LI STY

F I LOLOG ICK É

FOL I A
PH I LOLOGICA

143 / 2020 / 1–2

 List y f ilologické CXLIII, 2020, 1–2, pp. 7–36

T HE PR IM A RY CONT R IBUT IONS

OF GR EEK PHILOSOPHICA L T HOUGHT
TO W EST ER N S Y NTA X:
FROM PL ATO TO CHRYSIPPE A N LOGIC *

Victor ia Manzano Ventur a

1. Introduction

There is a field in which the importance of ancient Greek philosophy

often continues to be undervalued and interpreted incorrectly: gram-
mar or, more specifically, syntax. It is apparent that Greek philosophical
thought operates with methodologies and within contextual frameworks
that are very different from those of the subsequent grammatical and
linguistic tradition. The great philosophical schools of ancient Greece –
from the Platonic to the Stoic – did not leave behind, however, reflec-
tions on language in their disquisitions, and from that philosophical
reflections on human words and language syntactic ideas and approach-
es of fundamental importance emerged.

*
 This work is part of the LAPAR Research Group (HUM002) of the Government
of Extremadura, directed by Professor Luis Merino Jerez, as well as part of the Research
Project “Grammars in Europe (seventeenth to eighteenth centuries): Studies and Editions”
(FFI2016-78496-P) of the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness, directed
by Professors Eustaquio Sánchez Salor and María Luisa Harto Trujillo. I would like to
express my heartfelt gratitude to the anonymous reviewers of Listy filologické as well as
to the editor, Matěj Novotný, whose exhaustive readings and valuable suggestions have
contributed significantly to the improvement of the article.
8 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

Despite their undeniable importance, these syntactic ideas and con-

cepts present in Greek philosophy have not always been given the atten-
tion they deserve.1 The philosophical context in which they are inscribed
and the difficulty of interpreting certain odd approaches from the view-
point of modern linguistic taxonomy have too often obscured the deci-
sive achievements and advances of Greek philosophy in the syntactic
field. Hence, the origin of syntax in the West is usually fixed in the sec-
ond century AD, specifically, in the Syntax by Apollonius Dyscolus –
a key reference text in subsequent syntactic development –,2 whereas the
decisive preceding work of Greek philosophers is much less valued and
also much less known.
Therefore, the objective of the present study is to focus on this less-
visible philosophical tradition to determine its main achievements and
advances in the syntactic field, its singular importance and subsequent
influence. In short, the analysis leads to the very roots of our syntax,
that is to say, of the syntactic theory of the West.

1 
Although somewhat belatedly, fortunately more and more works are paying atten-
tion to the study and analysis of the fundamental syntactic considerations present in
the Greek philosophical tradition. In this regard, the study of D. Taylor remains useful
for a general approach to syntactic theory in Greece and Rome, the first part of which
is dedicated to the close link – often neglected at that point – between Greek syntax
and philosophy (Taylor 1993, 266–273). More specifically, the works of L. Basset and
A. Bäck on the analysis and interpretation of the syntactic and linguistic approaches in
the Aristotelian oeuvre are very enlightening (Basset 2003; Bäck 2000). With regards to
Stoic syntax, the work of A. Luhtala stands out for its clarity of ideas and expression
(Luhtala 2000), and other similarly useful and interesting studies have been added in
recent years, such as that of D. Blank and C. Atherton (Blank – Atherton 2003, 310–
327, especially 320–323), or the most recent monograph of A. Bronowski (Bronowski
2019, 383–431). The present investigation owes much to these studies. There is still miss-
ing, however, a comprehensive work that would trace the path of syntactic reflections
in Greek philosophical tradition from the beginning to the end and, at the same time,
demonstrate the fundamental importance of Greek philosophical thought for the emer-
gence and establishment of Western syntactic theory.
2
 Another question is that this primitive syntax (Greek Περì Συντάξεως by Apollonius
Dyscolus as well as books XVII and XVIII of Priscian’s Latin Institutiones grammaticae) is
often denied the status of “true” syntax by modern scholars, cf. Swiggers – Wouters
2003, 33–38.
 C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO W E S T E R N S Y N TA X 9

2. First notes of a sy ntactic cha racter in Greek

philosophical thought (f if th a nd four th centur ies BC)

Long before grammar was established as an autonomous discipline in

ancient Greece – in the second century BC – important reflections and
notes of a grammatical and syntactic nature were already present within
the framework of Greek philosophical thought. A division of the parts
of speech is first attributed to the sophist Protagoras in the second half
of the fifth century BC,3 but reliable sources on the grade of grammat-
ical development in this early era are lacking, so that the matter is far
from clear and little can be said about it.
In the first half of the fourth century BC, however, within the dia-
logues of Plato, it is possible to find important theoretical reflections on
language. The questions discussed are extremely diverse.4 We are especially
interested in the well-known distinction between ὄνομα and ῥῆμα as basic
constituents of the statement (λόγος). Curiously, as scholars have point-
ed out, in this division of linguistic predication as presented in Plato’s
Cratylus and, especially, in the Sophist,5 there are not yet any syntactic
features. In his propositional analysis, Plato limits himself to segment-
ing the basic unit of thought (λόγος) into two juxtaposed constituents
under exclusively logical and semantic criterion: ὄνομα (“that which is
being talked about”) and ῥῆμα (“that which is predicated on the ὄνομα”).6
The Platonic division of predication exercised, however, a fundamen-
tal influence on the establishment of Western syntactic theory, which
happened – in our opinion – for two main reasons. This was because
the later grammatical tradition reinterpreted Plato’s logical distribution
(λόγος: ὄνομα, ῥῆμα) by assimilating it to the specific syntactic functions
of “sentence”: “subject” and “predicate”. This assimilation was possi-
ble thanks to the frequency with which the Platonic ὄνομα expressed,

3
 See Aristoteles, Rhetorica, 1407b6; Plato, Phaedrus, 267c; Diogenes Laertius, Vitae
philosophorum, IX,53. Cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 37–39; Frede 1977, 51.
4
 For a general consideration of the main linguistic issues discussed in Plato’s dia-
logues, see Irvine 1994, 25–30; Graffi 2010, 25; Kahn 2013, 69–85.
5
 Plato, Cratylus, 399b–425a; idem, Sophista, 262a–263b; also cf. idem, Theaetetus, 206d.
6
 Cf. Swiggers 1984, 15–17; De Rijk 1986, 218–234; Basset 1994; Luhtala 2000, 33–39.
10 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

in fact, the syntactic subject in accordance with the verb.7 In addition,

Plato with his binary propositional segmentation represents the begin-
ning of an essential reflection on the analysis and subsequent classifica-
tion of every statement: having either the complete or incomplete char-
acter of what is expressed.8
In this way, Plato’s logical analysis of the fundamental terms of the
proposition already laid the foundations of the current division of the
sentence into the syntactic functions of “subject” and “predicate”.

3. T he main contr ibutions of a sy ntactic nature

in the work of A r istotle (four th centur y BC)

In the encyclopaedic work of Plato’s disciple, Aristotle, it is also possible

to find notable reflections and approaches of a syntactic nature. Of course,
in Aristotelian logic one cannot yet speak of syntax as such. Nevertheless,
the philosopher pays considerable attention to the analysis of statements,
and in that analysis the advancement of considerations of a syntactic
nature is certainly noticeable. Although some syntactic aspects are only
mentioned briefly in Aristotelian logic, yet to a greater extent than in
Plato, they will exert a significant influence upon the later development
of Western syntactic theory.
In this sense, the contribution of Aristotle in the description of the
λόγος is essential. He takes up the Platonic division of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα,9
but deepens and broadens his analysis by means of a more exhaustive
and precise explanation – although, obviously, still not from a linguistic
point of view, but rather ontologically. The key lies in the novel inter-
pretation of the ῥῆμα (verb). It is its temporal meaning (χρόνος) that
Aristotle introduces into the definition of the verb (ῥῆμα), a fundamental

7
 Cf. Jiménez 1993, 16–17.
8
 Cf. Swiggers – Wouters 2003, 29.
9
 Aristoteles, Poetica, 1457a10–18; idem, De interpretatione, 16a–16b; idem, Rhetori-
ca, 1404b.
 C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO W E S T E R N S Y N TA X 11

trait that did not appear in Plato.10 From there, he identifies a double
meaning in all ῥῆμα: a conceptual content of its own and, at the same
time, the sign of predication that Aristotle associates per se with the con-
signification of time as a mark of existence.
To exemplify this dual nature of the ῥῆμα, Aristotle mostly resorts
to splitting the verb into a copula and a participle (“a man walks”
= “a man is walking”). In this way, the proposition (λόγος) is represent-
ed in Aristotelian logic no longer as a mere juxtaposition – according to
the Platonic model – but as a union, a union of ὄνομα + copula (ἔστι)
+ ὄνομα,11 in which the philosopher clearly distinguishes – and this con-
stitutes a fundamental syntactic contribution – between the affirmation
and denial of the expressed.12
In short, in the description of the proposition (λόγος) proposed in
On Interpretation, Aristotle is already discussing those statements that we
now call “intransitive” and “copulative”. This means that at a date as early
as the fourth century BC, Aristotle, although still using the coordinates
of logic, identifies and operates with two types of propositions that will
be central and indispensable in the subsequent linguistic sentence classi-
fication and systematization. In addition, the Aristotelian reflection on
the λόγος and its constituents provides the essential starting point that
will lead in the following centuries to a significant widening of propo-
sitional analysis and the introduction, among other things, of the con-
cept of verbal transitivity.13
Similarly important is the opposition that Aristotle establishes between
κλῆσις and πτῶσις,14 that is, between the nominative case and the rest of

10
 Aristoteles, Poetica, 1457a10–16; idem, De interpretatione, 16b6–7. Cf. Swiggers –
Wouters 2002, 112–113.
11
 Aristoteles, De interpretatione, 21a34. Cf. Luhtala 2000, 49–50; Bäck 2000, 114–
116. However, cf. De Rijk 2002, 24–33.
12
 Aristoteles, De interpretatione, 16a10–18, 16b27–29, 17a10–26. Cf. Basset 2003,
45–46.
13
 In this regard, the distinction that Aristotle poses for the first time, although in
a very general way, between the nature of the noun and the verb (see Aristoteles, De
interpretatione, 16b6–9) is fundamental.
14
 Aristoteles, Analytica priora, 48b41. Cf. Calboli 1975, 90–91; Basset 2003, 49.
12 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

the cases. In this instance, we venture to suggest – the question has not
yet been discussed in spite of its undoubted interest – that both terms
were not in all probability an Aristotelian invention but would come
from a long tradition of practical grammatical instruction.15 Be that as it
may, what interests us is that the opposition between κλῆσις and πτῶσις
allows Aristotle to operate with a nominative subject and also to iden-
tify πτῶσις as a sign of syntactic dependency. Indeed, in his doctrine
the πτῶσις, understood as a variation of the ὄνομα, there is the sign of
a dependent relationship. In the Prior Analytics, he assigns to different
prototypical words its corresponding case: for example, to ἴσον a dative,
to διπλάσιον a genitive, etc.16 In this way, the first step towards the con-
ception of a syntactic dependency is made.17
The Aristotelian trace in syntactic terminology is more than evident
in the case of the terms ὑποκείμενον and κατηγόρημα. As scholars have
pointed out, Aristotle used these two words to allude to the segmen-
tation of statements with a logical nature,18 but when referring to its
more strictly grammatical aspect, he used the words ὄνομα and ῥῆμα. In

15
 Although there is no consensus as to the date in which school education began
in Athens, some vase paintings seem to indicate the existence of school practices in At-
tica from as early as the end of the sixth century BC, see Novokhatko 2015, 17. Be that
as it may, at the beginning of the fourth century BC, the Athenian educational system
was fully consolidated. In this regard, the Platonic dialogue Protagoras, composed around
390 BC, offers us the usual teaching programme for Athenian youth which consisted of
three essential subjects: grammar, music and gymnastics, see Plato, Protagoras, 325c–326a;
cf. Novokhatko 2015, 21. With these points in mind, we consider plausible that the
terms κλῆσις and πτῶσις – attested to for the first time with grammatical meaning in
Aristotle’s Prior Analytics – would have emerged a few decades earlier in the context of
practical grammatical instruction taking place in Attica along with the study of parts of
speech, declination and conjugation. For an analysis of the terms κλῆσις and πτῶσις in
the Greek philosophical and grammatical tradition, see Bécares 1985, 226 and 335. On
the different interpretations of the term πτῶσις in Peripatetic and Stoic philosophy, cf.
Frede 1987, 304; Luhtala 2000, 103–104. For further insight into the Stoic concept of
case (πτῶσις), see Bronowski 2019, 408–423.
16
 Aristoteles, Analytica priora, 48b41–49a5.
17
 On the origin and establishment of the notion of “syntactic dependency” in the
grammatical tradition of the West, see Manzano 2013, 371–390.
18
 The fundamental Aristotelian classification alludes to “that of which something is
said” (ὑποκείμενον) and “that which is said” (κατηγόρημα). For the interpretation and
 C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO W E S T E R N S Y N TA X 13

the sixth century AD, both terms (ὑποκείμενον and κατηγόρημα) were
introduced into the thought of the West when translated into Latin by
the commentator Boethius as subiectum and praedicatum.19 Throughout
the Medieval and Renaissance period, they were used to a great extent,
but with a clear logical sense,20 since in the grammatical field – with the
crucial development of syntax in Central Europe from the second half of
the twelfth century – the terminological binomial suppositum and appos-
itum was employed to allude to the sentence segmentation of “subject”
and “predicate”.21
After the Renaissance period, however, the trend changes dramatical-
ly. The terms suppositum and appositum completely disappear from the
technical grammatical vocabulary, being replaced by the subiectum–prae-
dicatum pair, until then eminently logical. The grammatical assimilation
was possible thanks to the close link that logic and grammar had always
maintained. In this way, the two technical terms that current syntax uses
to designate the syntactic division of the clause, “subject” and “predi-
cate”, are also a direct inheritance of Aristotelian logic.
In conclusion, it is true that Aristotle’s considerations of a syntac-
tic nature are always tinged with a logical-philosophical nature. It is no
less true that some of his ideas, due to their analytical depth and sur-
prising linguistic value, have been taken up and extended by subsequent
authors and schools, and acquired a crucial importance in shaping the
syntax of the West.

meaning of these two terms in Aristotle, see Bécares 1985, 223 and 393; Baratin 1989,
383–384; Baratin 1992, 187–192.
19
 Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ; idem, In Categorias
Aristotelis libri quatuor. Cf. Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, IV,393.
Regarding the initial (fifth to sixth centuries) use of the terms subiectum and praedicatum
in Latin, cf. Pfister 1976; Graffi 2008, 53–54.
20
 Cf. Covington 1984, 69.
21
 For the use of the terms suppositum and appositum in Medieval and Renaissance
syntactic theory, see Pérez – Lozano 1988. It should be pointed out, however, that al-
though the credit for having introduced both terms in Latin grammar in the first half of
the twelfth century is erroneously given to Peter Helias, it is only from the texts of the
second half of the twelfth century onwards that the use, in the Latin grammatical tradi-
tion, of the words suppositum and appositum becomes common with a clear syntactic sense.
14 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

4. T he Mega r ia n school: the main innovations in

ref lections of a sy ntactic nature (four th centur y BC)

The so-called “Megarian school”, a philosophical school of the fourth

century BC that is important for the new ways of analysis in the study
of logic and dialectics, is the first of the schools in which the Peripatetic
trace in its final stage of development is discernible. Unfortunately, the
extant fragments and testimonies are very scarce.22
Founded by Euclides of Megara,23 a disciple of Socrates, at the begin-
ning of the fourth century BC, it was fundamentally characterized by
its mixture of ontology and Eleatic epistemology with Socratic ethics.24
It also stood out due to its interest in logic. Indeed, the Megarians were
remarkable, among other aspects, for the elaboration of paradoxes, the
analysis of conditional statements or the study of certain modal notions.
In this regard, Diogenes Laertius provides us with a very interesting
testimony by pointing out that the followers of the “Megarian school”
were called “Megarians” at first, then “Eristic philosophers”, and finally
“Dialecticians”.25 This brief note seems to support the hypothesis that
there existed a splinter group of authors in the last decades of the fourth
century BC dedicated exclusively to the study and analysis of dialectics.
Whether it was an independent group or a branch of the school itself,
what seems obvious is that by the end of the fourth century BC there
was a group of philosophers who focused their interest and attention on
logic, on dialectics and, consequently, on the description of statements.
Two issues seem particularly relevant and worth highlighting for what
they imply for the progress in the analysis of statements and, therefore,
in the reflection of a syntactic nature.
Firstly, the introduction of what we now call the “object” or “direct
object” of the transitive verb. Specialists such as A. Luhtala have placed
the origin of the notion of “object” or “complement” in the distinction

22
 See Muller 1985 and Mársico 2013.
23
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, II,106–112.
24
 See Humbert 1967; Bredlow 2011, 36–42. Cf. Gardella 2014.
25
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, II,106.
 C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO W E S T E R N S Y N TA X 15

between the nature of the noun and the verb.26 Such reflections already
appeared in Aristotle’s On Interpretation, in particular, in the comparison
of the terms ὑγίεια (“health”) and ὑγιαίνει (“is healthy”).27 This was elab-
orated from a more strictly grammatical perspective by the Megarian dia-
lecticians of the late fourth century who were the first to recognize the
fundamental distinction between “a field” and “having a field”.28
Secondly, the study of “propositions” (ἀξιώματα) and “predicates”
(κατηγορήματα). According to Diogenes Laertius, it was Clinomachus
of Thurii, a philosopher follower of the Megarian school at the end of
the fourth century BC, who has the credit for having written for the
first time on “propositions” and “predicates”.29 The lack of further evi-
dence prevents us from knowing exactly the linguistic depth and scope
of Clinomachus’ considerations. What seems undeniable is that his novel
reflection provided a starting point for later development, since “prop-
ositions” and “predicates” constituted the backbone on which Stoic
logic was articulated.
Consequently, the Megarian school and, more specifically, its dialec-
tics – little known and little valued in the studies on grammar and lan-
guage in Antiquity – provided the true beginning of certain essential
contributions to Western syntactic theory.

5. Stoicism a nd sy nta x: the impor ta nce of Chr ysippea n

logic in the establishment of Wester n sy nta x
(third centur y BC)

When Zeno of Citium began his teaching in the Painted Stoa of Athens
around the year 300 BC, he laid the foundations of the philosophical cur-
rent with the greatest influence in all areas of ancient thought: Stoicism.

26
 Cf. Luhtala 2000, 140–141.
27
 Aristoteles, De interpretatione, 16b6–9.
28
 Seneca informs us that the ancient dialecticians introduced the distinction between
“a field” (ager) and “having a field” (agrum habere), and that this distinction was adopted
by the Stoics, see Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium, 117,12.
29
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, II,112.
16 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

This influence also included linguistic theory and syntactic analysis, but
this aspect remains insufficiently known or appreciated.
Both Zeno and Cleanthes, his successor as the head of the school,
were primarily interested in ethics and theology respectively.30 Despite
this fact, according to our sources,31 both leaders would also show some-
thing of an interest in questions of logic and syntax.32 The interest would
be a minor one, however, little relevant and under the marked influence
of the Megarian dialectics, since the traces of Peripatetic logic are not
yet discernible in these first years of the Stoa.33
It is only with the third leader of the school, Chrysippus of Soli
(c. 280–207 BC), that the study of logic within Stoicism acquires impor-
tance under the influence not only of Megarian dialectics, but also – for
the first time – of the Peripatetic one.34 The advance of logic under the
leadership of Chrysippus is so fundamental that all Stoic logic can be
considered, in essence, Chrysippean.35 This is evidenced by the simple
consideration of some of the more than three hundred titles of works
and treatises on logic and language that are attributed to Chrysippus
by Diogenes Laertius: On Prepositions, On Predicates, On the Anomalies of
Diction, On Syntax and Elements of Speech, etc.36 It is in this context where
the origin of some key notions of Western syntax must be located.
There are two circumstances that explain the general lack of knowl-
edge of the decisive advances of Stoic philosophy in syntax. The first is

30
 Cf. Rist 1978, 387–398; Long 1974, 113.
31
 The simple consideration of the titles of some works attributed both to Zeno
(On Signs, On Style, see Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII,9) and to his succes-
sor (On Dialectics, On Predicates, ibid., VII,175) reveals some kind of concern for certain
questions of a linguistic and also syntactic nature already in the initial stage of Stoicism.
32
 As opposed to Cicero who denies that Zeno had any interest in dialectical mat-
ters (Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, IV,4,9 = SVF I,47), Epictetus attributes an
essential concern for the elements of speech and its syntax to the founder of the school
(Epictetus, Dissertationes, IV,8,12 = SVF I,51).
33
 Rist 1978, 388–389; Luhtala 2000, 57 and 59–61.
34
 Plutarchus, De Stoicorum repugnantiis, 1045f–1046a. For the primacy that Chrysippus
attributed to dialectics in the Stoic philosophical system, see ibid., 1035a (= SVF II,42).
35
 Cf. Frede 1974, 28–30; Sedley 2003, 17.
36
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII,190–193.
 C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO W E S T E R N S Y N TA X 17

that no original Stoic work has been preserved and that, in addition, the
main sources available to us – Galen, Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes
Laertius – are not wholly reliable because of their late date and ana­
chronistic nature.37 The second is that Stoic syntax is based on patterns
of analysis and methodological tools that are very different from those
of contemporary linguistics, which has caused much confusion in inter-
pretation.38 It is therefore necessary to outline first, briefly and in a very
general way, the main features of the elaborate and complex Stoic sys-
tem, of which syntax forms a part, and only then point out its most out-
standing contributions in this field.39
From its very beginning, the Stoic philosophical system is presented
as divided into three main parts: physics, logic and ethics.40 These three
parts appear perfectly interconnected with each other, constituting the
basic unity of Stoic philosophy.41 The Stoic philosophers placed logic
(τὸ λογικόν) first in teaching, demonstrating an intense interest for reason
and language as essential and defining characteristics of a human being.42
In turn, Stoic logic is divided into two subdisciplines: rhetoric and
dialectics.43 Dialectics – in which the syntactic interest of Stoicism is sit-

37
 On the sources of Stoic philosophy, see Pinborg 1975, 77–79; Sandbach 1975,
15–19; Taylor 1993, 267; Luhtala 2000, 62–63; Blank – Atherton 2003, 310–311;
Bronowski 2019, 8–12.
38
 Cf. Dinneen 1985, 150; Egli 1987, 110–113; Baratin 1991, 203; Blank – Ather-
ton 2003, 314–318.
39
 The exposition of Diogenes Laertius (Vitae philosophorum, VII,39–83) of the Sto-
ic philosophical system is, without a doubt, the best we have, given its length and sys-
tematization, but it was composed only towards the end of the second century AD. His
source was in all probability Diocles of Magnesia who lived in the first century BC and
who was the author of the Survey of the Philosophers, see ibid., VII,48; cf. Mansfeld 1986,
351–373. It has been pointed out, however, that Diogenes Laertius’ account of the theo-
retical system of Stoicism is too well organized to not be suspicious, see Taylor 1993, 267.
40
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII,39.
41
 Ibid., VII,40.
42
 Cf. Long 1974, 146–147; Taylor 1993, 267. For an exhaustive analysis of Stoic
logic, see Frede 1974; Brunschwig 1978; Döring – Ebert 1993; Bobzien 1999, 92–176;
Bobzien 2003, 85–123.
43
 Diogenes Laertius, VII,41. As M. Frede already pointed out, the Stoics probably
adopted both the term “logic” and the division of it into the disciplines of “rhetoric”
18 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

uated – is composed of two parts: φωνή (“sound”) and σημαινόμενον

(“meaning”),44 or, alternatively: σημαίνοντα (“that which signifies”) and
σημαινόμενα (“that which is signified”).45 Under the category of expres-
sion (φωνή or σημαίνοντα), the Stoics studied parts of speech, solecisms,
barbarisms, poetry, discursive ambiguity, and also issues of music and
euphony.46 Under the category of meaning (σημαινόμενα) – where their
syntactic analysis was presented –, they studied cases, verbal genders
and, above all, the λεκτά in their different subdivisions and categories.47
Defining the Stoic λεκτόν – translated as “sayable” or “expressible” –
is not a simple task due to its incorporeal nature. No genuinely Stoic text
contains a definition of this core concept of Stoic dialectics. Diogenes
Laertius defines it as “that which subsists in accordance with a rational
impression” (τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον).48 From there,
it can be deduced that this rational thought or λεκτόν will, in the end,
take the form of a proposition. Nevertheless, the basic unit of Stoic syn-
tax – although it will finally result in a material and identifiable linguis-
tic unit – is not, in essence, either corporeal or articulated, such as words
or sentences, but is situated in the previous stage corresponding to ratio-
nal thinking.49 It is this incorporeal and, therefore, complex and elusive

and “dialectics” from Xenocrates, a disciple of Plato and head of the Academy (from
339 to 314 BC), see Frede 1974, 24 n. 10.
44
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII,43.
45
 Ibid., VII,62.
46
 Ibid., VII,44.
47
 Ibid., VII,43.
48
 Ibid., VII,63; see Luhtala 2000, 68; Bronowski 2019, 112. Cf. Sextus Empiricus,
Adversus mathematicos, VIII,11–12 (transl. Robert G. Bury): “Three things are linked to-
gether, the thing signified and the thing signifying and the thing existing; and of these
the thing signifying is the sound (‘Dion’, for instance); and the thing signified is the ac-
tual thing indicated thereby, and which we apprehend as existing in dependence on our
intellect, whereas the barbarians although hearing the sound do not understand it, and
the thing existing is the external, real object, such as Dion himself.” Therefore, accord-
ing to Sextus Empiricus, the λεκτόν or basic unit of Stoic syntax could be defined as the
thing signified that we understand and that exists according to our intellect. For a more
exhaustive analysis of this passage, see Luhtala 2000, 76–77; Bronowski 2019, 347–365.
49
 On the elusive concept of the Stoic λεκτόν, see Frede 1994; Luhtala 2000, 143–
144; Bobzien 2003, 85–86; and especially Bronowski 2019.
 C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO W E S T E R N S Y N TA X 19

nature of the theory of λεκτά that explains, in our opinion, the general
lack of knowledge and adequate assessment of Stoic syntax in the history
of Western linguistic thought, despite the fact that it is in the syntax of
the λεκτά that we must look for the origin of some of the key notions
of Western syntactic theory.
One of the essential contributions of Stoicism to the later grammatical
tradition is that which appertains to the concept of αὐτοτέλεια (linguis-
tic “self-sufficiency”). As has been pointed out, Plato – with his distinc-
tion between ὄνομα and ῥῆμα – begins the reflection on the complete-
ness or incompleteness of a predicate. The Stoic philosophers continue
and deepen this reflection through their fundamental division of λεκτά
into complete and incomplete ones. According to Diogenes Laertius,
the λεκτά whose enunciation is not finished are incomplete (ἐλλιπῆ), for
example, “writes”,50 and those whose enunciation is finalized are com-
plete (αὐτοτελῆ), for example, “Socrates writes”. Among the incomplete
λεκτά, the Stoics include “predicates” (κατηγορήματα), and among the
complete ones, syllogisms, questions and inquiries and also “proposi-
tions” (ἀξιώματα), which constitute the most important type of com-
plete λεκτά.51
The followers of the Stoa were therefore the first to establish the
self-sufficiency and semantic completeness (αὐτοτέλεια) of a statement
as a criterion for definition and acceptability, although it was not con-
ceived as the only criterion for acceptance of a statement in Stoic logic.52
In this regard, it is essential that the notion of αὐτοτέλεια was later inher-
ited by the grammatical tradition where it became the basic principle of

50
 On the λεκτὰ ἐλλιπῆ in Stoic linguistic theory, see Detel et al. 1980, 276–288.
51
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII,63; Taylor 1993, 269. As is often the
case with many of the key concepts of Stoic linguistic theory, however, the notion of com-
plete/incomplete λεκτόν is not clearly defined in the extant sources, see Luhtala 2000, 87.
52
 For the acceptance of a statement, along with the linguistic criterion of αὐτοτέλεια,
the Stoics used other criteria more genuinely philosophical, such as the truth and false-
hood of the contents that supported the degree of referentiality of the subjects. Thus,
in the prototypical Stoic proposition the position of the subject was occupied by a pro-
noun, as it immediately referred to a real life referent, see Luhtala 2000, 88, 145.
20 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

defining the oratio.53 It already occurs both in Apollonius Dyscolus (sec-

ond century AD) and in Priscian (sixth century AD), who in their influ-
ential grammatical treatises make it clear from the beginning that the
objective of their syntactic analysis is the “perfect sentence” – αὐτοτελὴς
λόγος and oratio perfecta respectively.54 From there, the entire later gram-
matical tradition will assume the concept of oratio perfecta (< αὐτοτελὴς
λόγος < Stoic αὐτοτέλεια) as the standard and indispensable form of the
definition of a sentence.
In addition, the contribution of Stoicism is fundamental with regard
to the notions of “activity” and “undergoing of action”. It should be
clarified first – because this question remains a source of confusion and
misinterpretation55 – that according to the principles of Stoic philosophy
the verb cannot, under any circumstances, signify or undergo activity.
Indeed, the Stoics place the verb, like the noun, under the component
of expression (φωνή or σημαίνοντα); but they assign to these two parts
of speech a very different meaning. While the noun means a body, the
verb signifies something belonging to that body. The nuance is highly

53
 In the Stoic philosophical system, of course, the completeness of a statement is not
based on the combination of parts of speech (noun and verb) – as will happen in the lat-
er grammatical tradition – but on different kinds of λεκτά, cf. Bronowski 2019, 383–403.
54
 Apollonius Dyscolus, De syntaxi, I,1; Priscianus, Institutiones grammaticae, XVII,2.
55
 It is common to find comparisons, with no further explanation, that are made
between “direct, inverse and neutral” predicates (κατηγορήματα) of Stoic logic and “ac-
tive, passive and neutral” verbs of the grammatical tradition. This is an erroneous inter-
pretation of the Stoic syntax theories and methodologies for two main reasons. First,
because the parts of speech and, therefore, also the verb are placed in the Stoic philo-
sophical system – as already noted – under the category of expression (σημαίνοντα) and
lack syntactic force. Thus, what is combined in the Stoic syntax is not the verbs, but the
equivalent units of meaning (σημαίνομενα), that is, the κατηγορήματα. And second, be-
cause the notion of “active” and “passive” belongs – according to the principles of the
Stoic ontology – exclusively to bodies, and bodies are represented in linguistic theory by
nouns, while verbs – and also the κατηγορήματα – are assigned an incorporeal character.
And that which is incorporeal does not have the capacity to be either active or passive.
In short, the Stoic syntax of the λεκτά cannot be interpreted in the same terms as the
syntax of the parts of speech of the subsequent grammatical tradition.
 C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO W E S T E R N S Y N TA X 21

significant, because the Stoic theory holds that the notion of action
belongs uniquely and exclusively to bodies.56
In short, in the Stoic philosophical system the verb cannot, by defi-
nition, signify action. And, if in the component of expression (φωνή or
σημαίνοντα) the Stoics assign to the verb an incorporeal nature, then,
obviously, in terms of meaning (σημαινόμενα) the predicate (κατηγόρημα),
which is a type of incomplete λεκτόν, also has an immaterial and incor-
poreal nature. In short, in the Stoic theory – unlike the later grammatical
tradition – neither the verb nor the predicate can represent the activity.
Apart from the characteristic incorporeal conception of the verb, how-
ever, the notion of action plays a crucial role in the linguistic theory of
the Stoa. In fact, active and passive predicates constitute the most import-
ant subgroup of incomplete λεκτά in the Stoic propositional analysis.57
We know from Diogenes Laertius that Chrysippus dedicated an entire
treatise to the study of active and passive predicates (Περὶ ὀρθῶν καὶ
ὑπτίων).58 Unfortunately, nothing has been preserved from this work.
Our only source for analysis is the passage where the biographer address-
es the Stoic typology of predicates. Of extraordinary interest is his refer-
ence to the three main types of Stoic predicates according to the notion
of action: “direct”, “reversed” and “neuter”. “Direct” (ὀρθά) predicates
are achieved by construing with one of the oblique cases, such as ἀκούει,
ὁρᾷ, διαλέγεται. “Reversed” (ὕπτια) predicates are construed with a pas-
sive particle (τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ),59 such as ἀκούομαι, ὁρῶμαι. Finally,
“neuter” (οὐδέτερα) predicates do not assume the features of either one
or the other, for example, φρονεῖν, περιπατεῖν.60

56
 Cf. Luhtala 2000, 93; Bronowski 2019, 128–132.
57
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII,43 and 63.
58
 Ibid., VII,192.
59
 There is no consensus among scholars when interpreting this “passive particle”.
While A. López Eire states that “particle” alludes to the passive ending (López 1990, 143),
other authors such as J. Lallot or D. Blank and C. Atherton maintain that this passive
particle refers to the preposition ὑπό and, consequently, probably also to the genitive case
governed by it (Lallot 2015, 874; Blank – Atherton 2003, 326). On this controversy and
the interpretation of the reversed predicate in Stoic linguistic theory, see Signes 2016, 52.
60
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII,64. It should be noted that the Stoics
also dealt with the category of the “middle”. After the definition of the direct, reversed
22 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

This tripartite classification, established around semantic and syntac-

tic criteria,61 and having human action as its basis (agents and patients
always involve two human participants),62 is of crucial importance.63 It
is actually nothing less than the starting point of the verbal typology in
Western grammar. In the tripartite Stoic description of predicates, the
categories of action and undergoing of action, which already existed in
ontology, are linked for the first time to linguistic predication; the pro-
totypical dual opposition “active/passive” (ὀρθά/ὕπτια) appears for the
first time, and the “transitive/intransitive” (ὀρθά/οὐδέτερα) syntactic-func-
tional distinction is also pointed out for the first time. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the imprint of this typology is present throughout
the subsequent development of the category of verbal voice.
It is already perceptible in the verbal categorization of Apollonius
Dyscolus. Of course, the theoretical framework and methodology of
Apollonian syntactic analysis is radically different from that of the
Chrysippean logic.64 Apollonius operates in an eminently grammatical
context in which parts of speech have replaced cases and predicates as
building units and in which the verb means per se the action and under-
going of action. And yet, the core of his analysis is, in essence, a Stoic
one. Of the three voices (διαθέσεις)65 that Apollonius Dyscolus distin-

and neuter predicates, Diogenes refers to the category of ἀντιπεπονθότα, reversed pred-
icates that represent an active action. This category constitutes a clear precedent for the
later “middle voice”, see Signes 2016, 52–54.
61
 Scholars have often pointed out the absence of morphological criteria in the
Stoic classification of predicates according to the notion of action, cf. Flobert 1975, 5;
Harto 1994, 22.
62
 Cf. Long 1974, 122; Luhtala 2000, 66.
63
 Cf. Blank – Atherton 2003, 322–323; Signes 2016, 54.
64
 See Luhtala 2000, 189–192.
65
 The verbal category of the διάθεσις plays a fundamental role in Apollonius’ syntactic
theory. In this regard, A. Luhtala argues that the notion of διάθεσις replaced the idea of
predication, an idea crucial – as we are pointing out – for the construction of sentences
in Stoic logic, see Luhtala 2000, 192. As M. Pantiglioni has emphasized, the definition
of διάθεσις as a category in Apollonius is somewhat lacking and the term itself is used
both for “voice” and for “mood”; the uncertainty of the term and of the category will
only be overcome in the work of Pseudo-Dionysius (third to fourth centuries AD), see
Dionysius Thrax, Ars grammatica, 13; cf. Pantiglioni 1988; Wolanin 2009, 51–68; Signes
 C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO W E S T E R N S Y N TA X 23

guishes – active, passive and middle – the middle voice is considered as

having no meaning of its own (οὐ προσχωροῦσα οὐδετέρᾳ),66 and the
prototypical opposition “active/passive” is established on the basis of
human action so that in all persons the passive voice is derived from
the active forms.67
Four centuries later, Priscian will repeat the same scheme of analy-
sis in the Latin grammatical field. He distinguishes between five types
of gene­ra verbi 68 that were canonical in the Latin grammatical tradition
(activum, passivum, neutrum, commune, deponens)69 but clearly prioriti­zes
the “active/passive” dichotomy that he describes in Apollonian and Stoic
terms, that is, on the basis of human action and the possibility of dia-
thetic transformation in the entire paradigm.70
In short, the contributions of Stoicism with regard to linguistic predi­
cation are so rich and relevant that they will forge, as we could see in
the works of Apollonius Dyscolus and Priscian, the subsequent verbal
systematization in Western linguistics.
Another concept absolutely central in modern syntax also has its
origin in the philosophy of the Stoa: transitivity. As we have already
pointed out, the first embryonic notes of the concept are found in the
Aristotelian distinction between the nature of the noun and the verb.71

2016, 87, 102. On the category of διάθεσις in Apollonius, see Hahn 1951; Lambert 1978,
245–252; Lambert 1984, 144; Julien 1985; Boehm 2001, 96–97; Lallot 2015, 874–877.
66
 Apollonius Dyscolus, De syntaxi, III,54. For Apollonius, the middle voice is lo-
cated between the active and the passive forms without converging on either of them.
In this sense, as J. Signes points out, it is very relevant that the neuter voice (οὐδέτερα) –
which does not appear as such in Apollonius – is generally implicit in this definition
(Signes 2016, 75–76).
67
 Apollonius Dyscolus, De syntaxi, III,30.148.157. Cf. Manzano 2010, 89.
68
 According to K. Barwick, Remmius Palaemon used the term significatio, introduced
by Pliny, to refer to the verbal voice in Latin (Barwick 1967, 23). The designation of genus
is attributed to Quintilian, the term affectus, a translation of the Greek διάθεσις, is only
used by Macrobius and Priscian, see Quintilianus, Institutio oratoria, IX,3,7; Macrobius,
Excerpta, I,22; Priscianus, Institutiones grammaticae, VIII,7. Genus and significatio were the
two terms used most often in the Roman grammatical tradition to refer to the verbal voice.
69
 Priscianus, Institutiones grammaticae, XVIII,127–134.
70
 Ibid., XVIII,127; VIII,9. Cf. Manzano 2010, 98–99.
71
 Aristoteles, De interpretatione, 16b6–9.
24 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

This distinction was later assumed by the Megarian dialecticians who

developed and extended it from a linguistic perspective until they dis-
tinguished between “a field” and “having a field”.72 The lack of original
texts and more detailed references prevents us, however, from determin-
ing whether the dialecticians of the late fourth century BC already con-
sidered the oblique case in propositional analysis.
What we do know for certain is that the Stoic philosophers, strong-
ly influenced by the Megarian dialecticians, systematically operated with
the oblique case in the analysis of predicates, and that this marks the ori-
gin of the notion of transitivity in Western linguistic thought. Surviving
testimonies suggest that Stoic logic recognized two types of perfectly
delimited constructions: one consisting of the predicate and the nomi-
native case, and the other also having an oblique case.73
According to Apollonius Dyscolus, the Stoics labelled some active
predicates such as “Trypho loves” or “Trypho harms” as deficient predi­
cates or “less than predicates” (ἔλαττον ἤ κατηγορήματα),74 obviously
because they required the presence of an oblique case to complete their
meaning. Accordingly, one of the definitions of the predicate attribut-
ed to the Stoics by Diogenes Laertius claims that it is “a state of affairs

72
 Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium, 117,12.
73
 See Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII,64: Ἔστι δὲ τὸ κατηγόρημα […]
λεκτὸν ἐλλιπὲς συντακτὸν ὀρθῇ πτώσει πρὸς ἀξιώματος γένεσιν. […] Ὀρθὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστι
τὰ συντασσόμενα μιᾷ τῶν πλαγίων πτώσεων πρὸς κατηγορήματος γένεσιν, οἷον ἀκούει,
ὁρᾷ, διαλέγεται. ὕπτια δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συντασσόμενα τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ, οἷον ἀκούομαι,
ὁρῶμαι. οὐδέτερα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ μηδετέρως ἔχοντα, οἷον φρονεῖ, περιπατεῖ. Therefore, given
that the predicates that join with the nominative case are ὀρθά or οὐδέτερα, the propo-
sition (ἀξίωμα) will or will not have an oblique case, and the construction will be tran-
sitive or intransitive.
74
 Apollonius Dyscolus, De syntaxi, III,155. It should be noted that the distinction
between complete and deficient predicates is not explicitly defined in any of the preserved
Stoic sources. Some of the preserved citations and references reveal, however, that the
philosophers of the Stoa addressed the analysis of predicates from the perspective of the
completeness of the thought (αὐτοτέλεια) and in this way distinguished between predi-
cates that require an oblique case to be complete (deficient predicates > transitivity) and
predicates that are not constructed with oblique cases, since they are autonomous and
complete on their own (complete predicates > intransitivity). As for the analysis of pred-
icates in Stoic logic from distinct perspectives, cf. Luhtala 2000, 95–96.
 C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO W E S T E R N S Y N TA X 25

construed around one or more subjects” (πρᾶγμα συντακτὸν περί τινος

ἢ τινῶν),75 which evidently represents the notion of in/transitivity in
Stoic logic.
The lack of other testimonies is, however, an insurmountable obsta-
cle to knowing more about the opposition of transitivity/intransitivity
in Stoicism. Aspects important from a linguistic point of view – such
as syntactic descriptions or the types of examples used in the analysis –
and the degree of development of the theory remain in the dark.76 In
any case, the fundamental thing is that Stoic logic incorporated, for the
first time, the oblique case in propositional analysis, thus giving rise to
the notion of transitivity and laying the foundations for its subsequent
systematization and development.
In fact, Apollonian syntax is based on two types of central sentences,
the intransitive and the transitive, and both types are defined according
to the parameters established by Stoic logic: completeness of thought
(αὐτοτέλεια) and in/transitive action involving two human participants.77
The innovation of Apollonius Dyscolus with regards to his predecessors
consists in the development of a terminology related to transitivity, while
not yet systemic or specialized: the qualifiers διαβατικός, μεταβατικός
and διαβιβαστικός together with the nouns διάβασις and μετάβασις for
verbs in which the action passes from one person to another, and the
adjectives ἀδιαβίβαστος and ἀμετάβατος – less frequent – for verbs that
do not express any transition.78

75
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII,64.
76
 The intransitive clause occurs with greater frequency and relevance among the
extant examples of Stoic propositions. In other words, the intransitive clause figures as
the standard one in our sources. As A. Luhtala points out, however, the transitive type
could have been equally important although it is less well attested to due to the ten-
dency of our sources to equate the Stoic proposition with the Peripatetic one (Luhtala
2000, 94 and 145).
77
 Apollonius Dyscolus, De syntaxi, III,148.157. Cf. Manzano 2010, 89–90.
78
 Cf. Luhtala 1990, 28–29. The scant use of the adjectives ἀδιαβίβαστος and
ἀμετάβατος betrays the lesser development of intransitive construction in Apolonius
Dyscolus, cf. Luhtala 2000, 187; Manzano 2010, 90–92.
26 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

Four centuries later, Priscian incorporates into Latin grammar the

words transitio, transitivus and intransitivus,79 equivalents of the Greek
Apollonian terminology. And it is the notion of transitivity – human
agents and patients / semantic completeness – which the grammarian
from Caesarea inherits from Apollonius and, ultimately, from Stoic syn-
tax, which will be expanded and adapted in the Latin language. From
there, the transitio of Priscian will mark the development and subsequent
systematization of the category on the old continent.
Finally, the last of the decisive contributions of Stoicism to modern
syntax concerns the category of impersonality. The primary text of ref-
erence in this respect is, once again, the passage by Diogenes Laertius
on the Stoic typology of predicates. Unfortunately, in the section refer-
ring to the impersonal construction, the text is corrupt. At the begin-
ning of the passage, the biographer points out that some of the pred-
icates are “congruities” (συμβάματα), but after this brief note, there is
a gap in the text.80
This lacuna can be complemented, with relative reliability, from other
fragments and later manuals of logic and grammar, among which is, pri-
marily, the Apollonius’ Syntax itself. These citations and references allow
us to reconstruct the examples of συμβάματα predicates (“congruities”)
to which Diogenes Laertius alludes. These would be examples of the
type “Theon walks”, based on the congruence between the nominative

79
 Priscian, unlike Apollonius Dyscolus, used the terms related to transitivity – tran-
sitio, transitivus, transitive, intransitivus, intransitive – quite frequently and systematically
(Priscianus, Institutiones grammaticae, XI,8.9; XIII,22.23.26; XIV,15; XVII,31.116.119.120.
151.153.154; XVIII,5.8.10.34.35.55.64.127.129.137.138, etc.). At times, he used the terms
absolutus/absolute as equivalent counterparts to the terms intransitivus/intransitive (ibid.,
XVII,93; XVIII,34.35.135). Cf. Luhtala 1990, 37–38. In addition, Priscian introduced
a new use of the terms transitivus and intransitivus in his treatise, which has no precedent
in Apollonius Dyscolus, given that the adverbs transitive/intransitive refer, at times, not
to the verb form, but to the very sentence structure in order to designate the “verb and
oblique” and “nominative and verb” relationship in a respective manner. Cf. Luhtala
1990, 37–39. This interpretation of transitivity, focused on the constructio, would come
to form a central element in Medieval grammar, as of the twelfth century.
80
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII,64.
 C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO W E S T E R N S Y N TA X 27

case and the predicate.81 It is also possible to complete the Stoic classi-
fication from passages alluding to the predicates called παρασύμβαματα
(“incongruities”). The παρασυμβάματα are incongruences between the
oblique case and the predicate, exemplified by constructions such as “it
concerns Tryphon” (μέλει Τρύφωνι) or “it repents Socrates” (μεταμέλει
Σωκράτει).82 It seems evident that the συμβάματα/παρασυμβάματα oppo-
sition was already used by the Stoics and provided, in fact, the germ of
the later grammatical distinction between personal and impersonal verbs.
In other words, the grammatical category of impersonality also has its
origin in Stoic philosophy.83
Moreover, the philosophers of the Stoa were not only limited to
identifying and operating with the category of impersonality for the first
time, but they already knew, as it seems from the surviving fragments,
that the infinitive can be the predicable substance of a verb in the third
person singular.84 Along the same line, but of greater significance, is the
fact that the Stoics, in reality, did not consider the possibility of imper-
sonal constructions at the level of the λεκτόν. According to Diogenes
Laertius, as previously mentioned, all propositions (ἀξίωμα) are made up
of a predicate (κατηγόρημα), which is an incomplete λεκτόν, and a nom-
inative case (ὀρθὴ πτώσις).85 The predicates παρασυμβάματα are charac-
terised, however, by the absence of the nominative case and the com-
bination of the predicate with an oblique case: Σωκράτει μεταμέλει (“it
repents Socrates”). The difficulty and contradiction are only apparent.
Although Stoic logic operates, on the language level, with sentences that
lack a name in the nominative case, the subject term (= nominative case)
is in fact present in all prepositions on the deeper level of the λεκτόν.
As R. Gaskin has suggested, in the sentence Σωκράτει μεταμέλει there is

81
 Apollonius Dyscolus, De syntaxi, III,187.
82
 Ibid., III,187.
83
 For further information on the concept of “impersonality” in Stoic philosophy
at a structural and ontological level, see Bronowski 2019, 423–431.
84
 Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, VIII,9,26,4; see Gaskin 1997, 96–97. The con-
sideration of the infinitive as a case (πτώσις) in Stoic logic is not exempt, however, from
doubts and difficulties, cf. Bronowski 2019, 373–377.
85
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, VII,64.
28 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

a nominative case available corresponding to Σωκράτει and acquired by

the equation of this sentence with the sentence Σωκράτης μεταμελείται
(“Socrates repents”).86
In short, on the level of the λεκτόν, two sentences such as Σωκράτει
μεταμέλει (“it repents Socrates”) and Σωκράτης μεταμελείται (“Socrates
repents”) correspond to a single and identical analysis: the subject term
or nominative case (Σωκράτης) + the predicate (μεταμέλειν) > Σωκράτει
μεταμέλει = Σωκράτης μεταμελείται.87 Along this same theoretical line
of suggesting a deeper or more abstract level of analysis, an elliptical
nominative subject will also be assumed as an explanation of an imper-
sonal sentence – although within a different theoretical framework and
methodology – by the later grammatical tradition, and will be one of the
most useful and relevant currents in the development of the category.
In our opinion, Apollonius Dyscolus follows the postulates of Stoicism
in the formulation of his two main theoretical approaches in this field:
the assignment of an infinitive as a direct case to verb forms in the third
person singular such as χρή or δεῖ,88 and the retrieval of an elliptical
nominative (νοουμένη εὐθεῖα) in verbs that will later be called “ethical”
or “of feeling”.89 The same conception is continued and developed in
the Latin grammar of Priscian, who postulates the need to assume an
elliptical nominative that expresses the verbal concept itself in both the
impersonal passive (curritur: cursus)90 and the impersonal active currently
referred to as “ethical”, “of feeling” or “affective” (pudet me tui = pudor
me habet tui).91
In summary, it is evident that the Stoic philosophy had an extraordi-
nary bearing on the development of some of the key notions of Western
syntax: oratio perfecta, verbal systematization (active, passive and neuter

 Gaskin 1997, 95.

86

 Ibid.; cf. Bronowski 2019, 425–426.

87

88
 Apollonius Dyscolus, De syntaxi, III,75–83. Cf. Manzano 2010, 94.
89
 Apollonius Dyscolus, De syntaxi, III,188. Cf. Le Bourdellès 1994, 139; Manza-
no 2010, 95.
90
 Priscianus, Institutiones grammaticae, XVIII,67–68. Cf. Sánchez 1994, 332; Man-
zano 2010, 105.
91
 Priscianus, Institutiones grammaticae, XVIII,59–60. Cf. Manzano 2010, 105.
 C O N T R I B U T I O N S TO W E S T E R N S Y N TA X 29

predicates), the notion of transitivity, and the category of impersonali-

ty. In fact, the later syntactic-grammatical development draws, to a great
extent, on the ideas, reflections and approaches of the Stoic philoso-
phers, without which it would not have been possible.

6. Conclusions

Frequently undervalued and little recognized from a linguistic point of

view, the syntactic ideas and reflections scattered in Greek philosophical
thought from Plato to Chrysippus have a crucial linguistic importance.
Assimilated by the later grammatical tradition, they played a decisive
role in the initial process of configuration of certain key doctrines and
notions of Western syntactic theory. The most important points may
be summarised as follows:
1. Plato, with his division of λόγος into ὄνομα and ῥῆμα, not only ini-
tiates reflection on the completeness or incompleteness of a statement,
but also, by assimilating the logical to the syntactic plane (λόγος: ὄνομα
+ ῥῆμα > sentence: subject + predicate), establishes the basis of contem-
porary sentence division in the specific syntactic functions of subject
and predicate.
2. Aristotle distinguishes, for the first time, the sentences that are now
called “intransitive” and “copulative”, adding the identification of prop-
ositional affirmation and negation. From the opposition between κλῆσις
and πτῶσις – which would probably have a long tradition of practical
grammatical instruction – he also identifies the πτῶσις as a marker of
government and thus makes the first step towards the configuration of
a relation of government. And from his coordinated terms ὑποκείμενον
and κατηγόρημα, later translated into Latin as subiectum and praedicatum,
the words “subject” and “predicate” are directly derived.
3. The dialecticians of the Megarian school adopted pioneering
approaches in syntax that will be developed later. As far as can be inferred
from the scarce fragments, they are the first to recognize the fundamen-
tal syntactic distinction between “a field” and “having a field”, and to
address the study of “propositions” and “predicates”.
30 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

4. Stoic logic is the true origin of Western syntactic theory. Presenting

their syntactic analysis in a philosophical context – the theory of the
λεκτά –, the Stoics are the first to operate with the important concept
of αὐτοτέλεια (linguistic “self-sufficiency”); they are the first to link –
through the typological distinction of “direct”, “reversed” and “neuter”
predicates – the categories of action and undergoing of action to lin-
guistic predication and articulate the prototypical dual “active/passive”
(ὀρθά/ὕπτια) opposition; they are the first to incorporate the oblique
case in propositional analysis and consider the concept of transitivity;
and they are the first to conceive – by means of the distinction between
the συμβάματα (“congruities”) and παρασυμβάματα (“incongruities”)
predicates – the category of impersonality.
Each of these Stoic notions was assimilated by the later grammatical
tradition, Apollonius Dyscolus and Priscian, thus forming the essential
basis for later syntactic development of Western linguistic thought.

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36 V I C TO R I A M A N Z A N O V E N T U R A

Summar y

THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF GREEK

PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT TO WESTERN SYNTAX:
FROM PLATO TO CHRYSIPPEAN LOGIC

Ideas and reflections of a syntactic nature in Greek philosophy have

not been sufficiently highlighted or assessed from a linguistic perspec-
tive due to the philosophical context in which they occur. This article
explores the primary advances and contributions of ancient Greek phi-
losophy – from Plato to Chrysippean logic – in the field of syntax and
reveals the fundamental influence of those achievements on subsequent
syntactic and grammatical development. It illustrates the decisive impor-
tance – often insufficiently recognised – of Greek philosophical thought
for the origins and structuring of basic doctrines, notions and catego-
ries of Western syntax.

Keywords: ancient Greek philosophy; linguistic contributions; Western

syntax

Victoria Manzano Ventura

University of Extremadura
Faculty of Philosophy and Humanities
Department of Ancient Sciences
Avenida de la Universidad, s/n. 10071 Cáceres, Spain
victoriamv@unex.es