Strategic Foresight

and Warning:
Navigating
the Unknown
Helene Lavoix, Editor
Strategic Foresight and
Warning: Navigating the
Unknown

Helene Lavoix, Editor

CONTENTS
Foreword i
Kumar Ramakrishna

Strategic Foresight and Warning: An Introduction 1

Helene Lavoix

Risks and Opportunities: The Role of Strategic Foresight and Warning 12

Jan Eichstedt

Cognitive Biases: What We Think Affects the World -The Case of Climate 24
Change and Terrorism
Marc Villot

The future of food security: complexity and a systemic approach 34

Ya-Yi Ong

Strategic foresight and warning, the United States (U.S.) Department of 44

Defense and counterinsugency in Iraq
Justin M. Goldman

Framing the Future for ASEAN 54

Loh Woon Liang

Typhoon Ketsana and the effects of cognitive biases in a government’s 63

strategic foresight and early warning capability
Gayedelle V. Florendo

Navigating Uncertainty: Understanding and Appreciating the Role of the 77

Human Analyst
B.C. Tan

Abstracts 87

Contributors 91

About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) 93

About the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) 94

FOREWORD

As part of the Master of Science programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of

International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore,
experienced political scientist specialised in Strategic Foresight and Warning Dr.
Helene Lavoix was invited to teach a module on Strategic Foresight and Warning in
the second quarter of 2010. As a result of excellent student and other feedback on
the module, it was decided that the best student essays should be put together in an
easily accessible format for the benefit of the wider Strategic Foresight and Warning
community and interested readers in Singapore and elsewhere. Dr. Lavoix very
kindly agreed to select and edit the best essays and write the Introduction. The short
monograph you hold in your hands is the result of all this effort.

This collection of essays is intended to showcase the potentially wide

applicability of Strategic Foresight and Warning approaches and concepts. These
provide a suite of useful analytical tools for busy analysts within and outside
government. Such tools may well be timely as policy analysts everywhere face the
demanding task of having to make sense of an often bewildering variety of often-
linked transnational security threats, challenges and opportunities that comprise the
complex milieu within which Singapore and other countries find themselves
inextricably a part of. More experienced readers are requested to excuse whatever
imperfections they may encounter in these essays. These are after all, written by
post-graduate students, many of whom were encountering Strategic Foresight and
Warning for the very first time. Finally, it is hoped that this monograph will help
achieve the wider goal of encouraging greater policy interest in the increasingly
important domain of Strategic Foresight and Warning. Happy reading!

Kumar Ramakrishna
Associate Professor and Head,
Centre of Excellence for National Security
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
November 2010

" i
STRATEGIC FORESIGHT AND WARNING: AN
1
INTRODUCTION
Helene Lavoix

Since Pearl Harbour, for most of recent history, societies have been taken by
surprise more than once by events that inflicted harm and damage on them and
threatened their objectives and strategies. However, since the end of the Cold War,
starting with the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it seems that those surprises have not
only been accumulating, but have also done so with an increased frequency,
spreading from one domain to another, so that courses of actions easily backfire and
are increasingly difficult to choose and implement. For example, societies faced 9/11
and the spread of terrorist attacks worldwide; the violent aftermath of the victory of
the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq; the degradation of the situation in Afghanistan after a
deceptive improvement; SARS, H1N1, H5N1, AIDS as a precursor, and the
development of human resistance to antibiotic;2 an increase in and potential volatility
of energy prices, Peak Oil,3 unclear and insufficiently considered potential Peak Coal
and Peak Uranium;4 the global financial crisis since 2007 and its economic
aftermath; the 2008 food crisis; accumulated and grinding localized crises prompted
by extreme weather events such as Katrina; an increased pace of biodiversity loss;
the 2010 BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill; volcanic ash paralyzing air traffic; a spreading
and increasing fragilisation of the modern rational state throughout the world with all
its wide-ranging potential consequences, exemplified by mammoth budget deficits,
with Greece in 2009-2010 as one of the most recent illustrations, etc. We are thus
faced with a rising global uncertainty, crises and doubts piling up and accelerating,

1
I would like to take the opportunity to thank first, all those intelligence and warning analysts and
officers that I cannot name but who will recognize themselves if or when they read these lines, those
exemplary men and women I have met these past years – and that I shall hopefully continue to meet -
for all the knowledge and understanding they have shared with me, for the example they gave me and
are offering to others in serving their respective nations, the world, their mission and their craft, often
at whatever cost to their well being. They were essential in allowing me to embrace Strategic
Foresight and Warning and in transmitting understanding to my students. Without them, this book
could not have been written. I hope it does not disappoint them. Then, I would like to thank all the
students who have contributed to this volume without sparing their time or effort, despite their
graduation assignments and sometimes demanding jobs, as well as their classmates, for their
enthusiasm, their persistence, their insights and most of the time their friendship. I have learned much
with them and I wish them all great successes.
2
Bryan Walsh, “Meat and Antibiotics: Getting Our Animals Off Drugs,” Time.com, June 29, 2010,
accessed 30 June 2010, http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/06/29/meat-and-antibiotics-getting-
our-animals-off-drugs/?xid=rss-topstories#ixzz0sMN2QTeH; WHO, “Antimicrobial resistance,” Fact
sheet N°194, Revised January 2002.
3
Peak Oil is shorthand for “the peaking of world conventional oil production.” “… geologists know that
at some future date, conventional oil supply will no longer be capable of satisfying world demand. At
that point world conventional oil production will have peaked and begin to decline.” Robert L. Hirsch,
Roger Bezdek, & Robert Wendling, Peaking Of World Oil Production: Impacts, Mitigation, & Risk
Management, report of the U.S. Department of Energy, February 2005, 7-8.
It has been denied for a long time and its existence was again revised because of the economic crisis.
4
Among others, B. Kavalov and S. D. Peteves, “The Future of Coal.” Prepared for European
Commission DG Joint Research Centre Institute for Energy (JRC IFE), February 2007; Michael
Dittmar, The Future of Nuclear Energy: Facts and Fiction, Institute of Particle Physics, ETH, Zurich,
August to November 2009, accessed June 28, 2010, http://arxiv.org/abs/0908.0627v1.

" 1
contributing to a feeling of disarray in the population and general increased tension
among state actors and at systemic level.
However, human societies and rulers entrusted with their security are
prepared to face this situation. In general, living beings are equipped with more or
less complex systems to warn about dangers and prevent harm, not only as
individuals but also as groups and species. For example, “plants that come under
attack by insects produce higher levels of jasmonic acid and methyl jasmonate,
which build up in the damaged parts of the plant. If ingested by the insect, the
proteinase inhibitors can interfere with its digestive system and deter the insect from
feeding.”5 Furthermore, unharmed but close-by plants are warned of the danger by
the spread of the volatile methyl jasmonate, which signals the attack and prompts
“them to produce defensive chemicals before they are attacked.”6
Closer to us, since the dawn of mankind, human beings organized in societies
have had to face for their survival the inevitable challenge, always renewed, that is to
coordinate their activities with larger uncertain changes in their milieu, notably when
their surroundings could be threatening.7 Throughout history, this activity has
evolved, been assigned to specific types of actors and been given many names, one
of the latest being strategic foresight and warning.
What is strategic foresight and warning (SF&W)? It is an organized and
systematic process to reduce uncertainty regarding the future.8 It aims to allow
policy-makers and decision-makers to take decisions with sufficient lead-time to see
those decisions implemented at best.9 It must thus help us in identifying the frontiers
of plausibility within which changes in our surroundings are most likely to take place
within a specific period of time, so that we can best coordinate our activities for our
society’s security, in the light of those coming alterations.
SF&W’s objective is thus very concrete; it needs to address all those issues
that belong to the mission of rulers qua rulers, i.e. to ensure the security of their

5
Simon Cotton, “Methyl Jasmonate,” accessed June 28, 2010,
http://www.chm.bris.ac.uk/motm/jasmine/jasminev.htm; Methyljasmonate.com, accessed June 28,
2010, http://www.methyljasmonate.com/main.html; Jurgen Engelberth, “Smelling the Danger and
Getting Prepared: Volatile Signals as Priming Agents in Defense Response,” Essay 13.8, A
Companion to Plant Physiology, Fourth Edition by Lincoln Taiz and Eduardo Zeiger, accessed 28
June 2010, http://4e.plantphys.net/article.php?ch=13&id=378.
6
Ibid. and Edward E. Farmer & Clarence A. Ryan, “Interplant communication: Airborne methyl
jasmonate induces synthesis of proteinase inhibitors in plant leaves,” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
(PNAS), Vol. 87, October 1990: 7713-7716,.
7
Norbert Elias, Time: An Essay (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
8
Thomas Fingar, “Anticipating Opportunities: Using Intelligence to Shape the Future,” and ''Myths,
Fears, and Expectations,” Payne Distinguished Lecture Series 2009 Reducing Uncertainty:
Intelligence and National Security, Lecture 3 & 1, FSI Stanford, CISAC Lecture Series, October 21,
2009 & March 11, 2009, accessed June 28, 2010, http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/evnts/5859/lecture_text.pdf.
9
Jack Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?” Sherman Kent
Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, Vol.2, Number 1, accessed June 28, 2010,
https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol2no1.htm; Cynthia M. Grabo,
Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, edited by Jan Goldman, (Lanham MD:
University Press of America, May 2004); Kenneth Knight, “Focused on foresight: An interview with the
U.S.’s national intelligence officer for warning,” McKinsey Quarterly, September 2009, accessed June
28, 2010,
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Public_Sector/Management/Focused_on_foresight_An_interview_
with_the_U.S._national_intelligence_officer_for_warning_2415.

" 2
polity, including the consideration of opportunities.10 SF&W is crucial because,
without it, emerging but also latent issues or imminent problems could be missed,
leading the various actors concerned to focus solely on already known and mastered
problems – the syndrome of “fighting the last war” – hence allowing strategic
surprises to occur and multiply.
This is why in 2004, the government of Singapore introduced strategic
anticipation as a whole-of-government approach then fully involving its scholarly and
academic community imbued with a multinational multidisciplinary outlook.11 In this
framework, the Center of Excellence for National Security (CENS) of the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technology
University, working closely with Singaporean national security agencies such as the
National Security Coordination Secretariat within the Prime Minister’s Office, has
included approaches to the future and SF&W as one of its research programs “on
the assumption that resilience also encompasses robust visions of the future.”12
Meanwhile, SF&W is taught as part of the RSIS Masters’ programme, notably its
MSc in Strategic Studies.13 The essays published in this monograph represent a
selection of the best papers written on the topic by post-graduate students, many of
them with professional experience, during the academic year 2009-2010 and
represent fresh insights and multinational, multidisciplinary and multi-background
contributions to the field.
This volume has two objectives. First, it is designed to show policy-makers,
decision-makers and specialised analysts the very practical side of SF&W as it
addresses issues of concern. Second, with a practitioners’ audience in mind, it is
also organised according to an ideal type of SF&W process, exemplifying some of its
steps, and reflecting upon them and their challenges through concrete case studies.
In accordance with the concrete objective of SF&W – providing policy-makers
and decision-makers with sufficient lead-time for decision and action – the volume
presents instances of SF&W applied to specific issues. Throughout those essays, we
shall look first, with Jan Eichstedt at definitions and perceptions of risks and
opportunities in our contemporary societies, notably within the framework of National
Security and at the crucial importance of SF&W for successful policy-making in the
21st century. Then, we Marc Villot will address climate change and terrorism; Ya-Yi
Ong food security, Justin Goldman the second Iraq War, Woon Liang Loh the future
of ASEAN, Gayedelle V. Florendo Typhoon Ketsana in the Philippines, and B.C. Tan
human analytical shortcomings in warning systems.
Second, as a process to reduce uncertainty regarding the future, SF&W is
organised within those institutions that constitute the political authorities’ nexus, and
composed of methods and tools that allow it to fulfil its mission in a more systematic
way that could otherwise be haphazardly implemented throughout institutions by
classical future-orientated analysis or estimates.
SF&W has evolved from a long history that gave it its characteristics as much
in terms of objectives, legitimacy, status, and processes, as in terms of

10
Knight, “Focused on foresight.”
11
Peter Ho, “The RAHS Story,” in Edna Tan Hong, Ngoh & Hoo Tiang Boon, ed. Thinking about the
Future, Strategic anticipation and RAHS, (Singapore: NSCC & RSIS, 2008), xi – xix; Justin Zorn,
“Different lenses on the future: U.S. and Singapore’s approaches to strategic planning;” in Aaron Low,
ed. Decisions in a complex World: Building Foresight capabilities, (Singapore: RAHS, 2010), 3-7.
12
RSIS, accessed June 28, 2010, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/ and CENS http://www.rsis.edu.sg/cens/.
13
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/grad/index.htm.

" 3
methodologies. For the most recent part, since World War II, its development can be
articulated around a double path and with three stages. First, warning came to be
rather separated from Strategic Foresight throughout the stable context of the Cold
War and the early post-Cold War era. Indeed, the stability of the times made us
believe that Strategic Foresight was unnecessary as threats and dangers were
thought to be known and unchanging in nature. Warning, besides activities related to
natural hazards, was mainly part of the realms of the military and of intelligence and
was known as “Indications and Warning.”14 After the breakup of Yugoslavia and the
return of war on the international agenda, warning was rediscovered outside those
circles by aid and development agencies and affiliated organizations, under the
guise of Early Warning Systems.15
Meanwhile, strategic foresight or, more broadly, approaches to the future
followed three, interacting tracks, which developed mainly during the Cold War. First,
science, characterized as being descriptive, explanatory, and predictive, had a major
role to play in terms of strategic foresight. Natural sciences have indeed assumed
this role, with all the difficulties and caution implied by the fundamental discoveries of
the late 19th and 20th centuries, such as the theory of relativity (general and special),
systems theory, quantum physics and complexity theory.16 Social science, on the
contrary, has tended to abandon and even loathe any predictive mission, notably
from the advent of post-modernism, an exception being forecasting or quantitative
techniques most often grounded in statistics, and applied in various disciplines.
Then, from the 1960s onward, the Rand Corporation, an outgrowth of World
War II’s American Rand project, “dedicated to furthering and promoting scientific,
educational, and charitable purposes for the public welfare and security of the United
States” set out to do pioneering work “for anticipating and preparing for possible
future developments in military and political affairs.”17 It started using scenarios and
created the “Delphi polling” technique. 18 It continues this work with its Frederick S.
Pardee Center for Longer Range Global Policy and the Future Human Condition
established in 2001.
Finally, a new discipline, Futures Studies, was created at the end of the 1950s
in France with Gaston Berger’s La Prospective. It expanded in the 1960s through
larger international movements composed of European (the World Futures Studies
Federation) and American intellectuals (The World Future Society), with well-known

14
U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2005; Arthur Hulnick,
"Indications and Warning Intelligence for Homeland Security: Seeking a new Paradigm" Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village,
Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005.
15
Helene Lavoix, Indicateurs et méthodologies de prévision des crises et conflits: Evaluation,
(Indicators and Methodologies of crisis and conflict prevention : an evaluation) (Paris: AFD, December
2005).
16
Among others, Roland Omnes, Quantum Philosophy: Understanding and Interpreting
Contemporary Science (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1999); Roger Lewin,
Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999 2d ed.), Santa Fe
Institute, accessed June 28, 2010, http://www.santafe.edu/.
17
Rand Corporation, accessed June 28, 2010, http://www.rand.org/about/history/.
18
Edward Cornish, “The Search for Foresight: How THE FUTURIST Was Born,” THE FUTURIST
January-February 2007, p.52, for an explanation of scenarios and Delphi polling, see Jerome C.
Glenn and Theodore J. Gordon, Ed., The Millennium Project: Futures Research Methodology, Version
3.0, 2009.

" 4
developments such as The Club of Rome and its Limits to Growth.19 The intellectual
foundation of these movements was rather pro-peace, “non-quantitative,” and
emphasised human intent. Since then, futurists have developed many
methodologies, which it would be impossible to detail in such short a space as its
most recent peer-reviewed survey, Futures Research Methodology, counts no less
than “39 chapters totalling about 1,300 pages.”20 The most famous among them are
the scenarios method and its variations. By and large, their initial outlook as well as
their evolution compounded by a widespread belief in the “End of History” from the
end of the Cold War onwards, led Futures Studies to serve mainly businesses with
traditionally little involvement with issues of national security.21
Times have now changed and awareness has started dawning that a
transition is taking place. Not only is the Cold War over, but the immediate post-Cold
War world when only economics mattered and would solve everything is fading. War
and traditional national security issues have been back on the international agenda
since the mid-1990s and more particularly since 9/11. They can no longer be seen
as separated from non-traditional national security issues. An example of this is the
role of military-linked organisations such as the Center for a New American Security
(CNAS) in raising environmental awareness.22 In this framework, we are all
struggling to adapt our institutions, our thinking and our worldview(s) to a new world
in the making still mixed with the late modern world, which is fast changing, where
dangers converge, and where novel threats and hazards emerge. It is this transition
and the related uncertainty that makes a complete process of SF&W even more
crucial today, when all efforts of the past must be synthesised and brought together
in the most efficient and concrete way, while inefficient or ill-adapted tools and
methodologies must be discarded. This volume is a contribution to this effort as
these essays are examples of various steps of a sketched, ideal process of SF&W.
Eichstedt, after addressing the larger problem of the place of risk and
opportunities in our contemporary societies, underlines the role of SF&W in
prioritizing issues in a context of finite resources. Tackling the same challenge but
from a different angle, Villot shows that the way policy-makers, the larger public and
analysts decide to give precedence to one threat or danger over another – here
terrorism and climate change – stems from those cognitive biases that affect us all at
the individual as well as the collective levels, and against which the process of
SF&W constantly fights through design and tools. In a similar way, Ong explains,
with the example of food security, that cognitive biases on the one hand, and
incapacity to tackle complexity, on the other, make us miss the emergence of new
issues and dangers, potentially invalidating the way we prioritise issues of concern.
Those three essays together are also crucial if one wants to understand the
part of the SF&W process that is often called “horizon scanning”. The latter consists
of identifying weak signals of emerging threats, and must be done permanently in

19
The Club of Rome, accessed June 28, 2010, http://www.clubofrome.org/eng/home/; Paalumäki,
Heli, "Imagine a Good Day" – Bertrand de Jouvenel's Idea of Possible Futures in the Context of
Fictitious and Historical Narratives, Ennen & nyt, Vol. 1: The Papers of the Nordic Conference on the
History of Ideas, Helsinki 2001.
20
Glenn and Gordon, Futures research methodology
21
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). A brief look
at most centers specialized in Futures studies will show that they are usually located within business
schools or management departments of universities. Reading of many related journals will also show
the heavy emphasis on business, management and related matters.
22
CNAS, accessed June 28, 2010, http://www.cnas.org/

" 5
conjunction with the prioritization of issues. Indeed, to be able to identify new
dangers, one must first have a larger question in mind – what is national security for
us (Eichstedt) – and then “scan the environment” for clues about novel dangers or
those that are not yet taken into account.23 The sine qua non conditions to achieve
horizon scanning is to have an open mind, thus being as free as possible from all
biases (Villot and Ong); and to be able to tackle complexity by seeing patterns and
linkages (Ong).
With issues of concern identified and prioritised, we need now to outline the
potential futures we shall face, within frontiers of plausibility for each issue. Indeed, it
is only within this “cone of plausibility” that policy-makers will be able to choose,
define, and design courses of actions.24 Specific methodologies of strategic
foresight, initially mainly inherited from Rand’s work and from Futures Studies, are
used for this purpose. Yet, considering the specificity of dealing with national
security, notably in terms of clients (the policy-makers), actors involved (the state,
the regime institutions, citizens, and other political actors), in terms of scope,
complexity, and lethality of impact in case of failure, those initial tools and
methodologies are being specifically reworked and tested. Meanwhile, new ones,
increasingly incorporating science, are being created as the experimental part of the
Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) program shows.25 Ong’s case study
perfectly illustrates this effort and why it is carried out by mapping the complexity of
food security, while also stressing specific points for which further research should
be endeavoured if we are to use a proper systemic and complex approach to the
future.
Goldman’s article then exemplifies first the use and utility of simulations with
the case of the American involvement in Iraq. Second, he revisits the too rarely
considered method that is visionary foresight,26 while showing how it has been
adapted to involve multiple actors and resulted in a revision of the
Counterinsurgency (COIN) manual that changed the course of the war.
Finally, Loh uses an explanation by futurist Sohail Inayatullah of the three
existing types of understanding of the future and thus of the world out there,27 to
creatively develop a novel methodology of strategic foresight specifically adapted to
his chosen issue, “Can the ASEAN community be built successfully by 2015?”
Once potential and plausible futures have been devised with various
methodologies, one must explore the remaining possibilities for surprise, for example
by using “wild cards.” According to James Dewar, this means identifying the potential
for surprise by questioning the assumptions upon the grounding of foresight work as

23
Beat Habbegger, Horizon Scanning in Government: Concept, Country Experiences, and Models for
Switzerland, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 2009, accessed June 28, 2010,
http://www.crn.ethz.ch/publications/crn_team/detail.cfm?id=96084; Gordon, Theodore J. and Glenn,
Jerome C., “Environmental Scanning,” The Millennium Project: Futures Research Methodology,
Version 3.0, Ed. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. Gordon, chapter 2, 1-19.
24
Charles Taylor, Alternative world scenarios for a new order of nations, U.S. Army War College,
1993, accessed June 28, 2010, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB245.pdf.
25
Edna Tan Hong, Ngoh & Hoo Tiang Boon, ed. Thinking about the Future, Strategic anticipation and
RAHS, (Singapore: NSCC & RSIS, 2008); Horizon Scanning Center of the National Security
Coordination Secretariat of Singapore - website: http://app.hsc.gov.sg/public/www/home.aspx.
26
Jerome C. Glenn, “Genius Forecasting, Intuition, and Vision,” The Millennium Project: Futures
Research Methodology, Version 3.0, Ed. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. Gordon, Chapter 25.
27
Sohail Inayatullah, "From Who am I to When am I? Framing the Time and Shape of the Future,"
Futures 1993, 25(3): 235-253.

" 6
well as imagining as many events as possible, however improbable, that could affect
the issue as foreseen, selecting among those potential events based on criteria of
plausibility and high impact, then devising the so-called “wild cards scenarios” before
monitoring their possible happenstance through specifically built indicators.28 Loh,
imaginatively, integrated fully wild card scenarios to his newly created methodology.
Foresight products must then be delivered to clients, all those actors that must
use them for the elaboration of policy, strategy, and strategic planning. This part,
considering its complexity, is not dealt with in the framework of this monograph.
Having now a fully developed foresight product, we move to the last step of
the overall process, warning.29 Indeed, for the issue at hand, the previous stages
have given us an understanding of the underlying dynamics as well as its plausible
evolutions and outcomes. We may thus devise a coherent series of indicators
grounded in a true complex understanding of the issue. Those indicators will be
monitored to follow potential developments, with the collection of raw data or
information then transformed into corresponding indications. When or if the issue
evolves into warning problems – for example if the issue is “domestic instability,”
then we may have “instability in countries x, y, and z” as problems - those indicators
will be specifically detailed for surveillance, i.e. adapted to each problem. If the
indications then obtained so signal, then a warning, which must include assessment
of impact, likelihood, and timeframe,30 facilitated by the previous steps, will be
delivered to the client or customer, i.e. the policy-maker or decision-maker. Warning
and many of its difficulties is illustrated and explained by Florendo in the case of a
warning failure: typhoon Ketsana. Meanwhile, Tan’s essay studies the challenges
linked to the indispensable human factor in warning analysis.
Warning is an ultimate test for the whole SF&W process, because only the
delivery of timely warnings can soundly allow policy-makers to accomplish their
coordinating task. Warning ends the process of SF&W but also begins it,
transforming it in a cycle. Indeed, as the indications collected represent the real
world, they may imply a need to restart the whole cycle. Then, following a warning,
policy-makers take actions (a non-action being considered as an action), which
changes reality. This, again, necessitates revisiting the overall cycle.
Strikingly, most of these essays stresses and underlines the vexing horizontal
challenge of biases that runs throughout the whole process of SF&W and affects
anyone, from the analyst to the officer to the policy-makers to whom foresight
products and warning are delivered.31 Villot and Florendo focus on the effect of
biases on prioritizing issues. Goldman showed the long and strenuous efforts
needed to overcome biases. Tan tackles the bias challenge in detail, showing
notably that no technology devised to replace human shortcomings may, bypass
human analysis. Loh and Eichstedt set the example, albeit briefly, by accomplishing
the difficult exercise of assessing their own biases, an effort that should be built upon
and become a compulsory practice in the field.

28
James A. Dewar, “The Importance of “Wild Card” Scenarios,” Discussion Paper, RAND, accessed
June 28, 2010, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/nic2020/dewar_nov6.pdf.
29
The words that belong to the specific Warning vocabulary will be italicised in the rest of the chapter.
See Grabo, Anticipating Surprise for a detailed explanation of the Warning process and its challenges.
30
Grabo, Anticipating surprise.
31
Lawrence Woocher, “The Effects of Cognitive Biases on Early Warning,” Paper presented at the
International Studies Association Annual Convention, 29 March 2008.

" 7
 Finally, each and every foresight product should be tested against reality
when time comes, and scrutinised in exactly the same way as warning. Goldman
provides us with a rare and precious example of this test in the case of the now de-
classified war-game, Desert Crossing. The aim of such exercises would not be to
check that reality was exactly predicted, although, as Goldman exemplifies, it would
seem that a fundamental inability to predict might have been overstated. It would be
to identify where and why we have been successful or wrong so as to improve tools,
methodologies, and processes. To submit foresight products to this harsh and
unremitting test is an absolute imperative if SF&W is to win the trust of policy-
makers, finds its rightful and necessary place within polities’ institutions and thus
meets its objective.

" 8
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RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES: THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC
FORESIGHT AND WARNING
Jan Eichstedt

An Uncertain World – “Doom and Gloom” or “Phoenix from the Ashes”?

On an average day, a quick scan of newspapers reveals the following:
dangerous volcanic ash over Europe,1 the possibility of a nuclear Iran and natural
hazards in China.2 It seems that we live in times full of risk. When this author
attended the International Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Symposium 2010
in Singapore, he was under the impression that there was an emphasis on risks on
the side of policy-makers and the organizations advising them. In turn, they seemed
to neglect the other side of the same coin: opportunities! This paper will explore
whether, in fact, there is an imbalance between the focus on risks and on
opportunities when it comes to national policies by examining as empirical material a
sample of U.S. Presidents’ State of the Union Addresses. If pre-eminence was given
to risks, how could it be explained and how could Strategic Foresight and Warning
(SF&W) restore the balance?
Ideally, Strategic Foresight is a tool designed to reduce uncertainty with
regard to various long-term developments that potentially have high impacts on the
nation state. It allows decision-makers to formulate and implement policies with
sufficient lead-time. Strategic Warning aims at the timely notification of decision-
makers about developments that affect the state’s security. Therefore, Strategic
Foresight and Warning is the base for any kind of strategic planning.
The first section of this essay will define terms and concepts of risks and
opportunities, explain the methodology and present the empirical data. The second
part will explain the findings, focusing on the “risk society.” The last section will
elaborate on how SF&W could successfully broker between the notion of risks and of
opportunities. Finally, this paper will conclude that strategic planning facilitated and
aided by SF&W has to become a key component if we want to achieve successful
policymaking in the 21st century.

1. Theoretical Framework
This section will define key concepts and terms before explaining the
methodology used in examining 16 State Of The Union Addresses by Presidents Bill
Clinton (Democratic Party) and George W. Bush (Republican Party) between 1993-
2008. Finally, the empirical data will be presented.

1.1 Definitions
In contemporary discourse, terms of crises, risks, threats, dangers, and
hazards are used synonymously. Often, this is confusing and, therefore, it is of
utmost importance to gain a clear understanding about the vocabulary before
analyzing the U.S. Presidents’ speeches. Consequently, this part of the essay will
define the key terms used in this paper.

1
Dagny Lüdemann, “Wie gefährlich ist die Aschewolke?,” Die Zeit Online, 16 Apr. 2010.
2
Xinhua News Agency, “Moderate earthquake jolts Tibet,” People’s Daily, 17 Apr. 2010.

" 12
 The Oxford Dictionary defines risk as “a situation involving exposure to
danger or the possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome might happen.”3
The Dictionary of Psychology states that “risk is a danger or a hazard or a situation
involving these two.” Furthermore, this situation “is likely to cause loss or injury.” In
addition, the notion of agency is highlighted. In a given situation an action might
result in an outcome that is uncertain. However, the probabilities of these outcomes
are known or can be estimated.4 This author defines the term risk as a function of the
probability and the impact of an event that is the occurrence of something that either
will or will not happen. This definition has two sides. Probabilities are quantifiable
and, therefore, should be objective. Probabilities require data that are often scientific
in nature. However, scientific data is contestable and this author will come back to
the challenges involving the policy-maker – scientist nexus in the next section of this
essay. In contrast, impacts have a subjective element to them, since they try to
qualify the outcome of an event. Because impacts are subjective, even when the
probability is known, some individuals will perceive an event as a risk and some will
not. Consequently, risk is defined here as something that inherently implies an action
or a belief.
The term threat includes the notion of intention. Defined as “a statement of an
intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile action as a retribution for
something done or not done,” a threat can also be “a thing that is likely to cause
damage or danger.”5 Therefore, many “things” can be understood as being a threat
because they are likely to cause damage or danger. However, threats become risks
only when humans decide to use these “things.” A hazard is “a biological, chemical,
or physical agent that is reasonably likely to cause illness or injury if not properly
controlled.”6 Hazardous materials are a potential threat. Nuclear and chemical
agents are likely to cause damage and danger if not dealt with properly but humans
turn this threat into a risk by their own behaviour and actions.
A danger is “an element of a hazard, a threat and a risk.” It can also be
understood as “a liability and exposure to harm or a thing that causes or is likely to
cause harm.” The opposite of a danger is safety or security.7 Defined as the freedom
from risk or danger, security in the national context has occupied social groups since
the beginning of mankind.8 In this regard, the meaning and definition of national
security (NS) is essential to every state in order to have a good anchor for SF&W.
We shall examine this aspect further in the next section.
The main hypothesis of this essay is that political decision-makers are overly
focused on mitigating risks, when they perceive that there is a crisis. The dictionary
states that a crisis is “a time of intense difficulty and danger.”9 Crises inherently carry
risks but also open the door for opportunities, defined as “a time or set of
circumstances that make it possible to do something.”10 However, this definition
lacks the positive connotation associated with opportunities. Hence opportunities is

3
The Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd ed., s.v. “risk”
4
Andrew M. Colman, ed., A Dictionary of Psychology, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
s.v. “risk”
5
The Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd ed., s.v. “threat”
6
David A. Bender, ed., A Dictionary of Food and Nutrition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
s.v. “hazard”
7
The Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd ed., s.v. “danger”
8
The Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd ed., s.v. “security”
9
The Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd ed., s.v. “crisis”
10
The Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd ed., s.v. “opportunity”

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understood here as the possibility to advance the well-being and prosperity of the
nation and, in turn, its citizens. Therefore, notions of risks and opportunities in
connection to NS are always population centric in liberal democracies.
It is understood that there are many more definitions for all these terms and
concepts discussed in the academic world.11 However, of utmost importance for this
essay is the emphasis that risks are socially constructed by actions and behaviours
of actors that can be politicians, social groups or individuals. While the overall
connotation is negative, risks also open the door for opportunities. Therefore, risk
and opportunities are two sides of the same coin.

1.2 Methodology
With some exceptions, the President of the United States of America
addresses the State of the Union in January or February every year since its
inception in 1790. The President comments on accomplishments made since his last
State of the Union Address (SOUA) and looks ahead to the next year in regard to
major policy issues.12 The SOUAs were chosen to test the hypothesis for two
reasons. First, the United States is still the dominant world power, with American
policies driving developments around the world. Second, the data was readily
available.
The method used was a text search tool looking for the terms of risk and
opportunity in the SOUAs. However, this method proved to be insufficient. On a
regular basis the presidents spoke of threats, dangers, crises or security. This might
have as much to do with the synonymous usage of the above stated terms as with
the fact that the recurrence of the same noun is not perceived as good style in
language. As explained previously dangers and threats are integral parts of risks,
which in turn are part of crises. Therefore, these terms were bundled, keeping risk as
the overreaching concept. Despite the fact that the wider scope of the text search
now includes all these words, the methodology was still not satisfying. Indeed, the
terms used had a qualitative element that the quantitative method was not able
sufficiently to unveil. For example, in 1995, President Clinton spoke in vague terms
about security at home and abroad.13 Three years later, he stated that the U.S. had
the opportunity to become a closer community because of economic growth.14 In his
2005 speech, President Bush spoke about the voters that took the risk to take to the
polls in a recent Iraqi election.15 Obviously, the term risk had no linkage to Bush’s
domestic constituents; it lacked relevance to U.S. citizens. Therefore, all 16 SOUAs
were analyzed for the usage of the above stated terms in regard to the research
question. One has to acknowledge that this way of conducting the research was
prone to misunderstandings and personal biases. The author had to interpret what

11
A quick check on Oxford Reference Online (http://www.oxfordreference.com/pub/views/home.html)
produces different definitions according to different dictionaries, i.e. A Dictionary of Sports Studies,
The New Oxford Companion to Law etc. This clearly underlines the fact that the entire concept of risk
and risk mitigation is highly contested.
12
See “State of the Union Addresses of the Presidents of the United States – The American
Presidency Project,” accessed April 18, 2010, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php.
13
William J. Clinton, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals,” 24 Jan.
1995, accessed April 11, 2010, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=51634.
14
William J. Clinton, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals,” 27 Jan.
1998, accessed April 11, 2010, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=56280.
15
George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals,” 2 Feb.
2005, accessed April 11, 2010, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=58746.

" 14
the presidents had intended to say. Furthermore, his personal understanding of risk
clearly influenced the research. Nevertheless, the findings were persuasive.

1.3 Data
From 1992 until 2008 the term risk was mentioned 20 times in SOUAs. On 11
times it referred to risk in regard to the concept of NS, understood as the physical
survival of the state, and nine times in regard to economic risks. The term threat was
used a total of 61 times. Fifty-eight of those phrases were aimed to highlight a threat
to NS. Only three times was a threat to the economy conceptualized.

The word crisis in connection to the economy was used 11 times while it was
used in relation to NS only thrice. Clinton and Bush both liked to emphasize dangers,
mentioning it 51 times: 43 times in regard to NS and eight times in connection with
the economy. The usage of the terms risk, threat, crisis, and danger added up to a
total of 146 times. However, the term security was used heavily: 100 times in regard
to NS, 111 times referring to welfare (Social Security, Medicare etc.) and 15 times in
connection to the economy, totalling 226 times. The number of references to terms
suggesting risks is an astounding total of 372. In contrast, references to the term
opportunity were made only 79 times (72 in regard to the economy and only seven
times in reference to NS).

" 15
 Hence, the initial research question holds ground. As proven by the analysis
of selected SOUAs, there was an overemphasis on the notion of risk and a neglect
of possible opportunities. The question remains why this was the case.

2. The Risk Society

The grey eminence of strategic intelligence, Sherman Kent, once argued that
politicians have to strike a balance between policies that deal with risks and policies
that seize opportunities.16 Obviously, the findings of the previous section clearly
indicate that at least two presidents did not read his book. Why are politicians overly
focused on risks in their public speeches and, consequently, in their policies? This
section will explore possible factors and explanations that form the basis for
arguments on how SF&W could aid in altering this one-sided equation.
Some scholars bluntly state that, while there has always been risk to life, the
nature of risk has changed and our world has become increasingly uncertain.17 This
explanation is too shallow. Accordingly, the concept of national security, with a focus
on its development and scholarly debate, will be examined first. Second, the nexus
of politics and science in regard to risk assessment and mitigation will be critically
evaluated. Third, the role of the society and public opinion in with regard to what
constitutes a socially accepted risk has to be elaborated upon.
The question of how a nation state defines the concept of NS is of paramount
importance for understanding risks and opportunities. Furthermore, the concept of
NS enables SF&W to scan the horizon in a timely manner for relevant weak signals
of emerging risks and opportunities. Traditionally, NS has been understood as the
physical survival of the state. The focus was on inter-state conflicts and the business
of war. One of the great thinkers, Swiss born Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pointed out
that rulers and their population commit themselves to a social contract. In this
contract, citizens are willing to give up some of their freedoms in return for security.
Furthermore, Rousseau stated that societies might actually fall back into chaos if
politicians violate the social contract by not dealing with crises in a credible way.18
German sociologist Ulrich Beck was the first to introduce the term risk into social
theory. In his groundbreaking book Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992),
Beck distinguished between plagues, natural disasters and famines that carry a
notion of fate that were beyond human control in the pre-industrial period on the one
hand, and risks that could be mitigated and controlled as a result of modernization
on the other. He reasoned that risk assessment developed along the lines of
modernity, resulting in insurances against illnesses and unemployment for example.
However, the end of the Second World War confronted societies with uninsurable
risks that were a result of modernization themselves. Therefore, Beck and Giddens
concluded that social actors are forced to deal with systematically produced,
unintended social and environmental consequences as products of
industrialization.19 This understanding has implications for the definition of NS.

16
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence For American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1949), 4-5.
17
Jane Franklin, “Introduction,” The Politics of Risk Society,” ed. Jane Franklin (Cambridge, Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 1.
18
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994),
55-68.
19
John Scott and Gordon Marshall, eds., A Dictionary of Sociology (Oxford University Press, 2009),
s.v. “risk”

" 16
Scholars like Ulmann and Buzan widened this concept, including issues into its
definition that might generate an impact on the military realm.20 Examples are
migration or climate change. This resulted in the establishment of the Copenhagen
School of International Relations that tried to explain the securitization of issues that
had no connection to the traditional understanding of NS. Furthermore, the late
1990’s saw the deepeners who stated that security is defined as a human
condition.21 Critics argued that these definitions opened the floodgates for
securitizing a whole range of issues. They stated that governments had an interest in
doing so. If policy-makers were to declare something as of vital importance to NS,
the rules of the political game would change to favour the executive.22 The findings in
section 1.3 seem to underline these arguments. Both presidents mentioned security
226 times. However, while Clinton focused especially on social security (60
references), Bush overemphasized national security (64 references) in a traditional
context. This can be traced to the flavour of the day: Clinton focused on health care
reform and Bush became a wartime president. However, the securitization of an act
only works when the public believes in the securitizing move.23 While Clinton did not
pass his health care reform, partly because of public resentments, Bush signed the
Patriot Act into law. Under him there was a consensus within the population and
legislative about the threat posed by international terrorism. In conclusion, the
definition of NS is a vital step for a nation state. In regard to this essay, a concept for
NS will enable SF&W to identify risks and opportunities by scanning the horizon for
relevant weak signals.
In order to examine the nexus between politics and science, we remember the
definition of the term risk from section 1.1. The probability of an event is an important
factor in determining risk. As stated, probabilities, in theory, should be quantifiable
and, therefore, objective. However, in reality they are not. In this regard the role of
science has to be critically evaluated. On issues such as Mad Cow Disease24 or the
flu virus H1N125 scientists are not able to quantify the probabilities of occurrence.
They even differ and contradict each other’s findings on the very same issue.26 Now
scientists do not make a claim that an activity is risky or not. A variety of social
groups and actors, among them political decision-makers, do. However, politicians
rely on scientific expertise to correctly estimate the outcome of an issue to make a
decision in the form of policy. Thus, it seems that today’s science might be of less
value than expected and that scientists might actually be part of the overall problem
that leads to an overemphasis of risks.27
Finally, this essay briefly examines the role of society. Nowadays, everyone
seems to be mitigating risks. We drink red wine to reduce the probability of a certain

20
Peter Hough, Understanding Global Security, 2nd ed. (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2008), 7.
21
Ibid., 9-10.
22
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security – A New Framework For Analysis (Boulder,
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), 24-5.
23
Ibid.
24
Ulrich Beck, “Politics of Risk Society,” The Politics of Risk Society, ed. Jane Franklin (Cambridge,
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 7.
25
Shannon Brownlee and Jeanne Lenzer, “Shots in the Dark,” The Atlantic Vol. 304, No. 4 (2009): 44-
54.
26
Anthony Giddens, “Risk Society: the Context of British Politics,” The Politics of Risk Society, ed.
Jane Franklin (Cambridge, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 24.
27
John Durant, “Once the Men in White Coats Held the Promise of a Better Future…,” The Politics of
Risk Society, ed. Jane Franklin (Cambridge, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 72.

" 17
cancer. We do not eat French Fries for the fear of acryl amide. The list goes on and
on. This is what scholar Grove-White calls the Risk Society.28 To cite the examples
of BSE and the Y2K bug, public opinion forced politicians to act and commit valuable
resources to mitigate these threats ad hoc. Besides the role of the 24/7 media cycle,
policy-makers have to broker the interests of different social groups, when it comes
to risk mitigation. The impact of an event might be perceived differently according to
the actor. While many people stopped eating British beef and French Fries during
the late 1990s, others, like this author, continued enjoying medium-rare steaks from
English cattle, until the import was banned, with a generous portion of fried potato
sticks. However, societies expect politicians to be on top of issues that are potentially
risky although, initially, they tend not to know or agree on what those risks are.29 The
French contaminated blood scandal is a case in point. In France’s biggest public
health scandal, the Centre National de Transfusion Sanguine knowingly distributed
blood contaminated with HIV to about 4000 people.30 Rightly, the French public
demanded action to be taken because they felt that the social contract had been
violated. However, this only happened after the issue was made public and despite
the fact that only a minuscule portion of the population had been affected. In regard
to the SOUAs it would be interesting to widen the scope of the analysis in order to
include speeches from another era. Did presidents during the last centuries use the
above stated terms with more, less or the same frequency and what would that tell
us about their perception of risk and that of their population?
The factors mentioned are only a small sample. There are many more:
personal biases, political interests, and lobby groups for instance. Furthermore, the
political system in liberal democracies seems to favour reactive short-term measures
over pro-active long-term solutions. However, one thing seems to be clear. Except
for some natural hazards, risks are man made and socially constructed.31 One
should keep this in mind because the very act of mitigating an accepted and publicly
agreed upon risk, might create another one down the road.32 In addition, our inability
to understand the consequences of our acts in complex environments adds to the
misery. This is where SF&W comes in. How it will help to communicate and mitigate
risks while promoting opportunities will be the object of discussion in the next
section.

3. The Role of Strategic Foresight

The data presented previously implies that the American society seems to
face many issues that are wide in scope and can cause damage, harm, loss, or
injury. Therefore, it seems that the task of risk mitigation becomes overly important.
Obviously, mitigating against all kinds of risks requires a lot of resources in times
when government funding is in dire straits. Nevertheless, politicians have to act
because of the social contract that is so important for the cohesion of society. This

28
Robin Grove-White, “Risk Society, Politics and BSE,” The Politics of Risk Society, ed. Jane Franklin
(Cambridge, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 50.
29
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (New York, London, Toronto: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991),
365.
30
BBC Online Network, “World: Europe Blood scandal ministers walk free,” BBC News, 9 Mar. 1999.
31
Ortwin Renn, “Concepts of Risk: A Classification,” Social Theories of Risk, eds. Sheldon Krismky,
Dominic Golding (Westport: Praeger, 1992), 55.
32
Nick Pidgeon, Roger E. Kasperson, and Paul Slovic, “Introduction,” The Social Amplification of
Risk, eds. Nick Pidgeon, Roger E. Kasperson, Paul Slovic (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 6, 8.

" 18
section will briefly make the case why governments should create a SF&W program,
and highlight one possible model for such an exercise discussed within the academic
world. Then the tasks and criteria for success will be defined for foresight to make
the point that it is important not only to focus on risks but on opportunities as well.
Considering governments’ long-term responsibilities for the security and
prosperity of their nations, the need for strategic planning becomes clear. In this
regard, the importance of “getting the foundation right” cannot be overstated.
Resources are scarce. As a result, nation states cannot afford to plan for every
contingency. They need a screening device that assists them to be proactive rather
than reactive.33 This device has to be SF&W. It should be the initial step in an overall
multi-agency process for strategic planning and constitute the base for all successive
steps. Furthermore, it should be able to better manage socially constructed risks and
emphasize “opportunity-taking” more than in the past.
In 2004 a group of students proposed a model for a National Council for
Strategic Planning (CSP) within the political system of the U.S. with direct links to the
government and departments, as well as to Congress and other stakeholders like
think tanks and non-governmental organizations (NGO). SF&W was an integral part
in CSP. Several foresight task forces would scan for weak signals and future trends.
Once a major trend had been anticipated and identified, the cycle of strategic
planning could be initiated. For the students, to achieve a successful foresight
exercise, the key was access to decision-makers and the possibility to influence the
political process.34 In the same way scholars Calof and Smith concluded that
successful strategic foresight programs have to generate an impact on policy.35
While the students’ overall focus was on strategic planning, this essay will
concentrate only on the role of SF&W and its importance as the anchor for
government policies. Singapore’s Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS)
office scans for weak signals that might be of importance to the government.36
However, how are they to know which signals might be important and relevant when,
as stated, risks are socially constructed mainly outside of government? The answer
cannot simply be: “It is important if it is affecting national security!” This is only
sufficient when NS is understood in a traditional way. However, the need for
foresight increases if one uses the wider and deeper definitions. To solve this
dilemma, it is proposed that SF&W has to anticipate the impact and the relevance of
weak signals in regard to their cultural, societal, and political milieu. The decision of
“How safe is safe enough?” is for the political decision-maker. But in order for him to
make this decision, to formulate policies and to commit resources, he needs an
estimation of the relevance and impact of future trends onto his society. Trying to
securitize every issue and trend will result in a waste of resources. However, SF&W
has to do a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, it has to anticipate trends that
can lead to crises full of risks but also of opportunities. On the other hand, it must
also anticipate if society understands the severity of this trend or if the securitization
of this issue could potentially fail. A case in point is that of H1N1 in Germany. The
German government, aided by scientists around the world, anticipated the impact of

33
Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic, “Introduction,” 9.
34
Leon Fuerth, “Creation of a Commission on Strategic Planning,” Futures Research Quarterly Vol.
20, No. 4 (2004): 5-32.
35
Jonathan Calof and Jack E. Smith, “Critical success factors for government-led foresight,” Science
and Public Policy Vol. 37, No. 1 (2010): 31.
36
Pidgeon, Kaspersen, and Slovic, “Introduction,” 9.

" 19
swine flu as potentially high, resulting in a variety of negative ripple effects for
German society. As a result, a massive advertising campaign for vaccinations was
started and several million shots were ordered. However, the population did not
believe in the securitizing move. It refused to get vaccinated and when swine flu
turned out to be not so deadly after all, 30 millions shots were left over and had to be
re-sold on the market, resulting in a huge loss for public treasuries.37 Currently, the
discussion is ongoing on whether or not incorrect scientific data and lobbying led the
government to overreact or citizens did not understand its severity. Considering how
low the fatality rate has been, the first explanation is more persuasive. The dilemma
is that swine flu could very well have been a worldwide pandemic. In this case the
German government could have been accused of not taking the issue seriously
enough. This dynamic can be applied for many more issues, the most prominent
being climate change. To this day some governments proclaim climate change to be
the biggest threat with impacts on traditional and non-traditional security. But some
governments challenge this assumption. The same ambiguity can be found within
any social group. Therefore, SF&W has to anticipate and monitor all trends and
understand their trajectory, using all available data. If findings are inconclusive, this
very fact has to be noted. Furthermore, SF&W has to anticipate if the securitization
of any given trend will be successful within the wider context of society. If SF&W
anticipates that a certain trend will have a high impact with regard to risks or
opportunities but finds that the population will not follow or understand the
securitizing move, it has to articulate this assessment to policy-makers. It is the
decision-makers’ responsibility to communicate that a trend is of strategic
importance for the country and act accordingly.
Another critical factor for success will be the anticipation of policy impacts.
How does a certain measure shape the trajectory of a trend? What are the
consequences? Human beings are generally not very good at thinking strategically in
complex systems. Developmental aid in Africa and the huge debt of nation states
can attest to this very fact.38 The main point is that opportunities could be more
easily highlighted if impacts of policy initiatives could be correctly estimated. When
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was elected in 1998, he instantly realized that
the German industry was not suited for a globalized economy. He also understood
that this risk to German heavy industry was a chance for renewable energy
technologies to be developed because of certain global trends like scarcity of fossil
fuels and an emphasis on climate change. Accordingly, he acted upon this
opportunity and promoted clean technology through subsidies and legislation
although the population did not understand the trajectory of this trend at the time.39
Today, Germany is one of the leading clean technology producing countries. SF&W
should highlight such developments and emphasize opportunities.
In conclusion, strategic foresight is an important government function for this
century. In order to be successful, it has to have access to stakeholders and has to
generate estimation of policy impacts. Furthermore, it has to assess the relevance of
weak signals and anticipate the long-term consequences of recommendations and
policies. Moreover, it should promote opportunities to strike a balance.

37
“Impfstoffverkauf gescheitert,” Die Zeit Online, 7 May 2010.
38
Dietrich Dörner, Die Logik des Mißlingens. Strategisches Denken in komplexen Situationen, 8th ed.
(Hamburg: rororo, 2003).
39
Gerhard Schröder, Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2007).

" 20
Conclusion
This essay sought to explore the notion that political decision-makers are occupied
with mitigating risks while neglecting opportunities. In the first part, a sample of
SOUAs was quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed. The findings underlined the
validity of the research question. The next part looked at possible explanations for
the data, concluding that a wide variety of factors within the “risk society” result in the
overemphasis on risk mitigation. The last part looked at the role and tasks of
strategic foresight exercises in the policy realm and the criteria for success.
In summary, the overemphasis on risk leads to an inefficient allocation of
scarce resources with a focus on short-term considerations. However, today’s world
is more complex and interconnected. Therefore, policies have to be comprehensive,
robust, and flexible. The focus should be on nodes connecting different issues.
These nodes need to be identified. Trends affecting them need to be anticipated and
the underlying drivers and trajectories need to be understood. This forms the basis
for successful strategic planning. SF&W should be able to estimate all these factors
and shape outcomes by offering recommendations on which future trends to focus
on. These recommendations should emphasize opportunities true to the saying:
“Nothing ventured, nothing gained!”

" 21
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" 22
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" 23
COGNITIVE BIASES: WHAT WE THINK AFFECTS THE
WORLD -THE CASE OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND
TERRORISM
Marc Villot
Risk assessment is always a controversial issue in which various actors
debate the plausibility or the reality that the threat is real. In these debates some
risks and threats become national priorities while others are deemed less important.
In an ideal world, this assessment would be the product of rational judgement and
analysis. Yet this is not always the way the human mind operates. In this essay we
shall be looking at two main threats of the modern age: terrorism and climate
change. Both have experts arguing that the risks are over or understated, forming
asymmetrical positions on the issues. The problem is further expanded exacerbated
by our own interpretation of the available information and forecasts. Owing to the
uncertainty about the effects and risks of climate change and terrorism, our own
biases either play up or dampen the plausible outcomes. This is not simply the case
for the less-informed public; the problem of cognitive biases is as crucial to the
devising of forecasts by scientists and experts as it is for policy-makers who must
make choices on whether the potential risks demand immediate action. The
importance of cognitive bias in this debate demonstrates how decision-makers and
the public do not view an issue as a vital national security issue. This stance is found
in the United States of America and to a lesser extent within European states, which
illustrates the impact of biases and belief systems on the issue of climate change.
Why, therefore, is terrorism perceived as a more plausible threat than climate
change? Why does terrorism allow governments to implement restrictive measures,
such as the tightening of airport security, whereas there is no political will or public
support for actions against climate change? To answer these questions, this paper
argues that terrorism, unlike climate change, is perceived as a major risk due to the
cognitive process by which we define threats. In order to assess the influence of
cognitive biases, this paper will compare public perceptions of terrorism and climate
change and those of policy-makers’ and elucidate why one is deemed a national
priority in the U.S. and in some parts of Europe whereas the other is identified as
less important.
This essay will be divided into three sections. Firstly, it will define climate
change, terrorism, and cognitive biases. Secondly, it will assess the impact of
cognitive biases on risk assessment made by experts, decision-makers, and the
public. It will illustrate these impacts with examples from climate change and
terrorism. Finally, this essay will compare the reactions to terrorism and climate
change both of the public at large and of policy-maker, thereby addressing the
problem of threats’ prioritization. In the process, it will seek to illustrate how cognitive
biases influence our judgement, pushing certain issues to a higher priority than we
would otherwise do rationally.
Before developing the issue at hand, a definition of the terms is in order.
Though climate change is a controversial issue, one may define it as the modification
of the Earth’s environment through the activities of men. In other words, Man has a
profound impact on his environment, to the extent that scientists now believe that he

" 24
is bringing along an irreversible change.1 Though consensus is slowly growing that
Man is causing climate change, there is little agreement on what this evolution of our
natural world will look like and whether it will prove problematic for future
generations.2 To illustrate, there are several scenarios put forward by the scientific
community that argue that climate change will be a slow process, giving our societies
the time to adapt to new environmental realities.3 However, others argue for caution
and maintain that abrupt climate change is a very real possibility, that if ignored
could seriously undermine our ability to deal with the associated risks.4 Such
scholars argue that though these scenarios have a low probability, they are still a
very real possibility, and with our current stance on the issue we would be caught by
surprise.5 On the other side of the spectrum, terrorism, which is also a low likelihood
event with equally important consequences, is placed very high on our list of risk
priorities.6 We fear terrorism in a way we do not fear climate change. The reasons for
this asymmetrical evaluation of risks lie in how our brain deals with risks and
uncertainties.
There is a widespread and ongoing debate over what terrorism is, without any
real agreement of what defines a terrorist or an act of terrorism. It is one of the few
instances in which most people can agree that certain acts constitute terrorism
without being able to properly define the term. For simplicity’s sake this essay will
use the definition of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations that, in Title 22, defines
terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to
influence an audience.”7 Although this definition is not perfect, the scope of these
problems exceeds the limits of this paper.
In order to process complex information and uncertainties, our brain takes
mental “shortcuts and rules of thumbs to make judgements that are generally quite
accurate but can lead to error.”8 Our reliance on these shortcuts means that we are
not always capable of making rational choices in the face of high levels of
uncertainty and risk. Our ability to think and make decisions rationally is further
compounded with our relative inability to quantify and deal with probability or
uncertainty and risk.9 In order to overcome this, we rely upon a variety of mental
shortcuts or biases that make sense out of issues too unpredictable to be properly

1
Roger A. Pielke, Jr, “What is Climate Change?” in Issues in Science and Technology, summer 2004,
accessed April 19, 2010, http://www.issues.org/20.4/p_pielke.html.
2
Mike Hulme, “Abrupt Climate Change: Can Society Cope?,” Philosophical Transactions:
Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, 361 1810, (2003): 2001.
3
Thomas Lowe and Irene Lorenzoni, “Danger is all around: Eliciting expert perceptions for managing
climate change through a mental models approach” Global Environmental Change, 17, (2007): 138.
4
Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, “An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for
United
States National Security,” U.S. Department of Defense Report, 2003, 3.
5
Ibid, 1-4.
6
Cass R. Sunstein, “On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change,”
Columbia Law Review, 107 (2), (2007).
7
Quoted in Black, “Patterns of Global Terrorism”, U.S. State Department, April 30, 2003, accessed
April 19, 2010, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19977.htm,.
8
Jeffrey Rachlinski, “Innovation in Environmental Policy: The Psychology of Global Climate Change,”
University of Illinois Law Review, 299, (2000): 4.
9
Neville Nicholls, “Cognitive Illusions, Heuristics, and Climate Prediction,” Bulletin of American
Meteorological Society, 80 (7), (1999): 1386.

" 25
processed.10 In other words, our biases play a crucial role in the development of our
choices and beliefs when it comes to risks and probabilities. Therefore, how we
interpret information or forecasts impacts our decision-making process. It is these
biases and belief systems that frame how we address a risk. Therefore, why is
terrorism viewed as a national priority while climate change is not? These biases are
not necessarily acknowledged, as we are not always aware that we are making
erroneous choices, given that “the observer doesn’t see that he doesn’t see what he
doesn’t see.”11
Before addressing the question of why the public and policy-makers focus on
terrorism to the detriment of climate change, this paper will first provide a brief
overview of the impact of cognitive biases on how experts, policy-makers, and the
public engage issues. An understanding of the influence of these biases and
assumptions, at all levels of risk analysis and interpretation, must be appreciated in
order to demonstrate how these issues influence our perception of what a plausible
threat is and what it is not.
At the root of risk analysis are expert opinions and forecasts. These opinions
would ideally be objectively formulated based on data that has been assimilated in a
rational way. However, even in the realm of natural sciences this is not a given, with
biases affecting what information is used and what underlying assumptions experts
already possess. Various scholars have written on this topic, ranging from the
geosciences to meteorological predictions. Nicholls argues that all sciences involving
forecasts and predictions are subject to biases that affect the way models are
constructed and how expert predictions are then interpreted by concerned actors.12
Drawing from the example of El Nino in 1997/1998, Nicholls argues that scientists
tend to be overly confident in their models and their own knowledge.13 This is due to
how experts assimilate information, whereby powerful initial assumptions influence
how they interpret new information.14 Furthermore, “new evidence appears reliable
and informative if it is consistent with one’s initial beliefs” meaning that we assimilate
information in a way that supplements our existing perspective.15 This is true for both
terrorism and climate change; as seen in the divergent opinions on the nature of the
threat of Al-Qaeda (AQ), with scholars such as Sageman and Hoffman pointing out
data that is consistent with their beliefs and dismissing other information.16 They both
have studied AQ as an organisation but have come to two opposing conclusions: on
one hand, Sageman argues that AQ has evolved into a decentralised and leaderless
movement based more on ideology than a hierarchical entity, and on the other,
Hoffman asserts that AQ is still very much a more classical-style organisation, with
objectives formulated by its top leaders being carried out by independent cells.17

10
Rachlinski, “Innovation,” 4.
11
Heinz Von Forester quoted in Karlheinz Steinmuller, "Thinking out of the Box. Weak Signals and
Wild Cards for European Regions," Futura, 2, (2007).
12
Nicholls, “Cognitive Illusions,” 1386.
13
Ibid, 1390.
14
Ibid, 1386.
15
Rachlinski, “Innovation,” 5.
16
Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in 21st Century, (University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2008); Bruce Hoffman, “Al Qaeda has a new Strategy, Obama Needs one too” in The
Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/01/08/AR2010010803555.html, January 10th 2010.
17
Ibid.

" 26
 Moreover, the use of language is critical in the development of forecasts and
risk assessment. How experts frame their positions and predictions will have an
impact on the receiver: studies have shown that the wording of reports plays an
understated role in how the reader will react and thus make decisions. Nicholls
states that in “the face of losses and in the face of gains we tend to be more
conservative when offered gains and adventurous when we face loss.”18 In other
words the framing of the issue influences how decision-makers will react.
All these factors play a key role in how policy-makers assess the presented
information and make their decisions. Here again there are multiple biases that
influence what choices will be made. In this respect, the concept of timing is crucial
to how policy-makers will react to climate change.19 Due to their organisational bias,
they are prone to short-sightedness, as they see problems only in the short term and
within a limited geographical space.20 As such, decision-makers will look at climate
change forecasts in ways that reflect their personal position: “how will climate
change and emissions mitigation affect the major constituencies of my political
party?”21 Therefore, if a threat is viewed as being a long-term and slowly evolving
risk, then policy-makers are unlikely to push for dramatic and restrictive policies that
would curtail this possible threat. The problem is that despite calls for action by the
scientific community, the “threat of climate change [...] remains a psychologically,
temporally and spatially distant risk.”22 Consequently, a policy-maker’s perception of
plausibility and proximity of the threat will have an impact on how the policy-maker
interprets the information presented to him. He will thus pick what he perceives as
dangerous depending on his perceptions.23 Consequentially, if presented with
reports on climate change and on terrorism he will prioritise terrorism over the former
because his biases and assumptions create this threat as more plausible than the
latter.
Finally the degree to which a policy-maker engages a threat or risk will have
an impact on the public’s perception of the plausibility of such a threat.24 As such the
rhetoric used by then-President Bush Jr. in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack was
made in a language of war and danger. During the course of the War on Terror, the
language was one of risk: “we are a nation at risk” and “our country is more in
danger of an attack.”25 There is no similar use of language with regards to climate
change, with politicians seeking to dampen the impact of climate change as a
plausible threat to the U.S.. For example, Watson, the chief climate change
negotiator for the Bush administration, stated of Hurricane Katrina that “there is a

18
Nicholls, “Cognitive Illusions,” 1388.
19
Lowe and Lorenzoni, “Danger is all around,” 138.
20
Michelle C. Baddeley, Andrew Curtis, and Rachel A. Wood, “An Introduction to Prior Information
Derived from Probabilistic Judgements: Elicitation of Knowledge, Cognitive Biases and Herding,”
Geological Society Special Publications, 239, 2004, 8.
21
Michael Oppenheimer and Alexander Todorov, “Global Warming: The Psychology of Long Term
Risk”, Climatic Change, 77, (2006): 1, accessed April 17, 2010, DOI: 10.1007/s10584-006-9086-6.
22
Irene Lorenzoni and Nick Pidgeon, “Public Views on Climate Change: European and USA
Perspectives”, Climactic Change, 77, (2006): 86.
23
Lowe and Lorenzoni, “Danger is all around,” 140.
24
Sunstein, “On the Divergent American Reactions,” 520.
25
President Bush quoted in Suzanne Goldenberg, “We are a Nation in Danger” The Guardian, August
3rd 2004, accessed April 17, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/aug/03/uselections2004.usa;
and Associated Press, “Bush: Congress Putting U.S. in Danger” in MSNBC February 15th 2008,
accessed April 17, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23184150/.

" 27
difference between climate and extreme weather [...] we cannot blame any single
extreme event, and attribute that to climate change.”26
The biases coming into play at the two previous levels complement the biases
of the general public and their reaction to uncertain threats and risks the future may
hold. Various surveys in the U.S. and Europe have shown that these populations
view climate change as a serious issue with important political and moral
consequences.27 However, this perception has not correlated with legislation that
seriously attempts to mitigate the impact of climate change.28 The rationale behind
this is how the public recognizes the risk and crucially how they perceive the cost of
policies.29 As stated earlier, individuals react differently when they believe that they
have much to gain or lose from change. The public will therefore subjectively assess
the validity of restrictive legislation through biased lenses whereby their perception of
costs and benefits of legislation are placed against the perceived risk.30
Therefore the question is what cognitive biases come into play when the
public evaluates risks presented to them by decision-makers and experts.
Leiserowitz argues that for a threat to become plausible in the minds of the public it
must be perceived as having personal ramifications for them.31 In his study, he found
that most Americans view the risk of climate change as lying in a distant realm,
where the threats would not affect him or his family but would most likely play out in
a remote country.32 Climate change is thus “perceived as a distant and impersonal
threat removed in space and time.”33 Sunstein’s analysis of public perceptions of
climate change demonstrated that this perceived distance made actors overestimate
their immunity to risks, allowing them to ignore the threat of climate change.34
Moreover, a rational understanding of the probability of the threat is overshadowed
by personal experience and emotions.35 These two factors play a powerful role in
how individuals perceive threats because they stimulate images and allow us to
envision the threat, thus making it appear more real and plausible.36 Stated
alternatively, our biases stipulate that if threats can be more readily imagined, they
are more likely to occur and affect ourselves, family and friends. As such, the ability
of actors to ascertain plausibility is overshadowed by emotions and images in what
Slovic and Fischhoff call the “availability bias.”37 Within these instances, we consider

26
Watson quoted in Associated Press, “New heat on U.S. over global warming treaty” in MSNBC
November 29th 2005, accessed April 17, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10256169/from/RSS/,.
27
Suzanne Stoll-Kleemann, Tim O'Riordan, Carlo C. Jaeger, “The Psychology of Denial Concerning
Climate Mitigation Measures: Evidence From Swiss Focus Groups”, Global Environmental Change,
11, (2001): 109-111.
28
Ibid.
29
Oppenheimer and Todorov, “Global Warming,” 2.
30
Ellen Peters and Paul Slovic, “The Springs of Actions: Affective and Analytical Information
Processing in Choice”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26 (12), (2000).
31
Anthony, Leiserowitz, “Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect,
Imagery, and Values”, Climatic Change, 77, (2006): 52.
32
Ibid, 53.
33
Lowe and Lorenzoni, “Danger is all around,” 132.
34
Sunstein, “On the Divergent American Reactions,” 552.
35
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, “Public Views on Climate Change,” 73.
36
Leiserowitz, “Climate Change Risk Perception,” 49.
37
Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein, “Knowing with Certainty: The
Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception
and Performance, 3 (4), (1977).

" 28
that the frequency of events is tied to our memory of past examples.38 Consequently,
“risk reduction legislation is often fuelled by identifiable crises, bringing worst-case
scenarios to mind.”39 These misleading personal experiences or memories cause
risks to be over-or underestimated, whereby terrorism is granted much more
credibility than climate change.40
Therefore, though the public believes that climate change is a threat, they do
not believe that individual action can mitigate it. Nor do they believe that there are
grounds for restrictive policies that will affect their lifestyle and the competitiveness of
their nation in the global economy.41 Consequently, their stance is actually one of
wishful thinking, in which they deem individual action meaningless, allowing them to
evade responsibility, while hoping that someone else will take the lead in addressing
the issue.42 As such, public opinion in the U.S. and Europe consider that their current
lifestyle outweighs the possible benefits of tackling climate change.43 As we shall see
in the following section, this is not the case with the threat of terrorism, where the
plausibility of the threat is considered to be high enough to justify restrictive
measures to dampen its possible effects. Nevertheless, we have not witnessed a
widespread call for action against climate change that would impinge on our
pocketbook and way of life.44
The question this paper seeks to address is how the prioritization of risk and
then the reaction to them are affected by the impact of cognitive biases on risk
assessment at policy-making and public opinion levels. In order to be able to show
that cognitive biases indeed have such an impact, we must first ask ourselves if the
two threats chosen are similar enough to allow for such a comparison. Both terrorism
and climate change are considered to be low plausibility high-impact incidents,
where, despite the unlikelihood of us being affected, the consequences of the threat
would be huge.45 Sunstein argues that both carry with them worst-case scenarios
that could cost the lives of thousands, yet no one is able to assign a probability of an
incident occurring.46 However, we can find statements such as the “One Percent
Doctrine”, attributed to former Vice President Cheney, "if there was even a 1 percent
chance of terrorists getting a weapon of mass destruction — and there has been a
small probability of such an occurrence for some time — the United States must now
act as if it were a certainty."47By contrast, there has been no similar statement made
for the issue of climate change. The mainstream media downplays the threat of
climate change, assuming that climate change will be a gradual process during
which our societies will have the luxury of time to adapt and even profit from it.48
Moreover, Lorenzoni and Pidgeon argue that trust in governments and institutions is

38
Ibid, 563.
39
Sunstein, “On the Divergent American Reactions,” 539
40
Nicholls, “Cognitive Illusions,” 1386.
41
Lowe and Lorenzoni, “Danger is all around.” 138.
42
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, “Public Views,” 86.
43
Stoll-Kleemann, O'Riordan and Jaeger, “The Psychology of Denial,” 113.
44
Leiserowitz, “Climate Change Risk Perception,” 52, 56.
45
Sunstein, “On the Divergent American Reactions,” 505.
46
Ibid, 505-506.
47
Suskind quoted by Michiko Kakutani, “Personality, Ideology and Bush’s Terror Wars” in The New
York Times, June 20th 2006, accessed April 17, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/20/books/20kaku.html,.
48
Alexander MacDonald, “The Wild Card in the Climate Change Debate” in Issues in Science and
Technology, July 1st 2001: 1.

" 29
crucial for public acceptance of policy choices, seemingly public trust in
government’s ability to tackle terrorism surpasses their ability to handle climate
change.49
A variety of scholars have argued that in order for a threat to muster
widespread public support and political will, there must be a vivid image that comes
to mind when one thinks of the threat.50 As we saw previously, since humans
struggle with the notion of uncertainty, our brains process this information using
memory of past events, which are then associated with likelihood. In the case of
terrorism, there are several events that can come into play when assessing the
probability of a terrorist attack: for example, 9/11, the London 7/7 attack and the
Madrid Bombing.51 These events stimulate powerful emotions that conjure intense
images of disaster whilst the idea of climate change does not.”52 These strong
feelings cloud an actor’s ability to judge probability, which leads to a push for
mitigation actions that can supersede the scope of the threat.53
This means that we perceive terrorism as more likely to have an effect on our
daily lives. In other words, due to vivid images and strong emotions, we assume that
we have a higher chance of being adversely affected by a terrorist attack than by
climate change.54 There is no equivalent image for the case of climate change:
environmentalists have failed to demonstrate a link between Hurricane Katrina and
climate change, thus limiting its impact on public perceptions.55
Moreover, there is no focal point that can easily be identified. In the case of
9/11 or the 7/7 Bombings, policy-makers and the public could point their finger at
Osama bin Laden or radical Islamic terrorist organisations. However, this has not
been the case with climate change; in this instance scientists have enumerated a
variety of reasons for climate change with carbon emissions figuring high on the list
of causes.56 Despite this, it is much harder to visualise carbon emissions than it is to
evoke the well-known face of bin Laden. Likewise, it is easier to link terrorism with
how effective policies will be; the measures put in place in the U.S. reflect this belief,
as they are believed to be targeted against a very real threat, which if left undeterred
may have dramatic consequences.57 This is not the case with climate change where
political beliefs and losses to one’s lifestyle inhibit individuals from supporting
policies.58 Therefore the costs and benefits are perceived differently because of our
biases. While most people do not believe they will be impacted by either risk, there
still remains the belief that the costs associated with implementing counter-terrorism
measures are beneficial enough to accept the inconveniences.59 However, since the
threat of climate change is not perceived to be plausible in the short term, there is no
such willingness to make sacrifice.

49
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, “Public Views,” 89.
50
Ibid, 80.
51
Sunstein, “On the Divergent American Reactions,” 507
52
Ibid, 534.
53
Ibid, 542; Rachlinski, “Innovation in Environmental Policy,” 8.
54
Sunstein, “On the Divergent American Reactions,” 516.
55
Leiserowitz, “Climate Change Risk Perception,” 45; Sunstein, “On the Divergent American
Reactions,” 520.
56
Schwartz and Randall, “An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario,” 2-4.
57
Sunstein, “On the Divergent American Reactions,” 503.
58
Stoll-Kleemann, O'Riordan and Jaeger, “The Psychology of Denial,” 110.
59
Sunstein, “On the Divergent American Reactions,” 527-528.

" 30
 Therefore, one can argue that “global warming and the policies proposed to
mitigate or adapt to it occur within a rich and complex socio-political context, in which
groups of individuals are socio-politically predisposed to select, ignore and interpret
information in different ways.”60 This means that we assimilate information that
reduces or amplifies risks depending on our biases.61 Applied to terrorism and
climate change, we see signs of the rising and ever present threat of terrorism
whereas we ignore the threat of climate change. This is translated by a rejection of
information attempting to demonstrate the risks of climate change, while legitimising
information showing that terrorism is a threat. Moreover, even mixed evidence will,
instead of creating doubt, reinforce our beliefs that our assumptions and primary
position was correct.62 A very real example of this is the rationale and public support
for the invasion of Iraq on the grounds of the War on Terror.63
Despite the growing number of scientists and experts ringing alarm bells and
the growing number of signs of climate change, there is little evidence that public
perceptions of the risks are evolving to demand greater preventive measures. The
melting of the ice caps in the Northern Hemisphere have not caused a public outrage
and demand for action, the likes of which were witnessed in the aftermath of the
collapse of the World Trade Centre buildings. The reasons behind this are the
cognitive biases that we use unconsciously to assess uncertainties and risks. This
paper has argued that these biases are crucial in how the public and decision-
makers prioritise threats and risks that demand counter measures and legislation. As
such these biases have led to a deployment of impressive measures to tackle the
threat of terrorism while the efforts involved in reducing our emissions have been
next to naught. The reasons for this are not that there is a lower risk involved in
climate change but due to the way we perceive terrorism as a more plausible threat
than climate change.

60
Leiserowitz, “Climate Change Risk Perception,” 64.
61
Ibid, p. 49.
62
Nicholls, “Cognitive Illusions,” 1393.
63
Sunstein, “On the Divergent American Reactions,” 527.

" 31
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" 32
Schwartz Peter and Doug Randall. “An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its
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http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/20/books/20kaku.html.

" 33
THE FUTURE OF FOOD SECURITY: COMPLEXITY AND A
SYSTEMIC APPROACH
Ya-Yi Ong
“Food is not a commodity like others. We should go back to a policy of maximum food self-sufficiency.
It is crazy for us to think we can develop countries around the world without increasing their ability to
feed themselves.”
– Former U.S. President Bill Clinton, Speech at the United Nations World Food Day, October 16, 2008

Introduction
Over the past hundred years, the world has seen only three major spikes in
food prices. The first one took place right after World War II, the second one
occurred in the 1970s and the third one happened just recently, between 2007 and
2008.1 There is a saying: “Crisis is the mother of invention”. When the latest food
price crisis struck, it revived research and debates on the future of food security. For
too long, the world has been caught up in endless rounds of deliberation on climate
change, energy, nuclear proliferation – everything, except the most basic one that
keeps all of mankind alive: food.
However now we have series upon series of papers that detail how
governments, businesses, and civil society should act to ensure global food security.
It is thus the author’s intention to caution readers against being lulled into thinking
that food security is just another one of those issues that can be simplistically
resolved through the implementation of a grocery list of recommendations. On the
contrary, a systemic approach that will consider the complexity of food security,
notably regarding its future, must be adopted.
Section I of this paper will present the facts and events, giving first an
overview of how food production was tackled with seeming success in the past via
the Green Revolution, then bringing us back to the present issue of food price crisis.
Section II will emphasize the complexity of the interdependent factors of food
security with respect to its future. Section III will seek to critique the kinds of factors
that are included in a systems approach, so as to allow for its best use.

Section I: From Past Success to Present Debacle

Past Success – The Green Revolution
Until the first part of the 20th century, increasing the amount of land under
cultivation was the most important means of augmenting global food production.2
Between the 1960s and the 1970s, the “Green Revolution”, a process that increased
industrialized agriculture through the expansion of irrigation infrastructure and
widespread use of synthetic fertilizer / pesticide, became the key driver for ensuring
that food supply kept pace with the population growth.3
Even as it was lauded for its success, the Green Revolution has not been
without its limitations. Mainly premised on the mechanization of agriculture, critics

1
Joachim von Braun, Responding to the World Food Crisis: Getting on the Right Track, International
Food Policy Research Institute, 1 September 2008, accessed 20 April 2010,
http://www.ifpri.org/publication/responding-world-food-crisis-getting-right-track, 1.
2
Alex Evans, The Feeding of the Nine Billion, Global Food Security for the 21st Century, Chatham
House report, 1 January 2009, accessed 20 April 2010,
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/694/, 17.
3
Ibid.

" 34
associated it with a host of environmental degradation and pollution problems.4 They
also charged that the benefits of the process were unequally distributed – with
technological revolution mainly concentrated on the best agricultural lands, where
large-scale farmers in developed nations were the main beneficiaries, leaving out
small-scale rural farmers in less developed countries.5 It is also subject to the law of
diminishing returns.6 Between 1970 and 1990, productivity growth (global average
aggregate yield) was 2.0% annually.7 This declined to an average of 1.1% annually
between 1990 and 2007. The fact that world production has since been falling even
as population and consumption continue to rise is a cause for concern.
Alas, man is prone to overestimating the success of his undertakings. Richard
Heuer refers to this as a cognitive bias related to the perception of cause and effect.8
And so it is that rapid technological progress caused man to think that there will
always be enough food for an ever-increasing population (an unintended
consequence of progress), without having realized that the inequalities which came
with the 20th century Green Revolution have actually made the threats faced in the
coming decades even greater than those previously confronted.

Present Debacle – Food Price Crisis

Various reasons have been attributed to the most recent food price crisis. In
2000, apparent abundant food supplies on the world markets coupled with an
efficient supply chain network led to a long-term slump in the price of commodities.
For a time, policy intended for production to fall behind consumption so as to clear
surplus stock.9 However, the unanticipated depreciation of the U.S. dollar in 2002
caused oil prices to rise.10 As oil prices rose, the costs of agricultural inputs and
transport increased. Rising oil prices also turned bio fuels into an attractive substitute
for oil in places like the United States and the European Union.11 This has
inadvertently led to developing countries like Indonesia and Malaysia rapidly cutting
down forests to expand oil-palm plantations in a bid to supply up to 20% of the EU
bio fuels market.12 In 2006, it is thought that investment funds’ use of automated
trend-following trading practices could have contributed to increased price volatility of
commodities. At around the same time, extreme weather in a number of major food-
producing countries contributed to shortages in food production.13
Consequently from 2006 onwards, food prices began to rise sharply, a trend
that subsequently led to major civil unrests from Mexico to Pakistan. In the West
African state of Burkina Faso, rioters burned down government buildings and looted
stores.14 This was followed by massive protests in Cameroon, wherein a taxi drivers’

4
Evans, The Feeding of the Nine Billion, 19.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Richard J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, (New York: Novinka Books, 2006), 145.
9
Evans, The Feeding of the Nine Billion, 12.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Eric Holt-Giménez, “Food First Backgrounder: Biofuels--Myths of the Agro-fuels Transition,” 6 July
2007, Food First, Institute for Food and Development Policy, accessed April 20, 2010,
http://www.foodfirst.org/node/1711.
13
Evans, The Feeding of the Nine Billion, 12.
14
Vivienne Walt, “The World's Growing Food-Price Crisis,” Time, 27 February 2008, accessed April
20, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1717572-1,00.html.

" 35
strike over fuel prices mutated to one on food prices.15 And Indian protesters torched
food-ration stores in West Bengal, accusing businesses of selling government-
subsidized food on the lucrative black market.16 In mid-2007, in a bid to curb the
inflation of domestic food prices, governments imposed export restrictions.17 By
2008, importing countries, in turn, reduced trade barriers to build their stocks and
likewise control inflation.18 It was only during late 2008 that commodity prices started
decreasing as a result of the global economic slowdown.19

Section II: Complexity – the Past and the Present linked with the Future
What do the previous two series of events tell us? It is that we live in exciting
times wherein we are constantly pushed to go beyond our limits. Interesting enough,
Blaise Pascal, a 17th century French philosopher and mathematician wrote, “But the
parts of the world all have such a relationship and such link to one another, that I
believe it impossible to know one without the other and without the whole.”20
Roger Lewin, in his 1992 work Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos,
succinctly observed that a past where the job of a policy-maker was to ensure things
ran smoothly in a command-control style of management is not applicable in today’s
world anymore.21 A time when policy-makers could operate with a machine model of
the world was a period wherein a straightforward response like the Green Revolution
could find much success.
It can perhaps be said that we human beings are victims of our own progress.
We have advanced from a world predicated on linear thinking, control and
predictability to the next level.22 For we now find ourselves struggling with something
more organic and nonlinear, where there is limited control and a restricted ability to
predict the norm.23 Our continued advancement has resulted in a connected
economy where top-down linear management is simply ineffective and impedes
creativity.24
It is a matter of fact that the 2007/2008 food price crisis triggered a massive
re-thinking of how human beings need to view the security of food systems. At the
same time, that realization is tempered by the enormity of the task at hand. In order
to seriously tackle an issue as vital as mankind’s food security, one needs to
consider the dynamics of the entire system. It is not enough for food production to be
maximized; the entire food systems’ growth now has to be premised on a
sustainable platform that is robust in the face of any shocks. Emphasis has changed
from mere optimization to renewal and resilience.
Jay Forrester, in a 1998 paper aptly titled Designing the Future, mentioned
that dynamic systems are complex, in that sometimes policies established to solve a

15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Evans, The Feeding of the Nine Billion, 12.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Blaise Pascal, Thoughts of Mr. Pascal on Religion and on some other topics that have been found
after his death among his papers (Paris: Chez Guillaume Desprez, 1671), 318.
21
Roger Lewin, Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992),
199.
22
Ibid, 197.
23
Ibid.
24
Lewin, Complexity, 199.

" 36
problem are actually its very cause.25 Such situations cause downward spirals,
especially if the very policies that are causing the problems are believed to be
alleviating the problems. This principle has been demonstrated in the recent food
price crisis, wherein one country’s knee-jerk response of curbing food exports led to
another state’s counter-reaction of lowering import barriers, further exacerbating the
security of food supplies in both.
Indeed, human beings live in a never-ending circular environment, wherein
each action is based on a set of current conditions, and these in turn affect future
conditions, while these changed conditions become the basis for later action.26
Inevitably, human beings have to think of food security as one complex adaptive
system, where a diversity of agents interact and mutually affect each other and in so
doing, generate novel, emergent, behaviour for the system as a whole.27
The old “business-as-usual” model advocated by the Green Revolution is
characterized by an intensification of food production through high reliance on
chemical inputs. While this helped to increase food production for a few decades, it
also put enormous pressures on the environment and unwittingly lent support to the
expansion of unhealthy diet patterns.28 The alternative is to seek to rebalance
human beings’ diet while ensuring the utilization of environmental-friendly and
resource-efficient farming methods.
However, achieving food security on the basis of sustainable development
practices is not as easy as it sounds. Several interdependent factors are involved.
Thus, it is imperative to use feedback loops to interconnect them, for there is neither
beginning nor end to the process, as we shall now see.29
Land: The Green Revolution advances were principally made through
increasing the amount of land that could be used for cultivation. If man is to continue
this trend of increasing food production, acreage needs to be expanded.30 However,
the amount of farmland available in the world continues to shrink owing to the
expansion of urban spaces.31 Meanwhile, a new trend of cash-rich countries
acquiring land from poor but land-rich countries in order to secure food supplies
further disadvantages developing states.32
Water: Falling water tables across large parts of the world limits the amount
of land that can be cultivated.33 The overall decrease in the availability of water
affects diet patterns as well. While a kilogram of root crop like potato requires 500
litres of water to produce, a kilogram of meat like beef requires 15,000 litres of water
to produce!
Energy: Today, links between the world’s food and energy economies are
stronger than ever. Higher oil prices tend to contribute to higher food prices.34 In turn,

25
Jay Forrester, “Designing the Future,” MIT System Dynamics in Education Project, 15 December
1998, accessed April 20, 2010, http://sysdyn.clexchange.org/sdep/papers/Designjf.pdf, 4.
26
Ibid, 3.
27
Lewin, Complexity, 198.
28
Soil Association, “Strategies for a food secure future,” 1 January 2009, accessed April 20, 2010,
http://www.soilassociation.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=aBVYgjxtNOI%3d&tabid=565, 1.
29
Forrester, “Designing the Future,” 4.
30
Evans, The Feeding of the Nine Billion, 20.
31
Laurie A. Garrett, “Food Failures and Futures,” Council on Foreign Relations, 15 May 2008,
accessed April 20, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16289/food_failures_and_futures.html, 9.
32
Von Braun, “Responding to the World Food Crisis,” 5.
33
Evans, The Feeding of the Nine Billion, 24.
34
Ibid, 27.

" 37
rising petroleum costs generate huge interest in the conversion of bio-fuels to
ethanol. Again, this act of diverting food crops to fuel sources puts upward pressure
on food prices and imperils the future security of food supplies.35
Climate: The quest to reduce carbon emissions is seeing major shifts in
agricultural production, from industrialized farming to organic farming, which causes
a decrease in the productive yield in the short-term. But unless adequate cuts in
emissions are achieved, there will be long-term impacts on the planet, which will
affect the agriculture industry as well.36 Erratic rainfall and rising temperatures need
to be accounted for as well.
Demography: The current population forecasts suggest that world population
will reach a total of 9.2 billion people in the year 2050 and most of this increase will
be accounted for by the less developed regions.37 Once more, a rising population
implies increased pressures on food supply. The World Bank estimates that by 2030,
nearly a billion more people will join the world’s existing middle class. With rising
middle class prosperity comes greater demand for meat and diverse foods.38
Diseases: Many of the developing countries face the additional burden of high
HIV infection rates. This, coupled with insufficient access to treatment, means that
even if the population increases, the number of adults available to produce food in
those regions will be adversely affected.39
Development assistance: Food aid provided by developed countries like the
United States has been accused of primarily serving the interests of its donors by
providing the American agricultural sector with a means to dispose of their surplus
produce.40 This in turn depresses the agricultural sector of recipient nations and
further endangers the livelihood of small farm holders in the rural areas, eroding their
food security.
Politics: More often than not, food production remains a political issue as it
affects the use and control of resources that is the economic basis for many
countries.41 And yet, contentious issues such as biotechnology, intellectual property
rights, land ownership and empowerment of women continue to be neglected in
these global political discussions. 42
Actually, the task of analyzing the complex linkages of such interdependent
factors requires a team of domain experts and subject specialists. Nevertheless, we
shall attempt a brief version here (see Figure 1 below).

35
Garrett, “Food Failures,” 15.
36
Evans, The Feeding of the Nine Billion, 28.
37
Ibid, p.30.
38
Garrett, “Food Failures,” 12.
39
United Nations, World Population Prospect, The 2008 Revision, United Nations, 1 January 2008,
accessed April 20, 2010, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp2008/index.htm, 12.
40
Sandy Ross, "The World Food Programme: a case of benign U.S. policy?," Australian Journal of
International Affairs 61.2 (2007): 267-281.
41
Jane Midgley, Just Desserts? Securing global food futures, Institute for Public Policy Research, 27
January 2009, accessed April 20, 2010,
http://www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=644, 31."
42
Ibid.

" 38
 Figure 1: Food Security and its Various Interdependent Factors

From the systems perspective, all of life is interconnected. The much-touted

effects of climate change imply that the security of our planet’s water supplies will not
always be guaranteed. Without sufficient water, arable lands that do not undergo the
requisite irrigation will not be able to produce the expected amount of food. And as
the world’s population continues to grow, demand for energy resources remains
relentless. Fuel prices are driven up by rising demand and decreasing / stagnant
supply. This leads to the never-ending search for alternative sources of energy,
currently found in the form of bio-fuels. However, an increasing amount of land that
is dedicated to the cultivation of bio-fuel crops (instead of food crops) threatens the
stability of food supply. Added to this already intricate situation is the emergence of
pandemics and diseases that may imperil the lives of the very people who are at the
forefront of food production. However, if we consider the possibility that these very
diseases themselves may mean that the world’s population will never reach the
projected nine billion, food security will not be an issue in the first place. It is a
conundrum.

Section III: Other Ways of looking at the Future

The greatest challenge to policy-makers lies in the complexity of causality. No
single piece of legislation can completely tackle the issue alone – thus any policy
must be based on a complex view that embraces all the different factors at play.43
One crucially independent factor that has often been missed out in the discussion of
food futures is that of time itself. We find a wide array of literature discussing major
issues like climate change, changing demographics, appropriate trade and

43
Garrett, “Food Failures,” 11.

" 39
agricultural policies, but rarely do we come across an article that places significant
emphasis on the factor of time.
In the one or two instances of such articles, there has been no rigorous
justification as to why the authors chose a particular year to project the price of food.
It appears to be based on whatever data is available to the authors at the time of
writing. This brings to mind a type of cognitive bias that is related to an ambiguous
expression of the probability of events. Part of the difficulty in responding to the food
crisis is the lack of credible and up-to-date information on the impact of food prices
on poor people and the effects of policy responses after implementation.44 One may
ask why there is a need to spend some effort on the time factor. This is because,
methodologically, in the systems approach, a small or incremental change in time
may lead to chance variations becoming indistinguishable until they are seen from a
broader perspective.45 Having too short a timeline could cause the analyst to miss
the bigger picture that could have been discernible if the span of time had been
lengthened. On the other hand, projecting too far into the future may lead to the
failure to take into consideration more real and urgent medium-term problems on the
assumption that advances in technology would obliterate those very issues in the
future.
Also, to make sense of the implications of recent food price behaviour for
policy, it is necessary to consider whether what is being observed is a transitory
spike or something persistent. A longer-term time perspective that covers a range of
food commodities, taking currency and exchange rates, issues into consideration
and the price of food relative to other commodities is required to formulate
appropriate policies.46
Another crucial influential factor that has not been thoroughly discussed but is
a part of the systems approach is the scale of space. Most writings appear to tackle
food security directly on a global level. There is thus a failure to take into
consideration that the reality is far from ideal. Not every state or region has the
same capacity or capability to tackle the issue of food self-sufficiency. There is an
almost unspoken assumption that trade will always be uninterrupted, that if one
location has an inadequate supply, it could easily be purchased from locations with
surplus produce, which could be effortlessly transported across the already
established supply chain networks. This is a classic example of what Heuer would
describe as a situation where “We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive.”47
What if there was a concerted terrorist attack on the global transport network, how
would countries like Singapore account for the import of their food supply? Note that
this scale of space factor does not just refer to the stereotypical developing country,
which does not have sufficient access to food (either because it does not have the
cash or because its lands are too arid for agriculture). It also refers to cash-rich
developed states like Singapore, which has very little agriculture and is an open
economy that is highly dependent on food imports.

44
Von Braun, Responding to the World Food Crisis, 8.
45
Allena Leonard and Stafford Beer, “The Systems Perspective: Methods and Models for the Future,”
Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. Gordon, Ed., The Millennium Project: Futures Research
Methodology, Version 3.0, 2009, 5.
46
Karen H. Johnson, “Food Price Inflation,” Council of Foreign Relations, 7 July 2008, accessed April
20, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16729/food_price_inflation.html, 4.
47
Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 22.

" 40
 In short, it is inadequate to speak of sustainable agricultural and rural
development on a global scale. Situations vary widely from one continent to another,
between regions of the same continent, between countries, and even within
countries, on a local level. While various events that have taken place historically
may serve as useful guides for tackling present day issues, caution needs to be
exercised when applying them to future challenges. The complex nature of our
world today dictates that such “one-size-fits-across-all-time” generalizations may not
always hold true. A more accurate understanding of the scale of both time and space
in a systems approach would greatly aid inter-state coordination efforts, leading to
better securitization of food.

Conclusion
No one knows what the future holds. Foresight and warning studies on food
security do not seek to predict its future. What it hopes to do is to enable
researchers and policy-makers to contemplate the subject in ways that might enable
them to anticipate any future shocks to the world’s food system. It is important that
the response to the issue permits it to build the kind of food and agriculture system
that can cope with a variety of possible outcomes. These outcomes could come in
the form of high food and energy prices that could be caused by attacks on its supply
chain networks or could materialize as a short-term glut of low food prices caused by
a global recession. Whatever the result, it is important for mankind to stop lurching
from one process to another and develop a system that can cope with surprise
events on an international scale.48

48
Von Braun, Responding to the World Food Crisis, 9.

" 41
Bibliography

Evans, Alex. The Feeding of the Nine Billion, Global Food Security for the 21st
Century. Chatham House report, 1 January 2009. Accessed 20 April 2010,
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Education Project. Accessed April 20, 2010.
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Garrett, Laurie A. “Food Failures and Futures.” Council on Foreign Relations, 15 May
2008. Accessed April 20, 2010,
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Heuer, Richard J. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. New York: Novinka Books,
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Holt-Giménez, Eric. “Food First Backgrounder: Biofuels--Myths of the Agro-fuels
Transition.” 6 July 2007. Food First, Institute for Food and Development
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Midgley, Jane. Just Desserts? Securing global food futures. Institute for Public Policy
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Track. International Food Policy Research Institute. 1 September 2008.
Accessed April 20, 2010 http://www.ifpri.org/publication/responding-world-
food-crisis- getting-right-track.

" 42
Walt, Vivienne. “The World's Growing Food-Price Crisis.” Time, 27 February 2008.
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" 43
STRATEGIC FORESIGHT AND WARNING, THE UNITED
STATES (U.S.) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
COUNTERINSUGENCY IN IRAQ
Justin M. Goldman
Introduction
Strategic foresight is a critical tool for the United States (U.S.) Department of
Defense (DoD) as planners confront a complex global security environment. These
efforts cover a range of activities from exercises to assess the impact of force
planning decisions to a war-game that simulates a major theatre of war to update
existing operational plans. In his 2008 Bastille Day keynote address to the Second
World Congress on Social Simulation, Joshua M. Epstein of the Brookings Institution
argued that one of the many reasons for modelling was to train practitioners.1 Major
DoD war-games are built around plausible scenarios with participants from multiple
agencies, reflecting the need for whole-of-government approaches to these
contingencies. The U.S. decision to invade Iraq in March 2003 is one of the most
scrutinized actions in recent years. This conflict has been unforgiving, with high
costs incurred through loss of lives and treasure, amidst the chaos that the U.S.-led
coalition was unprepared for at the start of the war. Strategic anticipation will be
examined through multiple activities related to U.S. involvement in Iraq.
Many of the challenges in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq were identified in a
now unclassified war-game called Desert Crossing. The first section in this paper will
examine the actions driven by Central Command (CENTCOM) under General
Anthony Zinni that led to the Desert Crossing war-game and the insights it produced.
Former Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis Thomas Fingar has
addressed the need for strategic foresight to address risks, and to identify the
opportunities to shift key developments in more positive directions.2 In the fall of
2005 when the Iraq War was deteriorating, General David Petraeus took over the
Doctrine Division at the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth. The
second section will look at the effort taken under his leadership to overhaul a
counterinsurgency doctrine that had not been updated for over two decades. By
engaging stakeholders ranging from intelligence officials to human rights experts, the
doctrine reflected how kinetic military operations had been insufficient in post-
Saddam Iraq. As Michel Godet has written, “the complexity of problems and the
need to address them collectively call for methods that are as rigorous and
participatory as possible to enable those involved to identify the appropriate
problems and agree upon their solutions.”3 In conjunction with the new doctrine, this
paper will look at the December 2006 exercise at the American Enterprise Institute
(AEI) that proposed an alternative military strategy that was focused on protecting
the Iraqi population.

1
Joshua M. Epstein, “Why Model?” Santa Fe Institute Working Papers, 2008, accessed April 20,
2010, http://www.santafe.edu/research/publications/workingpapers/08-09-040.pdf.
2
Thomas Fingar, “Anticipating Opportunities: Using Intelligence to Shape the Future,” Series 2009
Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence and National Security, Lecture 3, FSI Stanford, CISAC Lecture
Series, October 21, 2009, accessed April 20, 2010, http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/evnts/5859/lecture_text.pdf.
3
Michel Godet, Creating Futures: Scenario Planning as a Strategic Management Tool, (Paris:
Economica, 2006), 21.

" 44
Desert Crossing
The end of the 1991 Gulf War resulted in a permanent cease-fire agreement
where the United Nations (UN) Security Council ordered the Saddam Hussein
Government to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs
under international supervision. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) would be
responsible for conducting inspections to ensure that such disarmament was taking
place.4 In the Gulf War’s immediate aftermath, General Anthony Zinni served as the
Deputy Commanding General of Operation Provide Comfort, which provided relief to
Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. He later wrote of the dominant role of non-military
matters stating he was “now exposed to political issues, economic issues,
humanitarian issues, social issues, international agency issues, NGO issues, [and]
media issues.”5 This experience would impact his approach when he became the
Commander of CENTCOM in 1997.
While the Saddam Hussein regime continued to obstruct the work of
UNSCOM, the situation deteriorated rapidly in December 1998. UNSCOM Chief
Richard Butler withdrew his inspectors and the UN evacuated its staff from Iraq.
Operation Desert Fox was an air campaign that targeted nuclear, chemical, and
biological sites as well as the Iraqi regime’s ability to threaten its neighbours, which
lasted for 72 hours.6 Although reporting from the region made it clear that the regime
was shaken, Saddam Hussein remained belligerent. General Zinni began to examine
the challenge of a post-Saddam Iraq and the type of response needed from the U.S.
Government. Although the outcome of a military operation against Iraq was clear,
dealing with the aftermath was not; General Zinni, later in testimony before the U.S.
Congress, urged caution due to the challenges of winning the peace in post-Saddam
Iraq.7
Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff were focused on operations in the Balkans,
General Zinni was committed to exploring how to manage post-Saddam Iraq.
Working with war-gaming specialists from Booz Allen Hamilton, the three-day
wargame was based on the interagency process with teams representing the
National Security Council Principal’s Committee (NSC/PC), the Deputies Committee,
a red team of anti-coalition elements, and a green team of coalition nations.8 It was
designed to contend with questions General Zinni raised that covered issues from
refugee challenges to establishing a transitional government in Iraq.9 Each war-
game scenario would demand that the U.S. lead an intervention to stabilize the
country. The war-game included over 70 participants including DoD, the Department
of State (DoS), the NSC, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the CENTCOM

4
Arms Control Association, “A Chronology of UN Inspections,” Arms Control Today, October 2002,
accessed April 14, 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_10/iraqspecialoct02.
5
Tony Koltz and Tony Zinni, The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and
Purpose, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 69.
6
Mark J. Conversino, “Operation DESERT FOX: Effectiveness with Unintended Consequences,” Air
and Space Power Journal, 13 July 2005, accessed April 14, 2010,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/conversino.html.
7
Mark Frost, Mark Herman, and Robert Kurtz, Wargaming for Leaders: Strategic Decision Making
From the Battlefield to the Boardroom, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009), 45.
8
Central Command, “Desert Crossing Seminar After Action Report,” The National Security Archive,
4 December 2006, accessed April 13, 2010,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB207/index.htm pp. 8.
9
Frost, Herman, and Kurtz, Wargaming, 48.

" 45
Staff.10 The scenarios were designed to get the participants to think through the
potential challenges that would need to be confronted. The “Desert Crossing
Seminar was designed to elicit insights on how to manage change, while minimizing
undesirable effects and shaping new environments, in a post-Saddam Iraq.”11 The
After Action Report (AAR) accurately projected many challenges that arose following
the 2003 invasion.
Desert Crossing produced key insights organized into several themes. The
first dealt with the urgency of political/military planning to deal with the aftermath of a
military operation. “Sustaining peace often requires more complex planning and
sophisticated intervention techniques than do combat operations.”12 The AAR
recommended a force of 300,000-400,000 personnel, far greater than the force of
180,000 that invaded Iraq in 2003. General Zinni acknowledged the impact of a
larger force stating, “The first requirement is to freeze the situation, to gain control of
the security. To prevent the 'revenge' killings that might occur. To prevent bands or
gangs or militias that might not have your best interests at heart from growing or
developing.”13 Persistent insecurity was a tremendous obstacle to establishing a
legitimate government in Iraq following the invasion.
The AAR acknowledged that the U.S. did not have an adequate
understanding of the agendas of Iraqi opposition groups and it acknowledged the
weaknesses found in the exiled Iraqi opposition; the report concluded that Iran could
raise the consequence level of an intervention in Iraq.14 Analyst Jason Burke
acknowledged the Iranian position five years into the war stating, “Tehran's major
historical rival has been profoundly weakened, and there is a leadership vacuum in
the Islamic world, in no small part due to the loss of credibility with 'the street' of
rulers such as King Abdullah of Jordan or the House of al-Saud.”15 Ahmad Chalabi
was an exiled opposition leader close to the Bush Administration who was invited to
the 2004 State of the Union address by First Lady Laura Bush. After falling out with
the Bush Administration he remained influential in Iraq. Under Chalabi’s leadership
the Justice and Accountability commission disqualified hundreds of Sunni and
secular Shiite candidates for the March 2010 Election that resulted in him being
more aligned with the Iranian objectives in Iraq.16 Although former Prime Minister
Iyad Allawi’s cross-sectarian Iraqiya bloc edged out both Shiite electoral blocs,
Chalabi’s actions were clearly at odds with a U.S. policy that urged political
reconciliation.17 General Zinni was followed by General Tommy Franks, under

10
Central Command, “Desert Crossing,” 8.
11
Ibid, 36.
12
Frost, Herman, and Kurtz, Wargaming, 48.
13
Rebecca. Leung, “Gen. Zinni: They’ve Screwed Up.” 60 Minutes, 21 May 2004, accessed April 16,
2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/21/60minutes/main618896.shtml.
14
Central Command, “Desert Crossing,” 11.
15
Jason Burke, “And the Biggest Winner is: Iran,” The Observer, 16 March 2008, accessed April 16,
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2008/mar/16/iraqandiran.
16
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond,” 25 February 2010,
accessed April 15, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-syria-
lebanon/iraq/094-iraqs-uncertain-future-elections-and-beyond.aspx.
17
Khalid Al-Ansari, “Iraq’s PM Says Next Government has to Include Sunnis,” Washington Post 16
April 2010, accessed April 19, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/16/AR2010041601326.html.

" 46
whose leadership the Desert Crossing plan for invading Iraq was “neglected and
even disparaged as outmoded.”18

Adapting from Unsuccessful Approaches in Iraq

In October of 2005 General Petraeus assumed command of the Combined
Arms Center (CAC) in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has been leading the Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) that focused on developing
the capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). That experience combined with his
successful command of the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul during the invasion of
Iraq in 2003, placed him in a unique position to drive change through doctrinal
development and military education. General Petraeus led the charge to develop a
capacity to wage counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare in the U.S. military. The need
was urgent. Kalev Sepp, a retired Army Special Forces officer who was teaching at
the Naval Postgraduate School had recently returned from Iraq after conducting an
assessment on how well U.S. commanders grasped COIN principles. His troubling
conclusion was “twenty percent of them got, sixty percent were struggling, and
twenty percent were trying to fight a conventional war.”19
Jerome C. Glenn, the Director of the Millennium Project, writes how ‘vision’ is
utilized to describe the future condition that one would seek to create and that such
visions often emerge from those seasoned in a particular field who argue for a
particular set of developments.20 General Petraeus may have had such a thought on
his mind as an Information Operations conference was taking place at Fort
Leavenworth in December 2005. During this conference the writing team for what
would become the COIN manual was assembled and the critical ideas that would fill
the manual were identified. Conrad Crane is a retired U.S Army Lieutenant Colonel
(LtCol) with a PhD in History from Stanford University and was a West Point
classmate of General Petraeus.21 Crane led the writing team of academics and
veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the drafts were to be completed in just
two months as time was of the essence in turning around the war in Iraq.
In February 2006 a unique public conference was co-sponsored by General
Petraeus and the Combined Arms Center along with Sarah Sewall, the Director of
the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University. The draft of the
COIN Manual was discussed by the 135 experts on irregular warfare in attendance;
they included military officers, all relevant U.S. government agencies, allied
government and military personnel, human rights advocates, diplomats,
development experts, and a small number of seasoned journalists.22 David Kilcullen,
a retired Australian Army Lieutenant-Colonel, was in attendance representing the
Department of State. He would be forced to leave early in response to the news
coming out of Iraq that the al-‘Aaskariyya shrine in Samarra, one of the most

18
Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in
Iraq, 2006-2008 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009), 135.
19
Ricks, The Gamble, 25.
20
Jerome C. Glenn, “Genius Forecasting, Intuition, and Vision,” Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J.
Gordon Ed. The Millennium Project: Futures Research Methodology, Version 3.0. 2009, Ch. 25, 4-5.
21
U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Filed Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2007), xvi.
22
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 119.

" 47
important mosques in Shia Islam, had been bombed.23 Eliot Cohen of Johns
Hopkins University attended the conference and reflected that he “thought the most
interesting thing was the range of attendees, which spoke volumes about
Petraeus.”24 This vetting process was essential to ensure the manual would stand up
to criticism and to build broad support; the human rights advocates objected to
ambiguous language related to harsh interrogations that were ultimately removed.25
While the manual was being refined, Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, LtCol Jan
Horvath, and LtCol John Nagl gave an indication of the dramatic shift taking place in
a Military Review article entitled, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of
Counterinsurgency.” As violence escalated in Iraq as sectarian strife grew following
the Samarra mosque bombing, the authors argued that “counterinsurgents achieve
the most meaningful success by gaining popular support and legitimacy for the host
government, not by killing insurgents.”26 This would be a dramatic departure from
the intense, kinetic operations conducted by U.S. forces such as both battles for
Fallujah in 2004, which drew comparisons to the 26-day battle in Hue City during the
Tet Offensive of 1968.27 As a result of such intense fighting many units were
operating with an emphasis on force protection, staying on large forward operating
bases well removed from the Iraqi population. COIN theorists argued that
“counterinsurgents gain ultimate success by protecting the populace” rather than
utilizing risk-averse approaches that separate them from the people.28 This required
U.S. forces to conduct presence patrols and develop critical rapport with the
population in order to understand social needs. Although the population-centric
approach emphasizes providing security for citizens and carrying out civic
reconstruction, COIN requires relentless targeting of extremists to isolate them from
the population.29
David Kilcullen was in Iraq in March 2006 to evaluate the fallout from the
Samarra Mosque bombing and to provide guidance to U.S. forces carrying out
complex operations in theatre. Upon his return to Washington he wrote a piece
called “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency.”
He emphasized practices at the tactical level such as adjusting to the media scrutiny
that forces operating in this challenging environment faced, to practising “armed
social work” while ensuring that the initiative was maintained above all else.30 As the
article was read across the U.S. military, Conrad Crane circulated the updated draft
of the COIN manual across the Army and Marine Corps. The extensive feedback
was incorporated into the final version and reflected a desire to embrace this new
approach.
23
Sam Knight, “Al-Askariya shrine: 'Not just a major cathedral',” Times of London, 22 February 2006,
accessed April 17, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article733713.ece.
24
Ricks, The Gamble, 24.
25
Ibid, 25.
26
Eliot Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” Military Review,
March-April 2006, accessed April 18, 2010, http://www.usgcoin.org/docs1/MilitaryReview_2006-Mar-
Apr.pdf.
27
Robert D. Kaplan, “Five Days in Fallujah,” The Atlantic, July-August 2004, accessed April 19, 2010,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/07/five-days-in-fallujah/3450/.
28
Cohen et al., “Principles.”
29
Mark Bowden, “The Professor of War,” Vanity Fair, May 2010, accessed April 20, 2010,
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2010/05/petraeus-201005.
30
David Kilcullen, Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency, March
2006, accessed April 19, 2010, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/COIN/repository/28_Articles_of_COIN-
Kilcullen(Mar06).pdf.

" 48
 While this process was taking place throughout the U.S. military, the U.S.
Congress was approaching a mid-term election in November with dwindling public
support for the War in Iraq. In March 2006 a bipartisan group in Congress appointed
the Iraq Study Group (ISG) to assess the situation in Iraq and make policy
recommendations. In December 2006 the ISG report recommended that “the primary
mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi Army,
which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations.”31 Fred Kagan
had been developing another approach that was being studied at the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI). He was a good friend of then-Colonel H.R. McMaster as
they had taught together at the U.S. Military Academy. Kagan was impressed with
how McMaster’s 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) had conducted
counterinsurgency operations in Tal Afar during 2005. Just days after the ISG Report
was released, a group of defence scholars and military officers met at AEI to
examine the alternative military approach. Officers from McMaster’s 3rd ACR
participated in the scenario along with retired General Jack Keane, former Vice Chief
of Staff of the Army who was in close communication with General Petraeus.32 The
3rd ACR officers had applied population-centric COIN in Tal Afar and the exercise
wanted to examine how that approach would work in other Iraqi cities, especially
Baghdad.33
Kagan and his Iraq Planning Team at AEI had been utilizing open-source
materials to plan where additional brigades could be utilized in concert with the
upcoming rotation schedule. The proposed redeployment of forces to better protect
the Iraqi populace would be validated by the insights from the 3rd ACR officers based
on their experience in Tal Afar.34 Utilizing unclassified maps and images, the group
determined the size of the unit needed to secure specific neighbourhoods. Michel
Godet raised the matter of asking the right questions and identifying key variables at
the heart of scenario planning.35 The seminar studied questions such as the utility of
deploying a battalion-sized unit in Adhamiya, an area in north Baghdad where Sunni
and Shia citizens lived in mixed neighbourhoods. Kagan explained that “the purpose
of this operation is to reduce sectarian violence to levels low enough to permit
political and economic development, reconciliation, and the recruitment and training
of an Iraqi Army and police force with an appropriate regional and sectarian
balance.”36 General Keane who had been serving on the Defense Policy Board and
had access to current intelligence, was astounded by the level of detail they had
compiled and how it corresponded with what he knew from classified briefings.37 He
brought the plan to the highest levels within the American Government. When
Keane and Kagan briefed General Kody, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the only
adjustment to the projected deployments was a three-week shift in one of the

31
Iraqi Study Group, Iraq Study Group Report, December 2006, accessed April 20, 2010,
http://media.usip.org/reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf, 7.
32
Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008, (London: Pocket
Books, 2008), 277.
33
Ricks, The Gamble, 95.
34
Ibid. 96.
35
Godet, Creating Futures, 115.
36
Frederick W. Kagan, Choosing Victory: A Plan For Success in Iraq, American Enterprise Institute,
January 2007, accessed April 20, 2010,
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070111_ChoosingVictoryupdated.pdf, 13.
37
Woodward, The War Within, 277.

" 49
brigades’ timeframes.38 When President Bush announced the new strategy in
January, General Petraeus took command of Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I)
with David Kilcullen as his senior COIN advisor. When Ambassador Ryan Crocker
arrived in March the new leadership was in place. The U.S. began implementing a
population-centric approach articulated in the new COIN manual and changing the
course of the war.

Conclusion
The DoD has a tremendous responsibility to provide policy-makers with the
best military advice and to be ready to conduct difficult operations in pursuit of U.S.
policy objectives. Strategic foresight can provide critical insights, particularly as
certain courses of action are studied. When conducting the simulation of Desert
Crossing, key stakeholders were able to test assumptions and gain a better grasp of
the consequences that an invasion of Iraq would have. National Security Advisor
Sandy Berger responded to the idea of a U.S. invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq at
that time stating “the only sure way for us to affect his departure now would be to
commit hundreds of thousands of American troops to fight on the ground inside Iraq.
I do not believe that the costs of such a campaign would be sustainable at home or
abroad.”39
Mindsets and biases are a considerable challenge for those charged with
providing strategic foresight as well as for those with responsibility for policy. In the
lead-up to the War in Iraq, the Bush Administration was accused of the dangerous
practice of groupthink. Following psychologist Irving Janus, Bush Administration
officials were thought to have “illusions of invulnerability leading to excessive
optimism” and were marked by “collective efforts to rationalize leading decision-
makers to discount warnings that might otherwise force them to reconsider.”40 The
expectations in engaging in this invasion of Iraq failed to recognize the severe
difficulties that would emerge. As Winston Churchill wrote, “the statesman who
yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the
master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.”41 Such
shortcomings would only begin to be gradually rectified in late efforts to deal with
post-Saddam Iraq led by General Petraeus.
The process of updating the COIN manual was bolstered by engaging a much
wider range of stakeholders and experts. It took tremendous leadership to carry out
this form of the Delphi method, particularly the February 2006 conference that
engaged such a broad audience. Conrad Crane spoke of his mental and physical
exhaustion after facilitating this process.42 This wider engagement was critical to the
development of the COIN manual and lead to a much richer doctrinal publication.
When the group at AEI met to examine a population-centric approach, officers from
the 3rd ACR would “‘red-team’ the planning— that is, to look at the proposed
operation from the enemy’s point of view.”43 This collaboration led to the theories of
38
Ricks, The Gamble, 97.
39
Sandy Berger, “Change Will Come to Iraq,” Speech to the National Press Club, 23 December 1998,
accessed April 20, 2010, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/berger2.htm.
40
Karen J. Alter, “Is ‘Group-Think’ Driving Us to War?’” The Boston Globe, 16 September 2002,
accessed April 20, 2010, http://www.grailwerk.com/docs/bostonglobe8.htm.
41
David Sanger, “The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American
Power.” (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009), vii.
42
Ricks, The Gamble, 26.
43
Ibid, 97.

" 50
scholars being tested by seasoned practitioners that produced a sound concept to
present to policy-makers. The strategic planning demands of DoD are extensive and
activities such as war-games are critical to training those who will be required to
carry out these courses of actions on the ground. Rigorous foresight exercises can
provide insights and test critical plans before substantial decisions and resource
commitments are made. They should continue to be a critical tool for DoD planning
and military advice to policy-makers.

" 51
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http://www.santafe.edu/research/publications/workingpapers/08-09-040.pdf.
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Decision Making From the Battlefield to the Boardroom. New York: McGraw-
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Glenn, Jerome C. “Genius Forecasting, Intuition, and Vision.” Jerome C. Glenn and
Theodore J. Gordon Ed. The Millennium Project: Futures Research
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Godet, Michel. Creating Futures: Scenario Planning as a Strategic Management
Tool. Paris: Economica, 2006.

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International Crisis Group. “Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond.” 25
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Woodward, Bob. The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008. London:
Pocket Books, 2008.

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FRAMING THE FUTURE FOR ASEAN
Loh Woon Liang
Introduction
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) celebrated its 40th
Anniversary in 2007. Some consider this to be a remarkable achievement,
considering ASEAN’s modest beginnings within a South East Asia neighbourhood
that has suffered long periods of instability. Moving forward, ASEAN plans to create
an ASEAN Community, comprising the ASEAN Political-Security Community
(APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community (ASCC). The successful achievement of this vision would be indications
of stability and growth in the region. To do so, ASEAN has a roadmap from 2009 to
2015 to build a ‘meaningful ASEAN community’. It is the purpose of this paper to
answer the central question: Can the ASEAN community be built successfully by
2015?
This paper will adopt Sohail Inayatullah’s three frames of reference as
approach to the future and thus ask the central question according to the predictive,
interpretive, and critical frames.1 The analysis will focus on the security and
economic aspects. The strategic anticipation thus provided on this issue can inform
national policy-making on the likely image of ASEAN’s future in each frame; either
the present continues, collapses, reverts to a prior state, or transforms.2 The main
argument for this paper is that ASEAN’s present push for integration will continue
and that ASEAN is likely to become the meaningful community it envisages. The
conclusion will acknowledge possible biases in the analysis and observations for
each frame.

Predictive
Inayatullah’s predictive frame attempts to predict and control the future, with the
view that the universe is by and large stable with discernable laws.3 In the predictive
approach, empirical data and theory are key, while time is viewed as linear and not
appropriate for critical evaluation. The expected outcome of the predictive frame,
according to Inayatullah, is that the present will continue – things will go up, as
James Dator puts it, an example of which would be ‘continued growth.’4 Linear
thinkers are usually optimistic, believing that despite contradictions and minor
evolutions the general pattern is progress. As Inayatullah puts it ‘society marches on
either through technology, capital accumulation, innovation, or the pull of God.’5
The predictive frame views rules as already being laid out, emphasizes data
and theories, and assumes that things generally stay in place. Aligning to it, the
variables for the predictive frame used in this paper are based on the blueprint for
the ASEAN community, as well as relevant empirical data associated with ASEAN.
The vision for the ASEAN community is founded on the backbone of the ASEAN

1
Sohail Inayatullah, “From Who am I to When am I? Framing the Time and Shape of the Future,”
Futures, 25(3) 1993: 235-253.
2
Ibid.
3
Inayatullah, “From Who am I.”
4
James Dator, and Sharon Rodgers, Alternative Futures for the State Courts of 2020, (Chicago:
American Judicature Society, 1991).
5
Inayatullah, “From Who am I.”

" 54
Charter signed on 20 November 2007. Once the ratification process of the Charter is
completed amongst member states, ASEAN will become a formal institution whose
members are legally bounded to fulfil their obligations to one another and to
ASEAN6. Naturally, even the best plans can fail especially when external factors
evolve unexpectedly in the course of fulfilling the ASEAN vision.
The APSC is envisaged to have three key characteristics: (1) a rules-based
community of shared values and norms; (2) a cohesive, peaceful, stable, and
resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; and (3) a
dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and
interdependent world.7 The APSC is built upon existing rules found in ASEAN
political instruments such as the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South East Asia (TAC)
and the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).
Data on ASEAN’s military capabilities and expenditures support the vision of APSC.
ASEAN militaries and their weapon purchases are demonstrations of regime
legitimacy, national sovereignty, and virility rather than demonstrative of preparing
for large-scale invasions.8 Moreover in recent times, ASEAN armed forces have
mainly been engaged in irregular wars against insurgents and drug traffickers, as
well as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. Owning to
economic woes and internal security problems, most of the ASEAN states (except
Singapore) have slashed defence expenditures, weapons procurement, and force
modernization.9 In building an outward looking region, ASEAN has established
security fora, such as the ASEAN Plus One, ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia
Summit with many non-regional countries. Critically, the APSC is not meant to
function as a military alliance similar to NATO.10 Therefore, thorny issues such as
human rights, non-traditional security, and democracy that have threatened to
obstruct ASEAN growth and integration are expected not to impede the progress
towards APSC. As Inayatullah articulates in the Predictive frame, the progress
formula has been found and the only problem is staying the course. Yet, ASEAN’s
progress along this course can be challenged when the external security
environment changes, particularly in Asia. For example, conflicts in the South China
Sea and the Korean peninsula over deep-seated issues would be likely to shift
attention and initiative away from the ASEAN community.
On the economic aspect, the AEC’s vision, as stated in the blueprint, is based
on four key characteristics: first, a single market and production base; second, a
highly competitive economic region; third, a region of equitable economic
development, and fourth, a region fully integrated into the global economy.11 In

6
Termsak Chalermpalanupap, “Institutional Reform: One Charter, Three Communities, Many
Challenges,” Hard Choices: Security, Democracy and Regionalism in Southeast Asia, Donald K.
Emmerson, (Ed.), (Stanford: Walter H. Shorenstein APARC, 2008), 101.
7
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Political-Security Community blueprint, (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat,
June 2009), 2.
8
N.M. Joon, “International Cooperation in Regional Security: ‘Non-interference’ and ASEAN Arms
Modernization,” B. Moller (ed.), Security, Arms Control and Defence Restructuring in East Asia,
(Aldershot, 1998).
9
Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa, & Richard Neu, ‘The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy
Toward China’, RAND, 2001, 54.
10
Chalermpalanupap, “Institutional Reform,” 112.
11
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Economic Community blueprint, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, January
2008, 6.

" 55
making a single market, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) has been virtually
established and member countries have made significant progress in the lowering of
intra-regional tariffs through the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)
Scheme.12 In terms of competitiveness, ASEAN’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
and GDP per capita have grown annually between 2001 and 2008.13 At the same
time, total trade based on the 2008 level has increased about 2.2 times between
1998 and 2008 to reach a value of U.S.$1.7 trillion. Additionally, foreign direct
investments have also grown 2.6 times since 1998 to U.S.$59 billion in 2008. In
terms of economic equitability and global integration, intra-ASEAN trade has grown
steadily in the same period to make up 26.8% of total trade in 2008; trade
dependency data also demonstrates a high level of integration with the global
economy. While the empirical data indicates a growing ASEAN economy destined
for the AEC it envisions, two key issues might derail the progress. First, the rapid
opening up of the ASEAN market to larger and developed economies could stimulate
ASEAN to work faster on its regional market. Yet, the fledgling ASEAN economies
could be overexposed, draining resources from improving domestic markets.
Second, no central authority is assigned to build the AEC.14 In fact, most of the
bilateral agreements with external markets are negotiated at the national level, with
hardly any ASEAN involvement. Overall, despite plausible exogenous challenges,
the Predictive frame show positive signs for the establishment of the APSC and AEC
by 2015.

Interpretive
According to Inayatullah, the Interpretive frame for the future examines how
different cultures, cosmologies, and discourses approach and create the future15. In
contrast to the Predictive frame, the Interpretive frame views laws as being culturally
and historically specific and not necessarily universal. According to the Interpretive
frame, values inform data and theory. Further, the Interpretive concept of time is
constructed differently by various cultures and historical epistemes in a cyclical time
that varies according to different cosmologies. The cyclical time is generally a
pessimist’s view of the future, and Inayatullah understands it to be “a version of the
‘Return of the Past’ scenario”. In other words, outcomes in the Interpretive frame are
likely to collapse and history will repeat itself.
The Interpretive frame is often referred to as ‘historical’ or ‘cultural’, which will
also form our variables. Historically, ASEAN experienced two distinct periods of
‘turbulence’ and ‘confidence’. In the period of ‘turbulence’ that began just prior to the
formation of ASEAN in 1967, the region was embroiled in bilateral tensions and
internal unrest. Indonesia was engaged in border clashes with Malaya and then in
Konfrontasi with the Federation of Malaysia. In 1965, Singapore separated from the
Federation it had joined two years earlier. The Philippines, disputing Malaysia’s
claims on Sabah, refused to acknowledge the Federation until 1966. Finally, the
Vietnam War escalated with the United States’ full-scale participation in 1965. The
Philippines and Thailand sided with South Vietnam and even had contingents of

12
Extracted from the ASEAN website, accessed on February 1, 2010,
http://www.aseansec.org/19585.htm.
13
ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Community in Figures – ACIF 2009, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat,
February 2010, 3-4.
14
Chalermpalanupap, “Institutional Reform,” 107.
15
Inayatullah, “From Who am I.”

" 56
troops fighting in Vietnam. The insecurity experiences of Southeast Asia motivated
the five founding countries (or ASEAN-5 16) to work together to transform the region
into one in which regional peace would allow member states to concentrate on
national development. It was this desire that underpins ASEAN’s strong emphasis on
‘non-interference’ and a ‘consensus-based’ approach.17 After the founding of ASEAN
in Bangkok in 1967, the nature of such cooperation became institutionalized in the
TAC that was signed at the first ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976.
In the second period of ‘confidence’ that followed the 1976 Summit, ASEAN
enjoyed a relatively peaceful co-existence with other Southeast Asian states and
security from external threats. The end of the Vietnam War did not open the
floodgates for communist ascendance that ASEAN had anticipated and prepared
against in the wake of the victory of communist forces in Vietnam. Instead, ASEAN-5
was shielded from external aggressions while having to deal with internal communist
insurgencies. This allowed ASEAN-5 to sustain economic growth and welcome
foreign investments, particularly the ‘Tiger Economies’ of Singapore, Malaysia,
Thailand, and Indonesia.18 Furthermore, ASEAN’s solidarity was strengthened by its
diplomatic resistance to Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s. Meanwhile
Brunei joined in 1984. Consequently, the strong economic growth as well as the
respect for national sovereignty attracted Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and finally
Cambodia to join ASEAN during the late 1990s. Occasional bilateral disputes
internally (e.g. border conflicts between Cambodia and Thailand), as well as
unresolved disputes involving external states (e.g. ownership of the Spratly Islands),
became the motivations for ASEAN to engage in ‘confidence building’ both regionally
and externally. This approach is reflected in initiatives such as the Manila
Declaration on the South China Sea, the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF)19 and the opening of accession to the TAC by non-Southeast Asian states20.
The key question is whether enough momentum and confidence has been built to
propel ASEAN to a new stage of regionalism as articulated in the ASEAN Vision
2020. A collective history of colonial rule, communist threat and arguably now the
rise of China, encourages ASEAN member states to enhance cooperation and
converge on the idea of a code of conduct – non-forceful settlement of disputes,
norm-building, and confidence-building measures.21 Yet, a ‘return of the past’
scenario of inter-state conflicts similar to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978
cannot be entirely ruled out. Besides formal structures, ASEAN’s informal practices,
that is, its strategic culture, play a significant role in shaping the regional future.
The ASEAN Way is the regional strategic culture that includes a desire to seek
consensus over confrontation, reliance on bilateral ties, emphasis on informal

16
ASEAN-5 refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
17
Malcolm Chalmers, “ASEAN and confidence building: Continuity and change after the cold war,”
Contemporary Security Policy, 18: 1, (1997): 36-56.
18
Asia Market Research: http://www.asiamarketresearch.com/asia/
19
Forum participants included the ASEAN members, the other Southeast Asian states that were not
yet ASEAN members, ASEAN’s then seven dialogue partners, Papua New Guinea, an ASEAN
observer, and China and Russia, then still “consultative partners” of ASEAN. India became a
participant on becoming a dialogue partner in 1996. Mongolia and the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea were admitted in 1999 and 2000.
20
As of April 2008, fourteen non-regional states have signed the TAC.
21
Jing-dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for U.S.
Interests, Strategic Studies Institute Publications, Oct 2006, 11.

" 57
structures and personal relationship.22 The formulation of the ASEAN Way has its
origins in the 1950s and came into practice in the 1960s, as shown by regional
conferences.23 Three characteristics of the ASEAN Way appear detrimental to the
long-term development of the ASEAN community. First, ASEAN’s rigid insistence on
non-interference under all circumstances undermines the association’s image as a
useful regional group that is internationally recognized. Second, ‘consensus building’
as the only decision-making tool, could indirectly allow members to safeguard
national interests above ASEAN interest. Third, the emphasis on informal
relationships in agreements as compared to legally defined terms has the danger of
the agreement not being able to survive beyond the signing. The main criticism of
the ASEAN way, though, lies in its seemingly limited interest in a world that has
increasingly been dominated by the forces of globalization.24 This view was
underscored when the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 seemed to condemn the region
once and for all to the backwaters of global affairs.25 Yet, the financial crisis also
produced a sense of resentment at how East Asia’s governments had been treated
by the United States and by key global governance institutions, notably the IMF.26
This gave further rationale to the ASEAN states to build a specific method of
economic development on the ASEAN Way. Constructing on this, ASEAN’s recent
warm economic and security ties with China are due in part to the latter’s
appreciation of the ASEAN Way. Together with integration into the global market and
constant dialogues with its trading partners, ASEAN in recent years has begun to
display influence in global affairs. Most notably as the ASEAN-China linkage
improves, the ASEAN Way is beginning to prove its effectiveness and even present
a significant alternative to the ‘Western-only’ approach to ‘global governance’.27

Critical
Inayatullah’s Critical frame is focused on countering the categorizations used to
construct the future by asking what the particular social costs for any approach or
view of the future are.28 The Critical frame views intelligibility as ‘clearly problematic
since the universe is constituted by our knowing acts.’ The theory-data-values
triangular relationship is challenged in the critical frame since ‘data is no longer
independently real’. Hence, the Critical frame sets out to ask tough questions that
challenges the norm and upset the balance of power. The objective is to depart from
current understandings and ‘remove the future from the pre-determined history.’
Therefore the Critical frame articulates the future as a combination of continued
growth and return to the past, linear and cyclical, and of empirical and history,
otherwise ‘transformational.’
To satisfy the Critical frame, two wildcard scenarios or ‘Grey Swan’ events that
could happen to ASEAN in the future are considered. The understanding of the ‘Grey

22
Desmond Ball, “Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Security Studies, 3, 1, Autumn 1993:
46–47.
23
K.R. Narayanan, ‘The 50th anniversary of Panchsheel’, Chinese Journal of International Law 3(2),
(2004): 369–72.
24
Richard Stubbs, “The ASEAN alternative? Ideas, institutions and the challenge to ‘global’
governance’,” The Pacific Review, 21:4, December 2008: 460.
25
Ibid.
26
R. Higgott, “The Asian economic crisis: a study in the politics of resentment,” New Political
Economy 3(3), (1998): 333–56.
27
Stubbs, “The ASEAN alternative?” 451–468.
28
Inayatullah, “From Who am I.”

" 58
Swan’ begins from Taleb’s description of ‘Black Swan’ events that have three
attributes.29 First, as an outlier event, it moves beyond regular expectations and is
something that nothing in the past can point to as a possibility. Second, the event’s
occurrence has an extreme impact. Third, it becomes ‘explainable’ after the event. In
tandem, ‘Grey Swans’ are rare but expected events, which can be used to anticipate
the future. Arguably, wildcards provide the necessary questions to challenge the
existing conditions and distance ourselves from our known realms; they will thus be
useful in our understanding of the future within the Critical frame. For this purpose, a
nuclear-armed Myanmar and a major pandemic outbreak in the region are used as
two wildcards.
In the first wildcard scenario, any country that becomes armed with nuclear
weapons would instantly destabilize the region to which it belongs. The
consequences would be multiplied if the country were Myanmar – one of the poorest
countries in the world, run by a military dictatorship and politically isolated for most of
its recent history. In August 2009, speculation about Myanmar's nuclear activities
surfaced after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the U.S. was
concerned about the possibility that North Korea was providing clandestine nuclear
assistance to Myanmar.30 This was coupled by the uncovering of ‘evidences’ such as
aerial photos of a secret reactor in Myanmar, sighting of a North Korean freighter
suspected of carrying nuclear materials heading towards Myanmar and the arrests of
a North Korean and two Japanese nationals for allegedly trying to export a magnetic
measuring device to Myanmar that could be used to develop missiles.31 The second
wildcard event is based on studies released by the World Health Organization
(WHO) identifying the Asia-Pacific region as a potential epicentre of future infectious
diseases, similar to the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and avian
influenza.32 Although pandemic response plans are in place, the impact on ASEAN
countries would be worsened by the inability to develop a vaccine, high mortality
rates and large population displacements across borders. The two scenarios even
though unlikely, are ‘threat multipliers’ that would cause multi-faceted damages to
ASEAN politically, economically and socially.
How then to deal with wildcard scenarios? Taleb says that one should forget
about ‘full predictability’ and be able to exploit the ‘inherent unpredictability’ by being
prepared.33 He goes on to suggest the need to focus on the consequences (which
you can know) rather than the probability (which you cannot know). In that case,
even if the ‘Grey Swan’ event does not materialize exactly as anticipated, one is able
to mitigate the threat and survive it. For ASEAN, the association is well prepared and
resilient regarding the potential consequences that could be brought about by events
like a nuclear Myanmar or regional pandemics because of institutionalized ideas.
Stubbs identified five institutional ideas espoused by ASEAN – the importance of
neutrality, the equality of nations in terms of non-interference, peaceful settlement of
disputes, emphasis on informality and non-confrontation, and finally promoting

29
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, (London: Penguin
Books, 2007), xviii.
30
Mark Hibbs Bonn, “IAEA probes Myanmar data, discourages new research reactors,” Nuclear
Fuels, 34:16, 10 August 2009: 3.
31
“Fears rise for Myanmar's nuclear ambitions,” Hobart Mercury (Australia), 22 July 2009.
32
N.M. Ferguson, D.A. Cummings & S. Cauchemez, “Strategies for containing an emerging influenza
pandemic in Southeast Asia,” Nature, 437:8, (2005): 209-214.
33
Taleb, The Black Swan, 203-6.

" 59
domestic stability and social harmony.34 These grand ideas are rooted in cultural
norms and are widely recognized by member states as common grounds for problem
solving. Arguably, these ideas are symbolic to ASEAN and are its key organizational
strength that would enable it to continue growing through a future that includes ‘Grey
Swan’ scenarios.

Conclusion
The first part of the conclusion identifies the biases that could mar this paper.
The three biases identified are cognitive, cultural, and emotion-induced. Firstly,
cognitive bias could affect the analysis gleaned from evaluating evidence (data,
theory and values). 35 This is critical for the predictive frame where data is key in the
analysis. For example, the writer could have opted to select data that are more
familiar and easily accessible. Secondly, the writer is born, bred and educated in the
region and hence could be culturally biased in his analysis. Thirdly, related to the
second, the writer invariably exudes a pro-ASEAN emotional bias, hence will tend to
conclude with a positive future for ASEAN. With the biases laid out, the last part of
the paper will present the conclusions from Inayatullah’s frames that support the
central argument that ASEAN is moving towards a meaningful ASEAN community.
Firstly from a Predictive standpoint, evidence from data and theoretical plans
provide sufficient proof of ASEAN’s ability to develop according to its project for an
ASEAN community by 2015. The high intensity of security initiatives, dialogue
forums and economic integration, demonstrate the current position of ASEAN as
favourable to its further growth. In addition, the target set for the ASEAN community
is relatively modest, hence achievable within ASEAN’s abilities. Therefore, continued
growth is the likely forecast with the Predictive frame. Secondly, pertaining to the
Interpretive frame, the historical experience and culture developed collectively over
forty years of security and economic integration places ASEAN on a higher plane
that facilitates the next wave of regionalism, especially given the huge push for
security and economic integration that took place in the last decade. In addition, with
a global orientation starting to shift towards China, ASEAN’s close relationship with
China and global partners suggests that full ASEAN regionalism is plausible.
Therefore, even though things within the Interpretive tend to ‘return to the previous
state,’ we contend the contrary for ASEAN’s future. Finally, on the Critical frame, we
conclude that ASEAN’s institutional ideas transcend present and future challenges to
its growth. ASEAN’s strategic culture anchors regional stability and is key to its
resilience towards unexpected and high impact events. In summary, notwithstanding
biases, this paper argues that ASEAN is likely to continue its growth into a
meaningful community by 2015, based on empirical data, cultural and historical
indications.

34
Stubbs, “The ASEAN alternative?” 451–468.
35
Richards J. Heuer Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Center for the Study of Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency, 1999, 111-126.

" 60
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TYPHOON KETSANA AND THE EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE
BIASES IN A GOVERNMENT’S STRATEGIC FORESIGHT
AND EARLY WARNING CAPABILITY
Gayedelle V. Florendo
Introduction
Barely five years after the Asian Tsunami and four years after Hurricane
Katrina, governments remain severely incapable of anticipating and efficiently
responding to natural disasters. The Philippines was caught unprepared when in
September 2009 typhoon Ketsana swept the country’s capital and caused record
flooding. Approximately 10 million people became victim of flood and/or landslides,
with close to 1000 lives lost.1 Total damages were estimated at U.S.$4.38B or what
amounts to approximately 2.7 percent of the Philippines GDP.2
Francis Fukuyama wrote that Hurricane Katrina was “one of the most fully
predictable and scenario tested natural disasters in American history but still did not
lead to appropriate preparatory actions...”3 Similarly the Philippine government, more
than most governments, was well aware of the risks from typhoons and the necessity
of preparation to ensure timely and appropriate response. But like the U.S.
government with Katrina, it was found especially negligent with Ketsana. Often the
excuse that catastrophes are unexpected is offered; but this was not the case here.
Indeed, according to Richard Posner, “Mankind’s predictive ability has progressed as
science advances,”4 as is absolutely the case with detection capabilities associated
with severe weather patterns. However, recent events have shown that anticipating
and preparing for the future, even “mitigating our blindness, have become
increasingly difficult.”5 States almost always appear oblivious to the crises that befall
them. What accounts for these situations? Far worse, how does one explain not
seeing the obvious?
This essay examines the role of cognitive biases in a state’s planning and its
leaders’ ability to effectively identify and anticipate threats, and effect appropriate
responses. From a broader perspective, it looks at the impact of cognitive biases on
how states determine their priorities. To illustrate this, the article uses as a case
study typhoon Ketsana. It begins by defining key concepts, proceeds with a narration
of events surrounding Ketsana then examines three key arguments that attempt to
explain the Philippine government’s poor response to Ketsana. An alternative
explanation is then discussed; it argues that more than lapses and deficiencies in
disaster response, cognitive biases fundamentally account for the government’s
failure in anticipating the readily recognizable and high impact threat of Ketsana. The

1
Inquirer.net, “Space Tech Used During Ondoy, Peping,” 29 October 2009, The Philippine Daily
Inquirer, accessed April 20, 2010, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20091029-
232897/Space-tech-used-during-Ondoy-Pepeng.
2
National Disaster Coordination Center, “Rising Above and Beyond Ondoy, Peping and Santi:
Lessons Learned Workshop,” 17-18 December 2009.
3
Francis Fukuyama, “The Challenges of Uncertainty,” Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events
and Wildcards in Global Politics Francis Fukuyama Ed. (Brookings Institutions Press: 2007), 1.
4
Richard A. Posner, “Thinking About Catastrophe,” Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and
Wildcards in Global Politics Francis Fukuyama Ed. (Brookings Institutions Press: 2007), 9.
5
Fukuyama, “The Challenges of Uncertainty,” 1.

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paper then discusses ways to circumvent effects of biases in disaster response, in
particular, and a state’s identification of priority concerns, in general.

Defining Strategic Foresight and Warning (SF&W)

Strategic foresight is defined as “the ability to create and maintain a high-
quality, coherent and functional forward view, and to use the insights arising in useful
ways. For example: to detect adverse conditions, guide policy, shape strategy, and
to explore new markets, products and services.”6 Being prepared is its ultimate
reward, which “results in the ability to seize opportunities and to deal more effectively
with threats, such as minimizing risks or even preventing certain events from
happening.”7 One of the ways SF&W illuminates future trajectories is through
scenarios defined as narrations about groups of events that illuminate how the future
might play out. “Well-crafted scenarios help people by changing their assumptions
about how the world works.8” Scenarios can also be useful in helping decision-
makers overcome psychological and organizational barriers in managing surprise.9
Meanwhile, warning is defined as “an intangible, a theory, a perception, a
belief…”10 “the product of reasoning, a hypothesis whose validity cannot be
confirmed until it is too late.11” Warning’s purpose “is to enable the policymaker to
make the best possible decisions from the facts and judgements sent to him…
warning does not exist until it has been conveyed to the policymaker.”12
Following Heinonen, SF&W is closely associated with risk anticipation or
anticipating “situations in which it is possible but not certain that some undesirable
event or failure will occur.”13 Risk may also refer to “an unwanted event, which may
or may not occur.” “Risk and future share similar qualities; they hold a spectrum of
possibilities but where only a fraction will be realized.” Increased efforts in looking at
“global changes and exploring alternative futures thus enhance (our) ability to
envision and prepare for risks. Risks are also linked to probabilities since alternative
futures and scenarios are assessed based on probability.” But “measuring probability
depends on those making the evaluation.” Another key trait of risks is uncertainty,
what we essentially ascribe the future to be. Thus, “knowledge about risk is
recognizing lack of knowledge” and, as a consequence, proactively anticipating the
future. Heinonen further stressed that “the value of forecasting is not defined by the
way it is realized, but by the impact it will have on strategies, decision-making and,
on future state of affairs.” At the very least, risk anticipation draws attention to an
issue or trend and leads to “decisions that eliminate or alleviate the threat in
6
Richard A. Slaughter, Futures for the Third Millennium, (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Prospect
Media, 1995).
7
Peter Schwartz, and Doug Randall, “Anticipating Strategic Surprise,” Blindside: How to Anticipate
Forcing Events and Wildcards in Global Politics Francis Fukuyama Ed. (Brookings Institutions Press:
2007), 97.
8
P. Wack, “The Gentle Art of Receiving—Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids,” Harvard Business Review
(November-December 1985): 2-14.
9
Robert Lempert, “Can Scenarios Help Policymakers,” Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events
and Wildcards in Global Politics. Francis Fukuyama Ed. (Brookings Institutions Press: 2007), 112.
10
Cynthia M. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, (Lanham: United Press of
America, 2004), 14.
11
Ibid.
12
Grabo, Anticipating Surprise, 14
13
For references in this paragraph, except if mentioned otherwise, Sirkka Heinonen,
“Multidimensional Concept of Risks in Horizon Scanning.” Thinking About the Future: Strategic
Anticipation and RAHS Singapore: National Security Coordination Secretariat: 2008), 57, 59.

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question.” Thus risks can also be rehearsed and “a forecast not realized may in fact
be valuable.” Nonetheless, as risk could also mean opportunities or “a catalyst for
change that results in improving a system.” Therefore, foresight means better
preparation for the future - not just reacting to future events but actively impacting
the future.

Typhoon Ketsana, September 2009

Tropical storm Ketsana (“Ondoy”) “entered the Philippine Area of
Responsibility (PAR) on 24 September 2009 and swept across Metro Manila on the
morning of 26 September.”14 Accroding to the NASA, Ketsana brought “a month’s
volume of rain – a record of 13.43 inches of rain – in just twelve hours,” causing
widespread flooding.15 The brunt of the deluge hit Manila around 8:00AM. The high
level of rainfall was attributed to “the interaction between Ketsana’s low-level
circulation and the southwest monsoon, which runs from June to September in the
country.” After Ketsana left on 27 September, “another typhoon, Parma, entered the
PAR, causing massive flooding and landslides in the country’s northernmost
provinces.” “In between, two minor weather disturbances lingered but did not bring
as much damages.” “The foregoing events affected 2,118,367 families or 10,183,609
persons either as victims of flooding and/or landslides while almost a thousand died.”
The total damage caused by the storm was estimated to be around U.S.$4.38B or
approximately about 2.7 percent of the country’s GDP.
The devastation caused by Ketsana has prompted individuals and groups to
ask why Ketsana caught everyone by surprise. Typhoons are a frequent occurrence
in the Philippines, which faces “19 weather disturbances on average each year.”16
The Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration
(PAGASA) has three categories to describe the intensity of a tropical cyclone:
“tropical depression (up to 63 (kilometer per hour (kph)), tropical storm (64-118 kph),
and typhoon (exceeding 118 kph).”17 The cyclones that preceded Ketsana had
maximum sustained surface winds18 of 215 kph or greater and are called "super
typhoons"19: for example, typhoons Iliang and Loleng (1998), Harurot (2003), Yoyong
in (2004), Paeng, Queenie and Reming in 2006 as well as Egay (2007).20 Except for
Egay, all super typhoons were strong enough for PAGASA to raise Public Storm
Warning Signal #4.21 But not one caused widespread flooding in Metro Manila the
way Ketsana did, swiftly submerging villages in hours and turning highways into
rivers. The government drew heavy criticism for its slow and inadequate response.
There are three explanations for the state’s poor response to Ketsana gathered from
accounts in the radio, print and television media during and after the storm.

14
National Disaster Coordination Center, “Rising Above and Beyond Ondoy.”
15
For the references and facts in this paragraph, see NASA, “NASA’s TRMM Satellite Sees Tropical
Storm Ketsana’s Record Flooding in Northern Philippines,” 29 September 2009, accessed April 20,
2010, http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/hurricanes/archives/2009/h2009_Ketsana.html
16
Inquirer.net, “Space Tech Used During Ondoy.”
17
GMA News research, “Past Super Typhoons in the Philippines,” 2 October 2009, GMA News,
accessed April 20, 2010, http://www.gmanews.tv/story/173677/past-super-typhoons-in-the-philippines.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.

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What Warning?
The first explanation argues that there was a warning of an incoming typhoon
but that there was no warning of massive flooding in Metro Manila.22 A look at
PAGASA’s reports has shown that an hourly public advisory on the strength and
direction of typhoon Ketsana had been given using short messaging system, radio,
print and television media.23 Days before Ketsana struck, PAGASA also warned that
there would be “six more cyclones before the year ends.”24 It was further shown that
“basic and applied researches are made in almost all areas of “the atmospheric and
geophysical sciences.”25 This research, in turn, produces flood forecast, real-time
weather, status of water reservoirs, and satellite images of flood-prone and flood-
stricken areas. This is despite the paltry sum that PAGASA had been getting. The
National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) Chief said that Doppler radars are
also being used.26
The closest reference which could support claims that PAGASA had
anticipated and warned of massive flooding is Situation Report No. 127 issued on 26
September at 10:00AM by the NDCC. The advisory, which was issued two days after
Ketsana entered the PAR, warned of possible flash floods in Metro Manila. During
this time La Mesa Dam, the water reservoir nearest to Metro Manila, had reached a
critical level. The NDCC issued subsequent advisories on an hourly basis. There
was evidently none issued earlier.
The evidence now suggests that sufficient warning on the typhoon and
possible flooding had been conveyed by PAGASA, prompting NDCC to issue an
advisory. It is clear, however, that it took NDCC until 10:00AM of 26 September 2010
to issue the advisory - hours after several areas had already reported knee-deep
floodwaters. Could this failure account for the government’s poor response to
Ketsana? This brings us to an examination of the government’s disaster response
mechanism.

Poor Disaster Response Mechanism

Those who witnessed or experienced Ketsana firsthand lamented the
Philippine government’s poor response. For example, the emergency teams were
deployed several hours after the release of the already delayed flood advisory;28 and
disaster response teams only had 13 rubber boats to service 10 million people.29 It is

22
See, for example, Marlon Ramos, Nikko Dizon, and Edson C. Tandoc Jr. “Too Much Rain Too
Soon,” 27 September 2009, The Philippine Daily Inquirer, accessed April 20, 2010,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20090927-227074/Too-much-rain-too-soon.
23
See, for example, GMA News.TV, “Ondoy Moves Closer to Catanduanes,” 24 September 2009,
GMA News, accessed April 20, 2010, http://www.gmanews.tv/story/173063/39ondoy39-moves-closer-
to-catanduanes-pagasa.
24
GMA News.TV, “Ondoy Intensifies Into Tropical Storm,” 24 September 2009, GMA News, accessed
April 20, 2010, http://www.gmanews.tv/story/173177/39ondoy39-intensifies-into-tropical-storm-4-
areas-under-signal-2.
25
“Rising Above and Beyond Ondoy.”
26
Nikko Dizon, “PAGASA upgrade sought after Ondoy hit,” 27 September 2009, The Philippine Daily
Inquirer, accessed April 20, 2010, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/metro/view/20090927-
227184/PAGASA-upgrade-sought-after-Ondoy-hit.
27
Old NDCC website, accessed April 20, 2010, www.ndc.gov.ph
28
Ibid.
29
Aries Rufo, “Gibo Delayed Purchase of Rubber Boats,” 12 October 2009, ABS-CBN News,
accessed April 20, 2010, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/10/12/09/teodoro-delayed-purchase-
rubber-boats.

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argued that the country’s disaster response mechanism is not at all capable of
anticipating and responding to disasters. This argument specifically calls attention to:
1) the NDCC’s failure to promptly and appropriately consider PAGASA’s warnings,
particularly, on the possibility of a massive flooding and; 2) the NDCC’s and its
member agencies’ failure to consider that a massive flood could occur in Metro
Manila.
Among the salient provisions30 in establishing NDCC, two points merit
attention: 1) the NDCC does not have its own regular budget, and 2) it operates
through member-agencies and its networked National, Regional and Local Disaster
Coordinating Councils headed by local government chiefs. In Ketsana’s case,
disaster preparedness and response fell under NDCC, the Office of Civil Defence
(OCD) and the local governments. Where funds and acquisition of resources are
concerned, the local government units (LGUs) or Local Disaster Coordinating
Councils (in Ketsana’s case, the Metropolitan Manila Disaster Coordinating Council)
- were in a much better position to advise on, prepare for, and respond to
forthcoming disasters. But the Local Government Code prohibits the use of calamity
funds unless a state of calamity is declared by the NDCC.”31 Thus, in the months
prior to Ketsana, LGUs may not have been able to use the appropriated funds. This
flaw, however, had not been addressed. Rather, it was learned that “the OCD had
been providing the needed resources due to the Local Government Code
prohibition.”32 This is despite their limited or lack of operational funds. This, in turn,
caused needless delay of the acquisition of resources as the OCD and NDCC would
have to go through necessary requests and wait for approval.
Given all these, one could readily identify several fault lines plaguing the
country’s disaster response (early warning, communication of that warning, and
evacuation plans) causing the NDCC and the local government to respond the way
they did with Ketsana. Altogether, however, other than identifying which among
these fault lines was the main problem, they all point to the possibility that these
agencies have been remiss in thinking the unthinkable, which also suggests that
there was more to the poor disaster response mechanism in explaining the
government’s response to Ketsana.

Climate Change
There were those who argued that the country’s disaster response
mechanism -circuitous, handicapped and poorly funded as it is - would not have
been able to respond to any severe weather disturbances effectively, considering
climate change and what it does to seemingly manageable weather conditions as
Ketsana.33 Environmentalists and those who have experienced the effects of

30
“1) State policy on self- reliance among local officials… in responding to disasters or emergencies;
2) Organization of disaster coordinating councils from the national down to the municipal level; 3)
Statement of duties and responsibilities of the National, Regional and Local Disaster Coordinating
Councils; 4) Preparation of the National Calamities and Disaster Preparedness Plan by the Office of
the Civil Defense--NDCC’s operational arm--and implementing plans by NDCC member-agencies; 5)
Conduct of periodic drills and exercises; and 6) authority for government units to program their funds
for disaster preparedness activities in addition to the 2% calamity fund as provided for in PD 474
(amended by RA 8185).”
31
Rufo, “Gibo Delayed Purchase of Rubber Boats.”
32
Ibid.
33
See, for example, Nikko Dizon, “‘Ondoy’ a preview of more disasters to come– Atienza,” 29
September 2009, The Philippine Daily Inquirer, accessed April 20, 2010,

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Ketsana wrote that climate change multiplies the effects or causes it to be very
unpredictable.34 Urban planning, garbage management, investment in renewable
energy resources and “change in lifestyle”35 were some of the suggestions made in
mitigating extreme weather conditions due to climate change.
While all this is sound, to argue that climate change - and the government’s
and public’s limited view of it - had caused it to be ill-prepared for Ketsana is a bit far-
fetched, if not difficult to prove.36 This argument, nonetheless, highlights the fact that
the government and the public have indeed been unprepared. Even as it does so
with the purpose of conveniently taking away that blame and directing it to a
relatively novel threat as climate change or the more common but overlooked poor
urban planning and garbage management. Nonetheless, it has correctly drawn
attention to the need to tackle the much bigger or fundamental challenge of climate
change, which, when seen through this perspective, dwarfs Ketsana and quite
correctly portrays the latter as merely the effect or consequence of several other
factors. Consequently, this argument implies going beyond an overhaul of the entire
disaster response mechanism and moving into examining how agencies and the
public see events, especially disasters, which brings us to an alternative explanation
for the government’s poor response to Ketsana.

Not Only Was it Not Possible, it Also Wasn’t a Threat

This essay argues that appropriate warning had been given and that the
extent and severity of an impending event was sufficiently made known, but that the
NDCC, the local governments, and the public did not heed the call primarily for two
reasons. First, typhoons had been known to hit and severely impact neighbouring
provinces of the country’s capital and not Metro Manila. Second, typhoons are not a
valid and priority threat on which the government thinks it should be focusing its
meagre resources. This argument, in effect, delves beyond examining PAGASA’s
capability, the efficiency of disaster response, and the government’s and public’s
response to climate change.
It follows, and resonates well, with Richard Posner’s discussion of Hurricane
Katrina, where he identified psychological discomforts, political obstacles, and
analytical problems as factors that account for the inability to seriously consider and
prepare for catastrophes.37 These claims are made clear by findings of the
participants to the Global Futures Forum: Emerging Threats in the 21st Century in
2006, which identified analytical difficulties and challenges from cognitive and

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20090929-227432/Ondoy-a-preview-of-
more-disasters-to-comeAtienza; Nikko Dizon and Jocelyn Uy, “‘Ondoy’ exposed flaws in gov’t disaster
system,” 09 October 2009, The Philippine Daily Inquirer, accessed April 20, 2010,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20091009-229128/Ondoy-exposed-flaws-in-
govt-disaster-system ; Gloria Ramos, “Lessons from Ondoy,” Cebu Daily News, 5 October 2009, The
Philippine Daily Inquirer, accessed April 20, 2010,
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/cebudailynews/opinion/view/20091005-228486/Lessons-from-Ondoy
and Augusto Villalon, “‘Ondoy’s’ lesson: We must change the way we live,” 18 October 2009, The
Philippine Daily Inquirer, accessed April 20, 2010,
http://showbizandstyle.inquirer.net/lifestyle/lifestyle/view/20091018-230792/Ondoys-lesson-We-must-
change-the-way-we-live.
34
Dizon & Uy, “‘Ondoy’ exposed flaws.”
35
Ibid.
36
At the very least, to argue that which happened to explain why it occurred indicates that the
underlying reasons behind the government’s poor response remain unclear.
37
Posner, “Thinking About Catastrophe.”

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organizational issues inherent in the individual, organizational and customer levels
as the key problem and not necessarily the collection or the lack of information.38 The
same framework shall be used in examining how cognitive biases strongly influence
individuals’, organizations’, and officials’ capability in anticipating and responding to
Ketsana. What are these biases?
At the individual level, most Metro Manila residents and those involved in
disaster response did not think Ketsana would be any different from typhoons that
usually batter the country.39 State officials also did not think a weather disturbance
was as important and immediate a priority as preventing crime; it thus did not
warrant putting personnel on alert and allocating funds from already meagre
resources.40 Moreover, there was the general belief among the public that Metro
Manila had not seen floods with stronger typhoons in the past and would not do so
with a comparably mild typhoon like Ketsana.41
These cognitive biases are also evident at the organizational level. It was
clear that organizations responsible for the country’s security and welfare did not
perceive typhoons and other environmental hazards as valid and priority threats
compared to threats emanating from crime and separatist and insurgent groups.42 If
there had been any consideration given to the risk of natural disasters, increased
attention by the NDCC (through the supplementing of resources) would have been
given to regions prone to natural disasters and not Metro Manila.43 NDCC Chairman
and Defence Secretary Teodoro said another problem was that operating
agencies—particularly, the Armed Forces and the Police—were equally hard up with
their modest assets apportioned to the policy of crushing terrorism and the
communist insurgency by June 2010. Teodoro said the NDCC was also “task-
saturated,” monitoring conflict-areas in Mindanao, perennial flooding in Cotabato and
Compostela Valley, and the restiveness of Mt. Mayon. PAGASA and NDCC also
suffer from chronic budgetary constraints. Consequently, this indicates the extent of
influence that scientific endeavours have in how the government pursues and
prioritizes objectives.
When a country’s individuals and organizations have such notions, it becomes
clear how, at the policy-making level, the need to respond to an imminent typhoon
threat as Ketsana has not been given due attention. It also becomes clear why the
need for a more effective mechanism has not been seriously contemplated.44 One
wonders why the pessimist or cautionary view, which Fukuyama ascribes to policy-
makers when thinking about the future, has not engendered the same response to
Ketsana or natural disasters, in general. A stubborn refusal to see the obvious
because the cautionary view favours prioritizing the more familiar threats such as
insurgency and terrorism probably explains such dispositions. Perhaps this also
explains why the disaster response mechanism may have been in place for quite
some time now, but, as has been the case with previous disasters, this mechanism

38
CSS/ETH - Global Futures Forum, Emerging Threats in the 21st Century, Strategic Foresight and
Warning Seminar Series I – report, 9-11 November 2006, Zurich, Switzerland.
39
See, for example, Marlon, Dizon, and Tandoc Jr. “Too Much Rain.”
40
Dizon and Uy, “Ondoy’ exposed flaws”
41
Marlon, Dizon, and Tandoc Jr. “Too Much Rain.”
42
Dizon and Uy, “Ondoy’ exposed flaws”
43
Jaime Laude, “Don't blame Teodoro on boat purchase,” 15 October 2009, The Philippine Star,
accessed April 20, 2010, http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleid=514329.
44
Ibid.

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has only gone as far as rushing in the middle or after the event had occurred, with
only the slightest idea of the damage wrought.
In the case of Ketsana, this ad-hoc disaster response mechanism meant not
having the power and resources to direct disaster response efforts; having troops
belatedly joining rescue missions; having tugboats that could not get to flooded
barangays (villages);45 and poor evacuation and restoration efforts. The UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on 1 October 2009 reported “widespread
problems with distribution of relief goods and assistance outside of the 726
evacuation centres (public schools).”46 The Philippine National Red Cross also
reported “insufficient sanitation facilities at evacuation shelters in coping with the
volume of people.”47 For a country that suffers yearly from typhoons and flooding,
water, food, and medicines should already have been stockpiled. Prior identification
and preparation of evacuation centres should have also been in place.

Managing Cognitive Biases in Disaster Anticipation and Response

Woocher emphasises that despite impressive forecasting accuracy…
“Decision-makers do not make more use of early warning information and
analysis.”48 He argues that “the warning-response gap is accepted to be the heart of
the problem in preventing conflict and crises.”49 Grabo expanded on this when she
underlined that too many warning failures are attributable above all to people’s
failure in examining their evidence realistically and in drawing conclusions from it
rather than to subjective feelings.50 But both Woocher and Grabo also recognize “that
nobody achieves total objectivity” 51 and the only way to circumvent the negative
effects of biased views is to manage this inherent condition.
Managing cognitive biases essentially includes one or all of the following:
enhancing analytic methods and skills through further education and training;52
enabling feedback within and among institutions;53 learning and using analytic tools
such as the Delphi Method;54 and increased collaboration with other fields. “Enabling
imagination, which is one of two necessary pillars of strategic anticipation and
foresight,”55 is also considered important. Without imagination, as underlined by
Gordon, “one can only extrapolate trends, which are less than useful in providing the
necessary vision for long-term planning.”56 To overcome this lack of imagination,

45
Ibid.
46
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) “Tropical Storm Ketsana: Situation
Report No. 3,” 1 October 2009, www.reliefweb.net
47
Ibid.
48
Lawrence Woocher, “The Effects of Cognitive Biases on Early Warning,” Paper Presented at the
International Studies Association Annual Convention, 29 March 2008
49
Ibid.
50
Grabo, Anticipating Surprise, 40.
51
Ibid.
52
Heuer, Richard J. Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Center for the Study of Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency, 1999.
53
Glenn, Jerome C., “Participatory Methods,” The Millennium Project: Futures Research
Methodology, Version 3.0, Ed. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. 2009, Chapter 23.
54
Gordon, Theodore J., “The Delphi Method,” The Millennium Project: Futures Research
Methodology, Version 3.0, Ed. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. 2009, Chapter 4, 2.
55
Glenn, Jerome C., “Genius Forecasting, Intuition and Vision,” The Millennium Project: Futures
Research Methodology, Version 3.0, Ed. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. 2009, Chapter 25.
56
Glenn, “Genius Forecasting.”

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Gordon suggests the use of a complementary set of processes, such as intuitions,
prospective, and insights in forecasting and strategic planning.57
In responding to catastrophes, the above named methods could be useful.
Enhancing analytic methods and skills through further education and training,
enabling feedback within and among institutions, and increased collaboration,
among others, would have spelled a great difference in the government’s response
to Ketsana. At the very least, it would have challenged the way the public, the NDCC
and the local governments perceived and prepared for disasters, which PAGASA
has not been able to do despite its constant warnings. Resources, in turn, would
have been ready. For example, “the acquisition of rigid-hull inflatable boats could
have been made earlier.”58 While NDCC Chief Teodoro approved the purchase as
early as March 2009, he opted for “regular bidding, thus prolonging procurement.”59
“Installation of rain gauges and water level devices in Metro Manila”60 would have
also been made before Ketsana happened. In general, a review of the provisions for
disaster response would have been made years ago, alongside efforts at
“implementing a viable urban development plan, which would prevent danger zones
from being developed; controlling the population growth in the metropolis by
spreading growth to other regions; investing in a comprehensive drainage plan; and
implementing laws pertaining to setbacks and encroachments in danger zones.”61
Meanwhile, policy-makers’ pessimistic or cautionary views of the future and the
prohibitions that go with them when dealing with those they consider low priority risks
would have been discarded or put to good use. Finally, scientific endeavours would
have played a greater role in how the government chooses to pursue and prioritize
its objectives.

Strategic Anticipation and Setting Government’s Priority Concerns

If strategic foresight and warning is to be defined the way it had been earlier,62
then the above discussion on managing cognitive biases and opening new
perspectives in disaster response (while also preventing pitfalls) makes sense. If
being prepared is strategic foresight and warning’s ultimate reward, which, as stated
earlier, “results in the ability to seize opportunities and minimize risks or even
prevent certain events from happening,” then managing cognitive biases in disaster
response would have served its purpose in the case of Ketsana. At the very least, if
SF&W means having the government and the public’s assumptions challenged and
consequently prompting them to manage and prepare for surprises, it would have
been worth a try.
57
Ibid.
58
In the first two months of 2009, 36 incidents of flash floods had been recorded in 31 provinces. As
of December 2008, its stock of rubber boats had been depleted to zero. A total of 182 rubber boats
were distributed to LGUs and government agencies and NGOs in 2008. Another report of the OCD
showed that of the 949 flood-prone municipalities, only 3 percent have been provided with rigid-hull
rubber boats.
59
Rufo, “Gibo Delayed Purchase.”
60
Alcuin Papa, “Polls Delayed Storm Alarm System,” The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 July 2010,
accessed April 20, 2010, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100622-
276910/Polls-delayed-storm-alarm-system.
61
Rowena C. Burgos, “Don’t Blame God, Blame Urban Planning,” 3 October 2009, The Philippine
Daily Inquirer, accessed April 20, 2010,
http://showbizandstyle.inquirer.net/lifestyle/lifestyle/view/20091003-228234/Dont-blame-God-blame-
botched-urban-planning.

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 The difficult situation that the Philippines faced with Ketsana and the more
lamentable realities the catastrophe has revealed are no doubt being addressed.
Last February, a law aimed at enhancing disaster management has been enacted,
providing for “all actions and measures pertaining to all aspects of disaster risk
management.”63 This includes the creation of a National Disaster Risk Management
Framework. The Armed Forces are to come up with a comprehensive plan before 30
June 2010 for massive rescue operations.64 The police have “purchased 85 total
rubber boats, each costing Php1.7M (approximately U.S.$36,000), of which 21 will
be deployed in Metro Manila.”65 Other fault lines in disaster response are being
examined and addressed.
At best, these measures ensure a robust response to another flooding in
Metro Manila. In reality, however, these measures are no more valuable in
addressing that which it was initially set out to overcome. Even in this regard,
another massive failure cannot be discounted as the nature of catastrophes and
disasters and the extent of its force invariably remain unknown. If a government
intends to anticipate correctly catastrophes or natural disasters and respond to them
quite adroitly, it must first seek out, understand, and, more importantly, evaluate risks
through clear and able lenses. Earlier in this essay, it was stated that increased
efforts at exploring “global changes and alternative futures enhance (our) ability to
envision and prepare for risks.66 Also, risk anticipation should effectively draw
attention to an issue or trend and “lead to decisions that either eliminate or alleviate
the threat in question.”67 The Philippine government cannot afford to again fail in
anticipating catastrophes that have the potential of seriously placing any region in
the country in grave danger. The case of Ketsana has shown that effective disaster
response begins with - and is not complete without - getting out of well-entrenched
views or biases when determining priority concerns. In particular, it is finding a
delicate balance between pursuing traditional security issues and equally pressing
non-traditional concerns, which the country is seriously suffering from. Otherwise,
the risk of not being able to anticipate and respond to another catastrophe shall
remain; such a situation, if allowed to happen, could readily impact other disasters
waiting to happen.

63
Juan De la Cruz, “NCR priority deployment area of new rubber boats, says PNP-Maritime Group,”
22 June 2010, Balita.dot.ph, accessed April 20, 2010, http://balita.ph/2010/06/22/ncr-priority-
deployment-area-of-new-rubber-boats-says-pnp-maritime-
group/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Balita-dot-ph+(balita-
dot-ph)
64
Marlon Ramos, “Be Ready for Big Quake Military Told,” 21 June 2010, The Philippine Daily Inquirer,
accessed April 20, 2010, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20100621-276772/Be-
ready-for-big-quake-military-told.
65
Ibid.
66
Heinonen, Sirkka, “Multidimensional Concept,” 57.
67
Ibid, p. 59

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NAVIGATING UNCERTAINTY: UNDERSTANDING AND
APPRECIATING THE ROLE OF THE HUMAN ANALYST
B.C. Tan
In an age of increasing complexity, societies around the globe have
experienced countless unanticipated shocks that have greatly tested the stability and
resilience of social and political structures. While decision-makers throughout history
have endured the impacts of unexpected events, the exceedingly high level of
interconnectivity in today’s global system significantly exacerbates all shocks as they
reverberate throughout the world.
Therefore in this age when unanticipated shocks have the potential of rapidly
snowballing into potentially catastrophic situations, decision-makers can no longer
idly accept the risks of an uncertain future. The purpose of strategic warning systems
is to provide decision-makers with a systematic and purposeful view of the future so
as to reduce the uncertainties presented by the future through the identification of
probable threats.1 Through strategic warning systems, decision-makers may
enhance their decision-making process through a better anticipation of the
impending future.
Strategic warning systems are highly complex processes that are complicated
by difficult challenges and certain limitations – a fundamental challenge is the
cognitive limitations of human analysis. This has prompted governments and
intelligence agencies that maintain strategic warning systems to increasingly look
towards technology as a means to address the analytical limitations within strategic
warning frameworks. This essay explores the dynamics of human analysis in
strategic warning systems and the role of technology as a complementary tool to
human analytical limitations.
In order to appreciate the complexity of strategic warning systems, this essay
will begin with a chronological description of the strategic warning process. Like most
other intelligence methods, strategic warning systems are still fundamentally
dependent on human analytical input. This means that strategic warning systems are
subject to certain limitations of human analysis such as cognitive deficiencies and
other forms of biases, which have profound impact on the accuracy of strategic
warning output. The various manifestations of cognitive biases and how they may
influence analysis will be examined to explicate the ways by which strategic warning
systems are affected by human analytical limitations.
A particularly popular belief is that technology might be able to replace the
role of human analysis in strategic warning systems.2 This essay will explore the
computer-based approach to strategic warning systems, which primarily depends on
statistical, knowledge-based and artificial intelligence methods, and more importantly
the rate of accuracy expected with this approach. Research conducted on this
subject has indicated that the computer-based approach to strategic warning has
failed to result in sufficiently reliable outputs.3 This essay will argue that while human
analysis is subject to potential cognitive distortions, it provides the necessary

1
Steve Chan, “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning,” The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Mar., 1979) : 171-180.
2
Petya I. Ivanova & Todor D. Tagarev, “Indicator space configuration for early warning of violent
political conflicts by genetic algorithms,” Annals of Operations Research, 97(1-4) (2000): 287.
3
Ibid.

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elements of creativity and capacity to analyse such complex issues with the
necessary depth and contextual understanding that technology simply cannot
replicate. Therefore technology alone simply cannot replace a human analyst in
strategic warning and foresight. However, technology can be used intelligently to
provide solutions to minimise cognitive deficiencies.
Therefore in order to improve strategic warning systems, governments should
be seeking pragmatic methods to overcome human analytical challenges. As the
human analytical component simply cannot be replaced, technology should only be
applied as a supplementary tool that can aid the process and should be designed in
ways that support and improve human analysis.

What are Strategic Warning Systems?

Strategic warning is defined by Kenneth Knight as a “notification of impending
events, activities, and/ or conditions, whether strategic or tactical in nature that may
adversely affect national security interest.”4 In order to qualify as a strategic warning,
certain criteria have to be met. Firstly, a warning must have a likelihood assessment
such as the probabilities of an impending attack. Secondly, a warning must have an
impact assessment of the probable magnitude of the event. Thirdly, a strategic
warning must have an estimated timeline or timeframe; a general threat in the
undefined infinite future is insufficient to qualify as a strategic warning. And finally, a
warning must be delivered to decision-makers in a way that actions can be taken to
mitigate the threat. It should be noted here that advance lead-time sufficient to
execute a counteraction is critical in strategic warning.5 Therefore, in order for
strategic warning to be effective, the warning product must be credible in assessing
the contingent threats and has to provide sufficient lead time for the decision-maker
to act against these dangers.6

Processes of Strategic Warning Systems

The processes of strategic warning systems are highly complex and
elaborate. Helene Lavoix defined the strategic warning system as a cyclical process,
composed of the following chronological steps, accomplished according to defined
objectives and strategy: 1) identification of additional themes and issues through
exploratory foresight; 2) definition of identified warning issues and corresponding
indicators; 3) monitoring of warning issues through indicators; 4) definition of warning
problems and related indicators; 4) surveillance of warning problems; 5) production
of warning output; and 6) dissemination of the warning product to the decision-
makers.7 While bearing some similarities with a complex version of the traditional
intelligence cycle, a strategic warning process cycle discerns itself as a proactive
intelligence process as opposed to the reactive process of targeted and guided

4
Kenneth Knight, “Focused on foresight: An interview with the U.S.’s national intelligence officer for
warning,” McKinsey Quarterly (Sept 2009), accessed on June 30, 2010,
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Public_Sector/Management/Focused_on_foresight_An_interview_
with_the_U.S._national_intelligence_officer_for_warning_2415.
5
Lawrence Woocher, “The Effects of Cognitive Biases on Early Warning,” Paper Presented at the
International Studies Association Annual Convention, 29 March 2008.
6
Jack Davis, “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning,” Sherman Kent Center for
Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, Vol.1, Number 1 (Sept 2002).
7
Helene Lavoix, “Early Warning and 21st Century Challenges,” Paper presented at the 5th meeting of
the Club of Budapest, European Commission, Bucharest, February 2009.

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collection, analysis, and dissemination associated with the traditional intelligence
cycle.

Warning According to Objectives

In the limitless world of threats, risks and vulnerabilities, even the most
ambitious and technologically advanced strategic warning system is incapable of
monitoring and tracking each and every single threat. While the “outside in”
approach that attempts to scan activities with a 360 degree focus seeks to minimize
blind spots, the resulting issue of information overload has convinced most
governments to adopt a more focused scan of a predetermined set of interests.8
Therefore a critical component of a strategic warning process is the requirement to
develop a set of objectives that eventually defines and shapes the threat selection
process. For instance, the universal primal objective of any biological organism is
survival; this would often be a central and most basic objective in a strategic warning
system.

Identification of Additional Themes and Issues Through Exploratory Foresight

With the objectives of national interests defined, the human analyst would be
required to scan the environment to identify the threats based on those objectives
and additionally to spot threats that were not singled out in the initial objectives’
definition. This exploratory scan further assesses plausible future scenarios and
identifies the threats they may present.

Defining Identified Warning Issues

Once a set of clear warning issues have been defined the warning analyst
must develop indicators for such threats in order to be successful. Indicators are key
incidents, which have been identified as triggers or part of a trend leading to a
potential escalation that actualises a threat. A detailed analysis of each possible
situation must be produced for each plausible threat scenario.

Monitoring Threat Issues and Indicators

Having developed indicators for all plausible and probable threat scenarios,
the analysts must then focus their attention on the continued monitoring of these
indicators. The ability to monitor and track these indicators effectively would provide
a warning analyst with sufficient prior knowledge of an impending threat scenario.

Production of the Strategic Warning Product

The strategic warning product must be concise and clearly understood by the
client. For instance, the strategic warning product must indicate the probability of the
threat actualising, a clear assessment of the magnitude of damage were the threat to
occur and a clear indication of the timeline of this threat actualising. In the absence
of clear and concise information in the strategic warning product, clients may often
inject their own personal perceptions onto the magnitude and probability of threat
actualisation.

8
Jan Oliver Schwarz, “Pitfalls in implementing a strategic early warning system,” Foresight - The
journal of future studies, strategic thinking and policy Volume 7, Number 4, (9) (2005): 22-30.

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Dissemination of the Strategic Warning Product to Decision-makers
The final step in a strategic warning system is the dissemination of the
warning product to decision-makers. There are two key components for this step: 1)
delivery of the strategic warning product to the correct decision-maker who is able to
take the necessary mitigating action; and 2) ensuring the strategic warning product is
delivered to the decision-maker with sufficient lead time for them to take action.
Without both of these components in place, the strategic warning system will fail.

Challenges to Strategic Warning Systems

The field of strategic warning systems is marred with challenges and
obstacles. The requirement of strategic warning systems is to identify and
communicate an impending threat in a timely, convincing, and decision-enhancing
fashion.9 It is a highly difficult and problematic task, which is complicated when first
signs of the threat have not yet actualised and still loom far in the future. Because of
the time factor involved, the threat cannot have materialised or even “emitted” strong
indications - hard evidence of the enemy at the gate would be sufficient to constitute
a strategic warning failure. As such, strategic warning analysts are required to
depend on anticipatory judgements; and strategic warning by nature is derived from
inference, deduction, intuition and at times, pure speculation. In such situations
analysts will have to issue strategic warnings without the support of obvious
evidence. Without a ‘smoking gun’, strategic warning analysis becomes highly
vulnerable to errors.10
In the retrospective studies done on strategic warning systems, strategic
warning failures are more often caused by analytical deficiencies than insufficient
information.11 Analytical defects are often a result of biases in analysis. The various
categories of biases are cognitive, cultural, emotionally-induced, and organisational,
with cognitive biases singled out as a major ingredient of analytical failures.

The Human Analyst is Indispensable

In the exceedingly human-dependent strategic warning process described
above, it is evident that the process is human centric. However the limitations and
critical challenges of human analysis on strategic warning systems, such as
cognitive biases, can greatly undermine the accuracy of strategic warning products.
Technological advancements in recent years, in particular the advancement of
computing technology, has given rise to suggestions that the innovative use of
technology can ameliorate certain analytical deficiencies faced by strategic warning
systems. In strategic warning systems, there are usually two approaches: human
analysis and computer-based assessment. Computer-based assessment
fundamentally involves statistical, knowledge-based, and artificial intelligence
methods in pattern and trend identification.12 Often these automated or computerised
analytical systems have been considered an alternative or complementary option to
human analytical work. However despite current advancements in technology, no
computer system or program is able to match and replicate human analytical
creativity, and has yet to present sufficiently reliable output.13

9
Ibid.
10
Davis, “Improving CIA Analytic Performance.”
11
Ibid.
12
Ivanova & Tagarev, “Indicator space configuration.”
13
Ibid.

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 The identification and assessment of patterns and trends simply cannot be
accomplished in isolation from contextual understanding. This very necessity places
the human analyst as an indispensable component of any strategic warning system.
Therefore, strategic warning systems must take into account these human analytical
deficiencies and challenges, and seek to minimise their negative effects through
possible technological or process-based mitigation methods.

Cognitive Biases
Richard J. Heuer from the Center for the Study of Intelligence defines
cognitive biases as the “mental errors caused by our simplified informational
processing strategies”14 and that it is a subconscious mental error that is consistent
and predictable. Manifestations of cognitive biases include arbitrary inference,
selective abstraction, overgeneralisations, magnification, and minimisation,
dichotomous thinking, jumping to conclusions, discounting the positive and
personalisation.15 All these traits are exceedingly detrimental to analysis. Cognitive
biases can and will affect strategic warning systems in both horizontal and vertical
aspects; it can clearly affect the analytical output of the individual in a horizontal
process, and influence the dissemination and acceptance of the warning product in a
vertical process.16

Horizontal Effects - Analysis17

Cognitive biases are a major hurdle in effective strategic warning analysis.
Within strategic warning analysis, due to the deficiencies of cognitive biases, the
analysis may be affected in the evaluation of evidence, characterisation of emerging
threats, and also the judgement on the likelihood of impending threats. During the
initial analysis phase, when analysts are processing the collected data, the
manifestation of cognitive biases may result in the tendency to be oversensitive to
the consistency of information – furthermore incorrectly mistaking correlation as for
causation. For instance, the analyst would have subconscious preferences when the
evidence supports the cognitive model initially built. Hence the analyst might accept
this absence of contradiction as a validation of accuracy as opposed to engaging in
the individual evaluation of each item of evidence for reliability. This is often a
recurring issue. Despite having an item of evidence discredited earlier, analysts
might have difficulty abandoning the earlier causal hypothesis formed with the
discredited but consistent information.18
In the intermediate analysis phase, analysts have a tendency to link and
associate evidence into a coherent causal pattern. This cognitive preference for
cause and effect often replaces or underplays the scientific method and scientific
findings. In such situations, the failure to accept randomness, for example, often
results in situations where causal reasoning is incorrectly applied, while other types
of cognitive biases lead to misconceptions of conspiracies, nonexistent patterns and
trends. Owing to the tendency of the human mind to systematically simplify cognitive
processes, there is a strong inclination for characterising events under simplistic

14
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Center for the Study of Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency, 1999.
15
Ivanova & Tagarev, “Indicator space configuration.”
16
Woocher, “The Effects of Cognitive Biases.”
17
Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.
18
Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.

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models such as cause-effect relationships and other centralised structured model.
Essentially, the mind prefers to link and associate any set of data into an apparent
pattern or coherent narrative rather than consider more complex, possibly random,
and unrelated, components. This inclination to fall back on causal reasoning will
often result in the conceptualisation of inaccurate trends and patterns.
While most assessments have focused on the deficiencies of human
analytical capabilities, recent studies have identified and highlighted strengths in
human analysis. The Triarchic Theory of Intelligence, for example provides an
alternate assessment of human analytical capabilities to the traditional cognitive
theories.19 According to the Triarchic Theory, there are three fundamental aspects of
intelligence: analytic intelligence, creative intelligence, and practical intelligence.20 Of
the three fundamental aspects of intelligence outlined by the Triarchic Theory,
creative intelligence and practical intelligence are particularly important in the context
of strategic warning analysis.
In the difficult step of strategic foresight, strategic warning systems are
required to envision future scenarios. These future scenarios might be traditional
types of events that have occurred in the past such as wars, pandemics, and
ecological disasters. However the future also presents novel events that might
significantly differ from any previous events in history, thus necessitating the difficult
task of horizon scanning. In such situations, pure analytical capabilities alone would
be grossly insufficient to identify completely new events and then derive
corresponding scenarios. Therefore, creative intelligence or analytical creativity is
critical in any effective early warning system.

Vertical Effects - Dissemination

Furthermore, the negative impact of cognitive biases goes beyond the
analysis component of strategic warning systems and can substantially influence the
effectiveness of the decision-maker in evaluating the warning and the eventual
decision regarding the response. A key attribute, among others, that may
differentiate strategic warning from tactical warning is sufficiently advanced periods
of warning provided to an impending event.21 However, the fact remains that the
decision-maker is usually preoccupied by current intelligence products as opposed to
long range intelligence such as strategic warning22 – the issue is not disinterest but
simply not having time to deal with issues beyond the current horizon. Therefore
warning analysts face a major challenge in the dissemination of strategic warning,
particularly when faced with a difficult choice in how cautious an approach to adopt.
When analysts are over-cautious in their assessment of the threat, they face the risk
of failure, and if they are over-aggressive in issuing warnings, they risk the criticism
of “crying wolf’.
In the already highly difficult field of strategic warning analysis, analysts are
further burdened with the complexity of effective dissemination and conveyance of
the strategic warning to decision-makers. This becomes a significantly daunting task
when there is a persistent vulnerability of error in analysis. This is especially

19
Robert J. Sternberg, “A Broad view of intelligence the theory of successful intelligence,” Consulting
Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, 55(3) (2003): 139–154.
20
Ibid.
21
Cynthia M. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, edited by Jan Goldman,
(Lanham MD: University Press of America, May 2004).
22
Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2 ed. Washington DC: CQ Press, 2003.

" 82"
amplified when an inconvenient warning is issued to decision-makers that would
entail either unpopular or costly countermeasures.
A senior U.S. intelligence official once noted that, policy-makers see
themselves and their staffs as on a par with or being as substantively knowledgeable
on issues of interest as the intelligence community.23 This unduly rigid mindset of
decision-makers in addition to the cognitive distortion presents a highly problematic
environment for analysts to convey strategic warnings convincingly. The inherent
difficulty here is to produce a warning product that is complex enough to adequately
explain the varying degrees of likelihood and impact, while simple enough for
decision-makers to understand and be convinced.

Fine Tuning the Analytical Process

Shortage of information is usually not the issue; if anything, the overload of
information is often a cause of concern. Much of the collected information is often left
unprocessed. In this respect, technology can play a complementary role in assisting
human analytical processes. Accepting the indispensable role of human analysis in
strategic warning systems, investment into automating areas such as data-mining,
text-mining and visual projection can greatly complement the analytical process and
at the same time free up the analysts from the chore of sifting and sorting these large
masses of information,24 allowing them more importantly to concentrate on the
analysis and to view issues from a ‘big picture’ perspective, improving their capacity
to identify patterns and trends.25
The Center for Intelligence Studies presented six fundamental steps to
improving analysis, these include: an enhanced process of analysis, improving the
analyst recruitment, training and education process, improving communication
between users and analysts, enforcing a validation process within analysis and
encouraging persistent review of past judgements, establishing a system that retains
experiences and lessons learned, and finally implementing a process of continual
collaboration and sharing.26
In this framework, technology can also provide a real-time interactive
communication platform among analysts and strategic warning customers. Very few
intelligence products provided to decision-makers are ever written solely by one
analyst;27 intelligence products benefit significantly from peer review and critique.
Interactive platforms that encourage the continuous review and challenge of previous
assessments and analysis can greatly improve the quality of warning products.
Process-driven methods can be put in place to mitigate cognitive deficiencies in
analysis, such as automated aids integrated into the process architecture that remind
analysts to adopt a falsification approach or the scientific approach to evidence and
analytical evaluation. Other aids may constantly remind and question the analyst on
cognitive biases. These may include certain analytical guidelines or checklists.

23
Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.
24
Khee Yin How, “Singapore Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Initiative (RAHS),” Paper
presented at the International Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Symposium 2007, Singapore,
accessed June, 30, 2010.
http://www.rahs.org.sg/IRAHSS_07/speakersPresentations/How%20Khee%20Yin.pdf.
25
Lowenthal, Intelligence.
26
Jeffrey R. Cooper, “Curing analytical pathologies: pathways to improved intelligence analysis,”
Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005, retrieved from Woocher, “The Effects of Cognitive Biases.”
27
Lowenthal, Intelligence.

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 On an institutional level, cognitive distortions of traditional analysis can be
mitigated through the parallel application of alternate forms of analysis. For instance,
while maintaining traditional analysis, organisations can commission red team
analysis and alternative analysis. And finally, in the highly interconnected complexity
of today’s world, strategic warning systems must employ analytical contributions
from a wide variety of disciplines. Previously, strategic warning systems generally
only involved analysts from psychology, anthropology, biology, economics, and
political science backgrounds.28 However, further diversification to include other
disciplines as varied as agriculture, engineering, and medical science must be
considered. The Singapore Joint Counter Terrorism Centre (JCTC), for example, has
institutionalised diversity within its analytical architecture to incorporate an element of
alternative analysis. For every domain monitored by the JCTC, there are four
particular analytical profiles sought - Domain Expert, Terrorism Expert, Intelligence/
Security Expert, and Fresh Eyes. The ‘Fresh Eyes’ or non-experts can provide an
alternative view that adds diversity in interpretation and analysis of scenarios.29
Strategic warning systems present unrelenting and painful challenges that
require perpetual improvements and fine-tuning. For the foreseeable future, human
analytics will continue to be the primary engine that drives strategic warning
systems. While the imperfection of the human cognitive design will continue to
challenge the ideal output of strategic warning systems, the unique human
capabilities of creative intelligence and practical intelligence are critical components
of strategic warning systems. While the realization of cognitive biases alone is
insufficient to address this analytical deficiency, there are various ways that can
minimise the occurrence of cognitive biases in analysis. These solutions can be
applied individually to analysts or institutionally to minimise cognitive distortions.
Therefore, robust systems must be put in place that consistently remind
human analysts of their cognitive limitations, incorporating technological aids such as
tagging and visualisation aids that mitigate the analytical stress of working on large
dataset issues, and institutional insistence on the development of a rigorous analysis
corps including the promotion of diversity within those units.

28
Ivanova & Tagarev, “Indicator space configuration.”
29
Khee Yin How, “Singapore Risk Assessment.”

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Bibliography

Chan, Steve. “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic

Warning.” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Mar., 1979):
171-180.
Cooper, Jeffrey R. “Curing analytical pathologies: pathways to improved intelligence
analysis.” Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005. Retrieved from Woocher,
Lawrence. “The Effects of Cognitive Biases on Early Warning.” Paper
Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, 29
March 2008.
Davis, Jack. “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning.” Sherman
Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, Vol.1, Number 1
(Sept 2002).
Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. edited by
Jan Goldman. Lanham MD: University Press of America, May 2004.
Heuer, Richards J. Jr. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Center for the Study of
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999.
How, Khee Yin. “Singapore Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Initiative
(RAHS).” Paper presented at the International Risk Assessment and Horizon
Scanning Symposium 2007, Singapore. Accessed June, 30, 2010.
http://www.rahs.org.sg/IRAHSS_07/speakersPresentations/How%20Khee%2
0Yin.pdf
Ivanova, Petya I., & Tagarev, Todor D. Indicator space configuration for early
warning of violent political conflicts by genetic algorithms. Annals of
Operations Research, 97(1-4) (2000).
Knight, Kenneth. “Focused on foresight: An interview with the U.S.’s national
intelligence officer for warning.” McKinsey Quarterly (Sept 2009). Accessed on
June 30, 2010.
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Public_Sector/Management/Focused_on_f
oresight_An_interview_with_the_U.S._national_intelligence_officer_for_warni
ng_2415.
Lavoix, Helene. “Early Warning and 21st Century Challenges.” Paper presented at
the 5th meeting of the Club of Budapest, European Commission, Bucharest,
February 2009.
Low, Aaron. (Ed.). Decisions in a complex world: building foresight capabilities.
Singapore: Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Centre, National Security
Coordination Secretariat, 2010.
Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 2 ed. Washington DC: CQ
Press, 2003.
Schwarz, Jan Oliver. “Pitfalls in implementing a strategic early warning system.”
Foresight - The journal of future studies, strategic thinking and policy Volume
7, Number 4, (9) (2005): 22-30.
Sternberg, Robert J., “A Broad view of intelligence the theory of successful
intelligence.” Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research 55(3)
(2003): 139–154.

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Woocher, Lawrence. “The Effects of Cognitive Biases on Early Warning.” Paper
Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, 29
March 2008.
Yurica, Carrie L. & Robert A. Di Tomasso. “Cognitive Distortions.” Encyclopedia of
Cognitive Behavior Therapy (2005), Part 3: 117-122, DOI: 10.1007/0-306-
48581-8_36.

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ABSTRACTS
Risks and Opportunities: The Role of Strategic Foresight and Warning
Jan Eichstedt

The populations in developed western countries seem to be obsessed with the

mitigation of man-made, socially constructed risks. As a result, politicians
overemphasize the notion of risk and security, while neglecting opportunities to
advance the prosperity and interests of their countries. In order to prove the validity
of this claim, a sample of U.S. president’s State of the Union Addresses was
quantitatively and qualitatively examined. The findings will be explained by focusing
on three factors: 1) the phenomenon of securitization 2) the science – policy nexus
and 3) the society at large. Furthermore, this essay will argue that there is a need for
Strategic Foresight and Warning that scans the horizon for “weak signals,”
anticipates their relevance in the societal context and make recommendations on
which of the many future trends decision-makers should focus on. In addition
Strategic Foresight and Warning should assist in estimating policy outcomes with a
special focus on promoting opportunities.

Cognitive Biases: What We Think Affects the World - The Case of Climate
Change and Terrorism
Marc Villot

When dealing with risks and threats, our ability to assess them rationally is
compounded by our cognitive processes. The inability of the human mind to properly
judge plausibility and uncertainty means that our brain uses mental shortcuts to
estimate likelihood of threats. This essay seeks to illustrate the profound impact our
cognitive biases have on our assessment of what threatens our livelihoods. By
looking at the cases of terrorism and climate change, this paper demonstrates the
process by which we prioritise threats is prone to subjectivity in which our biases and
assumptions under and overestimate the plausibility of risks. This leads us to focus
on specific issues while ignoring others that may represent much more potent and
likely threats. The consequence of these cognitive biases is strategic surprise that
can catch policy-makers and the public off guard, despite the availability of
information highlighting the existence of risks. This essay argues that the reasons
behind our prioritisation of terrorism over climate change is not due to plausibility but
based on our cognitive biases and the ways in which we assimilate information on
both issues.

The Future of Food Security: Complexity and a Systemic Approach

Ya-Yi Ong

For the longest time, energy, climate, nuclear power, terrorism have dominated top
policy-makers’ global agenda. It is almost an irony that it has to take a price crisis for
the most basic component of human survival – food – to recapture the world’s
attention. It is against this backdrop that the paper seeks to better understand the
complexity of global food security using the systems approach.

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Strategic Foresight and Warning, the United States (U.S.) Department of
Defense and Counterinsurgency in Iraq
Justin M. Goldman

Strategic foresight has been a valuable tool within the U.S. Department of Defense.
Commanders and planners have gained significant insights through its use,
particularly when evaluating potential courses of action for operational purposes. Iraq
has been one of the most scrutinized foreign policy decisions taken by the U.S.
Government in the last decade. Strategic foresight exercises have been an important
part of this process. This paper starts by looking at the now de-classified war-game,
Desert Crossing, which took place in June 1999. In the aftermath of the March 2003
invasion of Iraq, the coalition found itself unprepared for the post-conflict challenges,
although many were probable considering the Desert Crossing seminar’s findings.
General David Petraeus led the effort to develop the capability within the U.S.
military to effectively wage counterinsurgency and guided the process of updating
the doctrine for this type of warfare. Finally the paper will look at the American
Enterprise Institute’s seminar that aimed to test the concept behind the 2007 shift to
a population-centric approach in Iraq.

Framing the Future for ASEAN

Loh Woon Liang

The main argument for this paper is that ASEAN’s present push for integration will
continue and that ASEAN is likely to become the meaningful community it envisages
in 2015. The approach to the future of ASEAN in this paper adopted Sohail’s three
frames of reference, predictive, interpretive, and critical. In the predictive, empirical
data and theory were identified. ASEAN historical and cultural factors were used to
shape the interpretive frame. Finally, high impact but low probability events were
considered in the critical frame. Biases were duly acknowledged in part of the
conclusion.

Typhoon Ketsana and the effects of cognitive biases in a government’s

strategic foresight and early warning capability
Gayedelle V. Florendo

This paper examines issues and concepts related to cognitive biases or “limitations
in the way individuals (or a group of individuals) process information and make
decisions.”1 In particular, the article seeks to explain the role of cognitive biases in a
state and its leaders’ ability to effectively identify and anticipate threat/s, and,
consequently, raise timely warning and effect appropriate responses. To illustrate
this point, the paper uses as a case study typhoon Ketsana which hit the Philippine
capital, Metro Manila, in September last year. The typhoon caused record flooding
and massive paralysis of the country’s capital and provinces in Luzon. Specifically,
the paper argues how cognitive biases fundamentally account for the Philippine
government’s abject failure in anticipating this readily recognizable, high impact
threat. From a broader perspective, the article looks at the role of cognitive biases in
how the Philippine government determines priority concerns. In particular, the paper

1
Woocher, “The Effects of Cognitive Biases.”

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asks why catastrophes that seriously place the country’s capital in grave danger had
not been taken into account. This article argues that in an increasingly complex
world--where the risk of another catastrophe remains--if a state and its leaders
intend to correctly determine priorities and evaluate the nature and extent of threats,
it is necessary to start with identifying and managing well-entrenched views or
biases. The paper then discusses a few ways to achieve this end.

Navigating Uncertainty: Understanding and Appreciating the Role of the

Human Analyst
B.C. Tan

In the ever-increasing interdependent global system of today, volatile situations are

no longer contained by geography or isolated by subject. This new age of global
interaction adds increased levels of complexity in the already persistently uncertain
future.

This rapidly increasing complexity in global affairs has added substantial stress and
anxiety to the traditional decision-making model. Decision-makers today find
themselves increasingly dependent on strategic warning systems to leverage the
uncertainty of the future. While strategic warning systems are exceedingly complex
processes that seek to reduce the uncertainties presented by the future, like other
intelligence methods, strategic warning systems are still fundamentally dependent on
human analytical input. However, human analysis does present certain limitations
such as cognitive deficiencies and other forms of biases that have profound impact
on the effectiveness and accuracy of strategic warning systems. This particular
concern has pressed governments involved with strategic warning systems to
consider the possibility of using technology to address these human analytical
limitations. However in the complex process of strategic warning systems – can
technology truly be the solution?

The human analyst while subjected to certain cognitive limitations still provide the
critical elements of creativity and capacity to analyse complex issues with the added
necessary context that no technology can replicate in our current level of technology.
Computer based approaches in strategic warning systems depend on statistical,
knowledge based and artificial intelligence methods; which to date have failed to
result in sufficiently reliable outputs2. While technology can provide solutions to
minimise cognitive deficiencies, technology simply cannot replace the role of the
human analyst in strategic warning and foresight.

Therefore, governments and organisations involved in strategic warning systems

should focus efforts on designing and improving processes that can effectively
mitigate cognitive deficiencies. These mitigation techniques may include processes
and systems that perpetually remind and enforce a critical approach on evidence
and analysis review. Additionally, on an organisational level, other mitigation
techniques may include the injection of diversity in analysis through the introduction
of red team analysis, alternative analysis and the recruitment of analysts from
diverse disciplines.

2
Ivanova & Tagarev, “Indicator space configuration.”

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In conclusion, strategic warning systems will remain highly problematic and
susceptible to human analytical deficiencies. However the human analytical
component simply cannot be replaced, thus leaving as only option willingness and
efforts to address and overcome these challenges.

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CONTRIBUTORS
Dr. Helene Lavoix works as an independent researcher and consultant specialised
in Strategic Foresight and Warning (SF&W), conflict and crises prevention, genocide
and Eastern Asia for various international institutional actors. She teaches SF&W, for
example as Visiting Senior Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security
of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) (NTU - Singapore). She
has published on SF&W, indicators, fragile states, complexity, and genocide. Her
current research interests are focused on actionable SF&W for traditional and non-
traditional security issues, including international multidisciplinary collaborative
processes, multidisciplinary dynamic models and networks, belief systems and
biases, as well as the future of the modern state. Prior to that, she served as an
analyst in International Relations (Eastern Asia and Globalisation) for the European
Commission, created and headed the Cambodian branch of a NGO in the field of
Development during and after the UN peace-building mission and worked in finance.
She holds a PhD in Political Science and a MSc in International Politics of Asia
(distinction) from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of
London, and a Master in Finance (Grande Ecole, France - valedictorian).

Jan Eichstedt grew up in East Berlin and joined the Armed Forces of the Federal
Republic of Germany in 1997. During his career, he served as an officer in various
units of the Army’s Reconnaissance Corps. As a course director at the International
Special Training Center, Mr. Eichstedt was responsible for drafting and implementing
training courses for soldiers of the Division Specialized Operations on topics, ranging
from cross-cultural competence to counter insurgency. He left the military as a
Captain in 2009. He received a Master of Economics from Helmut-Schmidt
University in Hamburg in 2004 and a Master of Science in Strategic Studies from the
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore in 2010. Adding to his
experience in the Middle East, while in Singapore, Mr. Eichstedt dealt with regional
foreign and security policy issues with a focus on China’s strategic outlook. He also
studied the politics of risk and Strategic Foresight and Warning. Mr. Eichstedt is
currently residing in Berlin, Germany.

Marc Villot was raised in France and moved to the UK in 2005 to pursue a degree in
International Relations from the University of Birmingham. He then moved to
Singapore and was awarded a scholarship at the Rajaratnam School of International
Studies where he undertook a Master of Science in Strategic Studies. His work
focuses on ethnic insurgency, radicalisation, and cognitive biases in risk
assessment. He was a research assistant at the Centre for Excellence and National
Security for Professor Kumar Ramakrishna. Mr Villot is currently living in Singapore.

Ya-Yi Ong worked as an Information Technology Project Manager prior to pursuing

a Master of Science at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. With
business process and systems implementation as her forte, she nevertheless
decided to pursue an MSc in International Political Economy in the hopes of
contributing in the arena of international development work in the future.

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Justin M. Goldman earned an MSc in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University where he is an
Associate Research Fellow in Military Studies. He served in the U.S. Marine Corps
as an infantryman deploying to Afghanistan and Pakistan in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom during 2001-2002. Following his honourable discharge he earned
a BA in International Policy from Regis University in Denver, Colorado. He has
served as a civilian analyst within the U.S. Department of Defense including the Joint
Heavyweight Torpedo Program in partnership with the Royal Australian Navy. In the
spring of 2008 he deployed to Liberia and Senegal onboard USS Fort McHenry as
part of Africa Partnership Station, a maritime security cooperation engagement.

Loh Woon Liang is an officer from the Republic of Singapore Air force. He was
awarded the SAF Postgraduate Award to pursue the MSc in Strategic Studies at
RSIS. Woon Liang holds a BEng in Civil and Environmental Engineering from the
Nanyang Technological University. Woon Liang joined the Air force in 1998 and has
held both staff and operational appointments. He is currently back with the Air force
after his MSc and is deployed in an operational role.

Gayedelle V. Florendo graduated with a Master's degree in Strategic Studies and a

Certificate in Terrorism Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS) in 2010. Prior to this, Ms. Florendo worked as a research analyst at a
counter terrorism unit in South-western Philippines.

B.C. Tan is the global head of organized crime research for World-Check. He
graduated from the Ohio State University with a B.A. in Political Science, and
International Security and Intelligence. He is currently a M.Sc. candidate in Strategic
Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
Technological University. His key research areas include transnational organized
crime, narcotics trafficking, crime-terror nexus, anti-money laundering, and the
counter-financing of terrorism. He contributes regularly to several Anti-Money
Laundering and security focused publications that have included the Anti Money
Laundering Magazine and Jane’s Intelligence Review.

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ABOUT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS)
The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was officially inaugurated
on 1 January 2007. Before that, it was known as the Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies (IDSS), which was established ten years earlier on 30 July 1996.
Like its predecessor, RSIS was established as an autonomous entity within the
Nanyang Technological University (NTU).

The School exists to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the
forefront of Asia-Pacific security studies and international affairs. Its three core
functions are research, graduate teaching and networking activities in the Asia-
Pacific region. It produces cutting-edge security related research in Asia-Pacific
Security, Conflict and Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and
Country and Area Studies.

The School‘s activities are aimed at assisting policymakers to develop

comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and
stability in the Asia-Pacific and their implications for Singapore.

For more information about RSIS, please visit http://www.rsis.edu.sg/.

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ABOUT THE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE
FOR NATIONAL SERCURITY (CENS)
The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) is a research unit of the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous
policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is
multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who
are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs.

Why CENS?
In August 2004 the Strategic Framework for National Security outlined the key
structures, security measures and capability development programmes that would
help Singapore deal with transnational terrorism in the near and long term.
However, strategising national security policies requires greater research and
understanding of the evolving security landscape. This is why CENS was established
to increase the intellectual capital invested in strategising national security. To this
end, CENS works closely with not just other RSIS research programmes, but also
national security agencies such as the National Security Coordination Secretariat
within the Prime Minister’s Office.

What Research Does CENS Do?

CENS aspires to be an international research leader in the multi-disciplinary study of
the concept of Resilience in all its aspects, and in the policy-relevant application of
such research in order to promote Security within and beyond Singapore.
To this end, CENS conducts research in four main domains:

Radicalisation Studies
‚ The multi-disciplinary study of the indicators and causes of violent
radicalisation, the promotion of community immunity to extremist ideas and
best practices in individual rehabilitation. The assumption being that
neutralising violent radicalism presupposes individual and community
resilience.

Social Resilience
‚ The systematic study of the sources of – and ways of promoting – the
capacity of globalised, multicultural societies to hold together in the face of
systemic shocks such as diseases and terrorist strikes.

Homeland Defence
‚ A broad domain encompassing risk perception, management and
communication; and the study of best practices in societal engagement,
dialogue and strategic communication in crises. The underlying theme is
psychological resilience, as both a response and antidote to, societal stresses
and perceptions of vulnerability.

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Futures Studies
‚ The study of various theoretical and conceptual approaches to the systematic
and rigorous study of emerging threats, as well as global trends and
opportunities – on the assumption that Resilience also encompasses robust
visions of the future.

How Does CENS Help Influence National Security Policy?

Through policy-oriented analytical commentaries and other research output directed
at the national security policy community in Singapore and beyond, CENS staff
members promote greater awareness of emerging threats as well as global best
practices in responding to those threats. In addition, CENS organises courses,
seminars and workshops for local and foreign national security officials to facilitate
networking and exposure to leading-edge thinking on the prevention of, and
response to, national and homeland security threats.

How Does CENS Help Raise Public Awareness of National Security Issues?
To educate the wider public, CENS staff members regularly author articles in a
number of security and intelligence-related publications, as well as write op-ed
analyses in leading newspapers. Radio and television interviews have allowed
CENS staff to participate in and shape the public debate on critical issues such as
radicalisation and counter-terrorism, multiculturalism and social resilience, as well as
the perception, management and mitigation of risk.

How Does CENS Keep Abreast of Cutting Edge National Security Research?
The lean organisational structure of CENS permits a constant and regular influx of
Visiting Fellows of international calibre through the Distinguished CENS Visitors
Programme. This enables CENS to keep abreast of cutting edge global trends in
national security research.

For more information on CENS, log on to http://www.rsis.edu.sg/CENS and follow

the links to “Centre of Excellence for National Security”.

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This collection of essays is intended to showcase the
potentially wide applicability of Strategic Foresight
and Warning approaches and concepts. These pro-
vide a suite of useful analytical tools for busy analysts
within and outside government. Such tools may well
be timely as policy analysts everywhere face the de-
manding task of having to make sense of an often
bewildering variety of often-linked transnational
security threats, challenges and opportunities that
comprise the complex milieu within which Singa-
pore and other countries find themselves inextrica-
bly a part of. Finally, it is hoped that this monograph
will help achieve the wider goal of encouraging
greater policy interest in the increasingly important
domain of Strategic Foresight and Warning.

Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna

Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security