Proceedings of

ASME TURBO EXPO 2001

June 4-7, 2001, New Orleans, Louisiana

2001-GT-0428

FAILURE ANALYSIS OF INLET GUIDE VANES

Ronald L. McAlpin1, Peggy L. Talley1, Henry L. Bernstein1, and Robert E. Holm2

1
Gas Turbine Materials Associates, San Antonio, Texas
2
Occidental Chemical Corporation, Houston, Texas

ABSTRACT information bulletins that do address material issues and

The common failure modes of Variable Inlet Guide Vanes
(VIGV's or IGV's) on industrial gas turbines are reviewed.
These mechanisms include corrosion, cracking, and wear of
the IGV's, their bushings and thrust washers. A new
mechanism for IGV failure is described through a case
history and metallurgical examination. High cycle fatigue
cracking in multiple IGV's was found at a location different
from the expected cracking location. The failure is caused by
a combination of wear loss and galling of the IGV metal
shafts against the polymer bushings, combined with
deterioration of the polymer matrix. Finite element analysis
(FEA) is used to verify the loading mode, maximum stress
location, and crack propagation direction.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
failure modes of IGV’s, but these are not in the open
literature.
This paper reports on a new failure mode and mechanism for
the IGV. The failure occurred at the inner diameter, and was
caused by deterioration of the inner bushing. This paper also
provides a summary of previously reported failure modes for
IGV’s, as well as a description of some of the materials used.
1.1 IGV Construction and Materials
A typical variable inlet guide vane is shown in Fig. 1. The
outer diameter (OD) of the IGV is the driven end. The end of
the drive shaft includes a thrust washer. The inner diameter
(ID) of the IGV rests in a bushing and follows the O.D.
rotation.

Inlet Guide Vanes (IGV’s) are used to control the air entering
a gas turbine. They may be fixed or variable. Variable inlet
guide vanes (VIGV’s) are used to throttle the airflow –
reducing it at start-up, and modulating airflow to obtain
higher exhaust temperatures for part load operation in
combined cycle applications. This paper addresses materials
issues in VIGV’s, more commonly referred to as IGV’s.
(Fixed IGV’s have few material issues apart from corrosion.)
There are few technical papers in the open literature that
address materials issues in IGV’s, apart from those that deal
with the corrosion of the materials of construction [1,2,3]. (A
literature survey did not find any technical papers that deal
specifically with IGV materials or IGV failures.) The turbine
manufacturers (OEM’s) distribute to their customers product
Materials utilized for IGV’s have included the following:
• Type 316 austenitic stainless steel (limited use),
• Type 403 martensitic stainless steel; and
• Custom 450 (also called GTD-450) precipitation-
hardening stainless steel.
Type 403 stainless IGV’s have been plated with NiCd
coatings, but this process has been discontinued because of
the toxicity of cadmium. Various metallic-ceramic coatings
are currently used. Coatings have not been effective on
Custom 450.

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Fig. 1. Diagram of variable inlet guide vane (IGV),
viewed from suction side.
Materials previously used for inner bushings were various
mineral-filled thermosetting polymers (DU and Phenolic
bushings). These materials had good hardness, but with
limited environmental resistance. More recently, the
thermoplastic resin TFE (polytetrafluoroethylene) has been
used (Chemlon bushing), and exhibits excellent chemical
resistance and high lubricity.
1.2 Known IGV Failure Modes and Inspection
Because IGV’s throttle the compressor air, operational failure
will affect the engine performance. If the IGV actually breaks
off and goes into the compressor, then a massive compressor
failure will result. Most reported IGV failures occurred at the
OD (driven end) of the IGV, and have been related to
cracking or seizing caused by corrosion, wear, high cycle
fatigue, or combined mechanisms.
Inspection practices and recommendations are driven by
failure experience. The goal of inspection is to identify
critical levels of damage and replace components before a
costly failure can result. Common practice is to inspect
IGV’s for damage at scheduled outages, which may be
annual, biannual, or less frequent depending upon the
application and potential damage mode. The OEM’s provide
guidelines addressing inspection procedures, recommended
intervals, and some inspection limits.
Pitting corrosion in IGV’s is promoted by the presence of
liquid water and dissolved salts – chlorides are most often
involved. Condensing moisture, airborne fouling, wash
water, and ingress of rain water, can all contribute to the
occurrence of pitting. Inspection limits for pitting address pit
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size and distribution. Pitting damage ultimately causes
failure by initiating a cracking mechanism.
The limited use of type 316 stainless steel resulted in failures
from stress corrosion cracking (SCC). SCC requires material
susceptibility in a specific environment or corrosive agent,
and an applied or residual stress. Usually, aqueous chlorides
are the causative agent for SCC in type 316 S.S., and the
corrosive conditions that promote SCC can be less aggressive
than the conditions for pitting.
Wear loss in bushings, thrust washers, and the mating spindle
surfaces on the IGV’s causes looseness. Looseness can
promote cyclic bending loads, and high local contact stresses
on the load-bearing surfaces. Inspection concentrates on
clearances between the IGV inner button and bushing.
Growth of corrosion products on the thrust washer can also
push the IGV inward and cause binding, which increases
loads and may also lead to cracking.
High cycle fatigue cracking can result after wear or corrosion
damage has accumulated or advanced to a sufficient degree to
cause crack initiation. High cycle fatigue loading is driven by
flow-induced vibration. Crack propagation rates in IGV’s are
expected to be slow, with loads controlled by operating
(throttle) cycles and vibration. The normal location for crack
inspection is at the outer diameter (driven) end of the IGV’s,
at the fillet between the thrust collar and airfoil. One design
places an additional radius cut in the airfoil base at this
location. Crack initiation at the leading edge near the outer
end has also been observed. Inspection by penetrant testing
(PT) can verify the presence of cracks.
2.0 CASE HISTORY
A single cracked IGV was found in a General Electric
MS7001E (Frame 7E) gas turbine, after 84,000 operating
hours. Failure of a second IGV resulted during subsequent
service, after an additional 8,000 hours. Inspection then
found cracking in several more IGV’s. The IGV’s were made
from GTD 450, and exhibited normal metallurgical
properties. The IGV’s contained widespread pitting
corrosion; however, the sizes of the pits were within G.E.
allowable inspection limits for type 403 material.1
2.1 Fracture Examination
Cracking on the IGV’s initiated at the inner end of the airfoil,
at the leading edge corner of the inner support button. On the
fractured IGV, the cracking propagated to failure at the
1
Corrosion limits for IGV’s made from GTD-450 are not
publically available.
 trailing edge, shown in Fig. 2. The fracture location was
opposite from the expected location for fatigue cracking
failures, which is at the outer diameter end.
Fig. 2. Failed IGV. The inner end segment includes the
bushing in place on the button. Arrows located at the crack
initiation point.
The cracking resulted by high-cycle fatigue, as observed
macroscopically, and verified by scanning electron
microscopy (SEM) fractography techniques. The opened
segment from the first crack is shown in Fig. 3. Two cracks
initiated from the two leading edge corners, at the suction and
pressure sides, and joined into a single propagating crack
front. Cracking in all the IGV’s was verified to be high-cycle
fatigue, with the same initiation points, and following this
same crack path.
Fig. 3. Plan view of opened crack segment. Arrows locate
two origins at the botton corners on opposite sides of the
airfoil. (Scale divisions = 0.01 inch.)
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On the initially cracked IGV, the suction side crack originated
at a large pit, of 70 mils (1.8 mm) diameter (Fig. 4). The pit
is slightly smaller than the maximum size allowed by the
G.E. inspection requirement for this location in type 403
material.1 The large pit may have been an accelerating factor
in the cracking, but not a primary factor in the cracking
occurrence. Cracking in other IGV’s initiated by high-cycle
fatigue in the absence of pitting corrosion.
Fig. 4. Large corrosion pit (arrow) at IGV crack origin.
2.2 Metal Button Wear
The opposite sides of the support buttons on the IGV’s
showed different wear conditions (Fig. 5). The pressure side
surfaces were generally smooth, while wear on the suction
sides formed a very rough texture. Aerodynamic forces on
the IGV’s are expected to produce contact loads along the
suction side and toward the trailing edge. Patches of adhered
material from the polymer bushings were also present.
Minimum diameters were aligned with the visual wear, and
indicated up to 9 mils (0.20 mm) wear loss. The button
diameters were within acceptable inspection limits.
Metallographic examination revealed the button pressure side
surfaces were smooth, microscopically flat, and essentially
featureless. Mixed wear modes forming broad and shallow
wear pits were documented on the button suction sides.
Galling produced a deformed surface layer at edges of the
wear pits (Fig. 6). Abrasive wear formed groove-type metal
loss by cutting and rubbing, while adhesive wear caused
surface roughening from compressive buildup of wear
particles and tensile stretching of a surface deformed layer
(Fig. 7).
 Fig. 5. Button surface conditions on suctions side (a) and pressure side (b) surfaces. (Scale divisions = 0.1 inch.)

2.2 Polymer Bushing Deterioration
Compared to a new bushing, the bushing from a failed IGV
demonstrated a 5% mass loss. Both wear loss and
deformation from contact loads were indicated by
dimensional measurements, which showed decreases of both
inside and outside diameters, and an increase in the axial
height of the bushing. Wear loss of up to 6 mils (0.15 mm)
was indicated. Density of the failed bushing had also
decreased by 4%, which denotes swelling of the polymer.
The bushing I.D. surface contained shallow wear grooves and
pit-type features, and a buildup of fine metallic particles
(Fig. 8), which resulted from wear of the metal button against
the polymer. X-ray microanalysis confirmed the metal
particles were the same composition as the IGV button. The
wear surfaces also exhibited a buildup of mineral filler
particles originating from the polymer formulation. Other
than hydrocarbon residues, which could result from
lubricants, no extraneous materials were found on the
bushing wear surfaces.
The TFE resin matrix of the polymer bushing had
deteriorated, confirmed by both infrared spectroscopy (IR)
and durometer hardness testing. Hardness of a new bushing
measured 61 Shore D with 0 creep. Hardness of the failed

Fig. 6. Microstructure of galling layer (between arrows) on Fig. 7. Adhesive wear features (arrow) on button contact
button contact surface (original 1000X – Vilella’s reagent). surface (original 1000X – Vilella’s reagent).

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Fig. 8. Metallic wear particles (bright) on bushing contact
surface (original 20X).
bushing was 56 Shore D, with 5 points creep.2 Weakening of
the polymer matrix is indicated by the loss in hardness, and
the creep response indicates a “tacky” or adhesive behavior,
denoting a loss in lubricity.
3.0 STRESS ANALYSIS
A simplified three-dimensional model of the IGV was
developed. The airfoil of the IGV was approximated as a flat
plate, with a cylindrical button offset to the trailing edge, as
on the IGV. Fillets were added between the button and the
airfoil. Measurements were taken of the IGV to ensure
accuracy of the model.
This solid model was analyzed using the Aegis finite element
analysis program, with tetrahedral elements and a linear
elastic, static analysis. For the model, the airfoil was fixed at
the OD end and torque was applied to the button, to represent
binding. The results are shown in Fig. 9, for the equivalent,
or von Mises, stress.
The maximum stress occurred at the leading edge corner of
the bottom of the button. The orientation of the maximum
stress is along a curve pointing towards the trailing edge.
Cracking in all the IGV samples started at this same corner,
and grew in the same direction, concurring with this
simplified stress analysis.
2 high cycle fatigue, and combined mechanisms. Inspection
Durometer hardness is reported after an initial 5 seconds
dwell, and creep is reported from the hardness decrease after
an additional 15 seconds dwell.
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4.0 NEW FAILURE MODE
The cause of cracking and failure in the IGV’s is galling and
mechanical wear between the bushing and IGV buttons.
Cracking resulted by high-cycle fatigue, and was driven by
increased operational stresses caused by the button galling.
Long-term deterioration of the bushings is a primary factor in
the failure mechanism. Both mechanical damage and
environmental aging of the polymer resin are indicated.
While the polymer bushing is staked in place to prevent
rotation, deformation of the bushing and the combined wear
of the bushing and the IGV button allow the bushing to move
in its socket and to cant in position relative to the button.
Contact stresses are increased both by the angular
displacement and the buildup of wear debris, which
ultimately causes galling of the button on the bushing.
Galling increases the operational stress to promote the fatigue
cracking.
5.0 DISCUSSION
In the case history presented, recommendations for bushing
replacement were based upon clearance measurements. No
recommendation had been made based upon total operating
hours. These polymer bushings had operated for over 84,000
hours. Wear on the IGV button was also within the
inspection limits. However, deterioration of the bushing was a
combination of both wear and dimensional swelling, so that,
neither clearance or button measurements would identify the
need for replacement.
The failure denotes the need to identify both a lifetime limit
for the polymer bushings, and a minimum clearance limit.
Even if inspection results show proper clearances, a required
bushing replacement should be set at the major inspection
interval of 48,000 hours. Bushing replacement before
polymer deterioration can also increase the IGV service life
by minimizing wear on the support button.
The clearance inspection requirement includes only a
maximum limit. With zero clearance between the button and
bushing, binding may be occurring. For this reason, a
minimum clearance of 1 to 2 mils (0.04 to 0.08 mm) should
be required.
6.0 SUMMARY
Most failures of IGV’s result from cracking or seizing at the
OD (driven end). The failures are caused by corrosion, wear,
procedures have been defined by failure experience to address
the known mechanisms.
 Fig. 9. Results of the simplified stress analysis showing the equivalent, or Von Mises, stress contours. Maximum
stress occurs at the crack origin.

A new failure mode for IGV’s resulting from binding and REFERENCES
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of the IGV buttons is a factor. Deterioration of the bushing Environment and Material Evaluation, GE Reference No.
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produces dimensional swelling and loss of lubricity.
2. Henthorne, M., T. Debold, and R. Yinger, 1972, “Custom
The normal inspection procedure based on clearance 450, A New High-Strength Steel,” Corrosion/72, NACE.
measurements would not identify the need for bushing
replacement. Replacement at a service limit of 48,000 hours 3. Kolkman, H. J., and A.J.A. Mom, 1984, “Corrosion and
should prevent the failure and minimize wear on the IGV Corrosion Control in Gas Turbines Part I: The
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to thank Occidental Chemical Corporation

and Gas Turbine Materials Associates for their support of this
work and their willingness to share these results with the
technical community. The authors also wish to thank Ms.
Julie Nicholls for the preparation of this manuscript.

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