Estrada v. Escritor A.M. No.

P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:
Escritor worked as a court interpreter in the RTC of Las Pinas City Since
1999. She has been married to Quilapio, a man who is not her spouse, for almost
twenty-five years and has a son with him. Quilapio is still legally married to another
lady, and her spouse died a year before she entered the judiciary.
Complainant Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral
act and requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According
to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it
might appear that the court condones her act.
Escritor admitted the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for
the alleged gross immoral conduc and claimed that their conjugal arrangement is
permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
the Bible Trace Society.
Escritor and Quilapio made their declarations in the usual and approved form
prescribed by Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by the elders of the congregation
where the declarations were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower Central
Office. Moreover, the congregation believed that once all legal impediments for the
couple were lifted, the validity of the declarations ceased, and the couple were
obliged to legalize their union. In this case, although Escritor was widowed in 1998 --
a fact that, on her part, lifted the legal impediment to marry -- her mate was still not
capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations remained valid.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
against respondent or her partner. Thus, the State’s interest only amounts to the
symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction
between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state
interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state.
 The Court also discussed three seminal cases reflecting U.S. jurisprudence
on Free Exercise: Sherbert, Yoder, and Smith. Sherbert held that when a law of
general application infringed religious exercise, albeit incidentally, the State interest
sought to be promoted must be so paramount and compelling as to override the free
exercise claim. Otherwise, the Court itself would carve out the exemption. In Yoder,
on the other hand, the U.S. Court again ruled that religious exemption was in order,
notwithstanding any criminal penalty imposed by the law of general application. The
two cases laid out the following doctrines: (a) Free Exercise Clause claims were
subject to the heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test, if the government
substantially burdened the exercise of religion; (b) this test governed cases, whether
the burden was direct (the exercise of religion triggered a criminal or civil penalty) or
indirect (as when the exercise of religion resulted in the forfeiture of a government
benefit).
Right to freedom of religion must prevail. Benevolent neutrality recognizes
that government must pursue its secular goals and interests, but at the same time,
strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular,
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interest. Thus, the conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to
freedom of religion.