must be commensurate with the offense, and in Guzman v.
National University,222 which affirmed the student's right to due process.
Apart from the academic freedom of teachers and students, the academic freedom of
the institution itself is recognized and constitutionally guaranteed.
The landmark case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology223 elucidates how academic freedom is enjoyed by institutions of higher
learning:
[I]t is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the
recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed
of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to
attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide
sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President
Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is
similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the
university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university
professor." He cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of
Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of European
universities: "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be
obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an
organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members
within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In
considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore,
between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the
individual university teacher." Also: To clarify further the distinction between the
freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he says: The personal
aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher - recognized and
effectively guaranteed by society - to seek and express the truth as he personally sees
it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of
the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic
freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they
disseminate their learning. (Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Garcia also enumerated the internal conditions for institutional academic freedom, that
is, the academic staff should have de facto control over: (a) the admission and
examination of students; (b) the curricula for courses of study; (c) the appointment
and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d) the allocation of income among the
different categories of expenditure. 224
Reference was also made to the influential language of Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,225 describing it as the "business of the university"
to provide a conducive atmosphere for speculation, experimentation, and creation
where the four essential freedoms of the university prevail: the right of the university
to determine for itself on academic grounds (a) who may teach; (b) what may be
taught; (c) how it shall be taught; and (d) who may be admitted to study.
4(a). State's supervisory and regulatory power over legal education in relation
to academic freedom
The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself
who may teach; what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who to admit, being
part of their academic freedom. The State, in the exercise of its reasonable supervision
and regulation over education, can only impose minimum regulations.
At its most elementary, the power to supervise and regulate shall not be construed as
stifling academic freedom in institutions of higher learning. This must necessarily be so
since institutions of higher learning are not mere walls within which to teach; rather, it
is a place where research, experiment, critical thinking, and exchanges are secured.
Any form of State control, even at its most benign and disguised as regulatory, cannot
therefore derogate the academic freedom guaranteed to higher educational institutions.
In fact, this non-intrusive relation between the State and higher educational institutions
is maintained even when the Constitution itself prescribes certain educational "thrusts"
or directions.226
This attitude of non-interference is not lost in jurisprudence. To cite an example, due

regard for institutional academic freedom versus State interference was recognized
in Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,227 the commendable purpose of the Philippine
Regulation Commission of ensuring the integrity of the examination notwithstanding:
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the
academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere
with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best
enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full-
[f]ledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are
clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review
schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,228 the Court
upheld the university's academic freedom to choose who should teach and held that the
Civil Service Commission had no authority to dictate to the university the outright
dismissal of its personnel. Nothing short of marked arbitrariness, 229 or grave abuse of
discretion230 on the part of the schools, or overriding public welfare 231 can therefore
justify State interference with the academic judgment of higher educational institutions.
As held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,232 "[a]s corporate entities,
educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls
or pressure."
5. Right to education
Apart from the perspective of academic freedom, the reasonable supervision and
regulation clause is also to be viewed together with the right to education. The 1987
Constitution speaks quite elaborately on the right to education. Section 1, Article XIV
provides:
SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education
at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
The normative elements of the general right to education under Section 1, Article XIV,
are (1) to protect and promote quality education; and (2) to take appropriate steps
towards making such quality education accessible.
"Quality" education is statutorily defined as the appropriateness, relevance and

excellence of the education given to meet the needs and aspirations of the individual
and society.233
In order to protect and promote quality education, the political departments are vested
with the ample authority to set minimum standards to be met by all educational
institutions. This authority should be exercised within the parameters of reasonable
supervision and regulation. As elucidated in Council of Teachers:234
While the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality education, the
determination of what constitutes quality education is best left with the
political departments who have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and
resources to determine the same. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission again are very instructive:
Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education" to
send appropriate signals to the government that, in the exercise of its
supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set satisfactory minimum
requirements in all areas curriculum, faculty, internal administration, library,
laboratory class and other facilities, et cetera, and it should see to it that
satisfactory minimum requirements are met by all educational institutions,
both public and private.
When we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters, among

others, as curriculum development, development of learning resources and
instructional materials, upgrading of library and laboratory facilities,
innovations in educational technology and teaching methodologies,
improvement of research quality, and others. Here and in many other provisions
on education, the principal focus of attention and concern is the students. I would like
to say that in my view there is a slogan when we speak of quality of education that I
feel we should be aware of, which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other words,
even if the quality of education is good now, we should attempt to keep on improving
it. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, "accessible" education means equal opportunities to education
regardless of social and economic differences. The phrase "shall take appropriate steps"
signifies that the State may adopt varied approaches in the delivery of education that
are relevant and responsive to the needs of the people and the society. This is why,
towards this end, the State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system
of education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high
school levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children,
elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs,
subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both
public and private schools, especially to the underprivileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-
learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that
respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics,
vocational efficiency, and other skills.235 (Emphases supplied)
The deliberations of the framers in this regard are instructive:
MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize
is that education should be equally accessible to all regardless of social and
economic differences. So we go into the issue of providing opportunities to
such an education, recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come
from the poorer social classes because of their inability to continue education. 236 x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
And further, as follows:
This is why when we speak of education as a right, it means very clearly that
education should be accessible to all, regardless of social and economic
differences, meaning, educational opportunities should be provided through a
system of free education, at least, up to the secondary level. And recognizing
the limits of our financial resources, tertiary education should still be afforded
and provided availability to those who are poor and. deserving. That is why
when we say that education is a right, it imposes a correlative duty on the part of the
State to provide it to the citizens. Making it a right shows that education is recognized
as an important function of the State. Education is not merely a social service to be
provided by the State. The proposed provision recognizes that a right to education is a
right to acquire a decent standard of living, and that, therefore, the State cannot
deprive anyone of this right in the same manner that the right to life, the right to
liberty and property cannot be taken away without due process of law. 237 (Emphasis
supplied)
The element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus, pertains to both the
elimination of discrimination especially against disadvantaged groups and to the
financial duty of the State for, after all, the right to education is part and parcel of
social justice. The objective is to make quality education accessible by appropriate
means.
Apart from the Constitution, the right to education is also recognized in international
human rights law under various instruments to which the Philippines is a state
signatory and to which it is concomitantly bound.
For instance, Article 13(2)238 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes; the right to receive an education with the
following interrelated and essential features: (a) availability; (b) accessibility; (c)
acceptability; and (d) adaptability. 239
In particular, accessibility is understood as giving everyone, without discrimination,

access to educational institutions and programs. Accessibility has three overlapping
dimensions:
(1) Non-discrimination - education must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable
groups, in law and fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds x x x;
(2) Physical accessibility - education has to be within safe physical reach, either by
attendance at some reasonably convenient geographic location ([e.g.] a neighborhood
school) or [via] modern technology ([e.g.] access to a "distance learning" programme);
[and]
(3) Economic accessibility - education has to be affordable to all. This dimension of
accessibility is subject to the differential wording of [A]rticle 13(2) in relation to primary,
secondary and higher education: whereas primary education shall be available "free to
all", States parties are required to progressively introduce free secondary and higher
education[.]240
Pertinent to higher education, the elements of quality and accessibility should also be
present as the Constitution provides that these elements should be protected and
promoted in all educational institutions.
Nevertheless, the right to receive higher education is not absolute.
5(a). Right to education is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission

and academic requirements
Article 26(1)241 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[t]echnical
and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall
be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit[,]" while the ICESCR provides that
"[h]igher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by
every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free
education[.]"242 Thus, higher education is not to be generally available, but accessible
only on the basis of capacity.243 The capacity of individuals should be assessed by
reference to all their relevant expertise and experience. 244
The right to receive higher education must further be read in conjunction with the right
of every citizen to select a profession or course of study guaranteed under the
Constitution. In this regard, the provisions of the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(3),
Article XIV are more exacting:
SEC. 5. x x x
xxxx
(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
There is uniformity in jurisprudence holding that the authority to set the admission and
academic requirements used to assess the merit and capacity of the individual to be
admitted and retained in higher educational institutions lie with the institutions
themselves in the exercise of their academic freedom.
In Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,245 the Court ruled:

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary
proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary
upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather
than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to
freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are,
to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution.
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right x x x extends as well to
parents x x x as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student
discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded
as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its
very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic
groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the
panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to
education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that
is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. (Citation in the
original omitted; emphases supplied)
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines,246 the Court similarly held:
xxxx
2. What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social,
economic, and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and
high school grades but also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the
State maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where
finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the
high school level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and
universities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a
duty to be obligatory in the case of students in the colleges and universities. As far as
the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right
because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free,
at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall
be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of
merit."
3. It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the

social economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation
imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally
available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should
be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for
excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked
academic deficiency.
4. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes

the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances
failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however,
that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate
against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly
and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus
prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. (Emphases
supplied)
Likewise, in Calawag:247
Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and
Sports v. San Diego, we held that the right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e),
Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to select a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements." The thesis requirement and the compliance with the
procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic requirements a
person desiring to complete a course of study would have to comply
with. (Citation in the original omitted; emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the framers on the qualifications to the right to education are also
illuminating:
MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you, Madam President. Before I ask questions directed to the
chairman and members of the committee, I would like to warmly congratulate them for
a job well-done. The committee report to my mind, Madam President, is excellent and I
hope it will not, in the course of amendments, suffer from adulteration. With respect to
page 1, lines 12-13: "Education is the right of every citizen of the Philippines," I agree
with this statement, but when we talk of the right, I understand from the chairman that
it is compellable and from Commissioner Guingona, that it is enforceable in
court. Suppose a student of a private school is not allowed to enroll by reason
of misconduct or that his stay in the school is considered by the administration
of that school to be undesirable, does he have a right to enforce his right to
education under this situation?
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, the right to education, like any other right, is
not absolute. As a matter of fact, Article XXVI of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, when it acknowledges the right to education, also qualifies it when at the end of
the provision, it say, "on the basis of merit." Therefore, the student may be subject
to certain reasonable requirements regarding admission and retention and this
is so provided in the draft Constitution. We admit even of discrimination. We have
accepted this in the Philippines, and I suppose in the United States there are schools
that can refuse admission to boys because they are supposed to be exclusively
for girls. And there are schools that may refuse admission to girls because
they are exclusively for boys. There may even be discrimination to accept a
student who has a contagious disease on the ground that it would affect the
welfare of the other students. What I mean is that there could be reasonable
qualifications, limitations or restrictions to this right, Madam President.
MR. GASCON: May I add, Madam President.
MR. NOLLEDO: Yes, the Commissioner may.
MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize
is that education should be equally accessible to all regardless of social and economic
differences. So we go into the issue of providing opportunities to such an education,
recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come from the poorer
social classes because of their inability to continue education.
However, in the same light, this right to education is subject to the right of
educational institutions to admit students upon certain conditions such as
ability to pay the required entrance examination fee and maintaining a
respectable school record. When we speak of this right of schools as far as
maintaining a certain degree or quality of students, these conditions must be
reasonable and should not be used just to impose certain unfair situations on
the students.
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, may I add.
There is already established jurisprudence about this. In the United States, in the case
of [Lesser] v. Board of Education of New York City, 239, NYS 2d 776, the court held
that the refusal of a school to admit a student who had an average of less than 85
percent which is the requirement for that school was lawful.
In the Philippines, we have the case of Padriguilan [sic] v. Manila Central

University where refusal to retain the student was because of the alleged deficiency in a
major subject and this was upheld by our Supreme Court. There is also the case
of Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, wherein Garcia, a woman, tried to continue
studying in this school of theology.248 (Citation in the original omitted; emphases
supplied)
Extant from the foregoing is that while there is a right to quality higher education, such
right is principally subject to the broad academic freedom of higher educational
institutions to impose fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. Plainly stated, the right to receive education is not and should not be
taken to mean as a right to be admitted to educational institutions.
With the basic postulates that jurisdiction over legal education belongs primarily and
directly to the political departments, and that the exercise of such police power must be
in the context of reasonable supervision and regulation, and must be consistent with
academic freedom and the right to education, the Court now proceeds to address
whether the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662 and the corresponding LEB issuances
fall within, the constitutionally-permissible supervision and regulation of legal
education.
C.
LEB's Powers Under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the Court's Jurisdiction Under
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution
1. Section 3(a)(2) on increasing awareness among members of the legal

profession
One of the general objectives of legal education under Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662
is to "increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of
the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.]" This objective is reiterated by
the LEB in LEBMO No. 1-2011, Section 7, Article II, as follows:
SEC. 7. (Section 3 of the law) General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education.
a) Legal education m the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:

xxxx
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of

the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The plain language of Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No.
1-2011 are clear and need no further interpretation. This provision goes beyond the
scope of R.A. No. 7662, i.e., improvement of the quality of legal education, and, instead
delves into the training of those who are already members of the bar. Likewise, this
objective is a direct encroachment on the power of the Court to promulgate rules
concerning the practice of law and legal assistance to the underprivileged and should,
thus, be voided on this ground. As aptly observed by the CLEBM and which the Court
had approved:
In the same vein Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education
increasing "awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place
in the law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of law as they perform
the task of educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the
Constitution also provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules on "legal assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A.
No. 7662] might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power. 249
2. Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal apprenticeship and law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the bar
Towards the end of uplifting the standards of legal education, Section 2, par. 2 of R.A.
No. 7662 mandates the State to (1) undertake appropriate reforms in the legal
education system; (2) require proper selection of law students; (3) maintain quality
among law schools; and (4) require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal
education.
Pursuant to this policy, Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 grants LEB the power to establish
a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar examinations:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x x
xxxx
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar,
which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office
or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that
the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this
purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and
the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new
member of the Bar.
This power is mirrored in Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011:
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving
the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the

Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law
office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific
period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12)months. For
this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation
and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new
member of the Bar[.]
It is clear from the plain text of Section 7(g) that another requirement, i.e., completion
of a law internship program, is imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This
requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate
rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto.
The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar
examinations belongs to the Court. In fact, under the whereas clauses of the Revised
Law Student Practice Rule, the Court now requires the completion of clinical legal
education courses, which may be undertaken either in a law clinic or through an
externship, as a prerequisite to take the bar examinations, thus:
Whereas, to produce practice-ready lawyers, the completion of clinical legal education
courses must be a prerequisite to take the bar examinations as provided in Section 5 of
Rule 138.
Under Section 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of
legal education, but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar
examinations, and consequently, admissions to the bar. This is a direct encroachment
upon the Court's exclusive authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions to the
bar and should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.
Further, and as will be discussed hereunder, the LEB exercised this power in a manner
that forces upon law schools the establishment of a legal apprenticeship program or a
legal aid clinic, in violation of the schools' right to determine for themselves their
respective curricula.
3. Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(h) on continuing legal education of

practicing lawyers
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the power given to the LEB to adopt a system
of continuing legal education implies that the LEB exercises jurisdiction not only over
the legal education of those seeking to become lawyers, but also over those who are
already lawyers which is a function exclusively belonging to the Court. 250 Respondent,
on the other hand, maintains that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal
education is different from the mandatory continuing legal education required of all
members of the bar.251 Respondent explains that the continuing legal education under
R.A. No. 7662 is limited to the training of lawyer-professors and not to the practice of
the legal profession.252
The questioned power of the LEB to adopt a system of continuing legal education
appears in Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - x x x
xxxx
system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools,
and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
xxxx
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x
xxxx
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the [LEB]
may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as the [LEB] may deem necessary; x x x
(Emphases supplied)
This power is likewise reflected in Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, as follows:
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving
the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board
may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary[.] x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal education" under Section 2, par. 2,
and Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the legal
education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is
authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and
for such duration as the LEB deems, necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court's
power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education
of "lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is practice of law. The mandatory continuing
legal education of the members of the bar is, in fact, covered by B.M. No. 850 or the
Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) dated August 22, 2000 which
requires members of the bar, not otherwise exempt, from completing, every three
years, at least 36 hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE
Committee directly supervised by the Court.
As noted by the CLEBM:

Thus, under the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State "shall
undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require the proper
selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools and require
apprenticeship and continuing legal education["]. The concept of continuing legal
education encompasses education not only of law students but also of members of the
legal profession. Its inclusion in the declaration of policies implies that the [LEB] shall
have jurisdiction over the education of persons who have finished the law course and
are already licensed to practice law. Viewed in the light of Section 5, paragraph 5 of
Article VIII of the Constitution that vests the Supreme Court with powers over the
Integrated . Bar of the Philippines, said portion of Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662] risks a
declaration of constitutional infirmity. 253 (Underscoring supplied)
4. Section 7(e) on minimum standards for law admission and the PhiLSAT
issuances
Of the several powers of the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, its power to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission under Section 7(e) received the strongest objection from
the petitioners. Section 7(e), provides:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x
xxxx
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications

and compensation of faculty members; (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners argue that the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission
belongs to the Court pursuant to its rule-making power concerning the admission to the
practice of law; Thus, Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 which gives the LEB the power to
prescribe the minimum standards for law admission is allegedly unconstitutional as it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Necessarily, according to the petitioners,
the PhiLSAT which was imposed by the LEB pursuant to Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 is
likewise void.
The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-making power and the power
of the LEB to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of
R.A. No. 7662. Consequently, the PhiLSAT, which intends to regulate admission to law
schools, cannot be voided on this ground.
4(a). LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for "law admission"

pertain to admission to legal education and not to the practice of law
Much of the protestation against the LEB's exercise of the power to prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission stems from the interpretation extended to the
phrase "law admission." For petitioners, "law admission" pertains to the practice of law,
the power over which belongs exclusively to the Court.
The statutory context and the intent of the legislators do not permit such interpretation.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part must be read together with
the other parts, to the end that the general intent of the law is given primacy. 254 As
such, a law's clauses and phrases cannot be interpreted as isolated expressions nor
read in truncated parts, but must be considered to form a harmonious whole. 255
Accordingly, the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission should be read with the State policy behind the
enactment of R.A. No. 7662 which is fundamentally to uplift the standards of legal
education and the law's thrust to undertake reforms in the legal education system.
Construing the LEH's power to prescribe the standards for law admission together with
the LEB's other powers to administer, supervise, and accredit law schools, leads to the
logical interpretation that the law circumscribes the LEB's power to prescribe admission
requirements only to those seeking enrollment to a school or college of law and not to
the practice of law.
Reference may also be made to DECS Order No. 27-1989, as the immediate precursor
of R.A. No. 7662, as to what is sought to be regulated when the law speaks of "law
admission" requirements.
Section 1, Article VIII of DECS Order No. 27-1989 is clear that the admission
requirement pertains to enrollment in a law course, or law school, or legal education,
thus:
Article VIII
Admission, Residence and Other Requirements
SEC. 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law course unless he complies
with specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education
and the Supreme Court of the Philippines, for which purpose he must present to
the registrar the necessary credentials before the end of the enrollment period.
(Emphases supplied)
This contemporary interpretation suffice in itself to hold that the phrase "law admission"
pertains to admission to the study of law or to legal education, and not to the practice
of law. Further support is nevertheless offered by the exchanges during the Senate
interpellations, wherein it was assumed that the phrase "minimum standards for law
admission" refers to the requirements that the student must fulfill before being
admitted to law school. This assumption was not corrected by the bill's sponsor. 256
4(b). Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 is reasonable supervision and regulation
Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, insofar as it gives the LEB the power to prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission is faithful to the reasonable supervision and
regulation clause. It merely authorizes the LEB to prescribe minimum requirements not
amounting to control.
Emphatically, the law allows the LEB to prescribe only the minimum standards and it
did not, in any way, impose that the minimum standard for law admission should be by
way of an exclusionary and qualifying exam nor did it prevent law schools from
imposing their respective admission requirements.
Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, the minimum standards for admission to law schools
as implemented by the LEB are: (1) completion of a four-year high school course; and
(2) completion of a course for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. 257 Again, these
requirements are but consistent with the nature of the law course in the Philippines as
being both a professional and post-baccalaureate education.
As the facts disclose, however, the LEB later on introduced the PhiLSAT as an additional
prerequisite for admission to law school.
4(c). Pursuant to Section 7(e), LEB is authorized to administer an aptitude

test as a minimum standard for law admission
Evident from the Senate deliberations that, in prescribing the minimum standards for
law admission, an aptitude test may be administered by the LEB although such is not
made mandatory under the law. Thus:
Senator Tolentino: x x x
I will proceed to another point, Mr. President. I have taught law for more than 25 years
in private schools and in the University of the Philippines as well. There is one thing I
have noticed in all these years of teaching and that is, many students in the law school
are not prepared or apt by inclination or by ability to become lawyers. I see that the
objectives of the legal education that are provided for in this bill do not provide for
some mechanism of choosing people who should take up the law course.
As it is now, because of our democratic principles, anybody who wants to become a

lawyer, who can afford the tuition fee, or who has the required preparatory course, can
be admitted into the law school. And yet, while studying law, many of these students -
I would say there are about 30 or 40 percent of students in private schools - should not
be taking up law but some other course because, simply, they do not have the
inclination, they do not have the aptitude or the ability to become lawyers.
Can that be provided for in this bill, Madam Sponsor? Would it contravene really our
principles of democracy where everybody should be free to take the course that he
wants to take? Or should the State be able to determine who should be able or who
should be allowed to take a particular course, in this case of law?
Senator Shahani: Mr. President, there are those aptitude tests which are being
taken when the student is in high school to somehow guide the guidance
councilors [sic] into the aptitude of the students. But the talent or the
penchant for the legal profession is not one of those subjects specifically
measured. I think what is measured really is who is, more or less, talented for
an academic education as against a vocational education. But maybe, a new
test will have to be designed to really test the aptitude of those who would
like to enter the law school. x x x
Senator Tolentino: x x x
Many parents want to see their children become lawyers. But they do not consider the
aptitude of these children, and they waste money and time in making these children
take up law when they really are not suited to the law course. My real concern is
whether by legislation, we can provide for selection of those who should be
allowed to take up law, and not everybody would be allowed to take up law. x
xx
xxxx
Senator Shahani: Mr. President, of course, the right to education is a

constitutional right, and I think one cannot just categorically deny a student -
especially if he is bright - entrance to a law school. I think I would stand by
what I had previously said that an aptitude examination will have to be
specially designed. It is not in existence yet. x x x258 (Emphases supplied)
This matter was amplified in second reading:
Senator Angara: x x x
Senator Tolentino asked why there is an omission on the requirements for admission to
law school. I think [Senator Shahani] has already answered that, that the [LEB] may
prescribe an aptitude test for that purpose. Just as in other jurisdictions, they
prescribe a law admission test for prospective students of law. I think the
board may very well decide to prescribe such a test, although it is not
mandatory under this bill.259 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The lawmakers, therefore, recognized and intended that the LEB be vested with
authority to administer an aptitude test as a minimum standard for law admission. The
presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and
one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose
of the law.260 This presumption has not been successfully challenged by petitioners.
It also bears to note that the introduction of a law aptitude examination was actually
supported by the Court when it approved the CLEBM's proposed amendment to Section
7(e), as follows:
SEC. 6. Section 7 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 7. Power and Functions. - x x x
xxxx
d). to prescribe minimum standards for ADMISSION TO LAW SCHOOLS INCLUDING A

SYSTEM OF LAW APTITUDE EXAMINATION x x x[.]" (Underscoring supplied)
And further in Bar Matter No. 1161261 when the Court referred to the LEB the conduct of
a proposed law entrance examination.
4(d). PhiLSAT, as an aptitude exam, is reasonably related to the improvement

of legal education
Having settled that the LEB has the power to administer an aptitude test, the next issue
to be resolved is whether the exercise of such power, through the PhiLSAT, was
reasonable.
Indeed, an administrative regulation is susceptible to attack for unreasonableness.

In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,262 the Court held:
It is an [axiom] in administrative law that administrative authorities should
not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To
be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to
secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to
be invalid. (Emphasis supplied)
To determine whether the PhiLSAT constitutes a valid exercise of police power, the
same test of reasonableness, i.e., the concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
means, is employed. Petitioners argue that the PhiLSAT is unreasonable because: it is
not a conclusive proof of the student's aptitude; 263 it entails unreasonable examination
and travel expenses and burdensome documentary requirements; 264 applying for
PhiLSAT exemption is inconvenient;265 it is redundant to existing law school entrance
exams;266 and it is not supported by scientific study. 267
Unfortunately, these grounds are not only conclusions of fact which beg the
presentation of competent evidence, but also necessarily go into the wisdom of the
PhiLSAT which the Court cannot inquire into. The Court's pronouncement as to the
reasonableness of the PhiLSAT based on the grounds propounded by petitioners would
be an excursion into the policy behind the examinations - a function which is
administrative rather than judicial.
Petitioners also argue that there is no reasonable relation between improving the
quality of legal education and regulating access thereto. The Court does not agree.
The subject of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. It is indubitable
that the State has an interest in prescribing regulations promoting education and
thereby protecting the common good. Improvement of the quality of legal education,
thus, falls squarely within the scope of police power. The PhiLSAT, as an aptitude test,
was the means to protect this interest.
4(e). Tablarin sustained the conduct of an admission test as a legitimate

exercise of the State's regulatory power
Moreover, by case law, the Court already upheld the validity of administering an
aptitude test as a reasonable police power measure in the context of admission
standards into institutions of higher learning.
In Tablarin, the Court upheld not only the constitutionality of Section 5(a) of R.A. No.
2382, or the Medical Act of 1959, which gave the Board of Medical Education (BME) the
power to prescribe requirements for admission to medical schools, but also MECS Order
No. 52, Series of 1985 (MECS Order No. 52-1985) issued by the BME which prescribed
NMAT.
Using the rational basis test, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as
follows:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a
condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of
the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the
power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of
minimum medical educational requirements - i.e., the completion of prescribed courses
in a recognized medical school - for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we
have before us in the instant case is closely related; the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the
rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted
to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity
in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of
limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and
the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional; schools in general,
and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like

the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the
quality of medical education, in the country." Given the widespread use today of
such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America
the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with
far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the
failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to
recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies
and minds for disease or trauma.268 (Emphases supplied)
The Court reached its conclusion that NMAT is a valid exercise of police power because
the method employed, i.e., regulation of admissions to medical education is reasonably
related to the subject, i.e., the protection of the public by ensuring that only those
qualified are eventually allowed to practice medicine.
The necessity of State intervention to ensure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by those unqualified to take care of the life and health of patients was
likewise the reason why the Court in Department of Education, Culture and Sports v.
San Diego269 upheld the "three-flunk" rule in NMAT:
We see no reason why the rationale in the [TabIarin] case cannot apply to the case at
bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This
may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability,
by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the
former in the regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that
the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the
police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the

purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is
intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession
from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. (Emphases supplied)
Tablarin recognized that State intervention was necessary, and therefore was allowed,
because of the need to meet the goal of promoting public health and safety.
In similar vein, the avowed purpose of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal
education by evaluating and screening applicants to law school. As elucidated, the State
has an interest in improving the quality of legal education for the protection of the
community at-large, and requiring an entrance test is reasonably related to that
interest. In other words, the State has the power and the prerogative to impose a
standardized test prior to entering law school, in the same manner and extent that the
State can do so in medical school when it prescribed the NMAT.
In all, the Court finds no constitutional conflict between the Court's rule-making power
concerning admissions to the practice of law and on the LEB's power to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.
Further, pursuant to its power under Section 7(e), the Court affirms the LEB's authority
to initiate and administer an aptitude test, such as the PhiLSAT, as a minimum standard
for law admission. Thus, the PhiLSAT, insofar as it functions as an aptitude exam that
measures the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law to the end
that the quality of legal education is improved is not per se unconstitutional.
However, there are certain provisions of the PhiLSAT that render its operation
exclusionary, restrictive, and qualifying which is contrary to its design as an aptitude
exam meant to be used as a tool that should only help and guide law schools in
gauging the aptness of its applicants for the study of law. These provisions effectively
and absolutely exclude applicants who failed to pass the PhiLSAT from taking up a
course in legal education, thereby restricting and qualifying admissions to law schools.
As will be demonstrated, these provisions of the PhiLSAT are unconstitutional for being
manifestly violative of the law schools' exercise of academic freedom, specifically the
autonomy to determine for itself who it shall allow to be admitted to its law program.
D.
LEB's Powers vis-a-vis Institutional Academic Freedom and the Right to
Education
1. PhiLSAT
Paragraphs 7, 9, 11, and 15 of LEBMO No. 7-2016, provide:

xxxx
7. Passing Score - The cut-off or passing score for the PhiLSAT shall be FIFTY-
FIVE PERCENT (55%) correct answers, or such percentile score as may be
prescribed by the LEB.
xxxx
9. Admission Requirement - All college graduates or graduating students

applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the
PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law school in the
Philippines. Upon the effectivity of this memorandum order, no applicant shall be
admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading
to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has
passed the PhiLSAT taken within 2 years before the start of studies for the
basic law course and presents a valid [Certificate of Eligibility] as proof
thereof.
xxxx
11. Institutional Admission Requirements - The PhiLSAT shall be without prejudice

to the right of a law school in the exercise of its academic freedom to
prescribe or impose additional requirements for admission, such as but not
limited to:
a. A score in the PhiLSAT higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the
LEB;
b. Additional or supplemental admission tests to measure the competencies

and/or personality of the applicant; and
c. Personal interview of the applicant.
xxxx
15. Sanctions - Law schools violating this Memorandum Order shall [be] imposed
the administrative sanctions prescribed in Section 32 of LEBMO No. 2, Series of
2013 and/or fine of up to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for each infraction.
(Emphases supplied)
Without doubt, the above provisions exclude and disqualify those examinees who fail to
reach the prescribed passing score from being admitted to any law school in the
Philippines. In mandating that only applicants who scored at least 55% correct answers
shall be admitted to any· law school, the PhiLSAT actually usurps the right and duty of
the law school to determine for itself the criteria for the admission of students and
thereafter, to apply such criteria on a case-by-case basis. It also mandates law schools
to absolutely reject applicants with a grade lower than the prescribed cut-off score and
those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility. The token regard for institutional academic
freedom comes into play, if at all, only after the applicants had been "pre-selected"
without the school's participation. The right of the institutions then are constricted only
in providing "additional" admission requirements, admitting of the interpretation that
the preference of the school itself is merely secondary or supplemental to that of the
State which is antithetical to the very principle of reasonable supervision and
regulation.
The law schools are left with absolutely no discretion to choose its students at the first
instance and in accordance with its own policies, but are dictated to surrender such
discretion in favor of a State-determined pool of applicants, under pain of
administrative sanctions and/or payment of fines. Mandating law schools to reject
applicants who failed to reach the prescribed PhiLSAT passing score or those with
expired PhiLSAT eligibility transfers complete control over admission policies from the
law schools to the LEB. As Garcia tritely emphasized: "[c]olleges and universities should
[not] be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or
reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly
higher category."270
1(a). Comparison of PhiLSAT with NMAT and LSAT
Respondent urges the Court to treat the PhiLSAT in the same manner that the Court
treated the NMAT in Tablarin. Petitioners oppose on the ground that the PhiLSAT and
the NMAT are different because there is a Constitutional body, i.e., the Court, tasked to
regulate the practice of law while there is none with respect to the practice of medicine.
The Court treats the PhiLSAT differently from the NMAT for the fundamental reason that
these aptitude exams operate differently.
For one, how these exams allow the schools to treat the scores therein obtained is
different.
While both exams seem to prescribe a "cut-off" score, the NMAT score is evaluated by
the medical schools in relation to their own cut-off scores. Unlike the PhiLSAT score, the
NMAT score is not the sole determining factor on whether or not an examinee may be
admitted to medical school. The NMAT score is only meant to be one of the bases for
evaluating applicants for admission to a college of medicine.
Medical schools further enjoy the discretion to determine how much weight should be
assigned to an NMAT score relative to the schools' own admissions policy. Different
medical schools may therefore set varying acceptable NMAT scores. Different medical
schools may likewise assign different values to the NMAT score. This allows medical
schools to consider the NMAT score along with the other credentials of the applicant.
The NMAT score does not constrain medical schools to accept pre-selected applicants; it
merely provides for a tool to evaluate all applicants.
Obtaining a low NMAT percentile score will not immediately and absolutely disqualify an
applicant from being admitted to medical school. Obtaining a high NMAT percentile
score only increases an applicant's options for medical schools. Taking the NMAT, thus,
expands the applicant's options for medical schools; it does not limit them.
For another, medical schools are not subjected to sanctions in case they decide to
admit an applicant pursuant to their own admissions policy. In fact, at some
point,271 there was even no prescribed cut-off percentile score for the NMAT, and
instead it was stressed that a student may enroll in any school, college or university
upon meeting the latter's specific requirements and reasonable regulations. 272 Also, the
issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission to a college of medicine had been
transferred to. the medical schools, thus, rightfully giving the responsibility for and
accountability of determining eligibility of students for admission to the medical
program to the schools concerned.273
Similar to the NMAT, the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is only one of the several
criteria for evaluation for law school admission. It is just one of the methods that law
schools may use to differentiate applicants for law school. The American Bar Association
actually allows a law school to use an admission test other than the LSAT and it does
not dictate the. particular weight that a law school should give to the results of the
LSAT in deciding whether to admit an applicant. 274
In contrast, the PhiLSAT score itself determines whether an applicant may be admitted
to law school or not, the PhiLSAT being strictly a pass or fail exam. It excludes those
who failed to reach the prescribed cut-off score from being admitted to any law school.
It qualifies admission to law school not otherwise imposed by the schools themselves.
The PhiLSAT, as presently crafted, employs a totalitarian scheme in terms of student
admissions. This leaves the consequent actions of the applicant-student and the school
solely dependent upon the results of the PhiLSAT.
1(b). Balancing State interest with institutional academic freedom
Thus far, it is settled that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, is
reasonably related to the State's unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of
legal education. This aptitude test, however, should not be exclusionary, restrictive, or
qualifying as to encroach upon institutional academic freedom. Moreover, in the
exercise of their academic freedom to choose who to admit, the law schools should be
left with the discretion to determine for themselves how much weight should the results
of the PhiLSAT carry in relation to their individual admission policies. At all times, it is
understood that the school's exercise of such academic discretion should not be gravely
abused, arbitrary, whimsical, or discriminatory.
With the conclusion that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, passes
the test of reasonableness, there is no rea on to strike down the PhiLSAT in its entirety.
Instead, the Court takes a calibrated approach and partially nullifies LEBMO No. 7-2016
insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking thereof
within two years as a prerequisite for admission to any law school which, on its face,
run directly counter to institutional academic freedom. The rest of LEBMO No. 7-2016,
being free from any taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect,
especially in view of the separability clause 275 therein contained.
1(c). PhiLSAT and the right to education
Anent the argument that the PhiLSAT transgresses petitioners' right to education and
their right to select a profession or course of study, suffice to state that the PhiLSAT is
a minimum admission standard that is rationally related to the interest of the State to
improve the quality of legal education and, accordingly, to protect the general
community. The constitutionality of the PhiLSAT, therefore, cannot be voided on the
ground that it violates the right to education as stated under Section 1, Article XIV of
the Constitution. The Court's pronouncement in Tablarin276 again resonates with
significance:
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more,
petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact
clash with that provision. On the contrary, we may note - x x x - that the statute and
the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality
education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to
Section 5(3) of Article XIV, as one must, one cannot but note that the latter phrase of
Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to
take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all" who might for any
number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school, but rather merely to make
such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements."
2. Other LEB issuances on law admission
Apart from the PhiLSAT, the LEB also imposed additional requirements for admission to
law schools under LEBMO No. 1-2011, specifically:
Article III
Prerequisites and Program Specification
SEC. 15. Prerequisites to admission to Law School. - x x x
xxxx
Where the applicant for admission into a law school is a graduate of a foreign institution
or school following a different course and progression of studies, the matter shall be
referred to the Board that shall determine the eligibility of the candidate for
admission to law school.
SEC. 16. Board Prerequisites for Admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. Program. - The Board
shall apply Section 6 of Rule 138 in the following wise: An applicant for admission to
the Ll.B. or J.D. program of studies must be a graduate of a bachelor's degree and
must have earned at least eighteen (18) units in English, six (6) units in
Mathematics, and eighteen (18) units of social science subjects.
SEC. 17. Board Prerequisites for Admission to Graduate Programs in Law. - Without

prejudice to other requirements that graduate schools may lay down, no applicant
shall be admitted for the Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent master's degree
in law or juridical science, without an Ll.B. or a J.D. degree. Admission of non-
Members of the Philippine Bar to the master's degree shall be a matter of academic
freedom vested in the graduate school of law. The candidate for the doctorate degree in
juridical science, or doctorate in civil law or equivalent doctorate degree must have
completed a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent degree.
Graduate degree programs in law shall have no bearing on membership or non-

membership in the Philippine Bar.277 (Emphases supplied)
Further, LEBMO No. 1-2011, Article V, provides:
xxxx
SEC. 23. No student who has obtained a general average below 2.5 or 80 in the college
course required for admission to legal studies may be admitted to law school.
Exceptions may be made by the Dean in exceptionally meritorious cases, after having
informed the Board.278
These provisions similarly encroach upon the law school's freedom to determine for
itself its admission policies. With regard to foreign students, a law school is completely
bereft of the right to determine for itself whether to accept such foreign student or not,
as the determination thereof now belongs to the LEB.
Similarly, the requirement that an applicant obtain a specific number of units in English,
Mathematics, and Social Science subjects affects a law school's admission policies
leaving the latter totally without discretion to admit applicants who are deficient in
these subjects or to allow such applicant to complete these requirements at a later
time. This requirement also effectively extends the jurisdiction of the LEB to the courses
and units to be taken by the applicant in his or her pre-law course. Moreover, such
requirement is not to be found under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as this
section simply requires only the following from an applicant to the bar exams:
SEC. 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted
unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that,
before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an
authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed
therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following
subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english,
spanish, history and economics.
Likewise, in imposing that only those with a basic degree in law may be admitted to
graduate programs in law encroaches upon the law school's right to determine who
may be admitted. For instance, this requirement effectively nullifies the option of
admitting non-law graduates on the basis of relevant professional experience that a law
school, pursuant to its own admissions policy, may otherwise have considered.
The required general weighted average in the college course suffers the same infirmity
and would have been struck down had ·it not been expressly repealed by the LEB
because of the PhiLSAT.279
3. Section 7(c) and 7(e) on the minimum qualifications of faculty members
The LEB is also empowered under Section 7(c) to set the standards of accreditation
taking into account, among others, the "qualifications of the members of the faculty"
and under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe "minimum qualifications and
compensation of faculty members[.]"
Relative to the power to prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty members, LEB
prescribes under LEBMO No. 1-2011 the following:
[PART I]
Article V
Instructional Standards
SEC. 20. The law school shall be headed by a properly qualified dean, maintain a
corps of professors drawn from the ranks of leading and acknowledged
practitioners as well as academics and legal scholars or experts in juridical
science[.] x x x
xxxx
PART III
QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUM
Article I
Faculty Qualifications
SEC. 50. The members of the faculty of a law school should, at the very least,
possess a L1.B. or a J.D. degree and should be members of the Philippine Bar.
In the exercise of academic freedom, the law school may also ask specialists in various
fields of law with other qualifications, provided that they possess relevant doctoral
degrees, to teach specific subjects.
Within a period of five (5) years of the promulgation of the present order,
members of the faculty of schools of law shall commence their studies in
graduate schools of law.
Where a law school offers the J.D. curriculum, a qualified Ll.B. graduate who is a
member of the Philippine Bar may be admitted to teach in the J.D. course and may
wish to consider the privilege granted under Section 56 hereof.
SEC. 51. The dean should have, aside from complying with the requirements
above, at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or a master's degree in a
related field, and should have been a Member of the Bar for at least 5 years
prior to his appointment as dean.
SEC. 52. The dean of a graduate school of law should possess at least a

doctorate degree in law and should be an acknowledged authority in law, as
evidenced by publications and membership in learned societies and
organizations; members of the faculty of a graduate school of law should
possess at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or the relevant master's or
doctor's degrees in related fields.
Aside from the foregoing, retired justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals may serve as deans of schools of law,
provided that they have had teaching experience as professors of law and provided
further that, with the approval of the Legal Education Board, a graduate school of
law may accredit their experience in the collegiate appellate courts and the judgments
they have penned towards the degree [ad eundem] of Master of Laws.280 (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, a law faculty member must have an Ll.B or J.D. degree
and must, within a period of five years from the promulgation of LEBMO No. 1-2011, or
from June 14, 2011 to June 14, 2016, commence studies in graduate school of law.
The mandatory character of the requirement of a master's degree is underscored by the

LEB in its Resolution No. 2014-02, a "sequel rule" to Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1-2011,
which provides that:
xxxx
1. Members of the law faculty are required to be holders of the

degree of Master of Laws. It is the responsibility of the law deans to
observe and implement this rule.
2. The law faculty of all law schools shall have the following percentage of
holders of the master of laws degree:
2.1. School Year- 2017-2018-20%

2.2. School Year- 2018-2019 - 40%
2.3. School Year- 2019-2020-60%
2.4. School Year- 2020-2021-80%
3. In computing the percentage, those who are exempted from the rule shall
be included.
4. Exempted from this requirement of a master's degree in law are the

following:
The Incumbent or Retired Members of the:
3.1. Supreme Court;

3.2. Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals;
3.3. Secretary of Justice and Under-Secretaries of Justice, Ombudsman, Deputy
Ombudsmen, Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitors General
3.4. Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission who teach Labor Laws;
3.5. Regional Trial Court Judges;
3.6. DOJ State and Regional State Prosecutors and Senior Ombudsman Prosecutors who
teach Criminal Law and/or Criminal Procedure;
3.7. Members of Congress who are lawyers who teach Political Law, Administrative Law,
Election Law, Law on Public Officers and other related subjects;
3.8. Members of Constitutional Commissions who are Lawyers;
3.9. Heads of bureaus who are lawyers who teach the law subjects which their respective
bureaus are implementing;
3.10. Ambassadors, Ministers and other [D]iplomatic Officers who are lawyers who teach
International Law or related subjects;
3.11. Those who have been teaching their subjects for 10 years or more upon
recommendation of their deans; and
3.12. Other lawyers who are considered by the Board to be experts in any field of law
provided they teach the subjects of their expertise.
5. The following are the sanctions for non-compliance with the

foregoing rules:
4.1. If a law school is non-compliant with these rules for the first time beginning School Year
2017-2018, the Board shall downgrade its Recognition status to Permit status;
4.2. If a law school under a Permit status should remain non compliant with these rules in
succeeding school years, the Board shall downgrade the Permit status to Phase-Out
status;
4.3. If a law school which is under Phase-Out status remains non compliant with these rules
in succeeding school years, the Board shall order its closure to take effect at the end of
the school year.
6.
7. If a law school under sanction shall become compliant, its Recognition
status shall be restored. (Emphases supplied)
xxxx
And under LEBMO No. 2:
SEC. 31. Unfitness to Continue Operating a Law Program. A law school which is
operated below quality standards of a law school is unfit to continue operating a
law program.
xxxx
2) A law school is substandard if the result of the inspection and evaluation of the law
school and its facilities by members of the Board or its staff shows that the law school
has serious deficiencies including a weak faculty as indicated, among others, by the
fact that most of the members are neophytes in the teaching of law[.] x x x
xxxx
SEC. 32. The imposable administrative sanctions are the following:
a) Termination of the law program (closing the law school);

b) Phase-out of the law program;
c) Provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law program
of the substandard law school under Permit Status.
This master of laws degree requirement is reiterated in LEBMO No. 17, Series of
2018 (Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic Requirement of Master of
Laws Degree for Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law Schools), as
follows:
xxxx
B) For Members of the Law Faculty
SEC. 6. For purposes of determining compliance with the minimum academic

requirement of a Ll.M. degree for the members of the law faculty in law schools
required under Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1, Series of 2011 and Resolution No. 2014-02,
the required percentage of holders of Ll.M. shall be computed based on the aggregate
units of all courses/subjects offered during the semester by the law school.
SEC. 7. Within thirty (30) days upon completion the effectivity this of this memorandum
[sic], the President of the HEI and the Dean of each law school shall jointly submit to
the LEB separate certification of the total teaching assignments/load for the
1st Semester and 2nd Semester of the Academic Year 2017-2018 in the
prescribed matrix form containing the names of every faculty member, his/her
highest academic law degree, qualification for , exemption from the Ll.M.
requirement, if applicable, courses/subjects assigned to teach, and academic
weight of each course/subject, and a disclosure whether or not the law school
is compliant with the prescribed percentage of Ll.M. holders for faculty
members. Thereafter, the same certification shall be submitted for every regular
semester not later than 45 days from the start of the semester.
xxxx
SEC. 12. Law schools failing to meet the prescribed percentage of its faculty
members required to have Ll.M. degrees shall be imposed the appropriate
administrative sanction specified under Resolution No. 2014-02. (Emphases
supplied)
To be sure, under its supervisory and regulatory power, the LEB can prescribe the
minimum qualifications of faculty members. This much was affirmed by the Court when
it approved the CLEBM's proposal to revise the powers of LEB under R.A. No. 7662, but
nevertheless retaining the LEB's power to "provide for minimum qualifications for
faculty members of law schools." As worded, the assailed clauses of Section 7(c) and
7(e) insofar as they give LEB the power to prescribe the minimum qualifications of
faculty members are in tune with the reasonable supervision and regulation clause and
do not infringe upon the academic freedom of law schools.
Moreover, this minimum qualification can be a master of laws degree. In University of

the East v. Pepanio,281 the Court held that the requirement of a masteral degree, albeit
for tertiary education teachers, is not unreasonable. Thus:
The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not
unreasonable. The operation of educational institutions involves public
interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in
possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed
to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human
activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well
from ill prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or
technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to
possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment. (Emphasis
supplied)
This was reiterated in Son v. University of Santo Tomas,282 as follows:
As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate
program professor's field of instruction has been in place, through DECS Order 92
(series of 1992, August 10, 1992) or the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools. Article IX, Section 44, paragraph [1(a)] thereof provides that college faculty
members must have a master's degree in their field of instruction as a minimum
qualification for teaching in a private educational institution and acquiring regular status
therein.
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of its
[rule]-making power as provided for under Section 70 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232,
otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982. As such, it has the force and effect of
law. In University of the East v. Pepanio, the requirement of a masteral degree for
tertiary education teachers was held to be not unreasonable but rather in accord with
the public interest.
xxxx
From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents,
for maintaining professors without the mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners,
agreeing to be employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary qualifications.
Petitioners cannot therefore insist to be employed by UST since they still do not possess
the required master's degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and maintain
professors without the necessary master's degrees is not a ground for claiming illegal
dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as the law is concerned, respondents are in
violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the practice of hiring unqualified
teaching personnel; but the law cam1ot come to the aid of petitioners on this sole
ground. As between the parties herein, they are in pari delicto.
xxxx
The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the undergraduate teacher's field of

instruction has been cemented in DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and
respondents have been violating it. The fact that government has not cracked down on
violators, or that it chose not to strictly implement the provision, does not erase the
violations committed by erring educational institutions, including the parties herein; it
simply means that government will not punish these violations for the meantime. The
parties cannot escape its concomitant effects, nonetheless. And if respondents knew the
overwhelming importance of the said provision and the public interest involved - as
they now fiercely advocate to their favor - they should have complied with the same as
soon as it was promulgated.
xxxx
In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaoisi v. St. Scholastica's College that

-
Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois still cannot legally
acquire a permanent status of employment. Private educational institutions must still
supplementarily refer to the prevailing standards, qualifications, and conditions set by
the appropriate government agencies (presently the Department of Education, the
Commission on Higher Education, and the Teclmical Education and Skills Development
Authority). This limitation on the right of private schools, colleges, and universities to
select and determine the employment status of their academic personnel has been
imposed by the state in view of the public interest nature of educational institutions, so
as to ensure the quality and competency of our schools and educators. (Internal
citations omitted)
Thus, the masteral degree required of law faculty members and dean, and the doctoral
degree required of a dean of a graduate school of law are, in fact, minimum reasonable
requirements. However, it is the manner by which the LEB had exercised this power
through its various issuances that prove to be unreasonable.
On this point, the amicus curiae, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, while admitting that the
masteral degree requirement is a "laudable aim" of the LEB, nevertheless adds that the
LEB-imposed period of compliance is unreasonable given the logistical and financial
obstacles:
The masteral degree requirement is a laudable aim of LEB, but the possibility of
meeting the LEB period of compliance is unreasonable and unrealistic in the light of
logistical and financial considerations confronting the deans and professors, including
the few law schools offering graduate degrees in law.
To illustrate, to the best of my knowledge there are no more than six (6) graduate
schools of law around the country to service potential applicants. Those who have opted
for graduate studies in law find it very costly to fly to the venue. While one or two
programs may have been delivered outside the provider's home school venue to reach
out to graduate students outside the urban centers, pedagogical standards are often
compromised in the conduct of the modules. This is even aggravated by the fact that
very few applicants can afford to go into full-time graduate studies considering that
most deans and professors of law are in law practice. Perhaps, LEB should work in
consultation with PALS in designing a cost-effective but efficient delivery system of any
graduate program in law, [especially] for deans and law professors. 283
Further, the mandatory character of the master of laws degree requirement, under pain
of downgrading, phase-out and closure of the law school, is in sharp contrast with the
previous requirement under DECS Order No. 27-1989 which merely prefer faculty
members who are holders of a graduate law degree, or its equivalent. The LEB's
authority to review the strength or weakness of the faculty on the basis of experience
or length of time devoted to teaching violates an institution's right to set its own faculty
standards. The LEB also imposed strict reportorial requirements that infringe on the
institution's right to select its teachers which, for instance, may be based on expertise
even with little teaching experience. Moreover, in case a faculty member seeks to be
exempted, he or she must prove to the LEB, and not to the concerned institution, that
he or she is an expert in the field, thus, usurping the freedom of the institution to
evaluate the qualifications of its own teachers on an individual basis.
Also, while the LEB requires of faculty members and deans to obtain a master of laws
degree before they are allowed to teach and administer a law school, respectively, it is
ironic that the LEB, under Resolution No. 2019-406, in fact considers the basic law
degrees of Ll.B. or J.D. as already equivalent to a doctorate degree in other non-law
academic disciplines for purposes of "appointment/promotion, ranking, and
compensation."
In this connection, the LEB also prescribes who may or may not be considered as full-
time faculty, the classification of the members of their faculty, as well as the faculty
load, including the regulation of work hours, all in violation of the academic freedom of
law schools. LEBMO No. 2 provides:
SEC. 33. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. There are two general kinds of faculty
members, the full-time and part-time faculty members.
a) A full-time faculty member is one:

1) Who possesses the minimum qualification of a member of the faculty as prescribed in
Sections 50 and 51 of LEBMO No. 1;
2) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work for the law school;
3) Who has no other occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work, except when
permitted by the higher education institution of which the law school is a part; and
4) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher education institution.
b) A part-time faculty member is one who does not meet the qualifications of a full-time
professor as enumerated in the preceding number.
SEC. 34. Faculty Classification and Ranking. Members of the faculty may be classified,
in the discretion of the higher education institution of which the law school is a part,
according to academic proceeding, training and scholarship into Professor, Associate
Professor, Assistant Professor, and Instructor.
Part-time members of the faculty may be classified as Lecturers, Assistant Professorial

Lecturers, Associate Professorial Lecturers and Professorial Lecturers. The law schools
shall devise their scheme of classification and promotion not inconsistent with
these rules.
SEC. 35. Faculty Load. Generally, no member of the faculty should teach more
than 3 consecutive hours in any subject nor should he or she be loaded with
subjects requiring more than three preparations or three different subjects
(no matter the number of units per subject) in a day.
However, under exceptionally meritorious circumstances, the law deans may allow
members of the faculty to teach 4 hours a day provided that there is a break of 30
minutes between the first 2 and the last 2 hours. (Emphases supplied)
The LEB is also allowed to revoke permits or recognitions given to law schools when the
LEB deems that there is gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of
professors or instructors under Section 41.2(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, thus:
SEC. 412. Permits or recognitions may be revoked, or recognitions reverted to permit
status for just causes including but not limited to:
a) fraud or deceit committed by the institution in connection with its application to the
Board;
b) the unauthorized operation of a school of law or a branch or an extension of a law

school;
c) mismanagement or gross inefficiency in the operation of a law school;
d) gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or
instructors;
e) violation of approved standards governing institutional operations, announcements
and advertisements;
f) transfer of the school of law to a site or location detrimental to the interests of the
students and inimical to the fruitful and promising study of law;
g) repeated failure of discipline on the part of the student body; and
h) other grounds for the closure of schools and academic institutions as provided for in
the rules and regulations of the Commission on Higher Education. 284 (Emphasis
supplied)
In this regard, the LEB is actually assessing the teaching performance of faculty
members and when such is determined by the LEB as constituting gross incompetence,
the LEB may mete out penalties, thus, usurping the law school's right to determine for
itself the competence of its faculty members.
4. Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal apprenticeship and legal

internship
While the clause "legal apprenticeship" under Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on
legal internship, as plainly worded, cannot immediately be interpreted as encroaching
upon institutional academic freedom, the manner by which LEB exercised this power
through several of its issuances undoubtedly show that the LEB controls and dictates
upon law schools how such apprenticeship and internship programs should be
undertaken.
Pursuant to its power under Section 7(g), the LEB passed Resolution No. 2015-
08 (Prescribing the Policy and Rules in the Establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic in Law
Schools) wherein it classified legal aid clinics into three types: (1) a legal aid clinic
which is an outreach project of a law school; (2) a legal aid clinic which entitles the
participating student to curricular credits; and (3) a legal aid clinic that entitles the
participating student to avail of the privileges under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.
Pertinent to the third type, the LEB requires the law schools to comply with the
following rules:
xxxx
b) Implementing Rules
(1) A LAC should be established by the law school.
(2) The law school should formulate its Clinical Legal Education Program and submit it
to the Legal Education board for its assessment and evaluation.
(3) If Legal Education Board finds the Clinical Legal Education Program to be proper
and in order it shall endorse it to the Supreme Court for its approval.
(4) Once approved by the Supreme Court, fourth (4th) year law students in that law school
enrolled in it shall be allowed to practice law on a limited manner pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, Section 24(c), Article IV of LEBMO No. 2 prescribes the activities that should be
included in the law school's apprenticeship program, as follows:
Article IV
Law School: Administrative Matters and Opening of Branches or Extension Classes
SEC. 24. Administrative Matters.
xxxx
c) Apprenticeship Program. The apprenticeship program should be closely supervised by

the Dean or a member of the faculty assigned by the Dean to do the task. The
apprenticeship program should at least include any of the following activities:
1) Preparation of legal documents

2) Interviewing clients
3) Courtroom observation and participation
4) Observation and assistance in police investigations, inquests and preliminary
investigations
5) Legal counseling
6) Legal assistance to detention prisoners
7) For working students, participation in the legal work of the legal section or office of the
employer-entity x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Relatedly, Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, provides:
Article IV
Grading System
SEC. 59. Grading System. - The law school, in the exercise of academic freedom, shall
devise its own grading system provided that on the first day of classes, the students
are apprised of the grading system and provided further that the following are
observed:
xxxx
(d) When apprenticeship is required and the student does not complete the mandated
number of apprenticeship hours, or the person supervising the apprenticeship program
deems the performance of the student unsatisfactory, the dean shall require of the
student such number of hours more in apprenticeship as will fulfill the purposes of the
apprenticeship program.285 (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions unduly interfere with the discretion of a law school regarding its
curriculum, particularly its apprenticeship program. Plainly, these issuances are beyond
mere supervision and regulation.
III.
Conclusion
In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality of legal education, does
not encroach upon the Court's jurisdiction to promulgate rules under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution. It is well-within the jurisdiction of the State, as an
exercise of its inherent police power, to lay down laws relative to legal education, the
same being imbued with public interest.
While the Court is undoubtedly an interested stakeholder in legal education, it cannot

assume jurisdiction where it has none. Instead, in judicial humility, the Court affirms
that the supervision and regulation of legal education is a political exercise, where
judges are nevertheless still allowed to participate not as an independent branch of
government, but as part of the sovereign people.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged is settled as belonging exclusively to the Court, certain provisions and
clauses of R.A. No. 7662 which, by its plain language and meaning, go beyond legal
education and intrude upon the Court's exclusive jurisdiction suffer from patent
unconstitutionality and should therefore be struck down.
Moreover, the exercise of the power to supervise and regulate legal education is
circumscribed by the normative contents of the Constitution itself, that is, it must be
reasonably exercised. Reasonable exercise means that it should not amount to control
and that it respects the Constitutionallyguaranteed institutional academic freedom and
the citizen's right to quality and accessible education. Transgression of these limitations
renders the power and the exercise thereof unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission. The PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude
test to guide law schools in measuring the applicants' aptness for legal education along
with such other admissions policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum
standard.
However, the PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant's

aptitude for law school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools
who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the PhiLSAT
is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design
mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates
institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional.
In striking down these objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT, the State's inherent power
to protect public interest by improving legal education is neither emasculated nor
compromised. Rather, the institutional academic freedom of law schools to determine
for itself who to admit pursuant to their respective admissions policies is merely
protected. In turn, the recognition of academic discretion comes with the inherent
limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical, arbitrary, or gravely abused.
In similar vein, certain LEB issuances which exceed the powers granted under its
charter should be nullified for being ultra vires.
As in all levels and areas of education, the improvement of legal education indeed
deserves serious attention. The parties are at a consensus that legal education should
be made relevant and progressive. Reforms for a more responsive legal education are
constantly introduced and are evolving. The PhiLSAT, for instance, is not a perfect
initiative. Through time and a better cooperation between the LEB and the law schools
in the Philippines, a standardized and acceptable law admission examination may be
configured. The flaws which the Court assessed to be unconstitutional are meanwhile
removed, thereby still allowing the PhiLSAT to develop into maturity. It is, thus,
strongly urged that recommendations on how to improve legal education, including
tools for screening entrants to law school, reached possibly through consultative
summits, be taken in careful consideration in further issuances or legislations.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.
The Court further declares:
As CONSTITUTIONAL:
1. Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the
power to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account,
among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty without
encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning; and
2. Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the
power to prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal education
and minimum qualifications of faculty members without encroaching upon the
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:
1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal
education" as an aspect of legal education which is made subject to Executive
supervision and control;
2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the
objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal
profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as
it gives the Legal Education Board the power to establish a law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the Bar; and
4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as
it gives the Legal Education Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory
continuing legal education and to provide for the mandatory attendance of
practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it may deem
necessary.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:
1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and
qualifying admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional academic
freedom on who to admit, particularly:
a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college
graduates or graduating students applying for admission to the basic law
course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for
admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall
be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses
leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless
he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of
studies for the basic law course;
b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a

prerequisite for admission to law schools; Accordingly, the temporary
restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining the Legal Education
Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made PERMANENT. The
regular admission of students who were conditionally admitted and
enrolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in the exercise of their
academic freedom; and
c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;
2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications
and classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law
in violation of institutional academic freedom on who may teach, particularly:
a. Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;
b. Resolution No. 2014-02;
c. Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;
d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and
3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on
the establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in
violation of institutional academic freedom on what to teach, particularly:
e. Resolution No. 2015-08;
f. Section 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and
g. Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.

SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C. J., I join the separate dissenting and concurring opinion of J. Leonen.
Carpio, Carandang, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Peralta, J., no part.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see separate concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., See separate dissenting and concurring opinion.
Jardeleza, J., Please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Caguioa, J., Please see separate concurring.
A. Reyes, Jr., J., Please see my concurring opinion.
Gesmundo, J., Please separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Hernando, J., on official business.
Lazaro-Javier, J., Please see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 113271 October 16, 1997
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA
CATOLICO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit with the Seller. 1
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare private respondent
Antonia Melodia Catolico (hereafter Catolico) not a "true Servant," thereby assailing the 30
September 1993 decision and December 1993 Resolution of the National Labor Relations
2 3
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93, which sustained the reinstatement and
monetary awards in favor of private respondent and denied the petitioners' motion for
4
reconsideration.5
The facts are as follows:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter

WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988.
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General

6
Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's
accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another
memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting
7
the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides
she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act
was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith
and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting
Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven.
8
In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro

9
warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents."
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an
irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP), which he
described as follows:
. . . A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with
YSP Sales Invoice No. 266 representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at
P384.00 per unit. Previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is
P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per bottle (or
total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated
December 15, 1988. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it
was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department
(Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten
bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their check voucher no. 629552
(shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through China Bank check no.
892068 dated November 9, 1989 . . . .
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having received
it and that she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana,
EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was
actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana
if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang
ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms.
Catolico. 10
Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-
11
four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her
explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2
12
February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be
placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. 13
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No.
266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaña's
invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. 14
In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check
15
she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that
the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and
Co's secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying 16
Catolico of her termination; thus:
We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter dated Feb. 2, 1990 and Feb.
10, 1990 respectively regarding our imposition of preventive suspension on you for acts of
dishonesty. However, said letters failed to rebut the evidences [sic] in our possession which
clearly shows that as a Pharmacist stationed at Espana Branch, you actually made Purchase
Orders at YSP Phils., Inc. for 10 bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00/bottle with previous price
of P320.00/bottle only. A check which you received in the amount of P640.00 actually
represents the refund of over price of said medicines and this was confirmed by Ms. Estelita
Reyes, YSP Phils., Inc. Accounting Department.
Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the company.
Accordingly, you are hereby terminated effective March 8, 1990.
On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension.
17
In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor
18
practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed
to "prove what [they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was
conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the
dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest
of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half month's pay
for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal
suspension "representing 30 days work." Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico as
follows:
30 days Preventive Suspension P2,000.00

Backwages 26,858.50
1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21
Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15
—————
TOTAL AWARD P35,401.86
—————
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the
Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause
to terminate her services.
In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the
19
ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her
employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by
YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But,
it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of
Article III of the Constitution. It concluded:
20
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of
evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the
appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in
the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this special civil action
for certiorari, which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of

facts.
II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.
III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions"
from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989
was not the first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and
that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity to violate company rules,"
constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was given ample
opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.
Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the
21
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's
person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed with the
NLRC's decision, as it was of the persuasion that (a) the conclusions reached by public respondent
are inconsistent with its findings of fact; and (b) the incident involving the opening of envelope
addressed to private respondent does not warrant the application of the constitutional provisions. It
observed that Catolico was given "several opportunities" to explain her side of the check
controversy, and concluded that the opportunities granted her and her subsequent explanation
"satisfy the requirements of just cause and due process." The OSG was also convinced that
Catolico's dismissal was based on just cause and that Catolico's admission of the existence of the
check, as well as her "lame excuse" that it was a Christmas gift from YSP, constituted substantial
evidence of dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed petitioners' argument that there was no violation of
the right of privacy of communication in this case, adding that petitioner WATEROUS was justified
22
in opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a
business communication in which it had an interest.
In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the OSG, the NLRC
contends that petitioners miserably failed to prove their claim that it committed grave abuse of
discretion in its findings of fact. It then prays that we dismiss this petition.
In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal.
The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company
rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the
contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was
discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication;
hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence.
Catolico likewise disputes petitioners' claim that the audit report and her initial response that she
never received a check were sufficient to justify her dismissal. When she denied having received a
check from YSP, she meant that she did not receive any refund of overprice, consistent with her
position that what she received was a token gift. All that can be gathered from the audit report is that
there was apparently an overcharge, with no basis to conclude that Catolico pocketed the amount in
collusion with YSP. She thus concluded that her dismissal was based on a mere suspicion.
Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of WATEROUS
because, being merely a pharmacist, she did not handle "confidential information or sensitive
properties." She was doing the task of a saleslady: selling drugs and making requisitions when
supplies were low.
A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that, except as to the third
ground, the instant petition must fail.
Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee
be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample
opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so
desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
23
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. 24
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was
dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after
receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were
joined through said letters. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic] in
[WATEROUS] possession," which were not, however, submitted. What the "evidences" [sic] other
than the sales invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just
and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a
finding that the dismissal is unjustified. Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.
25
It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged
anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that
there was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered
Catolico's inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit:
26
4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in violation
of the [company] procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC
needed medicines like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which
has a previous price of only P320.00;
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the
cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through
Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there was really an overprice and she said that the
difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552 which was shown to me
and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated
November 9, 1989.
It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes
never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements
attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value. 27
Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While Valdez informed Co,
through the former's memorandum of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00 "thru
28
MBTC Check No. 222832," the said check was never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt
from YSP offered by petitioners.
Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not indicate an
overcharge. The purchase order dated 16 August 1989 stated that the Voren tablets cost
29
P320.00 per box, while the purchase order dated 5 October 1989 priced the Voren tablets at
30
P384.00 per bottle. The difference in price may then be attributed to the different packaging used in
each purchase order.
Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets were
recommended by Director-MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. Lopez and
approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co. The purchase orders were silent as to
Catolico's participation in the purchase. If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners, they or
their officers should have disapproved the transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to
blame for their predicament but themselves. This set of facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible
situation proposed by petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with
suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to
transact, with the said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at all
involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate, much less
benefit from, what Valdez called an "under the table deal" with YSP.
Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of
employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on
31
substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or

suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of
32
employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. 33
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no
reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect
34
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true,
as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be
to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. In this case,
35
however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year
of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of
separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution
of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993,
respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding
the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against
unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 WILLIAM FENN, More fruits of Solitude, maxim 209, in I Harvard Classics 389
(Charles W. Eliot ed., 1937).
2 Per Commissioner Rogelio I. Rayala, with Commissioners Domingo H. Zapanta

and Edna Bonto-Perez, concurring. Original Record (OR), unpaginated; Annex "A" of
Petition, Rollo, 25-36.
3 OR, 86-92; Annex "J" of Petition, Rollo, 96-102.
4. OR, unpaginated.
5 Id.
6 OR, 15.
7 Id., 16.
8 Id., 60.
9 Id., 17.
10 OR, 18.
11 Id., 19.
12 Id., 32.
13 Id., 20.
14 Id., 21.
15 Id., 35.
16 OR, 36.
17 Id., 2.
18 Supra note 3.
19 Supra note 2.
20 These sections pertinently provide as follows:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the Court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
21 193 SCRA 57 [1991].
22 Citing People v. Marti, supra note 21.
23 Tiu v. NLRC, 215 SCRA 540, 551 [1992].
24 Mañebo v. NLRC, 229 SCRA 240, 251 [1994].
25 Reno Foods, Inc. v. NLRC, 249 SCRA 379, 386 [1995]; Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121574, 17 October 1996, 5-6.
26 Rollo, 71-72.
27 People v. Laurente, 255 SCRA 543, 567 (1996); Batiquin v. Court of Appeals, 258
SCRA 334, 342 [1996].
28 OR, 18.
29 Annex "A" of Petitioner's Reply to Complainant's Position Paper, OR, 42.
30 Annex "B," id., id., 43.
31 See LABOR CODE, Art. 282.
32 Falguera v. Linsangan, 251 SCRA 364, 376 [1995]; De la Cruz v. NLRC, G.R. No.
119536, 17 February 1997, 7.
33 Marina Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 420, 425 [1991]; De la Cruz v.
NLRC, supra note 32, at 7.
34 Supra note 21.
35 Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120482, 27 January 1997,
9; De la Cruz v. NLRC, supra note 31, at 8.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
R. No. 181881 October 18, 2011
BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner,

vs.
CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN
BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D.
UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was
charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employee’s personal files
stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside
the Decision1 dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution 2 dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner
Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
which found him guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 and penalized him with dismissal.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also
the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan
Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent

CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent through a
courier service (LBC) from a certain "Alan San Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was
received by the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following
office practice in which documents marked "Confidential" are left unopened and instead sent to the
addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Dear Madam Chairwoman,
Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just
alright for an employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused gov’t employee having a
pending case in the csc. I honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is
the chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who have
pending cases in the Csc. The justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue.
Please investigate this anomaly because our perception of your clean and good office is being
tainted.
Concerned Govt employee3

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to
back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal
divisions."4 After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay
Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team informed the officials of
the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert
Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson David’s directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division
(LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely
monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the
head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of
computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair. The text messages received by
petitioner read:
"Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going over the PCs of PALD and LSD per
instruction of the Chairman. If you can make it here now it would be better."
"All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per memo of the chair."
"CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were not also informed about this.
"We can’t do anything about … it … it’s a directive from chair."
"Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous complaint"; "ill send a copy of the memo
via mms"5
Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he
will just get a lawyer. Another text message received by petitioner from PALD staff also reported the
presence of the team from CSC main office: "Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa kuarto natin." 6 At
around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the
computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of preserving all the files stored
therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by
the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering
about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters 7 in connection with administrative cases in
the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause
Order8 dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit
his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioner’s personal files, Chairperson David made
the following observations:
Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are related to or connected
with administrative cases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the CSCRO No. IV, the
CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft
pleadings are for and on behalves of parties, who are facing charges as respondents in
administrative cases. This gives rise to the inference that the one who prepared them was
knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and inimical to the
interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to discipline
misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. The number of pleadings so prepared
further demonstrates that such person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice but pursues it
with seeming regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and certainly against
common human experience, to believe that the person concerned had engaged in this customary
practice without any consideration, and in fact, one of the retrieved files (item 13 above) appears to
insinuate the collection of fees. That these draft pleadings were obtained from the computer
assigned to Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he was the one responsible or had a hand in
their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was within his direct control and
disposition.9
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-
complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he "lawyering"
for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition"
when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him
to submit his comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he had
protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated
January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that the files in his computer were his
personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not
authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional
right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He
pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer
issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all
attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. As to the anonymous letter,
petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal
complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACC). In view of
the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent is thus
inadmissible as evidence, being "fruits of a poisonous tree." 10
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 070382 11 finding prima facie case against the
petitioner and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees). Petitioner was directed to submit his answer under oath within five
days from notice and indicate whether he elects a formal investigation. Since the charges fall under
Section 19 of the URACC, petitioner was likewise placed under 90 days preventive suspension
effective immediately upon receipt of the resolution. Petitioner received a copy of Resolution No.
070382 on March 1, 2007.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the
formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the
authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. Petitioner reiterated that
he never aided any people with pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files found in his
computer were prepared not by him but by certain persons whom he permitted, at one time or
another, to make use of his computer out of close association or friendship. Attached to the motion
were the affidavit of Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa who entrusted his own files to be kept at petitioner’s
CPU and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado, the latter being Atty. Solosa’s client who attested that petitioner
had nothing to do with the pleadings or bill for legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to Atty.
Solosa and not to petitioner. Petitioner contended that the case should be deferred in view of the
prejudicial question raised in the criminal complaint he filed before the Ombudsman against Director
Buensalida, whom petitioner believes had instigated this administrative case. He also prayed for the
lifting of the preventive suspension imposed on him. In its Resolution No. 070519 12 dated March 19,
2007, the CSC denied the omnibus motion. The CSC resolved to treat the said motion as petitioner’s
answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition13 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and
Resolution No. 070382 dated February 26, 2007 as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction. Prior to this, however, petitioner
lodged an administrative/criminal complaint against respondents Directors Racquel D.G. Buensalida
(Chief of Staff, Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office of
the Ombudsman, and a separate complaint for disbarment against Director Buensalida. 14
On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the CSC setting the formal
investigation of the case on April 30, 2007. On April 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for
the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction. 15 Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing
conference scheduled on April 30, 2007, the CSC reset the same to May 17, 2007 with warning that
the failure of petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing conference shall entitle
the prosecution to proceed with the formal investigation ex-parte. 16 Petitioner moved to defer or to
reset the pre-hearing conference, claiming that the investigation proceedings should be held in
abeyance pending the resolution of his petition by the CA. The CSC denied his request and again
scheduled the pre-hearing conference on May 18, 2007 with similar warning on the consequences of
petitioner and/or his counsel’s non-appearance. 17 This prompted petitioner to file another motion in
the CA, to cite the respondents, including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt. 18
On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071134 19 denying petitioner’s motion to set aside
the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings and to inhibit the designated hearing officer, Atty.
Bernard G. Jimenez. The hearing officer was directed to proceed with the investigation proper with
dispatch.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution,
petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex
parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420, 20 the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a.
Ricky A. Pollo GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE with all its accessory penalties, namely, disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service
examinations.21
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, the CSC
noted the dearth of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the government as
employer invades the private files of an employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his
official use, in the course of initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee
and without the latter’s consent or participation. The CSC thus turned to relevant rulings of the
United States Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of O’Connor v. Ortega 22 as authority for the
view that government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could
validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the "probable
cause" or warrant requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling cited by the CSC is the more
recent case of United States v. Mark L. Simons 23 which declared that the federal agency’s computer
use policy foreclosed any inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its
employees. Though the Court therein recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode
the respondent’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in which the computer was installed,
still, the warrantless search of the employee’s office was upheld as valid because a government
employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search pursuant to an investigation of work-related
misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC held that petitioner has no
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he was using in the regional office in
view of the CSC computer use policy which unequivocally declared that a CSC employee cannot
assert any privacy right to a computer assigned to him. Even assuming that there was no such
administrative policy, the CSC was of the view that the search of petitioner’s computer successfully
passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the
aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed that it pursued the search in its capacity as government
employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving work-related
misconduct, which exempts it from the warrant requirement under the Constitution. With the matter
of admissibility of the evidence having been resolved, the CSC then ruled that the totality of
evidence adequately supports the charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and violation of R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave
infractions justified petitioner’s dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
In his Memorandum24 filed in the CA, petitioner moved to incorporate the above resolution dismissing
him from the service in his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal via a Rule 43 petition. In a
subsequent motion, he likewise prayed for the inclusion of Resolution No. 071800 25 which denied his
motion for reconsideration.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no
grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1) petitioner
was not charged on the basis of the anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-
finding investigation was conducted and the results thereof yielded a prima facie case against him;
(2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in petitioner’s computer and later
confiscating the same, Chairperson David had encroached on the authority of a judge in view of the
CSC computer policy declaring the computers as government property and that employee-users
thereof have no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on
the computer system; and (3) there is nothing contemptuous in CSC’s act of proceeding with the
formal investigation as there was no restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal arguing
that –
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED

SERIOUS IRREGULARITY AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS
ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O. 292 WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THE CONTRARY IS
EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER 2nd PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8 OF CSC
RESOLUTION NO. 99-1936, WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO THE ORIGINAL RULES
PER CSC RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED PALPABLE

ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED
THAT PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY, TO UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF OFFICE
MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL MEMORANDUM SIGNED SOLELY
AND EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT BY THE COLLEGIAL
COMMISSION CONSIDERING THAT POLICY MATTERS INVOLVING SUB[S]TANTIAL
RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY AN OFFICE MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO
PROCEDURAL AND ROUTINARY INSTRUCTION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED JANUARY 3, 2007 AND
THE TAKING OF DOCUMENTS IN THE EVENING THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M.
IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION LIMITING THE DEFINITION [OF] GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE INVOLVING AND TAINTED WITH PERSONAL
HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DATA STORED IN THE
GOVERNMENT COMPUTERS ARE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES INCLUDING THE
PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE CONTRARY IS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 14 OF OM.
10 s. 2002. AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT
DAVID BY VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS
OF A JUDGE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER NEW
ARGUMENTS, ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED AS WELL AS ITS
FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE ACTION ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND
INCORPORATE CSC RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420 DATED JULY 24, 2007 AND CSC
RESOLUTION 07-1800 DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT RULE LIKEWISE ON
THE FOUR URGENT MOTION TO RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO.26
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and
the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression on
his constitutional right to privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected
by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution,27 which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures.28 But to fully understand this concept and application for the
purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of
pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As the Court declared in People v. Marti 29 :
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had
its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court
and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction. 30
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,31 the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth
violated his right to privacy and constituted a "search and seizure". Because the petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-
fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). 32
In Mancusi v. DeForte33 which addressed the reasonable expectations of private employees in the

workplace, the US Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment rights with
regard to an office at union headquarters that he shared with other union officials, even as the latter
or their guests could enter the office. The Court thus "recognized that employees may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police."
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in the 1987
case of O’Connor v. Ortega34 where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed by a state
hospital, claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials investigating
charges of mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program, sexual harassment of female
hospital employees and other irregularities involving his private patients under the state medical aid
program, searched his office and seized personal items from his desk and filing cabinets. In that
case, the Court categorically declared that "[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely
because they work for the government instead of a private employer." 35 A plurality of four Justices
concurred that the correct analysis has two steps: first, because "some government offices may be
so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable", a court must
consider "[t]he operational realities of the workplace" in order to determine whether an employee’s
Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy
expectation, an employer’s intrusion on that expectation "for noninvestigatory, work-related
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard
of reasonableness under all the circumstances." 36
On the matter of government employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in their workplace,

O’Connor teaches:
x x x Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices
and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The employee’s expectation of privacy must be
assessed in the context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from
entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases
offices are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government
offices that others – such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general
public – may have frequent access to an individual’s office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that
"[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear
merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as
employer," x x x but some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the
public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work
environments in the public sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 37 (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared that Dr.
Ortega’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials infringed
"an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider as reasonable." Given the undisputed
evidence that respondent Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other
employees, kept personal correspondence and other private items in his own office while those
work-related files (on physicians in residency training) were stored outside his office, and there being
no evidence that the hospital had established any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging
employees from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets (although the
absence of such a policy does not create any expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise
exist), the Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his
desk and file cabinets.38
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital officials was
reasonable, the O’Connor plurality decision discussed the following principles:
Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of
Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the "search…was not a reasonable search under
the fourth amendment." x x x "[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by
[public employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches…[W]hat is
reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place. x x x Thus, we must
determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of
the standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires "balanc[ing] the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." x x x In the case of
searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees’
legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control,
and the efficient operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an
employee’s office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the
routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant
procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with
such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we have
required warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of
investigating the violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely incident to the
primary business of the agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant requirement
would conflict with the "common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every
employment decision became a constitutional matter." x x x
xxxx
The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and
proper operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services to the public, and
the work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before
they entered an employee’s desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence.
Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory
context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons.
Similarly, the concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by
public employers for the purpose of securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient and proper
operation of the agency, therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee
offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related

employee misconduct. Even when employers conduct an investigation, they have an interest
substantially different from "the normal need for law enforcement." x x x Public employers have an
interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of
these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other
work-related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases, public employees are entrusted
with tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to both
the agency and the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law enforcement officials, therefore,
public employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and
overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient
manner. In our view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue
here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the
employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency’s work,
and ultimately to the public interest. x x x
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement
make the…probable-cause requirement impracticable," x x x for legitimate, work-related
noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard
of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the
efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of
public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally
protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by
the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider
‘whether the…action was justified at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine whether the
search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place,’" x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception"
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a
noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be
permissible in its scope when "the measures adopted are reasonably related to the
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of …the nature of the
[misconduct]." x x x39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a hearing on the factual dispute as to the
character of the search and neither was there any finding made as to the scope of the search that
was undertaken, the case was remanded to said court for the determination of the justification for the
search and seizure, and evaluation of the reasonableness of both the inception of the search and its
scope.
In O’Connor the Court recognized that "special needs" authorize warrantless searches involving
public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which
government interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This
reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are
related to law enforcement.40
O’Connor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy rights in the
workplace. One of these cases involved a government employer’s search of an office computer,
United States v. Mark L. Simons41 where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials containing
child pornography. Simons was provided with an office which he did not share with anyone, and a
computer with Internet access. The agency had instituted a policy on computer use stating that
employees were to use the Internet for official government business only and that accessing
unlawful material was specifically prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall understand that
the agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the user’s Internet access as deemed
appropriate. CIA agents instructed its contractor for the management of the agency’s computer
network, upon initial discovery of prohibited internet activity originating from Simons’ computer, to
conduct a remote monitoring and examination of Simons’ computer. After confirming that Simons
had indeed downloaded pictures that were pornographic in nature, all the files on the hard drive of
Simon’s computer were copied from a remote work station. Days later, the contractor’s
representative finally entered Simon’s office, removed the original hard drive on Simon’s computer,
replaced it with a copy, and gave the original to the agency security officer. Thereafter, the agency
secured warrants and searched Simons’ office in the evening when Simons was not around. The
search team copied the contents of Simons’ computer; computer diskettes found in Simons’ desk
drawer; computer files stored on the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes; videotapes; and various
documents, including personal correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to suppress these
evidence, arguing that the searches of his office and computer violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled that the searches of Simons’
computer and office did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and the first search warrant was
valid. It held that the search remains valid under the O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement
because evidence of the crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative
inspection. Simons’ violation of the agency’s Internet policy happened also to be a violation of
criminal law; this does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer.
The warrantless entry into Simons’ office was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard
announced in O’Connor because at the inception of the search, the employer had "reasonable
grounds for suspecting" that the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, as the employer was
already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access to download over a thousand
pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably related to the objective of the
search, and the search was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard
to the files in his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Simons must first prove that
he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. x x x And, in
order to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy, Simons must show that his subjective expectation
of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. x x x
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons’ computer did not violate his Fourth
Amendment rights because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the files downloaded from the Internet. Additionally, we conclude that Simons’ Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated by FBIS’ retrieval of Simons’ hard drive from his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record or fruits of
his Internet use in light of the FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly stated that FBIS would
"audit, inspect, and/or monitor" employees’ use of the Internet, including all file transfers, all
websites visited, and all e-mail messages, "as deemed appropriate." x x x This policy placed
employees on notice that they could not reasonably expect that their Internet activity would be
private. Therefore, regardless of whether Simons subjectively believed that the files he transferred
from the Internet were private, such a belief was not objectively reasonable after FBIS notified him
that it would be overseeing his Internet use. x x x Accordingly, FBIS’ actions in remotely searching
and seizing the computer files Simons downloaded from the Internet did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
xxxx
The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office.
x x x Here, Simons has shown that he had an office that he did not share. As noted above, the
operational realities of Simons’ workplace may have diminished his legitimate privacy expectations.
However, there is no evidence in the record of any workplace practices, procedures, or regulations
that had such an effect. We therefore conclude that, on this record, Simons possessed a
legitimate expectation of privacy in his office.
xxxx
In the final analysis, this case involves an employee’s supervisor entering the employee’s
government office and retrieving a piece of government equipment in which the employee had
absolutely no expectation of privacy – equipment that the employer knew contained evidence of
crimes committed by the employee in the employee’s office. This situation may be contrasted with
one in which the criminal acts of a government employee were unrelated to his employment. Here,
there was a conjunction of the conduct that violated the employer’s policy and the conduct that
violated the criminal law. We consider that FBIS’ intrusion into Simons’ office to retrieve the hard
drive is one in which a reasonable employer might engage. x x x42 (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board 43 which involved the
constitutionality of a provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, have also
recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of
the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees’ privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company’s work
policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining
unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace.
Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we now
address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the
contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include "(1) the employee’s
relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee
when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item."
These factors are relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry,
and we consider the two questions together.44 Thus, where the employee used a password on his
computer, did not share his office with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy and any search of that space and items located therein must comply with the
Fourth Amendment.45
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his
personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share
with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors.
Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees
from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance
office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and
even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial
request. He described his office as "full of people, his friends, unknown people" and that in the past
22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is "personally assisting incoming
clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report,
Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service,
and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying
customer."46 Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of
privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned
factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer
as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in
Simons.
Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy (CUP)" explicitly provides:
POLICY
1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission and may be
used only for legitimate business purposes.
2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in the

performance of their respective jobs.
3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any given time.
xxxx
No Expectation of Privacy
4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall not have
an expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer
system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select and assign
Users to handle the confidential examination data and processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything they
create, store, send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or any other computer
network. Users understand that the CSC may use human or automated means to monitor
the use of its Computer Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a personal property

or for the exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum of receipt (MR) has been
issued. It can be shared or operated by other users. However, he is accountable therefor
and must insure its care and maintenance.
xxxx
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be responsible for safeguarding their
passwords for access to the computer system. Individual passwords shall not be printed,
stored online, or given to others. Users shall be responsible for all transactions made using
their passwords. No User may access the computer system with another User’s password or
account.
13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to the computer
system or to encode particular files or messages does not imply that Users have an
expectation of privacy in the material they create or receive on the computer system. The
Civil Service Commission has global passwords that permit access to all materials stored on
its networked computer system regardless of whether those materials have been encoded
with a particular User’s password. Only members of the Commission shall authorize the
application of the said global passwords.
x x x x47 (Emphasis supplied.)
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and
that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human
means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer
resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in O’Connor which are relevant in determining whether an employee’s
expectation of privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy
policy.48 In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held that a state university employee
has not shown that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files where the
university’s computer policy, the computer user is informed not to expect privacy if the university has
a legitimate reason to conduct a search. The user is specifically told that computer files, including e-
mail, can be searched when the university is responding to a discovery request in the course of
litigation. Petitioner employee thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when
university officials conducted a warrantless search of his computer for work-related materials. 49
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search conducted on petitioner’s
computer, we answer in the affirmative.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-
related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David
regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na
division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David
stated in her sworn affidavit:
8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has received several text messages from
unknown sources adverting to certain anomalies in Civil Service Commission Regional Office IV
(CSCRO IV) such as, staff working in another government agency, "selling" cases and aiding parties
with pending cases, all done during office hours and involved the use of government properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any verifiable leads and details sufficient
to warrant an investigation;
10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it pinpointed the persons and
divisions involved in the alleged irregularities happening in CSCRO IV;
11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its
effect on the integrity of the Commission, I decided to form a team of Central Office staff to back up
the files in the computers of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and Legal Division;
x x x x50
A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct.51 Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it
was held that where a government agency’s computer use policy prohibited electronic messages
with pornographic content and in addition expressly provided that employees do not have any
personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems and technology, the
government employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his
office computer, and therefore evidence found during warrantless search of the computer was
admissible in prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the defendant employee’s computer
hard drive was first remotely examined by a computer information technician after his supervisor
received complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-
mail messages throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his
computer to access the prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of the agency, his
computer tower and floppy disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative investigation
ensued and later search warrants were secured by the police department. The initial remote search
of the hard drive of petitioner’s computer, as well as the subsequent warrantless searches was held
as valid under the O’Connor ruling that a public employer can investigate work-related misconduct
so long as any search is justified at inception and is reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified it in the first place. 52
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its
inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its
actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by O’Connor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the
mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed
American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity
as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant
requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain
division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was "lawyering" for parties having pending cases with the said
regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was
grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the
practice of "lawyering" for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly
repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast
clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in
the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of
administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually
impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and
confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the
complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the
concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was
justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out
incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they
could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate
action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open
and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in
the vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent
himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of files
from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to
Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the
managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational
effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees.
Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible. 53
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other
argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited
authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant
because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already
mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable ground for
suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the
investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the
anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement
in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel
Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila54 involving a branch clerk (Atty. Morales)
who was investigated on the basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his
working hours filing and attending to personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and utilities.
The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The team was able to access Atty.
Morales’ personal computer and print two documents stored in its hard drive, which turned out to be
two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the RTC of Manila, both in the name of another
lawyer. Atty. Morales’ computer was seized and taken in custody of the OCA but was later ordered
released on his motion, but with order to the MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein. The OCA
disagreed with the report of the Investigating Judge that there was no evidence to support the
charge against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a
categorical and positive statement affirming the charges against Atty. Morales, along with other court
personnel also charged in the same case. The OCA recommended that Atty. Morales should be
found guilty of gross misconduct. The Court En Banc held that while Atty. Morales may have fallen
short of the exacting standards required of every court employee, the Court cannot use the evidence
obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found no evidence to support the claim of OCA that
they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales, as in fact the latter
immediately filed an administrative case against the persons who conducted the spot investigation,
questioning the validity of the investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure. And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings,
retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him
administratively liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for
insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the former which
involved a personal computer of a court employee, the computer from which the personal files of
herein petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the
use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner
with the item seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and circumstances under American
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007 on Computer Use
Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the office
computer assigned to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the office computer of petitioner are
admissible in the administrative case against him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the CSC
was correct in finding the petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded
not only respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. 55
The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial number of drafts of legal
pleadings and documents stored in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and
testimonies of the witnesses it presented during the formal investigation. According to the CSC,
these documents were confirmed to be similar or exactly the same content-wise with those on the
case records of some cases pending either with CSCRO No. IV, CSC-NCR or the Commission
Proper. There were also substantially similar copies of those pleadings filed with the CA and duly
furnished the Commission. Further, the CSC found the explanation given by petitioner, to the effect
that those files retrieved from his computer hard drive actually belonged to his lawyer friends
Estrellado and Solosa whom he allowed the use of his computer for drafting their pleadings in the
cases they handle, as implausible and doubtful under the circumstances. We hold that the CSC’s
factual finding regarding the authorship of the subject pleadings and misuse of the office computer is
well-supported by the evidence on record, thus:
It is also striking to note that some of these documents were in the nature of pleadings responding to
the orders, decisions or resolutions of these offices or directly in opposition to them such as a
petition for certiorari or a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This indicates that the
author thereof knowingly and willingly participated in the promotion or advancement of the interests
of parties contrary or antagonistic to the Commission. Worse, the appearance in one of the retrieved
documents the phrase, "Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," lends plausibility to an
inference that the preparation or drafting of the legal pleadings was pursued with less than a
laudable motivation. Whoever was responsible for these documents was simply doing the same for
the money – a "legal mercenary" selling or purveying his expertise to the highest bidder, so to speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the
presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said computer.
More significantly, one of the witnesses, Margarita Reyes, categorically testified seeing a written
copy of one of the pleadings found in the case records lying on the table of the respondent. This was
the Petition for Review in the case of Estrellado addressed to the Court of Appeals. The said
circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly undermining the interest of the
Commission, his very own employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the Commission to believe that the documents
were the personal files of some of his friends, including one Attorney Ponciano Solosa, who
incidentally served as his counsel of record during the formal investigation of this case. In fact, Atty.
Solosa himself executed a sworn affidavit to this effect. Unfortunately, this contention of the
respondent was directly rebutted by the prosecution witness, Reyes, who testified that during her
entire stay in the PALD, she never saw Atty. Solosa using the computer assigned to the respondent.
Reyes more particularly stated that she worked in close proximity with Pollo and would have known
if Atty. Solosa, whom she personally knows, was using the computer in question. Further, Atty.
Solosa himself was never presented during the formal investigation to confirm his sworn statement
such that the same constitutes self-serving evidence unworthy of weight and credence. The same is
true with the other supporting affidavits, which Pollo submitted.
At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention of the respondent, it evinces the fact
that he was unlawfully authorizing private persons to use the computer assigned to him for official
purpose, not only once but several times gauging by the number of pleadings, for ends not in
conformity with the interests of the Commission. He was, in effect, acting as a principal by
indispensable cooperation…Or at the very least, he should be responsible for serious misconduct for
repeatedly allowing CSC resources, that is, the computer and the electricity, to be utilized for
purposes other than what they were officially intended.
Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing of the appellant that the line
appearing in one of the documents, "Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," was a private
joke between the person alluded to therein, Eric N. Estrellado, and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not
indicative of anything more sinister. The same is too preposterous to be believed. Why would such a
statement appear in a legal pleading stored in the computer assigned to the respondent, unless he
had something to do with it?56
Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not have entertained an anonymous
complaint since Section 8 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires a verified complaint:
Rule II – Disciplinary Cases
SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due
course unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases
initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the complaint need not be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the

allegation therein or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person
complained of may be required to comment.
xxxx
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative complaint is deemed to have
been initiated by the CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and search of the
files stored in the hard drive of computers in the two divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter --
as part of the disciplining authority’s own fact-finding investigation and information-gathering -- found
a prima facie case against the petitioner who was then directed to file his comment. As this Court
held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals 57 --
Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule II
of Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be initiated against a
civil service officer or employee by the appropriate disciplining authority, even without being
subscribed and sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the
complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to petitioner’s challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002 (CUP), the same deserves scant
consideration. The alleged infirmity due to the said memorandum order having been issued solely by
the CSC Chair and not the Commission as a collegial body, upon which the dissent of Commissioner
Buenaflor is partly anchored, was already explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the
Addendum to Commissioner Buenaflor’s previous memo expressing his dissent to the actions and
disposition of the Commission in this case. According to Chairperson David, said memorandum
order was in fact exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the January 23, 2002 Commission
Meeting, attended by her and former Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and Valmores. Hence, the
Commission En Banc at the time saw no need to issue a Resolution for the purpose and further
because the CUP being for internal use of the Commission, the practice had been to issue a
memorandum order.58 Moreover, being an administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or
which regulates only the personnel of the CSC and not the public, the CUP need not be published
prior to its effectivity.59
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSC’s ruling
that petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of these offenses justified the imposition on
petitioner of the ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties, pursuant to existing
rules and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007
and Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224
are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
See Separate Concurring Opinion I join opinion of J. Bersamin

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
I join the concurring and dissenting

opinion of Justice Bersamin ARTURO D. BRION
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

I join Justice L. Bersamin's concurring

(No Part)
and dissenting opinion
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

I concur but share J. Carpio's concerns

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* No part.
1
Rollo, pp. 63-83. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, with Associate Justices
Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of this Court) and Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok
concurring.
2
Id. at 85.
3
Id. at 306.
4
Id. at 305.
5
CA rollo, p. 56.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 21-24.
8
Id. at 20-25.
9
Id. at 25.
10
Id. at 55-62.
Id. at 26-33. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David and Commissioner Mary Ann Z.

11
Fernandez-Mendoza concurred in ruling that a prima facie case existed against petitioner
while Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor dissented [see Memorandum (OCOM-C Memo No.
14, s. 2007, CA rollo, pp. 431-434).
CSC records, pp. 71-l to 71-n. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David and Commissioner
12
Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza concurred in the denial of the omnibus motion while
Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor reiterated his dissent.
13
CA rollo, pp. 2-19.
14
Id. at 288-294, 321-325.
15
Id. at 336-340.
16
Id. at 373.
17
Id. at 376-378.
18
Id. at 388-392.

19
Fernandez-Mendoza concurred in denying the motion while Commissioner Cesar D.

Buenaflor dissented stating that based on his dissenting position, any subsequent
proceedings in this case is of no moment since the initiatory proceedings was in violation of a
person’s fundamental rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. (Id. at 465.)

20
Fernandez-Mendoza concurred in ruling that petitioner is guilty as charged while

Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor maintained his dissent.
21
Id. at 618.
22
480 U.S. 709 (1987).
23
206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
24
Id. at 560-585.

25
Fernandez-Mendoza concurred in the denial of the motion for reconsideration while

Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor reiterated his dissent under his "Addendum to the
Dissenting Position Under OCOM-C Memo No. 14, S. 2007". (Id. at 720.)
26
Rollo, p. 19.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and
27
161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685,
July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary,
28
2003 ed., p. 162.
29
G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 57.
30
Id. at 63.
31
389 U.S. 437 (1967).
32
Id.
33
392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968).
34
Supra note 22.
35
Id. at 717.
36
City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, U.S. 2010, June 17, 2010.
37
Supra note 22 at 717-718.
38
Id. at 718-719.
39
Id. at 719, 722-725.
40
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, C.A. (Md), December 2, 2009.
41
Supra note 23.
42
Id.
43
Supra note 27 at 432-433.
U.S. v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, C.A.10 (Okla.), April 3, 2007, citing United States v.
44
Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998).
45
U.S. v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184 C.A.9 (Mont.), January 30, 2007.
46
CA rollo, pp. 42, 61.
47
Id. at 440-443.
Biby v. Board of Regents, of the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, 419 F.3d 845 C.A.8
48
(Neb), August 22, 2005.
49
Id.
50
CA rollo, p. 639.
51
U.S. v. Thorn, 375 F.3d 679, C.A.8 (Mo.), July 13, 2004.
52
Id.
53
CA rollo, pp. 611-612.
54
A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361.
Vertudes v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 153166, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 210, 230, citing
55
Rosario v. Victory Ricemill, G.R. No. 147572, February 19, 2003, 397 SCRA 760, 766 and
Bagong Bayan Corp., Realty Investors and Developers v. NLRC, G.R. No. 61272,
September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 107.
56
CA rollo, pp. 616-617.
57
G.R. No. 147009, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 394, 401.
58
Rollo, p. 299.
59
See Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 535 (1986).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I concur with the Court’s denial of the petition. However, I file this separate opinion to (1) assert a
statutory basis for the disposition of the case, and (2) articulate the exception to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) office regulation denying expectation of privacy in the use of government
computers.
First. The CSC’s computer use regulation, which opens to access for internal scrutiny anything CSC
employees "create, store, send, or receive in the computer system," has a statutory basis under the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. Section 4(2) of the Code mandates that
"[g]overnment x x x property shall be x x x used solely for public purposes."1 In short,
any private use of a government property, like a government-owned computer, is prohibited by law.
Consequently, a government employee cannot expect any privacy when he uses a government-
owned computer because he knows he cannot use the computer for any private purpose. The
CSC regulation declaring a no-privacy expectation on the use of government-owned computers
logically follows from the statutory rule that government-owned property shall be used "solely" for a
public purpose.
Moreover, the statutory rule and the CSC regulation are consistent with the constitutional treatment
of a public office as a public trust.2 The statutory rule and the CSC regulation also implement the
State policies, as expressly provided in the Constitution, of ensuring full disclosure of all government
transactions involving public interest, 3 maintaining honesty and integrity in the public service, and
preventing graft and corruption. 4
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the constitutional guarantees of privacy and reasonable search are
unavailing against audit inspections or internal investigations for misconduct, as here, of electronic
data stored in government-owned property such as computing, telecommunication, and other
devices issued to civil servants. These constitutional guarantees apply only to searches of
devices privately owned by government employees.
Second. The CSC office regulation denying CSC employees privacy expectation in "anything they
create, store, send, or receive in the computer system," 5 although valid as to petitioner Briccio Pollo,
is constitutionally infirm insofar as the regulation excludes from its ambit the three CSC
commissioners solely by reason of their rank, and not by reason of the confidential nature of the
electronic data they generate.
Office regulations mandating no-privacy expectation such as the CSC regulation in question cannot
justify access to sensitive government information traditionally recognized as confidential. Thus,
insulated from the reach of such regulations are Presidential conversations, correspondences, or
discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings, internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and
other collegiate courts, draft decisions of judges and justices, executive sessions of either house of
Congress, military and diplomatic secrets, national security matters, documents relating to pre-
prosecution investigations by law enforcement agencies and similar confidential matters. 6 The
privilege of confidentiality covering these classes of information, barring free access to them, is
grounded on the nature of the constitutional function of the public officials involved, coupled with
considerations of efficiency, safety and comity interests since disclosure of confidential information
jeopardizes decision-making, endangers lives and undermines diplomatic dealings, as the case may
be.
The CSC, as the government’s "central personnel agency," 7 exercises quasi-judicial functions in
"[r]ender[ing] opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service matters." 8 The CSC’s
internal deliberations on administrative cases are comparable to the internal deliberations of collegial
courts. Such internal deliberations enjoy confidentiality and cannot be accessed on the ground that
an audio of the deliberations is stored in a government-owned device. Likewise, draft decisions of
CSC commissioners that are stored in government-issued computers are confidential information.
By providing that "[u]sers except the Members of the Commission shall not have an expectation

of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive in the [government-owned] computer
system," the CSC regulation creates a new, constitutionally suspect category of confidential
information based, not on the sensitivity of content, but on the salary grade of its author. Thus, a
glaring exemption from the CSC’s own transparency regulation is "anything x x x create[d], store[d],
sen[t], or receive[d]" in the commission’s computer system by the three CSC members. As the new
category is content-neutral and draws its confidentiality solely from the rank held by the government
official creating, storing, sending and receiving the data, the exemption stands on its head the
traditional grounding of confidentiality – the sensitivity of content.
The constitutional infirmity of the exemption is worsened by the arbitrariness of its rank-based
classification. The three CSC commissioners, unlike the rest of the lower ranked CSC employees,
are excluded from the operation of the CSC’s data transparency regulation solely because they are
the CSC’s highest ranking officers.9 This classification fails even the most lenient equal protection
analysis. It bears no reasonable connection with the CSC regulation’s avowed purposes of "[1]
[p]rotect[ing] confidential, proprietary information of the CSC from theft or unauthorized disclosure to
third parties; [2] [o]ptimiz[ing] the use of the CSC’s [c]omputer [r]esources as what they are officially
intended for; and [3] [r]educ[ing] and possibly eliminat[ing] potential legal liability to employees and
third parties."10 The assumption upon which the classification rests – that the CSC commissioners,
unlike the rest of the CSC’s thousands of employees, are incapable of violating these objectives – is
plainly unfounded.
The only way by which the CSC commissioners, or for that matter, any of its employees, can
constitutionally take themselves out of the ambit of the CSC’s no-privacy regulation is if they (1)
invoke the doctrine of confidentiality of information, and (2) prove that the information sought to be
exempted indeed falls under any of the classes of confidential information adverted to above (or
those comparable to them). Sensitivity of content, not rank, justifies enjoyment of this very narrow
constitutional privilege.
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the petition.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Presidential Decree No. 1445. Section 4(2) provides in full: "Government funds or property
shall be spent or used solely for public purposes."
2
Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution provides: "Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives."
3
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution provides: "Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."
4
Section 27, Article II of the Constitution provides: "The State shall maintain honesty and
integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption."
5
The rule under CSC Memorandum No. 10, series of 2002, provides:
No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall not
have expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive in the
computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select and
assign Users to handle the confidential examination of data and processes.
6
Under Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002, 384 SCRA 152,
188), these are also beyond the reach of the constitutional right to information.
7
Constitution, Article IX(B), Section 3.
8
Executive Order No. 292, Book V, Title I, Chapter 3, Section 12(5).
9
Aside from its three commissioners, the CSC has two assistant commissioners and twelve
divisions in its central office, including an office for legal affairs. The CSC also maintains 16
regional offices.
10
CSC Memorandum No. 10, series of 2002, enumerates these as its objectives.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

BERSAMIN, J.:
I render this concurring and dissenting opinion only to express my thoughts on the constitutional
right to privacy of communication and correspondence vis-à-vis an office memorandum that
apparently removed an employee’s expectation of privacy in the workplace.
Indispensable to the position I take herein is an appreciation of the development and different
attributes of the right to privacy that has come to be generally regarded today as among the valuable
rights of the individual that must be given Constitutional protection.
The 1890 publication in the Harvard Law Review of The Right to Privacy, 1 an article of 28 pages co-
written by former law classmates Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, is often cited to have given
birth to the recognition of the constitutional right to privacy. The article was spawned by the
emerging growth of media and technology, with the co-authors particularly being concerned by the
production in 1884 by the Eastman Kodak Company of a "snap camera" that enabled people to take
candid pictures. Prior to 1884, cameras had been expensive and heavy; they had to be set up and
people would have to pose to have their pictures taken. The snap camera expectedly ignited the
enthusiasm for amateur photography in thousands of people who had previously not been able to
afford a camera. This technological development moved Warren and Brandeis to search for a legal
right to protect individual privacy.2 One of the significant assertions they made in their article was the
declaration that "the common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to
what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others," 3 said right
being merely part of an individual’s right to be let alone. 4
While some quarters do not easily concede that Warren and Brandeis "invented" the right to privacy,
mainly because a robust body of confidentiality law protecting private information from disclosure
existed throughout Anglo-American common law by 1890, critics have acknowledged that The Right
to Privacy charted a new path for American privacy law. 5
In 1928, Brandeis, already a Supreme Court Justice, incorporated the right to be let alone in his
dissent in Olmstead v. United States,6 viz:
"The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of our
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings, and of his intellect. They knew that only a
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone ̶ the most comprehensive of rights,
and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts
ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth." [emphasis supplied]
In 1960, torts scholar William Prosser published in the California Law Review 7 his article Privacy
based on his thorough review of the various decisions of the United States courts and of the privacy
laws. He observed then that the "law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four
different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have
almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff,
in the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, ‘to be let alone.’" 8 He identified the four torts as: (a) the
intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (b) the public disclosure
of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (c) the publicity that places the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye; and (d) the appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s
name or likeness.9
With regard to the first tort of intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into private affairs, Prosser
posited that there was a remedy when a person "intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns" in a manner that was "highly
offensive to a reasonable person." 10 The second and third torts established liability when the
publicized matter was highly offensive to a reasonable person and was not a legitimate concern of
the public – if it involved disclosure of embarrassing private facts – or placed another before the
public in a false light.11 Lastly, the tort of appropriation afforded a relief when a person adopted "to
his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another." 12
In the 1977 landmark ruling of Whalen v. Roe,13 the US Supreme Court expanded the right to privacy
by categorizing privacy claims into two, namely: informational privacy, to refer to the interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters; and decisional privacy, to refer to the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.
All US Circuit Courts recognizing informational privacy have held that this right is not absolute and,
therefore, they have balanced individuals’ informational privacy interests against the State’s interest
in acquiring or disclosing the information.14 The majority of the US Circuit Courts have adopted some
form of scrutiny that has required the Government to show a "substantial" interest for invading
individuals’ right to confidentiality in their personal information, and then to balance the State’s
substantial interest in the disclosure as against the individual’s interest in confidentiality. 15 This
balancing test was developed in United States v. Westinghouse 16 by using the following factors, to
wit: (a) the type of record requested; (b) the information it did or might contain; (c) the potential for
harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (d) the injury from disclosure to the relationship
in which the record was generated; (e) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized
disclosure; (f) the degree of need for access; and (g) the presence of an express statutory mandate,
articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access. 17
Decisional privacy, on the other hand, evolved from decisions touching on matters concerning
speech, religion, personal relations, education and sexual preferences. As early as 1923, the US
Supreme Court recognized decisional privacy in its majority opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska. 18 The
petitioner therein was tried and convicted by a district court, and his conviction was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the Nebraska, for teaching the subject of reading in the German language to a
ten-year old boy who had not attained and successfully passed eighth grade. 19 In reversing the
judgment, Justice McReynolds of the US Supreme Court pronounced that the liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Justice McReynolds elaborated
thusly:
"Practically, education of the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially qualified
persons who devote themselves thereto. The calling always has been regarded as useful and
honorable, essential, indeed, to the public welfare. Mere knowledge of the German language cannot
reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and
desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation. His right thus to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the
liberty of the Amendment."
In Griswold v. Connecticut,20 the US Supreme Court resolved another decisional privacy claim by
striking down a statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives by married couples. Justice
Douglas, delivering the opinion, declared:
"By Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, the right to educate one’s children as one chooses is made
applicable to the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. By Meyer v.
Nebraska, supra, the same dignity is given the right to study the German language in a private
school. In other words, the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment,
contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes not
only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read
(Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143) and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to
teach (see Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195) -- indeed, the freedom of the entire university
community. (Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-250, 261-263; Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 112; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 369). Without those peripheral rights, the
specific rights would be less secure. And so we reaffirm the principle of the Pierce and
the Meyer cases.
xxxx
"The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of
contraceptives, rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means
having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the
familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. (NAACP v. Alabama, 377
U.S. 288, 307). Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship."
One of the most controversial decisional privacy claims was dealt with in Roe v. Wade, 21 by which
the US Supreme Court justified abortion in the United States on the premise that:
"This right of privacy xxx is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in
early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child,
and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and
otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing
stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible
physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
xxxx
"Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however
based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute
and is subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state interests as to protection of
health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant."
In the Philippines, we have upheld decisional privacy claims. For instance, in the 2003 case of
Estrada v. Escritor,22 although the majority opinion dealt extensively with the claim of religious
freedom, a right explicitly provided by the Constitution, Justice Bellosillo’s separate opinion was
informative with regard to the privacy aspect of the issue involved and, hence, stated:
"More than religious freedom, I look with partiality to the rights of due process and privacy. Law in
general reflects a particular morality or ideology, and so I would rather not foist upon the populace
such criteria as "compelling state interest," but more, the reasonably foreseeable specific connection
between an employee’s potentially embarrassing conduct and the efficiency of the service. This is a
fairly objective standard than the compelling interest standard involved in religious freedom.
"Verily, if we are to remand the instant case to the Office of the Court Administrator, we must also
configure the rights of due process and privacy into the equation. By doing so, we can make a
difference not only for those who object out of religious scruples but also for those who choose to
live a meaningful life even if it means sometimes breaking "oppressive" and "antiquated" application
of laws but are otherwise efficient and effective workers. As is often said, when we have learned to
reverence each individual’s liberty as we do our tangible wealth, we then shall have our
renaissance."
Relevantly, Article III, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution embodies the protection of the privacy of
communication and correspondence, to wit:
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
xxxx
Yet, the guarantee in favor of the privacy of communication and correspondence is not absolute, for
it expressly allows intrusion either upon lawful order of a court or when public safety and order so
demands (even without a court order). 23
In its 1965 ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut,24 the US Supreme Court declared that the right to
privacy was a fundamental personal right; and that the enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights should not be construed as a denial or disparagement of others that have been retained by the
people,25 considering that the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights had penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that helped give them life and substance." Accordingly, an
individual’s right to privacy of communication and correspondence cannot, as a general rule, be
denied without violating the basic principles of liberty and justice.
The constitutional right to privacy in its Philippine context was first recognized in the 1968 ruling of
Morfe v. Mutuc,26 where the Court affirmed that:
"The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly
apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing
it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization,
urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it.
In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."
Morfe v. Mutuc emphasized the significance of privacy by declaring that "[t]he right to be let alone is
indeed the beginning of all freedom." 27 The description hewed very closely to that earlier made by
Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States that the right to be let alone was "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 28
It is elementary that before this constitutional right may be invoked a reasonable or objective
expectation of privacy should exist, a concept that was introduced in the concurring opinion of
Justice Harlan in the 1967 case Katz v. United States,29 no doubt inspired by the oral argument 30 of
Judge Harvey Schneider, then co-counsel for petitioner Charles Katz. Since the idea was never
discussed in the briefs, Judge Schneider boldly articulated during his oral argument that
"expectations of privacy should be based on an objective standard, one that could be formulated
using the reasonable man standard from tort law."31 Realizing the significance of this new standard in
its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Harlan, in his own way, characterized the reasonable
expectation of privacy test as "the rule that has emerged from prior decisions." 32
Justice Harlan expanded the test into its subjective and objective component, however, by stressing
that the protection of the Fourth Amendment has a two-fold requirement: "first, that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’."33 Although the majority opinion in Katz v. United
States made no reference to this reasonable expectation of privacy test, it instituted the doctrine that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 34
In the 1968 case Mancusi v. DeForte, 35 the US Supreme Court started to apply the reasonable
expectation of privacy test pioneered by Katz v. United States and declared that the "capacity to
claim the protection of the Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place, but
upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion."36
II
Bearing in mind the history and evolution of the right to privacy as a Constitutionally-protected right, I
now dwell on whether the petitioner, a public employee, enjoyed an objective or reasonable
expectation of privacy in his workplace, i.e. within the premises of respondent Civil Service
Commission, his employer.
At the outset, I state that the right to privacy involved herein is the petitioner’s right to informational
privacy in his workplace, specifically his right to work freely without surveillance or intrusion. 37
I find relevant the doctrine laid down in O’Connor v. Ortega, 38 where the US Supreme Court held that
a person was deemed to have a lower expectation of privacy in his workplace. The decrease in
expectation of privacy was not similar to a non-existent expectation, however, for the US Supreme
Court clarified:
"Given the societal expectations of privacy in one’s place of work expressed in

both Oliver and Mancusi, we reject the contention made by the Solicitor General and petitioners that
public employees can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of work.
Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government,
instead of a private employer. The operational realities of the workplace, however, may make some
employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor, rather than a
law enforcement official. Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file
cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of
actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. xxx An office is seldom a private
enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees.
Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during
the workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature
of government offices that others – such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and
the general public – may have frequent access to an individual's office. We agree with JUSTICE
SCALIA that
‘[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear

merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as
employer,’
but some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation
of privacy is reasonable.
xxxx
"Balanced against the substantial government interests in the efficient and proper operation of the
workplace are the privacy interests of government employees in their place of work, which, while not
insubstantial, are far less than those found at home or in some other contexts. As with the building
inspections in Camara, the employer intrusions at issue here "involve a relatively limited invasion" of
employee privacy. Government offices are provided to employees for the sole purpose of facilitating
the work of an agency. The employee may avoid exposing personal belongings at work by simply
leaving them at home. [emphasis supplied]
For sure, there are specific reasons why employees in general have a decreased expectation of
privacy with respect to work-email accounts,39 including the following:
(a) Employers have legitimate interests in monitoring the workplace; 40
(b) Employers own the facilities;
(c) Monitoring computer or internet use is a lesser evil compared to other liabilities, such as
having copyright infringing material enter the company computers, or having employees
send proprietary material to outside parties;
(d)An employer also has an interest in detecting legally incriminating material that may later
be subject to electronic discovery;
(e) An employer simply needs to monitor the use of computer resources, from viruses to
clogging due to large image or pornography files.41
In view of these reasons, the fact that employees may be given individual accounts and password
protection is not deemed to create any expectation of privacy.42
Similarly, monitoring an employee’s computer usage may also be impelled by the following
legitimate reasons:
(a) To maintain the company’s professional reputation and image;
(b) To maintain employee productivity;
(c) To prevent and discourage sexual or other illegal workplace harassment;
(d) To prevent "cyberstalking" by employees;
(e) To prevent possible defamation liability;
(f) To prevent employee disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential information; and
(g)To avoid copyright and other intellectual property infringement from employees illegally
downloading software, etc.43
Even without Office Memorandum (OM) No. 10, Series of 2002 being issued by respondent Karina
Constantino-David as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the employees of the Commission,
including the petitioner, have a reduced expectation of privacy in the workplace. The objective of the
issuance of OM No. 10 has been only to formally inform and make aware the employees of the
Commission about the limitations on their privacy while they are in the workplace and to advise them
that the Commission has legitimate reasons to monitor communications made by them,
electronically or not. The objectives of OM No. 10 are, needless to state, clear in this regard. 44
III
Unlike the Majority, I find that the petitioner did not absolutely waive his right to privacy. 45 OM No. 10
contains the following exception, to wit:
Waste of Computer Resources. x x x
xxxx
However, Users are given privileged access to the Internet for knowledge search, information
exchange and others. They shall be allowed to use the computer resources for personal purpose
after office hours provided that no unlawful materials mentioned in item number 7 and 8 are
involved, and no other facilities such as air conditioning unit, video/audio system etc., shall be used
except sufficient lights. [emphasis supplied]
Thereby, OM No. 10 has actually given the petitioner privileged access to the Internet for knowledge
search, information exchange, and others; and has explicitly allowed him to use the computer
resources for personal purposes after office hours. Implicit in such privileged access and permitted
personal use was, therefore, that he still had a reasonable expectation of privacy vis-à-vis whatever
communications he created, stored, sent, or received after office hours through using the
Commission’s computer resources, such that he could rightfully invoke the Constitutional protection
to the privacy of his communication and correspondence.
In view of the petitioner’s expectation of privacy, albeit diminished, I differ from the Majority’s holding
that he should be barred from claiming any violation of his right to privacy and right against
unreasonable searches and seizures with respect to all the files, official or private, stored in his
computer. Although I concede that respondent David had legal authority and good reasons to issue
her order to back up the petitioner’s files as an exercise of her power of supervision, I am not in full
accord with the Majority’s holding for the confiscation of all the files stored in the computer. The need
to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to the State’s regulation may not be filled by
means that unnecessarily and broadly sweep and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 46
I hold, instead, that the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the
communications created, stored, sent, or received after office hours through the office computer, as
to which he must be protected. For that reason, respondent David’s order to back up files should
only cover the files corresponding to communications created, stored, sent, or received during office
hours. There will be no difficulty in identifying and segregating the files created, stored, sent, or
received during and after office hours with the constant advancement and improvement of
technology and the presumed expertise of the Commission’s information systems analysts.
Nonetheless, my concurrence with the Majority remains as regards the petitioner’s administrative
liability and the seizure of the remainder of the files. I am reiterating, for emphasis, that the
diminution of his expectation of privacy in the workplace derived from the nature and purpose of a
government office, actual office practice and procedures observed therein, and legitimate
regulation.47 Thus, I vote to uphold the legality of OM No. 10. I hasten to add, to be very clear, that
the validity of the seizure of the files should be limited to the need for determining whether or not the
petitioner unjustly utilized official resources of the Commission for personal purposes, and should
not extend to the reading of the files’ contents, which would be violative of his right to privacy.
I adhere to the principle that every man is believed to be free. Freedom gears a man to move about
unhampered and to speak out from conviction. That is why the right to privacy has earned its worthy
place in the Bill of Rights. However, although the right to privacy is referred to as a right to be
enjoyed by the people, the State cannot just sit back and stand aside when, in the exercise of his
right to privacy, the individual perilously tilts the scales to the detriment of the national interest.
In upholding the validity of OM No. 10, I also suppose that it is not the intention of the Majority to
render the Bill of Rights inferior to an administrative rule. Rather, adoption of the balancing of
interests test, a concept analogous to the form of scrutiny employed by courts of the United States,
has turned out to be applicable especially in the face of the conflict between the individual interest of
the petitioner (who asserts his right to privacy) and the Commission’s legitimate concern as an arm
of the Government tasked to perform official functions. The balancing of interest test has been
explained by Professor Kauper, 48 viz:
"The theory of balance of interests represents a wholly pragmatic approach to the problem of First
Amendment freedom, indeed, to the whole problem of constitutional interpretation. It rests on the
theory that is the Court’s function in the case before it when it finds public interests served by
legislation on the one hand and First Amendment freedoms affected by it on the other, to balance
the one against the other and to arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If on
balance it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such a character that
it outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the Court will find the legislation valid. In short, the
balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even
those stated in the First Amendment, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve
appropriate and important interest." (emphasis supplied.)
The Court has applied the balancing of interest test in Alejano v. Cabuay, 49 where it ruled that the
substantial government interest in security and discipline outweighed a detainee’s right to privacy of
communication. The Court has elucidated:
"In Hudson v. Palmer, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable expectation
of privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners necessarily lose many
protections of the Constitution, thus:
‘However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also
clear that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights. These
constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are "justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system." The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a
practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of "institutional needs and objectives" of prison facilities,
chief among which is internal security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve,
incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence and retribution are factors in
addition to correction.’
"The later case of State v. Dunn, citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and

made no distinction as to the detainees’ limited right to privacy. State v. Dunn noted the considerable
jurisprudence in the United States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a
substantial government interest such as security or discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if
complete censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of opening the mail and reading it is also
permissible. We quote State v. Dunn:
‘[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the
close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security
and internal order. We are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoner’s expectation of privacy
always yield to what must be considered a paramount interest in institutional security. We believe
that it is accepted by our society that "[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents
of confinement."’
xxxx
"Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees’
letters in the present case violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication. The letters were
not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the
same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
xxxx
"In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on
the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts "balance the
guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators." The deferential
review of such regulations stems from the principle that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would
seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the
intractable problems of prison administration." [emphasis supplied]
Much like any other government office, the Commission was established primarily for the purpose of
advancing and accomplishing the functions that were the object of its creation. 50 It is imperative,
therefore, that its resources be maximized to achieve utmost efficiency in order to ensure the
delivery of quality output and services to the public. This commitment to efficiency existed not solely
in the interest of good government but also in the interest of letting government agencies control
their own information-processing systems.51 With the State and the people being the Commission’s
ultimate beneficiaries, it is incumbent upon the Commission to maintain integrity both in fact and in
appearance at all times. OM No. 10 was issued to serve as a necessary instrument to safeguard the
efficiency and integrity of the Commission, a matter that was of a compelling State interest, and
consequently to lay a sound basis for the limited encroachment in the petitioner’s right to privacy.
But, nonetheless, Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut 52 might be
instructive:
"In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved,
they may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some
rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. Where there is a significant
encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling (Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524). The law must be shown
‘necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.’"
(McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 186)
Even assuming that the anonymous tip about the petitioner’s misuse of the computer proved to be
false, i.e., the petitioner did not really engage in lawyering for or assisting parties with interests
adverse to that of the Commission, his permitting former colleagues and close friends not officially
connected with the Commission to use and store files in his computer, 53 which he admitted, still
seriously breached, or, at least, threatened to breach the integrity and efficiency of the Commission
as a government office. Compounding his breach was that he was well informed of the limited
computer use and privacy policies in OM No. 10, in effect since 2002, prior to the seizure of his files
in January of 2007. The Court should not disregard or ignore the breach he was guilty of, for doing
so could amount to abetting his misconduct to the detriment of the public who always deserved
quality service from the Commission.
IV
As early as in Olmstead v. United States,54 Justice Brandeis anticipated the impact of technological

changes to the right to privacy and significantly observed that -
"xxx time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes." Subtler and more far-
reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and
invention have made it possible for the government, by means far more effective than stretching
upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet. Moreover, "in the
application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may
be." The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to
stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled
to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and related
sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. xxx"
In this era when technological advancement and the emergence of sophisticated methodologies in
terms of the science of communication are already inexorable and commonplace, I cannot help but
recognize the potential impact of the Majority’s ruling on future policies to govern situations in the
public and private workplaces. I apprehend that the ruling about the decreased expectation of
privacy in the workplace may generate an unwanted implication for employers in general to
henceforth consider themselves authorized, without risking a collision with the Constitutionally-
protected right to privacy, to probe and pry into communications made during work hours by their
employees through the use of their computers and other digital instruments of communication. Thus,
the employers may possibly begin to monitor their employees’ phone calls, to screen incoming and
out-going e-mails, to capture queries made through any of the Internet’s efficient search engines
(like Google), or to censor visited websites (like Yahoo!, Facebook or Twitter) in the avowed interest
of ensuring productivity and supervising use of business resources. That will be unfortunate.
The apprehension may ripen into a real concern about the possibility of abuse on the part of the
employers. I propose, therefore, that the ruling herein be made pro hac vice, for there may be
situations not presently envisioned that may be held, wrongly or rightly, as covered by the ruling, like
when the instrument of communication used is property not owned by the employer although used
during work hours.
As a final note, let me express the sentiment that an employee, regardless of his position and of the
sector he works for, is not a slave of trade expected to devote his full time and attention to the job.
Although the interests of capital or public service do merit protection, a recognition of the limitations
of man as a being needful of some extent of rest, and of some degree of personal space even during
work hours, is most essential in order to fully maximize the potential by which his services was
obtained in the first place. The job should not own him the whole time he is in the workplace. Even
while he remains in the workplace, he must be allowed to preserve his own identity, to maintain an
inner self, to safeguard his beliefs, and to keep certain thoughts, judgments and desires hidden.
Otherwise put, he does not surrender his entire expectation of privacy totally upon entering the gates
of the workplace. Unreasonable intrusion into his right to be let alone should still be zealously
guarded against, albeit he may have waived at some point a greater part of that expectation. At any
rate, whenever the interest of the employer and the employee should clash, the assistance of the
courts may be sought to define the limits of intrusion or to balance interests.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the petition, subject to the qualification that the petitioner’s right to
privacy should be respected as to the files created, stored, sent or received after office hours; and to
the further qualification that the decision be held to apply pro hac vice.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
4 Harvard Law Review 193.
Richards, Neil M. and Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
2
Confidentiality, The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 96 (2007), pp. 128-129.
3
Supra, note 1, p. 198.
Id., p. 195; Warren and Brandeis adopted the "right to be let alone" language from Judge
4
Thomas M. Cooley’s 1888 treatise The Law of Torts 29 (2d ed. 1888).
5
Richards and Solove, op. cit., p. 125.
6
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7
48 California Law Review, No. 3 (August 1960), p. 383.
8
Id., p. 389.
9
Id.; see also Richards and Solove, op. cit., pp. 148-149.
Restatement of Torts 2d §652B (1977) (Prosser was also a reporter of the Second
10
Restatement of Torts).
11
Id., §652D-§652E (1977).
12
Id., §652C (1977.)
13
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
Gilbert, Helen L., Minors’ Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, The University of
14
Chicago Law Journal (2007), pp. 1385-1386.
15
Id., p. 1386.
16
638 F2d 570 (3d Cir 1980).
17
Id., p. 578.
18
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
19
The criminal information was based upon "An act relating to the teaching of foreign
languages in the State of Nebraska," approved April 9, 1919, pertinent portions of which
provide:
Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private,

denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any
language other than the English language.
Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as languages
only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade as
evidenced by a certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the
county in which the child resides.
Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less
than twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) or be
confined in the county jail for any period not exceeding thirty days for each offense.
Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its
passage and approval.
20
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21
410 U.S. 113 (1973)
22
A.M. No, P-02-1651, August 4, 2003, 408 SCRA 1.
23
Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, 1986 Ed., p. 191.
24
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25
Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
26
G.R. No. L-20387, 22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968.
27
Id., citing Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451, 467 (1952).
28
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
29
389 U.S, 347, 350-351 (1967).
30
The transcript of Judge Schneider’s oral argument in part provides:
Mr. Schneider: x x x We think and respectfully submit to the Court that whether or
not, a telephone booth or any area is constitutionally protected, is the wrong initial
inquiry.
We do not believe that the question should be determined as to whether or not, let's
say you have an invasion of a constitutionally protected area, that shouldn't be the
initial inquiry, but rather that probably should be the conclusion that is reached after
the application of a test such as that we propose are similar test.
Now, we have proposed in our brief and there's nothing magical or ingenious about
our test.
It's an objective test which stresses the rule of reason, we think.
The test really asks or opposes the question, "Would a reasonable person objectively
looking at the communication setting, the situation and location of a communicator
and communicatee -- would he reasonably believe that that communication was
intended to be confidential?"
We think that in applying this test there are several criteria that can be used.
Justice William J. Brennan: So that parabolic mic on the two people conversing in the
field a mile away might --
Mr. Schneider: Absolutely.
xxx
We think that if a confidential communication was intended and all the other aspects
of confidentiality are present, then it makes no difference whether you're in an open
field or in the privacy of your own home.
We would submit to the Court that there are factors present which would tend to give
the Courts, the trial courts, and ultimately this Court, some guidelines as to whether
or not objectively speaking, the communication was intended to be private.
xxx
Mr. Schneider: x x x
I believe the following factors at least should be included in an analysis of this

problem.
One, what is the physical location?
In other words, where did the conversation take place?
Was it in a situation where numerous persons were present or whether just a few
people present?
I think that bears on the issue.
I think the tone of voice bears on the issue.
I think that you can have a communication for example in your house which almost
everyone would see all things being equal would be confidential.
However, if you use a loud enough voice, I think you destroy your own confidentiality.
xxx
Mr. Schneider: x x x
We feel that the Fourth Amendment and at the Court's decisions recently for a long
time, I believe, have indicated that the right to privacy is what's protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
We feel that the right to privacy follows the individual.
And that whether or not, he's in a space when closed by four walls, and a ceiling, and
a roof, or an auto-mobile, or any other physical location, is not determined of the
issue of whether or not the communication can ultimately be declared confidential.
xxx
Justice John M. Harlan: Could you state this Court tested this as you propose?
Mr. Schneider: Yes, we propose a test using in a way it's not too dissimilar from a
tort, that tort reasonable man test.
We're suggesting that what should be used is the communication setting should be
observed and those items that should be considered are the tone of voice, the actual
physical location where the conversation took place, the activities on the part of the
officer.
When all those things are considered, we would ask that the test be applied as to
whether or not a third person objectively looking at the entire scene could reasonably
interpret and could reasonably say that the communicator intended his
communication to be confidential. x x x (emphasis supplied.)
31
Winn, Peter, Katz and the Origins of the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test, 2008.
Id.; see the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S, 347,
32
350-351 (1967).
33
Concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States, supra.
Katz v. United States, supra; writing for the majority, Justice Stewart made the following
34
pronouncement:
xxx. In the first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally protected area."
Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional
"right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of
governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do
with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from
other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a person’s general right
to privacy — his right to be let alone by other people — is, like the protection of his
property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.
35
392 U.S. 364 (1968).
36
Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court.
37
In Whalen v. Roe, supra, note 13, p. 599, the Court advanced the principle that the right to
information privacy has two aspects: (1) the right of an individual not to have private
information about himself disclosed; and (2) the right of an individual to live freely without
surveillance and intrusion.
38
480 U.S. 709, 715-17 (1987).
Tan, Oscar Franklin B., Articulating the Complete Philippine Right to Privacy in
39
Constitutional and Civil Law: A Tribute to Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Carpio,
Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 82, No. 4 (2008), pp. 228-229.
Id., citing Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical
40
Analysis, 13 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 77, 95 (2003).
Id., citing Matthew Finkin, Information Technology and Worker’s Privacy: The United
41
States Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 474 (2002).
42
Supra Note 6, p. 228.
Ciocchetti, Corey A., Monitoring Employee Email: Efficient Workplaces vs. Employee
43
Privacy, <http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2001dltr0026.html#8.> Last visited

on June 14, 2011; citing Terrence Lewis, Pittsburgh Business Times, Monitoring Employee
E-Mail: Avoid stalking and Illegal Internet Conduct)
<http://www.pittsburgh.bcentral.com/pittsburgh/stories/2000/05/22/focus6.html>.
44
Rollo, p. 98.
O.M. No. 10 provides:
OBJECTIVES
Specifically, the guidelines aim to:
· Protect confidential, proprietary information of the CSC from theft or unauthorized

disclosure to third parties;
· Optimize the use of the CSC’s Computer Resources as what they are officially
intended for; and
· Reduce, and possibly eliminate potential legal liability to employees and third
parties.
45
Id., p. 99; O.M. No. 10 states:
Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything they
create, store, send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or any other
computer network. Users understand that the CSC may use human or automated
means to monitor the use of its Computer Resources.
46
Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, note 20, citing NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
47
O’Connor v. Ortega, 25 480 U.S. 709, 715-17 (1987).
48
Cited in Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 899.
49
G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 188, 211-214.
50
The Civil Service Commission was conferred the status of a department by Republic Act
No. 2260 as amended and elevated to a constitutional body by the 1973 Constitution. It was
reorganized under PD No. 181 dated September 24, 1972, and again reorganized under
Executive Order no. 181 dated November 21, 1986. With the new Administrative Code of
1987 (EO 292), the Commission is constitutionally mandated to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the Civil Service. Also, as the
central human resource institution and as adviser to the President on personnel
management of the Philippine Government, the Civil Service Commission exists to be the
forerunner in (1) upholding merit, justice and fairness; (2) building competence, expertise
and character; (3) ensuring delivery of quality public services and products; (4)
institutionalizing workplace harmony and wellness; and (5) fostering partnership and
collaboration. www.csc.gov.ph/mandate and mission. Last visited on July 13, 2011.
Regan, Priscilla M., Legislating Privacy (Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy),
51
The University of North Carolina Press, 1995, p. 186.
52
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Rollo, p. 96-97; Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Affidavit executed by Ponciano R. Solosa

53
narrated the following:
4. That I have also requested Ricky who is like a son to me having known him since
he was eighteen (18) years old, to keep my personal files for safekeeping in his
computer which I understand was issued thru Memorandum Receipt and therefore
for his personal use;
5. That this affidavit is issued to attest to the fact that Mr. Pollo has nothing to do with
my files which I have entrusted to him for safekeeping including my personal
pleadings with the LTO and PUP, of which I have been the counsel on record and
caused the preparation and signed thereof accordingly.
Also, paragraph 5 of the Affidavit executed by Eric N. Estrellado mentioned the

following:
8. That I deny what was indicated in CSC Resolution No. 07-0382 under item 13 and
14 that Ricky Pollo is earning out of practicing or aiding people undersigned included,
the truth of the matter the statement made "Epal, kulang ang bayad mo.", was a
private joke between me and my counsel and friend Atty. Solosa. That item 14 was
my billing statement with the law firm of solosa [sic] and de Guzman. Ricky has
nothing to do with it. These private files but was intruded and confiscated for
unknown reasons by people who are not privy to our private affairs with my counsel.
That these are in the CPU of Ricky, as he would request as in fact Atty. Solosa
himself requested Ricky to keep files thereof thru flash drive or disk drive;
54
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Brandeis, Olmstead v. United States, supra Note 6.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
G.R. No. 202206
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
TENG MONER y ADAM, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal of the Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
1
No. 04399 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Teng Manery Adam, which affirmed the Joint
Decision dated August 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 95 in
2
Criminal Case Nos. Q-05-133982 and Q-05-133983. Anent Criminal Case No. Q-05-133982, the trial
court found appellant Teng Moner y Adam (Moner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II (sale of dangerous drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In the same judgment, Moner and his co-accused
were acquitted of the charge of violating Section 11, Article II (possession of dangerous drugs) of the
same statute which was the subject of Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983.
The crime of which Moner was convicted is described in the Information dated April 25, 2005, as
follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of April, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and
there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said
transaction, three point ninety-one (3.91) grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.3
Subsequently, on May 16, 2005, Moner pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the aforementioned charge of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs upon his arraignment. 4
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals presented the factual milieu of this case in this manner:
To establish the guilt of accused-appellant, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses namely:
P02 Joachim Panopio, P03 Junnifer Tuldanes and PO3 Edwin Lirio.
The prosecution's evidence tends to establish the following facts:
On April 23, 2005, the police operatives of Las Piñas Police Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operation Task Force (SAIDSOTF) had arrested a certain Joel Taudil for possession of illegal drugs.
Upon investigation, they gathered from Taudil that the source of the illegal drugs was Teng Moner
(herein accused-appellant) who hails from Tandang Sora, Quezon City.
As per this information, Police Chief Inspector Jonathan Cabal formed a team that would conduct a
buy-bust operation for the apprehension of accused-appellant. The team was composed of himself,
SP04 Arnold Alabastro, SPO1 Warlie Hermo, PO3 Junnifer Tuldanes, PO3 Edwin Lirio, PO2 Rodel
Ordinaryo, PO1 Erwin Sabbun and PO2 Joachim Panopio. The marked and boodle money were
given to PO2 Panopio who acted as the poseur-buyer.
Before proceeding with the buy-bust operation, the team prepared the pre-operation report
addressed to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the authority to operate outside their
jurisdiction and the coordination paper. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Central Police District
Office (CPDO), Camp Karingal, Quezon City for proper coordination. Thereafter, the team together
with Taudil and a CPD-DIID personnel proceeded [to] No. 26 Varsity Lane, Barangay Culiat,
Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Upon reaching the place they made a surveillance and assumed their
respective positions.
At the target area, P02 Panopio and Taudil went to accusedappellant's house. While outside the
gate, Taudil summoned accusedappellant and the latter came out after a few minutes. The two men
talked with each other in the Muslim dialect. Taudil introduced PO2 Panopio as his friend to
accused-appellant and told him that PO2 Panopio was interested to buy shabu. PO2 Panopio asked
for the price of five (5) grams of shabu. Accused-appellant replied that the same would cost him
₱8,000.00 and asked him if he has the money. When PO2 Panopio confirmed that he has the
money with him, accused-appellant asked them to wait and he went inside the house. When he
returned after a few minutes, he handed a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected
as shabu to PO2 Panopio who in turn gave him the marked and boodle money. Accused-appellant
was about to count the money when PO2 Panopio gave the pre-arranged signal to his team and
introduced himself as [a] police officer.
Accused-appellant resisted arrest and ran inside the house but PO2 Panopio was able to catch up
with him. The other members of the team proceeded inside the house and they saw the other
accused gather[ed] around a table re-packing shabu. PO3 Lirio confiscated the items from them and
placed the same inside a plastic bag.
After accused-appellant and his co-accused were arrested, the team proceeded to the Las Piñas
City Police Station. The items confiscated from them were turned over by PO2 Panopio to PO3
Dalagdagan who marked them in the presence of the police operatives, accused-appellant and his
co-accused. PO3 Dalagdagan prepared the corresponding inventory of the confiscated items. The
specimens were then brought to the police crime laboratory for testing. The specimens yielded
positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Consequently, a case for Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 was filed against accused-
appellant and another for Violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 against him and his co-
accused.
In refutation of the prosecution's version, the defense presented four (4) witnesses, to wit: Judie
Durado, Fatima Macabangen, accused-appellant and Richard Pascual.
It is the contention of the defense that on April 23, 2005, accused-appellant and his co-accused in
Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983 were at the house located along No. 26 Varsity Lane, Philam,
Tan.dang Sora, Quezon City to prepare for the wedding of Fatima Macabangen and Abubakar
Usman to be held the following day. While they were inside the house, several armed persons
wearing civilian clothes entered and announced that they were police officers. They searched the
whole house and gathered all of them in the living room.
The police officer who was positioned behind accused-appellant and Abubakar dropped a plastic
sachet. The former asked accused-appellant and Abubakar who owns the plastic sachet. When
accused-appellant .denied its ownership, the police officer slapped him and accused him of being a
liar. Thereafter, they were all frisked and handcuffed and were brought outside the house. Their
personal effects and belongings were confiscated by the police officers. Then they boarded a
jeepney and were brought to [the] Las Piñas Police Station.
Upon their arrival, they were investigated. A police officer asked them to call up anybody who can
help them because they only needed money for their release. Judie Dorado called up [his] mother.
They saw the other items allegedly confiscated from them only at the police station. At around 10:00
o'clock in the evening, they were brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City. From there, they went to
Makati for drug testing and were returned to Las Piñas Police Station.
Subsequently, cases for Violation of R.A. No. 9165 were filed against them. 5
After receiving the evidence for both sides, the trial court convicted Moner on the charge of
selling shabu while, at the same time, acquitting him and his co-accused of the charge of possession
of illegal drugs. The dispositive portion of the August 4, 2009 Joint Decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders its Joint Decision as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-05-133982:

The Court finds accused TENG MONER Y ADAM "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 or illegal selling of three point ninety-one (3.91) grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a FINE of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(Php500,000.00).
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983:
The Court finds accused TENG MONER Y ADAM, JUDIE DURADO Y MACABANGEN, FATIMA
MACABANGEN Y NUÑEZ, ABUBAKAR USMAN Y MASTORA, GUIAMIL ABU Y JUANITEZ,
NORODIN USMAN Y MASTORA, RICHARD PASCUAL Y TANGALIN and AMINA USMAN-MONER
"NOT GUILTY" for violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. 9165 considering that the prosecution failed
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The pieces of evidence subject matter of Crim. Case No. Q-05- 133983 are hereby ordered to be
safely delivered to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition. 6
As can be expected, Moner elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which, unfortunately for him,
ruled to affirm the findings of the trial court and dispositively held:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated August 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95,
Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-05- 133982 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt is hereby AFFIRMED. 7
Hence, Moner interposes this appeal wherein he reiterates the same errors on the part of the trial
court contained in his Brief filed with the Court of Appeals, to wit:
A. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED ITS DECISION DATED
AUGUST 4, 2009 FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT MONER GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165, WHEN
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE THREE (3) PROSECUTION WITNESSES (P02 JOACHIM P
ANOPIO, P03 JUNNIFER TULDANES, AND P03 EDWIN LIRIO) ARE HIGHLY
INCREDIBLE AND UNBELIEVABLE TO PROVE THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST.
B. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS DECISION WHEN IT RELIED SOLELY
ON THE PERJURED TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES POLICE
OFFICERS WHICH ARE FULL OF INCONSISTENCIES.
C. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION

WHEN IT FAILED TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE
WITNESSES WHO CLEARLY TESTIFIED THAT THERE WAS REALLY NO BUY-BUST
AND THAT APPELLANT MONER WAS NOT SELLING ANY PROHIBITED DRUGS.
D. THE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED DECISION

DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE MANDATORY PROVISION OF SEC. 19 OF R.A. NO. 9165, ON THE MATTER
OF PHYSICAL INVENTORY, AND PICTURE TAKING OF THE EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED FROM THE ACCUSED, AS WELL AS THE PROVISION OF SECTION 86
THEREOF. 8
In sum, Moner maintains that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof to sustain his
conviction for the charge of sale of dangerous drugs. He highlights the fact that the prosecution
failed to present in court the informant who pointed to him as a supplier of shabu. He also stresses
that the buy-bust operation was conducted without proper coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Likewise, he derides the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as
inconsistent, incredible and unworthy of belief. Most importantly, he underscores the failure of the
arresting officers to comply with the statutorily mandated procedure for the handling and custody of
the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from him.
The appeal is without merit.
For a successful prosecution of an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following essential
elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or ·sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. 9
A perusal of the records of this case would reveal that the aforementioned elements were
established by the prosecution. The illegal drugs and the marked money were presented and
identified in court. More importantly, Police Officer (PO) 2 Joachim Panopio (PO2 Panopio ), who
acted as poseur-buyer, positively identified Moner as the seller of the shabu to him for a
consideration of ₱8,000.00.
With regard to Moner's contention that the prosecution's failure to present the informant in court
diminishes the case against him, we reiterate our pronouncement on this matter in the recent case
of People v. Lafaran :
10
It has oft been held that the presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded as indispensable
to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented
in court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of the
culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant's identity is protected
in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant
is considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect
his security be disregarded. In the present case, as the buy-bust operation was duly witnessed by
SPO2 Aro and PO3 Pera, their testimonies can take the place of that of the poseur-buyer.
Thus, we concur with the appellate court's finding that there is no need to present the informant
because PO2 Panopio, who acted as the poseur-buyer, had testified in court. Furthermore, the other
members of the buy-bust team, namely PO3 Junnifer Tuldanes (PO3 Tuldanes) and PO3 Edwin
Lirio (PO3 Lirio ), gave clear and credible testimonies with regard to the criminal transaction that was
consummated by appellant and PO2 Panopio.
In addition, we rule that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that were
pointed out by Moner consist merely of minor variances that do not deviate from the main narrative
which is the fact that Moner sold illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer. It has been held, time and again,
that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations of witnesses do not destroy the
witnesses' credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony. It bears stressing, too, that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of
11
witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great
respect, if not conclusive effect.
12
Lastly, we can give no credence to Moner's contention that the prosecution failed to prove an
unbroken chain of custody in consonance with the requirements of law.
To ensure that the drug specimen presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same
material seized from him or that, at the very least, a dangerous drug was actually taken from his
possession, we have adopted the chain of custody rule. The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) has
expressly defined chain of custody involving dangerous drugs and other substances in the following
terms in Section 1 (b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
In relation to this, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 pertinently provides the following:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous

Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof[.]
Furthermore, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
9165 relevantly states:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
We have consistently ruled that noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165 will not necessarily render the illegal drugs seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation
inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs have been preserved, i.e., the
illegal drugs being offered in court as evidence is, without a specter of doubt, the very same item
recovered in the buy-bust operation. 13
With regard to the foregoing, Moner asserts that he should be acquitted of the criminal charges
levelled against him specifically because of the following serious lapses in procedure committed by
the apprehending officers: (a) the physical inventory was not conducted at the place where the
seizure was made; (b) the seized item was not photographed at the place of seizure; and (c) there
was no physical inventory and photograph of the seized item in the presence of the accused, or his
representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
The aforementioned concerns can be squarely addressed by a careful and assiduous review of the
records of this case accompanied by a liberal application and understanding of relevant
jurisprudence in support thereof. Both object and testimonial evidence demonstrate that the
apprehending officers were able to mark the dangerous drugs seized and to prepare a physical
inventory of the same at the Las Piñas Police Station which was the place where Moner and his co-
accused were brought for processing. The following excerpts lifted from the transcript of the
testimony of PO2 Panopio during trial confirm this fact:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, after your team recovered [the] evidence on top of the table inside the house,
arrested those persons whom you identified a while ago and also arrested Teng Moner recovered
from him the buy-bust money, what happened next?
A We brought them to the police headquarters.
Q In what headquarters did you bring the persons arrested?
A We brought them to Special Action ... SAID-SOTF Las Piñas Police Station.
xxxx
Q Now, I would like to inform you that under Section 21 of the Republic Act 9165, the arresting
officer immediately after the arrest of the accused or the person buy-bust for possession must
prepare the inventory of seized evidence.
A Yes, sir.
Q What do you mean by "yes"?
A We did prepare an inventory, sir.
Q So, you are aware of that provision?
A I just forgot the Section 21, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)

Q You do not know that doing an inventory is a requirement under Section 21?
A Yes, your Honor.
PROS.: (to the witness)
Q Now, you said that you are aware of Section 21 an inventory must be made. Do you know whether
your team complied with that provision of the law upon reaching the station?
A Yes, sir,
Q What do you mean by "yes"?
A We made an Inventory Report, sir.
Q Where is now that Inventory Report?
A It's with the documents I submitted earlier in court, sir.
xxxx
PROS: (to the Court)
This piece of document handed by the witness your Honor, the Inventory of Property Seized be
marked as Exhibit "OOO".
COURT: (to the witness)
Q That is the original, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, your Honor.
xxxx
PROS.: (to the Court)
Q The signature of PO3 Rufino G. Dalagdagan under the heading "Received By:" be bracketed and
be marked as Exhibit "OOO-1"; the list of the articles appearing [in] the body of Exhibit "OOO" be
bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "OOO-2". This Receipt of Property Turned-Over, your
Honor, which states: "I, P03 RUFINO G. DALAGDAGAN OF SAID-SOTF, LAS PINAS CITY
POLICE STATION, SPD hereby acknowledge received (sic) the items/articles listed hereunder
[from] PO2 JOACHIM P. PANOPIO" and may we request, your honor that letters appearing on the
top of the name TENG MONER ADAM, ET AL. (RTS) be marked as Exhibit "OOO-3"
PROS.: (to the witness)
Q Who prepared this Exhibit "OOO"?
A PO3 Rufino Dalagdagan, sir.

Q These items listed [in] the body of marked as Exhibit "OOO", who made these items?
A I, myself, sir.
Q Now, showing to you this Exhibit marked as "OOO-3" particularly on [the] letters RPS appearing
inside the parenthesis, who placed that entry (RPS)?
A Police Officer Dalagdagan, sir.
Q Where were you at the time when this (RPS) marked as Exhibit "OOO-3" was made?
A I was inside the office, sir.
Q Where were those persons whom your team arrested when this evidence marked as Exhibit
"OOO" was made?
A They were also inside the office, sir.
xxxx
Q You said a while ago that in consideration with the buy-bust money, you received from the
accused, Teng Moner, that plastic sachet containing shabu. Upon reaching the station, what
happened to the plastic sachet, subject matter of the buy-bust operation?
A I turned it over, sir.
Q To whom?
A PO3 Dalagdagan, sir.
Q And before you turned it over to the investigator, PO3 Dalagdagan, that shabu subject
matter of the buy-bust operation, what did you do with it?
A He placed [the] markings on it, sir.
Q Showing to you several pieces of evidence placed inside the brown envelope. Kindly look at the
same and pick from these several items that plastic sachet, subject matter of the buy-bust
operation?
A (Witness picked from the bunch of evidence the plastic sachet which already marked as Exhibit
"P" and he read [the] markings "TMAU1-23APR05".)
Q Now, you also stated a while ago that you were the one who personally recovered the buy-bust
money used in the operation from the possession of the accused, Teng Moner. If the same would be
shown to you, would you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q Now, you also stated that the Request for Laboratory Examination was made by the
investigator, Now, who delivered the plastic sachet subject matter of the buy-bust operation
for laboratory examination?
A We did, sir. (Emphases supplied.)

14
Judging from the cited testimony, it is apparent that the apprehending officers were able to
substantially comply with the requirements of the law regarding the custody of confiscated or seized
dangerous drugs. When cross-examined by the defense counsel during trial about the reason
behind the buy-bust team's noncompliance with standard procedure, PO3 Tuldanes, one of the
apprehending officers, gave the following response:
ATTY. PALAD: (to witness)
Q Meaning you had no time to make the inventory right at the scene of the alleged buy-bust?
A Yes, sir, because we were immediately instructed to pull out from the area.
Q Was there any threat on your lives that you immediately pulled out from the said area?
A It was not our area - Area of Responsibility - so we just wanted to make sure, for security and
immediately left, sir.
Q So this fear for security, you did not follow this photographing/inventory?
A We did not do that anymore, sir, because our security was at risk. 15
Verily, the circumstances that the buy-bust team proceeded first to the Central Police District (CPD)
Station, Camp Karingal in Quezon City and, from there, they were accompanied by a police officer
from the CPD to the target location, aside from proving that it was a legitimate police operation,
supported the existence of a security risk to the buy-bust team. These additional precautions taken
by the buy-bust team underscored their unfamiliarity with the location of the operation and, in fact,
corroborated the above-quoted testimony that the buy-bust team believed there was a threat to their
security.
With regard to the accused’s allegation that the buy-bust team failed to coordinate with the PDEA
before proceeding with the operation that nabbed Moner, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals declare in unison that the requisite prior coordination with PDEA did happen. Likewise, our
own review did not provide any reason for us to disbelieve said established fact.
To reiterate, noncompliance with the chain of custody rule is excusable as long as there exist
justifiable grounds which prevented those tasked to follow the same from strictly conforming to the
said directive. The preceding discussion clearly show that the apprehending officers in this case did
not totally disregard prescribed procedure but, instead, demonstrated substantial compliance with
what was required. It was likewise explained that the divergence in procedure was not arbitrary or
whimsical but because the buy-bust team decided that they could not linger at the crime scene as it
would unduly expose them to security risks since they were outside their area of responsibility.
Notably, in the recent case of Palo v. People, we affirmed a conviction for illegal possession of
16
dangerous drugs despite the fact that the seized illegal substance was only marked at the police
station and that there was no physical inventory or photograph of the same:
The fact that the apprehending officer marked the plastic sachet at the police station, and not at the
place of seizure, did not compromise the integrity of the seized item. Jurisprudence has declared
that "marking upon immediate confiscation" contemplates even marking done at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical inventory nor the
lack of photograph of the confiscated item renders the same inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items as these
would be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. 17
With regard to the third breach of procedure highlighted by Moner, this Court
cites People v. Usman wherein we declared that the chain of custody is not established solely by
18
compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the
presence of the enumerated persons by law. In that case, the police officers who arrested and
processed the accused did not perform the prescribed taking of photographs under the law but,
nevertheless, the assailed conviction was upheld. The Court reasoned thus:
[T]his Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in
reality it is not, "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important
factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. x x x. 19
In the case at bar, the records indicate that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
had been preserved despite the procedural infirmities that accompanied the process. On this score,
we quote with approval the disquisition of the Court of Appeals:
The record shows that upon the arrest of accused-appellant, the shabu and marked money were
confiscated from him by P02 Panopio. Accused-appellant was immediately brought to the Las Piñas
Police Station where the items confiscated from him were turned-over by P02 Panopio to P03
Dalagdagan, the investigator-on-case. The latter received the confiscated items and marked
them in the presence of P02 Panopio and accused-appellant. An inventory of the confiscated
items was also made.
Thereafter, the request for laboratory examination was prepared by P03 Dalagdagan and signed by
P/C Insp. Jonathan A. Cabal. The specimen together with the request was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City by P02 Panopio and the other police officers. There, it was
received by PSI Michael S: Holada, who delivered the specimen and request for laboratory test to
the forensic chemist PIS Maridel C. Rodis. After examination, the specimen submitted for testing
proved positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The result of the test was
reduced to writing and signed by the forensic chemist. It was duly noted by P/Sr. Supt. Ricardo
Cacholaver. It is worth stressing that the prosecution and defense had agreed to dispense with the
testimony of the forensic chemist and stipulated among others that she could identify the documents
and the specimens she examined. (Emphases supplied and citations omitted.)
20
Anent Moner' s allegation that the buy-bust team asked money from him and his former co-accused
in exchange for their liberty, it must be emphasized that the said allegation only came to light when
defense counsel asked appellant what happened when he and his former co-accused were brought
to the Las Piñas Police Station. Curiously, however, defense counsel did not confront any of the
21
prosecution witnesses regarding the said accusation. More importantly, based on the record, no
criminal or administrative· case relating thereto was ever filed by Moner or any of his former co-
accused against their alleged extortionists. Nevertheless, on this particular issue, we would like to
reiterate our ruling that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by
the courts with disfavor for it can just easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in most prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 22
At this juncture, it bears repeating that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Admittedly, the
23
buy-bust team did not follow certain aspects of procedure to the letter but this was excusable under
the saving clause of the chain of custody rule and prevailing jurisprudence. As a consequence
thereof, their arrest of Moner in the performance of their duty cannot be described as having been
done so irregularly as to convince this Court to invalidate the credibility and belief bestowed by the
trial court on the prosecution evidence. Accordingly, Moner must provide clear and convincing
evidence to overturn the aforesaid presumption that the police officers regularly performed their
duties but the records show that he has failed to do so. Absent any proof of mishandling, tampering
or switching of evidence presented against him by the arresting officers and other authorities
involved in the chain of custody, the presumption remains.
This is not the first time that this Court has been confronted with the question of whether or not to
uphold the conviction of a person arrested for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs who had been
positively identified by credible witnesses as the perpetrator of said crime but the manner by which
the evidence of illegal drugs was handled did not strictly comply with the chain of custody rule. To
reiterate past pronouncements, while ideally the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect
and unbroken, in reality, it is not as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain. Unfortunately; rigid obedience to procedure creates a scenario wherein the safeguards that
24
we set to shield the innocent are likewise exploited by the guilty to escape rightful punishment.
Realizing the inconvenient truth that no perfect chain of custody can ever be achieved, this Court
has consistently held that the most important factor in the chain of custody rule is the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.25
We find it apropos to highlight this Court's discussion in Zalameda v. People, which was restated in
26
the recent case of Saraum v. People 27
We would like to add that noncompliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the
inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs
inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule,
the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the court
x x x.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-
admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to noncompliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is noncompliance with said section, is not of
admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The
weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each
case.
Stated differently, if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled precisely in the manner prescribed
by the chain of custody rule, the consequence relates not to inadmissibility that would automatically
destroy the prosecution's case but rather to the weight of evidence presented for each particular
case. In the case at bar, the trial court judge convicted Moner on the strength of the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses despite an imperfect chain of custody concerning the corpus delicti.
It should be noted that Section 21(a) of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items. (Emphases supplied.)
The above-quoted provision recognizes that the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses and the
admissibility of other evidence are well within the power of trial court judges to decide. Paragraph
(5), Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests upon the Supreme Court the following
power, among others:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Jurisprudence explains the above-quoted constitutional provision m the following manner:
Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing
scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the
1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the "power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law."
However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to "repeal, alter or
supplement" such rules.
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous
charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress' subsidiary and corrective power.
This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice that this Court's power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress." 28
The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a
traditional power of this Court. This includes the power to promulgate the rules of evidence.
29
On the other hand, the Rules of Evidence are provided in the Rules of Court issued by the Supreme
Court. However, the chain of custody rule is not found in the Rules of Court. Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165 was passed by the legislative department and its implementing rules were promulgated
by PDEA, in consultation with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other agencies under and within
the executive department.
In the United States, the chain of custody rule is followed by the federal courts using the provisions
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Court of Appeals applied this rule in United States v.
Ricco and held as follows:
30
The "chain of custody" rule is found in Fed. R. Evid. 901, which requires that the admission
of an exhibit must be preceded by "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims." x x x.
x x x As we have pointed out, the "chain of custody' is not an iron-clad requirement, and the fact of a
‘missing link' does not prevent the admission of real evidence, so long as there is sufficient proof that
the evidence is what it purports to be and has not been altered in any material respect." x x x.
According to Cornell University's online legal encyclopedia, "[r]ules of evidence are, as the name
indicates, the rules by which a court determines what evidence is admissible at trial. In the U.S.,
federal courts follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, while state courts generally follow their own
rules." In the U.S. State of Alaska, for example, the "chain of custody" rule is found in Alaska
31
Evidence Rule 901(a). 32
Evidence is defined in Section 1 of Rule 12833 as "the means, sanctioned by these rules,
of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact." Section 2 of the
same Rule provides that "[t]he rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and
hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules."
Furthermore, the said Rule provides for the admissibility of evidence, and states that "[ e ]vidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules." The Rules
of Admissibility provide that "[ o ]bjects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court.
When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the
court. " 34
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is important to distinguish if a matter is a proper

subject of the rules of evidence, which as shown above are promulgated by the Court, or it is a
subject of substantive law, and should be passed by an act of Congress. The Court discussed this
distinction in the early case of Bustos v. Lucero :
35
Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the
legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J., 980.) Substantive law is that part
of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates ·the rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer;
as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law
which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be
punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the
first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence - which is "the mode and
manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the
fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" - is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in
private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is
punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So.,
419; 179 La., 462.) The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We
can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole
code of evidence embodied in these Rules.
In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States Supreme Court said:
"Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the constitutional limitation
may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall.
386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650; Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364;
Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443. And
there may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense available under
the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a
harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U.
S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, 42 L. ed., 1061, 18
Sup. Ct. Rep., 620. But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of
evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and
unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited. A statute which, after indictment,
enlarges the class of persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification of
persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto law. Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U. S., 575, 28 L. ed.,
263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the rules of
evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously
held inadmissible, Thompson vs. Missouri, 171 U. S., 380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or
which changes the place of trial, Gut vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573; or which abolishes a
court for hearing criminal appeals, creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U.
S., 377, 382, 38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 570."
xxxx
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact definition. The
difference is somewhat a question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467;
Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative
power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties
affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P.,
1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on
substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion
as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but
operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not
merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's
approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure,
adding new and different rules without regard to their source and discarding old ones.
To emphasize, the distinction in criminal law is this: substantive law is that which declares what acts
are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural
law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. 36
Based on the above, it may be gleaned that the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a
rule of procedure. It is therefore the Court who has the last say regarding the appreciation of
1âwphi1
evidence. Relevant portions of decisions elucidating on the chain of custody rule are quoted below:
Saraum v. People : 37
The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the
confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal
drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused until the
time they are presented in court.x x x. (Citation omitted.)
Mallillin v. People :
38
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that
the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the
mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral
certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of
guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same. (Citations omitted.)
These are matters well within the powers of courts to appreciate and rule upon, and so, when the
courts find appropriate, substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved may warrant the conviction of the
accused. This is the rationale, grounded on the constitutional power of the Court, to pass upon the
credibility and admissibility of evidence that underlies the proviso in Section 21(a) of the IRR of
Republic Act No. 9165.
To conclude, this Court has consistently espoused the time-honored doctrine that where the issue is
one of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed unless the
consideration of certain facts of substance and value, which have been plainly overlooked, might
affect the result of the case. We do not believe that the explainable deviations to the chain of
39
custody rule demonstrated by the police officers involved in this case are reason enough to overturn
the findings of the trial court judge, who personally observed and weighed the testimony of the
witnesses during trial and examined the evidence submitted by both parties.
In light of the foregoing, we are compelled to dismiss the present appeal and affirm the conviction of
Moner for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

assailed Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04399
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITAA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
WE CONCUR:
On Leave
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO *
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Please see Dissenting Opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE ***
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO **
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
On leave .
**
Per Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28, 2018 .
***
Per Raffle dated February 26, 2018.
Rollo, pp. 2-20; penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla with Associate

1
Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Agnes Reyes-Carpio concurring.
2
CA rollo, pp. 73-92; penned by Presiding Judge Henri Jean-Paul B. Inting.
3
Records, p. 2.
4
Id. at 35-36.
5
Rollo, pp. 6-9.
6
CA rollo, p. 92.
7
Rollo, p. 20.
8
CA rollo, p. 110.
9
Ampatuan v. People, 667 Phil. 747, 755 (2011).
10
771Phil. 311, 326-327 (2015).
11
People v. Mamalumpon, 767 Phil. 845, 855 (2015).
12
People v. Castro, 711 Phil. 662, 673 (2013).
13
People v. Cunanan, 756 Phil. 40, 50 (2015).
14
TSN, October 18, 2005, pp. 27-40.
15
TSN, July 25, 2006, p. 64.
16
780 Phil. 681 (2016).
17
Id. at 694-695.
18
753 Phil. 200 (2015).
19
Id. at 214.
Rollo, p. 18.
20
TSN, June 4, 2008, p. 7.

21
People v. Ygot, G.R. No. 210715, July 18, 2016, 797 SCRA 87, 93.
22
People v. Minanga, 751 Phil. 240, 249 (2015).

23
Ambre v. People, 692 Phil. 681, 695 (2012).

24
Saraum v. People, 779 Phil. 122, 133 (2016).

25
614 Phil. 710, 741-742 (2009), citing People v. Del Monte, 575 Phil. 577, 586 (2008).
26
Supra note 25 at 133.
27
Baguio Market Vendors Mu/ti-Purpose Cooperative v. Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil. 543, 548-

28
549 (2010).
Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
29
Fees, 626 Phil. 93, 106 (2010).
52 F. 3d 58 - United States Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit 1995, citing United States v.
30
HowardArias. 679 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir.1982).
Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute.

31
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/evidence. Last visited on March 1, 2017.
Evidence Rule 901(a) states that if the government offers physical evidence (or testimony
32
describing physical evidence) in a criminal trial, and if that physical evidence "is of such a
nature as not to be readily identifiable," or if the physical evidence is "susceptible to
adulteration, contamination, modification, tampering, or other changes in form attributable to
accident, carelessness, error or fraud," then the government must, as foundational matter,
"demonstrate [to a] reasonable certainty that the evidence is x x x properly identified and free
of the possible taints" identified in the rule.
Rules of Court.
33
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 1.

34
81 Phil. 640, 649-652 (1948).

35
22 C.J.S. 49.

36
Supra note 25 at 132.
37
576 Phil. 576, 586-587 (2008).

38
People v. Mercado, 755 Phil. 863, 874 (2015).

39
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
REPUBLIC vs. ESTATE OF MENZI G.R.

No. 152578 November 23, 2005 PCGG
OCTOBER 30, 2017
FACTS:
In the aftermath of the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order
(EO) No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) tasked with the
recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. This was followed by EO Nos. 2
and 14, respectively freezing all assets and properties in the Philippines in which the former
President, his wife, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees have any interest or participation, and defining the jurisdiction over cases involving the
ill-gotten wealth. Pursuant to the executive orders, several writs of sequestration were issued by
the PCGG in pursuit of the reputedly vast Marcos fortune.
The PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration sequestering the shares of Marcos and with the Emilio
Yap and Eduardo Cojuangco and their nominees and agents in the Bulletin Publishing
Corporation (Bulletin) where they own substantial holdings, and another Writ of Sequestration
for the shares of stock, assets, properties, records and documents of Hans Menzi Holdings and
Management, Inc. (HMHMI).
ISSUE:
Is PCGG empowered to sell sequestered assets?
RULING:
The contention that the sale of the 214 block to the Bulletin was null and void as the PCGG
failed to obtain approval from the Sandiganbayan is likewise unmeritorious. While it is true that
the PCGG is not empowered to sell sequestered assets without prior Sandiganbayan approval,
this case presents a clear exception because this Court itself directed the PCGG to accept the
cash deposit offered by Bulletin in payment for the Cojuangco and Zalamea sequestered shares
subject to the alternatives mentioned therein and the outcome of the remand to the
Sandiganbayan on the question of ownership of these sequestered shares.
Like the remedies of “freeze order” and “provisional takeover” with which the PCGG has been
equipped, sequestration is not meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any right to
his property and vest the same in the sequestering agency, the Government or any other person,
as these can be done only for the causes and by the processes laid down by law. These remedies
“are severe, radical measures taken against apparent, ostensible owners of property, or parties
against whom, at the worst, there are merely prima facie indications of having amassed ‘ill-
gotten wealth,’ indications which must still be shown to lead towards actual facts in accordance
with the judicial procedures of the land.” Considering that sequestration is not meant to create a
permanent situation as regards the property subject thereof and subsists only until ownership is
finally judicially determined, it stands to reason that, upon its dissolution, the property
sequestered should likewise be returned to its owner/s. Indeed, sequestration cannot be allowed
interminably and forever, if it is to adhere to constitutional due process
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 152578 November 23, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Presidential Commission on Good

Government, Petitioner,
vs.
ESTATE OF HANS MENZI (Through its Executor, MANUEL G. MONTECILLO), EMILIO T. YAP,
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ESTATE OF FERDINAND MARCOS, SR., and IMELDA R.
MARCOS, Respondents.
x----------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 154487
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x ------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 154518
ESTATE OF HANS M. MENZI (Through its Executor, Manuel G. Montecillo), and HANS M.
MENZI HOLDINGS AND MANAGEMENT, INC. (HMHMI), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT), Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
In the hope-filled but problem-laden aftermath of the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order (EO) No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) tasked with, among others, the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
This was followed by EO Nos. 2 and 14, respectively freezing all assets and properties in the
Philippines in which the former President, his wife, their close relatives, subordinates, business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees have any interest or participation, and defining the
jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth. Pursuant to the executive orders, several writs
of sequestration were issued by the PCGG in pursuit of the reputedly vast Marcos fortune.
Following a lead that Marcos had substantial holdings in Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Bulletin),
the PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration dated April 22, 1986, sequestering the shares of Marcos,
Emilio T. Yap (Yap), Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco), and their nominees and agents in
Bulletin.
This was followed by another Writ of Sequestration issued on February 12, 1987, this time
sequestering the shares of stock, assets, properties, records and documents of Hans Menzi
Holdings and Management, Inc. (HMHMI).
The Republic then instituted before the Sandiganbayan on July 29, 1987, a complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages entitled "Republic of the Philippines
v. Emilio T. Yap, Manuel G. Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea, Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos" and docketed as Civil Case No. 0022. The complaint substantially
averred that Yap knowingly and willingly acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of the Marcos
spouses in appropriating shares of stock in domestic corporations such as the Bulletin, and for the
purpose of preventing disclosure and recovery of illegally obtained assets. It also averred that Cesar
Zalamea (Zalamea) acted, together with Cojuangco, as dummies, nominees and/or agents of the
Marcos spouses in acquiring substantial shares in Bulletin in order to prevent disclosure and
recovery of illegally obtained assets, and that Zalamea established, together with third persons,
HMHMI which acquired Bulletin.
On March 10, 1988, the complaint was amended joining Cojuangco as Zalamea’s co-actor instead of
mere collaborator. The complaint was amended for the second time on October 17, 1990. The
amendment consisted of dropping Zalamea as defendant in view of the Deed of Assignment dated
October 15, 1987 which he executed, assigning, transferring and ceding to the Government the
121,178 Bulletin shares registered in his name. These shares, as will be explained forthwith, formed
part of the 214,424.5 shares (214 block) which became the subject of a case 1 that reached this
Court.
The Second Amended Complaint also included the Estate of Hans M. Menzi (Estate of Menzi),
through its executor, Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo (Atty. Montecillo), as one of the defendants.
The issues presented for resolution as stated in the Sandiganbayan’s Pre-Trial Order dated
November 11, 1991 were:
1) Whether or not the sale of 154,470 shares of stock of Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc., subject of this
case by the late Hans M. Menzi to the U.S. Automotive Co. Inc. is valid and legal; and
2) Whether or not the shares of stock of Bulletin Publishing Co. Inc. registered and/or issued in the
name of defendants Emilio T. Yap, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar Zalamea and the late Hans M.
Menzi (and/or his estate and/or his holding company, HM Holding & Investment Corp.) are ill-gotten
wealth of the defendants Marcos spouses.
Make of record the oral manifestation of Atty. Estelito Mendoza, counsel for defendant Eduardo
Cojuangco. That: (a) whether or not the said 154,470 shares of stock of Bulletin Publishing Co. Inc.
legally belonged to the late Hans Menzi before he sold the same to U.S. Automotive Co. Inc. and (b)
whether or not plaintiff Republic is entitled to the same, should also be threshed out during the trial
on the merits.2
After protracted proceedings which spawned a number of cases 3 that went up to this Court, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision4 dated March 14, 2002,5 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the following Bulletin shares are the ill-gotten wealth of the defendant Marcos
spouses:
A. The 46,626 Bulletin shares in the name of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., subject of the
Resolution of the Supreme Court dated April 15, 1988 in G.R. No. 79126.
Pursuant to alternative "A" mentioned therein, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG
is hereby declared the legal owner of these shares, and is further directed to execute, in accordance
with the Agreement which is entered into with Bulletin Publishing Corporation on June 9, 1988, the
necessary documents in order to effect transfer of ownership over these shares to the Bulletin
Publishing Corporation.
B. The 198,052.5 Bulletin shares in the names of:
No. of Shares
Jose Y. Campos 90,866.5
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. 90,877
Cesar C. Zalamea 16,309
Total 198,052.5
which they transferred to HM Holdings and Management, Inc. on August 17, 1983, and which the
latter sold to Bulletin Publishing Corporation on February 21, 1986. The proceeds from this sale are
frozen pursuant to PCGG’s Writ of Sequestration dated February 12, 1987, and this writ is the
subject of the Decision of the Supreme Court dated January 31, 2002 in G.R. No. 135789.
Accordingly, the proceeds from the sale of these 198,052.5 Bulletin shares, under Philtrust Bank
Time Deposit Certificate No. 136301 dated March 3, 1986 in the amount of P19,390,156.68 plus
interest earned, in the amount of P104,967,112.62 as of February 28, 2002, per Philtrust Bank’s
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to consign the Proceeds of Time Deposits of HMHMI, filed on
February 28, 2002 with the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135789, are hereby declared forfeited in
favor of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.
2. Ordering the defendant Estate of Hans M. Menzi through its Executor, Manuel G. Montecillo, to
surrender for cancellation the original eight Bulletin certificates of stock in its possession, which were
presented in court as Exhibits …., which are part of the 212,424.5 Bulletin shares subject of the
Resolution of the Supreme Court dated April 15, 1988 in G.R. No. 79126.
3. Declaring that the following Bulletin shares are not the ill-gotten wealth of the defendant Marcos
spouses:
a. The 154,472 Bulletin shares sold by the late Hans M. Menzi to U.S. Automotive Co., Inc., the sale
thereof being valid and legal;
b. The 2,617 Bulletin shares in the name of defendant Emilio T. Yap which he owns in his own right;
and
c. The 1 Bulletin share in the name of the Estate of Hans M. Menzi which it owns in its own right.
4. Dismissing, for lack of sufficient evidence, plaintiff’s claim for damages, and defendants’
respective counterclaims.
SO ORDERED.6
In the present consolidated petitions, the foregoing Sandiganbayan Decision is assailed on different

grounds.
The Republic, in G.R. No. 152758, assails the afore-quoted Decision insofar as it declared as not ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcos spouses the 154,472 shares (154 block) sold by Menzi to U.S.
Automotive Co., Inc. (US Automotive) and dismissed the Republic’s claim for damages.
In G.R. No. 154487, Cojuangco questions paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Sandiganbayan Decision.
In G.R. No. 154518, on the other hand, the Estate of Menzi imputes grave error and
misinterpretation of facts and evidence against the Sandiganbayan in declaring that the 46,626
Bulletin shares in the name of Cojuangco, and the 198,052.5 shares (198 block) in the names of
Jose Campos (Campos), Cojuangco and Zalamea are ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
The three blocks of Bulletin shares of stock subject of these consolidated petitions are:
1. 154,472 shares (154 block) sold by the late Menzi and/or Atty. Montecillo to US Automotive on
May 15, 1985 for ₱24,969,200.09;
2. 198,052.50 (198 block) issued and registered in the names of Campos, Cojuangco, and Zalamea
which were transferred to HMHMI and subsequently sold by HMHMI (through Atty. Montecillo) to
Bulletin on February 21, 1986 for ₱23,675,195.85; and
3. 214,424.5 shares (214 block) issued and registered in the names of Campos, Cojuangco, and
Zalamea which were the subject of the unanimous Resolution of this Court, through Mr. Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee, in Bulletin v. PCGG7 (Teehankee Resolution) dated April 15, 1988 and
the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated January 2, 1995 and April 25, 1996 in Civil Case No. 0022.
For clarity of presentation, the 154 block, which is the subject of the Republic’s petition in G.R. No.
152578, is treated separately from the 198 and 214 blocks, which are the subjects of the petitions in
G.R. No. 154487 and G.R. No. 154518.
154 Block
In 1957, Menzi purchased the entire interest in Bulletin from its founder and owner, Mr. Carson
Taylor. In 1961, Yap, owner of US Automotive, purchased Bulletin shares from Menzi and became
one of the corporation’s major stockholders.
On April 2, 1968, a stock option was executed by and between Menzi and Menzi and Co. on the one
hand, and Yap and US Automotive on the other, whereby the parties gave the each other
preferential right to buy the other’s Bulletin shares.
On April 22, 1968, the stockholders of Bulletin approved certain amendments to Bulletin’s Articles of
Incorporation, consisting of some restrictions on the transfer of Bulletin shares to non-
stockholders.8 The amendments were approved by the Board of Directors of Bulletin and by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Several years later, on June 5, 1984, Atty. Amorsolo V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Vice President of
US Automotive, executed a promissory note with his personal guarantee in favor of Menzi, promising
to pay the latter the sum of P21,304,921.16 with interest at 18% per annum as consideration for
Menzi’s sale of his 154 block on or before December 31, 1984.
One day after Menzi’s death on June 27, 1984, a petition for the probate of his last will and
testament was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 29, by the named executor,
Atty. Montecillo, and docketed as Special Proceeding No. 84-25244.
On January 10, 1985, Atty. Montecillo filed a motion praying for the confirmation of the sale to US
Automotive of Menzi’s 154 block. The probate court confirmed the sale in its Order dated February
1, 1985.
Accordingly, on May 15, 1985, Atty. Montecillo received from US Automotive two (2) checks in the
amounts of ₱21,304,778.24 and ₱3,664,421.85 in full payment of the agreed purchase price and
interest for the sale of the 154 block. On the same day, Atty. Montecillo signed a company voucher
acknowledging receipt of the payment for the shares, indicating on the dorsal portion thereof the
certificate numbers of the 12 stock certificates covering the 154 block, the number of shares covered
by each certificate and the date of issuance thereof.
Atty. Montecillo also wrote on the lower portion of the promissory note executed by Atty. Mendoza
the words "Paid May 15, 1985 (signed) M.G. Montecillo, Executor of the Estate of Hans M. Menzi."
Upon these facts, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the sale of the 154 block to US Automotive is valid
and legal. According to the Sandiganbayan, the sale was made pursuant to the stock option
executed in 1968 between the parties to the sale. Negotiations took place and were concluded
before Menzi’s death, and full payment was made only after the probate court had judicially
confirmed the sale.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Republic’s claim, based on the affidavit of Mariano B. Quimson,
Jr. (Quimson) dated October 9, 1986, that the sale should be nullified because US Automotive only
acted as a dummy of Marcos who was the real buyer of the shares. According to the court, the
Republic failed to overcome its burden of proof since Quimson’s affidavit was not corroborated by
other evidence and was, in fact, refuted by Atty. Montecillo.
In its Memorandum9 dated July 7, 2003 in G.R. No. 152578, the Republic argues that the
Sandiganbayan failed to take into account the fact that despite Menzi’s claim that he acquired
Bulletin in 1957, he did not include any Bulletin shares in his Last Will and Testament executed in
1977. Atty. Montecillo, the executor of Menzi’s estate, likewise did not include any Bulletin share in
the initial inventory of Menzi’s properties filed on May 15, 1985. Neither were any Bulletin shares
declared by Atty. Montecillo even after the probate court issued an Order dated November 17, 1992
for the submission of an updated inventory of Menzi’s assets.
The Republic claims that despite these circumstances, coupled with Quimson’s affidavit detailing
how Marcos used his dummies to conceal his control over Bulletin, as well as the letters and
correspondence between Marcos and Menzi indicating that Menzi consistently updated Marcos on
the affairs of Bulletin, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the 154 block was not ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. The Sandiganbayan’s erroneous inference allegedly warrants a review of its findings.
Moreover, the Republic disputes the Sandiganbayan’s ruling that it heavily leaned on the affidavit of
Quimson without presenting any other corroborating evidence. 10 It argues that in the proceedings
before the PCGG, Quimson was subjected to cross-examination by the lawyers of Bulletin which is
controlled by Yap. Further, the evidence it presented before the PCGG purportedly showing that the
transfer of Bulletin shares from Menzi to US Automotive was undertaken due to pressure exerted by
Marcos on Menzi should have been taken into account.
The Republic insists that the sale between Menzi and U.S. Automotive was a sham because the
parties failed to comply with the basic requirement of a deed of sale in the transfer of the subject
shares. Further, a number of questions were allegedly not resolved, such as: (a) Who was the seller
of the subject shares—the late Menzi as the alleged owner or Atty. Montecillo as then special
administrator and later executor of Menzi’s estate; (b) If Menzi sold the shares, was there a need to
confirm the sale? If Atty. Montecillo was the one who sold them, what was his authority to sell the
said shares?
The Republic also contends that Menzi and Yap were both dummies of the late President Marcos,
used by the latter in order to conceal his interest in Bulletin. Hence, the 154 block should also have
been declared ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor the Government.
The foregoing allegedly warrants the award of damages in favor of the Republic which the
Sandiganbayan erroneously failed to do.
The Republic, therefore, prays that the Sandiganbayan Decision, insofar as it declares the sale of
the 154 block to be valid and legal, be reconsidered and judgment accordingly rendered declaring
the 154 block as ill-gotten wealth, forfeiting the same or the proceeds thereof in favor of the
Republic, and awarding actual, temperate and nominal damages in the Court’s discretion, moral
damages in the amount of 50 Billion Pesos, exemplary damages of 1 Billion Pesos, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and treble judicial costs.
The Estate of Menzi and HMHMI filed a Memorandum11 dated March 10, 2005, averring that the
Republic failed to adduce evidence of any kind that the 154 block was ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. They claim that the requirements for a valid transfer of stocks, namely: (1) there must be
delivery of the stock certificate; (2) the certificate must be indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-
fact or other persons legally authorized to make the transfer; and (3) the transfer must be recorded
in the books of the corporation in order to be valid against third parties, have all been met.
The parties to the sale allegedly confirm the indorsement and delivery of the Bulletin shares of stock
representing the 154 block. The requirement that the transfer be recorded in the books of the
corporation was also met because US Automotive exercised its rights as shareholder.
It is also allegedly immaterial whether it was Menzi or Atty. Montecillo who indorsed the stock
certificates. If it was Menzi, then his indorsement was an act of ownership; if it was Montecillo, then
the indorsement was pursuant to the duly executed General Power of Attorney filed with the SEC
and, subsequently, on the basis of his authority as Special Administrator and Executor of Menzi’s
estate.
In his Memorandum12 dated May 10, 2005, Yap also maintains that the sale of the 154 block was
valid and legal. The non-inclusion of the said block of shares in the inventory of Menzi’s estate was
purportedly due to the fact that the same had, by then, been sold to US Automotive. Yap also claims
that Atty. Montecillo was duly authorized to effect the sale by virtue of the General Power of
Authority and the Last Will and Testament executed by Menzi.
The absence of a deed of sale evidencing the sale is allegedly not irregular because the law itself
does not require any deed for the validity of the transfer of shares of stock, it being sufficient that
such transfer be effected by delivery of the stock certificates duly indorsed. At any rate, a duly
notarized Receipt covering the sale was executed. 13
Moreover, the BIR certified that the Estate of Menzi paid the final tax on capital gains derived from
the sale of the 154 block and authorized the Corporate Secretary to register the transfer of the said
shares in the name of US Automotive. Further, a stock certificate covering the 154 block was issued
to US Automotive by Quimson himself as Corporate Secretary.
Sec. 63 of the Corporation Code provides the requisites for a valid transfer of shares:
Sec. 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares.—The capital stock of stock corporations shall be
divided into shares for which certificates signed by the president or vice-president, countersigned by
the secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of the corporation shall be issued in
accordance with the by-laws. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be
transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-
in-fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be
valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the
corporation showing the names of the parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the
number of the certificate or certificates and the number of shares transferred.
No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall be transferable in the
books of the corporation. [Emphasis supplied]
The Corporation Code acknowledges that the delivery of a duly indorsed stock certificate is sufficient
to transfer ownership of shares of stock in stock corporations. Such mode of transfer is valid
between the parties. In order to bind third persons, however, the transfer must be recorded in the
books of the corporation.
Clearly then, the absence of a deed of assignment is not a fatal flaw which renders the transfer
invalid as the Republic posits. In fact, as has been held in Rural Bank of Lipa City, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,14 the execution of a deed of sale does not necessarily make the transfer effective.
In that case, petitioners argued that by virtue of the deed of assignment, private respondents had
relinquished to them all their rights as stockholders of the bank. This Court, however, ruled that the
delivery of the stock certificate duly indorsed by the owner is the operative act that transfers the
shares. The absence of delivery is a fatal defect which is not cured by mere execution of a deed of
assignment. Consequently, petitioners, as mere assignees, cannot enjoy the status of a stockholder,
cannot vote nor be voted for, and will not be entitled to dividends, insofar as the assigned shares are
concerned.
There appears to be no dispute in this case that the stock certificates covering the 154 block were
duly indorsed and delivered to the buyer, US Automotive. The parties to the sale, in fact, do not
question the validity and legality of the transfer.
The objection raised by the Republic actually concerns the authority of Atty. Montecillo, the executor
of Menzi’s estate, to indorse the said certificates. However, Atty. Montecillo’s authority to negotiate
the transfer and execute the necessary documents for the sale of the 154 block is found in the
General Power of Attorney executed by Menzi on May 23, 1984, which specifically authorizes Atty.
Montecillo "[T]o sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over upon such consideration and under such
terms and conditions as he may deem proper, any and all stocks or shares of stock, now standing or
which may thereafter stand in my name on the books of any and all company or corporation, and for
that purpose to make, sign and execute all necessary instruments, contracts, documents or acts of
assignment or transfer."15
Atty. Montecillo’s authority to accept payment of the purchase price for the 154 block sold to US
Automotive after Menzi’s death springs from the latter’s Last Will and Testament and the Order of
the probate court confirming the sale and authorizing Atty. Montecillo to accept payment therefor.
Hence, before and after Menzi’s death, Atty. Montecillo was vested with ample authority to effect the
sale of the 154 block to US Automotive.
That the 154 block was not included in the inventory is plausibly explained by the fact that at the time
the inventory of the assets of Menzi’s estate was taken, the sale of the 154 block had already been
consummated. Besides, the non-inclusion of the proceeds of the sale in the inventory does not affect
the validity and legality of the sale itself.
At any rate, the Sandiganbayan’s factual findings that the 154 block was sold to US Automotive
while Menzi was still alive, and that Atty. Montecillo merely accepted payment by virtue of the
authority conferred upon him by Menzi himself are conclusive upon this Court, supported, as they
are, by the evidence on record.16 As held by the Sandiganbayan:
… The sale was made pursuant to the Stock Option executed in 1968 between the parties to the
sale, considering the restrictions contained in Bulletin’s Articles of Incorporation as amended in 1968
limiting the transferability of its shares. Negotiations for the sale took place and were concluded
before the death of Menzi. After his death, full payment of the entire consideration of the sale,
principal and interest, was made only after judicial confirmation thereof in the Probate Case. The
transaction was duly supported by the corresponding receipt, voucher, cancelled checks, cancelled
promissory note, and BIR certification of payment of the corresponding taxes due thereon. 17
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not our function to examine and weigh all over again
the evidence presented by the parties in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. 18
It is also significant that even Quimson’s affidavit does not state, in a categorical manner, that Yap
was a Marcos dummy used by the latter to conceal his Bulletin shareholdings. In contrast, Quimson
unqualifiedly declared that Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea were the former dictator’s nominees to
Bulletin.19
We, therefore, agree with the Sandiganbayan that the sale of the 154 block to US Automotive was
valid and legal.
198 and 214 blocks
HMHMI was incorporated on May 20, 1982 by Menzi, Campos, Cojuangco, Rolando C. Gapud
(Gapud) and Zalamea, with an authorized capital stock of ₱1,000,000.00 divided into 100,000
shares with par value of P10.00 each.
A Deed of Transfer and Conveyance was executed by Menzi, Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea on
August 17, 1983, transferring the shares of stock registered in their names in various corporations to
HMHMI in exchange for 6,000,000 shares of the latter’s capital stock, subject to the approval by the
SEC of HMHMI’s Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock. The shares of stock transferred included
the 198 block of Bulletin shares, 90,866.5 of which were registered in the name of Campos; 90,877
in the name of Cojuangco; and 16,309 in the name of Zalamea.
On February 14, 1984, HMHMI amended its Articles of Incorporation by increasing its authorized
capital stock to ₱100,000,000.00 divided into 10,000,000 shares with par value of P10.00 per share.
On January 15, 1986, the law firm of Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako wrote a letter to
Bulletin’s corporate secretary, Atty. Mendoza, requesting that three (3) certificates of stock
representing 90,866.5, 90,877, and 16,309 Bulletin shares be issued in favor of HMHMI in exchange
for 21 certificates of stock in HMHMI.
Atty. Mendoza acknowledged receipt of the 21 certificates of stock but replied that the transfer by
Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea of their Bulletin shares to HMHMI cannot be recorded in the
books of Bulletin because it was made in violation of Bulletin’s Articles of Incorporation which
provides restrictions and limitations on the transferability of the shares of the company by its
stockholders. Bulletin, however, offered to buy the shares at the price fixed in the Articles of
Incorporation. The offer appears to have been accepted by HMHMI through its President, Atty.
Montecillo.
Thus, on January 30, 1986, HMHMI’s Board of Directors passed a resolution approving the sale to
Bulletin of the 198 block and authorizing its President or Corporate Secretary to sign and execute
the corresponding deed of sale. Accordingly, a Deed of Sale was executed on February 21, 1986 by
Atty. Montecillo whereby HMHMI sold the 198 block to Bulletin for the amount of ₱23,675,195.85.
On April 22, 1986, the shares of Marcos, Yap, Cojuangco and their nominees or agents in the
Bulletin were sequestered by virtue of a Sequestration Order issued by the PCGG.
The SEC issued a certification to the effect that as of February 21, 1986, the total subscribed shares
of Bulletin was 756,861. Of these, 198,052.5 were treasury shares, leaving the total outstanding
shares at 567,808.5. The stockholders of Bulletin and the shares of stock held by each of them were
listed as follows:
Name No. of Shares

Emilio T. Yap 2,617
Menzi Trust Fund 28,977
Estate of Hans M. Menzi 1
U.S. Automotive Co. Inc. 318,084
xxx xxx
Cesar Zalamea 121,178
Jose Campos 46,620.5
Eduardo Cojuangco 46,626
Xxx xxx
Total 567,808.5
On February 12, 1987, another Writ of Sequestration was issued by the PCGG, sequestering all the
shares of stock, as well as the assets, properties, records and documents of HMHMI. Because of
this Sequestration Order, the proceeds from the sale of the 198 block which were deposited with
Philtrust Bank were frozen.20
On March 16, 1987, the sequestration of the 2,617 Bulletin shares of Yap was lifted upon the latter’s
motion.
On April 14, 1987, the PCGG wrote a letter/order to the Corporate Secretary of Bulletin, asking for
the schedule of the annual stockholders’ meeting of the corporation because the sequestered shares
consisting of the 214 block will be voted by the Commission. This letter became the subject of a
petition21 filed by Bulletin with this Court questioning the validity of the PCGG’s letter/order and
seeking to compel PCGG to accept Bulletin’s offer of a cash deposit in the amount of
₱34,592,903.34 representing the value of the 214 block of sequestered Bulletin shares. The Court
issued a temporary restraining order.
On July 31, 1987, the PCGG received from Bulletin the amount of ₱8,173,506.06 as full payment of
46,620.5 Bulletin shares registered in the name of Campos. The receipt stated that "Mr. Jose Y.
Campos has waived the ownership of said shares in favor of the Republic of the Philippines through
the Presidential Commission on Good Government."
A Deed of Assignment was likewise executed by Zalamea on October 15, 1987, assigning and
waiving in favor of the Republic his rights to 121,178 Bulletin shares registered in his name. On the
same day, Bulletin issued in favor of PCGG a check in the amount of ₱21,244,926.96 as full
payment of Zalamea’s shares.
This Court, on April 15, 1988, issued the Teehankee Resolution, the dispositive portion of which
pertinently states:
2. Directing the Commission to accept the cash deposit of P8,174,470.32 offered by petitioner for the
46,626 sequestered shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. expressly subject to the
alternative conditions (A and B) hereinabove set forth, and likewise directing the Commission to
accept the cash deposit, if it has not actually sold the Cesar C. Zalamea Bulletin shares to petitioner
(supra, p. 13, par [2]) of P21,244,926.96 for the sequestered shares of Bulletin in the name of Mr.
Cesar Zalamea under the same alternatives already mentioned; and
3. Remanding the case regarding the issue of ownership of the said sequestered Bulletin shares for
determination and adjudication to the Sandiganbayan. 22
An agreement was thereafter executed between PCGG and Bulletin on June 9, 1988 regarding the
46,626 Bulletin shares of Cojuangco whereby PCGG accepted Bulletin’s deposit in the amount of
₱8,174,470.32, subject to the alternatives set forth in the Teehankee Resolution, as follows:
Alternative "A"—To standby as full payment plus whatever interest earnings thereon upon final
judgment of the Court declaring the Republic of the Philippines as owners of the 46,626 shares,
accompanied by the corresponding original stock certificates, issued in the name of the government,
duly endorsed in favor of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation, free from liens and encumbrances; or
Alternative "B"—To immediately return to Bulletin Publishing Corporation the cash deposit in the
amount of P8,174,470.32 plus whatever interest earnings thereon upon final judgment by the Court
declaring that Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. is the true owner of the 46,626 shares. 23
With this factual backdrop, the Sandiganbayan ruled that Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea were
nominees and dummies of Marcos. Hence, the 198 block which these nominees transferred to
HMHMI and which, in turn, were sold to Bulletin are ill-gotten wealth.
The Sandiganbayan anchored its finding on the Deposition of Campos taken on November 25, 1994
before the Philippine Consulate General in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, that he held
shares in Bulletin and HMHMI "per instruction of President Marcos;" that the beneficial owner of
these shares "must be President Marcos;" and that he received three (3) dividend checks from
Bulletin "for the benefit of President Marcos."
Based on the Deed of Assignment executed by Zalamea on October 15, 1987, wherein he
manifested that he "does not claim true and beneficial ownership" of the 121,178 Bulletin shares
registered in his name and that he voluntarily waived and assigned these shares in favor of PCGG,
the Sandiganbayan concluded that Zalamea could not have been a nominee of Menzi, as the latter’s
estate claims, but of Marcos.
The Sandiganbayan likewise rejected Cojuangco’s contention that the Bulletin and HMHMI shares
registered in his name "were not acquired and held by him as dummy, nominee and/or agent of
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Romualdez Marcos, but upon the request, and as
nominee, of the late Hans Menzi who owned and delivered to him said shares." According to the
Sandiganbayan, Cojuangco failed to present evidence necessary to establish his affirmative
defense.
As regards the 214 block, the Sandiganbayan ruled that there is no longer any dispute concerning
the ownership of the 46,620.5 shares held by Campos and the 121,178 shares held by Zalamea in
view of the Teehankee Resolution and the fact that these shares have been waived and assigned to
PCGG.
The Sandiganbayan went on to declare that the only remaining issue pertaining to Cojuangco’s
claim to his alleged portion of the 214 block should be resolved in favor of the Republic because of
Cojuangco’s consistent disavowal of any "proprietary interest in the shares which are the subject
matter of the instant case" and his claim that he held the shares as nominee of Menzi.
The Sandiganbayan further ruled that Yap’s shares, which were acquired by him in 1961 before
Marcos became President, are not ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. Moreover, the one (1) Bulletin
share for which dividend checks were issued to and received by the Estate of Menzi was deemed to
belong to the latter.
In G.R. No. 154487, petitioner Cojuangco assails paragraphs 1 and 2 of the

Sandiganbayan Decision. Allegedly, the Government does not claim that in acquiring the Bulletin
shares registered in Cojuangco’s name, the late President Marcos used government funds or
resources. Cojuangco raises several issues, namely: (a) Were the Bulletin shares, at any time, of
government ownership? (b) Were the Bulletin shares acquired by Marcos and, if so, did he use
government funds to acquire them? (c) Did petitioner Cojuangco act as the "dummy" or "nominee" of
Marcos to acquire, or to conceal the acquisition of the shares by the latter?
In the Memorandum for Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.24 dated May 6, 2005, Cojuangco argues that the
Republic neither alleged nor presented evidence to prove that that the Bulletin shares registered in
his name were owned by the Republic but were taken by the Marcoses "by taking advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship" or that they
were acquired by the Marcoses from Menzi with the use of government or public funds. Hence, the
conclusion should be sustained that the shares were owned by Menzi and never by the Republic,
and no public funds were used in their acquisition.
Cojuangco attacks the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on Quimson’s affidavit saying that it is hearsay
because Quimson was not presented in court to affirm the contents of his affidavit and was not
subjected to cross-examination as he had already passed away when Civil Case No. 0022 was tried.
Quimson’s affidavit is allegedly double hearsay insofar as it alleges that Marcos owned the Bulletin
shares and that Cojuangco was merely Marcos’ nominee because Quimson had no contact with
Marcos and his knowledge of the latter’s purported ownership of the Bulletin shares was merely
relayed to him by Menzi.
Even the supposed corroborating evidence, consisting of the affidavits of Pedro Teodoro, Evelyn S.
Singson, Gapud, and Angelita Reyes, have allegedly been declared as having no probative value
inasmuch as the affiants did not take the witness stand and could not be cross-examined.
The Republic likewise allegedly failed to prove its contention that Bulletin issued checks in favor of
Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea which were deposited into numbered accounts in Security Bank &
Trust Company owned by the Marcoses. Moreover, the dividend checks supposedly indorsed by
Cojuangco in blank do not conclusively demonstrate that they were indorsed in favor of the
Marcoses.
On the other hand, there is allegedly sufficient evidence on record to prove that Cojuangco was a
nominee of Menzi. These documents consist of the testimony of Atty. Montecillo to the effect that, as
far as he knew, Cojuangco "really acted as nominee for the General," and the originals of the stock
certificates covering the Bulletin shares registered in Cojuangco’s name.
Cojuangco further avers that the allegation that the Bulletin shares were registered in his name upon
the request, and as nominee, of Menzi is a specific denial and not an affirmative defense as the
Sandiganbayan declared. As a specific denial, the allegation need not be proven unless the
Republic presents adequate evidence proving the allegations in its complaint which, Cojuangco
insists, the Republic failed to do.
He likewise argues that the Republic is not entitled to damages of any kind because it failed to
establish that it has any proprietary interest in the Bulletin shares registered in his name; that the
said shares are owned by the Marcoses; and that it suffered any pecuniary loss by reason of such
ownership.
Based on these allegations, Cojuangco prays that he be declared the owner of the 46,626 Bulletin
shares registered in his name, together with all cash and stock dividends which have accrued in
favor of said shares from October 15, 1987, and ordering the PCGG to return the cash deposit of
₱8,174,470.32 plus interest to Bulletin.
In its Memorandum25 dated March 17, 2005, the Republic maintains that Cojuangco has consistently
denied any proprietary interest in the Bulletin shares. Hence, he cannot claim ownership of the
Bulletin shares registered in his name. His allegation that that he was a nominee of Menzi was
pleaded by way of defense. Thus, he has the burden of proving this material allegation, set up as
new matter, that the shares were not his but Menzi’s.
Since the Bulletin shares were not included in the inventory of Menzi’s assets, it allegedly follows
that Cojuangco could not have been a nominee of Menzi who did not own the subject Bulletin
shares.
As regards the contention that the Republic failed to show that the shares belong to the Government
or were acquired using public funds, the Republic maintains that Marcos acquired the Bulletin shares
using his political clout. His very act of participating in a business enterprise using nominees to
conceal his ownership of Bulletin shares is already a violation of the Constitution.
Furthermore, Campos and Zalamea, who, like Cojuangco, held shares in the 198 and 214 blocks,
have already surrendered and assigned their respective shares to the Government and
acknowledged the right of the Government over the Bulletin registered in their names. Such is
allegedly a clear indication that they acted as dummies of Marcos. The admission of Campos and
Zalamea that their shares in the 214 block belonged to Marcos may allegedly be used to prove that
the 198 block was likewise held by them as dummies of the former dictator.
The Sandiganbayan also allegedly did not rely on the Teehankee Resolution to support its
conclusion that the 198 and 214 blocks are ill-gotten wealth but made its own finding after a full-
blown trial at which all the parties, except Cojuangco, presented their respective evidence.
Moreover, the evidence presented by the Republic allegedly preponderates in favor of its theory that
the Bulletin shares in the names of Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea were actually held in trust for
the benefit of the Marcoses. Notably, the PCGG Resolution dated May 22, 1987, presented by the
Republic as its Exhibit "I" declares that Quimson and Teodoro, close associates of Menzi, stated
under oath that when Marcos allowed the Bulletin to reopen during Martial Law, Menzi was allowed
only 20% participation, and that Marcos put his shares in the names of Campos, Cojuangco and
Zalamea.
Besides, Menzi did not execute any deed of trust in his favor as trustor and Campos, Cojuangco and
Zalamea as trustees. Neither did the Estate of Menzi claim that Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea
were nominees of Menzi as no cross-claim was filed by the Estate of Menzi even as it claimed
ownership of the 198 and 214 blocks.
In their Memorandum26 dated March 10, 2005 in G.R. Nos. 154487 and 154518, the Estate of Menzi
and HMHMI argue that the Sandiganbayan erred in not resolving the issue of the ownership of the
198 and 214 blocks. The Sandiganbayan instead allegedly relied on its misinterpretation of the
Teehankee Resolution to the effect that there is no longer any controversy as regards the ownership
of the portion of the 214 block held by Zalamea. According to said respondents, the Teehankee
Resolution clearly directed the Sandiganbayan to resolve the issue of ownership of both the
Zalamea and Cojuangco portions of the 214 block.
Respondents Estate of Menzi and HMHMI also contend that the Quimson affidavit should have been
treated as having no probative value with respect to the 154 block and the 198 and 214 blocks alike.
The affidavit was allegedly not at all corroborated by the other documents presented by the Republic
and cited in the assailed Decision.
They insist that Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea were nominees of Menzi, not dummies of Marcos,
because, as allegedly established during trial, the stock certificates covering the contested blocks of
shares were indorsed in blank and remained in Menzi’s possession. Even Campos allegedly testified
that he was never in possession of the stock certificates.
Assuming that Campos was indeed a Marcos dummy, his admission should apply solely to the
Bulletin shares registered in his name. Likewise, Zalamea allegedly never declared himself to be a
Marcos nominee, only that he does not claim true and beneficial ownership of the Bulletin shares
recorded in his name. The dividend checks for Zalamea’s shareholdings, in fact, allegedly indicate
the Estate of Menzi as the payee, proving that Zalamea was Menzi’s nominee.
Respondents Estate of Menzi and HMHMI further claim that the 198 and 214 blocks were not
mentioned in Menzi’s Last Will and Testament because Menzi knew of the impending promulgation
of a decree which would limit to only 20% the ownership of media enterprises by one person or
family. Allegedly, in order to get around this restriction, Menzi devised the nominee structure
whereby he used three (3) nominees to enable him to retain his 80% stake in Bulletin. Besides, there
was allegedly a legal question as to whether sequestered shares need to be declared for estate tax
purposes in the meantime that a case involving these shares was pending.
Said respondents finally posit that assuming that the 198 and 214 blocks are ill-gotten, the shares
themselves, and not merely the proceeds, should be forfeited in favor of the Government.
Yap, on the other hand, claims in his Memorandum27 dated May 10, 2005 filed in G.R. Nos.
154487 and 154518 that Cojuangco may not raise in his petition a new specific relief consisting of
the prayer that he be declared the owner of the 46,626 Bulletin shares registered in his name which
Cojuangco never asked for during the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Cojuangco is
allegedly bound by his judicial admission that he has no proprietary interest over the said Bulletin
shares.
Purportedly, because of this judicial admission, Alternative B mentioned in the Teehankee

Resolution was eliminated. The only option which remained was, as held by the Sandiganbayan, to
declare that the Government is the legal owner of the shares and direct the PCGG to execute the
necessary documents to effect the transfer thereof in accordance with Alternative A.
As regards the prayer that the shares themselves be forfeited in favor of the Government, Yap
contends that this cannot be done because the Government is barred by the Constitution from
acquiring ownership of private mass media.
The Estate of Menzi and HMHMI should also not be allowed to claim the portion of the 214 block
held by Campos and Zalamea whose ownership has allegedly been settled by this Court in the
Teehankee Resolution.
Yap also claims that the Estate of Menzi and HMHMI have unlawfully concealed the stock
certificates representing a portion of the shares held by Campos and Zalamea. Their lawyers,
specifically Atty. Montecillo, have also allegedly staked an unfounded claim on the Bulletin shares in
violation of their duty, as lawyers of Bulletin for several years, to protect the latter’s interests.
Cojuangco filed a Reply Memorandum28 dated October 17, 2005, substantially reiterating his
argument that the Sandiganbayan failed to make a finding that the Bulletin shares are ill-gotten as
defined by the pertinent executive orders and that they were owned by the Marcoses. Consequently,
he insists that there is no basis for the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the Republic is the legal
owner of the said shares.
The Republic also filed a Memorandum29 dated March 17, 2005 in G.R. No. 154518, averring that
the petition raises factual issues not proper in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The Republic insists that the Decision of the Sandiganbayan relative to the 198 and 214 blocks was
not based on Quimson’s affidavit alone but on the totality of the evidence presented to support the
complaint. Quimson’s affidavit was allegedly given prominence because it related in detail how
Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea came to be nominees of Marcos. The allegations in Quimson’s
affidavit were allegedly confirmed by Menzi’s Last Will and Testament, the initial inventory of his
assets, the letters and correspondence between Marcos and Menzi, Campos’ deposition, and the
dividend checks issued to Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea even after they have supposedly
transferred their Bulletin shares to HMHMI.
Moreover, Atty. Montecillo did not institute any action against Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea to
recover the shares. This allegedly indicates that the shares were not owned by Menzi and that
Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea did not act as Menzi’s nominees.
As regards the claim that Menzi owned the shares registered in the names of Campos, Cojuangco
and Zalamea because the stock certificates covering them were in Menzi’s possession, the Republic
maintains that mere possession of the stock certificates does not operate to vest ownership on
Menzi considering that Campos already declared that Marcos owned those shares and Zalamea
surrendered his shares to the Government.
Furthermore, the Republic alleges that the Sandiganbayan had already ruled with finality that the
Estate of Menzi and HMHMI cannot recover the Campos and Zalamea portions of the 214 block.
Specifically, in the Resolution dated January 2, 1995, the Sandiganbayan declared that the Estate of
Menzi cannot recover the Campos shares because the latter, who was not a co-defendant in the
case, had already voluntarily surrendered the same to the PCGG. Zalamea’s shares could likewise
not be recovered because he was also not a party, either as defendant, cross-defendant or third-
party defendant. Moreover, in another Resolution dated July 10, 1993, the Sandiganbayan held that
the Estate of Menzi has not pleaded any claim of ownership over the Bulletin shares in the names of
Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea, much less has it intervened to express any prejudice to it should
any judgment be rendered for or against Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea.
We again affirm the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.
It should be noted at the outset that there is no more dispute as regards the Bulletin shares
registered in the name of Campos. In fact, Campos was not included as a defendant in Civil Case
No. 0022. The Bulletin shares registered in his name have been voluntarily surrendered to the
PCGG and the proceeds thereof have accordingly been forfeited in favor of the Government.
The Pre-Trial Order of the Sandiganbayan dated November 11, 1991 likewise does not mention as
an issue the ownership of the Campos-held Bulletin shares.
The same cannot be said, however, of the Bulletin shares registered in the name of Zalamea.
Although he was dropped as a party-defendant in the Second Amended Complaint dated October
17, 1990 purportedly by reason of the Deed of Assignment he executed on October 15, 1987, the
Zalamea-held shares are clearly still covered by the Teehankee Resolution remanding the issue on
the ownership of the sequestered Cojuangco and Zalamea shares for determination and
adjudication by the Sandiganbayan.
Having said that, we now proceed to determine whether the Sandiganbayan committed reversible
error in rendering the assailed Decision.
As with the 154 block, the issues raised by the petitioners assailing the Sandiganbayan’s disposition
of the 198 and 214 blocks are largely factual and, therefore, generally beyond the scope of our
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Nonetheless, as will be shown in the following
disquisition, there is no cause for this Court to reverse the Sandiganbayan because the evidence on
record amply supports its findings and conclusions.
The 46,626 shares registered in the name of Cojuangco which formed part of the 214 block were
declared to be ill-gotten wealth based on the evidence presented by the Republic to show that
Cojuangco acted as a nominee of Marcos and on Cojuangco’s unsubstantiated allegation that he
acted as a nominee not of Marcos but of Menzi.
Cojuangco counters, however, that the allegation that he acted as Menzi’s nominee is a specific
denial which he does not have the burden of proving.
Notably, in the Answer of Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated March 16, 1989, Cojuangco
claimed as part of his denial that "whatever shares of stock he may have in Bulletin Publishing
Corporation and/or H.M. Holdings and Management, Inc. were not acquired and held by him as
dummy, nominee and/or agent of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Romualdez Marcos,
but upon the request, and as nominee, of the late Hans Menzi who owned and delivered to him said
shares."30
Likewise, in his Pre-Trial Brief dated January 15, 1992, Cojuangco stated that "[I]n regard shares of
stock in the name of defendant Cojuangco in Bulletin Publishing Corporation and/or HM Holdings &
Management, Inc., he was never, and is not, a nominee of any other person but the late Brig. Gen.
Hans M. Menzi. Defendant Cojuangco therefore reiterates that he has no proprietary interest in the
shares which are the subject matter of the instant case. They properly belong to the estate of the
late Hans Menzi."31
It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative allegations by the
degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases such as this one, the degree of evidence required
of a party in order to support his claim is preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by
one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is therefore incumbent
upon the plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his case. Corollarily, the defendant must likewise
prove its own allegations to buttress its claim that it is not liable. 32
The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. The burden of proof 33 may be on the
plaintiff or the defendant. It is on the defendant if he alleges an affirmative defense which is not a
denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but is one which, if established, will
be a good defense – i.e., an "avoidance" of the claim.34
In the instant case, Cojuangco’s allegations are in the nature of affirmative defenses which should
be adequately substantiated. He did not deny that Bulletin shares were registered in his name but
alleged that he held these shares not as nominee of Marcos, as the Republic claimed, but as
nominee of Menzi. He did not, however, present any evidence to support his claim and, in fact, filed
a Manifestation dated July 20, 1999 stating that he "sees no need to present any evidence in his
behalf."35
In contrast to Cojuangco’s consistent, albeit unsupported, disclaimer, the Sandiganbayan found the
Republic’s evidence to be preponderant. These pieces of evidence consist of: the affidavit of
Quimson detailing how Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea became Marcos’ nominees in Bulletin; the
affidavit Teodoro relative to the circumstances surrounding the sale of Menzi’s substantial shares in
Bulletin to Marcos’ nominees and Menzi’s retention of only 20% of the corporation; the sworn
statement of Gapud describing the business interests and associates of Marcos and stating that
Bulletin checks were periodically issued to Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea but were deposited
after indorsement to Security Bank numbered accounts owned by the Marcoses dividend checks
issued to Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea even after their shares have been transferred to
HMHMI; the Certificate of Incorporation, Articles of Incorporation and Amended Articles of
Incorporation of HMHMI showing that Bulletin shares held by Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea
were used to set up HMHMI; Deed of Transfer and Conveyance showing that Campos, Cojuangco,
Zalamea and Menzi transferred several shares, including Bulletin shares, to HMHMI in exchange for
shares of stock in the latter which shares were not issued; the Inventory of Menzi’s assets as of May
15, 1985 which does not include Bulletin shares; notes written by Marcos regarding Menzi’s
resignation as aide-de-camp to devote his time to run Bulletin’s operations and the reduction of his
shares in the corporation to 12%; and letters and correspondence between Marcos and Menzi
regarding the affairs of Bulletin.
These pieces of uncontradicted evidence suffice to establish that the 198 and 214 blocks are indeed
ill-gotten wealth as defined under the Rules and Regulations of the PCGG, viz:
Sec. 1. Definition.—(A) "Ill-gotten wealth is hereby defined as any asset, property, business

enterprise or material possession of persons within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2,
acquired by them directly, or indirectly thru dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
(2) Through the receipt, directly or indirectly, of any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks
or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the official concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled
corporations;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other

combination and/or by the issuance, promulgation and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; and
(6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship or influence for personal
gain or benefit.
Cojuangco’s disavowal of any proprietary interest in the Bulletin shares is conclusive upon him. His
prayer that he be declared the owner of the said shares, together with all the cash and stock
dividends which have accrued thereto since October 15, 1987, and that the PCGG be ordered to
return the cash deposit of ₱8,174,470.32 to Bulletin, therefore, has no legal basis and should
perforce be denied.
In this connection, it should be said that Cojuangco apparently desisted from presenting evidence
and chose instead to stake his claim with the Estate of Menzi and HMHMI. As found by the
Sandiganbayan, however, the Estate of Menzi and HMHMI failed to prove their allegation that
Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea were Menzi’s nominees. Neither did the Estate of Menzi and
HMHMI institute an action to recover the shares from Menzi’s nominees.
Significantly, even as they claimed ownership of the Bulletin shares in their Answer to the Republic’s
Second Amended Complaint, the Estate of Menzi and HMHMI did not file any cross-claim against
the purported Menzi nominees.
Quite revealing, too, is the fact that Campos, in his Answers to Direct Interrogatories36 taken before
the Consul General at the Philippine Consulate General in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada on
November 25, 1994, repeatedly declared that he owned a portion of the 198 block "per instruction of
President Marcos"37 and that he "became the shareholder, per instruction of President Marcos." 38
Likewise, in his Deed of Assignment dated October 15, 1987, Zalamea manifested that he "does not
claim true and beneficial ownership" of the Bulletin shares registered in his name and that he
voluntarily waived and assigned the same in favor of the PCGG.
These declarations should have alerted the Estate of Menzi and HMHMI to file cross-claims against
Campos and Zalamea. The fact that they did not enfeebles their claim of ownership.
It is also important to note that the Estate of Menzi did not include the 198 and 214 blocks in the
inventory of the estate’s assets dated May 15, 1985. If, as it claims, the Bulletin shares of Campos,
Cojuangco and Zalamea were held by them as nominees of Menzi, then these shares should have
been included in the inventory. The justification advanced for the said non-inclusion, which is that the
stock certificates covering them were not in the possession of Atty. Montecillo, is nothing but a
hollow pretext given the fact that even after the certificates came to Atty. Montecillo’s possession in
1987, an updated inventory declaring the said shares as part of Menzi’s estate was not filed
pursuant to the Order of the probate court dated November 17, 1992.
Further, the claim that Menzi would need dummies because of the impending promulgation of a
decree which would limit to 20% the ownership of media enterprises by one person or family is
incredulous since no such decree was ever issued.
Parenthetically, the fact that the stock certificates covering the shares registered under the names of
Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea were found in Menzi’s possession does not necessarily prove that
the latter owned the shares. A stock certificate is merely a tangible evidence of ownership of shares
of stock.39 Its presence or absence does not affect the right of the registered owner to dispose of the
shares covered by the stock certificate. Hence, as registered owners, Campos and Zalamea validly
ceded their shares in favor of the Government. This assignment is now a fait accompli for the benefit
of the entire nation.
The contention that the sale of the 214 block to the Bulletin was null and void as the PCGG failed to
obtain approval from the Sandiganbayan is likewise unmeritorious. While it is true that the PCGG is
not empowered to sell sequestered assets without prior Sandiganbayan approval, 40 this case
presents a clear exception because this Court itself, in the Teehankee Resolution, directed the
PCGG to accept the cash deposit offered by Bulletin in payment for the Cojuangco and Zalamea
sequestered shares subject to the alternatives mentioned therein and the outcome of the remand to
the Sandiganbayan on the question of ownership of these sequestered shares.
In light of the foregoing, we are not inclined to disturb the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the weight
and sufficiency of the evidence presented by the Republic and its finding that the evidence adduced
by the Estate of Menzi and HMHMI do not prove their allegation that Campos, Cojuangco and
Zalamea are Menzi’s nominees, taking into account the express admission of Campos that he
owned the shares upon Marcos’ instruction, the declaration of Zalamea that he does not claim true
and beneficial ownership of the shares, and the absolute dearth of evidence regarding Cojuangco’s
assertion that he is Menzi’s nominee.
With regard to the Republic’s prayer for damages, we find the same not supported by sufficient
evidence.
An award of actual or compensatory damages requires proof of pecuniary loss. In this case, the
Republic has not proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised on competent proof and
the best evidence obtainable, that it has suffered any actual pecuniary loss by reason of the acts of
the defendants. Hence, actual or compensatory damages may not be awarded. 41
On the other hand, while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, temperate,
nominal and exemplary damages may be adjudicated, proof of damage or injury should nonetheless
be adduced. As found by the Sandiganbayan, however, the Republic failed to show the factual basis
for the award of moral damages and its causal connection to defendants’ acts. Thus, moral
damages, which are designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer,42 may not be awarded. Temperate, nominal, and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and judicial costs may likewise not be adjudicated for
failure to present sufficient evidence to establish entitlement to these awards.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 152578, G.R. No. 154487 and G.R. No. 154518 are
DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated March 14, 2002 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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REPUBLIC vs. ESTATE OF HANS MENZI

G.R. 152578
.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In 1957, Menzi purchased the entire interest in Bulletin from its
founder and owner, Mr. Carson Taylor. In 1961, Yap, owner of
US Automotive, purchased Bulletin shares from Menzi and
became one of the corporation’s major stockholders.
Several years later, on June 5, 1984, Atty. Amorsolo V. Mendoza
(Atty. Mendoza), Vice President of US Automotive, executed a
promissory note with his personal guarantee in favor of Menzi,
promising to pay the latter the sum of P21,304,921.16 with
interest at 18% per annum as consideration for Menzi’s sale of his
154 block on or before December 31, 1984.
Accordingly, on May 15, 1985, Atty. Montecillo received from US
Automotive two (2) checks in the amounts of P21,304,778.24
andP3,664,421.85 in full payment of the agreed purchase price
and interest for the sale of the 154 block. On the same day, Atty.
Montecillo signed a company voucher acknowledging receipt of
the payment for the shares, indicating on the dorsal portion
thereof the certificate numbers of the 12 stock certificates
covering the 154 block, the number of shares covered by each
certificate and the date of issuance thereof.
Atty. Montecillo also wrote on the lower portion of the promissory
note executed by Atty. Mendoza the words “Paid May 15, 1985
(signed) M.G. Montecillo, Executor of the Estate of Hans M.
Menzi.”
In 1957, Menzi purchased the entire interest in Bulletin from its

founder and owner, Mr. Carson Taylor. In 1961, Yap, owner of
US Automotive, purchased Bulletin shares from Menzi and
became one of the corporation’s major stockholders.
Several years later, on June 5, 1984, Atty. Amorsolo V. Mendoza

(Atty. Mendoza), Vice President of US Automotive, executed a
promissory note with his personal guarantee in favor of Menzi,
promising to pay the latter the sum of P21,304,921.16 with
interest at 18% per annum as consideration for Menzi’s sale of his
154 block on or before December 31, 1984.
Accordingly, on May 15, 1985, Atty. Montecillo received from US

Automotive two (2) checks in the amounts of P21,304,778.24
andP3,664,421.85 in full payment of the agreed purchase price
and interest for the sale of the 154 block. On the same day, Atty.
Montecillo signed a company voucher acknowledging receipt of
the payment for the shares, indicating on the dorsal portion
thereof the certificate numbers of the 12 stock certificates
covering the 154 block, the number of shares covered by each
certificate and the date of issuance thereof.
Atty. Montecillo also wrote on the lower portion of the promissory
note executed by Atty. Mendoza the words “Paid May 15, 1985
(signed) M.G. Montecillo, Executor of the Estate of Hans M.
Menzi.”
ISSUE
Whether the sale and transfer of Bulletin shares of stocks from
Menzi to Yap is valid and legal.
RULING
Yes. The Corporation Code acknowledges that the delivery of a
duly indorsed stock certificate is sufficient to transfer ownership of
shares of stock in stock corporations. Such mode of transfer is
valid between the parties. In order to bind third persons,
however, the transfer must be recorded in the books of the
corporation.
Clearly then, the absence of a deed of assignment is not a fatal
flaw which renders the transfer invalid as the Republic posits. In
fact, as has been held in Rural Bank of Lipa City, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, the execution of a deed of sale does not necessarily
make the transfer effective.
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G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988
MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Balagtas P. Ilagan for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks
Law) on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial
Court. The facts stipulated upon read:
a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of this case;
b) That the accused was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation on or before
January 21, 1981;
c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued and made out check No. 26741,
dated January 24, 1981 in the sum of P2,541.05;
d) That the said check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness, Roy Nadera;
e) That the check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in remittance of
collection;
f) That the said check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but the same
was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed;
g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been properly Identified as the accused party
in this case.
At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence consisting of Exhibits
"A," "B" and "C." At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant waived the
right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of
Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of
conviction.
1
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that:
The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional
Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that
the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during
the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his
counsel.
Finding the petition meritorious, we resolved to give due course.
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to
this case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made

or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the
accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule 118)
[Emphasis supplied]
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words
and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory
(McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its
mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more importantly,
penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly
applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-
23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his
counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of
Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign
the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused
did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish
the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the
Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused
cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that
evidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been
entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or
reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 [1928]).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby
ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Per Justice Gloria C. Paras; Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Conrado T.
Limcaoco, concurring.
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G.R. No. 201858 June 4, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JENNY LIKIRAN alias "Loloy", Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malaybalay City, Branch 8, for the death of Rolando Sareno, Sr. (Sareno ). In its
Decision dated July 17, 2006, the RTC disposed as follows:
1
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Loloy Likiran guilty of the crime of Murder and imposes upon
him the penalty of Reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of [P]50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; [P]50,000.00 moral damages; [P]30,000.00 actual damages, and [P]10,000.00
attorney's fee and to pay the costs. This court has no jurisdiction over Jerome alias Caro Likiran as
he is not impleaded in the information.
SO ORDERED. 2
The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the wee hour of March 19, 2000 in
BarangayBugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance was being
held at the basketball court. Prosecution witnesses Celso Dagangon (Dagangon), Prescado
Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno (Goloceno) testified that on said night, they were at
the dance together with Sareno at around 8:00 p.m. After a few hours, while Mercado and Goloceno
were inside the dance area, Jerome Likiran (Jerome), the accused-appellant’s brother, punched
3
Mercado on the mouth. Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he saw that Jerome was
armed with a short firearm while the accused-appellant was holding a hunting knife, so he backed
off. Dagangon and Sareno, who were outside the dance area, heard the commotion. Afterwards,
Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant
stabbed him on the back. It was Dagangon who saw the incident first-hand as he was only three
meters from where Sareno was. Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after
Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that point. Sareno suffered
multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left scapular area. 4
The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he admitted that he
was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion happened. Heand Jerome stayed
within the area where the sound machine was located and they only heard the gunshots outside.
Other witnesses testified in the accused-appellant’s defense, with Edgar Indanon testifying that he
saw the stabbing incident and that it was some other unknown person, and not the accused-
appellant, who was the culprit; and Eleuterio Quiñopa stating that he was with the accused-appellant
and Jerome inside the dance hall at the time the commotion occurred.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellant’s
culpability. Prosecution witness Dagangon’s positive identification of the accused-appellant was
5
held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the crime of murder. The RTC also rejected the
6
accused-appellant’s defense of denial as it was not supported by evidence. It also ruled that alibi
cannot favor the accused-appellant since he failed to prove that it was impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime on the night of March 19, 2000. 7
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto per assailed Decision dated July 27,
8
2011, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated July 17, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8 of Malaybalay City, in Criminal Case No. 10439-00 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED. 9
The CA sustained the findings of the RTC as regards the identity of the accused-appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the crime. The CA, nevertheless, deviated from the RTC’s conclusion that there
was conspiracy between Jerome and the accused-appellant, and that abuse of superior strength
attended the commission of the crime. According to the CA, the information failed to contain the
allegation of conspiracy, and the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish that Jerome and the
accused-appellant ganged up on the victim. 10
The CA, however, sustained the RTC’s finding of treachery. 11
The accused-appellant protested his conviction. According to him, the prosecution failed to
12
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the accused-appellant argued that the
prosecution failed to prove the identity of the assailant and his culpability. 13
Upon review, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the RTC,
as affirmed by the CA, including their assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Factual findings
of the trial court are, except for compelling or exceptional reasons, conclusive to the Court especially
when fully supported by evidence and affirmed by the CA. 14
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. In
15
this case, the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime has been
adequately established by the prosecution, more particularly by the testimony of Dagangon. The
Court cannot sustain the accused-appellant’s argument that it was impossible for Dagangon to see
the assailant considering that there was no evidence to show that the place where the crime
occurred was lighted. As found by the CA, Dagangon was only three meters away from the accused-
appellant and Jerome and had a good view of them. Moreover, there was no distraction that could
have disrupted Dagangon’s attention. He even immediately identified the accused-appellant and
Jerome during police investigation, and there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the
police beforehand that the accused-appellant was one of the suspects. Positive identification by a
16
prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater
weight than alibi and denial. Such positive identification gains further ground in the absence of any
17
ill motive on the part of a witness to falsely testify against an accused.

18
The accused-appellant also asserted that the information charged him of murder committed by
attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing his instantaneous death. The
19
accused-appellant argued that the evidence on record established that Sareno was in fact shot by
some other person. At this juncture, the Court notes that the testimony of Dagangon, indeed,
20
identified two assailants – the accused-appellant and his brother, Jerome; however, it was only the
accused-appellant who was charged with the death of Sareno. Defense witnesses also testified that
Jerome died on March 12, 2005. 21
The CA disregarded the accused-appellant’s contention and ruled that "the cause of death was not
made an issue in the court a quo" and the Certificate of Death was admitted during the pre-trial
conference as proof of the fact and cause of death. And even assuming that the cause of death
22
was an issue, the CA still held the accused-appellant liable for the death of Sareno on the basis of
the Court’s ruling in People v. Pilola. 23
The Court reviewed the records of this case and finds sufficient basis for the CA’s disregard of the
accused-appellant’s argument.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated upon and
admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Cidric
Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of
Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular
area." Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
24
Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or admissions made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. In this case, while it appears that the
25
pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may
nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its admission. Moreover, a death
26
certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the regular performance of his duty is prima facie
evidence of the cause of death of the victim. Note that the certificate of death issued by Dr. Dael
27
provides the following:
CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate cause : DOA
Antecedent cause : Multiple GSW
Underlying cause : Stab wound scapular area (L) 28
The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sareno’s cause of death. 29

More importantly, the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and logical consequence
resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the shooter, it is nevertheless
true that the stab wound he inflicted on Sareno contributed to the latter’s death. In Quinto v.
Andres, the Court stated that:
30
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and
death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its
criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is
criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to
the death of the victim. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away
from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. x x x[.] (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
31
The Court, however, cannot agree with the RTC and CA’s conclusion that the killing of Sareno was
attended by treachery, qualifying the crime to murder.
Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements are shown: a)
the malefactor employed means, method, or manner of execution affording the person attacked no
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b) the means, method, or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. Treachery is not present when the killing is not
32
premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just
triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the
victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment. 33
In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to the fact that the shooting and
stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur of the moment incident, a result of the brawl that happened
during the barrio dance. The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant and his brother
Jerome deliberately planned the means by which they would harm Sareno. In fact, what was
revealed by the prosecution evidence was that Sareno was an innocent bystander who unfortunately
became a target of the accused-appellant and Jerome’s rampage. Consequently, the accused-
appellant should be liable only for the lesser crime of Homicide.
In convictions for homicide, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes the penalty of
reclusion temporal, which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In 34
the absence of any modifying circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium
period, or from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and
35
four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be
36
imposed on the accused-appellant shall be within the range of reclusion temporal medium, and the
37
minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the
offense, or prision mayor in any of its periods, which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to
38
twelve (12) years. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the Court thereby
39
sentences the accused-appellant to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum.
With regard to the damages awarded, the Court affirms the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) moral damages, as these are in
accord with the Court's judicial policy on the matter. These, on top of the Thirty Thousand Pesos
40
(₱30,000.00) actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) attorney's fees awarded by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Further, the monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.41
The Court, moreover, deletes the attorney's fees awarded by the RTC as there is nothing on record
proving that the heirs of Sareno actually incurred such expense. Attorney's fees are in the concept of
actual or compensatory damages allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of
the Civil Code, and absent any evidence supporting its grant, the same must be deleted for lack of
42
factual basis. 1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00484 is MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Jenny Likiran alias "Loloy" is hereby found guilty of
the lesser crime of HOMICIDE, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years
of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. Further, the award of attorney's fees is hereby DELETED.
Interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded, to
earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
In all other respects, the Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Issued by Presiding Judge Pelagio B. Estopia; CA rollo, pp. 20A-42.
2
Id. at 42.
3
Also known as Caro in other parts of the records.
4
Rollo, p. 4.
Jerome was not named co-accused in the Information for murder filed in Criminal Case No.
5
10439-00.
6
CA rollo, p. 32.
7
Id. at 34-37.
Penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan Manahan, with Associate Justices

8
Romulo V. Borja and Edgardo T. Lloren, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-18.
9
Id. at 17.
10
Id. at 13-15.
11
Id. at 15.
The accused-appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office, manifested that he will not file
12
a supplemental brief, the arguments for his acquittal having been exhaustively discussed in
the Appellant’s Brief filed with the CA. See Resolution dated July 17, 2013.
13
CA rollo, p. 15.
14
People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 196434, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 604, 608.
15
People v. Villarico, Sr., G.R. No. 158362, April 4, 2011, 647 SCRA 43, 53.
16
Rollo, pp. 10-12.
17
People v. Tomas,Sr., G.R. No. 192251, February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 530, 547-548.
18
People v. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013, 688 SCRA 646, 654.
19
CA rollo, p. 17.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 26, 28.
22
Rollo, pp. 13-14.
23
453 Phil. 1 (2003).
24
Records, p. 83-A.
See Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 15, 24 (2000).
25
People v. Marollano, 342 Phil. 38, 54-55 (1997).

26
People v. Crisostomo, 243 Phil. 211, 217-218 (1988).

27
Records, p. 9.
28
Section 4, Rule 118 provides: "After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order
29
reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind
the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action
during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice." (Emphasis ours)
493 Phil. 643 (2005).

30
Id. at 653.
31
People of the Philippines v. Javier Cañaveras, G.R. No. 193839, November 27, 2013.
32
Id., citing People v. Teriapil, G.R. No. 191361, March 2, 2011, 644 SCRA 491, People v.
33
Tigle, 465 Phil. 368 (2004), and People v. Badajos, 464 Phil. 762 (2004).
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 27.

34
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 64(1).

35
Act No. 4103, as amended.

36
Act No. 4103, Section 1.

37
Id.
38
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 27.

39
People of the Philippines v. Erwin Tamayo y Bautista, G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 20 I 4;
40
Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170462,
February 5, 2014.
People v. Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, January 23, 2013, 689 SCRA 236.
41
See People v. Hernandez, 476 Phil. 66, 91 (2004).

42
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
G.R. No. 180314 April 16, 2009
NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of the
Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 promulgated on 7 August 2007 which found petitioner
Normallah A. Pacasum guilty of Falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, and its Resolution2 dated 22 October 2007 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion for New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.
On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public
Documents, defined and punished under paragraph 1 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in Cotabato City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused NORMALLAH A.
PACASUM, a high ranking public official being the Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, while in the performance of her
official functions, committing the offense in relation thereto, taking advantage of her official position,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified her Employee Clearance 3 submitted
to the Office of the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating
the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose of
claiming her salary for the months of August and September 2000. 4
On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking that she be given the
opportunity to file her counter-affidavit during a preliminary investigation in order that her right to due
process would not be violated.5 Petitioner further filed an Urgent Motion for Preliminary Investigation
and/or Reinvestigation with a Prayer to Recall or Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. 6
On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for preliminary

investigation/reinvestigation decreeing that petitioner was not deprived of the opportunity to be heard
before the Office of the Ombudsman as she had waived her right to be heard on preliminary
investigation.7
On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.8 Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held and the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial
Order.9 The parties did not enter any admission or stipulation of facts, and agreed that the issues to
be resolved were as follows:
1. Whether or not accused Normallah Pacasum, being then the Regional Secretary of the
Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City,
falsified her Employee Clearance, which she submitted to the Office of the Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura
Y. Pangilan, the Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for purposes of claiming her salary for
the months of August and September 2000;
2. Whether or not the accused took advantage of her official position in order to commit the
crime charged.10
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Subaida K. Pangilan, 11 former Human
Resource Management Officer V of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Laura Y.
Pangilan, former Supply Officer of the Department of Tourism, ARMM; 12 and Rebecca A.
Agatep,13 Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City.
Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a retired government employee and formerly a
Human Resource Management Officer V of the ARMM which position she held from May 1993 to 28
May 2003. As such, one of her duties was to receive applications for clearance of Regional
Secretaries of the ARMM. She explained that an Employees Clearance was a requirement to be
submitted to the Office of the Regional Director by retiring employees, employees leaving the
country or those applying for leave in excess of thirty days. The person applying for clearance shall
get a copy of the employees clearance and shall accomplish the same by having the different
division heads sign it.
Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accused-petitioner – Norma Pacasum – to be the former
Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism (DOT), ARMM. She narrated that in the year 2000,
petitioner submitted the original of an Employees Clearance to her office in compliance with the
memorandum14 dated 8 August 2000 issued by Governor Nur Misuari, directing all officers and
employees to clear themselves of property and money accountabilities before their salaries for
August and September 2000 would be paid. Upon inspection of the Employees Clearance, she
noticed that the signature of Laura Pangilan (Laura) contained in said document was not hers. She
said Laura Pangilan was her daughter-in-law, and that the latter’s signature was very familiar to her.
Mrs. Pangilan immediately photocopied15 the original Employees Clearance with the intention of
sending the same to her daughter-in-law for the purpose of having the latter confirm if the signature
on top of her name in the Employees Clearance was hers. There being no messenger available, she
instead called up Laura to come to her office to verify the signature. Laura, whose office was only a
walking distance away, came and inspected the clearance, and denied signing the same. After she
denied that she signed the clearance, and while they were conversing, the bearer of the Employees
Clearance took said document and left.
Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the person who took the original of the Employee
Clearance, but said that the latter was a niece and staff member of the petitioner. She said that all
the signatures16 appearing in the Employees Clearance were all genuine except for Laura’s
signature.
The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y. Pangilan, the person whose signature was
allegedly imitated. Laura testified that presently she was holding the position of Human Resource
Management Officer II of the Department of Tourism - ARMM. Prior to said position, she was the
Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM from 1994 to January 2001. As such, she issued memorandum
receipts (MR) to employees who were issued government property, and received surrendered office
properties from officers and employees of the DOT - ARMM. She said she knew the accused, as she
was their Regional Secretary of the DOT - ARMM.
Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie Cris17 Batuampar, an officemate and niece of
petitioner Pacasum, went to her house with the Employees Clearance of petitioner. Batuampar
requested her to sign in order to clear petitioner of all property accountabilities. She refused to sign
the clearance because at that time, petitioner had not yet turned over all the office properties issued
to her. A few days later, she was called by her mother-in-law to go to the latter’s office and inspect
the Employees Clearance submitted by the representative of petitioner. She went to her mother-in-
law’s office and was shown the Employees Clearance of petitioner. Upon seeing the same, she
denied the signature18 appearing on top of her name. Thereupon, Marie Cris Batuampar, the
representative of petitioner, took the Employees Clearance and left.
Laura revealed she executed a joint complaint-affidavit 19 dated 28 August 2001 regarding the instant
case. She issued a certification20 with a memorandum receipt21 dated 23 November 1999, signed22 by
petitioner. The certification attested she did not sign petitioner’s Employees Clearance because all
the office properties issued to petitioner had not been turned over or returned to the Supply Officer of
the DOT - ARMM. Finally, she said that as of 2 January 2005, her last day as Supply Officer,
petitioner had not returned anything.
The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A. Agatep, Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office,
Quezon City, testified that she had been a telegraph operator for nineteen years. On 31 May 2005,
she was at the Telegraph Office in Commission on Audit, Quezon City. She received two
telegrams23 for transmissions both dated 31 May 2005. One was addressed to petitioner and the
other to Marie Cris Batuampar. Upon receiving said documents, she transmitted the documents
through telegram. The telegram addressed to petitioner was received by her relative, Manso Alonto,
in her residence on 1 June 2005, while that addressed to Ms. Batuampar was transmitted to, and
received in, Cotabato City on 1 June 2005.24
On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered25 its documentary evidence consisting of Exhibits A,
A-1, A-1-a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2-c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f, A-2-g, A-3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7,
A-8, and A-9, to which the accused filed her objections. 26 The trial court admitted all the exhibits on
10 August 2005.27
For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Regional Solicitor General, took
the stand.
For her defense, petitioner testified that she was appointed by ARMM Regional Governor Nur
Misuari (Gov. Misuari) as Regional Secretary of the DOT of the ARMM in 1999. She said she was
familiar with the Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari directing all ARMM
officers and employees to liquidate all outstanding cash advances on or before 31 August 2000 in
view of the impending expiration of the Governor’s extended term. At first, she said the
memorandum applied to her, she being a cabinet secretary, but later she said same did not apply to
her because she had no cash advances. Only those with cash advances were required to get an
Employees Clearance before they could receive their salaries. She then instructed her staff to work
on her salary.
Petitioner said she did not know where the original of her Employees Clearance was. Neither did she
know if the signature of Laura Pangilan therein had been imitated or forged. She likewise said that
although the Employee Clearance was in her name, she did not cause Laura’s signature to be
affixed thereto.
Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary for the month of August 2000 sometime in
said month, because ARMM Executive Secretary Randolph C. Parcasio told her that she did not
need a clearance before she could get her salary because she was re-appointed. 28
Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original of the subject Employees Clearance. 29 When
she first saw the photocopy of the Employees Clearance, the signature of Laura was not there. She
was able to see the photocopy of the Employees Clearance again after this case had been filed with
the Sandiganbayan, already with the alleged signature of Laura. Petitioner said it was not she who
placed or caused Laura’s purported signature to be affixed there.
Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari did not apply to her, because she had no
cash advances and she could receive her salary even without clearance. At that time, she said the
Cashier, Accountant and the Auditor checked her records and found that she had no cash
advances.30 Because she was elsewhere, she instructed her secretary to get her salary. However,
she was informed by her staff that her salary could not be released because the Office of the
Governor required a clearance. Her staff worked on her clearance, the purpose of which was for the
release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000. She was able to get all the
needed signatures except for Laura’s signature. With the refusal of Laura to sign, her staff went to
Executive Secretary Parcasio and explained the situation.
Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst. Special Prosecutor I Anna Isabel G. Aurellano
ordering her to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor the original of the Employees
Clearance of the DOT-ARMM issued in her name sometime on 22-23 August 2000.
On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her receipt of her salary, she believed that an
Employees Clearance was necessary, and for this reason she had this document prepared by her
staff. She said her Employees Clearance was always in the possession of Marie Cris, her assistant
secretary. It was Marie Cris who showed her the document twice. 31
Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General, testified that he was familiar with the
Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari because the same was the product of
consultation among him, Gov. Misuari and ARMM Executive Secretary Parcasio. He explained that
this memorandum pertained only to outstanding cash advances. He added that an Employees
Clearance was not a requirement and was not sufficient to comply with the directive contained in the
memorandum, because what was required for the purpose of release of salaries was a credit notice
from the Resident Auditors of the Commission on Audit.
On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its documentary exhibits 32 consisting of Exhibits 1
to 5, with sub-markings. The prosecution objected to the purpose for which Exhibit 1 was offered.
The trial court admitted all the defense exhibits.33
On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision convicting petitioner of the
crime charged in the information. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Normallah A. Pacasum GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the Information and, with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby
sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as maximum with the accessories thereof and to pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(₱2,000.00) with costs against the accused.34
The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM Supply Officer Laura Y. Pangilan appearing
in the Employees Clearance of petitioner to have been falsified/forged. It did not give much weight
on petitioner’s defense denying she was the one who actually falsified her Employees Clearance by
imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan and that she had no idea about the alleged falsification,
because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her clearance and the
one who submitted the said clearance to the Office of the Regional Governor of the ARMM. The trial
court found said denial unsubstantiated and ruled that while there was no direct evidence to show
that petitioner herself "actually" falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, there were
circumstances that indicated she was the one who committed the falsification/forgery, or who asked
somebody else to falsify/forge the subject signature in her Employees Clearance. The
Sandiganbayan added that considering it was petitioner who took advantage of and profited from the
use of the falsified clearance, the presumption was that she was the material author of the
falsification. Despite full opportunity, she was not able to rebut said presumption, failing to show that
it was another person who falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, or that another person
had the reason or motive to commit the falsification/forgery or could have benefited from the same.
The Sandiganbayan likewise did not sustain petitioner’s contention that she did not stand to benefit
from the falsification of her Employees Clearance and from the submission thereof to the Office of
the Regional Governor, because she allegedly had no existing cash advances. She claimed that an
Employees Clearance was not needed to enable her to draw her salary for the months of August
and September 2000 under the 8 August 2000 Memorandum of Gov. Misuari, and that the
presumption that he who benefits from the falsification is presumed to be the author thereof does not
apply to her. The lower court explained that the aforementioned memorandum applied to petitioner,
she being an official of the ARMM. It said that the applicability of said memorandum to petitioner was
even admitted by her when she, in compliance therewith, instructed her staff/assistant secretary to
work for her Employees Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the month of August 2000.
It said that the fact that she (allegedly) had no existing cash advances did not exempt her from the
coverage of the memorandum, because she must show she had no cash advances and the only
way to do this was by obtaining a clearance.
Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees Clearance had no probative value in proving
its contents and was inadmissible because the original thereof was not presented by the
prosecution. The Sandiganbayan did not agree. It said that the presentation and admission of
secondary evidence, like a photocopy of her Employees Clearance, was justified to prove the
contents thereof, because despite reasonable notices (telegrams) made by the prosecution to
petitioner and her assistant secretary to produce the original of her Employees Clearance, they
ignored the notice and refused to present the original of said document.
On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan35 to which the prosecution filed a Comment/Opposition. 36 Subsequent thereto,
petitioner filed a Supplement to Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for New
Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.37 Petitioner prayed that her motion for new trial be
granted in order that the testimony of Marie Cris Batuampar be introduced, the same being newly
discovered evidence. The prosecution filed its Opposition. 38
On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit; and the motion for new trial, because the evidence sought to be
presented did not qualify as newly discovered evidence. 39
On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.
In our Resolution40 dated 27 November 2007, respondent People of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), was required to file its Comment on the petition. 41 After two
motions for extension to file comment on the petition, which were granted by this Court, the OSP
filed its Comment dated 18 February 2008.42 Petitioner was required43 to file a Reply to the
Comment, which she did on 5 June 2008. 44
On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition for review on certiorari and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. They
filed their respective memoranda on 21 November 2008 and on 5 November 2008. 45
Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in:
I. Finding that petitioner benefited from the alleged falsification, hence must be deemed the
author thereof, when the evidence on record does not support, but even contradicts, such a
conclusion.
II. Presuming that petitioner had unliquidated cash advances hence was required under the
Misuari Memorandum to submit her Employee’s Clearance to clear herself of these, when
there is no evidence to that effect and the prosecution even admitted so.
III. Not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of the photocopy of the allegedly forged
Employee’s Clearance, in favor of the innocence of the Accused.
IV. In short-circuiting the right of the petitioner to present additional evidence on her behalf,
thus denying her due process.46
Petitioner contends that under the Misuari memorandum dated 8 August 2000, she was not required
to file an Employees Clearance to draw her salary, since what was required under said
memorandum was a Credit Notice from the COA. She further contends that since she was not
required to file said Employees Clearance because she had no cash advances, the signature in her
Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue" because what was required was a Credit
Notice.
As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that under the aforesaid memorandum, what was
required before she could draw her salaries was a Credit Notice from the COA and not an
Employees Clearance. The full text of the Memorandum 47 form the Regional Governor reads:
MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR
TO: ALL CONCERNED
SUBJECT: AS STATED
DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000
1. In view of the impending expiration of the extended term of the undersigned, it is hereby
directed that all outstanding cash advances be liquidated on or before August 31, 2000.
2. Effective September 1, 2000, the salaries and other emoluments of all ARMM
officials/employees with unliquidated cash advance shall be withheld until they have settled
their accounts and a corresponding Credit Notice is issued to them by the Commission on
Audit.
3. Due to budgetary and financial constraints brought about by the drastic cut of our budget,
memorandum dated December 01, 1998 is hereby reiterated. Therefore all releases for
financial assistance is hereby suspended effective immediately.
4. For strict compliance.
PROF. NUR MISUARI
It is clear from said memorandum that what was required from officers/employees who had
unliquidated cash advances was the corresponding Credit Notice issued by the COA after they had
settled their accounts. There was indeed no mention of any Employees Clearance therein. Up to this
point, we agree with petitioner. However, on her contention that the signature of Laura Pangilan in
her Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue," we disagree. Whether the signature of
Laura Pangilan was imitated or not is the main issue in this case for falsification.
From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit Notice requirement was effective only starting 1
September 2000 and not before. In the case at bar, the information charges petitioner not with failure
to secure a Credit Notice, but with allegedly falsifying her Employees Clearance by imitating the
signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM. The Credit Notice requirement
was therefore irrelevant and a non-issue as regards the release of salaries prior to 1 September
2000.
The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the signature of Laura Pangilan in petitioner’s
Employees Clearance imitated? If yes, (2) Who imitated or caused the imitation of said signature?
On the first query, the same was answered by Laura Pangilan. She said that the signature in
petitioner’s Employees Clearance was not hers. The same was an imitation. When a person whose
signature was affixed to a document denies his/her signature therein, a prima facie case for
falsification is established which the defendant must overcome. 48
Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an Employees Clearance to draw her salary. She
adds that Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of the ARMM, told her and her secretary,
Marie Cris Batuampar, that she did not need an Employees Clearance because she was re-
appointed.49
These arguments are untenable. There was a need for petitioner to file an Employees Clearance not
only for compliance with the Misuari memorandum but, more importantly, because her term of office
was about to end, since her position was coterminous with the term of Gov. Misuari, the appointing
authority.50 She even admitted that before she received her salary for August, 2000, 51 an Employees
Clearance was necessary.52 Moreover, her claim that Atty. Parcasio told her and her secretary that
she did not need an Employee Clearance to get her salary does not persuade us. In fact, we find her
alleged "re-appointment," when she was working for her Employees Clearance at around August
2000, improbable. How could she have been re-appointed by Gov. Alvarez, 53 whom she claims re-
appointed her sometime in the year 2000, when Gov. Misuari was still the Regional Governor of the
ARMM when she had her Employees Clearance prepared sometime in August 2000? Clearly, her
statement that she did not need an Employees Clearance because she was re-appointed does not
inspire belief.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the presumption that if a person had in his position
a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby,
he is presumed to be the material author of the falsification. He argues that the Sandiganbayan
overlooked the fact that there was no evidence to prove that petitioner made use of or uttered the
Employees Clearance, because there was no evidence that she submitted it -- if not, at least caused
it to be submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. To support such claim, she said there were
no "receipt marks" in the Employees Clearance to show that the Office of the Regional Governor
received said documents.
It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified document is separate and distinct from the
"falsification" of a public document. The act of "using" falsified documents is not necessarily included
in the "falsification" of a public document. Using falsified documents is punished under Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the falsification of the Employees Clearance was
consummated the moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated. In the falsification of a
public document, it is immaterial whether or not the contents set forth therein were false. What is
important is the fact that the signature of another was counterfeited. 54 It is a settled rule that in the
falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain
or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that in the falsification of a public document, the
principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed.55 Thus, the purpose for which the falsification was made and whether the
offender profited or hoped to profit from such falsification are no longer material.
The records further show that petitioner "used" or uttered the Employees Clearance. The fact that
the same was circulated to the different division heads for their signatures is already considered use
of falsified documents as contemplated in Article 172. The lack of the stamp mark "Received" in the
Employees Clearance does not mean that said document was not received by the Office of the
Regional Governor. We find the certification signed by Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive
Secretary of Office of the Regional Governor - ARMM, as contained in the Employees Clearance, to
be sufficient proof that the same was submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. It must be
stressed that the Executive Secretary is part of the Office of the Regional Governor.
Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of
Laura Pangilan, claiming that she had no knowledge about the falsification because it was her
assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her Employees Clearance.
Petitioner’s denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Denial, when
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence, which
deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.56 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a negative and self-serving assertion. 57
In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her witness Marie Cris Batuampar, the person
whom she instructed to work for her Employees Clearance. Her failure to present this person in
order to shed light on the matter was fatal to her cause. In fact, we find that the defense never
intended to present Marie Cris Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial order,
because the defense never listed her as a witness.58 Her attempt to present Ms. Batuampar to help
her cause after she has been convicted is already too late in the day, and Ms. Batuampar’s
testimony, which is supposed to be given, cannot be considered newly discovered evidence as to
merit the granting of her motion for new trial and/or reception of newly discovered evidence.
The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner "actually" imitated the signature of Laura Pangilan
in her Employees Clearance will not exonerate her. We have ruled that it is not strange to realize
that in cases of forgery, the prosecution would not always have the means for obtaining such direct
evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on circumstantial evidence
consisting of pieces of facts, which if woven together would produce a single network establishing
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 59 We totally agree with the Sandiganbayan, which
said:
While there is no direct evidence to show that the accused herself "actually" forged the signature of
Laura Pangilan in the Employees Clearance in question, the Court nevertheless finds the following
circumstances, obtaining in the records, to establish/indicate that she was the one who committed
the forgery or who asked somebody else to forge or caused the forgery of the signature of Laura
Pangilan in her Employees Clearance, to wit –
1. that the accused instructed her staff Maricris Batuampar to work for her Employees
Clearance in compliance with the Memorandum of ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari
and that the forged signature of Laura Pangilan was affixed on her clearance are strong
evidence that the accused herself either falsified the said signature or caused the same to be
falsified/imitated, and that possession by Maricris of the falsified clearance of the accused is
possession by the accused herself because the former was only acting upon the instructions
and in behalf of the latter;
2. that it was the accused who is required to accomplish and to submit her Employees
Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the months of August and September 2000
is sufficient and strong motive or reason for her to commit the falsification by imitating the
signature of Laura Pangilan or order someone else to forge it; and
3. that the accused was the only one who profited or benefited from the falsification as she
admitted that she was able to collect her salary for the month of August 2000 after her
falsified Employees Clearance was submitted and approved by the ORG-ARMM and
therefore, she alone could have the motive for making such falsification.
On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, no reasonable and fair-minded man would say that the
accused – a Regional Secretary of DOT-ARMM – had no knowledge of the falsification. It is an
established rule, well-buttressed upon reason, that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation,
when a person has in his possession or control a falsified document and who makes use of the
same, the presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger or the one who caused
the forgery and, therefore, guilty of falsification. Thus, in People v. Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court
held that –
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered
it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of
the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers. (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453;
People v. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338;
People v. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was the accused who took advantage and
profited in the use of the falsified Employees Clearance in question, the presumption is inevitable
that she is the material author of the falsification. And despite full opportunity, she was not able to
rebut such presumption by failing to show that it was another person who forged or falsified the
signature of Laura Pangilan or that at least another person and not she alone, had the reason or
motive to commit the forgery or falsification, or was or could have been benefited by such
falsification/forgery.60
The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan, as against the denials of petitioner, convince
us to apply the rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession
of, and who has used, a forged document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of falsification. 61 The
effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is offered, will thereby prevail. 62 A
prima facie case of falsification having been established, petitioner should have presented clear and
convincing evidence to overcome such burden. This, she failed to do.
Petitioner assails the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to the testimonies of the two Pangilans
when they failed to report the alleged falsification to the police or alert the Office of the Regional
Governor of said falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from getting her salaries.
We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect.63 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is the domain of the trial court, as it is in the
best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor. 64 The Sandiganbayan has given full probative
value to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. So have we. We find no reason to depart from
such a rule.
Aware that the prosecution failed to present the original from which the photocopy of petitioner’s
Employees Clearance was supposed to have been obtained, she maintains that the Sandiganbayan
should have doubted the authenticity and probative value of the photocopy of the Employees
Clearance.
The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the Employees Clearance. We
agree when it ruled:
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. The purpose of
the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence if the prevention of fraud,
because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or
secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court
and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and
defeat. Hence, as long as the original evidence can be had, the Court should not receive in evidence
that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that
the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be
disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight.
The foregoing rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Under Section 3(b) of Rule 130,
secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted "when the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice." And to warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a
writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as follows:
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. – If the document is in the
custody or control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary
evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.
Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party against whom it
is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has
done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the
document which may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open
court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in
custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original of
the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it, or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence
may be admitted.
Here, the accused admitted that her Employees Clearance was always in the possession of her
assistant secretary, [Marie Cris] Batuampar. So the prosecution in its effort to produce the original
copy of the said Employees Clearance of the accused, thru Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna
Isabel G. Aurellano of the Office of the Prosecutor, sent on May 31, 2005 thru the COA Telegraph
Office at Quezon City two (2) telegram subpoenas addressed to accused Normallah Pacasum, and
[Marie Cris] Batuampar ordering them to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor on or before
June 8, 2005, the original of the Employees’ Clearance in the name of Normallah Alonto Lucman-
Pacasum for the release of her August and September 2000 salary as DOT Regional Secretary.
Notwithstanding receipt of the said telegram subpoena by her uncle Manso Alonto in her residence
on June 1, 200[5], the accused did not appear before or submit to Assistant Special Prosecutor
Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, the original of the said Employees Clearance, much less offered to
produce the same.
Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the existence of the Employees Clearance as
evidenced by the photocopy thereof, and despite the reasonable notices made by the prosecution to
the accused and her assistant secretary to produce the original of said employees clearance they
ignored the notice and refused to produce the original document, the presentation and admission of
the photocopy of the original copy of the questioned Employees Clearance as secondary evidence
to prove the contents thereof was justified. 65
This Court decrees that even though the original of an alleged falsified document is not, or may no
longer be produced in court, a criminal case for falsification may still prosper if the person wishing to
establish the contents of said document via secondary evidence or substitutionary evidence can
adequately show that the best or primary evidence – the original of the document – is not available
for any of the causes mentioned in Section 3,66 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan severely restricted her time
to present evidence, allowing her only two hearing dates, thus resulting in her failure to present
another important witness in the of person of Atty. Randolph Parcasio. Petitioner was not denied due
process. She was given every opportunity to adduce her evidence. The Sandiganbayan outlined the
proceedings of the case as follows:
After the prosecution rested its case, by agreement of the parties, the initial hearing for the reception
of defense evidence was scheduled on September 19 and 20, 2005 both at 8:30 in the morning.
However, upon motion of the prosecution, the Court, in its Order of September 16, 2005, cancelled
the setting as the handling prosecutor, Pros. Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, had to attend a 5-day
workshop at PHINMA in Tagaytay City on September 19-23, 2005 and scheduled anew the hearing
on November 23 and 24, 2005, both at 8:30 in the morning. However, for failure of the defense
counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, to appear at the November 23, 2005 hearing despite due notice,
the Court cancelled the November 23 and 24 hearings, and moved the same to March 13 and 14,
2006 both at 8:30 in the morning, and at the same time directed the said defense counsel to show
cause in writing within five (5) days from receipt of the Order why he should not be held in contempt
for his failure to appear despite due notice. In compliance with this Order, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita,
1awphi1
filed his Explanation and Withdrawal of Appearance, respectively, which were both Noted by the
Court in its Resolution of January 19, 2006.
In view of the absence of the accused in the March 13, 2006 hearing and her continued failure to get
a substitute counsel considering that her counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, had already withdrawn
from the case since January 16, 2006, the Court cancelled the March 13 and 14, 2006 hearings and
moved the same to July 3 and 4, 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning and designated Atty. Conrado
Rosario of the PAO as counsel de oficio of the accused and directed the accused upon receipt of the
order to immediately confer with said counsel for purposes of preparing for her defense in the case.
On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the following Resolution, which reads:
Accused Normallah L. Pacasum’s letter of February 17, 2006 (received by mail on March 16, 2006)
requesting extension of time to engage the services of counsel is merely NOTED WITHOUT
ACTION as the next hearings are scheduled on July 3 and 4, 2006 and said accused would have
more than ample time to engage the services of counsel of her choice. For this reason, any excuse
from the accused on said settings that she failed to engage the services of counsel or that her
counsel needs more time to prepare will be unacceptable. At all events, this Court, in its Order of
March 13, 2006, had already appointed Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO as a counsel de oficio to
represent the accused, with specific orders to the latter to confer with Atty. Rosario and assist him in
preparing for her defense.
On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation of Atty. Conrado Rosario, counsel for the accused, that
since he was appointed counsel de oficio, the accused has not communicated with him and
therefore he was not ready to present any evidence for the accused, the Court cancelled the hearing
in order to give the defense another opportunity to present its evidence and reset it to July 4, 2006,
the following day as previously scheduled.
On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the following Order, which reads –
"When this case was called for hearing, accused asked for the resetting of the case on the ground
that she just hired a new counsel who thereafter arrived and entered his appearance as Atty.
Napoleon Uy Galit with address at Suite 202 Masonic Building, #35 Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon
City. With the appearance of her new counsel, Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is hereby discharged as
counsel de oficio of the accused.
"As prayed for by the accused, she is given the last chance to present her evidence on October 9
and 10, 2006, both at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. For repeated failure of the accused to
acknowledge receipt of the notices of the Court, her waiver of appearance is hereby cancelled and
she is ordered to personally appear in the scheduled hearings of this case.
SO ORDERED.
On October 6, 2006, the accused thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, filed an Entry of
Appearance, Motion For Postponement of October 9 and 10 Hearings stating therein that since his
service as new counsel was just engaged by the accused, and that the accused herself cannot also
attend the said hearing because she is undergoing fasting until October 24, 2006 in observance of
Ramadan, he asked to postpone the settings on October 9 and 10, 2006. At the hearing on October
9, 2006, the Court issued the following, which reads –
"Acting on the Entry of Appearance, Motion for Postponement of October 9 and 10, 2006 Hearing
filed by accused Normallah L. Pacasum, thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, finding the same to
be without merit, as this case has been set for hearing several times and the accused has been
given the last chance to present evidence, the Court hereby denies the motion for postponement.
"In this regard, in view of the absence of accused Normallah L. Pacasum in today’s hearing despite
the Order of the Court dated July 4, 2006, canceling her waiver of appearance, and ordering her to
personally appear before this Court, as prayed for by the prosecution, let a Bench Warrant of Arrest
be issued against the said accused. The cash bond posted for her provisional liberty is ordered
confiscated in favor of the government. The accused is given thirty (30) days from notice to explain
in writing why final judgment shall not be rendered against the said bond.
With the Manifestation of Atty. Bantreas Lucman that the defense is not ready to present its
evidence today and tomorrow, the last chance for it to present its evidence, the Court is constraint to
consider the accused’s right to present evidence as waived.
The parties are hereby given thirty (30) days to submit their respective memoranda. Thereafter, the
case shall be deemed submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, the accused thru counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order
dated October 25, 2006, and Motion to Set Hearing For Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift
Warrant of Arrest dated October 31, 2006.
At the hearing of accused’s motion for reconsideration on November 3, 2006, the Court issued the
following Order, which reads –
"When the ‘Motion To Set Hearing for Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest’ was
called for hearing this morning, only Attorneys Bantuas M. Lucman and Jose Ventura Aspiras
appeared. Accused Normallah L. Pacasum was absent.
In view of the absence of the accused, the Court is not inclined to give favorable action to the Motion
for Reconsideration. It must be stressed that the primordial reason for the issuance of the order
sought to be reconsidered in the presence of the accused in the previous hearing in violation of the
Court’s Order for her to personally appear in the hearings of this case and for her indifference to the
directives of the Court. With the absence anew of the accused, the Court has no alternative but to
deny the Motion.
Moreover, the Court notes the allegation in the Motion that the counsel sought the assurance of the
accused (and she promised) to appear before this Court if the motion will be granted, as if the Court
owes the accused the favor to appear before it. The accused is reminded/advised that the issuance
of the warrant of arrest, she has to voluntarily surrender and appear before the Court or be arrested
and brought to the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of Prosecution’s Memorandum

(And for a Second Look on the Matter of Accused’s Right to Present Defense Evidence) of the
accused dated November 21, 2006, and the prosecution’s Opposition thereto, the Court issued the
following Order, which reads –
"This refers to the Accused "Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of Prosecution’s
November 7, 2006 Memorandum (And For a Second Look on the Matter of Accused’s Right to
Present Defense Evidence)" dated November 21, 2006 and the plaintiff’s Opposition thereto dated
November 28, 2006.
"Inasmuch as the accused has already appeared before the Court and posted an additional bond of
P10,000.00 despite the aforesaid opposition of the prosecution, in the interest of justice, the Court is
inclined to reconsider and give favorable action to the motion and grant the accused another and
last opportunity to present here evidence.
"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted and this case is set for hearing for the accused’s last chance
to present and/or complete the presentation of her evidence on February 5 and 6, 2007 both at 8:30
in the morning in the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, despite the initial indifference of the accused to present her defense, the Court gave her
ample opportunity to present her evidence.67
The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation. In fact, we find that the trial court was lenient
with the petitioner. The failure of the defense to present Atty. Parcasio was its own doing. The
defense failed to prepare its witnesses for the case. As proof of this, we quote a portion of the
hearing when petitioner was testifying:
ATTY. ASPIRAS
Q Would you know where (sic) the whereabouts of this Sec. Parcasio would be (sic) at this time?
A He lives in Davao but after what happened to Gov. Misuari, we have not got together with the
other members of the cabinet of Gov. Misuari, but he lives in Davao, sir.
Q Would it be possible, Madame Witness, to request or ask him to testify in this case?
A After this hearing, I will look for Sec. Parcasio just to clear my name, sir.
CHAIRMAN
Not after this hearing, you should have already done that. Because we already gave you enough
opportunity to present your side, right? You should not be telling the Court that only after this
hearing, you will start looking (for) people who will, definitely, clear your name. You should be doing
that months ago, correct?
WITNESS
Yes, your Honors.68
Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees Clearance under Article 171, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. For one to be convicted of falsification under said paragraph, the followings
elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public officer, an employee, or a notary public; (2)
that he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by counterfeiting
or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.
All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently established. There is no dispute that petitioner was
a public officer, being then the Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism of the ARMM, when
she caused the preparation of her Employees Clearance (a public document) for the release of her
salary for the months of August and September 2000. Such being a requirement, and she being a
public officer, she was duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit said document. Were it not for
her position and employment in the ARMM, she could not have accomplished said Employees
Clearance. In a falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage
of his official position when (1) he had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the
preparation of the document; or (2) he had official custody of the document which he falsified. 69 It
being her duty to prepare and submit said document, she clearly took advantage of her position
when she falsified or caused the falsification of her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature
of Laura Pangilan. lawphil.net
Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we find the same proper. The penalty for
falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
₱5,000.00. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the felony,
the imposable penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, or within the range of eight (8) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty
to be imposed shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be
taken from within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional or from
six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483
dated 7 August 2007 and its resolution dated 22 October 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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G.R. No. L-5791 December 17, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BERNARDO GREGORIO and EUSTAQUIO BALISTOY, defendants-appellants.
Albert E. Somersille, for appellant Gregorio.

Cayetano Hipolito, for appellant Balistoy.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
Appeals were interposed by the defendants Bernardo Gregorio and Eustaquio Balistoy from the
judgment rendered in the two causes prosecuted, No. 1574, against Bernardo Gregorio, and No.
1575, against Eustaquio Balistoy, which were consolidated and in which but one judgment was
rendered, and forwarded to this court and registered under No. 5791.
In the suit instituted by Pedro Salazar, as a creditor, against Eustaquio Balistoy, in the justice of the
peace court of Libog, for the payment of a certain sum of money, judgment was rendered, on April 4,
1908, wherein the debtor was sentenced to pay to the plaintiff P275.92, with interest thereon, and
the costs. For the execution of the said judgment, two rural properties belonging to the debtor were
attached and the 27th of May, 1908, was set as the date for the sale and adjudication of the said
attached properties to the highest bidder. On the 18th of the same month, Bernardo Gregorio
requested the deputy sheriff to exclude the said realty from the attachment, alleging that he was the
owner of the land situated in Tambogon, one of the properties levied upon, 400 brazas in
circumference, situate in the pueblo of Bacacay, the location and boundaries of which are expressed
in his petition, for the reason that he had acquired it by purchase from the judgment debtor, Balistoy,
in 1905, prior to the filing of the complaint. By reason of this claim and petition the judgment creditor,
Salazar, had to give a bond, in view of which the sheriff proceeded with the sale of the said property,
and of another, also attached for the sum of P300, and both were adjudicated to the judgment
creditor, according to the certificate, Exhibit C.
lawphil.net
In order that the claim of intervention presented to the sheriff might prosper, Bernardo Gregorio
attached thereto the document Exhibit D, at the end of which and among other particulars appears
the memorandum dated in Libog as of February 22, 1905, and signed by Eustaquio Balistoy,
Lorenzo Gregorio, and Cirilo Valla, and in which Balistoy states that he bought the land referred to in
the said document from Luis Balistoy and sold it to Bernardo Gregorio for P300, wherefore he signed
as such vendor.
The charge consists in that Balistoy, with intent to injure his creditor, Pedro Salazar, and for the
purpose of avoiding the attachment and sale of one of the properties belonging to him, to secure the
payment of the judgment obtained by his creditor in the aforementioned suit, did, with disregard of
the truth in the narration of the facts, execute or write the said memorandum whereby, on February
25, 1905, he made or simulated a conveyance of one of the attached properties in favor of the said
Bernardo Gregorio, according to the aforesaid copy, when in fact the said memorandum was written
in April, 1908.
For the foregoing reasons a complaint was filed in each of the two aforesaid causes in the Court of
First Instance of Albay, charging each of the defendants with the crime of the falsification of a private
document, and proceedings having been instituted in both causes, which were afterwards, by
agreement of the parties thereto, consolidated, the court, on November 6, 1909, pronounced in both
of them the judgment appealed from, written in duplicate, whereby Balistoy was sentenced to the
penalty of one year eight months and twenty-one days of presidio correccional, to the accessory
penalties, to pay a fine of 1,501 pesetas, and, in case of nonpayment thereof through insolvency, to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, provided it should not exceed one-third of the
principal sentence, and to pay the costs incurred in cause No. 1575; and likewise, Bernardo
Gregorio was sentenced to the penalty of three months and eleven days of arresto mayor, to pay a
fine of 1,980 pesetas, and, in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, with
the provision that it should not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, to the accessory
punishments, and to pay the costs occasioned by cause No. 1574. From these sentences the
defendants, respectively, appealed.
This case concerns the falsity of a document alleged to have been written on a date prior to the one
when it actually was prepared, which instrument simulates the sale of a parcel of land by its owner to
a third party, with the intent to defraud the creditor who, through proper judicial process, solicited and
obtained the attachment and sale of the said property in order, with the proceeds of such sale, to
recover the amount which the owner of the land owed him.
The sale was recorded in a memorandum, made upon a private document, according to the alleged
copy of the latter presented at trial which belonged to the owner of land; and, notwithstanding the
fact that the sheriff, who carried out the proceedings of attachment and sale, testified to his having
seen the original of the said document, or at least the original memorandum of the conveyance, the
only record that could be of use to the intervener, who claimed a lien on the land which was to be
sold at public auction; certainly the mere exhibition of a copy of an unauthenticated private document
could not legally produce the effect of suspending the sale of the said land, inasmuch as such copy
is not sufficient proof of the right of the intervener and opponent, being e mere copy of a private
document whose legality has not been proven.
In the charge filed in this cause against the vendor and the vendee of the land in question, it is
stated that these parties, the defendants, simulated the said memorandum of sale or conveyance of
the land with the intent to injure the creditor, Pedro Salazar; but as the original document, setting
forth the said memorandum, was not presented, but merely a copy thereof, and furthermore, as it
could not be ascertained who had the original of the document containing the memorandum in
question, nor the exact date when the latter was written; the said memorandum, presumed to be
simulated and false, was not literally compared by the sheriff who testified that he had seen its
original for but a few moments, nor by any officer authorized by law to certify to documents and
proceedings such as are recorded in notarial instruments, nor even by two witnesses who might
afterwards have been able to testify before the court that the copy exhibited was in exact agreement
with its original; therefore, on account of these deficiencies, doubt arises as to whether the original of
the document, Exhibit D, really existed at all, and whether the memorandum at the foot of the said
exhibit is an exact copy of that alleged to have been written at the end of the said original
document. lawphil.net
In criminal proceedings for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and
courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in
order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced in the cause, whether or not the crime
of falsification was committed, and also, at the same time, to enable them to determine the degree of
each defendant's liability in the falsification under prosecution. Through the lack of the original
document containing the memorandum alleged to be false, it is improper to hold, with only a copy of
the said original in view, that the crime prosecuted was committed; and although, judging from the
testimony of the witnesses who were examined in the two consolidated causes, there is reason to
entertain much doubt as to the defendants' innocence, yet, withal, this case does not furnish decisive
and conclusive proof of their respective guilt as coprincipals of the crime charged. Defendants in a
criminal cause are always presumed to be innocent until their guilt be fully proven, and, in case of
reasonable doubt and when their guilt is not satisfactorily shown, they are entitled to a judgment of
acquittal. In view of the evidence produced in both of the aforesaid criminal causes, said causes can
only be terminated by such a finding.
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the judgment appealed from,
to acquit, and we hereby do acquit Eustaquio Balistoy and Bernardo Gregorio, with the costs of both
instances de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur. itc-alf
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[G.R. No. L-55436. November 25, 1983.]
NICASIO BORJE, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Corpuz & Padlan Law Office and Nicodemo T. Ferrer
for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT; UNTRUE ENTRIES, DATA
OR STATEMENTS ACCOMPLISHED BY AN EMPLOYEE BUT VERIFIED AND CERTIFIED BY
HEAD OF OFFICE; RELATIVE LIABILITY; CASE AT BAR. — On the face of the
documentary evidence, Exh. "A’’ and "D," the liability of petitioner as head of the office
who had signed the certification and verification printed thereon must be limited to the
contents of said verification and certification for which he does not necessarily incur
criminal responsibility if the entries, data or statements certified and verified turn out
not to be true in which case the employee or personnel making the entries, data or
statements as to his services and attendance is solely and separately responsible
therefor. In the instant case, since there is the Special Order No. 172 of Executive
Director Domingo Panganiban, concurrently BPI Director, marked Exh. 6, "Detail and
Designation of BPI personnel to NFAC in connection with the Masagana-99 Program
effective January to December, 1977" listing complainant for the assignment and detail,
the inclusion of Ducusin’ s name in the payroll was not irregular, Besides, the payroll is
prepared by the Budget Office based on the Special Order and not by the petitioner’s
office.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WITNESS; CREDIBILITY; UNREALIBILITY AND

UNWORTHINESS RELATIVE TO THE SANCTITY OF THE WITNESS’ OATH. — Reviewing
the testimony of witness Lorenzo, the records disclose that her original testimony at the
reinvestigsstion of the case before the Tanodbayan was favorable to the accused,
saying that she delivered the payroll and the checks to the complainant Ducusin, even
identifying she genuine signature of Ducusin on the payroll. The contradictory and
conflicting testimonies of this witness only proves her unreliability and unworthiness in
respect to the sanctity of the witness’ oath. The conclusion of the respondent court that
she was intimidated to testify in favor of the accused during the reinvestigation is not
warranted, considering that the witness herself is a high regional official, being the
Regional Disbursing Officer and Cashier and not subordinate to but perhaps co-equal in
rank to the petitioner and, therefore, may not be so easily intimidated by the accused
who was in no position or power to include her as accessory in the case. Lorenzo’s
testimony given at the Sandiganbayan hearing is not worthy of belief and must be
rejected.
3. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION THAT POSSESSOR OF A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT IS THE

AUTHOR THEREOF; MISPLACED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The Court rejects respondent
court’s reliance on the presumption that as possessor of the document, the accused is
presumed to be the author of the falsification, Petitioner has denied vigorously the
testimony of Lorenzo that he received the payroll and she checks from her. He said that
his participation in the preparation of the payroll ended with his signing thereof after
which the payroll goes to the Disbursing Officer for the preparation and issuance of the
checks to the payees at which time the payee affix their signatures on the payroll,
which is substantially corroborated by the original testimony of the witness Lorenzo
during the reinvestigation of the case before the Tanodbayan, Exhibit "A" appears to be
also signed by ten (10) other production technicians listed in the payroll, besides
complainant Ducusin. It initialled by three (3) personnel in the Accounting Services Unit
and further signed by the Regional Accountant and for the Regional Director. All of
these persons were at one time or another in possession of the document, all of them
had the same opportunity impliedly imputed to the accused. The payroll must have
been carried and passed by messengers and other employees from one office to
another, from one desk to another for purposes of typing, funding, initialling,
verification, certification, accounting, recording, drawing of the check and finally,
issuing of the check. In the Court’s view, the respondent court’s reliance on the
presumption which is only presumptive, is misplaced and unwarranted, there being no
sufficient reason to apply the same.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS; GREGORIO RULING STILL

TENABLE. — The Sandiganbayan held that" (a)ccused’s claim that in the absence of the
original documents it is improper to conclude that there is falsification of document in
accordance with the case of U.S. v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522, is sleazy for the case
referred to is not in point. The Court, does not agree wids the respondent court. Firstly,
the Gregorio ruling makes no distinction for the doctrine itself applies in criminal
proceedings for the falsifications of a document, whether simulated, counterfeited, or
falsified. Secondly, the Gregorio doctrine is still tenable. notwithstanding modern
copying devices for a falsified document, passed off as an original can also be
duplicated by xeroxing and thereafter, certified as true copy of the original ,ts in Exh.
"D." And thirdly, considering that in the case at bar, the xeroxing was done or caused
to be done by complainant Ducusin (TSN, pp. 189-191, Aug. 25, 1980) after talking out
the original documents without the official authority and permission of the Disbursing
Officer and Cashier, Remedios Lorenzo, who was then out on rural service and
thereafter the originals were lost, misplaced and are now missing, the failure to present
the originals is suspicious for complainant had ulterior and ill motive in accusing the
petitioner.
5. ID.; ILL MOTIVES OF COMPLAINANT; DISCERNIBLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The ill
motives of the complainant in falsely accusing the accused-appellant is easily
discernible herein. There is presented Exhibit "1," certified true copy of the information
filed against complainant Rodrigo Ducusin in Criminal Case No. A-893, CFI, Agoo, La
Union, for falsification committed on or about July 24, 1975 in relation to the grant of
farmer’s loan under the Gulayan Sa Kalusugan Food Production Program when
complainant was assigned to the Agoo Rural Bank, and a similar information for
falsification against Ducusin in Criminal Case No. A-894, Exh, "2." Referring to these
two (2) cases, Ducusin declared that petitioner Borje motivated the filing of the cases.
There is also the refusal of the petitioner to recommend acceptance of the resignation
of Docusin until he shall have cleared matters wish the Rural Bank of Agoo, La Union
considering that the total amount of P52,047.73 is involved. (Exhibit "8"). The rule is
established that the absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the
offended party and the principal prosecution witness tends to sustain the conclusion
that no such improper motive existed and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith
and credit (People v. Amiscua, 37 SCRA 813; People v. Mercado, 38 SCRA 168; People
v. Valdemoro, 102 SCRA 170). Conversely, where there is showing as to improper
motives, as in the case at bar, the testimony of complainant Ducusin is unworthy of
faith and credit and, therefore, deserves scant consideration. And since the prosecution
theory is built or based on such testimony, the cause of the prosecution collapses or
falls with it.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL NOT DEPENDENT ON THE

GOOD MORAL CHARACTER AND EXEMPLARY CONDUCT OF ACCUSED. — The record and
services of the accused-appellant is, indeed praiseworthy and commendable. But an
accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral
character and exemplary conduct if the court believes he is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be
resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution has discharged its duty of
proving his guilt beyond peradventure of doubt, of convincing the court as to the moral
certainty of his guilt.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J.:
That the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused has not been
satisfactorily overcome by the prosecution evidence in the case at bar where the
conviction of petitioner for falsification of public documents was based principally on the
mere assumption that as possessor of the falsified documents, he is presumed to be the
author of the falsification, is stoutly raised in this appeal by certiorari. Since there is no
direct proof showing that accused-appellant, being then the Provincial Plant Industry
Officer with many subordinate employees and personnel under him engaged in
agricultural field work and assigned in the rural areas like the complainant Rodrigo
Ducusin, had personally and actually falsified the public documents in question
(Timebook and Payroll, Exhibit "A" ; Daily Time Record, Exhibit "B" ; and Certification,
Exhibit "C") which under normal office procedures pass through numerous hands at
several government offices for typing, attestations, funding, accounting, and payment
of the check for P225.00, the legal issue thus raised merits Our careful consideration
and resolution, in the face of accused-appellant’s vigorous denial.
The Information filed against the accused-appellant reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses NICASIO BORJE of the crime of

FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT committed as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the period from January, February and March, 1977, and sometime
thereafter, in the Municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the Provincial Plant Industry Officer of Bureau of Plant Industry, Provincial Office at San
Fernando, La Union and in relation by his performance of the duties of his office, taking
advantage of his position as such, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify the Timebook and Payroll of his office for the periods January to
March, 1977, Daily Time Record for the same period of Rodrigo Ducusin and
Certification for P225.00 by causing it to appear in the said documents that Rodrigo
Ducusin have participated in the same and affixed his signatures thereon when in truth
and in fact he did not so sign the said documents nor otherwise participated in their
execution to the damage and prejudice of the said Rodrigo Ducusin and the Republic.
"CONTRARY to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to P.D. 1606.
"Manila, August 31, 1979.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO M. TEJANO

Special Prosecutor
APPROVED: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(SGD.) VICENTE ERIC
TANODBAYAN"
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and the trial commenced
on August 7, 1980 after the case was reinvestigated by the Tanodbayan on petition of
said accused-appellant, herein petitioner.
On October 23, 1980, the respondent court rendered a decision promulgated on

October 29, 1980, finding the petitioner guilty as per the dispositive portion thereof, to
wit:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, Accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for

the crime of Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized under Article
171, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstance to consider, the Court hereby sentences him to an indeterminate
imprisonment ranging from two (2) years, four (40 months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum, to pay a fine of P2,500.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, October 23, 1980." cralaw virtua1aw library
The decision appealed from recites the evidence for the government as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The gist of the evidence of the prosecution, which consist of the testimonies of
Ducusin, Edgardo Olivares, 43 years old, married, agronomist and Provincial Plant
Officer, Manuel Varquez, 45 years old, married and Regional Director and Remedios
Lorenzo, 47 years old, married and Cashier, all of the Bureau of Plant Industry in San
Fernando, La Union, shows that Ducusin was employed as Plant Pest Officer with the
Bureau of Plant Industry stationed in San Fernando, La Union from February 2, 1975 up
to his resignation on April 30, 1978. From February 2, 1975 up to December 1976, he
was detailed as production technician in the Program of the Bureau of Plant Industry
and the Bureau of Agricultural Extension receiving incentive pay from the National Food
and Agricultural Council (NFAC) during said period. In 1977, however, Ducusin was no
longer entitled to the NFAC incentive pay as he was detailed to the Surveillance Team
of the Bureau of Plant Industry from January 1977 up to April 30, 1978.
"Before one can receive his NFAC incentive pay, he must prepare his Daily Time Record
(CS Form 48) for the month and a certification that he is detailed with the Program. In
February 1978, Ducusin was informed by one Roberto Castro that he is supposed to
receive NFAC incentive pay because his name is included in the special order
enumerating those included in the program. This prompted Ducusin to go to the
Accounting Division of the Bureau of Plant Industry, Region I in San Fernando, La Union
to verify the information relayed to him by Castro and there he discovered that in the
payroll for January, February and March 1977 (Exhibit A) his name and signature
appeared. Attached to said payroll were a certification that he was detailed to the
Program (Exhibit C) and the corresponding Daily Time Records for said months (Exhibit
D) which appeared to have been all signed by him. Actually, however, he did not sign
the said payroll, certification and time records nor did he authorize anybody to sign for
him, Ducusin referred the aforesaid falsification to the accused in the last week of
February 1978 and accused, confessing to him that he got the money, repeatedly
offered him Two Hundred Twenty Five (P225.00) Pesos to cover his incentive pay but
he remained silent and refused to receive the amount. He finally brought the matter to
Regional Director Manuel Varquez who assigned Olivares to investigate the case. But
inasmuch as no further action was taken, he brought the case to the attention of the
President and the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry. Ducusin likewise submitted
his written resignation to the Regional Director (Exhibit E) on April 28, 1978 because he
felt ‘utterly’ demoralized because of undesirable actuations which he recently
discovered . . .’ On May 18, 1978, he received a reply from Regional Director Varquez
dated May 15, 1978 (Exhibit F) stating that his aforesaid letter of resignation had been
endorsed to the accused and attached therewith was the reply of the latter (Exhibit F-
1)."
cralaw virtua1aw library
Similarly, the decision condensed the evidence of the defense in the following manner.
"On the other hand, Accused, in brief, claimed that Ducusin was one of those involved
in the Program for the months of January, February and March 1977 as shown in
Special Order No. 172 of the Bureau of Blank Industry Director Domingo E. Panganiban
(Exhibits 6 and 6-A) and actually paid of his incentive pay and that it is not true that he
received the payroll (Exhibit A) and the corresponding checks from Remedios Lorenzo
for delivery to the persons whose names appear in said payroll. Accused denied that he
instigated the filing of two cases of falsification against Ducusin and to bolster said
denial accused presented Jacinto Costales, 54 years old, married and Second Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of La Union."
In fairness to the accused, We are constrained to include hereunder the more detailed
statement of facts submitted by him in his Brief, viz: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Province of La Union undertook as one of its projects the program known as the
Gulayan sa Kalusugan and Masagana ‘99 Program, the implementation of which became
a joint program of its Bureau of Plant Industry and its Bureau of Agricultural Extension.
Government employees detailed as production technicians in the Gulayan Program
received incentive allowances from the NFAC during the covered period. Their detail as
production technicians of the said program was effected only by a special order
emanating from the Bureau of Plant Industry Director; and before the employee
received his incentive pay, he was required to prepare his Daily Time Record for the
particular month and submit a Certification attesting to the fact that he was detailed to
the program.
"In the case-at-bar, complainant Rodrigo Ducusin, an employee of the Bureau of Plant
Industry, was detailed to the program from February 2, 1975 up to December 1977, his
assignment of work being contained in the NFAC Order captioned ‘Detail and
Designation of Personnel to NFAC, in connection with the Gulayan Program’ where his
name appeared opposite item 60 thereof. (Exhibit 6)
"Making it appear that he was surprised to learn that he was supposed to receive his
NFAC incentive pay for the months of January, February and March 1977 because he
was not entitled thereto as he was not anymore connected with the Gulayan Program;
and falsely making it appear that some person other than himself received bis incentive
pay by allegedly forging his signature on the Daily Time Records, the Payroll and the
Certification required and submitted — complainant Rodrigo Ducusin caused to be filed
a complaint against the petitioner, Nicasio Borje, supervising agronomist of the Bureau
of Plant Industry, Region 1, before the Tanodbayan . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library
Accused-appellant contends that complainant Ducusin was paid his incentive pay for the
months of January to March, 1977 in the total sum of P225.00 as Ducusin was included
in the payroll since he has worked with the Program as shown by Special Order No. 72
issued by the BPI Director and concurrent Executive Director of NFAC, Domingo
Panganiban, and that said Special Order, Exhibit 6 entitled "Detail and Designation of
BPI Personnel to NFAC in Connection with the Masagana ‘99 Program effective January
to December 1977" and dated May 17, 1977, included the name Rodrigo Ducusin,
herein complainant, opposite item No. 60 in page 2 of the Exhibit and marked Exhibit
6-A (TSN, Aug. 27, 1980, pp. 43-46) He confirms substantially the official procedure in
the preparation of the payroll and subsequent payment of the incentive pay to the
production technicians as described by witness Remedios Lorenzo, disbursing officer
and cashier for the BPI office in an Fernando, La Union. However, he vigorously denies
having received the payroll and the corresponding checks from witness Lorenzo as his
participation in the preparation of the said payroll ended with his signing thereof after
which the payroll goes to the disbursing officer for the preparation and issuance of the
checks to the payees.
The defense also presented in evidence certified true copies of two (2) criminal
informations for falsification dated August 13, 1979 filed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Jacinto Costales against complainant Ducusin before the Court of First Instance of La
Union, Branch III, Agoo, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. A-893 (Exhibit 1) and A-894
(Exhibit 2). The accused contends that the instant case against him was initiated by
Ducusin to get even with the petitioner as the complainant admitted in cross-
examination that he believes that Borje instigated said two criminal cases against him
(TSN, Aug. 25, 1980, pp. 21-27) cralawnad
Further contending that complainant Ducusin was doing dual work from July, 1976 up
to December, 1977, the defense presented Exhibits 5 to 5-C which is Memorandum
Order No. 56, Series of 1976, dated June 11, 1976, issued by BPI Director Panganiban
for the implementation of the Plant Pest and Disease Surveillance and Early Warning
Monitoring Project under the Philippine-German Crop Protection Program which shows
that complainant Ducusin was included in the list of personnel assigned to the
Surveillance and Early Warning System (SEWS) team as Plant Pest Control Officer. The
accused appellant declared that although Ducusin was named to this SEWS team, he
continued working with the Gulayan Program as production technician during said work.
The defense disclaims the authenticity of the prosecution’s Exhibit H which is

purportedly the original Borje reply letter to BPI Regional Director Varquez’
endorsement of Ducusin’s resignation letter. Instead, Exhibit 8 was presented in
evidence as the genuine carbon copy of Borje’s signed letter reply dated May 5, 1978 in
response to Varquez’ memorandum of May 3, 1978 wherein petitioner recommended
disapproval of Ducusin’s resignation in order that Ducusin could face the charges
against him in connection with his work with the Gulayan Program. (TSN, Aug. 27,
1980, pp. 56-58, 90)
The Sandiganbayan in its decision formulated two issues determinative of the innocence
or guilt of the accused, to wit: (1) Whether or not the Time Book and Payroll (Exhibit
A), the certification (Exhibit C) and the Daily Time Records (Exhibit D) in support of said
payroll were falsified; and (2) If they were, the liability of the accused, if any. As
indicated earlier, the accused-appellant was found guilty by respondent court.
Hence, the instant appeal by way of certiorari.
Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. The respondent court erred in holding that the petitioner is guilty of the offense of
falsification of public documents, the same not having been established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, considering that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. The originals of the alleged falsified documents were not presented in court and,
hence, the corpus delicti has not been established as held in the case of U. S. v.
Gregorio;
B. There is no iota of evidence that the petitioner falsified the complainant’s signature
on the alleged falsified documents;
C. The testimony of complainant’s witness, Remedios Lorenzo, was sufficiently

impeached by her own conflicting testimony previously given before the Tanodbayan;
D. The respondent court erred in finding as a fact that complainant was not entitled to
the NFAC incentive pay, in total disregard to the documentary evidence proving that he
was doing dual work, both with the Gulayan Program as well as the SEWS and
therefore, still entitled to the NFAC allowance.
II. The respondent court erred in not holding that complainant falsely ascribed the
offense to the petitioner, there being proof that complainant was possessed of ill
motives against petitioner.
Before resolving the above assigned errors, We find it imperative and compelling to
describe and detail the nature and contents of the vital documentary exhibits of the
prosecution alleged to have been falsified by the Accused-Appellant. These are official
forms and they are (1) Exhibit A, Timebook and Payroll of accused-appellant’s office for
the period January to March 1977; (2) Exhibit D, Daily Time Record for the same period
of Rodrigo Ducusin; and (3) Exhibit C, Certification that Ducusin was detailed to the
Program.
As appearing on the face of these exhibits, the act or participation of the petitioner
thereon is indicated below: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In Exhibit A (Timebook and Payroll), the printed certification below which the signature
of petitioner is affixed, reads thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"2. I certify that this roll is correct; every person whose name appears hereon rendered
service for the time and at the rates stated under my general supervision, and I
approve payment of this roll.
CERTIFIED CORRECT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(SGD.) NICACIO B. BORJE NFAC,
Prov’l Chairman"
In Exhibit D (Daily Time Record, Service Form No. 18), the signature of the accused-
appellant appears below the following words: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Certified true copy of the original: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Verified as to the prescribed office hours.
(SGD.) NICACIO BORJE
In-Charge’
Exhibit C (Certification) indicates no participation whatsoever of appellant Borje. It

simply states, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I hereby certify that the amount of two hundred twenty five pesos (P225.00) herein
claimed is only in reimbursement of representation and transportation expenses
(excepting trips from home to office and vice-versa) actually incurred by me in the
performance of my official duties as Production technician while on detailed with the
National Food and Agriculture Council, during the period from Jan. 1977 to March 1977
that I did not use any government vehicle or transportation furnished paid by the
government nor did I collect similar transportation and representation expenses from
my mother organization Bureau of Plant Industry during the period.
Certified true copy of the original: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(SGD.) Rodrigo Ducusin
(Signature)
RODRIGO DUCUSIN
(Print Name)"
On the face of the above documentary evidence, Exh. "A" and "D", the liability of
petitioner as head of the office who had signed the certification and verification printed
thereon must be limited to the contents of said verification and certification for which
he does not necessarily incur criminal responsibility if the entries, data or statements
certified and verified turn out not to be true in which case the employee or personnel
making the entries, data or statements as to his services and attendance is solely and
separately responsible therefor. In the instant case, since there is the Special Order No.
172 of Executive Director Domingo Panganiban, concurrently BPI Director, marked Exh.
6, "Detail and Designation of BPI personnel to NFAC in connection with the Masagana-
99 Program effective January to December, 1977" listing complainant for the
assignment and detail, the inclusion of Ducusin’s name in the payroll was not irregular.
Besides, the payroll is prepared by the Budget Office based on the Special Order and
not by the petitioner’s office.
According to complainant Ducusin, he was no longer connected with the Masagana

Program during the period of January to March 1977 because his assignment thereto
had been terminated. But he was asked this question by the Sandiganbayan, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"JUSTICE ESCAREAL: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: What evidence do you have that you were removed in I977 and you were no longer
performing your duties as technician?
A: It is only verbal." (TSN, p. 47, Aug. 25, 1980)
The alleged verbal order is doubtful for under normal and usual official procedure, a
written special order issued by a government office is cancelled, amended or modified
only by another written special order, not only for purposes of record on file but also to
prevent conflict and confusion in government operations. Moreover, under the best
evidence rule, Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the supposed verbal order
cannot prevail over the written Special Order No. 172 stated above. chanrobles law library
Respondent Sandiganbayan, however, justified the conviction of the accused on the

basis of the testimony of witness Remedios Lorenzo, Regional Disbursing Officer and
Cashier, to the effect that she delivered the payroll and checks to petitioner accused-
appellant, relying further on the presumption that as possessor of the
document, Accused-appellant is presumed to have falsified it.
But reviewing the testimony of witness Lorenzo, the records disclose that her original
testimony at the reinvestigation of the case before the Tanodbayan was favorable to
the accused, saying that she delivered the payroll and the checks to the complainant
Ducusin, even identifying the genuine signature of Ducusin on the payroll. We quote
hereunder excerpts of her testimony: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Prosecutor Ferrer: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: What is your SOP in the preparation of timebook and payroll, do you have to sign as
Regional Disbursing Officer?
A: I don’t sir. It is only the Budget Officer who prepares the payroll. After the budget
officer has prepared it will go to the accounting for funding and after the accounting it
will go to my office.
Q: All in all how many signatures are to be signed in the payroll for its validity under
your standard operation procedure?
A: There are four, sir. The provincial officer, the accountant for funding, then the
Director and after the director have signed it, it will go to any office.
x x x
Q: Under your standard operating procedure who will sign first the payroll. The payee
or the provincial plant officer?
A: Provincial plant officer.
Q: After the Provincial Plant Officer, the payroll will go to the regional accountant, is
that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after the Regional accountant it will go to the Director?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after the Regional Director, it will go to the Disbursing Officer?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that will be the time that the payee will receive the amount, is that correct?
A: We prepare the check for them.
Q: When do the payee affix their signatures in the payroll, if you know?
A: When I will issue them the check that is the time that they affix their signatures in
the payroll.
Q: So after that the check will go back to the Provincial Plant Officer?
A: It will not go back to the Provincial Plant Officer.
Q: After the Provincial Plant Officer has affixed his signature he has no further
participation in this payroll.?
A: No more, sir.
Q: Now, Mrs. Lorenzo, you also brought with you . . . By the way, who is supposed to
sign first this timebook and payroll under your Standard Operation Procedure. Is it the
Provincial Plant Officer?
A: Yes, sir. Then after that it will go to the office of the Regional Accountant, and after
the regional accountant have signed, it will go to the regional director for approval, and
from there it will go to my office.
Q: You are the same time cashier?
A: Yes, sir. My item is Cashier I.
Q: So, do you have any participation in this Exhibit "X" by way of issuing the check to
corresponding payee in this timebook and payroll?
A: In the preparation of the check, sir.
Q: Who delivers the check to the payee?
A: After we have prepared the check, they will just go to my office to get the check and
that is the time they will affix their signature.
Q: And they sign their names after delivering to them their respective checks?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Are you familiar with any of these signatures appearing in this timebook and payroll,
particularly that of Mr. Ducusin?
PROSECUTOR FERRER: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: By the way, before you answer that question do you know personally Mr. Rodrigo
Ducusin?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: He is also our employee in the office. He is one of the technicians under M-99.
Q: Since when have you known Mr. Rodrigo Ducusin
A: I could not exactly remember, sir.
A: Because I have come across their names when they got their checks from me.
Q: But before January 1977, you have already known him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How long before January 1977 have yon been a cashier or Regional Disbursing
Officer?
A: I was already a cashier since 1976, July 1975.
Q: As a cashier since that time, are you familiar with the signature of Mr. Ducusin?
A: I could not remember their signatures because there are plenty of personnel in the
Bureau of Plant Industry.
Q: Were you the one who issued the check to the complainant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In issuing the checks did you issue them individually to the personnels in the BPI?
A: Yes, sir. As soon as we pay the check to anyone, they have to affix their signature
first.
Q: Where do you deliver the checks to the payees?
A: In my office.
Q: At San Fernando, La Union?
A: Yes, sir." cralaw virtua1aw library
(TSN, December 21, 1979, pp. 5-14, Tanodbayan, Emphasis supplied.)
The contradictory and conflicting testimonies of this witness only proves her
unreliability and unworthiness in respect to the sanctity of the witness’ oath. Although
she tried to explain her complete "turn-about" by saying during the Sandiganbayan
hearing: "They told me that if I will testify against them, I will be accessory and I don’t
want to be involved in the case because I am not the one really who delivered the
checks to the production technician, sir." (TSN, p. 18, Aug. 27, 1980), the conclusion of
the respondent court that she was intimidated to testify in favor of the accused during
the reinvestigation is not warranted, considering that the witness herself is a high
regional official, being the Regional Disbursing (Officer and Cashier and not subordinate
to but perhaps co-equal in rank to the petitioner and, therefore, may not be so easily
intimidated by the accused who was in no position or power to include her as accessory
in the case. Lorenzo’s testimony given at the Sandiganbayan hearing is not worthy of
belief and must be rejected. cralawnad
We also reject respondent court’s reliance on the presumption that as possessor of the
document, the accused is presumed to be the author of the falsification. In the first
place, the factual basis which is the Lorenzo testimony which We have reviewed as
doubtful and variable, cannot be credited. Petitioner has denied vigorously the
testimony of Lorenzo that he received the payroll and the checks from her. He said that
his participation in the preparation of the payroll ended with his signing thereof after
which the payroll goes to the Disbursing Officer for the preparation and issuance of the
checks to the payees at which time the payee affix their signatures on the payroll,
which is substantially corroborated by the original testimony of the witness Lorenzo
during the reinvestigation of the case before the Tanodbayan.
In the second place, Exhibit "A" appears to be also signed by ten (10) other production
technicians listed in the payroll, besides complainant Ducusin. It is initialled by three
(3) personnel in the Accounting Services Unit and further signed by the Regional
Accountant and for the Regional Director. All of these persons were at one time or
another in possession of the document, all of them had the same opportunity impliedly
imputed to the accused. The payroll must have been carried and passed by messengers
and other employees from one office to another, from one desk to another for purposes
of typing, funding, initialling, verification, certification, accounting, recording, drawing
of the check and finally, issuing of the check. In Our view, the respondent court’s
reliance on the presumption which is only presumptive, is misplaced and unwarranted,
there being no sufficient reason to apply the same.
The defense contends that the prosecution, having presented xerox copies only of the
falsified documents, Exhs. "D" and "C", failed to prove the corpuz delicti of the crime
charged, citing the case of U.S. v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522. In this case of Gregorio, the
Supreme Court held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges
and the courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated,
counterfeited or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence
produced at the trial, whether or not the crime of falsification was actually committed;
in the absence of the original document, it is improper to conclude, with only a copy of
the said original in view, that there has been a falsification of a document which was
neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the existence of such original
document may be doubted." cralaw virtua1aw library
Reacting to the defense contention, the Sandiganbayan held that" (a)ccused’s claim
that in the absence of the original documents it is improper to conclude that there is
falsification of document in accordance with the case of U.S. v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522,
is sleazy for the case referred to is not in point," and then attempted to differentiate
said case with the case at bar by holding that" (h)ad the issue confronting the Court
been one of alteration or superimposition of signatures or word or figure, then the issue
of bringing out the original may have relevance." The Sandiganbayan further added:
"At any rate, it is worthwhile to note that with the development of modern copying
devices which virtually eliminate the possibility of error in reproduction of the original,
the relevancy of the doctrine in U.S. v. Gregorio is now open to question." cralaw virtua1aw library
We do not agree with the respondent court. Firstly the Gregorio ruling makes no
distinction for the doctrine itself applies in criminal proceedings for the falsification of a
document, whether simulated, counterfeited, or falsified. Secondly, the Gregorio
doctrine is still tenable notwithstanding modern copying devices for a falsified
document, passed off as an original can also be duplicated by xeroxing and thereafter,
certified as true copy of the original as in Exh. "D." And thirdly, considering that in the
case at bar, the xeroxing was done or caused to be done by complainant Ducusin (TSN,
pp. 189-191, Aug. 25, 1980) after taking out the original documents without the official
authority and permission of the Disbursing Officer and Cashier, Remedios Lorenzo, who
was then out on rural service and thereafter the originals were lost, misplaced and are
now missing, the failure to present the originals is suspicious for complainant had
ulterior and ill motives in accusing the petitioner as will be shown hereunder.
The ill motives of the complainant in falsely accusing the accused-appellant is easily
discernible herein. There is presented Exhibit "1", certified true copy of the information
filed against complainant Rodrigo Ducusin in Criminal Case No. A-893, CFI, Agoo, La
Union, for falsification committed on or about July 24, 1975 in relation to the grant of
farmer’s loan under the Gulayan Sa Kalusugan Food Production Program when
complainant was assigned to the Agoo Rural Bank, and a similar information for
falsification against Ducusin in Criminal Case No. A-894, Exh. "2." Referring to these
two (2) cases, Ducusin declared that petitioner Borje motivated the filing of the cases;
that in the filing of the case in the Fiscal’s Office in San Fernando, La Union, there is an
affidavit of Mr. Nicasio Borje and that because of that affidavit, it was Mr. Borje who
motivated the filing of the charge against him. (TSN, pp. 26-27, Aug. 25, 1980). There
is also the refusal of the petitioner to recommend acceptance of the resignation of
Ducusin until he shall have cleared matters with the Rural Bank of Agoo, La Union
considering that the total amount of P52,047.73 is involved. (Exhibit "8")
The rule is established that the absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating
the offended party and the principal prosecution witness tends to sustain the conclusion
that no such improper motive existed and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith
and credit. (People v. Amiscua, 37 SCRA 813; People v. Mercado, 38 SCRA 168; People
v. Valdemoro, 102 SCRA 170). Conversely, where there is showing as to improper
motives, as in the case at bar, the testimony of complainant Ducusin is unworthy of
faith and credit and, therefore, deserves scant consideration. And since the prosecution
theory is built or based on each testimony, the cause of the prosecution collapses or
falls with it.
cralawnad
According to respondent court, its conclusion that the accused falsified or caused to be
falsified the document in question is further supported by the following facts: (1) that
the accused confessed to him that he was the one who got the money and offered
immediately to Ducusin the sum of P225.00 to cover the incentive pay so that Ducusin
will just keep silent but Ducusin did not accept the money; and (2) that in his reply to
the letter of Ducusin denouncing the forging of his signature that he received his
incentive pay from January to March, 1977, the accused tried to justify the falsification
of the time record as shown in the portion of said reply, Exhibit "H."
In the light of the ill-motives of the complainant as shown above, this particular
assertion of Ducusin which is uncorroborated is sleazy, that is, flimsy, shabby, cheap or
unsubstantial. Moreover, petitioner’s reply marked Exh. "H" is not an admission of the
accused that he falsified or caused to be falsified the documents in question. In fact,
examining Exh. "H", it says that "his (Ducusin) daily time record (was) prepared by
other employees in order to justify such payment. The authenticity of Exh. "H" is denied
by the petitioner who presented Exh. "8" as the real and correct copy duly received and
initialed by the Regional Office, and therein, he wrote: "I therefore deny knowledge of
the alleged forgery of the signature of Mr. Ducusin in the same payroll." cralaw virtua1aw library
Finally, the defense puts forth the exemplary and distinguished record of the petitioner
as a public servant, having been in the government service for more than twenty (20)
years and multi-awarded and commended for meritorious services, among them as
scholar under the Colombo Plan specializing in pest management in England; Diploma
of Merit as Most Outstanding Employee in Ilocos Sur; Award as one of the Most
Outstanding Green Revolutionist in the Philippines, 1976; and Award as one of the Most
Outstanding Bureau of Plant Industry Employees, 1978. And citing the case of Manero
v. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 817 wherein the Supreme Court said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(T)he petitioner exhibited an exemplary record as a policeman; he was thrice cited by

his superiors for refusing to accept a bribe, was commended for minimizing armed
robberies, was twice the recipient to Letters of Appreciation and has been
recommended for promotion on the basis of known honesty and integrity. . .,"
in sustaining the innocence of the accused, petitioner also prays for his acquittal.
The record and services of the accused-appellant is, indeed praiseworthy and
commendable. But an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his
previous good moral character and exemplary conduct if the court believes he is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The affirmance or reversal of his
conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution has
discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond peradventure of doubt, of convincing the
court as to the moral certainty of his guilt.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Considering that, on the whole, the evidence presented against the accused in the case
at bar is not clear, competent and convincing, and considering further that there is
jurisprudence which, by analogy, supports the defense in U.S. v. Balais, 17 Phil. 503
wherein We held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The municipal treasurer who ‘certifies that the official payroll he signs is correct, that
the services have been rendered and the payments made as stated,’ does not pervert
the truth in the narration of the facts, if the persons certified as municipal secretary and
clerk to the municipal president were duly appointed and qualified as such municipal
secretary and clerk to the municipal president, discharging the duties of their respective
offices, the services certified having been rendered at the time referred to in the
payroll, and both persons having received their respective salaries from the municipal
treasurer certifying the payroll. Nor can it be taken as proving the falsification of the
document if it is subsequently discovered that the services were really not rendered by
the aforementioned persons themselves but by substitutes; for it is not the mission of
the municipal treasurer to take upon himself to investigate whether the persons
accredited to him as secretary and clerk, by the municipal council and whom he, in turn
acknowledges and pays their monthly salary, really or apparently perform the duties of
such offices,"
in resume, Our review of the case at bar concludes that the prosecution failed in
discharging its sworn duty to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
It has not overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused. Consequently, Accused-appellant must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan

convicting the accused is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. We find the accused-
appellant NOT GUILTY. No costs.
Judgment reversed.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., De Castro, Plana, Escolin Relova and

Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Aquino and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., took no part.
Abad Santos, J., I vote to affirm the judgment of conviction for the reasons stated by
the Sandiganbayan.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life;
Example: ORDINARY HABITS OF LIFE
…that you sleep at night
…that you'll have ridges on your nose when you use glasses regularly
"aa. That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;"
ROC Civil Code
No time period 5 year period

provided
Rule of procedure Rule of substantive law
Disputable Just provides for a ground where no marriage license is necessary; does
presumption not provide for a presumption
bb. That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and
who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work, or industry;
(compare with the following)
NCC
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
FC
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife *without the benefit of marriage or *under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a)
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article (meaning: they are not
capacitated to marry each other), only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided
in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
***
Why presumed to have been obtained through joint EWI:
-even if wife did not contribute financially (as it is usually the wife who stays at home), wife
presumed to have taken care of the household chores - so may contribution (see FC provisions,
it explains a lot)
e.g. What if the man and a woman, capacitated to marry each other and lives exclusively with
each other, it's just that they are not married or their marriage is void, jointly contribute
financially to the acquisition of a house and lot. The man declares that he owns 90% of the
property. Is the presumption relevant?
CHA: YES. The woman could claim that it is presumed that they have obtained the house and
lot through their joint efforts, as presumed by law, and it is on the man to prove otherwise (i.e.
that he owns 90% of the property as he contributed that proportion). (Ma'am didn't give any
answer so I tried to do so)
JOINT: is this not equivalent to EQUAL shares?
VAA: contemplate equal shares, or else they are worse off than men and women who are not
capacitated to marry but enjoy the presumption that they equally share their properties
cc. That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are *not capacitated to marry each
other and who have acquired property through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits
of money and evidences of credit are equal;
CHA: similar to Family code provision
"NOT CAPACITATED to marry each other"
-does not involve a situation where the other person is married (that's why they are not
capacitated to marry each other)
-if the other person is married, in accordance with the family code, the share of the guilty
person from the co-ownership shall accrue to the ACO of the valid marriage
"ACTUAL JOINT CONTRIBUTION"
-should prove the fact that actual contribution of money, property or industry was provided for
the presumption to apply that their contributions and shares are equal (unless they prove that
they possess more than just 50% of the share)
dd. That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within 300
days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of
proof to the contrary:
1. A child born before 180 days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within
300 days after the termination of the former marriage.
2. A child born after 180 days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within
300 days after the termination of the former marriage.
Cutoff points
2. 180 days after the solemnization of the 2nd marriage: relevant: pertains to the date of
conception, as it takes at least 6 months for a baby to live outside mom's womb
3. 300 days after the termination of the former marriage
If born BEFORE 180 days (6 months) after 2nd marriage + born WITHIN 300 days (10 months)
after end of 1st marriage = child conceived during 1st marriage
If born AFTER 180 days (6 months) after 2nd marriage + born WITHIN 300 days (10 months)
after end of 1st marriage = child conceived during 2nd marriage
e.g. In civil code:

Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, are natural.
Does this apply to presumptions?
NO. IRRELEVANT AND DIFFERENT. ROC provision refers to the termination of 1st marriage
while in CIVIL CODE, there's a subsequent marriage which legitimizes a child born when there's
no marriage yet. (so if sa ROC, terminate marriage, sa NCC, start pa lang)
When marriage may be TERMINATED

4. PHYSICAL TERMINATION: Death of the other spouse
5. LEGAL TERMINATION
1. Declaration of nullity of marriage
2. Presumptive death of one spouse, judicially declared
3. Annulment: deemed terminated from the point of judgment
4. Foreign divorce
5. 2nd marriage when the spouse presumptively presumed
VAA: if the child was born after 180 days after 2nd marriage but born after 300 days after the
1st marriage, is the child presumed a legitimate child of the second marriage?
NO. NO PRESUMPTION AS TO LEGITIMACY OR ILLEGITIMACY. (R131.4)

Sec.4 No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. There is no presumption of legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or
the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must
prove his allegation.
(compare with CC and FC)
CC
Art. 261. There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days
following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the
legitimacy or the illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation.
FC
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the
termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
"(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with the things of that
nature;"
-refers to longetivity
"USUAL"
-there must be a basis, a track record

VAA: does this cover human life?
No. You have to die at some point. It falls under (y) [that things happen according to the
ordinary course of nature…]
"(gg)That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority,
was so printed or published;"
PUBLIC AUTHORITY- institution which has authority to publish BOOKS (note: not just anything,
it must be in book form, which would include manuals, etc)
e.g. National Law Register published by the Law Center
Official Gazette
VAA: does this apply to foreign books?
NO. (hh) implicitly include foreign books.

(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in
tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
-refers to "country", does implying that it is another country aside from the Philippines…a
foreign country
-reports of cases: not just digests of cases, should contain the complete report of the cases
e.g. US Reports, Atlantic Reporter
Amjur not included as it only contains the digest of cases decided

(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when 2 persons perish in the same calamity, such as
wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of 15, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age of 60, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under 15 and the other is above 60, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over 15 and under 60, and the sex is different, the male is deemed to have
survived; if the sex is the same, the older;
If one be under 15 or over 60, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have
survived
4 factors necessary
6. NO succession issues
7. No particular circumstances from which one can refer as to who died first: Absolutely
no way to determine: if there's another way, don't use the presumption
e.g. One can swim, the other cannot, then possibly the one who can't swim died ahead
One is sick, the other is healthy, it can be inferred that the healthy person lived longer
8. WHERE:
1. Wreck
2. Battle
3. Conflagration
4. Any other calamity
9. Infer from strength/age/sex
"DISKARTE. That's the Filipino word for DISCRETION." - VAA
(kk) That if there is doubt, as between 2 or more persons who are called to succeed each other,
as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove
the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time.
-this is the provision applicable to succession
GR: died at the same time
X: unless death of one first proven by the person who alleges
WHY there's such a provision: this is for succession. To be fair, the two persons are presumed
to have died at the same time so that no one succeeds from the other. But if one wants to
prove that one succeeds from the other (through the earlier death of the latter), he has the
burden of proving that it is the case, as after proving such, he could win the case (sorry medyo
mahaba. Di ko ma-explain nang mas maganda eh)
e.g. X, a wealthy business man, went on a trip abroad with one of his child, A. They boarded a
plane which crashed. Only X's body was found. B was the only one left in the family. Would B
apply the presumption/s?
YES. It would be beneficial for X to apply (w) presumption, i.e. presumption of death of his
sibling A. If he proves that A is presumed to be dead, then he could inherit both from his dad X
and from his sibling A, provided A does not have compulsory heirs. If A still presumed to be
alive, he would have someone who would be sharing the estate of his dad X, aside from their
mom if alive and other heirs.
Presumptions are divided into 2 parts

10. Regularity
11. Good Faith
(VAA did not tell the difference between the two though. It is for us to determine which
provision belongs to which)
Basis of presumptions: human experience
CAN YOU STIPULATE BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED?
NO.
WHY: (CHA) It is provided by law. Parties cannot amend the law by stipulation, only the
Congress can amend the law.
CAN YOU STIPULATE ON THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE?
VAA: yes you can! Burden of evidence only refers to the order of presentation of evidence, and
in each stage, one of the parties either the claimant or defendant has the burden of evidence
Burden of Proof Burden of Evidence
Civil cases - on the party who would be defeated Both civil and criminal cases – lies with party who
if no evidence were given on either side asserts an affirmative allegation
Criminal cases – always on the prosecution
Does not shift as it remains throughout the trial Shifts from party to party depending upon the
with the party upon whom it is imposed exigencies of the case in the course of the trial
Generally determined by the pleading filed by the Generally determined by the developments at the
party trial or by provisions of law
REVERSE TRIAL:
-case where the defendant presents his evidence first, when the usual practice is that the
prosecution or the plaintiff presents evidence first
-here, only the BURDEN OF EVIDENCE CHANGES.
e.g. CIV: when the defendant presents an AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
…in a complaint for collection of money, the defendant could claim that he has already paid
money so he can prove first that he DID pay so as to speed things up. So the defendant has the
burden of evidence first. But the plaintiff still has the burden of proving that the defendant did
not pay, or else his claim would be defeated, same with the defendant who has the burden of
proving that he did pay, or he was not liable to pay
e.g. CRIM: when the defendant presents a JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE (usually when he
alleges that he only acted in SELF-DEFENSE)
-only the burden of evidence affected, i.e. the defense would be presenting its evidence first.
The burden of proof still remains with the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt
ZULUETA v. CA (? - not sure)
-here, the airlines allege as a defense that under US laws, overbooking is allowed, i.e. give out
tickets to more passengers as there are seats on the plane.
…is there any presumption applicable in this case?
YES. Processual presumption [note: processual presumption is not among those enumerated in
R131.3. It is found in jurisprudence: In Re: Testate Estate of Suntay, CIR v. Fisher…)
Processual presumption: Absent any evidence of foreign law, the foreign law is presumed to be
the same as that in the Philippines.
-applying this in the case, OVERBOOKING IS NOT ALLOWED IN THE PHILIPPINES. SO absent any
proof that it is allowed in the US, it cannot be made as an excuse for bumping off a passenger
in the Philippines.
(ff question: would US law be applicable at all? )
Borje vs. Sandiganbayan
F: Borje, the Provincial Plant Industry Officer, was alleged to have falsified several public
documents (Timebook, Payroll, Daily Time Record, Certification) in order to receive P225.00
which was supposed to have been received by one of his subordinates, Ducosin
-here, Borje was earlier convicted based on the presumption "(j) that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and thedoer of the
whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership
over, are owned by him"
HELD
Borje’s guilt has NOT been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the presumption that as possessor of the document, the accused is
presumed to be the author of the falsification is misplaced and unwarranted, there being no
sufficient reason to apply the same.
(1) Testimony of the Regional Disbursing Officer and Cashier, to the effect that she delivered
payroll and checks to Borje, is impeached by her orig testimony at Tanodbayan reinvestigation
where she said she delivered the payroll and checks to complainant Ducusin, even identifying
the genuine signature of Ducusin on the payroll. To use this doubtful testimony as factual basis
is unwarranted.
(2) Timebook and payroll was also signed by 10 other production technicians. It is initialled by 3
personnel in Accounting Services Unit and further signed by Regional Accountant and for the
Regional Director. All of these persons were at one time or another in possession of the
document, all of them had the same opportunity impliedly imputed to the accused. Payroll must
have been carried and passed by messengers & other employees from one office to another,
from one desk to another for purposes of typing, funding, initialling, verification, certification,
accounting, recording, drawing of the check and finally, issuing of the check.
- On the whole, the evidence presented against the accused is not clear, competent and
convincing.
VAA discussion (CHA's interpretation): Mali daw doctrine ng Borje (and the doctrine is?)
For the presumption to attach, the following should concur
(1) there was a taking
(2) taking was done in the doing of a recent wrongful act
Here, the wrongful act is falsification. What could be taken during the falsification are the
documents, as the presumption would presume that if Borje possesses the falsified documents,
he took it and was also the one who falsified it. The thing allegedly taken here is the check,
which was not falsified and was not proven to be in the possession of Borje. Therefore, the
presumption does not apply
BARCELON V. ROXAS
-wrong doctrine rin! Inulit ang Africa v. Caltex!

F: BIR issued an assessment for deficiency of tax. Taxpayer alleged that he didn't receive any
assessment, protested. Even with the protest, BIR levied on the properties of the taxpayer.
-during trial, the BIR was only able to present a record containing the fact that a notice was
sent to the taxpayer on this date through this sender.
H: "To qualify their statements as "official information" acquired by the officers who prepared
the reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of
the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record." - kaya di naniwala
sa BIR. Most probably (as di naman 'to assigned, binanggit lang ni ma'am so di ko alam facts)
the one who made the entry was deemed not to have personal knowledge that the
assessments were indeed received by the taxpayer.
CAPILI V CARDAÑA
(eto yung case na hinahanap ko buong summer!!!!)
F: young 12 year old girl, while walking OUTSIDE the school premises, was killed when an old
caimito tree, located inside the school grounds, but on the perimeter wall, fell on her. Action
for damages filed against school principal!
-School principal presented the following defense:

12. SHE DID NOT KNOW that the tree was dead!
(1) the tree does not look dead so she would not know that it is dead. If she did, she might
have ordered it removed
(2) someone offered to buy the tree (*ehem* to make it as firewood). Why would anyone buy
a tree if it's dead (e kasi nga gagawing panggatong!)
(3) when a meeting was held (to discuss WON they would sell the tree), no one told her that
the tree is dead!
13. Granting that the tree is dead and she knew of it, SHE ALREADY ASSIGNED IT!
--here Res Ipsa Loquitur was used to make the principal liable
ELEMENTS of RES IPSA LOQUITUR: 3 elements must concur
(1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant's negligence;
(2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured.
---there's a PRESUMPTION: THE DEFENDANT IS PRESUMED TO BE NEGLIGENT granting the

requisites concur
VAA: how do we use the doctrine if the principal uses the defense that SHE DIDN'T KNOW?
Why would anyone be liable if she did not even know the fact?
The mere fact that she did not know of the dead tree means she is negligent. As the principal, it
is her duty to oversee what happens inside the school and her admission that she did not know
only means she failed to observe of the due diligence required of her as the principal of the
school
RULE 132
A. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Section 1 – EXAMINATION TO BE DONE IN OPEN COURT
The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
shall be done in open court,
and under oath or affirmation.
Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak,
or the question calls for a different mode of answer,
the answers of a witness shall be given orally.
Section 2 – PROCEEDINGS TO BE RECORDED
The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing,
including the questions to be propounded to a witness
and his answer thereto,
the statements made by the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses
with reference to the case,
shall be recorded by means of
shorthand
or stenotype
or by other means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings
made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder
and certified as correct by him
shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings.
 To be admissible, testimony of a witness must be given in open court

 XCPT that such testimony may be supplanted:
1. in civil cases: by depositions (Rules 23-24ff)
2. in criminal cases: by depositions
conditional examinations (R119.12-15 // R123.1)
records of the preliminary investigation (R115.1(f)
GenRule: Mere presentation of affidavits of prosecution witnesses subject to cross-examination is not

allowed by the Rules
BUT under BP 129, summary procedures may be authorized by SC in special cases
SC may also adopt simplified procedures which may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits be
admitted in lieu of oral testimony (Sec. 36)
 Testimony of witness should be elicited by questions of counsel

 But Court itself may propound questions or may suggest questions to counsel
Can a statement made during the trial be "off the record"?
VAA: Pwede, if both parties agree. If one of the parties invoke R132.2 and the statement refers
to the case, the judge has no choice but to order the recording of the statement
Steno vs. Shorthand
Steno: uses a machine
Shorthand: it is handwritten
How should the witness answer
GR: ORALLY
X: when other modes are allowed
Video recording: is it allowed?
YES. SEC2: if found suitable by the court. It is the court which chooses the means how the
proceedings are to be recorded. He determines what is the official record of the case
FF UP: what if the judge leans toward one of the parties, make statements for the other party,
and orders the stenographer not to record it in the transcript BUT you have a tape or video
recording of the proceedings. Can you insist that the statement made by the judge be included
in the transcript?
YES. File a MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF THE TSN. The video recording can be used as evidence
to support a motion in R133
RIGHTS OF A WITNESS
Section 3 - RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF A WITNESS
A witness must answer questions, although his answer may tend to establish a claim against
him. However, it is the right of a witness:
To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or insulting
demeanor;
Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless otherwise
provided by law; or
Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it to be the very fact at issue
or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the
fact of his previous final conviction for an offense. (3a, 19a)
 Witness cannot refuse to answer questions material to the inquiry even if it may tend
to establish a claim against him
 But may refuse if:
Under the right against self-degradation unless:
Such question is directed to the very fact in issue
Refers to his previous final conviction or offense
Under the right against self-incrimination
 Criminal cases – Rule 115 Section 1(e): accused may refuse to take
the stand altogether
 Accused: may be with reference to the offense involved in the same
case wherein he is charged or to an offense for which he may be charged and tried in
another case
 Witness: offense involved is one for which he may be tried in another
case
 Right should be seasonably invoked and may be waived
 Other cases/proceedings – a party may be compelled to take the
stand but he may object to incriminating questions
Beltran v Samson (53 Phil 570): Where in a prosecution for falsification, the accused took the
stand and testified denying his authorship of the alleged falsified signature, on cross-examination he
can be compelled to give a sample of his handwriting and it was not a denial of his right against self-
incrimination
Bermudez vs. Castillo (64 Phil 483): Where, in a disbarment case, the complainant on cross-
examination denied authorship of certain handwritten letters, she could not be compelled to give
samples of her handwriting as it would amount to a denial of her right against self-incrimination in a
possible charge for perjury
Conflict can be reconciled:
>Beltran: it was the accused himself who opened the issue on his direct examination
He could have refused to testify altogether

Therefore, he waived his right
>Bermudez: complainant could not refuse to testify without an unfavorable inference being drawn
against her
Also, issue was raised during cross-exam, hence she did not waive the right
“unless otherwise provided by law” – refers to immunity statutes wherein the witness is granted
immunity from criminal prosecution
Why allowed to be asked questions even if it may tend to establish a claim against him, but not
when the question would subject the witness to a penalty for an offense?
VAA: It would not help the cause of truth if the evidence used to convict the accused came
from the accused himself. (remember "Goya's Ghost", where the accused was tortured so that
she would admit the offense charged against her.
Section 4 - ORDER IN THE EXAMINATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL WITNESS
The order in which the individual witness may be examined is as follows;
Direct examination by the proponent;

Cross-examination by the opponent;
Re-direct examination by the proponent;
Re-cross-examination by the opponent.
Section 5 - DIRECT EXAMINATION
Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness
by the party presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.
Section 6 - CROSS-EXAMINATION; ITS PURPOSE AND EXTENT
Upon the termination of the direct examination,
the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party

as to many matters stated in the direct examination,
or connected therewith,
with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, (impt daw to sabi ni ma'am)
and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
Section 7 - RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION; ITS PURPOSE AND EXTENT
After the cross-examination of the witness has been concluded,
he may be re-examined by the party calling him,
to explain
or supplement
his answers given during the cross-examination.
On re-direct-examination,
questions on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination,
may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
Section 8 - RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION
Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination,
the adverse party may re-cross-examine the witness
on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and
also on such other matters as may be allowed by the court in its discretion.
 A witness may be cross examined by the adverse party not only as to matters stated in
the direct examination but also as to matters connected therewith, and this should be allowed to do
with sufficient fullness and freedom to test the witness’ accuracy, truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias, and also to elicit from him any important fact bearing upon the issue
American rule: cross-exam must be confined to matters inquired about in direct
English rule: witness may be cross-examined not only upon matters relevant to the issue
This jurisdiction – more on English rule
 Unwilling/hostile/adverse party witness – cross examination shall only be on the
subject of his examination-in-chief
Same as accused testifying on his own behalf
 Question which assumes facts not on the record:
If on cross examination – objectionable for bring misleading
If on direct examination – objectionable for lack of basis
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. CIR (1978): When cross examination is not and cannot be done
or completed due to causes attributable to the party who offered the witness, the uncompleted
testimony is thereby rendered incomplete and should be stricken from the record.
People vs. Seneris (1980): Where in a criminal case the prosecution witness was extensively cross
examined on the essential elements of the crime and what remained for further cross-examination
was the matter of the prize or reward which was treated therein as merely an aggravating
circumstance, his failure to appear for further cross-examination thereon will not warrant the striking
out of his direct examination, especially since further cross-examination could not be conducted due
to the subsequent death of the said witness, a circumstance not attributable to the prosecution
*note: basta if the witness was already extensively cross-examined on material points and failed to
appear, don't strike his testimony!
*EXAMINATION: only refers to TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, not to other forms of evidence.
*After re-cross, no more re-re-cross…no more re-redirect
Section 9 - RECALLING WITNESS
After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded,
the witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court.
The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion,
as the interests of justice may require.
Recall based on discretion of the court

But recall is a matter of right if
*the examination of the witness has not been concluded
*the recall has been expressly reserved by a party with the approval of the court
If new witness discovered after end of period for examination of witnesses: RE-OPEN TRIAL
If witness already presented wants to add something else - RECALL witness
Section 10 - LEADING AND MISLEADING QUESTIONS
A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a
LEADING QUESTION. It is not allowed, except:
On cross examination;
On preliminary matters;
When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
ignorant,
or a child of tender years
or is of feeble mind
or a deaf-mute;
d. Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or

e. Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
A MISLEADING QUESTION is one
which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness,
or contrary to that which he has previously stated.
It is not allowed.
 LEADING QUESTION – one which suggests to the witness the answer desired
 May cause the witness, by reacting to an inference in his mind, to testify in
accordance with the suggestion by the question
 Answer may be “rather an echo of the question than a genuine
recollection
 Testimony on direct examination elicited through leading questions has little
probative value
People vs. Dela Cruz (2002): Leading questions may be permitted in the examination of a witness
who is immature; aged and infirm; an bad physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or
unaccustomed to, court proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-minded; confused and
agitated; terrified, timid or embarrassed while on stand; lacking in comprehension of questions or
slow to understand; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak or understand the English language or only
imperfectly familiar therewith
 MISLEADING QUESTION – one which assumes facts not in evidence or without
sufficient basis or which assumes testimony or proof which has not been given
*Leading questions are only prohibited when it is asked of the witness of the party conducting
the direct (i.e. kakampi nung lawyer yung witness)
Illustrations: in a collection suit
Example of leading question: "Is this not the signature of the debtor-defendant?"
Example of misleading question (where a fact not yet established is assumed): "When did you
say the defendant was supposed to pay?" - obligation to pay not yet established
Section 11 - IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY'S WITNESS
A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called,
by contradictory evidence, (CE)
by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad,or (THI)
by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, (PSI)
but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, (not PWA)
EXCEPT that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or
the record of the judgment,
that he has been convicted of an offense.
 Party can impeach adverse party’s witness by:

Contradictory evidence – other testimony of the same witness, or other evidence presented by him
in the same case, but not the testimony of another witness (VAA: Pede naman kahit
ibang testimony)
Evidence of prior inconsistent statements –statements, oral or documentary, made by the witness
sought to be impeached on occasions other than the trial in which he is testifying
 “Laying the predicate”
By confronting him with such statements, with the circumstances under which they were
made
By asking him whether he made such statement
By giving him a chance to explain the inconsistency
 Impeachment is incomplete if witness is not given the
chance to explain the discrepancy
 But defect is waived if no objection on that ground is raised
when the document involved is offered for admission
 No need to lay the predicate if the prior inconsistent statement
appears in a deposition of the adverse party and not a mere witness
 Statements are in the nature of an admission
 Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. vs. Hashim (50 Phil 132): Where
previous statements of a witness are offered as evidence of an admission, and not
merely to impeach him, the rule on laying the predicate does not apply
Evidence of bad character
evidence of bias, interest, prejudice or incompetence
THI: you can't prove this through a particular wrongful act
WHY: Res Inter Alios Acta part 2

Section 12 - PARTY MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OWN WITNESS
Except with respect to witnesses referred to in par. (d) and (e) of Section 10,
the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
(MOTION TO DECLARE A WITNESS AS A HOSTILE WITNESS)
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile
only if so declared by the court upon adequate showing of
his adverse interest,
unjustified reluctance to testify, or
his having misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared,
or the witness who is an adverse party,
may be impeached by the party presenting him IN ALL RESPECTS
as if he had been called by the adverse party,
except by evidence of his bad character.
He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, BUT
such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his exam-in-chief.
Fernandez vs. Tantoco (49 Phil 380): A party who voluntarily offers the testimony of a witness
in the case is, as a rule, bound by the testimony of the said witness.
EXCEPTIONS:
In case of a hostile witness

Where the witness is the adverse party or the representative of a judicial person which is the adverse
party
When the witness is not voluntarily offered but is required by law to be presented by the proponent, as in
the case of a subscribing witness to a will
 Party can impeach his own witness only by:
1. evidence contradictory to his testimony
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
 In case of hostile/adverse party/involuntary witnesses – can also be
impeached by other modes of impeachment
WHY CAN'T you impeach your own witness?
It's just a waste of time! This may be a good delaying tactic though (uh-oh)
IMPEACHMENT
-you attack the witness of the adverse party so that the court would not give any weight or
probative value to the testimony of a witness
-you only impeach the witness ALREADY PRESENTED!
Refer to last paragraph: Why can't a party presenting a hostile witness/adverse party impeach
the party by giving evidence of his bad character?
Prevent prejudice to the accused

IF THE WITNESS ALREADY HOSTILE BEFORE YOU CALL HIM TO THE WITNESS STAND, CAN YOU
DECLARE HIM A HOSTILE WITNESS?
YES. Para sure, under unjustified reluctance to testify!

Section 13 - HOW WITNESS IMPEACHED BY EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony,
(eto na: LAYING THE PREDICATE)
the statements must be related to him,
with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and
he must be asked whether he made such statements, and
if so, allowed to explain them.
If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness
before any question is put to him concerning them.
 “Laying the predicate”

 By confronting him with such statements, with the circumstances under which they
were made
 By asking him whether he made such statement
 By giving him a chance to explain the inconsistency
 Impeachment is incomplete if witness is not given the chance to explain the
discrepancy
 But defect is waived if no objection on that ground is raised when the
document involved is offered for admission
 No need to lay the predicate if the prior inconsistent statement appears in a deposition
of the adverse party and not a mere witness
 Statements are in the nature of an admission
 Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. vs. Hashim (50 Phil 132): Where previous statements
of a witness are offered as evidence of an admission, and not merely to impeach him, the rule on
laying the predicate does not apply
WHY LAY THE PREDICATE IN PIS, not in CE? So that the witness must be given an opportunity to
explain
CARAPEN v. PPL (?):
If a person made A, then now B, it's possible that A was made through a mistake. If the reason
for the inconsistency is reasonable (thus W explains), the judge could still give weight to his
statement
orje vs Sandiganbayan
(case #11)
Borje, a provincial plant officer of the bureau of plant industry in LaUnion, was accused of the crime of
falsification of public document.Herein complainant Ducusin alleged that the petitioner took
advantageof his position in falsifying the time book and payroll of his office for theperiods January to
March 1977, daily time record of Ducusin by making itappear that Ducusin participated in the same and
affixed his signatures,when in fact he did not sign the documents, in order to receive P225which was
supposed to have been received by Ducusin.To prove that Borje committed the crime, the prosecutor
presented
several documents such as: the time book and payro;; of the accused’s
office for the period of January to March 1977; the daily time record forthe same period of Rodrigo
Ducusin and the certification that Ducusinwas detailed to the program.On appeal, Borje argued that
proof beyond reasonable doubt was notestablished since; a. the originals of the alleged falsified
documents werenot presented in court hence, the corpus delicti was not established asheld in US vs
Gregorio and; b. there is no iota of evidence that the
petitioner falsified the complainant’s signature on the alleged falsified
documents.
ISSUE:
1.
WON Ducusin’s testimony with regard to his non
-participation inthe program is admissible2.
WON the presentation of the photocopies of the falsifieddocuments is enough to prove the crime of
falsification of publicdocuments
HELD:
1.
No. The alleged verbal order is doubtful for under normal andusual official procedure, a written special
order issued by a
government office is cancelled, amended or modified only byanother written special order, not only for
purposes of record onfile but also to prevent conflict and confusion in governmentoperations.
Moreover, under the best evidence rule, Section 2,Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the supposed verbal
order cannotprevail over the written Special Order No. 172 which lists Ducusinin the payroll for the
program.
2.
No. In U.S. vs Gregorio, it was held that:In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it
isindispensable that the judges and the courts have beforethem the document alleged to have been
simulated,counterfeited or falsified, in order that they may find,pursuant to the evidence produced at
the trial, whetheror not the crime of falsification was actually committed;in the absence of the original
document, it is improper toconclude, with only a copy of the said original in view,that there has been a
falsification of a document whichwas neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case,even the
existence of such original document may bedoubted.The SB is incorrect to dismiss the ruling in the
Gregoriocase. Firstly the
Gregorio
ruling makes no distinction forthe doctrine itself applies in criminal proceedings for thefalsification of a
document, whether simulated,counterfeited, or falsified. Secondly, the
Gregorio
doctrine is still tenable notwithstanding modern copyingdevices for a falsified document, passed off as
an originalcan also be duplicated by xeroxing and thereafter,certified as true copy of the original. And
thirdly,considering that in the case at bar, the xeroxing wasdone or caused to be done by complainant
Ducusin aftertaking out the original documents without the officialauthority and permission of the
Disbursing Officer andCashier, Remedios Lorenzo, who was then out on ruralservice and thereafter the
originals were lost, misplacedand are now missing, the failure to present the originalsis suspicious for
complainant had ulterior and ill motivesin accusing the petitioner Borje.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[G.R. No. 119619. December 13, 1996.]
RICHARD HIZON, SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO,

RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK, EFREN DELA PENA,
JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO VILLAVERDE, ANGELITO DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES
ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA, FRANCISCO ESTREMOS, ANGEL VILLAVERDE,
NEMESIO CASAMPOL, RICHARD ESTREMOS, JORNIE DELA PENA, JESUS
MACTAN, MARLON CAMPORAZO, FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS
DUARTE, JOSEPH AURELIO, RONNIE JUEZAN. BERNARDO VILLACARLOS,
RICARDO SALES, MARLON ABELLA, TEODORO DELOS REYES, IGNACIO ABELLA,
JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO LANGUYOD, DODONG DELOS REYES, JOLLY
CABALLERO and ROPLANDO ARCENAS, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 15417 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Palawan in Criminal Case No. 10429 convicting petitioners of the offense of illegal
fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance penalized under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975.
In an Information dated October 15, 1992, petitioners were charged with a violation of
P.D. 704 committed as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 30th day of September 1992, at Brgy. San Rafael, Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by First
Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by Richard Hizon, a domestic
corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, being then the owner,
crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson and with the use of said fishing boat, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another catch, take or gather or cause
to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery aquatic products in the coastal waters of
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance
(sodium cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes which were illegally
caught thru the use of obnoxious/poisonous substance (sodium cyanide)." 1
The following facts were established by the prosecution: In September 1992, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan
received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. In
response to these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist
the police in the detection and apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing.
On September 30, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, the Task Force Bantay Dagat
reported to the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and several small crafts were
fishing by "muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa.
The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members of the Task Force Bantay
Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the area and found
several men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B
Robinson within the seven-kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded the F/B
Robinson and inspected the boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio
Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the police saw two foreigners in the captain’s
deck. SPO3 Enriquez examined their passports and found them to be mere photocopies.
The police also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish
weighing approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. 2 They checked the license
of the boat and its fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SPO3
Enriquez brought the boat captain, the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for
further investigation.
At the city harbor, members of the Maritime Command were ordered by SPO3 Enriquez
to guard the F/B Robinson. The boat captain and the two foreigners were again
interrogated at the PNP Maritime Command office. Thereafter, an
Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the boat, its crew and fishermen
were charged with the following violations: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Conducting fishing operations within Puerto Princesa coastal waters without mayor’s
permit;
2. Employing excess fishermen on board (Authorized — 26; On board — 36);
3. Two (2) Hongkong nationals on board without original passports." 3
The following day, October 1, 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get
random samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for laboratory examination.
As instructed, the boat engineer, petitioner Ernesto Andaya, delivered to the Maritime
Office four (4) live lapu-lapu fish inside a plastic shopping bag filled with water. SPO3
Enriquez received the fish and in the presence of the boat engineer and captain, placed
them inside a large transparent plastic bag without water. He sealed the plastic with
heat from a lighter. 4
The specimens were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) sub-office in
the city for examination "to determine the method of catching the same for record or
evidentiary purposes." 5 They were received at the NBI office at 8:00 in the evening of
the same day. The receiving clerk, Edna Capicio, noted that the fish were dead and she
placed the plastic bag with the fish inside the office freezer to preserve them. Two days
later, on October 3, 1992, the chief of the NBI sub-office, Onos Mangotara, certified the
specimens for laboratory examination at the NBI Head Office in Manila. The fish
samples were to be personally transported by Edna Capicio who was then scheduled to
leave for Manila for her board examination in Criminology. 6 On October 4, 1992, Ms.
Capicio, in the presence of her chief, took the plastic with the specimens from the
freezer and placed them inside two shopping bags and sealed them with masking tape.
She proceeded to her ship where she placed the specimens in the ship’s freezer.
Capicio arrived in Manila the following day, October 5, 1992 and immediately brought
the specimens to the NBI Head Office. On October 7, 1992, NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia
Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish samples and found that they contained
sodium cyanide, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"FINDINGS: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Weight of Specimen.. . . . 1.870 kilograms Examinations made on the above-mentioned

specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS to the test for the presence of SODIUM CYANIDE. . .
."
REMARKS: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sodium Cyanide is a violent poison." 7
In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City filed the
complaint at bar against the owner and operator of the F/B Robinson, the First
Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by herein petitioner Richard Hizon, the
boat captain, Silverio Gargar, the boat engineer, Ernesto Andaya, two other crew
members, the two Hongkong nationals and 28 fishermen of the said boat.
Petitioners were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. As defense, they
claimed that they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Industries, Inc., a
domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing. They alleged that they catch fish by
the hook and line method and that they had used this method for one month and a half
in the waters of Cuyo Island. They related that on September 30, 1992 at about 7:00
A.M., they anchored the F/B Robinson in the east of Podiado Island in Puerto Princesa
City. The boat captain and the fishermen took out and boarded their sampans to fish for
their food. They were still fishing in their sampans at 4:00 P.M. when a rubber boat
containing members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay Dagat
approached them and boarded the F/B Robinson. The policemen were in uniform while
the Bantay Dagat personnel were in civilian clothes. They were all armed with guns.
One of the Bantay Dagat personnel introduced himself as Commander Jun Marcelo and
he inspected the boat and the boat’s documents. Marcelo saw the two foreigners and
asked for their passports. As their passports were photocopies, Marcelo demanded for
their original. The captain explained that the original passports were with the
company’s head office in Manila. Marcelo angrily insisted for the originals and
threatened to arrest everybody. He then ordered the captain, his crew and the
fishermen to follow him to Puerto Princesa. He held the magazine of his gun and
warned the captain "Sige, huwag kang tatakas, kung hindi babarilin ko kayo!" 8 The
captain herded all his men into the boat and followed Marcelo and the police to Puerto
Princesa.
They arrived at the city harbor at 7:45 in the evening and were met by members of the
media. As instructed by Marcelo, the members of the media interviewed and took
pictures of the boat and the fishermen. 9
The following day, October 1, 1992, at 8:00 in the morning, Amado Villanueva, one of
the fishermen at the F/B Robinson, was instructed by a policeman guarding the boat to
get five (5) fish samples from the fish cage and bring them to the pier. Villanueva
inquired whether the captain knew about the order but the guard replied he was taking
responsibility for it. Villanueva scooped five pieces of lapu-lapu, placed them inside a
plastic bag filled with water and brought the bag to the pier. The boat engineer, Ernesto
Andaya, received the fish and delivered them to the PNP Maritime Office. Nobody was in
the office and Andaya waited for the apprehending officers and the boat captain. Later,
one of the policemen in the office instructed him to leave the bag and hang it on a nail
in the -wall. Andaya did as he was told and returned to the boat at 10:00 A.M. 10
In the afternoon of the same day, the boat captain arrived at the Maritime office. He
brought along a representative from their head office in Manila who showed the police
and the Bantay Dagat personnel the original passports of the Hongkong nationals and
other pertinent documents of the F/B Robinson and its crew. Finding the documents in
order, Marcelo approached the captain and whispered to him "Tandaan mo ito, kapitan,
kung makakaalis ka dito, magkikita pa rin uli tayo sa dagat, kung hindi kayo lulubog ay
palulutangin ko kayo!" It was then that SPO3 Enriquez informed the captain that some
members of the Maritime Command, acting under his instructions, had just taken five
(5) pieces of lapu-lapu from the boat. SPO3 Enriquez showed the captain the fish
samples. Although the captain saw only four (4) pieces of lapu-lapu, he did not utter a
word of protest. 11 Under Marcelo’s threat, he signed the "Certification" that he
received only four (4) pieces of the fish. 12
Two weeks later, the information was filed against petitioners. The case was prosecuted
against thirty-one (31) of the thirty-five (35) accused. Richard Hizon remained at large
while the whereabouts of Richard Estremos, Marlon Camporazo and Joseph Aurelio were
unknown.
On July 9, 1993, the trial court found the thirty one (31) petitioners guilty and
sentenced them to imprisonment for a minimum of eight (8) years and one (1) day to a
maximum of nine (9) years and four (4) months. The court also ordered the
confiscation and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson, the 28 sampans and the ton of assorted
live fishes as instruments and proceeds of the offense, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused

SILVERIO GARGAR, ERNESTO ANDAYA, NEMESIO GABO, RODRIGO ABRERA, CHEUNG
TAI FOOK, SHEK CHOR LUK, EFREN DELA PENA, JONEL AURELIO, GODOFREDO
VILLAVERDE, ANGELITO DUMAYBAG, DEOMEDES ROSIL, AMADO VILLANUEVA,
FRANCISCO ESTREMOS, ARNEL VILLAVERDE, NEMESIO CASAMPOL, JORNIE
DELACRUZ, JESUS MACTAN, FERNANDO BIRING, MENDRITO CARPO, LUIS DUARTE,
RONNIE JUEZAN, BERNARDO VILLACARLOS, RICHARD SALES, MARLON ABELLA,
TEODORO DELOS REYES, IGNACIO ABELLA, JOSEPH MAYONADO, JANAIRO LANGUYOD,
DODONG DELOS REYES, ROLANDO ARCENAS and JOLLY CABALLERO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance commonly known as sodium cyanide, committed in violation of section 33
and penalized in section 38 of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended, and there
being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances appreciated and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the aforenamed accused is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from a minimum of
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to a maximum of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 45, in relation to the second sentence of Article 10
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) Fishing Boat (F/B) Robinson;
b) The 28 motorized fiberglass sampans; and
c) The live fishes in the fish cages installed in the F/B Robinson, all of which have been
respectively shown to be tools or instruments and proceeds of the offense, are hereby
ordered confiscated and declared forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED." 13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioners contend that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MERE "POSITIVE
RESULTS TO THE TEST FOR THE PRESENCE OF SODIUM CYANIDE" IN THE FISH
SPECIMEN, ALBEIT ILLEGALLY SEIZED ON THE OCCASION OF A WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND ARREST, IS ADMISSIBLE AND SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR THE PETITIONERS’
CONVICTION OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL FISHING.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE STATUTORY
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UNDER SEC. 33 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 704 CANNOT
PREVAIL AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, SUCH THAT
THE GRAVAMEN OF THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL FISHING MUST STILL BE PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF

THE TRIAL COURT AND ACQUITTING THE PETITIONERS." 14
The Solicitor General submitted a "Manifestation in Lieu of Comment" praying for

petitioners’ acquittal. 15
The petitioners, with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, primarily question the
admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless search of the
fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners. More concretely, they contend
that the NBI finding of sodium cyanide in the fish specimens should not have been
admitted and considered by the trial court because the fish samples were seized from
the F/B Robinson without a search warrant.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a
judicial warrant. 16 As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant
is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to
certain exceptions. Some of these are: 17 (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; 18
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving motor vehicle; 19 and (4)
search in violation of customs laws. 20
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of
customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor
vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search
warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have
not required a search warrant of vessels and aircrafts before their search and seizure
can be constitutionally effected. 21
The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching
our fishery laws. These vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable
them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other
government authorities enforcing our fishery laws. 22
We thus hold as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat
suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the
course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court. Moreover, petitioners
failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived their right to question any
irregularity that may have attended the said search and seizure. 23
Given the evidence admitted by the trial court, the next question now is whether
petitioners are guilty of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous
substances. Again, the petitioners, joined by the Solicitor General, submit that the
prosecution evidence cannot convict them.
We agree.
Petitioners were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D.
704 24 which provide as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 33. Illegal fishing, illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing;
dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. — It shall be unlawful for any
person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or
fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (l), (m) and
(d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such
explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be
punishable as hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon
recommendation of the Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he
deems necessary, allow for research, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or gather fish
or fishery/aquatic products in the specified area: Provided, further, That the use of
chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific
fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in neighboring waters shall not be
construed as the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this
section: Provided, finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales,
crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the
approval of the Secretary.
It shall, likewise, be unlawful for any person knowingly to possess, deal in, sell or in
any manner dispose of, for profit, any fish or fishery/aquatic products which have been
illegally caught, taken or gathered.
The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds containing

combustible elements, or obnoxious or poisonous substance, or equipment or device for
electric fishing in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman shall constitute a
presumption that the same were used for fishing in violation of this Decree, and the
discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious
or poisonous substance or by electricity shall constitute a presumption that the owner,
operator or fisherman were fishing with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substance or electricity."
x x x
Sec. 38. Penalties. — (a) For illegal fishing and dealing in illegally caught fish or
fishery/aquatic products. — Violation of Section 33 hereof shall be punished as follows:
virtual 1aw library
chanrob1es
x x x
(2) By imprisonment from eight (8) to ten (10) years, if obnoxious or poisonous
substances are used: Provided, That if the use of such substances results 1) in physical
injury to any person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from ten (10) to twelve (12)
years, or 2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from
twenty (20) years to life or death;"
x x x."25 cralaw:red
The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes or gathers or
causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine
waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious or poisonous substances. The
law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when: (a) explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are found
in a fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed
with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are
found in a fishing boat. Under these instances, the boat owner, operator or fishermen
are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.
Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the Fisheries Decree violates
the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. 26 As early as 1916, this
Court has rejected this argument by holding that: 27
"In some States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as common law
offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The
state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well-defined
limitations, has the right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as
what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the
defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not
committed with any criminal intent or intention." 28
The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is

generally conceded that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain
facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt of the accused and then shift the
burden of proof to the accused provided there is a rational connection between the facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed. 29 To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the
inference of one from proof of the other must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. 30 In
fine, the presumption must be based on facts and these facts must be part of the crime
when committed. 31
The third paragraph of section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on
facts proved and hence is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of
obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices for electric fishing, or of fish
caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and poisonous substances, explosives or
electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman evidence that the
owner and operator of the fishing boat or the fisherman had used such substances in
catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or
the fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise
from the discovery of the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the
fisherman in the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact
proved. 32
We stress, however, that the statutory presumption is merely prima facie. 33 It can
not, under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the
accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main fact presumed. 34 At no
instance can the accused be denied the right to rebut the presumption, 35 thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of men.
But the experience of men has taught them that an apparently guilty possession may
be explained so as to rebut such an inference and an accused person may therefore put
witnesses on the stand or go on the witness stand himself to explain his possession,
and any reasonable explanation of his possession, inconsistent with his guilty
connection with the commission of the crime, will rebut the inference as to his guilt
which the prosecution seeks to have drawn from his guilty possession of the stolen
goods." 36
We now review the evidence to determine whether petitioners have successfully

rebutted this presumption. The facts show that on November 13, 1992, after the
Information was filed in court and petitioners granted bail, petitioners moved that the
fish specimens taken from the F/B Robinson be reexamined. 37 The trial court granted
the motion. 38 As prayed for, a member of the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto
Princesa, in the presence of authorized representatives of the F/B Robinson, the NBI
and the local Fisheries Office, took at random five (5) live lapu-lapu from the fish cage
of the boat. The specimens were packed in the usual manner of transporting live fish,
taken aboard a commercial flight and delivered by the same representatives to the NBI
Head Office in Manila for chemical analysis.
On November 23, 1992, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of the NBI in Manila
conducted three (3) tests on the specimens and found the fish negative for the
presence of sodium cyanide, 39 thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Gross weight of specimen = 3.849 kg.
Examinations made on the above-mentioned specimens gave NEGATIVE RESULTS to

the tests for the presence of SODIUM CYANIDE." 40
The Information charged petitioners with illegal fishing "with the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance (sodium cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of assorted live
fishes." There was more or less one ton of fishes in the F/B Robinson’s fish cage. It was
from this fish cage that the four dead specimens examined on October 7, 1992 and the
five live specimens examined on November 23, 1992 were taken. Though all the
specimens came from the same source allegedly tainted with sodium cyanide, the two
tests resulted in conflicting findings. We note that after its apprehension, the F/B
Robinson never left the custody of the PNP Maritime Command. The fishing boat was
anchored near the city harbor and was guarded by members of the Maritime Command.
41 It was later turned over to the custody of the Philippine Coast Guard Commander of
Puerto Princesa City. 42
The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples and this
omission raises a reasonable doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught
with the use of sodium cyanide.
The absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports petitioners’ claim
that they did not use the poison in fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes by
the ordinary and legal way, i.e., by hook and line on board their sampans . This claim is
buttressed by the prosecution evidence itself. The apprehending officers saw petitioners
fishing by hook and line when they came upon them in the waters of Barangay San
Rafael. One of the apprehending officers, SPO1 Demetrio Saballuca, testified as
follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ATTY. TORREFRANCA ON CROSS-EXAMINATION: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q : I get your point therefore, that the illegal fishing supposedly conducted at San
Rafael is a moro ami type of fishing [that] occurred into your mind and that was made
to understand by the Bantay Dagat personnel?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Upon reaching the place, you and the pumpboat, together with the two Bantay
Dagat personnel were SPO3 Romulo Enriquez and Mr. Benito Marcelo and SPO1 Marzan,
you did not witness that kind of moro ami fishing, correct?
A : None, sir.
Q : In other words, there was negative activity of moro ami type of fishing on
September 30, 1992 at 4:00 in the afternoon at San Rafael?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And what you saw were 5 motorized sampans with fishermen each doing a hook
and line fishing type?
A : Yes, sir. More or less they were five.
Q : And despite the fact you had negative knowledge of this moro ami type of fishing,
SPO3 Enriquez together with Mr. Marcelo boarded the vessel just the same?
A : Yes, sir.
x x x" 43
The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find any sodium
cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did they find any trace of
the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the fish cage itself. An Inventory
was prepared by the apprehending officers and only the following items were found on
board the boat: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ITEMS QUANTITY REMARKS
F/B Robinson (1) unit operating
engine (1) unit ICE-900-BHP
sampans 28 units fiberglass
outboard motors 28 units operating
assorted fishes more or less 1 ton live
hooks and lines assorted
x x x" 44
We cannot overlook the fact that the apprehending officers assorted hooks and lines for
catching fish. 45 For this obvious reason, the Inspection/Apprehension Report prepared
by the apprehending officers immediately after the search did not charge petitioners
with illegal fishing, much less illegal fishing with the use of poison or any obnoxious
substance. 46
The only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the
first NBI laboratory test on the four fish specimens. Under the circumstances of the
case, however, this finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in
the F/B Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of
sodium cyanide.
Prosecution witness SPO1 Bernardino Visto testified that for the first laboratory test,
boat engineer Ernesto Andaya did not only get four (4) samples of fish but actually got
five (5) from the fish cage of the F/B Robinson. 47 The Certification that four (4) fish
samples were taken from the boat shows on its face the number of pieces as originally
"five (5)" but this was erased with correction fluid and "four (4)" written over it. 48 The
specimens were taken, sealed inside the plastic bag and brought to Manila by the police
authorities in the absence of petitioners or their representative. SPO2 Enriquez testified
that the same plastic bag containing the four specimens was merely sealed with heat
from a lighter. 49 Emilia Rosaldes, the NBI forensic chemist who examined the
samples, testified that when she opened the package, she found the two ends of the
same plastic bag knotted. 50 These circumstances as well as the time interval from the
taking of the fish samples and their actual examination 51 fail to assure the impartial
mind that the integrity of the specimens had been properly safeguarded.
Apparently, the members of the PNP Maritime Command and the Task Force Bantay
Dagat were the ones engaged in an illegal fishing expedition. As sharply observed by
the Solicitor General, the report received by the Task Force Bantay Dagat was that a
fishing boat was fishing illegally through "muro ami" on the waters of San Rafael. "Muro
ami" according to SPO1 Saballuca is made with net with sinkers to make the net
submerge in the water with the fishermen surround[ing] the net." 52 This method of
fishing needs approximately two hundred (200) fishermen to execute. 53 What the
apprehending officers instead discovered were twenty eight (28) fishermen in their
sampans fishing by hook and line. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would
have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the
fishermen were in order. It was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under
suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing with the use
of poisonous substances.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 15417 is reversed and set aside. Petitioners are acquitted of the crime
of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances defined under Section 33 of
Republic Act No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Information, Records, pp. 1-2.
2. TSN of February 1, 1993, pp. 16-22.
3. Exhibit "C," "C-5." cralaw virtua1aw library
4. Exhibit "F;" TSN of February 1, 1993, pp. 39-40; TSN of February 2, 1993, pp. 13-
16.
5. Exhibit "G." cralaw virtua1aw library
6. Exhibit "N," Exhibit "8;" TSN of March 11, 1993, p. 9.
7. Exhibit "I," "I-7." cralaw virtua1aw library
8. TSN of April 25, 1993, pp. 4-19; TSN of April 22, 1993, pp. 14-16.
9. TSN of March 23, 1993, pp. 15-16 TSN of April 22, 1993, p. 17; TSN of April 25,
1993, pp. 19-23.
10. TSN of March 23, 1993, pp. 19-21; TSN of March 24, 1993, pp. 3-12.
11. TSN of April 25, 1993, pp. 25-31.
12. Id., pp. 30-31; Exhibit "F" and Exhibit "4." cralaw virtua1aw library
13. Decision, pp. 21-22, Records, pp. 264-265.
14. Petition, p. 8, Rollo, p. 16.
15. Manifestation, pp. 13-20, Rollo, pp. 80-87.
16. Article III, Sections 2 and 3 [2]
17. People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122, 128 [1991]; Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
143 SCRA 267, 276 [1986].
18. 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, section 5.
19. People v. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63, 69 [1992]; People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra, at 126-
128.
20. Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336 [1975]; Magoncia v Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, 774 [1948];
Papa v. Mago, SCRA 857, 871-874 [1968].
21. Papa v. Mago, supra, at 873.
22. Roldan, Jr. v. Arca, supra, at 348.
23. People v. Exala, 221 SCRA 494, 499 [1993]; and Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 373, 382 [1991] on waiver of objection to the legality of the search and the
admissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search; People v. Lopez, Jr., 245
SCRA 95,105 [1995]; People v. Rivera, 245 SCRA 421, 430 [1995]; and People v.
Codilla, 224 SCRA 104, 117 [1993] on waiver of objection to the warrantless arrest.
24. as amended by P.D. 1058.
25. Emphasis supplied.
26. Article III, section 14 (2).
27. United States v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725, reiterating and expounding the ruling in
United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303 [1910]; Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional
Limitations, vol. 1, 639-641 [1927]; see also People Mingoa, 92 Phil. 857, 858 [1953].
28. United States v. Luling, supra, at 728.
29. Underhill, A Treatise on the Law of Criminal Evidence, vol. 1, pp. 76-77 [1956]; see
also Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at
Common Law, vol. 9, pp. 423-424 [1940].
30. Underhill, supra;
31. Underhill, supra, at 76, citing People v. Marcello, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 533; People v.
Mingoa, 92 Phil. 857, 859.
32. People v. Mingoa, supra; United States v. Catimbang, 35 Phil. 367, 371-372
[1916].
33. Conclusive statutory presumptions are generally held unconstitutional (Underhill,

supra, at 76 citing State v. Kelly, 218 Minn. 247, 15 N.W. 2d 554, 162 A.L.R. 477;
Kellogg v. Murphy, 349 Mo. 1165, 164 S.W. 2d 285; Miller v. Commonwealth, 172 Va.
639, 2 S.E. 2d 343).
34. Underhill, supra.
35. People v. Mingoa, supra, at 859.
36. United States v. Catimbang, supra, at 371-372; This case involved stolen cattle
found in the possession of the accused.
37. Records, pp. 67-69.
38. Id., pp. 71-73; Exhibit "14." cralaw virtua1aw library
39. TSN of March 26, 1993, pp. 22, 28.
40. Exhibit "16." cralaw virtua1aw library
41. TSN of March 10, 1993, pp. 63-64.
42. Records, p. 79.
43. TSN of March 10, 1993, pp. 29-31.
44. Exhibit "D." cralaw virtua1aw library
46. Exhibit "C" .
47. TSN of March 9, 1993, p. 9.
48. Exhibit "F," "F-3;" Exhibit "4." cralaw virtua1aw library
49. TSN of February 2, 1993, p. 14.
51. Six days.
52. TSN of March 10, 1993, p. 26; TSN of February 1, 1993, p. 66.
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 163, Series of 1986 "Prohibiting the Operation of
‘Muro-Ami’ and ‘Kayakas’ in all Philippine Waters" defines "muro-ami" as: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 1 (a)." ‘Muro-ami’ or drive-in-net means a Japanese fishing gear used in reef
fishing which consists of a movable bagnet and two detachable wings effecting the
capture of fish by spreading the net in an arc form around reefs or shoals and with the
aid of scaring devices, a cordon of fishermen drive the fish from the reefs toward the
bag portion of the whole net." (82 O.G. No. 48, 5052 Dec. 1, 1986).
53. TSN of March 10, 1993, p. 28.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
G.R. No. 234448, November 06, 2018
PRIVATE HOSPITALS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (PHAPI)

REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. RUSTICO JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. HON.
SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE ACTING SECRETARY
OF DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondents.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
On grounds of denial of substantive due process, repugnancy to the constitutional

presumption of innocence, violation of the equal protection and involuntary servitude
clauses, petitioner Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc., (PHAPi) - an
organization of privately-owned clinics, hospitals, and other health facilities - seeks to
declare as unconstitutional and void the duty imposed upon hospitals, medical
practitioners and employees to prevent actual death or injury under Section 1; the
penal provisions under Section 4; the presumption of liability clause under Section 5;
and the reimbursement and tax deduction clause under Sections 7 and 8, all of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 109321 otherwise known as an Act Strengthening the Anti-Hospital
Deposit Law.
The Antecedents
In 1984, Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 702 entitled An Act Prohibiting the Demand of
Deposits or Advance Payments for the Confinement or Treatment of Patients in
Hospitals and Medical Clinics in Certain Cases was enacted. BP 702 was described as a
landmark legislative measure that aimed to stop the practice of hospitals and medical
clinics of asking for deposits or advance payments for treatment or confinement of
patients in emergency and serious cases.2
Essentially, BP 702 makes it unlawful for any director, manager or any other officer of a
hospital or medical clinic to demand any deposit or any other form of advance payment
for confinement or treatment in such hospital or medical clinic in emergency or serious
cases.3 BP 702 penalizes such erring director, manager or any other officer of a hospital
or medical clinic with a fine of not less than one thousand pesos but not more than two
thousand pesos or imprisonment for not less than fifteen days but not more than thirty
days, or both such fine and imprisonment. 4
On August 25, 1997, BP 702 was amended by R.A. No. 8344. 5 R.A. No. 8344 makes it
unlawful not only to demand, but also to request, solicit, and accept any deposit or
advance payment as a prerequisite for confinement or medical treatment in emergency
or serious cases. R.A. No. 8344 further makes the refusal to administer medical
treatment and support as dictated by good practice of medicine to prevent death or
permanent disability unlawful. In case the hospital or the medical clinic has no
adequate medical capabilities, R.A. No. 8344 outlines the procedure for the transfer of
the patient to a facility where appropriate care can be given. 6 Under a new provision,
R.A. No. 8344 allows the transfer of the patient to an appropriate hospital consistent
with the latter's needs after the hospital or medical clinic has administered medical
treatment and support.7
R.A. No. 8344 also provides the following governing definitions for purposes of the law:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) Emergency - a condition or state of a patient wherein based on the objective

findings of a prudent medical officer on duty for the day there is immediate danger and
where delay in initial support and treatment may cause loss of life or cause permanent
disability to the patient.
(b) Serious case - refers to a condition of a patient characterized by gravity or danger

wherein based on the objective findings of a prudent medical officer on duty for the day
when left unattended to, may cause loss of life or cause permanent disability to the
patient.
(c) Confinement - a state of being admitted in a hospital or medical clinic for medical
observation, diagnosis, testing, and treatment consistent with the capability and
available facilities of the hospital or clinic.
(d) Hospital - a facility devoted primarily to the diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury or deformity, or in need of obstetrical
or other medical and nursing care. It shall also be construed as any institution, building
or place where there are facilities and personnel for the continued and prolonged care
of patients.
(e) Emergency treatment and support - any medical or surgical measure within the
capability of the hospital or medical clinic that is administered by qualified health care
professionals to prevent the death or permanent disability of a patient.
(f) Medical clinic - a place in which patients can avail of medical consultation or
treatment on an outpatient basis.
(g) Permanent disability - a condition of physical disability as defined under Article 192-
C and Article 193-B and C of Presidential Decree No. 442; as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.
(h) Stabilize - the provision of necessary care until such time that the patient may be
discharged or transferred to another hospital or clinic with a reasonable probability that
no physical deterioration would result from or occur during such discharge or transfer.
R.A. No. 8344 also increased the penalties prescribed under BP 702 to imprisonment of
not less than six months and one day but not more than two years and four months, or
a fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos, but not more than one hundred
thousand pesos, or both at the discretion of the court. However, if the violation was
committed pursuant to an established hospital or clinic policy or upon the instruction of
its management, the director or officer responsible for the formulation and
implementation of such policy shall suffer imprisonment of four to six years, or a fine of
not less than one hundred thousand pesos, but not more than five hundred thousand
pesos, or both, at the court's discretion. 8
Sensing the need to curb the still prevalent practice of refusing to provide initial medical
treatment and support in emergency or serious cases without the corresponding deposit
or advance payment, House Bill No. 51599 was submitted by the House Committee on
Health which seeks to increase the penalties for violation of BP 702 as amended by R.A.
No. 8344; expand the definition of "emergency care" to include women in active labor
and at the risk of miscarriage or fetal distress; include reimbursement from the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) for the expenses advanced by
hospitals and medical facilities in treating poor and indigent patients; and mandate the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to provide assistance to poor and
marginalized patients on emergency treatment in hospitals. 10
This development met similar support from the Senate through Senate Bill No.
135311 submitted by its Committees on Health and Demography, Justice and Human
Rights, and Ways and Means. Similar to its lower house counterpart, Senate Bill No.
1353 aims to increase the penalties for violation of the law; define "basic emergency
care"; and include PhilHealth reimbursement of basic emergency care incurred by the
hospital or medical clinic. However, peculiar to the Senate version is the presumption of
liability imposed against the hospital, medical clinic, and the involved official, medical
practitioner, or employee in the event of death, permanent disability, serious
impairment of the health condition of the patient, or injury to or loss of the unborn child
proceeding from the denial of admission to the health facility pursuant to a policy or
practice of demanding deposits or advance payments for confinement or treatment.
A consolidation of Senate Bill No. 1353 and House Bill No. 5159 gave birth to R.A. No.
10932 which was signed into law on August 3, 2017.
Thus, as it presently stands, R.A. No. 10932 makes it unlawful to request, solicit,
demand or accept deposit or advance payment as a prerequisite not only for
confinement or medical treatment but also for administering basic emergency care. 12 It
expands the scope of "basic emergency care" to include medical procedures and
treatment administered to a woman in active labor.13
In case a transfer to another hospital is deemed appropriate, R.A. No. 10932 further
mandates the local government unit where the hospital or medical clinic is located to
allow free use of its emergency medical vehicle. Moreover, all hospitals are required to
post a notice indicating its classification level and the list of medical services it is
authorized to perform.14
R.A. No. 10932 also introduces the creation of a Health Facilities Oversight Board
(Board) where complaints against health facilities for violations of the law shall be
initially filed. The Board is given the power to investigate, adjudicate and impose
administrative sanctions including the revocation of the health facility's license. 15
Further to the matter of penalties, R.A. No. 10932 imposes upon an erring official,
medical practitioner or employee of the hospital or medical clinic the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and one (1) day but not more than two
(2) years and four (4) months, or a fine of not less than P100,000.00, but not more
than P300,000.00, or both at the court's discretion. However, when the violation was
made pursuant to an established hospital policy or upon instructions of its
management, the penalties are increased as against the director or officer formulating
and implementing such policy to four (4) years to six (6) years, or a fine of not less
than P500,000.00, but not more than P1,000,000.00, or both, without prejudice to an
award for damages.16
In addition, R.A. No. 10932 introduces the three-strike rule, or when upon 3 repeated
violations committed pursuant .to an established policy or upon instruction of the
management, the health facility's license to operate shall be revoked by the
Department of Health (DOH). The law also makes the president, chairman, board of
directors, or trustees and other officers of the health facility solidarily liable for
damages.17
Apart from the foregoing, R.A. No. 10932 presumes liability against the hospital,
medical clinic, and the official, medical practitioner, or employee involved, in the event
of death, permanent disability, serious impairment or permanent injury to or loss of an
unborn child, proceeding from the denial of admission to a health facility pursuant to a
policy of requiring deposits or advance payments for confinement or treatment. 18
R.A. No. 10932 also mandates that the PhilHealth reimburse the cost of the basic
emergency care and transportation services rendered by the hospital or medical clinic
to poor and indigent patients and that the PCSO provide medical assistance for the
basic emergency care needs of the poor and marginalized groups. Expenses incurred in
giving basic emergency care to poor and indigent patients not reimbursed by PhilHealth
are allowed to be treated as tax deductions. 19
Meanwhile, pending resolution of the instant petition or on April 4, 2018, the DOH
issued Administrative Order No. 2018-0012 implementing R.A. No. 10932.
The Arguments for the Petitioner
Petitioner claims locus standi to file the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as

it stands to be directly injured by the implementation of R.A. No. 10932 insofar as the
law regulates the conduct of its members and places the latter's management and staff
at the risk of administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions. 20 At any event, petitioner
claims that the issues herein presented specifically on the denial of due process and to
equal protection of laws are of transcendental importance that should allow the present
petition to prosper despite the absence of direct injury. 21
Petitioner further claims that the issues raised in the instant petition are ripe for
adjudication given the imminent threat of the imposition of the unconstitutional duties
and the corresponding unconstitutional sanctions under R.A. No. 10932 against
petitioner's members with the impending approval of the rules implementing R.A. No.
10932.22 Petitioner also argues that an allegation that R.A. No. 10932 infringes upon
the constitutional rights to due process, equal protection of laws and the presumption of
innocence, is sufficient to invoke the Court's power of review. 23
Claiming exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, petitioner also advances the
view that direct resort to the Court is justified given the genuine issues of
constitutionality posed by the present petition. 24
Going into the merits of the petition, petitioner seeks to strike down as unconstitutional
R.A. No. 10932 for being unduly oppressive and thus violative of substantive due
process. Elaborating, petitioner argues that Section 1 of BP 702 as amended by R.A.
No. 8344 and R.A. No. 10932 imposes upon the proprietor, president, director,
manager or any other officer, medical practitioner or employee of a health care
institution the duty to administer basic emergency care or medical treatment and
support as dictated by good practice of medicine to prevent death, or permanent
disability, or in the case of a pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn
child, or non-institutional delivery in emergency or serious cases. 25
Petitioner argues that "basic emergency care" and "emergency treatment and support"
as defined under R.A. No. 10932 imposes upon the physician, the hospital, its
management and staff the untenable duties to actually prevent death, permanent
disability, permanent injury to or loss of an unborn baby or its non-institutional delivery
and to sufficiently address an emergency situation and in case of a woman in active
labor, to ensure the safe delivery of the baby. 26 Echoing Lucas, et al. v. Dr.
Tuaño,27 petitioner emphasizes that a physician is not an insurer of the good result of
treatment.28 Petitioner thus argues that the duty imposed by R.A. No. 10932, being
predicated on the achievement of an end that is impossible to guarantee, amounts to a
denial of due process.29
Further, petitioner aims to strike down the fines imposed under Section 4 for being
unjust, excessive, and oppressive as they are not commensurate to the act or omission
that is being penalized.30 Petitioner also questions the solidary liability for damages
under Section 4 insofar as it generally makes "other officers" of the health facility
solidarily liable with the president, chairman, members of the board of directors or
trustees.31
The presumption of liability spelled under Section 5 of R.A. No. 10932 is also being
assailed for being repugnant to the constitutional presumption of innocence. It is the
contention of petitioner that the presumption of liability clause allows for a presumption
of generalized liability, i.e., administrative, civil and criminal, upon the occurrence of
death, permanent disability and serious impairment of the health condition of the
patient or her unborn child after the denial of the patient's admission due to a hospital
policy of demanding deposits or advance payments. 32
Also, petitioner emphasizes that the presumption of liability clause necessarily

presumes that there is, at all times, a causal connection between the injury and the
acts or omissions complained of.33 Expounding on this argument, petitioner argues that
the offense defined under R.A. No. 10932 involves medical malpractice. As such, the
causation between the injury and the medical action are determinable only through the
technical and scientific competence of physicians and thus, cannot be presumed by
law.34
Finally, petitioner seeks to strike down as unconstitutional the exclusion of the basic
emergency care of patients not classified as poor, indigent or marginalized from
PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO assistance and tax deductibility under Sections 7 and
8 of R.A. No. 10932 for being violative of the equal protection clause.
Illustrating its argument, petitioner contends that these provisions would allow a
hospital who treats a poor patient to receive PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO
assistance and tax deduction, and yet the hospital who treats a patient not classified as
poor, indigent or marginalized will not be allowed a similar PhilHealth reimbursement,
PCSO assistance and tax deduction.35 It is likewise the view of petitioner that the law,
insofar as it obliges hospitals, its staff and management to render services to patients
not classified as poor, indigent, or marginalized without the corresponding
reimbursement, assistance and tax deduction, amounts to involuntary servitude. 36
The Arguments for the Respondents
Respondents Hon. Salvador Medialdea, Executive Secretary, and the Acting Secretary of
Department of Health, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seek to
dismiss the instant petition for being procedurally infirm on the ground
that certiorari and prohibition are proper only against judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial act. Like so, respondents seek a dismissal of the petition for lack of a
justiciable controversy in the absence of an actual governmental act which directly
causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged right of petitioner. 37 Respondents
also attacks petitioner's standing to file the present petition for lack of personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy, it being neither a hospital or health facility
itself.38 Further, respondents assert that the issues raised by petitioner being
speculative are not matters of transcendental importance that would justify a disregard
of the rule on locus standi and the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.39
Contrary to petitioner's claims, respondents contend that R.A. No. 10932 does not
impose upon the hospital, medical facility, its staff or management the duty to
guarantee that death, permanent loss or injury is prevented, neither does it penalize
the failure of the physician or the hospital staff to prevent such occurrences. Rather,
respondents argue that what R.A. No. 10932 prohibits is the act of requesting any form
of advance payment as a prerequisite for administering basic emergency care or
medical treatment, or the act of refusing to administer such as dictated by good
practice to prevent death, permanent loss or injury. 40
Also, respondents maintain that the fines imposed under R.A. No. 10932 are
reasonable, and that in any case, the determination of the propriety of fines for
violation of offenses lies within the discretion of the legislature. 41 Respondents add that
neither is the solidary liability imposed by law unreasonable because such arises only
from the participatory acts of the directors and officers who are responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies contrary to the mandates of R.A. No. 10932
and pertains only to damages which may be awarded to the patient-complainant.42
Respondents likewise defend the validity of the presumption of liability clause on the
argument that the liability therein mentioned pertains to the liability for the death,
permanent disability, serious impairment, injury or loss of the unborn child and that
such presumption arises only upon prior proof that there was denial of admission to the
health facility and that such denial was made pursuant to a policy of demanding
deposits for confinement or treatment. 43
Addressing the supposed violation of the equal protection clause, respondents maintain
that patients classified as "poor", "indigent", or "marginalized" substantially differ from
those who are not categorized as such, hence the provision on PhilHealth
reimbursement, PCSO assistance and tax deduction must be upheld in the face of the
equal protection challenge.44
Issues
Before the Court addresses the questions of constitutionality raised against certain
provisions of R.A. No. 10932, it is imperative to first determine whether the Court, in
fact, can discharge its power of judicial review. This is, in turn, determined by
addressing the following issues: (a) are petitions for certiorari and prohibition proper to
assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10932; (b) is direct resort to the Court proper;
(c) has petitioner, as an association of privately-owned hospitals, clinics and other
health facilities, the requisite legal standing; and (c) is the petition ripe for adjudication.
Ruling of the Court
We dismiss the petition. While the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are proper
legal vehicles to assail the constitutionality of a law, the requirements for the exercise
of the Court's judicial review even under its expanded jurisdiction must nevertheless
first be satisfied.
Propriety of Certiorari and Prohibition
Petitioner seeks to declare as unconstitutional certain provisions of R.A. No. 10932 and
for this purpose, availed of the remedy of certiorari and prohibition. Respondents
counter that certiorari and prohibition are available only against judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions and not against legislative acts, as in the instant case.
The rule is settled that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought determine the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over
it.45 The present petition specifically alleges that R.A. No. 10932 is unconstitutional for
being violative of substantive due process, the presumption of innocence, and the equal
protection of laws and as such, seeks that the enforcement and implementation thereof
be prohibited.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the ground for review in certiorari and prohibition
is grave abuse of discretion, and there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. 46 Petitions
for certiorari and prohibition are thus appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
questions.47
Grave abuse of discretion as a ground for review does not only appear under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court but also under Section 1,48 Article VIII of the Constitution defining
judicial power. As constitutionally defined, judicial power includes not only the duty to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also, the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. Such innovation under the 1987 Constitution later
on became known as the Court's "traditional jurisdiction" and "expanded jurisdiction,"
respectively.49
Given the commonality of the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the Court has
allowed the use of a Rule 65 petition to invoke this Court's expanded jurisdiction. 50
As expressly granted by the Constitution, the Court's expanded jurisdiction when

invoked permits a review of acts not only by a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. "Any branch or instrumentality of the Government" necessarily
includes the legislative and the executive, even if they are not exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.51
In Pedro Agcaoili, Jr., et al. v. The Honorable Representative Rodolfo C. Fariñas, et

al.,52 we affirmed the availability of the extraordinary writs for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the legislative and executive branches following Judge Villanueva v. Judicial and
Bar Council,53 as follows:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application
is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to

raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.54 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Accordingly, we held as proper remedies the writs of certiorari and prohibition
in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), et al. v. Quezon City, as
represented by Mayor Herbert Bautista, et al.,55 assailing the constitutionality of curfew
ordinances and in Agcaoili questioning the contempt powers of the Congress in the
exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation. Following this trend in
jurisprudence, petitioner therefore correctly availed of certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10932 and enjoin
its enforcement, notwithstanding that these governmental actions do not involve the
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Direct Resort to the Court
Jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition are shared by this Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts. 56 Since the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition are available to assail the constitutionality of a
law, the question as to which court should the petition be properly filed consequently
arises given that the hierarchy of courts "also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs." 57
Respondents argue that direct resort to this Court is unjustified and thus violates the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, "recourse must first be made to the lower-
ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court." 58 As a rule, "direct
recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort
and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional
functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket." 59
Nevertheless, we cautioned in The Diocese of Bacolod, et al. v. COMELEC, et al.,60 that

the Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent is never meant to be emasculated by
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. As such, this Court possesses full discretionary
authority to assume jurisdiction over extraordinary actions for certiorari filed directly
before it for exceptionally compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the
issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition. 61
As developed by case law, the instances when direct resort to this Court is allowed are
enumerated in The Diocese of Bacolod62 as follows: (a) when there are genuine issues
of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; 63 (b) when the
issues involved are of transcendental importance;64 (c) in cases of first impression;65 (d)
the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Supreme Court; 66 (e) the time
element or exigency in certain situations; 67 (f) the filed petition reviews an act of a
constitutional organ;68 (g) when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law;69 (h) the petition includes questions that are dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. 70
The present petition, while directed against an act of a co-equal branch of the
government and concerns a legislative measure directly affecting the health and well-
being of the people, actually presents no prima facie challenge, as hereunder
expounded, as to be so exceptionally compelling to justify direct resort to this Court.
Requisites of Judicial Review
Notwithstanding the propriety of the legal vehicle employed, the Court cannot exercise
its power of judicial review, even under its expanded jurisdiction, when the requisites
for the exercise thereof are not satisfied.
"The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive
and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution." 71 When exercised, the
judiciary does not arrogate upon it a position superior to that of the other branches of
the government but merely upholds the supremacy of the Constitution.
In Congressman Garcia v. The Executive Secretary,72 the Court held that, for a proper
exercise of its power of review, certain requisites must be satisfied, namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.73
Arguing the absence of the first and second requisites, respondents seek an outright
dismissal of the instant petition. We agree.
Actual Case or Controversy
"[A]n actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished
from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute." 74 To be justiciable, the case or
controversy must present a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. Regardless of whether the
Court's power of review is invoked under the traditional or expanded concept, the
presence of an actual case or controversy remains a requisite before judicial power is
exercised.75 However, when the Court's expanded jurisdiction is invoked, the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is satisfied upon a prima facie showing of
grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act. 76Alexander A. Padilla, et al.
v. Congress of the Philippines77 emphasized that for the Court to exercise its power of
judicial review and give due course to a petition for certiorari, the petitioners should set
forth their material allegations to make out a prima facie case for certiorari.
Interrelated with the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

ripeness. Consistently, a question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it. The
question of ripeness asks whether a case involves contingent events that may not occur
as anticipated and whether there is actual injury to the party being suit. 78 Thus, it is
required that an act had been accomplished or performed by either branch of the
government and that there is an immediate or threatened injury to the petitioner as a
result of the challenged action before courts may interfere. 79 In Province of North
Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't. of the Rep. Of the Phils. Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
(GRP), et al.,80 we held that "[w]hen an act of a branch of government is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute." 81
The allegations set forth in the petition failed to meet the requirement of a prima
facie showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Congress relative to the
provisions of R.A. No. 10932. While R.A. No. 10932 and its implementing rules are
accomplished acts of a co-equal branch of the government, the petition is unfortunately
bereft of any allegation that petitioner, nor any of its members, had thereby suffered an
actual or direct injury as a result of a discretion gravely abused. In the absence of an
actual and direct injury, any pronouncement by the Court would be purely advisory or
sheer legal opinion, in view of the mere hypothetical scenarios which the instant
petition presents.
The challenged law also enjoys the presumption of constitutionality which the Court, at
the first instance, cannot disturb in the absence of a prima facie showing of grave
abuse of discretion and, upon delving into the merits, in the absence of a clearest
showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution. 82 If the Court were to
invalidate the questioned law on the basis of conjectures and suppositions, then it
would be unduly treading questions of policy and wisdom not only of the legislature that
passed it, but also of the executive which approved it. 83
Legal Standing
Closely related to the constitutional mandate that the Court settle only actual cases or
controversies is the requirement of legal standing. Invariably, legal standing or locus
standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.84
As a rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question when (1) he can show
that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. 85
Sans doubt, R.A. No. 10932 governs the conduct of hospitals, medical facilities, medical
practitioners and employees inasmuch as the law imposes upon the latter certain
obligations and imposes corresponding sanctions in case of violation. However,
petitioner itself, is not a hospital, a medical facility, a medical practitioner or employee,
but an association thereof.
Section 1,86 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that juridical persons authorized by
law may be parties in a civil action. In turn, Article 44 87 of the Civil Code enumerates
the juridical persons having capacity to sue which includes corporations, partnerships
and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Section 4,88 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court mandates that "[f]acts showing the capacity of
a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons
that is made a party, must be averred."
Thus, while juridical persons, like an association, are endowed with the capacity to sue
or be sued, it must demonstrate substantial interest that it has sustained or will sustain
direct injury. Assuming a hospital is found liable for violating the provisions of R.A. No.
10932, the liability or direct injury inures not to the petitioner association itself but to
the member-hospital.
To be sure, the rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth
doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and the doctrine of transcendental
importance.89 To fall under the third party exception, an association filing a case on
behalf of its members must not only show that it stands to suffer direct injury, but also
that it has been duly authorized.by its members to represent them or sue in their
behalf.90
In this case, while petitioner successfully averred that it is a non stock, non-profit
organization, existing under the laws of the Philippines and identified its members being
the sole national organization of purely privately owned clinics, hospitals or other health
facilities in the Philippines, dedicated to the management and concerns of private
hospitals in the country,91 it failed to demonstrate that ample authority had been
extended to it by its members to file the instant petition.
The attached Board Resolutions92 and Secretary's Certificate93 merely state that the

"members of the [petitioner], view [R.A. No. 10932] as [unconstitutional] with respect
to its penal provisions or Section 4 thereof, the same being oppressive and
confiscatory; and with respect to its provision on 'Presumption of Liability' or Section 5
thereof, which is utterly against the Constitutional provision on 'Presumption of
Innocence'" without authorizing petitioner to file the necessary petition to question the
constitutionality of the law before any court. Petitioner therefore cannot benefit from
the third party exception to the requirement of locus standi.
In view of the foregoing limitations, there is no reason for the Court to take cognizance
of the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Senior Associate Justice), Peralta, Bersamin, Jardeleza, A. Reyes, Jr.,

and Hernando, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo, J., on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Leonen, J., See separate concurring opinion.
Caguioa, J., See separate concurring.
Gesmundo, J., on official leave.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on official leave.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on November 6, 2018 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this Office on December 12, 2018 at 3:10 p.m.
Very truly yours,

(SGD)
EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
1
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-HOSPITAL DEPOSIT LAW BY INCREASING THE
PENALTIES FOR THE REFUSAL OF HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS TO ADMINISTER
APPROPRIATE INITIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT AND SUPPORT IN EMERGENCY OR
SERIOUS CASES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 702,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "AN ACT PROHIBITING THE DEMAND OF DEPOSITS OR
ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR THE CONFINEMENT OR TREATMENT OF PATIENTS IN
HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS IN CERTAIN CASES", AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 8344, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved August 3, 2017.
2
See Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 6341.
3
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any director, manager or any other officer of a
hospital or medical clinic to demand any deposit or any other form of advance payment
for confinement or treatment in such hospital or medical clinic in emergency or serious
cases.
4
Section 2. Any director, manager or any other officer of a hospital or medical clinic
who violates Section 1 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos but not more than two thousand pesos or imprisonment for not less
than fifteen days but not more than thirty days, or both such fine and imprisonment.
Section 3. Any person convicted under this Act shall not be entitled to probation under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the
Probation Law of 1976.
5
AN ACT PENALIZING THE REFUSAL OF HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS TO
ADMINISTER APPROPRIATE INITIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT AND SUPPORT IN
EMERGENCY OR SERIOUS CASES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 702, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "AN ACT PROHIBITING THE DEMAND OF
DEPOSITS OR ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR THE CONFINEMENT OR TREATMENT OF
PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS IN CERTAIN CASES."
6
Section 1. Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 702 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
SECTION 1. In emergency or serious cases, it shall be unlawful for any proprietor,

president, director, manager or any other officer, and/or medical practitioner or
employee of a hospital or medical clinic to request, solicit, demand or accept any
deposit or any other form of advance payment as a prerequisite for confinement or
medical treatment of a patient in such hospital or medical clinic or to refuse to
administer medical treatment and support as dictated by good practice of medicine to
prevent death or permanent disability: Provided, That by reason of inadequacy of the
medical capabilities of the hospital or medical clinic, the attending physician may
transfer the patient to a facility where the appropriate care can be given, after the
patient or his next of kin consents to said transfer and after the receiving hospital or
medical clinic agrees to the transfer: Provided, however, That when the patient is
unconscious, incapable of giving consent and/or unaccompanied, the physician can
transfer the patient even without his consent: Provided, further, That such transfer
shall be done only after necessary emergency treatment and support have been
administered to stabilize the patient and after it has been established that such transfer
entails less risks than the patient's continued confinement: Provided, furthermore, That
no hospital or clinic, after being informed of the medical indications for such transfer,
shall refuse to receive the patient nor demand from the patient or his next of kin any
deposit or advance payment: Provided, finally, That strict compliance with the foregoing
procedure on transfer shall not be construed as a refusal made punishable by this Act.
7
Section 2. Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 702 is hereby deleted and in place
thereof, new sections 2, 3 and 4 are added, to read as follows:
xxxx
SEC. 3. After the hospital or medical clinic mentioned above shall have administered
medical treatment and support, it may cause the transfer of the patient to an
appropriate hospital consistent with the needs of the patient, preferably to a
government hospital, specially in the case of poor or indigent patients.
8
Section 2. Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 702 is hereby deleted and in place
thereof, new sections 2, 3 and 4 are added, to read as follows:
xxxx
SEC. 4. Any official, medical practitioner or employee of the hospital or medical clinic
who violates the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction by final judgment, be
punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and one (1) day but not
more than two (2) years and four (4) months, or a fine of not less than Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00), but not more than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or both, at the discretion of the court: Provided, however, That if such
violation was committed pursuant to an established policy of the hospital or clinic or
upon instruction of its management, the director or officer of such hospital or clinic
responsible for the formulation and implementation of such policy shall, upon conviction
by final judgment, suffer imprisonment of four (4) to six (6) years, or a fine of not less
than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), but not more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or both, at the discretion of the court.
9
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE PROVISION OF EMERGENCY HEALTH CARE SERVICE TO
PATIENTS, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 702, AS
AMENDED, ENTITLED "AN ACT PROHIBITING THE DEMAND OF DEPOSITS OR
ADVANCED PAYMENTS FOR THE CONFINEMENT OR TREATMENT OF PATIENTS IN
HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS IN CERTAIN CASES."
10
See Fact Sheet of House Bill No. 5159.
11
AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR THE REFUSAL OF HOSPITALS AND
MEDICAL CLINICS TO ADMINISTER APPROPRIATE INITIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT AND
SUPPORT IN EMERGENCY OR SERIOUS CASES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 702, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "AN ACT PROHIBITING THE DEMAND
OF DEPOSITS OR ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR THE CONFINEMENT OR TREATMENT OF
PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS IN CERTAIN CASES" AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8344, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
12
Section 1. Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 702, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. In emergency or serious cases, it shall be unlawful for any proprietor, president,
director, manager or any other officer and/or medical practitioner or employee of a
hospital or medical clinic to request, solicit, demand or accept any deposit or any other
form of advance payment as a prerequisite for administering basic emergency care to
any patient, confinement or medical treatment of a patient in such hospital or medical
clinic or to refuse to administer medical treatment and support as dictated by good
practice of medicine to prevent death, or permanent disability, or in the case of a
pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, or noninstitutional
delivery: Provided, That by reason of inadequacy of the medical capabilities of the
hospital or medical clinic, the attending physician may transfer the patient to a facility
where the appropriate care can be given, after the patient or his next of kin consents to
said transfer and after the receiving hospital or medical clinic agrees to the
transfer: Provided, however, That when the patient is unconscious, incapable of giving
consent and/or unaccompanied, the physician can transfer the patient even without his
consent: Provided, further, That such transfer shall be done only after necessary
emergency treatment and support have been administered to stabilize the patient and
after it has been established that such transfer entails less risks than the patient's
continued confinement: Provided, furthermore, That no hospital or clinic, after being
informed of the medical indications for such transfer, shall refuse to receive the patient
nor demand from the patient or his next of kin any deposit or advance
payment: Provided, finally, That strict compliance with the foregoing procedure on
transfer shall not be construed as a refusal made punishable by this Act.
13
Section 2. Section 2 of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 2. For purposes of this Act, the following definitions shall govern:
"x x x x
"(i) 'Basic emergency care' - the response to a situation where there is urgently
required medical care and attention, and shall include procedures required for initial
diagnosis, use of equipment and supplies in sufficiently addressing the emergency
situation, considering the welfare of the patient. It also includes the necessary medical
procedures and treatment administered to a woman in active labor to ensure the safe
delivery of the newborn.
"(j) 'Noninstitutional delivery' - the delivery of a newborn while in transit, outside of a

health facility, after an initial consultation was done with a health facility."
14
SEC. 3. Section 3 of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 3. After the hospital or medical clinic mentioned above shall have administered
medical treatment and support, it may cause the transfer of the patient to an
appropriate hospital consistent with the needs of the patient, especially in the case of
poor or indigent patients.
Where there is no ambulance available for use by the hospital or medical clinic for the
emergency transfer of the patient to a facility where the appropriate care shall be
given, the local government unit (LGU) where the hospital or medical clinic is located
must allow the free use of its emergency vehicle to transport the patient to the hospital
or medical clinic where a continuation of care shall be given. The hospital or medical
clinic must provide a staff nurse with advanced cardiovascular life support (ACLS)
certification or its equivalent to accompany the patient in the emergency vehicle.
All hospitals are required to post at their entrance a notice indicating the classification
level of the hospital as licensed by the Department of Health (DOH) and the list of
medical services that the hospital is authorized to perform."
15
SEC. 5. New Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall be inserted after Section 4 of Batas
Pambansa bilang 702, as amended, to read as follows:
xxxx
SEC. 6. Health Facilities Oversight Board. - All complaints for violations of this Act
against health facilities shall be filed initially with the Health Facilities Oversight Board
under the Health Facilities and Services Regulatory Bureau (HFSRB) of the [DOH]. The
Board shall be composed of a DOH representative with a minimum rank of director to
serve as Chair, a representative from the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PhilHealth), a representative from the Philippine Medical Association (PMA), a
representative from private health institutions and three (3) representatives from non-
government organizations (NGOs) advocating for patient's rights and public health, one
of whom should be a licensed physician.
The Board shall investigate the claim of the patient and after adjudication, impose
administrative sanctions in accordance with this Act including the revocation of the
health facility's license. On the basis of its own findings, the Board shall also facilitate
the filing of the criminal case in the proper courts. This is without prejudice to the right
of the patient-complainant to directly institute criminal proceedings in the courts.
16
SEC. 4. section 4 of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
more than two (2) years and four (4) months, or a fine of not less than One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00), but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00 or both, at the discretion of the court: Provided, however, That if such
than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), but not more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) or both, at the discretion of the court, without prejudice to damages
that may be awarded to the patient-complainant: Provided, further, That upon three (3)
repeated violations committed pursuant to an established policy of the hospital or clinic
or upon the instruction of its management, the health facility's license to operate shall
be revoked by the DOH. The president, chairman, board of directors. or trustees, and
other officers of the health facility shall be solidarily liable for damages that may be
awarded by the court to the patient-complainant.
17
Id.
18
SEC. 5. New Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall be inserted after section 4 of Batas
SEC. 5. Presumption of Liability. - In the event of death, permanent disability, serious

impairment of the health condition of the patient-complainant, or in the case of a
pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, proceeding from the
denial of his or her admission to a health facility pursuant to a policy or practice of
demanding deposits or advance payments for confinement or treatment, a presumption
of liability shall arise against the hospital, medical clinic, and the official, medical
practitioner, or employee involved.
19
SEC. 5. New Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall be inse1ted after section 4 of Batas
xxxx
SEC. 7. PhilHealth Reimbursement of Basic Emergency Care. - PhilHealth shall

reimburse the cost of basic emergency care and transportation services incurred by the
hospital or medical clinic for the emergency medical services given to poor and indigent
patients. Furthermore, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) shall provide
medical assistance for the basic emergency care needs of the poor and marginalized
groups.
20
Rollo, p. 8.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 10.
23
Id. at 10-11.
24
Id. at 11.
25
Id. at 13-14.
26
Id. at 14.
27
604 Phil. 98 (2009).
28
Id. at 125.
29
Rollo, p. 16.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 18.
32
Id. at 20.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 22.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 55.
38
Id. at 56.
39
Id. at 58-59.
40
Id. at 61.
41
Id. at 68.
42
Id. at 71.
43
Id. at 72.
44
Id. at 73-74.
45
Hon. Ermita v. Hon. Aldecoa-Delorino, 666 Phil. 122, 132 (2011).
46
Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Enriquez, et al., 798 Phil. 227, 294 (2016).
47
Francisco, Jr., et al. v. Toll Regulatory Board, et al., 648 Phil. 54, 86 (2010).
48
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in the Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
49
See Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 883, 909-910
(2003).
50
Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved
Medical Centers Association, Inc., et al., 802 Phil. 116, 139 (2016).
51
Araullo, et al. v. President Benigno S.C. Aquino III, et al., 737 Phil. 457, 531 (2014).
52
G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018.
53
757 Phil. 534 (2015).
54
Id. at 544, citing Araullo, et al. v. President Benigno S.C. Aquino III, et al., supra at
531.
55
G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017.
56
Section 4 of Rule 65 provides:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or missions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
57
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Assn., Inc. (CREBA) v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform,
635 Phil. 283, 300 (2010), citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor, 495 Phil. 422,
432 (2005).
58
Arroyo v. DOJ, et al., 695 Phil. 302, 334 (2012).
59
Dy v. Judge Bibat-Palamos, et al., 717 Phil. 776, 782 (2013).
60
751 Phil. 301 (2015).
61
Id. at 330-331.
62
Supra note 60.
63
Id. at 331.
64
Id. at 332.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 333.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 334.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 334-335.
71
Congressman Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, et al., 602 Phil. 64, 73 (2009).
72
602 Phil. 64 (2009).
73
Id. at 73.
74
Hon. Exec. Sec. Belgica, et al. v. Ochoa, Jr., et al., 721 Phil. 416, 519 (2013).
75
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), et al., v. Quezon City, as
represented by Mayor Herbert Bautista, et al., supra note 55.
76
Id.
77
G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017.
78
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), et al. v. The Secretary of Budget and
Management, et al., 686 Phil. 357, 369 (2012).
79
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) v. Philippine Government (GPH), G.R.
No. 218406, November 29, 2016, 811 SCRA 284, 297.
80
589 Phil. 387 (2008).
81
Id. at 486.
82
See Hon. Drilon v. Mayor Lim, 305 Phil. 146, 150 (1994).
83
ABAKADA GURO Party List (formerly AASJS), et al. v. Hon Purisima, et al., 584 Phil.
246, 268 (2008).
84
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Exec. Sec. Ermita, 558 Phil. 338, 350 (2007).
85
Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).
86
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical
persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term
"plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or
the third (fourth, etc.) - party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original
defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third
(fourth, etc.) - party defendant.
87
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created
by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to
law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which
the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member.
88
Sec. 4. Capacity. - Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence
of an organized association of person that is made a party, must be averred. A party
desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial,
which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's
knowledge.
89
White Light Corp., et al. v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 456 (2009).
90
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. of the Phils. v. Health Sec. Duque III, 561 Phil.
386, 396 (2007).
91
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
92
Id. at 33-34 and 36-37.
93
Id. at 35.
CONCURRING OPINION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur.
The present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by petitioner Private Hospitals

Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PHAPi) should be dismissed due to its lack of legal
standing, and the absence of an actual case or controversy.
The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of the
executive and legislative acts if they conform to the Constitution. Through such power,
the judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. However, for a
court to exercise this power, certain requirements must first be met, namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.1
In this case, PHAPi is not a hospital or medical clinic, but only an association of - as its
name denotes - private hospitals. As such, PHAPi is not directly subject to the
provisions of Republic Act No. (RA) 10932,2 and consequently, does not stand to suffer
a real and apparent threat or injury so as to demonstrate its locus standi to file this
petition. To be sure, while it claims that it represents the interests of its member
hospitals, records are bereft of any showing that it was specifically authorized to file
this case on their behalf. Hence, PHAPi's conveyed interests, through the distinct
manner of argumentation in the petition, can only be attributed as its own.
Furthermore, there appears to be no actual justiciable controversy that would sanction

a review of the assailed provisions of RA 10932. Among others, PHAPi does not allege
that any of its represented hospitals employs the deposit policy prohibited under RA
10932. Neither does PHAPi claim that a patient was refused admission by virtue of such
policy nor was it shown that a claim has been filed based on the said law. As
jurisprudence states, the need to prove an actual justiciable controversy is not merely
an idle procedural requirement, but a clear safeguard to ensure that the courts do not
unduly intrude into the areas specifically reserved to the other branches of
government.3 The Court's exercise of judicial review on a hypothetical and theoretical
situation runs the danger of it prematurely supplanting the wisdom of Congress with its
own.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Endnotes:
1
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64,73 (2009).
2
Entitled "AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-HOSPITAL DEPOSIT LAW BY
INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR THE REFUSAL OF HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS
TO ADMINISTER APPROPRIATE INITIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT AND SUPPORT IN
EMERGENCY OR SERIOUS CASES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 702, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS 'AN ACT PROHIBITING THE DEMAND OF
DEPOSITS OR ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR THE CONFINEMENT OR TREATMENT OF
PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS IN CERTAIN CASES,' AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8344, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on August 3, 2017.
3
See Philippine Constitution Association v. Philippine Government, G.R. Nos. 218406,
218761, 204355, 318407, and 204354, November 29, 2016, 811 SCRA 284, 296-297.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the ponencia and add the following observations.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PHAPi), represented by
its President, Dr. Rustico Jimenez, seeks to question the constitutionality of particular
provisions of Republic Act No. 10932, otherwise known as the Act Strengthening the
Anti-Hospital Deposit Law by Increasing Penalties for Refusal of Hospitals and Clinics to
Administer Medical Treatment in Emergency or Serious Cases.
Petitioner asserts that the case is ripe for adjudication considering that there is an
imminent threat that unconstitutional obligations and sanctions will be imposed on its
members because of the impending approval of the implementing rules of Republic Act
No. 10932.1 It also claims that it has the required locus standi because it stands to be
directly injured by the implementation of Republic Act No. 10932, considering that its
members' management and staff are placed at the risk of administrative, civil, and
criminal liabilities.2 It further argues that in any case, the absence of a direct injury
should not bar this Court from taking cognizance of this case as it raises issues that are
of transcendental importance, particularly on denial of due process, equal protection of
laws, and presumption of innocence.3
The ponencia notes that the requisites for this Court's exercise of the power of judicial
review is not present in this case.4 It found that there is no actual case or controversy,
and that petitioner does not have the required locus standi to file the petition.
It discusses that the requirement of an actual case or controversy is satisfied upon

a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the governmental act. Likewise, a
case is ripe for adjudication if there is an act of the government and an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioner as a result of the act. 5
The ponencia found that petitioner failed to meet the requirement. It notes that there is
no allegation that petitioner or its members have suffered an actual or direct injury
from any grave abuse of discretion. It found that the absence of the injury will render
this Court's opinion as merely advisory.6
The ponencia further points out that the law is presumed constitutional and this cannot
be overturned in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion or any
infraction of the Constitution. 7 It posits that it would be delving into questions of policy
and wisdom of the executive and legislative departments if it invalidated the law based
on conjectures and suppositions.8
As to locus standi, the ponencia notes that Republic Act No. 10932 covers hospitals,
medical facilities, medical practitioners, and employees, but not associations. 9 Thus, in
this case, the association is not the one who will be held liable for any violation of
Republic Act No. 10932.10
Furthermore, while an association has the capacity to sue or be sued, it must still show
a substantial interest such that it has sustained or will sustain a direct injury. 11 While
third-party standing may be invoked as an exception to the rule, the ponencia notes
that petitioner failed to demonstrate that it had been authorized by its members to file
the instant case.12
Thus, it did not take cognizance of the present petition.
I concur. This case is indeed not ripe for judicial review.
Canonical for the exercise of judicial review when the constitutionality of a law is being
questioned are these requirements: first, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination; second, the parties
raising the issue must have locus standi; third, the constitutionality of the law must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, resolving the issue on constitutionality
must be essential to the disposition of the case. 13
There is no actual case or controversy in the case at bar.
The requirement for an actual case or controversy is fundamental. This is based on

Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandabie and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
An actual case or controversy means that there are conflicting legal rights, such that
the legal claim of one party is opposed to the legal claim of another, and it is capable of
being resolved by the courts.14 It is necessary that the conflicting legal rights must be
real and concrete, not merely hypothetical or conjectural. 15
It is well-established in this jurisdiction that . . . for a court to exercise its power of
adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; . . . In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it
must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be
an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.16 (Citations omitted)
Thus, there must first be a real and material act affecting another, which one party
asserts is done within the bounds allowed by law, but which another contends is
injurious to his or her right. If there is yet no such act, or when such acts are merely
conjecture, there is no actual case or controversy. In case of a governmental act, the
party asserting its unconstitutionality must allege the actual act performed by the
government that caused it the injury.
In Lozano v. Nograles,17 this Court explained:

An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness". In
the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves
uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may
not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness:
first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the
parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of
ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to
determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch
of government before the courts may step in.18 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The requirement of an actual case or controversy is rooted on the respect for the
separation of powers of the three branches of the government. Courts cannot supplant
the discretionary acts of the legislative or the executive branch on the premise that
they know of a wiser, more just, or expedient policy or course of action. 19 They may
only act in case the other branches acted outside the bounds of their powers or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The other reason for requiring an actual case or controversy is to maintain the
significance of this Court's role in making "final and binding construction[s] of
law."20 Courts do not render mere advisory opinions. Judicial decisions are part of the
legal system,21 and thus, have binding effects on actual persons, places, and things.
Ruling on hypothetical situations with no bearing on any matter will weaken the import
of this Court's issuances. In Belgica, et al. v. Ochoa:22
Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there must be an
actual case or controversy. This Court cannot render an advisory opinion. We assume
that the Constitution binds all other constitutional departments, instrumentalities, and
organs. We are aware that in the exercise of their various powers, they do interpret the
text of the Constitution in the light of contemporary needs that they should address. A
policy that reduces this Court to an adviser for official acts by the other departments
that have not yet been done would unnecessarily tax our resources. It is inconsistent
with our role as final arbiter and adjudicator and weakens the entire system of the Rule
of Law. Our power of judicial review is a duty to make a final and binding construction
of law. This power should generally be reserved when the departments have exhausted
any and all acts that would remedy any perceived violation of right. The rationale that
defines the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to our rules on justiciability
are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a convincing violation of a right, but the
impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and irreparable that any delayed
exercise of judicial review or deference would undermine fundamental principles that
should be enjoyed by the party complaining or the constituents that they legitimately
represent.
The requirement of an "actual case," thus, means that the case before this Court
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic based on extra-legal or
other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice." Furthermore, "the
controversy needs to be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of
parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests." Thus,
the adverse position of the parties must be sufficient enough for the case to be pleaded
and for this Court to be able to provide the parties the proper relief/s prayed for.
The requirement of an 'actual case' will ensure that this Court will not issue advisory
opinions. It prevents us from using the immense power of judicial review absent a party
that can sufficiently argue from a standpoint with real and substantial
interests.23 (Citations omitted)
Moreover, hypothetical or conjectural situations illicitly widen the courts' discretion such
that future parties who present claims on the law being interpreted may be unduly
affected by the limitations set, without affording them the opportunity to be heard,
thus:24
An advisory opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or hypothetical. In
such cases, the conflict will not have sufficient concreteness or adversariness so as to
constrain the discretion of this Court. After all, legal arguments from concretely lived
facts are chosen narrowly by the parties. Those who bring theoretical cases will have no
such limits. They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind the future
parties who may have more motives to choose specific legal arguments. In other
words, for there to be a real conflict between the parties, there must exist actual facts
from which courts can properly determine whether there has been a breach of
constitutional text.25 (Emphasis in the original)
Thus, in cases where the constitutionality of a law is being questioned, it is not enough
that the law or the regulation has been passed or is in effect. To rule on the
constitutionality of provisions in the law without an actual case is to decide only the
basis of the mere enactment of the statute. This amounts to a ruling on the wisdom of
the policy imposed by the Congress on the subject matter of the law.
In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council,26 this

Court ruled that it is not enough that there is & possibility of abuse of the questioned
enactment. There must first be an actual act of abuse.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Herminio Harry Roque, et al.,27 this Court said that the
parties presented no actual case or controversy because they did not show any
government action implementing the questioned statute against them.
In Philippine Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and

Employment,28 this Court ruled that it is not enough that the issuances may result in a
diminution of the bus drivers and conductors' income, considering that the allegations
are based on speculation.
In Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,29 the petitioner in that

case did not assert a specific act committed against it by the Commission on Elections
in enforcing or implementing the questioned law. This Court found that there was no
actual case or controversy.
An allegation of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is

insufficient.30 If there is no exercise of discretion, it could not have been gravely
abused.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show that any violation of its rights was
committed as a consequence of the enactment of Republic Act No. 10932. The law itself
has not been enforced against petitioner or its members. In fact, petitioner's allegation
is that there is a risk or a threat that its members will be obligated and sanctioned by
the enactment of the law. Thus, there is yet no act committed by petitioner showing
any breach of the statute, and there is yet no act of enforcement or sanction against it.
There is no injury yet suffered by petitioner. The sanctions they alleged are still in the
realm of imagination.
II
I also agree that petitioner failed to show that it has the required locus standi to file the
petition.
As an association which represents private hospitals, petitioner is a third party to the

instant case. Thus, before it may file the petition, it must show that it is compliant with
the requisites for third-party standing.
Another requisite for this Court's exercise of judicial review is that the party filing must
have locus standi or legal standing to file the suit, thus:
Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." To possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct
injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."
....
Whether a suit is public or private, the parties must have "a present substantial
interest," not a "mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest." Those who bring the suit must possess their own right to the relief
sought.31 (Citations omitted)
The party filing must show that it has a substantial interest in the case such that it was
or will be directly affected or injured by the challenged governmental act.
However, this Court has given leeway to petitions filed by parties who have no personal
or substantial interest in the challenged governmental act but nonetheless raise
"constitutional issue[s] of critical significance." 32
The substantiality and directness of the injury is reckoned from the point of view of
petitioner. Thus, this Court has allowed suits to be filed by taxpayers in cases where
there is a claim of an unconstitutional tax measure or illegal disbursement of public
funds. Cases filed by voters who show an obvious interest in the validity of the
questioned election law have been allowed. Courts have likewise taken cognizance of
cases filed by legislators in petitions where they claim that their prerogative as
legislators have been infringed upon.33
In a very limited subset of cases, this Court has allowed a party to bring a suit on
behalf of another. However, for this Court to accept that the third party has the
standing to file the case, the following requisites must be present: first, the party filing
the suit "must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact', thus [has] a "sufficiently concrete
interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; [second, he or she] must have a close
relation to the third party; and [third, the third party is prevented by] some hindrance .
. . to protect his or her own interest."34
Associations have been able to file petitions on behalf of its members on the basis of
third-party standing.
In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Secretary of

Health,35 this Court found that an association "has the legal personality to represent its
members because the results of the case will affect their vital interests," 36 thus:
This [modern] view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members.
An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if
its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the
concerns of its constituents.
....
. . . We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized . . .
to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on
matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and
activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. The respondent is,
thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its
members are in every practical sense identical . . . The respondent [association] is but
the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. 37 (Citation omitted)
However, associations must sufficiently establish who their members are, that their
members authorized them to sue on their behalf, and that they would be directly
injured by the challenged governmental acts.38
In Philippine Bus Operators Association of the Philippines vs. Department of Labor and
Employment,39 this Court did not allow the association to represent its members
because it failed to establish the presence of these requirements. There was no
evidence of board resolutions or articles of incorporation showing that it was authorized
to file the petition. It noted that some of the associations even had their certificates of
incorporation revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission. This Court ruled
that it was not enough that they alleged that they were an association that represented
members who would be directly injured by the implementation of a law, thus:
The associations in Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines, Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., and The Executive Secretary were allowed to sue
on behalf of their members because they sufficiently established who their members
were, that their members authorized the associations to sue on their behalf, and that
the members would be directly injured by the challenged governmental acts.
The liberality of this Court to grant standing for associations or corporations whose
members are those who suffer direct and substantial injury depends on a few factors.
In all these cases, there must be an actual controversy. Furthermore, there should also
be a clear and convincing demonstration of special reasons why the truly injured parties
may not be able to sue.
Alternatively, there must be a similarly clear and convincing demonstration that the
representation of the association is more efficient for the petitioners to bring. They
must further show that it is more efficient for this Court to hear only one voice from the
association.
In other words, the association should show special reasons for bringing the action
themselves rather than as a class suit, allowed when the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons. In a class suit, a
number of the members of the class are permitted to sue and to defend for the benefit
of all the members so long as they are sufficiently numerous and representative of the
class to which they belong.
In some circumstances similar to those in White Light, the third parties represented by
the petitioner would have special and legitimate reasons why they may not bring the
action themselves. Understandably, the cost to patrons in the White Light case to bring
the action themselves—i.e., the amount they would pay for the lease of the motels—will
be too small compared with the cost of the suit. But viewed in another way, whoever
among the patrons files the case even for its transcendental interest endows benefits
on a substantial number of interested parties without recovering their costs. This is the
free rider problem in economics. It is a negative externality which operates as a
disincentive to sue and assert a transcendental right. 40
In Executive Secretary v. The Hon. Court of Appeals,41 the Asian Recruitment Council
Philippine Chapter, Inc. was found to have standing to file the petition for declaratory
relief on behalf of its member recruitment agencies because it proved through board
resolutions that it was authorized to sue on the behalf of its members. It was able to
show that it was the medium used by the members to effectively communicate their
grievances.
Allegations of transcendental importance are not enough to allow exceptions to locus

standi.
In Francisco v. House of Representatives,42 this Court enumerated factors that

determine if an issue is of transcendental importance.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are
instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the
presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.43 (Citations omitted)
Moreover, there must also be a showing of a "clear or imminent threat to fundamental
rights" and of "proper parties suffering real, actual or more imminent injury," 44 thus:
In addition to an actual controversy, special reasons to represent, and disincentives for

the injured party to bring the suit themselves, there must be a showing of the
transcendent nature of the right involved.
Only constitutional rights shared by many and requiring a grounded level of urgency
can be transcendent. For instance, in The Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the association was allowed to file on
behalf of its members considering the importance of the issue involved, i.e., the
constitutionality of agrarian reform measures, specifically, of then newly enacted
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
This Court is not a forum to appeal political and policy choices made by the Executive,
Legislative, and other constitutional agencies and organs. This Court dilutes its role in a
democracy if it is asked to substitute its political wisdom for the wisdom of accountable
and representative bodies where there is no unmistakable democratic deficit. It cannot
lose this place in the constitutional order. Petitioners' invocation of our jurisdiction and
the justiciability of their claims must be presented with rigor. Transcendental interest is
not a talisman to blur the lines of authority drawn by our most fundamental law.
....
Again, the reasons cited—the "far-reaching consequences" and "wide area of coverage
and extent of effect" of Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No.
2012-001—are reasons not transcendent considering that most administrative
issuances of the national government are of wide coverage. These reasons are not
special reasons for this Court to brush aside the requirement of legal
standing.45 (Citations omitted)
The petitioner was unable to prove that it was authorized by its members to file the
instant case through board resolutions or through its articles of incorporation; I find,
thus, that petitioner does not have the required standing to file the petition.
ACCORDINGLY, I VOTE to DISMISS the Petition.

Endnotes:
1
Ponencia, p. 7.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 14.
5
Id. at 15.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 16.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 17.
11
Id. at 16-17.
12
Id. at 17.
13
Levy Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 296 Phil. 56, 63-64 (1993) [Per C.J.
Davide, Jr., En Banc].
14
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC, 499 Phil. 281, 304
(2005) [Per C.J. Panganiban, En Banc].
15
Id. See also Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council,
646 Phil. 452, 479 (2010) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
16
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC, 499 Phil. 281, 304
(2005) [Per C.J. Panganiban, En Banc].
17
607 Phil. 334 (2009) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc].
18
Id. at 341.
19
See Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc];
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64 (2009) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
20
Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 661 (2013) [Per
J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
21
CIVIL CODE, art. 8.
22
721 Phil. 416 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
23
Id. at 661-662.
24
Philippine Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Department of Labor
and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
25
Id. at 25.
26
646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio-Morales].
27
718 Phil. 294 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
28
G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
29
Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 314 Phil. 131 (1995) [Per
J. Feliciano, En Banc].

30
See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 732 Phil. 1,
554-666 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
31
and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 27-28 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
32
Funa v. Villar, 686 Phil. 571, 585 (2012) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
33
See Funa v. Villar, 686 Phil. 571 (2012) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
34
White Light Corp., et al. v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 456 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En
Banc].
35
561 Phil. 386 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
36
Id. at 396.

37
Id. at 395-396.
38
and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 32 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
39
G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
40
Id. at 32-33.
41
473 Phil. 27 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
42
460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
43
Id. at 899.
44
In Re Supreme Court Judicial Independence v. Judiciary Development Fund, 751 Phil.
30, 44 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

45
and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 33-34 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari (Petition) filed by Private Hospitals Association of the

Philippines, Inc. (PHAPi) assails the constitutionality of select provisions of Republic Act
No. 109321 (RA 10932), or the Act Strengthening the Anti-Hospital Deposit Law, i.e.,
Sections 1, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of the said law.
I concur with the ponencia that the instant Petition should be dismissed at the first
instance because it does not present an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power, and the petitioner has no personal and substantial interest in
the case such that it has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.
In asking the Court to declare certain provisions of RA 10932 as unconstitutional for

supposedly contravening the Constitution, the petitioner invokes the Court's power of
judicial review under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. 2 The power of judicial
review refers to the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative
acts for their conformity with the Constitution. 3 Through such power, the judiciary
enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. 4 For the Court to exercise this
power, it is indispensable that certain requirements must first be met, namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.5
The Petition here fails the first two (2) requisites.
There is no actual case or controversy calling for the Court's exercise of judicial power.
An "actual case or controversy" is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an

assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished
from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. 6 There must be a contrariety of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.7
Related to the requisite of an actual case or controversy is the requisite of "ripeness,"

which means that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a
result of the challenged action.8
Otherwise stated, an actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy

that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.9
The Petition here does not allege that any medical institution or practitioner has
actually been held liable under RA 10932. Nor is there even an assertion that an
existing action has been filed against any medical institution or practitioner who
violated RA 10932. As well, there is likewise no assertion that any medical institution or
practitioner has actually committed any act violative of RA 10932 that makes such
institution or person susceptible to the liabilities imposed under the said law.
In short, it is apparent that the instant Petition was filed merely in anticipation of a
possible breach or infraction of the law. To emphasize, an actual case or controversy
which justifies the Court's exercise of its judicial review power necessitates an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not merely an
anticipatory controversy.
The petitioner has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of RA 10932.
That is not all. Again, in order for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the
person or entity challenging the act must have standing to challenge — he must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, locus

standi requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.10 Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of an act complained of, such proper party has no standing. 11
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, it is crystal clear that petitioner PHAPi has
no legal standing to question the constitutionality of RA 10932 — as it does not
stand to sustain any damage or injury of a direct and personal nature in the
implementation of RA 10932.
Under RA 10932, only officials, medical practitioners, and/or medical institutions that
actually demand/accept any form of advance payment as a prerequisite for
confinement/medical treatment of a patient in emergency situations or refuse to
administer medical treatment and support as dictated by good practice of medicine to
prevent death/permanent disability are subjected to potential liability under the law.
Emphasis must be placed on the fact that petitioner PHAPi is not a medical institution
that administers medical treatment, being an association with a completely separate
juridical personality from its members. With petitioner PHAPi being a juridical person
endowed with a distinct personality of its own, it is clear that any potential liability that
may be imposed upon any of the petitioner's member hospitals, clinics, and facilities
will NOT be a liability of petitioner PHAPi.
Restating the obvious, petitioner PHAPi will sustain no direct and personal injury from
the implementation of RA 10932; it has no personal stake in the issues raised in the
Petition. Hence, the requisite of locus standi is completely lacking, warranting the
outright dismissal of the instant Petition.
Section 1 of RA 10932 is not violative of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, even if the abovementioned matters were to be swept aside for the sake
of liberality, the instant Petition should nonetheless be dismissed as it is bereft of
substantive merit.
The petitioner argues that Section 112 of RA 10932 transgresses the Constitution
because it purportedly imposes upon medical institutions and medical practitioners the
untenable and impossible duty of actually preventing the death or permanent disability
of a patient, or, in the case of a pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her
unborn child, or non-institutional delivery. The petitioner posits the view that the
aforementioned provision of the law is violative of due process as it goes against the
jurisprudential doctrine that a physician is not an insurer of the good result of
treatment.13
The petitioner's interpretation of RA 10932 is mistaken.
The essence of RA 10932 is to prohibit medical institutions/practitioners from

requesting or accepting any deposit or any other form of payment as a prerequisite for
administering basic emergency care, confinement, or medical treatment of a patient, or
to refuse to administer medical treatment and support as dictated by good practice of
medicine to prevent death, or permanent disability, or, in the case of a pregnant
woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, or non-institutional delivery, only
in emergency or serious cases and only if the medical institution or practitioner has
adequate medical capabilities to administer treatment.
By reason of inadequacy of the medical capabilities of the hospital or medical clinic, the
attending physician may transfer the patient to a facility where the appropriate care can
be given, after the patient or his next of kin consents to said transfer and after the
receiving hospital or medical clinic agrees to the transfer. 14
Hence, contrary to the specious interpretation of the petitioner, Section 1 of RA 10932

does not mandate whatsoever that physicians be insurers of the good result of
treatment. The law merely imposes on medical institutions/practitioners the strict duty
to administer basic emergency care, as defined under the law, only with respect to
persons in emergency or serious situations, and when the medical
institutions/practitioners have the capability to administer such treatment.
Further, Section 4 of RA 10932 is also not violative of the Constitution.
The petitioner likewise argues that the fines and penalties imposed under Section 4 15 of
RA 10932 are constitutionally infirm becafuse they are supposedly unjust, excessive,
and oppressive; the penalties set by the law are allegedly not commensurate to the act
or omission being penalized.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
The penalties as prescribed by statute are essentially and exclusively legislative; the
courts should not encroach on the prerogative of the lawmaking body. 16 As pronounced
by the Court early on in United States v. Borromeo,17 the fixing of penalties for the
violation of statutes is primarily a legislative function, and the courts hesitate to
interfere, unless the fine provided for is so far excessive as to shock the sense of
mankind.
In any case, the stern fines and penalties provided by Section 4 of RA 10932 are not at
all unjust, excessive, and oppressive, considering that the violation of the law does not
entail mere damage to property. The observance of RA 10932 may very well determine
whether a patient experiencing an emergency health situation will survive or perish.
The grave consequences involved cannot be overstated; a patient's life hangs in the
balance. Further, the legislature's desire to impose strict penalties upon violators of RA
10932 is in fealty to the constitutional mandate that the State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the people.18
Hence, the petitioner's attempt to assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of RA 10932

must also fall.
Furthermore, Section 5 of RA 10932 likewise does not violate the Constitution.
Section 5 of RA 10932 (Presumption of Liability Clause) states:

SEC. 5. Presumption of Liability. — In the event of death, permanent disability, serious

impairment of the health condition of the patient-complainant, or in the case of a
pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, proceeding from the
denial of his or her admission to a health facility pursuant to a policy or practice of
demanding deposits or advance payments for confinement or treatment, a presumption
of liability shall arise against the hospital, medical clinic, and the official, medical
practitioner, or employee involved.
The petitioner finds Section 5, which makes the erring medical institution and/or
practitioner prima facie liable for medical malpractice, unconstitutional on the notion
that, in medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff must prove that the medical practitioner
failed to do what a reasonably prudent doctor would have done or did what a
reasonably prudent doctor would not have done. The petitioner adds that medical
malpractice must be proven with reasonable medical probability based on competent
expert testimony and that proximate cause of injury/death must be established.
These arguments are mistaken.
Under Section 5 of RA 10932, the presumption of liability on the part of the medical
practitioner/institution arises only when death, permanent disability, serious
impairment of the health condition of the patient-complainant, or, in the case of a
pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, occurs after the denial
by the medical institution/practitioner of the emergency patient's admission to the
health facility during an emergency/serious situation, pursuant to an established
policy/practice of demanding deposits/advance payments for confinement or treatment.
In the context of medical malpractice, Section 5 creates a presumption of negligence on

the part of the medical institution/practitioner when the latter commits a violation of
law, i.e., the act of denying the emergency patient's admission to the health facility
during an emergency/serious situation pursuant to an established policy/practice of
demanding deposits/advance payments for confinement or treatment, which RA 10932
considers a violation of law.
The presumption of negligence when a statutory duty has been violated.
While the petitioner posits the view that this is unconstitutional because the plaintiff, in
medical malpractice cases, must first prove that negligence was indeed committed, it
should be noted that under Philippine law, the violation of a statutory duty may be
treated either as a circumstance which establishes a presumption of negligence,
negligence per se, or a circumstance which should be considered together with other
circumstances as evidence of negligence. 19
The Court held in F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals20 that the failure of the
therein petitioner to construct a firewall in accordance with certain city ordinances in
itself sufficed to support a finding of negligence.
In Cipriano v. Court of Appeals,21 finding that the failure of the therein petitioner to

register and insure his auto rustproofing shop in accordance with Presidential Decree
No. 1572 constituted negligence per se, the Court held that "[t]here is thus a statutory
duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this duty that he was
guilty of negligence rendering him liable for damages to private respondent." 22
Hence, creating a presumption of negligence based on the violation of a

statutory duty is not legally infirm.
The violation of a statutory duty as the proximate cause of an injury
The petitioner also faults Section 5 of RA 10932 for supposedly presuming that the
illegal act of the medical institution/practitioner, i.e., denying the emergency patient's
admission to the health facility during an emergency/serious situation pursuant to an
established policy/practice of demanding deposits/advance payments for confinement
or treatment, is the proximate cause of the injury or death of the patient. The petitioner
argues that in medical malpractice cases, the act or omission complained of must be
established as the proximate cause of the injury or death.
In this respect, the pronouncement of the Court in Teague v. Fernandez,23 is

instructive:
"x x x [I]f the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented
by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to
be the proximate cause of the injury." x x x
"The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence,
negligence as a matter of law, or, according to the decisions on the question,
negligence per se, for the reason that non-observance of what the legislature has
prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an
ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as
so liable to injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act
is a breach of duty with respect to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has
been otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure
to conform to such standard is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in
and of itself, in the absence of a legal excuse. According to this view it is
immaterial, where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission constituting
such violation would have been regarded as negligence in the absence of any statute on
the subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that
injury would result from such violation. x x x"24 (Italics in the original omitted;
emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Otherwise stated, when a statute is created in order to prevent a certain injury, and
such injury occurs when the statute is violated, then the violation of the statute will be
deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury.
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, since Section 5 of RA 10932 contemplates a
situation wherein death, permanent disability, serious impairment of the health
condition of the patient-complainant, etc. occurs, which are the very injuries
intended to be prevented by the introduction of RA 10932, then the acts violative
of RA 10932 will be presumed to be the proximate cause of the death or serious injury.

In any case, the Presumption of Liability Clause does not create a conclusive
presumption that the defendant is automatically guilty of medical malpractice. What
the provision merely does is to shift the burden to the defendant to prove that
there was another act or event that was the proximate cause of the
death/injury.
The presumption of liability recognized under Philippine Law
Under various legal provisions and established legal doctrines, it is well recognized that
liability may, at certain times, be disputably presumed when certain acts have been
committed or when a certain set of conditions is present which has a reasonable or
rational connection with the fact presumed.
For instance, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is well-recognized in this jurisdiction,
wherein in a situation in which the thing causing the injury complained of is shown to
be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care, it is presumed, in the absence of sufficient explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care of the latter. 25
As another example, Article 1387 of the Civil Code provides that alienation of property
for valuable consideration made by a person against whom an unsatisfied judgment is
outstanding raises a presumption of fraud. 26
Similarly, under Article 1265 of the Civil Code, whenever a thing is lost in the
possession of the debtor, it shall be presumed that the loss was due to his fault, unless
there is proof to the contrary, and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1165.
With respect to common carriers, Article 1735 of the Civil Code states that if goods
under the care of common carriers are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, then the
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. In
relation to the foregoing, Article 1752 of the Civil Code even dictates that despite the
presence of an agreement limiting the liability of the common carrier in the vigilance
over the goods, the common carrier is nevertheless disputably presumed to have been
negligent in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration.
In the same way, according to Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.
With respect to motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2185 of the Civil Code provides that
unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he/she was violating any traffic
regulation.
Moreover, under Article 2188 of the Civil Code, there is prima facie presumption of
negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his
possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except
when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business.
In addition, and as already explained above, it is a settled rule that when a statute is
created in order to prevent a certain injury, and such injury occurred when the statute
was violated, the violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of
the injury.27 Jurisprudence has also recognized that the violation of a statutory duty
may be treated either as a circumstance which establishes a presumption of negligence,
negligence per se, or a circumstance which should be considered together with other
circumstances as evidence of negligence. 28
In fact, under Section 3(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the disputable presumption
that an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent is sufficient, unless satisfactorily
contradicted.
Hence, considering the foregoing provisions of law and established doctrines in

jurisprudence providing for the presumption of liability, the Presumption of Liability
Clause under Section 5 of RA 10932 is not at all a novel provision of law.
Similar to the abovementioned provisions and doctrines on the presumption of liability,

Section 5 merely creates a disputable presumption of liability over the death or injury
of a patient on the part of the medical practitioner and/or institution in a situation
wherein a violation of a statutory duty is committed, in which such violation has, at the
very least, a reasonable and rational connection to the death or injury that occurred.
The Presumption of Liability Clause does not violate the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
The notion of presuming liability has been so accepted in Philippine law that it has even
found application with respect to the more stringent and rigid concept of criminal
liability.
The Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of penal statutes that provide for
a prima facie evidence of guilt, shifting the burden of proof to the accused, despite the
elementary rule that the prosecution has the burden of establishing proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, neither can the argument be made that the Presumption of
Liability Clause infringes on the constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
To illustrate, under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the failure of a public officer
to have duly forthcoming public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use.
Also, under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
4885, the drawer of a check is given three (3) days to make good the said check by
depositing the necessary funds to cover the amount thereof; otherwise, a, prima
facie presumption will arise as to the existence of fraud, which is an element of the
crime of estafa.
In Bañares v. Court of Appeals,29 citing People v. Mingoa,30 the Court held that, contrary
to petitioner PHAPi's theory on the supposed infringement of the constitutional
presumption of innocence, there is no constitutional objection to a law providing that
the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded
upon the experience of human conduct:
There is, of course, no constitutional objection to a law providing that the

presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption
founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence
shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence. The legislature
may provide for prima facie evidence of guilt of the accused and shift the burden of
proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the
ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the
others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection
between the two in common experience.31 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Applying the foregoing to the Presumption of Liability Clause, considering that it
envisions a situation wherein a person who is in extremely urgent need of medical
attention is denied treatment by a medical institution/practitioner due to an illegal
policy or practice of demanding deposits/advance payments for confinement or
treatment, and such person dies or is seriously injured immediately thereafter, there is
undoubtedly a reasonable connection between the illegal act committed and the
ultimate fact presumed, i.e., liability for the death or injury of the emergency patient.
Such connection is not unreasonable and arbitrary, considering that death or

serious injury would be the rational and logical outcome/consequence when a
person experiencing an extremely urgent medical situation was not given
timely medical attention due to a policy or practice expressly prohibited by
law.
Finally, Sections 7 and 8 of RA 10932 do not violate the Constitution.
Lastly, the petitioner seeks to declare Sections 7 and 8 32 of RA 10932 unconstitutional
because the said provisions, which provide that PhilHealth reimbursement, Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office assistance, and tax deductions shall only cover basic
emergency care provided to poor, indigent, or marginalized patients, supposedly violate
the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause does not call for absolute equality. What it simply requires
is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the
equal protection clause permits classification. 33
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test
has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 34
First, a belabored discussion is not needed to explain that there are substantial
distinctions as to the medical treatment of poor, indigent, and marginalized patients
and that of patients who can very well afford medical treatment. It is self-explanatory
that poor, indigent, and marginalized patients are differently situated as compared to
affluent and well-off patients who have the means to avail themselves of medical
treatment. Further, the special treatment of poor, indigent, and marginalized patients
under RA 10932 is very much germane to the purpose of the law. In fact, the 1987
Constitution itself mandates that the State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential
goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable
cost, wherein there shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children.35 Lastly, it is not limited to existing conditions only and
that the questioned proviso .is equally apply to all members of the same class.
Given the foregoing reasons, I concur with the ponencia and vote to DISMISS the

instant Petition.

Endnotes:
1
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-HOSPITAL DEPOSIT LAW BY INCREASING THE
PENALTIES FOR THE REFUSAL OF HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS TO ADMINISTER
APPROPRIATE INITIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT AND SUPPORT IN EMERGENCY OR
SERIOUS CASES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLLANG 702,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "AN ACT PROHIBITING THE DEMAND OF DEPOSITS OR
ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR THE CONFINEMENT OR TREATMENT OF PATIENTS IN
HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS IN CERTAIN CASES", AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 8344, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
2
See Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 73 (2009).
3
Id. at 73.
4
Id.
5
Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 892 (2003).
6
Ocampo v. Enriquez, 798 Phil. 227, 288 (2016).
7
Id. at 288.
8
Id.
9
Board ofOptometry v. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187, 1206 (1996).
10
Ocampo v. Enriquez, supra note 6, at 289-290.
11
Id. at 290.
12
SECTION 1. In emergency or serious cases, it shall be unlawful for any proprietor,
president, director, manager or any other officer, and/or medical practitioner or
employee of a hospital or medical clinic to request, solicit, demand or accept any
deposit or any other form of advance payment as a prerequisite for administering basic
emergency care to any patient, confinement or medical treatment of a patient in such
hospital or medical clinic or to refuse to administer medical treatment and support as
dictated by good practice of medicine to prevent death, or permanent disability, or in
the case of a pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, or
noninstitutional delivery: Provided, That by reason of inadequacy of the medical
capabilities of the hospital or medical clinic, the attending physician may transfer the
patient to a facility where the appropriate care can be given, after the patient or his
next of kin consents to said transfer and after the receiving hospital or medical clinic
agrees to the transfer: Provided, however, That when the patient is unconscious,
incapable of giving consent and/or unaccompanied, the physician can transfer the
patient even without his consent: Provided, further, That such transfer shall be done
only after necessary emergency treatment and support have been administered to
stabilize the patient and after it has been established that such transfer entails less
risks than the patient's continued confinement: Provided, furthermore, That no hospital
or clinic, after being informed of the medical indications for such transfer, shall refuse
to receive the patient nor demand from the patient or his next of kin any deposit or
advance payment: Provided, finally, That strict compliance with the foregoing procedure
on transfer shall not be construed as a refusal made punishable by this Act.
13
See Lucas v. Tuaño, 604 Phil. 98, 125 (2009).
14
RA 10932, Sec. 1.
15
more than two (2) years and four (4) months, or a fine of not less than One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00), but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) or both, at the discretion of the court: Provided, however, That if such
than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), but not more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) or both, at the discretion of the court, without prejudice to damages
that may be awarded to the patient-complainant: Provided, further, That upon three (3)
repeated violations committed pursuant to an established policy of the hospital or clinic
or upon the instruction of its management, the health facility's license to operate shall
be revoked by the DOH. The president, chairman, board of directors, or trustees, and
other officers of the health facility shall be solidarily liable for damages that may be
awarded by the court to the patient-complainant.
16
People v. Millora, 252 Phil. 105, 122 (1989).
17
23 Phil. 279, 289 (1912).
18
1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 15.
19
See Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, 483 Phil. 756, 766-767 (2004).
20
247-A Phil. 51, 56 (1988).
21
331 Phil. 1019 (1996).
22
Id. at 1027.
23
151-A Phil. 648 (1973).
24
Id. at 652.

25
Spouses Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 123 Phil. 272, 281-282 (1966).
26
See Ramos v. Cho Chun Chac, 54 Phil. 713, 715 (1930).
27
Teague v. Fernandez, supra note 23, at 652.
28
Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19.
29
271 Phil. 886 (1991).
30
92 Phil. 856, 858-859 (1953).
31
Bañares v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, at 897.
32
SEC. 7. PhilHealth Reimbursement of Basic Emergency Care. — PhilHealth shall
reimburse the cost of basic emergency care and transportation services incurred by the
hospital or medical clinic for the emergency medical services given to poor and indigent
patients. Furthermore, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) shall provide
medical assistance for the basic emergency care needs of the poor and marginalized
groups.
SEC. 8. Tax Deductions. — Other expenses incurred by the hospital or medical clinic in
providing basic emergency care to poor and indigent patients not reimbursed by
PhilHealth shall be tax deductible.
33
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 459 (2010).
34
Id. at 459.
35
1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XIII, Sec. 11.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
RANCISCO GUERRERO, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Former

Special Seventh Division), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALABON, BRANCH 72,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ELEMENTS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. — For
double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: ". . . It is a settled rule
that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or
the second offense includes or its necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. And legal
jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
2. ID.; ID.; WHEN THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS DEEMED VIOLATED. — The right to
speedy trial is violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive
delay without the participation or fault of the accused, or when unjustified
postponements are sought which prolong the trial for unreasonable lengths of time.
3. ID.; ID.; SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES; CONSTRUED. — The case of Caballero v.

Alfonso, Jr., 153, SCRA 153, 162-163 (August 21, 1987), laid down the guidelines in
determining the applicability of the "speedy disposition" formula: ". . .’[S]peedy
disposition of cases’ is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of ‘speedy
trial’ accorded an accused in all criminal proceedings, ‘speedy disposition of cases’ is a
flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What
the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which
render rights nugatory. In the determination of whether or not the right to a ‘speedy
trial’ has been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each
other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to
assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered
in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the
administration of justice has violated the ‘speedy disposition of cases’ guarantee." cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PARTY’S INDIVIDUAL RIGHT SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE PEOPLE’S
RIGHT TO PUBLIC JUSTICE. — While this Court recognizes the right to speedy
disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has
always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not
attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party’s individual
rights should not work against and preclude the people’s equally important right to
public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of the
airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of
the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has
completely failed to assert his right seasonably and respondent judge was not in a
position to dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we
hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court
to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"Does the constitutional right to a speedy trial include the right to a prompt disposition
and judgment?" This is the question posed before this Court in the instant petition for
review under Rule 45 seeking to set aside (a) the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2
promulgated on February 18, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 237237; and (b) the Resolution
promulgated on September 10, 1992 denying the motion for reconsideration.
By a resolution dated November 13, 1995, the First Division of this Court transferred
this case, along with several others, to the Third. After careful deliberation and
consultation on the petition, comment, reply, memoranda and other submission of the
parties, this Court assigned the writing of this Decision to the undersigned ponente.
The Facts
The antecedents are not disputed. As summarized by the Solicitor General in his
memorandum, they are as follows: 3
"On November 16, 1971, an Information for Triple Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against petitioner before the Court of First Instance, Branch
XXXV, Caloocan City, presided by Judge Manuel A. Argel, and docketed as Criminal
Case No. C-2073, which reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘That on or about the 13th day of May, 1969, in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being then the pilot of non-commercial Aircraft, type Camanche PA-24-250
with registration marking PI-C515, then in-charge of, and has complete responsibility
for, the maintenance and operation of said aircraft, without taking the necessary care
and precaution to avoid accidents or injuries to persons, and without ascertaining as to
whether the quantity of fuel in the tanks of said aircraft was sufficient for the flight from
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija to MIA, Parañaque, Rizal, did, then and willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously operate, fly, pilot, maneuver and/or conduct the flight of said aircraft from
the airport at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija with four (4) passengers on board, and while the
said aircraft was already airborne after several minutes, the engine quitted twice
indicating that there was no more fuel, prompting the accused to make an emergency
manner landing on a fishpond which he executed in a careless, negligent and imprudent
manner in the Piper Camanche Owner’s Handbook, and as a result of the improper
execution of said emergency landing, the aircraft’s landing gear collided with a dike and
trees near the fishpond in Malabon, Rizal, resulting to the fatal injuries in three (3)
passengers, namely, Cpl. Teodoro Neric, Jose Mari Garcia and Lourdes Garcia which
directly caused their deaths.
Contrary to law.’
Due to several postponements, all filed by the petitioner, the prosecution was finally
able to start presenting its evidence on September 29, 1972 after petitioner entered his
pleas of ‘Not Guilty.’
On August 19, 1975, the prosecution finally rested its case.

On February 7, 1978, the defense rested its case.
On March 16, 1978, the hearing was terminated and the parties were ordered by Judge
Argel to submit their respective memoranda.
On January 19, 1979, Judge Bernardo P. Pardo who ostensibly took over as presiding
judge vice Judge Argel, granted private prosecutor’s omnibus motion to file
memorandum up to January 29, 1979.
On December 21, 1979, petitioner filed his memorandum.
It would appear that from the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch XXXV, the case was
subsequently assigned to Branch CXXV presided over by Judge Alfredo Gorgonio who
apparently did not take action thereon.
On January 30, 1989, Court Administrator Meynardo Tiro ordered the re-raffling of the
case from the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch CXXV to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon
which, under the provisions of B.P. 129, had jurisdiction over the case.
The case, now docketed as Criminal Cased No. 7356-MN, was raffled to presiding judge
Benjamin N. Aquino of the RTC, Navotas-Malabon, Branch 72.
On March 14, 1990, Judge Aquino ordered the parties to follow-up and complete the
transcript of stenographic notes within 30 days considering that the same was found to
be incomplete.
On April 29, 1990, since the parties were not able to complete the transcript of
stenographic notes, the court ordered the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses.
On May 15, 1990, the private prosecutor submitted copies of the duplicate originals of
the testimonies of Eusebio Garcia and Elena Obidosa (December 11, 1969), Celestino
Nazareno (March 16, 1973), Cenen Miras (April 27, 1973), Ariston Agustin (February
10, 1977) and Francisco Guerrero (December 5 and 19, 1977). The private prosecutor
manifested that he had communicated with one of the stenographers on record, Ms.
Remedios S. Delfin, who promised to look into her files and hopefully complete the
transcription of her stenographic notes.
On October 1, 1990, the presiding Judge set the retaking of the witnesses’ testimony on
October 24, 1990.
On October 24, 1990, the retaking of the testimonies was reset to November 9, 1990
due to petitioner’s failure to appear on the scheduled hearing.
On November 7, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right
to speedy trial has been violated.
On November 9, 1990, presiding Judge denied the motion to dismiss and reset the
retaking of the testimonies to November 21, 1990.
On November 16, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
on November 21, 1990. The presiding Judge set anew the retaking of the testimonies to
December 5, 1990.
Hence, petitioner filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for the review
of the orders of the Regional Trial Court dated November 9, 1990 and November 20,
1990 anent petitioner’s motion to dismiss, as well as his motion for reconsideration.
The petition was anchored on the alleged violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to
speedy trial.
In its decision which was promulgated on February 18, 1992, the Honorable Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. In a resolution dated September 10, 1992, petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied.”
Errors Assigned
Petitioner now assigns the following errors 4 against the respondent Court.
"I.
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the re-hearing of the instant
case will not suit the intended purpose and will only result in untold prejudice to the
petitioner.
II.
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the petitioner is entitled to a
dismissal of the criminal case equivalent to an acquittal on the merits based on the
violation of his right to speedy trial resulting from the failure to render a prompt
disposition of judgment." cralaw virtua1aw library
The First Issue: Untold Prejudice
Petitioner claims that through no fault of his, seven of the ten witnesses who testified
for the accused will no longer be able to testify anew.
So too, three witnesses for the prosecution have died and thus would not be able to
appear during the re-hearing. And even if all witnesses would be able to testify again,
"the passage of a long period of time spanning more than two decades since the
incident complained of will tend to confuse or hinder than aid the accurate recall of the
facts and circumstances of the case," as follows 5 : jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Capt. Ricardo B. Stohner of the Civil Aeronautics Administration has reportedly
migrated to either the U.S.A. or Canada, after he retired from CAA about eight (8)
years ago. Capt. Stohnner’s indispensable testimony as an expert witness as well as to
his personal knowledge of certain material facts as described in Francisco Guerrero’s
Memorandum of 17 December 1979, crucial to the defense, is now lost to the
petitioner.
(b) Eduardo V. Guerrero, a son of Francisco Guerrero, has been undergoing psychiatric
treatment for more than two years now, as he is suffering from chronic mental illness.
He is in no condition to testify. Copies of medical certificates on Eduardo’s condition
were submitted to the respondent courts as annexes to various pleadings.
(c) Rosario V. Guerrero, wife of Francisco Guerrero, was operated on last August for
tumor of the colon and is still suffering a partial disability. She is under medical advice
to avoid activities which may cause her stress, including testifying in court. Copies of
medical certificates on Mrs. Guerrero’s operation and condition were submitted to the
respondent courts as annexes to various pleadings.
(d) The whereabouts of Alberto Atanacio, Rodolfo Fontanilla, Editha Pangilinan, and
Rizal and Belen Macabole, are unknown, and despite diligent efforts exerted by
petitioner, they have not been found up to the present." cralaw virtua1aw library
At this point, this argument is premature and at best speculative. As to whether the
witnesses for the defense would be available at the trial, and if available, whether they
will still be in a position to recall the events that transpired in the case more than
twenty five years ago is a questions of fact which cannot be determined now. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General in his memorandum: 6
"Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the whereabouts of his witnesses (except Rizal and
Evelyn Macabole) are ascertainable should a diligent search may be made by him. This
can be gleaned from the return of the subpoena dated October 1, 1990 which forms
part of the record of the case. Eduardo Guerrero and Rosario Guerrero were
respectively served with subpoena and their alleged mental and physical incapacity to
testify should best be left to the assessment of respondent trial court. Edith (sic)
Pangilinan was notified of the retaking and is, thus, available. Alberto Atanacio and
Rodolfo Fontanilla, on the other hand, are in Lucena City. The exact whereabouts of the
last two witnesses can be ascertained if diligent efforts were exerted to locate them." cralaw virtua1aw library
The alleged unavailability of the witnesses for the prosecution should not be the
concern of the petitioner at this time. The burned of proving his guilt rests upon the
prosecution. And if the prosecution fails for any reason to present evidence sufficient to
show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, he will acquitted.
". . . The burden of proof rests upon the prosecution and unless the State succeeds in
proving his guilt, the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant
applies. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused-appellant could be laid
the responsibility of the offense charged." 7
". . . [C]ourts must exert utmost scrupulousness in evaluating the evidence of the
prosecution for it is elementary that the conviction of an accused must rest on the
strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense (People v. Cruz,
215 SCRA 339 ([1992]). The prosecution must overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence by proof beyond reasonable doubt; otherwise, the acquittal
of the accused is ineluctably demanded. . . ." 8
". . . It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution discharges
its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need
not even offer evidence in his behalf. Acquittal then of the accused-appellant is in
order." 9
On this matter, the respondent Court, 10 citing the assailed order of the trial court,
argues that there are really only two witnesses of the prosecution whose testimonies
need to be retaken and the rehearing should not really present a monumental problem;
"With only two (2) witnesses of the prosecution to be presented, coupled with a
promise of expeditiousness by respondent Judge, the Court is of the view that
petitioner’s misgivings are rather exaggerated. And as to his expressed fear that his
own witnesses for the defense can no longer testify ‘in the same manner as before,’ the
same Order well and truly states in adequate refutation that —
‘. . . the fear that the witnesses to the incident which occurred in 1969 may no longer
have the same perception of what they saw and, therefore, would not be able to testify
in Court in the same manner they originally testified is not the concern of the defense
but of the prosecution. If the prosecution witnesses cannot give convincing testimony in
the retaking of their testimony, that is the worry of the prosecution. It is not even
unfair to the accused if his witnesses cannot testify in the same convincing manner that
they testified before as long as the prosecution witnesses are convincing. Everything in
a criminal prosecution should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused and strictly
against the state.’ . . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent petitioner’s contention that the re-hearing would place him in double jeopardy,
suffice it to say that there has been no termination of the criminal prosecution — i.e. of
that "first jeopardy." For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must
concur:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or
is a frustration thereof (Citations omitted).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(Citation omitted)." 11
In the present case, there has not even been a first jeopardy, since the fourth element
— dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused — is
not present. Moreover, measured against the aforequoted standard, the re-taking of
testimonies cannot in any wise be deemed a second jeopardy. Hence, it is beyond
dispute that petitioner’s claim of double jeopardy is utterly without basis.
The Second Issue: Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition
True, indeed, the 1987 Constitution provides the right not only to a speed trial but also
to a speedy judgment after trial when in Section 16, Article III, it provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative bodies."cralaw virtua1aw library
Hence, the Constitution mandates dispatch not only in the trial stage but also in the
disposition thereof, warranting dismissals in case of violations thereof without the fault
of the party concerned, not just the accused.
In the recent case of People v. Leviste, 12 , this Court citing Gonzales v.

Sandiganbayan 13 and People v. Tampal, 14 reiterated the ruling that the right to
On the other hand, the case of Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 15 laid down the guidelines in
determining the applicability of the "speedy disposition" formula: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . .’(S)peedy disposition of cases’ is a relative term. Just like the constitutional
guarantee of ‘speedy trial’ accorded an accused in all criminal proceedings, ‘speedy
disposition of cases’ is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
In the determination of whether or not the right to a ‘speedy trial’ has been violated,
certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length,
of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice
caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered in answering judicial
inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the administration of justice has
violated the ‘speedy disposition of case’ guarantee." cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was
submitted for resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was re-
raffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after
respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to
follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that matters started to get
moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the new
trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of
petitioner’s absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused
suddenly became zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
While it may be said that it was not petitioner’s fault that the stenographic notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses were not transcribed, yet neither was it the prosecution’s.
The respondent trial judge can hardly be faulted either because he could not have
rendered the decision without the transcripts in question. Let it be remembered that he
was the judge who conducted the trial and hence he would not have had sufficient basis
to make a disposition in the absence of the said transcripts. As respondent Court of
Appeals noted: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Indeed, it can be gleaned from the pleadings on file that the case was assigned to
respondent Judge only in late 1989 or early 1990, and that he took prompt action
thereon by setting the case for retaking of testimonies, obviously as a prelude to
judgment. The case then was finally making progress toward termination. For such
dispatch and diligence, respondent Judge hardly deserves condemnation. Petitioner also
faults the prosecution for its failure ‘to follow up the status of the case." cralaw virtua1aw library
As regards the other judges to whom the case was assigned prior to 1989, the accused
himself could not pinpoint the cause of the problem: 16
"2) Reason for the delay — No one knows why the Presiding Judge (Manuel A. Argel) of
the respondent court who heard the trial did not render a decision during his tenure. No
one knows either why another former Presiding Judge (Alfredo Gorgonio) failed to turn
over the case to the Malabon court during the Judiciary Reorganization under B.P. Bldg.
129.
It appears later on that the case became a victim of neglect and languished in the court
docket. Non surprisingly, since the risk of such loss through neglect and other causes
grew with each passing year, part of the records and several transcripts were lost in the
time of the case lay unattended. Before being finally assigned to the respondent trial
court, the case was shuttled from court to court through various indorsements of
Executive Judges and the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court as a result of the
confusion as to which court had territorial jurisdiction over it."
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his
own right to speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge resent the case for
rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to asleep on his right
— a situation amounting to laches — had the respondent judge not taken the initiative
of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy precisely
so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if
during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989
when the case was re-raffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which
was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, 17 or at least made
some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the
stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his
silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right
to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection
from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the
same time, we hold that a party’s individual rights should not work against and
preclude the people’s equally important right to public justice. In the instant case, three
people died as a result of the crash of the airplane but that the accused was flying. It
appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the
accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his
right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose
of the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and
equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense)
substantial justice in the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The respondent trial court is directed to proceed
with judicious dispatch in the re-taking of testimonies and in concluding the case in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, pp. 42-51.
2. Seventh Division, composed of J. Serafin E. Camilon, ponente, JJ., Celso L. Magsino

and Artemon Luna, members.
3. Rollo, pp. 171-174.
4. Rollo, p. 17.
5. Petition, pp. 14-15; rollo, 18-19.
6. Rollo, pp. 221-222.
7. People v. Eslaban, 218 SCRA 534, 544 (February 8, 1993).
8. People v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA 116, 120 (August 4, 1994).
9. People v. Sulit, 233 SCRA 117, 125 (June 14, 1994).
10. CA Decision, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 44-45.
11. People v. Puno, 208 SCRA 550, 557 (May 8, 1992). See also People v. Assuncion,
208 SCRA 231, 239 (April 22, 1992), Gorion v. Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Br. 17,
213 SCRA 138, 148 (August 31, 1992), and Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA
575, 581 (October 13, 1994).
12. G.R. No. 104386 (March 28, 1996).
13. 199 SCRA 298 (July 16, 1991).
14. 244 SCRA 202 (May 22, 1995).
15. 153 SCRA 153, 162-163 (August 21, 1987).
16. Petition, p. 24; rollo, p. 28.
17. The 1987 Constitution was ratified and took effect on February 2, 1987, per People
v. Albofera, 159 SCRA 523, 524 (April 8, 1988); also, Dytiapco v. Civil Service
Commission, 211 SCRA 88, 94 (July 3, 1992). See also Republic of the Philippines
(PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading Corp. & Allied Banking Corp., G.R. No.
112708-09 (March 29, 1996), at p. 47.
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight
steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight
standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to
166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and
Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an
extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work
once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on
leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight,
petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the
PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily
complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two
weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to
report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another
set of weight check dates, which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of
Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight
requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those
similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency”
extended to him “which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5)
years,” his services were considered terminated “effective immediately.”
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in
view of the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need
not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper
the performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally
dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight
standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by
petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being
overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion
than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to
keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims
that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to
1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper
attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory
hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is
could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is
yes. I can do it now.”
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the
assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of
his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e)
of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may
not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
“[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the
employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions.
This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be
in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of
intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational

qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can
show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for
performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company
policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.”
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to

safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely
on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on
board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing
strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for
cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act
of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for
serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
from Atty. Renes^^
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[G.R. No. 107211. June 28, 1996.]
FRANCISCO GUERRERO, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Former

Special Seventh Division), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALABON, BRANCH 72,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ELEMENTS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. — For

double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: ". . . It is a settled rule
that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must concur: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or
the second offense includes or its necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. And legal
jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
2. ID.; ID.; WHEN THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS DEEMED VIOLATED. — The right to
3. ID.; ID.; SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES; CONSTRUED. — The case of Caballero v.

Alfonso, Jr., 153, SCRA 153, 162-163 (August 21, 1987), laid down the guidelines in
determining the applicability of the "speedy disposition" formula: ". . .’[S]peedy
disposition of cases’ is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of ‘speedy
trial’ accorded an accused in all criminal proceedings, ‘speedy disposition of cases’ is a
flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What
the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which
render rights nugatory. In the determination of whether or not the right to a ‘speedy
trial’ has been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each
other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to
assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered
in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the
administration of justice has violated the ‘speedy disposition of cases’ guarantee." cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PARTY’S INDIVIDUAL RIGHT SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE PEOPLE’S
RIGHT TO PUBLIC JUSTICE. — While this Court recognizes the right to speedy
disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has
always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not
attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party’s individual
rights should not work against and preclude the people’s equally important right to
public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of the
airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of
the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has
completely failed to assert his right seasonably and respondent judge was not in a
position to dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we
hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court
to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"Does the constitutional right to a speedy trial include the right to a prompt disposition
and judgment?" This is the question posed before this Court in the instant petition for
review under Rule 45 seeking to set aside (a) the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2
promulgated on February 18, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 237237; and (b) the Resolution
promulgated on September 10, 1992 denying the motion for reconsideration.
By a resolution dated November 13, 1995, the First Division of this Court transferred
this case, along with several others, to the Third. After careful deliberation and
consultation on the petition, comment, reply, memoranda and other submission of the
parties, this Court assigned the writing of this Decision to the undersigned ponente.
The Facts
The antecedents are not disputed. As summarized by the Solicitor General in his
memorandum, they are as follows: 3
"On November 16, 1971, an Information for Triple Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against petitioner before the Court of First Instance, Branch
XXXV, Caloocan City, presided by Judge Manuel A. Argel, and docketed as Criminal
Case No. C-2073, which reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘That on or about the 13th day of May, 1969, in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being then the pilot of non-commercial Aircraft, type Camanche PA-24-250
with registration marking PI-C515, then in-charge of, and has complete responsibility
for, the maintenance and operation of said aircraft, without taking the necessary care
and precaution to avoid accidents or injuries to persons, and without ascertaining as to
whether the quantity of fuel in the tanks of said aircraft was sufficient for the flight from
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija to MIA, Parañaque, Rizal, did, then and willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously operate, fly, pilot, maneuver and/or conduct the flight of said aircraft from
the airport at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija with four (4) passengers on board, and while the
said aircraft was already airborne after several minutes, the engine quitted twice
indicating that there was no more fuel, prompting the accused to make an emergency
manner landing on a fishpond which he executed in a careless, negligent and imprudent
manner in the Piper Camanche Owner’s Handbook, and as a result of the improper
execution of said emergency landing, the aircraft’s landing gear collided with a dike and
trees near the fishpond in Malabon, Rizal, resulting to the fatal injuries in three (3)
passengers, namely, Cpl. Teodoro Neric, Jose Mari Garcia and Lourdes Garcia which
directly caused their deaths.
Contrary to law.’
Due to several postponements, all filed by the petitioner, the prosecution was finally
able to start presenting its evidence on September 29, 1972 after petitioner entered his
pleas of ‘Not Guilty.’
On August 19, 1975, the prosecution finally rested its case.
On February 7, 1978, the defense rested its case.
On March 16, 1978, the hearing was terminated and the parties were ordered by Judge
Argel to submit their respective memoranda.
On January 19, 1979, Judge Bernardo P. Pardo who ostensibly took over as presiding
judge vice Judge Argel, granted private prosecutor’s omnibus motion to file
memorandum up to January 29, 1979.
On December 21, 1979, petitioner filed his memorandum.
It would appear that from the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch XXXV, the case was
subsequently assigned to Branch CXXV presided over by Judge Alfredo Gorgonio who
apparently did not take action thereon.
On January 30, 1989, Court Administrator Meynardo Tiro ordered the re-raffling of the
case from the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch CXXV to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon
which, under the provisions of B.P. 129, had jurisdiction over the case.
The case, now docketed as Criminal Cased No. 7356-MN, was raffled to presiding judge
Benjamin N. Aquino of the RTC, Navotas-Malabon, Branch 72.
On March 14, 1990, Judge Aquino ordered the parties to follow-up and complete the
transcript of stenographic notes within 30 days considering that the same was found to
be incomplete.
On April 29, 1990, since the parties were not able to complete the transcript of
stenographic notes, the court ordered the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses.
On May 15, 1990, the private prosecutor submitted copies of the duplicate originals of
the testimonies of Eusebio Garcia and Elena Obidosa (December 11, 1969), Celestino
Nazareno (March 16, 1973), Cenen Miras (April 27, 1973), Ariston Agustin (February
10, 1977) and Francisco Guerrero (December 5 and 19, 1977). The private prosecutor
manifested that he had communicated with one of the stenographers on record, Ms.
Remedios S. Delfin, who promised to look into her files and hopefully complete the
transcription of her stenographic notes.
On October 1, 1990, the presiding Judge set the retaking of the witnesses’ testimony on
October 24, 1990.
On October 24, 1990, the retaking of the testimonies was reset to November 9, 1990
due to petitioner’s failure to appear on the scheduled hearing.
On November 7, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right
to speedy trial has been violated.
On November 9, 1990, presiding Judge denied the motion to dismiss and reset the
retaking of the testimonies to November 21, 1990.
On November 16, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
on November 21, 1990. The presiding Judge set anew the retaking of the testimonies to
December 5, 1990.
Hence, petitioner filed petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for the review
of the orders of the Regional Trial Court dated November 9, 1990 and November 20,
1990 anent petitioner’s motion to dismiss, as well as his motion for reconsideration.
The petition was anchored on the alleged violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to
speedy trial.
In its decision which was promulgated on February 18, 1992, the Honorable Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. In a resolution dated September 10, 1992, petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied.”
Errors Assigned
Petitioner now assigns the following errors 4 against the respondent Court.
"I.
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the re-hearing of the instant
case will not suit the intended purpose and will only result in untold prejudice to the
petitioner.
II.
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the petitioner is entitled to a
dismissal of the criminal case equivalent to an acquittal on the merits based on the
violation of his right to speedy trial resulting from the failure to render a prompt
disposition of judgment." cralaw virtua1aw library
The First Issue: Untold Prejudice
Petitioner claims that through no fault of his, seven of the ten witnesses who testified
for the accused will no longer be able to testify anew.
So too, three witnesses for the prosecution have died and thus would not be able to
appear during the re-hearing. And even if all witnesses would be able to testify again,
"the passage of a long period of time spanning more than two decades since the
incident complained of will tend to confuse or hinder than aid the accurate recall of the
facts and circumstances of the case," as follows 5 : jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Capt. Ricardo B. Stohner of the Civil Aeronautics Administration has reportedly
migrated to either the U.S.A. or Canada, after he retired from CAA about eight (8)
years ago. Capt. Stohnner’s indispensable testimony as an expert witness as well as to
his personal knowledge of certain material facts as described in Francisco Guerrero’s
Memorandum of 17 December 1979, crucial to the defense, is now lost to the
petitioner.
(b) Eduardo V. Guerrero, a son of Francisco Guerrero, has been undergoing psychiatric
treatment for more than two years now, as he is suffering from chronic mental illness.
He is in no condition to testify. Copies of medical certificates on Eduardo’s condition
were submitted to the respondent courts as annexes to various pleadings.
(c) Rosario V. Guerrero, wife of Francisco Guerrero, was operated on last August for
tumor of the colon and is still suffering a partial disability. She is under medical advice
to avoid activities which may cause her stress, including testifying in court. Copies of
medical certificates on Mrs. Guerrero’s operation and condition were submitted to the
respondent courts as annexes to various pleadings.
(d) The whereabouts of Alberto Atanacio, Rodolfo Fontanilla, Editha Pangilinan, and
Rizal and Belen Macabole, are unknown, and despite diligent efforts exerted by
petitioner, they have not been found up to the present." cralaw virtua1aw library
At this point, this argument is premature and at best speculative. As to whether the
witnesses for the defense would be available at the trial, and if available, whether they
will still be in a position to recall the events that transpired in the case more than
twenty five years ago is a questions of fact which cannot be determined now. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General in his memorandum: 6
"Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the whereabouts of his witnesses (except Rizal and
Evelyn Macabole) are ascertainable should a diligent search may be made by him. This
can be gleaned from the return of the subpoena dated October 1, 1990 which forms
part of the record of the case. Eduardo Guerrero and Rosario Guerrero were
respectively served with subpoena and their alleged mental and physical incapacity to
testify should best be left to the assessment of respondent trial court. Edith (sic)
Pangilinan was notified of the retaking and is, thus, available. Alberto Atanacio and
Rodolfo Fontanilla, on the other hand, are in Lucena City. The exact whereabouts of the
last two witnesses can be ascertained if diligent efforts were exerted to locate them." cralaw virtua1aw library
The alleged unavailability of the witnesses for the prosecution should not be the
concern of the petitioner at this time. The burned of proving his guilt rests upon the
prosecution. And if the prosecution fails for any reason to present evidence sufficient to
show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, he will acquitted.
". . . The burden of proof rests upon the prosecution and unless the State succeeds in
proving his guilt, the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant
applies. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused-appellant could be laid
the responsibility of the offense charged." 7
". . . [C]ourts must exert utmost scrupulousness in evaluating the evidence of the
prosecution for it is elementary that the conviction of an accused must rest on the
strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense (People v. Cruz,
215 SCRA 339 ([1992]). The prosecution must overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence by proof beyond reasonable doubt; otherwise, the acquittal
of the accused is ineluctably demanded. . . ." 8
". . . It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution discharges
its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need
not even offer evidence in his behalf. Acquittal then of the accused-appellant is in
order." 9
On this matter, the respondent Court, 10 citing the assailed order of the trial court,
argues that there are really only two witnesses of the prosecution whose testimonies
need to be retaken and the rehearing should not really present a monumental problem;
"With only two (2) witnesses of the prosecution to be presented, coupled with a
promise of expeditiousness by respondent Judge, the Court is of the view that
petitioner’s misgivings are rather exaggerated. And as to his expressed fear that his
own witnesses for the defense can no longer testify ‘in the same manner as before,’ the
same Order well and truly states in adequate refutation that —
‘. . . the fear that the witnesses to the incident which occurred in 1969 may no longer
have the same perception of what they saw and, therefore, would not be able to testify
in Court in the same manner they originally testified is not the concern of the defense
but of the prosecution. If the prosecution witnesses cannot give convincing testimony in
the retaking of their testimony, that is the worry of the prosecution. It is not even
unfair to the accused if his witnesses cannot testify in the same convincing manner that
they testified before as long as the prosecution witnesses are convincing. Everything in
a criminal prosecution should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused and strictly
against the state.’ . . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent petitioner’s contention that the re-hearing would place him in double jeopardy,
suffice it to say that there has been no termination of the criminal prosecution — i.e. of
that "first jeopardy." For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must
concur:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or
is a frustration thereof (Citations omitted).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(Citation omitted)." 11
In the present case, there has not even been a first jeopardy, since the fourth element
— dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused — is
not present. Moreover, measured against the aforequoted standard, the re-taking of
testimonies cannot in any wise be deemed a second jeopardy. Hence, it is beyond
dispute that petitioner’s claim of double jeopardy is utterly without basis.
The Second Issue: Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition
True, indeed, the 1987 Constitution provides the right not only to a speed trial but also
to a speedy judgment after trial when in Section 16, Article III, it provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative bodies." cralaw virtua1aw library
Hence, the Constitution mandates dispatch not only in the trial stage but also in the
disposition thereof, warranting dismissals in case of violations thereof without the fault
of the party concerned, not just the accused.
In the recent case of People v. Leviste, 12 , this Court citing Gonzales v.

Sandiganbayan 13 and People v. Tampal, 14 reiterated the ruling that the right to
On the other hand, the case of Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 15 laid down the guidelines in
determining the applicability of the "speedy disposition" formula: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . .’(S)peedy disposition of cases’ is a relative term. Just like the constitutional
guarantee of ‘speedy trial’ accorded an accused in all criminal proceedings, ‘speedy
disposition of cases’ is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
In the determination of whether or not the right to a ‘speedy trial’ has been violated,
certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length,
of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice
caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered in answering judicial
inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the administration of justice has
violated the ‘speedy disposition of case’ guarantee." cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was
submitted for resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was re-
raffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after
respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to
follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that matters started to get
moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the new
trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of
petitioner’s absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused
suddenly became zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
While it may be said that it was not petitioner’s fault that the stenographic notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses were not transcribed, yet neither was it the prosecution’s.
The respondent trial judge can hardly be faulted either because he could not have
rendered the decision without the transcripts in question. Let it be remembered that he
was the judge who conducted the trial and hence he would not have had sufficient basis
to make a disposition in the absence of the said transcripts. As respondent Court of
Appeals noted: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Indeed, it can be gleaned from the pleadings on file that the case was assigned to
respondent Judge only in late 1989 or early 1990, and that he took prompt action
thereon by setting the case for retaking of testimonies, obviously as a prelude to
judgment. The case then was finally making progress toward termination. For such
dispatch and diligence, respondent Judge hardly deserves condemnation. Petitioner also
faults the prosecution for its failure ‘to follow up the status of the case." cralaw virtua1aw library
As regards the other judges to whom the case was assigned prior to 1989, the accused
himself could not pinpoint the cause of the problem: 16
"2) Reason for the delay — No one knows why the Presiding Judge (Manuel A. Argel) of
the respondent court who heard the trial did not render a decision during his tenure. No
one knows either why another former Presiding Judge (Alfredo Gorgonio) failed to turn
over the case to the Malabon court during the Judiciary Reorganization under B.P. Bldg.
129.
It appears later on that the case became a victim of neglect and languished in the court
docket. Non surprisingly, since the risk of such loss through neglect and other causes
grew with each passing year, part of the records and several transcripts were lost in the
time of the case lay unattended. Before being finally assigned to the respondent trial
court, the case was shuttled from court to court through various indorsements of
Executive Judges and the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court as a result of the
confusion as to which court had territorial jurisdiction over it."
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his
own right to speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge resent the case for
rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to asleep on his right
— a situation amounting to laches — had the respondent judge not taken the initiative
of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy precisely
so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if
during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989
when the case was re-raffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which
was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, 17 or at least made
some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the
stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his
silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right
to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection
from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the
same time, we hold that a party’s individual rights should not work against and
preclude the people’s equally important right to public justice. In the instant case, three
people died as a result of the crash of the airplane but that the accused was flying. It
appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the
accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his
right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose
of the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and
equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense)
substantial justice in the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The respondent trial court is directed to proceed
with judicious dispatch in the re-taking of testimonies and in concluding the case in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 1164. September 17, 1903. ]

MANUEL ALDEGUER, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HENRY

Jose M. Gay for Appellant.

Palma, Gerona & Mercado for Appellees.

1. CONTRACT; EVIDENCE; LOST WRITING; VESTED RIGHT. — Under the provisions of

2. ID.; ID.; RECITALS IN PUBLIC INSTRUMENT. — The recitals in a public instrument

3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. — The defense of the statute

4. ID.; NEW TRIAL; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. — To warrant the granting of a

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa and McDonough, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 1164. September 17, 1903. ]

MANUEL ALDEGUER, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HENRY

Jose M. Gay for Appellant.

Palma, Gerona & Mercado for Appellees.

1. CONTRACT; EVIDENCE; LOST WRITING; VESTED RIGHT. — Under the provisions of

2. ID.; ID.; RECITALS IN PUBLIC INSTRUMENT. — The recitals in a public instrument

3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. — The defense of the statute

4. ID.; NEW TRIAL; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. — To warrant the granting of a

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa and McDonough, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO,

E. M. Banzali for petitioner.

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's

Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing

But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.

FERIA, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library

I am sorry to dissent from the decision. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary

In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336,

Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the

It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the right

This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law

Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this

Petition is therefore granted.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library

In our concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Dequito and

In our opinion, section 11 of Rule 108 must be read, interpreted,

Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said

On the strength of the above quoted opinion the opinion should be

TUASON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito

It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural.

Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect

Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to

The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Montemayor, JJ.,

FERIA, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library

According to the resolution, the right of a defendant to be

First. Because "preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially

Secondly. Because, "preliminary investigation is not an essential

Lastly. Because, "the distinction between remedy and 'substantive

Before proceeding it is necessary to distinguish substantive law from

Substantive rights may be created or granted either in the

(1) As to the first argument, the premise "the preliminary

It is also not correct to affirm that section 11 of Rule 108 relating to