Conrado N. Que v. Atty Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.

A.C. No. 7054, 11 November 2014

Facts:

Que accused Revilla, Jr. of willfully delaying the final judgment of the lower court against his client.
Respondent successfully filed a petition of certiorari before the Court of Appeals, two petitions of
annulment of title and a petition for annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial Court, and a
petition for declaratory execution of the lower court’s decision against his client.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent violated various canons and provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Held:

Respondent’s abuse of court remedies by filing multiple actions praying for the same cause delayed the
execution of the final judgment of the court. The respondent’s willful and revolting falsehood is also
alleged by the complainant that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the
late Atty. Alfredo Catolico who was the previous counsel of the respondent’s clients. The respondent’s
repeated attempts go beyond legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the
interests of his clients. The respondent violated his duty as an attorney “never to mislead the judge or
any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.”

Due to the respondent’s multiple violations on the CPR, and is found liable for professional misconduct
for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04,
Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR); and Sections 20 (d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme
Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of law.

Pollo v. Constantino-David
G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011

Facts

Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an

anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then formed a team and issued a
memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna
(PALD) and Legal divisions.”

Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers
were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office
for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from
the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were
draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the
basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had
gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of “fishing
expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.

He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to
Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal
search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the charge. In
view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner
was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the
latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a
motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

Issue

WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search
and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy

Ruling

The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did not
violate his constitutional right.

In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City

A.C. No. 270, March 29, 1974

FACTS

On May 29, 1959, the Court, finding that respondent Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana, who was admitted to the
Philippine Bar on January 21, 1955, committed acts of misconduct as a notary public and "has exhibited
such a frame of mind and observed such a norm of conduct as is unworthy of a member of the legal
profession," ordered his disbarment.

Respondent has intermittently filed with this Court petitions for re-admission, supported by resolutions
from members of the Bench and Bar, labor unions, newspaper editors and reporters, members of
professional and civic organizations of the Province of Cebu, attesting to respondent's good conduct and
moral character since his disbarment, and petitioning for his reinstatement to the legal profession.

The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to practice, by one previously
disbarred, is to determine whether or not the applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by positive
evidence that the effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his character has been successful, and,
therefore, he is entitled to be re-admitted to a profession which is intrinsically an office of trust.

The earlier petitions filed by respondent were denied. On June 13, 1972, he filed a verified petition for
reinstatement, submitting proofs of his honesty and integrity and other indications of his good moral
character (clearances from the City Courts and Court of First Instance of Cebu, Police Department of
Cebu City, testimonials on his character by fiscals, lawyers, Judges of City Courts and of the Court of First
Instance, resolutions of the Cebu Lions Club, Sto. Rosario Council No. 5508 of the Knights of Columbus,
Bar Association of Cebu, Cebu Lawyers League, Inc.), and after the hearing on the petition for
reinstatement on July 18, 1972, the Court issued a resolution on July 20, 1972, to wit:

"x x x [A] cling on the respondent's prayer for reinstatement as a member of the Philippine Bar, and
considering (a) that respondent movant had been disbarred as of May 29, 1959; (b) that since then the
said respondent may be considered as having undergone adequate punishment; (c) that he has
observed exemplary conduct since then, according to credible certifications attesting to his repentance
for the offense committed by him thirteen (13) years ago, and may be reasonably expected to
scrupulously observe the Canons of Legal Ethics in the future; (d) but that, in view of the numerous
changes in the law since 1959, respondent movant should offer some guarantee of his ability to render
adequate service to his prospective clients; the Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C.
Rusiana be, as he is hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review classes in a
recognized law school, and that upon his filing with the Clerk of this Court of sworn certificates by the
individual professors of the review classes attesting to his having regularly attended and passed their
subjects, under the same conditions as ordinary students said movant Carlos C. Rusiana be readmitted
as a member of the Philippine Bar, upon his taking anew the lawyer's oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys in the custody of the Clerk of this Supreme Court."

ISSUE

WON Rusiana is allowed to be reinstated to the Bar

HELD

Yes. Carlos C. Rusiana is hereby allowed to take anew the lawyer's oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys
after paying to this Court the requisite fees.

Respondent has already complied with the requirements contained in the Court's resolution, as
evidenced by the sworn certificates by the individual professors of the review classes attended by him
attesting to his having regularly attended and passed their subjects under the same conditions as
ordinary students, and the separate letters, both dated February 25, 1974, of the Registrar and the Dean
of the Gullas Law School, of the University of the Visayas, addressed to Atty. Luis Garcia, this Court's
Deputy Clerk of Court and Acting Bar Confidant, confirming the truth of the professors' statements.

JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI and ROMULO CUI
G.R. No. L-1872, August 31, 1964

FACTS

The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui
and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated
and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act
gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such
persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the
spouses deed of donation)”
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one
of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent
administrator of the Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into
between them that was embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of
either the “convenio” or of his brother’s assumption of the position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the
office be turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court
ruled in favor of Jesus.

ISSUE

Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD

Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.

Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the
deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the
one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado),
should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the
one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed
the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in
1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of
the Hospicio.

The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws
but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A
Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements,
does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as
evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has “successfully
completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary
of Education.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of an
administrator, it is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession
would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of administrator.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and
unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office
of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than
that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the
roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
Florence Teves Macarrubo vs. Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo
424 SCRA 42

FACTS

In 1982, Edmundo Macarrubo married Helen Esparza. In 1986, he began his career as a lawyer. However
in 1991, Macarrubo married Florence Teves while his marriage with Esparza was subsisting. In June
2000, Teves filed a complaint for disbarment against Macarrubo. Teves alleged that Macarrubo made
her believe that his marriage with Esparza was void; that Macarubbo lived with her as her husband but
later on left her and then Macarrubo subsequently married another woman named Josephine
Constantino whom he subsequently abandoned. Teves presented as evidence documents proving
Macarubbo’s marriages as well as photos of him and his wife as a family. Macarrubo was initially
declared in default for failing to appear multiple times but was subsequently given the opportunity to
defend himself. In his defense, Macarrubo avers that he was only coerced to marry Teves in order to
save her face because at that time she was already pregnant; that Teves sent some strangers to pick
Macarrubo up wherever he goes. He presented a judicial declaration of the nullity of his marriage with
Teves; that the marriage was void for being a sham. He also averred that the ruling in the said case
serves as res judicata on the disbarment case because Teves failed to appear in the annulment case. He
also avers that his third marriage, with Constantino, is currently being annulled due to similar
circumstances.

The Investigating Commissioner, perhaps finding that Macarrubo was never remiss in supporting Teves
and the two kids he fathered with her and that his marriage with her is void, recommended a penalty of
three months suspension from the practice of law for grave misconduct.

ISSUE

Whether or not a second marriage entered into by a lawyer while his first one is subsisting shall be a
ground for disciplinary action if such second marriage is subsequently declared void.

HELD

Yes. Macarubbo is disbarred. Even though his second marriage is declared void, it is still undeniable that
he contracted it while his first one is subsisting. Further, since the second marriage is void, he is then
liable for concubinage for living with another woman while his first marriage is subsisting. The Supreme
Court cannot give credit to his defense that both second and third marriages are shot gun marriages. He
is a lawyer and is unlikely to be coerced. One incident of a “shotgun marriage” is believable, but two
such in succession would tax one’s credulity. Macarrubo’s actions show a blatant disregard to the
institution of marriage and family. His acts import moral turpitude and is a public assault upon the basic
social institution of marriage.

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
perceived to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such, including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage,
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community. Macarrubo violated the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Anent the issue of res judicata, it has been long ruled that disbarment cases are sui generis cases. A
disbarment case is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an
administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its
course. In this case, the annulment of Macarrubo’s second marriage will not work to remove such
second marriage as a ground for disbarment.

Constancia I. Valencia v. Atty. Dionisio C. Antiniw

A.C. No. 1302, A.C. No. 1391, A.C. No. 1543, 30 June 2008

Facts

This is an appeal for reinstatement to the bar of the respondent who was disbarred on 26 April 1991 for
falsifying a deed of sale and introduction the same as evidence for his client. From 1993 to 2002, the
respondent filed several motions and appeals for reinstatement to the bar. His motions and appeals
were accompanied by endorsements of his good moral character by various organizations such as IBP-
Pangasinan Chapter; Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts of Lingayen and Urdaneta,
Pangasinan; Provincial Prosecutors’ Association of Pangasinan; Provincial Board of Pangasinan; Rotary
Club of Urdaneta; and past National President of the IBP.

Issue

Whether or not the respondent should be readmitted to the practice of law.

Held

Records show that the long period of respondent’s disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of
his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to
live up once again of conduct demanded of every member of the bar. It is well-settled that the objective
of disciplinary proceedings is restorative justice, not retribution. Guided by their doctrine and
considering the evidence submitted by respondent satisfactorily showing his contribution and his being
again worthy of membership in the legal profession, the Supreme Court find that it is now time to lift
respondent’s disbarment.