NO.

X06-UWY-CV-18-6046436 S : SUPERIOR COURT

ERICA LAFFERTY, ET AL : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET

V. : AT WATERBURY

ALEX EMRIC JONES, ET AL : OCTOBER 21, 2022

NO. X06-UWY-CV-18-6046437 S : SUPERIOR COURT

WILLIAM SHERLACH : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET

V. : AT WATERBURY

ALEX EMRIC JONES, ET AL : OCTOBER 21, 2022

NO. X06-UWY-CV-18-6046438 S : SUPERIOR COURT

WILLIAM SHERLACH, ET AL : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET

V. : AT WATERBURY

ALEX EMRIC JONES, ET AL : OCTOBER 21, 2022

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT
Defendants Alex Jones and Free Speech Systems, LLC, herewith move,

pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes section 52-228b1 and Practice Book Section

1 General Statutes § 52-228b authorizes a party to a civil action to move to set aside a
verdict in a civil action: “No verdict in any civil action involving a claim for money
damages may be set aside except on written motion by a party to the action, stating the
reasons relied upon in its support, filed and heard after notice to the adverse party
according to the rules of the court. No such verdict may be set aside solely on the
ground that the damages are excessive unless the prevailing party has been given an
opportunity to have the amount of the judgment decreased by so much thereof as the
court deems excessive. No such verdict may be set aside solely on the ground that the
damages are inadequate until the parties have first been given an opportunity to accept
an addition to the verdict of such amount as the court deems reasonable.

 16-352, to set aside the verdict on grounds apparent in the record and on the basis of

remittitur. A separate motion and brief are filed concurrently to address the remittitur

claim. In short, the defendants contend that the cumulative weight of the court’s ruling

on pre-trial motions and its evidentiary rulings resulted in a complete abdication of the

trial court’s role in assuring a fair trial resulting in a substantial miscarriage of justice.

Jurors were presented with half-truths and led to believe that facts had been established

where no such thing had occurred; a disciplinary default for discovery non-compliance

permitted the plaintiffs’ counsel to mislead the jury. Additionally, the amount of the

compensatory damages award exceeds any rational relationship to the evidence offered

at trial. The defendants seek a new trial. The verdict in the instant case is both unjust

and against the weight of the evidence.

I. Nature of the Proceedings

On December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza murdered 20 school children and 6 adults

at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. Five and one-half

years later, the parents of several of the students killed, and the adult family members of

several of the adults killed, together with an FBI officer who arrived at the scene shortly

after the murders – some sixteen3 in all, sued Alex Jones and related defendants. In

three-lengthy complaints, the plaintiffs raised a series of claims: defamation per se,

2 Practice Book § 16-35 dictates the time parameters when post-verdict motions are
filed: “Motions in arrest of judgment, whether for extrinsic causes or causes apparent on
the record, motions to set aside a verdict, motions for remittitur, motions for additur,
motions for new trials ... must be filed with the clerk within ten days after the day the
verdict is accepted .... Such motions shall state the specific grounds upon which
counsel relies.
3 One of the plaintiffs, Jeremy Richman, took his own life while the suit was pending. No
estate was substituted for him in the wake of his death. His estate did not raise a claim
that Mr. Jones caused the suicide.

 negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false

light breach of privacy, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. On

the eve of trial, the plaintiffs dropped their claim of negligent infliction of emotional

distress.

The trial was limited to damages, as a result of a disciplinary default after

repeated motions by the plaintiffs requesting such spanning several years. Despite the

defendants having turned over tens of thousands of emails and documents, having

employees sit through dozens of depositions, and responding to both written discovery

requests and requests for admissions, the court entered a default, finding a willful failure

to substantially comply with discovery obligations, The jury was left to decide damages

alone.

At trial, the court construed the default in such a manner as to eliminate any need

for the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the harm they suffered was caused by Mr. Jones.

The trial record is replete with claims of harassment that are unattributed to a declarant,

lack any demonstrable nexus to the defendants and, in may instances, fail to meet even

minimal indicia of reliability. One plaintiff, for example, reported hearing through a third

party that some other person had urinated on the grave of their deceased child. This,

too, without more, was attributed to the defendants.

After several weeks of trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of

approximately $1 billion. Pending before the Court are the matters of common law

punitive damages in the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs, and punitive damages

arising under CUTPA. A briefing schedule is in place to address these issues, dates set

for evidentiary hearings, if such hearings are necessary, and an argument date of

 November 7 for unresolved questions. Presumably, judgment will enter shortly after

argument.

II. The Verdict

On October 12, 2022, the jury returned a verdict assessing compensatory

damages of $965 million and awarding common law punitive damages of attorneys’ fees

and costs. The compensatory damages awarded are as follows:

1. Robbie Parker: reputational harm, $60 million; emotional distress, $60 million;

2. David Wheeler: reputational harm, $25 million; emotional distress, $30 million;

3. Francine Wheeler: reputational harm, $24 million; emotional distress, $30

million;

4. Jacqueline Barden: reputational harm, $10 million; emotional distress, $18.8

million;

5. Mark Barden: reputational harm, $25 million; emotional distress, $32.6 million;

6. Nicole Hockley: reputational harm, $32 million; emotional distress $41.6

million;

7. Ian Hockley: reputational harm, $38 million; emotional distress, $43.6 million;

8. Jennifer Hensel reputational: harm $21 million; emotional distress, $31

million;

9. Donna Soto: reputational harm, $18 million; emotional distress, $30 million;

10. Carlee Soto-Parisi: reputational harm, $30 million; emotional distress, $36

million;

 11. Matthew Soto: reputational harm, $18 million; emotional distress, $39 million;

12. Jillian Soto-Marino: reputational harm, $30 million; emotional distress, $38.8

million;

13. William Aldenberg: reputational harm, $45 million; emotional distress, $45

million;

14. Erica Lafferty: reputational harm, $18 million; emotional distress, $58 million;

15. William Sherlach: reputational harm, $9 million; emotional distress, $27

million.

III. Even In The Context Of A Hearing In Damages, The Trial Resembled A

Memorial Service, Not A Trial; A New Trial Is Required, Both On
Constitutional Grounds And As A Result Of The Trial Court’s Abdication
Of Its Responsibility To Assure That All Parties Receive A Fair Trial

A. Whether A Liability Default Is Ever Appropriate In A Case

Involving Speech Is An Open Questions Of Law In Connecticut

Our state Constitution makes clear that claims involving speech are privileged.

Article First Section 6 of the Constitution gives to juries the right to decide both

questions of law and fact, under the guidance of the Court in a prosecution for libel. “In

all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence, and the

jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the

court.” Art. First, Section Six. Because one of the counts in this action sounds in

defamation, a form of libel, the jury, and the defendants, were deprived of their right to

have questions of law and fact decided by the jury under the guidance of the court.

This case has already been before the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding an

earlier sanction. Lafferty v. Jones, 336 Conn. 332 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 2467

(2021). In that case, the trial court entered a sanction against the defendants depriving

them of the right to have heard a special motion to dismiss under Connecticut’s anti-

SLAPP statute, Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-196a, after Mr. Jones made

vituperative comments about opposing counsel in a nationally syndicated broadcast,

offering a $1 million reward for information leading to the arrest of the individual who

sent child pornography via the Internet to Free Speech Systems, LLC, employees in an

effort to ensnare Mr. Jones in criminal prosecution. Although the Supreme Court did not

find that Jones had threatened counsel, or incited violence against counsel, it upheld

the trial court’s use of discretion in sanctioning the defendants as appropriate to assure

the intergrity of the judicial process. “[S]peech that interferes with the administration of

justice cannot be tolerated.” Id., 367. Mr. Jones requested review by the United States

Supreme Court as his speech was extra-judicial and otherwise protected by the first

amendment. Certiorari was denied.

The Court also held that the sanction imposed, denial of the right to have their

motion to dismiss heard, was justified given a history of non-compliance with discovery

as regards corporate records and Google Analytics data. It recited the following

standard for imposition of discovery-related sanctions:

First, the order to be complied with must be reasonably clear. In this

connection, however, we also state that even an order that does not meet this
standard may form the basis of a sanction if the record establishes that,
notwithstanding the lack of such clarity, the party sanctioned in fact understood
the trial court's intended meaning. This requirement poses a legal question that
we will review de novo. Second, the record must establish that the order was in
fact violated. This requirement poses a question of fact that we will review using
a clearly erroneous standard of review. Third, the sanction imposed must be
proportional to the violation. This requirement poses a question of the discretion
of the trial court that we will review for abuse of that discretion.

Id, 373-74, citing, Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1,

17-18 (2001)..

 The Court gave no weight to argument that the trial court’s decision to impose

these sanctions was precipitous and deprived Mr. Jones of due process. Mr. Jones

made the utterances complained of on a Saturday. The plaintiffs moved for sanctions

and requested an expedited briefing schedule on a Monday. The following day, a

Tuesday, the trial court heard oral arguments and imposed sanctions. Thereafter, the

defendants filed a public interest appeal the Supreme Court, which resulted in the ruling

cited above. Once the case was remanded, the defendants moved to disqualify the trial

court, Bellis, J., on grounds of perceived bias against Mr. Jones given the court’s

handling of this issue and other discovery-related issues. The motion was denied. The

case migrated from the Bridgeport Superior Court to the Waterbury Superior Court when

the judge was reassigned as a result of normal rotation of judicial staff.

After remand, the plaintiffs renewed their motions for sanctions at every turn.

Although Mr. Jones gave tens of thousands of emails, thousands of pages of

documents, sat for multiple depositions, answered a request to admit, and made

available members of his staff for dozens of depositions, he was nonetheless defaulted

for failure substantially to comply with discovery. He contends that the trial court both

abused its discretion and made clearly erroneous findings of fact in reaching the

conclusion to enter a default; those issues will likely be raised on direct appeal once

judgment enters. The trial court also failed to consider the unique place claims asserting

libel have in our jurisprudence. As a matter of law, he contends a default is never

appropriate under Connecticut law when libel is asserted. Juries have the right to decide

both questions of fact and law under the supervision of the court. In this instance, the

trial court acted unlawfully in depriving the jury, and the defendants, of the right to have

matters or fact and law decided by the jury.4

B. Any Sanctions Should Have Been Limited To Permissive Adverse

Inferences The Jury Should Have Been Free To Draw

This was not a case in which the defendants failed to answer the complaint,

failed to respond to discovery or otherwise failed to participate in the proceedings. In

such cases, the harsh remedy of a default may well be warranted.

In this case the defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, and then

resisted discovery it regarded as overbroad. When it failed to persuade the trial court

that it was correct in its claims of overbreadth, the plaintiffs took the position that the

defendants were willfully refusing to provide full and complete discovery with respect to

emails, internet communications and third-party data hosted by Google. In the end, the

plaintiffs persuaded the trial court to enter a default on liability, effectively relieving the

plaintiffs of proving their case. The result of this is that the plaintiffs were given the

benefit of tens of thousands of emails and documents provided by the defendants, and

the dozens of depositions for which the defendants and their employees sat, as they

went hunting for a judgment that would, in the words of one of their counsel, “stop Alex

Jones.” The result was a windfall to the plaintiffs – they received data they claimed was

incomplete, and were free to use it to create a fictitious strawman – an evil company

owned by a madman determined to target the parents of grieving children for profit. Just

why the trial court permitted this to occur is far from obvious. Mr. Jones told the jury he

thought the proceedings were “rigged” and the judge was a “tyrant.” The plaintiffs made

4This is apparently an issue of first impression in Connecticut as there are no reported

decisions applying this section of the State Constitution to a case or controversy.

sure to show the jury video of him saying that in broadcasts that were created by Mr.

Jones during trial. Given the tactical advantage his adversaries were given – an entry of

a default and the use of all he gave them in discovery against him in a hearing in

damages, his perspective is understandable. His efforts to recuse the judge in this

matter were reasonable responses to the rulings issued by the court.

Among the factors to be considered by a judge in assessing sanctions is

“proportional[ity] to the violation.” Jones, Id, 373-74, citing, Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc.

v. Hamilton Standard, supra, 257 Conn. 17-18. The default in this case was

disproportionate. The appropriate course would have been, assuming, arguendo, that

the court’s conclusion that the defendants failed substantially to comply with discovery

is sustainable, to instruct the jury that, in a trial involving both liability and damages, the

jury was free to draw adverse inferences from failure to comply. Entering a default,

where the defendants appeared, produced documents, attended depositions, answered

requests to admit, and otherwise responded to requests for production, gave the

plaintiffs a deadly advantage. They were able to use information provided by the

defendants to argue for damages in a case where the defendants were deprived of any

right to challenge the use to which the plaintiffs put that information. The result was the

functional equivalent of an execution by firing squad, with the defendants required to

pay the cost of the bullets used to kill them.

C. The Trial Court Eviscerated The Concept Of Causation In This

Case, Effectively Eliminating Any Requirement That The Plaintiffs
Show The Harm They Suffered Had Any Relationship To Anything
Mr. Jones Said Or Did

 Even in the context of a liability default, a plaintiff is required to prove the extent

of the damages sought. United National Indemnity Co. v. Zullo, 143 Conn. 124, 129-130

(1056); Mechanics Savings Bank v. Tucker, 178 Conn. 640, 644 (1979). That proof must

relate the damages suffered to the liability established. “Even in a hearing in damages,

… a plaintiff must still prove that the damages claimed were caused by the conduct

alleged.” Murray v. Taylor, 65 Conn. App. 300, 333 (2001), certification denied, 258

Conn. 928 (2001)(citation omitted). In this case, the trial court eviscerated the concept

of causation and relieved the plaintiffs of any responsibility to prove, or even to attempt

to prove, a linkage to the various and diffuse harms they suffered and the conduct of the

plaintiffs. The result was a grotesque miscarriage of justice.

By severing that connection between harm “established” and damages caused

by that harm, the plaintiffs were free to blame Mr. Jones for whatever harm they suffered

involving harassment at the hands of third parties. The trial court transformed the

proceeding into a bizarre example of existential strict liability, all but handing a blank

check to the plaintiff’s lawyers. In weeks of testimony the plaintiffs did not prove by

competent evidence that Mr. Jones ever sent anyone to harass a plaintiff, or that

anyone who listened to him heeded a call from him to harass a plaintiff. The jury was

instructed that liability had been “established,” a disciplinary default was transformed

into a fatal impression that somewhere, someone had somehow proven that Mr. Jones

did exactly what the plaintiffs alleged. The parties filed cross-motions in limine on

whether the jury should be told the truth about the default in order to avoid the jury’s

being misled. The court sided with the plaintiffs, keeping the truth from the jury and

10

permitting them to labor under the false impression that a finding had been made that

Mr. Jones had, in fact, caused the harms.

Not one witness in the case appeared to testify that they harassed a plaintiff at

the behest of Mr. Jones; neither did Mr. Jones himself harass a plaintiff – indeed, Mr.

Jones only ever broadcast the name of one plaintiff, Robbie Parker. The closest thing

the jury saw to harassing conduct was videos of Dan Bidondi, an Infowars employee,

and Wolfgang Halbig, a man who to this day denies that the Sandy Hook shootings took

place, haranguing Newtown officials over their “coverup” and participation in a “hoax.”

No plaintiff was present at that event and no plaintiff ever testified to seeing either man.

The only other testimony about an individual arguably connected to Mr. Jones

“harassing” a plaintiff came in the form of testimony about a man named Mark Mills who

harangued members of the Soto family at a memorial road race. Mills was a guest on

Mr. Jones’ show after disrupting a Superbowl press conference to claim that 9/11 was

an “inside job” by the government. Mr. Jones promised to talk to him off the air, and

suggested he might like Mr. Mills to do some work for Infowars. Eighteen months later,

Mr. Mills turned up in Connecticut at the road race. No evidence suggests he was sent

to, or was otherwise motivated to go to, the road race by Mr. Jones. Mr. Mills was

11

arrested, the jury was told.5 This was the best evidence of Mr. Jones’ harassment. The

balance was unsourced threats, hearsay reports of the acts and activities of unnamed

others – including a claim that a child’s grave had been urinated on, and reports of

notes, or other communications left on car windshields, doors, answering machines,

web pages, and other public locations. Almost none of this was admissible under

ordinary canons of evidence as either unreliable hearsay or lacking a foundation in the

form of a discernable nexus to Mr. Jones. Given the law of default imposed by the court,

these rules were unavailing: everything was Mr. Jones’ fault. The trial court wholly

abandoned its responsibility to assure that a fair trial, conducted according to the rules

of evidence, take place. The trial was transformed into a memorial service.

Running throughout this trial was an unanswered question about the impact of

the default on the scope of the proceedings. The plaintiffs argued throughout that the

default operated in such a manner as to “establish” the allegations of the complaint. The

defendants conceded that the operation of the default left the material allegations of the

complaint established. The court never decided what facts were material, and therefore

established. The result were rulings both incoherent and baffling. On some occasions

5 The Mills case was circumstantial. When Mr. Mills turned up at the road race, he never
mentioned either Mr. Jones or Infowars. No evidence was produced that he was ever on
the Infowars payroll, or even that he was ever paid by the defendants for anything, or
that the defendants encouraged him to do anything. The case ended with Mills’ pleading
to a count of interfering with a police officer/resisting arrest in exchange for a suspended
sentence. Significantly, Mr. Mills was not convicted of a crime involving harassment or
intimidation of a witness. See, F02B-CR15-0287389-S. Innuendo was piled on innuendo
and then asserted as an example of the sort of harassment that had been “established.”
One wonders why the plaintiffs thought this deception necessary, since the default
“established” what this deceitful example presumably illustrated.

12

heresay and foundation objections were sustained; on other occasions, such objections

were overruled – even when the form of the questions were identical.

In an action at law, the rule is that the entry of a default operates as a

confession by the defaulted defendant of the truth of the material facts alleged in
the complaint which are essential to entitle the plaintiff to some of the relief
prayed. It is not the equivalent of an admission of all of the facts pleaded. The
limit of its effect is to preclude the defaulted defendant from making any further
defense and to permit the entry of a judgment against him on the theory that he
has admitted such of the facts alleged in the complaint as are essential to such a
judgment. It does not follow that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for the full
amount of the relief claimed. The plaintiff must still prove how much of the
judgment prayed for in the complaint he is entitled to receive.(emphasis added)

United National Indemnity Co. v. Zullo, 143 Conn. 124, 129-30, 120 A.2d 73 (1956); see

also Mechanics Savings Bank v. Tucker, 178 Conn. 640, 644, 425 A.2d 124 (1979).

The court held, for example, that it was “established” by the default that Mr.

Jones knew his utterances about Sandy Hook were false from the very first moment he

raised a concern on air hours after the shootings took place on December 12, 2014. It

also took as “established” that Mr. Jones was part of a conspiracy of known and

unknown persons who had the intent to harass and intimidate the plaintiffs. Thus, at

various points, a plaintiff could, and did, testify that their received a verbal threat: on

some occasions objections to such testimony was sustained; at other times it was

overruled. Simply put, there was no coherent law of the case, and result was enormous

prejudice to the defendants, an evidentiary windfall that the plaintiffs should not have

enjoyed in the context of a disciplinary default or any other lawful proceeding.

13

 D. The Limitations On Cross-Examination

The plaintiffs’ theory of the case was simplicity itself: Mr.Jones uses anger to

generate social media traffic, which he then directs to web pages selling products.6

When it was apparent that Sandy Hook generated traffic, the defendants went all in,

broadcasting through an extensive social media network claims that it was all a hoax

and that the parents were crisis actors. The plaintiffs were determined to let nothing

stand in the way of this theory – not even the exhibits they offered at trial.

From the very first plaintiffs’ exhibit, which contained a picture of President

Barack Obama on a magazine cover and featured Mr. Jones complaining that “he” was

coming for our guns, the plaintiffs objected to questions asking who the “he” was on the

magazine cover. The objections were sustained. The plaintiffs then introduced social

media traffic statistics that showed an increase in internet activity on the defendants’

websites in the years following the Sandy Hook shooting. The traffic doubled from 2015

to 2016, according to the plaintiffs’ exhibits. The defendants were then denied the right

to cross examine on a certain signal event that might have explained the jump in web

traffic in 2016 – the election of President Donald Trump and Mr. Jones support of Mr.

Trump7 and his opposition to Hillary Clinton, a woman Mr. Jones is heard describing in

another video played for the jury by the plaintiffs as a “sea hag.” The trial court’s

rationale? This was not a case about politics. Somehow, despite this, the plaintiffs

6 Yeteven their expert, Clint Watts, would not attribute causation to Mr, Jones. Hould not
say whether Mr. Jones created the anger or whether he merely shed light on issues that
angered others, thus drawing listeners who felt that someone else understood the anger
they were experiencing. Plaintiffs’ counsel presented Mr. Jones as an angry Svengali
who could seduce the credulous; Mr. Jones may simply be an angry populist.
7 The jury never learned that Mr. Trump appeared on Infowars with Mr. Jones in 2016.

14

 showed to the jury an internal email sent by employees of the defendants quoting

Donald Trump’s promising never to let the defendants down. At one particularly

awkward moment, counsel for the plaintiffs objected to the use of a full exhibit they had

moved into evidence as “hearsay.”

Politics, the court ruled, was off limits, whether political figures were in the

plaintiffs exhibits or not. The court rejected argument that motive and bias as to politics

by a plaintiff seeking money damages is never collateral. This is almost certainly error

on the exhibits and evidence offered by the plaintiffs in this case.

Not content with this ruling, the plaintiffs sought further restrictions on the

defendants’ ability to challenge the extent of damages claimed.

Ten days into trial and more than mid-way through the examination of the 15-

plaintiffs in this case, one of the four trial counsel for the plaintiffs raised orally what he

referred to as an “ad hoc” issue relating to the scope of the defendants’ already limited

permissible cross-examination. This despite a pre-trial warning that serious issues

foreseeable on the eve of trial would not be entertained during trial absent a showing of

good cause. The plaintiffs sought preclusion of questioning on the extent of knowledge

each plaintiff had of Alex Jones during the years since 2012 and, apparently, the

frequency with which they were harassed by third parties over the years. The plaintiffs

also appeared to double down on their contention that, given the disciplinary default, the

issue of causation of harm has already by decided in their favor. Therefore, they

asserted, any harm that befell the individual plaintiffs regarding Sandy Hook from any

party, whether named or unnamed, or even identifiable, was Mr. Jones’s fault; any

communication, whether an unsourced verbal slur, an electronic communication, a note

15

left on a door or car, a letter sent to their home, was also the fault of Alex Jones. Any

questioning that tested whether directly or indirectly, causation of the extent of

damages, was, on the plaintiffs’ theory, res judicata.

The defendants suffered a disciplinary default. This was a hearing in damages. The

plaintiffs elected a trial by jury and elected to put on a case that the defendants’

intentionally targeted the plaintiffs for harassment and intimidation. In support of this, the

plaintiffs called Clinton Watts, a former law enforcement and military intelligence officer

to discuss the reach of Mr. Jones’s social media outlets. They also produced accounts

of three men with associations to Mr. Jones who went to Sandy Hook – two, Dan

Bidondi and Wolfgang Halbig, attended public meetings and harassed public officials;

there is no evidence either man ever saw, or attempted to see, a plaintiff. A third man,

Mark Mills, was a caller on Mr. Jones’ show, and then turned up more than a year later

at a road race sponsored by one of the foundations created by several of the plaintiffs,

where he was arrested. In a non-default context, this evidence would likely be

inadmissible in a liability trial. There simply is no nexus to Mr. Jones or any other than a

speculative inference that what Mssrs. Bidondi and Halbig did to town officials they must

have done to the plaintiffs. As to Mr. Mills, his appearance at a road race 15 months

after appearing on Infowars isn’t even a significant correlation, much less proof of

causation as to Mr. Jones’ alleged role in sending him. When counsel for the defendants

commented on this during closing arguments, plaintiffs counsel objected. The objections

were sustained, The remainder of the evidence of harm came from unnamed and

unknown sources. The Court at various times either sustained or overruled objections

as to the admissibility of such evidence on hearsay, relevance or foundation grounds.

16

 The plaintiffs were entitled to such damages as they could prove. But they were

not entitled to transform the doctrine of proximate cause into a theory of “but for”

causation, asserting that anything and everything they suffered at the hands of persons

named and unnamed since December 14, 2012, was the responsibility of Mr. Jones.

Even in the case of a disciplinary default, such a result would be unprecedented.

Mr. Jones and Free Speech Systems, LLC, were entitled to defend the claims for

money damages against them by testing the evidence. In this case, the plaintiffs

claimed that Mr. Jones intended to cause them extreme emotional distress in an

unrelenting campaign that continues to this very day. The defendants were denied the

right to put before the jury evidence to suggest that the extent of the damages were

overstated.

E. The Testimonial Trilemma Imposed On Mr. Jones

Not content with a disciplinary default, the plaintiffs continued to seek sanctions

of one sort or another up until the very day that trial began. Operating under the

assumption that Free Speech Systems, LLC, was a well-organized and well-managed

operation whose failure to comply with the exacting standards of discovery demanded

by the plaintiffs was evidence of an intent to withhold evidence, the plaintiffs managed to

persuade the Court to enter further sanctions, limiting the scope of what Mr. Jones, or

his corporate representative, could testify about. This had the result of placing Mr. Jones

in a cruel trilemma, resulting in his decision to boycott the proceedings, proceedings

which he likened to a “kangaroo court.”

Among the limitations placed on Mr. Jones’ were the following:

17

 • He was prohibited from testifying that Free Speech Systems, LLC, is

currently in bankruptcy;

• He could not testify that Sandy Hook was a minor part of overall

coverage of events offered on his platforms;

• He could not testify that he did not profit from Sandy Hook coverage;

• He could not testify to his belief that he and his firm had substantially

complied with discovery;

• He could not testify about his belief that the opinions he expressed

were protected by the First Amendment;

• He could not deny that he lied from the very beginning of his coverage

of the Sandy Hook shootings.

He was nonetheless compelled to testify by a trial subpoena, and he did testify.

Prior to his testimony the court, with the consent of counsel, canvassed him to

make sure that he understood the limitations on what he could and could not say. It was

also made clear to him that violating the court’s order could result in criminal contempt.8

Mr. Jones was faced with a dilemma. Testify consistent with the court’s order, but

testify in ways that he believes to be false – and commit perjury. Free Speech Systems,

LLC, is in bankruptcy. Mr. Jones would have testified under oath that Sandy Hook was a

minuscule part of his coverage over the decade in question. He would have testified that

his firm lost money covering Sandy Hook. He would have testified that he had complied

with discovery. He would have testified that he never lied about Sandy Hook, no matter

8 A sanction carrying up to six months in jail.

18

 how mistaken his beliefs were. If he testified truthfully, he would be in contempt. If he

testified, in accord with the court’s order, he would commit perjury. Both are criminal.

He engaged in combative cross-examination, where these doors were not

opened. Even so, counsel argued in a way that suggested to the jury the very things Mr.

Jones was not permitted to address in his testimony. He was effectively prevented from

testifying on his own behalf, where, if asked about any of the prohibited topics he likely

would have pleaded the fifth amendment against self-incrimination to avoid either

perjury or contempt. That, of course, would have yielded yet another windfall to the

plaintiffs in the form of an adverse inference. He elected not to testify rather than

participate in a proceeding in which he could be penalized for telling the truth.

For this he was called a coward in closing argument.

As with the case of the default, the plaintiffs were able to use sanctions to

prevent the defendants from presenting claims necessary to their defense in a hearing

for damages, and to argue what they say they could not prove – the extent of Sndy

Hook coverage. Plaintiffs counsel argued that the coverage was continuous, and

broadcast to millions; Mr. Jones could not say otherwise, a court order precluded that.

Yet the basis for that order was that the plaintiffs could not tell how extensive the

coverage was given the alleged failure by the defendants to comply with discovery. The

sanctions in this case were used to do what proof could not: promote arguments

unsustainable by competent evidence.

An appropriate remedy post-default would have been something far less than

preclusion of testimony: to wit, an instruction to the jury that they were free to draw an

adverse inference about the various topics on which the plaintiffs claimed prejudice. The

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result of the court’s ruling was a license to the plaintiff to present a caricature of the

evidence as the truth, an abandonment of the very goal of trial.

F. The Court’s Failure To Assure A Fair Trial

Despite multiple admonishments of counsel for both sides as to their conduct in

this proceeding, the plaintiffs’ counsel was permitted to engage in a vicious, over-the-

top, and gratuitous attack on Mr. Jones at the end of his examination of Mr. Jones. This

despite the fact that the undersigned stood, as commanded, and objected in a non-

argumentative manner, as ordered, to holler his objections. In a memorable cross-fire

worthy of pulp fiction, the court wholly lost control of the proceedings, to the detriment of

Mr. Jones, who was accused of targeting the plaintiffs, excoriated for not apologizing to

them, and otherwise abused in a manner that, had this been a criminal trial, would

certainly have resulted in a mistrial. It was a low-water mark in the history of trial

advocacy in Connecticut.

The court’s response? Exasperation. In the end, it was Mr. Jones’s counsel who

was advised that the court would not hesitate to hold him in contempt should it be

necessary. The conduct of counsel engaged in the harangue was unaddressed. It was

yet another example in this highly unusual trial of Mr. Jones getting the worse of any

application of judicial discretion.

G. The The Denial To Him Of His Counsel Of Choice And The Court’s
Unusual Decision To Hold A Show Cause Proceeding As Counsel
Of Record During The Pendency Of These Proceedings

At the onset of the proceedings, Mr. Jones was denied his counsel of choice,

Mark Randazza, who had applied pro hac vice to represent Mr. Jones. Mr. Randazza is

a nationally known, and recognized, first amendment lawyer. Deprived of his counsel of

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choice, Mr. Jones turned elsewhere, including to the undersigned, who was fired

months before trial. When the trial court refused to permit the undersigned to withdraw,

Mr. Jones was compelled to go to trial without his counsel of choice. Even his efforts to

have admitted another out-of-state lawyer, F. Andino Reynal, met with failure: Attorney

Reynal was “admitted,” but denied a speaking role a trial, leading him, ultimately, to

withdraw his application to appear rather than pay the mandated attorney occupancy

tax for the privilege of sitting in the gallery as a spectator.

On the eve of these proceedings, both Mr. Reynal and the undersigned were

summoned to an unprecedented show cause hearing by the trial court. At issue was not

conduct that appeared in the presence of the court, but a press account story about

potential disclosure of confidential records involving the Connecticut plaintiffs in another

case pending before a Texas judge. While Mr. Jones raises no claim of conflict over this

decision, the practical effect of a lawyer’s facing potential discipline by a trier of fact in a

matter as highly contested as this further taints this proceeding. Phillips v. Warden, 220

Conn. 112 (1991).

As yet, the court has not decided whether to impose discipline. The undersigned

writes comments critical of the court’s ruling in this proceeding apparently at his own

risk. All this was unnecessary. The matter could easily have been referred to a

grievance panel, as is customary for conduct not occurring in the presence of the court.

The court’s decision to do otherwise suggests a particular animus against either Mr.

Jones, his counsel, or both. Whether this animus led the court to use its discretion in the

manner in which it did in this case raises questions about the fairness of the trial.

H. The Plaintiff’s Presentation Of A Punitive Damages Case In A

Compensatory Damages Hearing

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 The plaintiffs in this case did not present evidence of economic loss, and no jury

instruction was requested or given on this topic. All that was requested was damages

for reputational harm and emotional distress. No mental health care providers were

called to testify. Indeed, plaintiffs’ counsel told the jury in rebuttal that the plaintiffs had

elected not to tender such records for fear that the defendants might publicize them.

There was no evidence presented about an appropriate measure of damages.

During argument, counsel for the plaintiffs suggested a base number of 550

million, corresponding to the number of social media impressions several of the

defendants’ websites had garnered during a relevant period at issue. This number was

generated by Clinton Watts. Counsel anchored this number by saying the jury could

apply a dollar, ten dollars or more to the number, and could give it to each plaintiff. You

are, he reminded the jury, the conscience of the community. He also reminded jurors

that “you reap what you sow.” He then reminded them that the corporate representative

for Free Speech Systems, LLC, had adopted the range of revenue for the corporation

proposed by counsel in a question at somewhere between $100 million and $1 billion

for a portion of the time period at issue. Jurors knew what they could do. Give a lot.

Stop Mr. Jones so he doesn’t do this again.

Whatever else this argument was, it was not an argument for compensatory

damages.

Counsel for the plaintiffs clearly wanted to try a punitive damages case for the

jury. Indeed, one of their failed pre-trial motions was a call for this Court the jury to issue

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 an “advisory verdict” on CUTPA punitive damages. The Court declined. The plaintiffs

persisted.

The jury was inspired by sympathy after hearing from sympathetic accounts of

how each plaintiff was educated, how they met their spouses, or, in the case of one

teacher, how much the teacher loved books, life, and her siblings. Each plaintiff testified

extensively – in most cases for half an hour -- before even getting to the issues for

which this hearing in damages was held. As they testified, other plaintiffs in the

audience chuckled in appreciation of anecdotes well delivered. When the testimony

turned to Mr. Jones it was usually brief. Most knew nothing of his or Infowars until after

the death of their loved one. Then came tales of harassment at the hands of third

parties, and tearful testimony about their fear and grief. It was well-choreographed by

counsel, and moving. Indeed, after one witness testified, the witness left the stand and

was embraced in a sympathetic hug by plaintiff’s counsel in the well of the court.

This was not supposed to be a memorial service. It was supposed to be a trial, a

trial in which the plaintiffs were to be held to their burden of proving such damages as

were fair, just and reasonable. The plaintiffs and their counsel shirked their responsibility

to put before the jury evidence from which a jury could calmly and rationally reach an

award of damages. No witness asked for a sum. No expert opined about a sum. No

document expressed a sum. It is no wonder the jury asked for clarification about the

charge involving money damages making a plaintiff whole. Jurors were left without

guidance and told simply to use their common sense.

Arguing that Mr. Joners must be stopped is not an argument for compensatory

damages. Neither is an argument that he must he held accountable. It is the

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 responsibility of plaintiffs to meet a burden of proving that a sum will compensate the

plaintiffs for the harm they have endured and likely will endure. The plaintiffs never did

this in this case, focusing instead on arousing sympathy, directing anger, and anchoring

a large number before the jury with the hope that jurors would do what they did in this

case – award a fortune.

A new trial is necessary, a trial in which the plaintiffs present evidence about what

damages should be, rather than mere argument that it should be a lot. That was an

abdication of their responsibility to do the only thing they were required to do in this

hearing in damages: prove the extent of the damages they seek.

I. The Misapplication Of CUTPA

The defendants moved for a directed verdict and/or for dismissal of the CUTPA

claim on several grounds: first, the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise a CUTPA claim;

second, the plaintiffs never pled an adequate CUTPA count by failing to plead a

necessary element, to wit: ascertainable loss; and, third, that the claim as stated,

together with the proof offered at trial, failed to support submitting the CUTPA claim to

the jury. The defendants press this claim notwithstanding the entry of a disciplinary

default. Additionally, the defendants argued that there was no CUTPA claim pleaded in

the complaint on the grounds that the complaint fails to make any allegations about a

product or the advertising of a product. At most, Mr. Jones engaged in tortious speech.

He supports the platform from which he makes those utterances by advertising and

selling products. CUTPA has never been applied in the manner suggested here – to

penalize a party whose speech on public affairs is supported by products sold in

commerce. It is being used as a club to silence speech in a manner wholly offensive to

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 the first amendment and to our state constitution’s more expansive guarantee of

freedom of speech.

The Plaintiffs Are Trying To Use A Trade Statute To Punish Speech

In sum, the plaintiffs CUTPA claims come down to this: Mr. Jones lies to stir fear

in consumers; he then sells products – primarily dietary supplements -- to consumers to

address their fear. In the case of the Sandy Hook families, Mr. Jones lied about the

shooting to drive folks to his web sites, where banner ads led them to product sites. He

intended to drive folks to those sites by spreading lies about public events and private

persons. He used defamation about events unrelated to products to increase sales. No

court has ever recognized this as a CUTPA violation.

Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int'l, LLC, 331 Conn. 53 (2019) comes close, but

not close enough, to saving this case. In Soto, firearms manufacturers marketed military

grade weapons to civilians, glorifying their destructive capacity. When a civilian used

such a weapon to slaughter school children and educators, the manufacturer was held

liable for its unscrupulous ad. Soto held that the plaintiffs’ decedents had standing to

raise claims despite the lack of a consumer relationship with the firearms’ manufacturer.

Id., pp. 99-100.

Soto did not hold that a lie told for the sake of commercial gain transforms

ordinary defamation into a CUTPA claim. One needs to lie about a product or otherwise

engage in unscrupulous advertising about a product.

In Soto, unscrupulous means were used to market a product that was then

misused to slaughter innocents. There is no analog here. The Court’s default results in a

conclusion that Mr. Jones lied about Sandy Hook. He lied to attract attention. That

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 attention drove people to his product pages and sales, presumably, increased. No one

died or was injured or even harmed from purchasing any, or too much, of a dietary

supplement. Indeed, no effort was made in this case to show the products lack efficacy.

The only evidence in the record was an off-hand remark by Dr. Jones in deposition

testimony played before the jury that the products were FDA approved.

The sole reason for pleading CUTPA in addition to the torts pleaded here is

simply to have access to a larger pot of punitive damages than the common law counts

afford. The court has discretion to award punitive damages under CUPTA, whereas

punitive damages are limited to attorneys’ fees and costs for the common law claims.

The Plaintiffs Never Pleaded Ascertainable Loss

The plaintiffs sued Mr. Jones in three separate complaints in 2018 for

defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent

infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice

Act. September 19, 2022, they consolidated the three complaints into one. The

defendants did not object to the submission of that Complaint. The trial Court having

issued a series of sanctions, including a default, now presides over a jury trial. The

plaintiffs have this day rested.

The defendants have waited for years to see whether the plaintiffs would claim

ascertainable loss; the time for further amendments to the complaint has passed. This

Count should be dismissed.

In the various complaints filed by the plaintiffs in this case, the plaintiffs have

been clear – they allege the defendants have caused them emotional distress. The

defendants have been defaulted, and the defendants have been left with nothing other

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than a defense against the extent of damages sought. Discovery has been extensive,

with hundreds of thousands of documents exchanged, and dozens of depositions taken.

The plaintiffs have had every opportunity to amend their complaints, and have done so,

submitting an amended complaint one week into a month-long trial.

The plaintiffs have withdrawn their negligent infliction of emotional distress claim,

leaving three common law counts – intentional infliction of emotional distress,

defamation and breach of privacy by publication of private facts – and one statutory

count, a claim of a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, as codified at

Connecticut General Statutes Section 42-110 et. seq.

Simply put, the plaintiffs have not pleaded a legally sufficient CUTPA claim. What

they have pleaded is a claim that does not exist as a matter of law. As the Appellate

Court made clear in Richey v. Main Street, 110 Conn. App. 209 (2008) even a default

does not save an inadequately pleaded count. “We conduct a plenary review of the

pleadings to determine whether they are sufficient to establish a cause of action upon

default.” Id., 220

The CUTPA claim in the current complaint is at paragraphs 452 to 462 of the

Amended Complaint. The claim incorporates by reference all of the preceding 452

paragraphs. Not one of these paragraphs pleads the one thing necessary to salvage a

CUTPA claim: ascertainable economic loss. Instead, the plaintiffs common law counts,

and the allegations surrounding them, are steeped in claims of emotional distress. At

best, the plaintiffs pleaded “actual and substantial damages”, see paras. 419, 432 and

446. This is legally insufficient to support a CUTPA claim. They assert in their various

pleadings that the measure of common law damages is separate and distinct from

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 ascertainable loss, effectively conceding that by incorporating claims from their common

law count into their CUTPA count they have made no effort to distinguish the damages

they seek in the CUTPA count from the damages they claim in their common law

counts.

CUTPA Is Inapplicable In A Case Pleading Only Emotional Distress

Our Courts have made clear for years that a CUTPA claim cannot rely on mere

claims of emotional distress, no matter how severe that distress may be.

As our Appellate Court made clear in 2019, “a claim of emotional distress does

not constitute an ascertainable loss of money or property for purposes of CUTPA.”

Parnoff v. Aquarion Water Co., 188 Conn. App. 153, 156 (2019). Indeed, Parnoff held

that the issue of punitive damages and attorney’s fees cannot be leveraged into a

substitute for ascertainable economic loss, a case in which the plaintiff neither alleged

nor demonstrated proof of anything other than emotional distress. Id.

The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of A Co. as to the
plaintiff's CUTPA claim, the plaintiff having failed to allege and demonstrate that
he suffered any ascertainable loss; contrary to the plaintiff's contention that
punitive damages and attorney's fees are sufficient to fulfill the ascertainable loss
requirement under CUTPA, those potential remedies, which are available to a
plaintiff once he has met the threshold barrier of the ascertainable loss
requirement and prevails on his CUTPA claim, cannot be the basis of
demonstrating an ascertainable loss, and although the plaintiff claimed that
his emotional distress fulfilled the ascertainable loss requirement, this court has
determined previously that a claim of emotional distress does not constitute an
ascertainable loss of money or property for purposes of CUTPA.

Parnoff, at 156.

Di Teresi v. Stamford Health Sys., 149 Conn. App. 502, 512 (2014) also makes

clear than emotional distress alone is legally insufficient to make out a claim for

ascertainable economic loss.

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 The Superior Court decisions since Builes, and the cases cited therein,
have continued to hold that emotional distress is not sufficient for purposes
of CUTPA. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Belizaire, Superior Court, judicial
district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-06-5002704S, 2011 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 1842 (July 13, 2011) ("[t]rial courts have uniformly dismissed or
stricken CUTPA claims on the basis that emotional distress by itself is not an
ascertainable loss sufficient to support a CUTPA claim"); Pratt v. University
Accounting Services, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex
Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-10-116011594S, 2012 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2239 (August 28, 2012) (same); Green-Pinto v. OR & L Facility Services, LLC,
Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-12-6027983, 2012
Conn. Super. LEXIS 3142 (December 24, 2012) (same); Wilton Meadows Ltd.
Partnership v. Coratolo, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk,
Docket No. CV-09-5009680S, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1939 (July 28,
2010) (same).
After a full review of the case law and the facts presented in this case, we
conclude that the plaintiffs' claim of emotional distress does not constitute an
ascertainable loss of money or property for purposes of CUTPA. The court,
therefore, did not err in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

DiTeresi at 512.

The plaintiffs cannot succeed in contending the scope of the “cigarette rule”

somehow extends the reach of CUTPA’s ascertainable loss requirement. As the Parnoff

Court noted:

In the plaintiff's final claim, he argues that the court improperly granted the
motion for summary judgment in favor of Aquarion as to his CUTPA claim (count
seventeen). He argues that he suffered an ascertainable loss and that "the
collective acts of [the defendants] raise a sufficient question of material fact such
that it could be found that [Aquarion] engaged in tortious conduct and, therefore,
also violated the first criteria of the cigarette rule." We disagree.
General Statutes § 42-110g (a) provides in relevant part: "Any person
who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property . . . as a result of the use
or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b, may
bring an action . . . to recover actual damages.. . The court may, in its discretion,
award punitive damages and may provide such equitable relief as it deems
necessary or proper." "The ascertainable loss requirement is a threshold barrier
[that] limits the class of persons who may bring a CUTPA action seeking either
actual damages or equitable relief. . . . Thus, to be entitled to any relief under
CUTPA, a plaintiff must first prove that he has suffered an ascertainable loss due
to a CUTPA violation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nat'l Waste Assocs.,
LLC v. Scharf, 183 Conn. App. 734, 750-51, 194 A.3d 1 (2018).
Parnoff, 179-180.

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 The plaintiffs have merely repleaded common law counts for damages under

cloak of a CUTPA claim. It is clear why they have done so. Only CUTPA yields the

unlimited punitive damages they hope to obtain in an effort to silence Mr. Jones. No

matter how repugnant this Court may regard Mr. Jones’s speech, he is entitled to due

process of law, and has a right not to face judgment on counts not sustainable as a

matter of law.

J. The Transformation Of An Adversarial Proceeding Into A Memorial

Service

Mr. Jones, Free Speech Systems, LLC, and the world, which watched this trial by

way of livestream, had every reason to expect something more than a memorial service

for sympathetic victims of a horrible crime and its aftermath. The cumulative weight of

the errors by the trial court transformed these proceedings into something far less than

a fair trial. Yes, the families in this case suffered horribly as a result of the murder of

their children. And, yes, we live in deeply divided times. There are still those who claim

that Sandy Hook was a hoax, among them a former defendant in this case, who during

and after these proceedings continued, and continues, to contact the court to complain

about the proceedings. Mr. Jones didn’t send them. There was no competent evidence

offered at this trial that he ever did. Instead, there was a shocking abuse of a

disciplinary default and its transformation into a series of half-truths that misled a jury

and resulted in substantial injustice.

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 The jury was misled in this case and led to believe that half-truths and sleights of

hand were the product of fair and just judicial proceedings. They were never told the

hold truth. Mr. Jones is within his rights to regard this trial as little more than very sort of

hoax he was accused of spreading.

I. Conclusion

Mr. Jones requests that the verdict be set aside and a new trial ordered.

Dated: OCTOBER 21, 2022

Alex Jones,
Free Speech Systems, LLC;

BY:/s/ Norman A. Pattis /s/

/s/ Kevin M. Smith /s/
Norman A. Pattis
Kevin M. Smith
PATTIS & SMITH, LLC
Juris No. 423934
383 Orange Street
New Haven, CT 06511
V: 203-393-3017 F: 203-393-9745
npattis@pattisandsmith.com
ksmith@pattisandsmith.com

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing has been emailed and/or mailed, this

day, postage prepaid, to all counsel and pro se appearances as follows:

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For Plaintiffs:
Alinor C. Sterling, Esq.
Christopher M. Mattei, Esq.
Matthew S. Blumenthal, Esq.
KOSKOFF KOSKOFF & BIEDER
350 Fairfield Avenue
Bridgeport, CT 06604

For Trustee Richard M. Coan

Eric Henzy, Esq.

ZEISLER & ZEISLER P.C.
10 MIDDLE STREET
15TH FLOOR
BRIDGEPORT, CT 06604

/s/ Norman A. Pattis /s/

Norman A. Pattis, Esq.

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