A Mexican Dilemma: The Mexico City Ayuntamiento and the Question of Loyalty, 1846-

1848
Author(s): Dennis E. Berge
Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review , May, 1970, Vol. 50, No. 2 (May, 1970),
pp. 229-256
Published by: Duke University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2513025

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 A Mexican Dilemma: The Mexico City
Ayuntamiento and the Question of
Loyalty, 1846-1848

DENNIS E. BERGE*

WL EHEN WAR broke out in 1846 between Mexico and the

United States, many Mexicans received the news with
misgivings, but few could have predicted the chain
of military disasters that followed. The ease with which invading
armies cut to the heart of the country cruelly exposed the weakness
of the national defense and discouraged the most valiant. Mexico
enjoyed many impressive material and human advantages, while the
invading armies were hardly more than bantam-sized and often dan-
gerously exposed. Also the Mexican will to resist remained firm
despite repeated defeats. Soldiers in the field, as well as most civil-
ians, were incensed at the presence of foreign invaders on their soil
and almost frantically eager to eject them.
The major problem-the source of Mexico's weakness and frustra-
tion-was that she lacked a government able to exploit her advantages
and transmute her stubborn will into effective action. Two decades of
revolution and illegitimacy had wrecked her political institutions;
president and congress had lost their capacity to focus and nerve
Mexican resistance. Rough handling had soiled their reputations
and stripped their positions of dignity and authority. A tainted of-
fice, men assumed, automatically tainted the officeholder, and all
government leadership sank into disrepute.
The aversion with which Mexicans viewed governmental activities
extended to the war effort almost from its inception. The first mili-
tary defeats were followed by two successful revolutions within six
months, and these seemed to tear all sense of integrity from govern-
ment direction of the war. Embittered, many men simply withdrew
from public affairs to join the great inert majority of Mexican society.
Others turned for leadership to the community, the Church, or the
political action groups that gave Mexico the semblance of a party
system. In this process the obligations of citizenship became subject
*The author is Associate Professor of History at San Diego State College.

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230 HAHR I MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
to different and sometimes conflicting interpretations. What seemed
patriotism to one Mexican was apt to seem treason to another. In
truth both terms had lost all normal meaning; neither had any neces-
sary relationship to statute law or even to the government. Instead,
each Mexican defined them according to his loyalties within Mexican
society itself.
Residents of the cities that lay in the path of the invasion had to
make an especially difficult choice among courses of action. Here the
price of mistakes was higher than elsewhere, the conflict between pub-
lic and individual self-preservation more distinct, and the fear of
betrayal from above more pronounced. The experiences of such cities
during the first year of the war were universally disheartening. The
Mexican army did not defend El Paso and Chihuahua, and when local
citizens attempted a defense, Alexander Doniphan 's invading Mis-
sourians crushed them. Matamoros and Tampico both contained sub-
stantial army garrisons, but when the enemy approached, these were
withdrawn and the cities laid open to enemy occupation. In Mon-
terrey and Veracruz, to be sure, the army attempted to make a stand.
The residents of both cities suffered through siege and house-to-house
fighting, only to see the army withdraw and leave them also to the
mercies of the invader. In April 1847 Santa Anna was defeated at
Cerro Gordo, trying to halt Winfield Scott's inland march from
Veracruz. He pulled his remaining troops northward through
Puebla, which he abandoned, and began to reorganize his defenses.
When Scott occupied Puebla a week later, the inhabitants received
him with a noticeable absence of hostility, and the Americans estab-
lished what was to remain a secure headquarters and base camp
within the city. Mexicans in other parts of the country severely
criticized Puebla for this cooperation, but the behavior of people and
city officials was so uniform, that their actions took on an anonymous
character. This protected individuals from the sting of the criticism,
and Puebla stayed on the path of order and accommodation.
Once the fate of Puebla had been settled, the most critical phase
of the invasion began, and the focus of the war shifted to Mexico
City. As the American army rested and refitted in Puebla, Mexican
forces gathered south of the capital. All the pressures and tensions
experienced in other war-torn cities now appeared in Mexico City,
heightened, however, by its vital role in national affairs. As else-
where, these pressures affected all segments of society, but in Mexico
City they were focused on the ayuntamiento, the heart of the mu-
nicipal government. Torn between its responsibilities to city and

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 231

nation, the ayuntamiento faced every dilemma produced by the war

and by the uncertainties of Mexican politics.
The ayuntamiento of Mexico City consisted of a twenty-man coun-
cil and a first alcalde-roughly the equivalent of a mayor-who pre-
sided over council meetings and served as the chief administrative
officer of the city. The council had both legislative and administrative
authority, and in normal times it dealt mainly with routine mu-
nicipal affairs-supervision of the local police force, city sanitation,
licensing of business establishments, regulation of water resources,
and the all-important levying and collection of taxes. In the spring
of 1847 the ayuntamiento was controlled by moderados-men com-
mitted to a cautious brand of Mexican liberalism that endorsed fed-
eralism, republican institutions, the elective process, and greater
democratization in Mexican life, but forced to take refuge in
gradualism because of their emotional attachment to the status quo.
The first alcalde, also a moderado, was Manuel Reyes y Veramendi,
who effectively dominated the actions of his council with the close
cooperation of Leandro Estrada, the able ayuntamiento secretary.
The moderado orientation of the ayuntamiento in the spring of
1847 was important, for at the national level a coalition of moderados
and santanistas controlled the government. It was not a comfortable
coalition, but it did create sympathy in the municipal council for at
least the civil arm of the government, where the moderados had most
influence. When Mexico City first came under direct threat by Scott's
army there was consequently some basis for cooperation between
municipal and federal authorities, which depended largely on the
mutual confidence that existed among men with similar ideological
views. On April 11 the ayuntamiento thus authorized the use of
municipal employees for building fortifications around the capital,
indicating its willingness, at this stage, to defend the city.'
The defeat at Cerro Gordo followed shortly, and the federal gov-
ernment then enacted defensive measures of its own. Congress
granted Acting President Pedro Anaya emergency wartime powers,
and on April 26 Anaya outlined the way these powers were to be
used. When a state of siege was declared for any part of Mexico
he authorized military authorities to seize complete control im-

' Memorandum of Castulo Barreda [rough draft], Mexico, D. F., April 12,
1847, in Archivo del Ayuntamiento (hereafter cited as AA), legajo 2266, hoja
142. Jesus Reyes Heroles discusses the attitudes of Mexican politicians toward the
war in his El liberalismo mexicano (Mexico, 1958), II, 375-379, though he over-
emphasizes the inconsistencies found within different segments of the political
spectrum.

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 232 HAHR I MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
mediately and suspend normal personal and property rights. Every
citizen was subject to conscription for work upon fortifications or for
military duty, and those suspected of favoring the enemy were to be
expelled from threatened areas.2 Shortly afterward Anaya authorized
a voluntary national guard, and on May 1, as Puebla succumbed to
occupation, the Federal District was declared to be in a state of
siege.3
These actions seemed to indicate a gradually stiffening will to
resist, but this was deceptive. In spite of Anayays actions a growing
spirit of distrust and uneasiness spread throughout the capital and
affected the moderados strongly. Rumors persisted that Santa Anna
intended to return to Mexico City and assume the office of the presi-
dency-which was legally his-in order to establish a military dic-
tatorship, and since many believed these rumors, the federal legisla-
ture drifted into helpless inaction.
Then, on May 18, Santa Anna returned to the capital. The tempo
of events quickened as a natural response to his energies, but the
anticipated move to establish a dictatorship did not take place.4 In-
stead he even lifted censorship from the city's press for a time, but
when newspapers began to discuss defensive preparations within the
city he reimposed the censorship more strictly than before.5 Santa
Anna then levied a special forced contribution of one million pesos
on the Mexican public, and he gave new impetus to the work upon
fortifications around the capital, which had apparently progressed
very slowly during the weeks before his return.6 The ayuntamiento,
which had remained in the shadows since its actions on April 11, was
then forced into an open position.
The ayuntamiento's response to increased defensive preparations
took the form of a letter dated June 2, 1847, signed by the members
of the council and addressed to the Ministerio de Relaciones Ex-
2 Bando de Ignacio Trigueros, Mexico, D. F., April 28, 1847, in AA, legajo
2265, expedient 21.
'Bando de Ignacio Trigueros, Mexico D. F., May 1, 1847, in AA, legajo 2265,
expedient 21; El Republicano (Mexico), May 2, 1847.
'For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding Santa Anna 's return to
Mexico City see Jos6 F. Ramirez, Mexico During the War with the United
States (Columbia, Missouri, 1950), 144-146.
'Bando de Ignacio Trigueros, Mexico, D. F., May 21, 1847; Bando de Jos6
Ignacio Gutierrez, Mexico, D. F., June 8, 1847; in AA, legajo 2265, expedient 21.
The new censorship decree warned that any person publishing information about
the defenses of the city would be treated as a spy.
6 The quota for the Federal District was fixed at 292,800 pesos; see Bando
de Jose Ignacio Gutierrez, Mexico, D. F., June 19, 1847, in AA, legajo 2264,
expediente 4.

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 233

teriores y Gobernacion.7 In this letter they protested against siege

preparations, on the grounds that Mexico City was indefensible-a
reversal of their earlier willingness to fortify the capital. While the
letter suggested growing uneasiness at the prospect of a fight for the
city, it indicated rejection of government leadership in the coming
crisis-primarily because Santa Anna had taken control away from
the moderados.
But the government refused to condone this rejection. On
June 7 the Secretary of War, Lino Alcorta, replied sharply to the
letter, denouncing the council for its unwillingness to defend the
capital. He declared that it was impossible for the government to
alter its plans to defend Mexico City, and that work upon fortifica-
tions would continue.8 It did continue, and the government was ap-
parently displeased with the support received by the ayuntamiento,
for on June 28 it again declared Mexico City to be in a " vigor-
ous state of siege, " and placed the entire Federal District un-
der complete military control.9 On protests from the ayuntamiento
the government returned limited jurisdiction to civil authorities with
a clear understanding that they must bow to the orders of military
authorities.10 During the following weeks tensions gradually mounted
as the day of Scott's approach grew near, and the ayuntamiento found
itself besieged with daily requisitions for laborers, carpenters, wagons,
and dray horses to aid in the construction of defensive positions.
The military imposed press censorship in a new and stricter form on
July 11, suspending all metropolitan newspapers except El Diario
del Gobierno.)' Price controls were also imposed on foodstuffs to
curb the effects of hoarding, profiteering, and the diminishing flow
of farm products into the city. As the situation became more tense
many families began to leave Mexico City.12
After the first of August General Scott, concluding a series of
futile armistice proposals to the Mexican government, began his
movement toward the capital. The tempo of activity on the city's bar-

I Manuel Reyes y Veramendi et al. to Ministro de Relaciones y Gobernaci6n,

Mexico, D. F., June 2, 1847, in Archivo Hist6rico Militar (hereafter cited as
AHM), expedient 2749, hojas 4-7.
'Lino Alcorta to Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Gobernaci6n [copy],
Mexico, D. F., June 7, 1847, in ARM, expedient 2749, hojas 8-11.
9 Proclamation of Jose Ignacio Gutierrez, Mexico, D. F., June 29, 1847, in AA,
legajo 2265, expedient 24.
10 Manuel Maria Lombardini to First Alcalde del Ayuntamiento de Mexico,
Mexico, D. F., June 30, 1847, in AA, legajo 2265, expedient 24.
"' Proclamation of Manuel Maria Lombardini, Mexico, D. F., July 17, 1847,
in AA, legajo 2265, expedient 21.
2 Ibid.; Guillermo Prieto, Memorias de mis tiempos (Mexico, 1958),

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 234 HAHR I MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
ricades then increased noticeably; military requisitions for laborers,
which had averaged from two to three hundred men a day, climbed
rapidly to seven hundred, and then still higher. By August 10 over
one thousand civilian workers labored on the gates, the causeways,
the Castle of Chapultepec, and other natural defensive positions
around the city.13 The ayuntamiento also attempted to secure hos-
pital facilities for the influx of wounded expected from the forth-
coming battles, but it received scant encouragement from private
and charity hospitals, which claimed to be already overflowing.'4
Between August 18 and 20 Scott's advancing army defeated the
Mexicans twice, at Padierna and Churubusco. Santa Anna then
agreed to an armistice to discuss peace terms, but he could not agree
to the severe demands of the Americans, and on September 7 the
armistice was ended. Scott then moved upon the city 's defenses.
Molino del Rey fell on September 8, and on September 13 he captured
the Castle of Chapultepec. From there he moved swiftly across two
causeways leading into the capital, and before darkness fell on the
13th he was in the outskirts of the city.
The seeming ease with which Scott invested Chapultepec, and the
suddenness of his descent from there into the city, created near panic
conditions. The streets were filled with broken and wandering rem-
nants of a beaten army mixed with frightened civilians, many bent
only on escaping the enemy. As evening fell, amid the rattle of mus-
ket fire and the boom of cannons from the garitas, two separate groups
met to decide the fate of the capital. The first was Santa Anna and
his major military commanders, the second the ayuntamiento of
Mexico City. Santa Anna had first to decide whether to make a
block-by-block defense of the capital, which would necessarily entail
great damage to the city itself, or to abandon it to Scott. No one
really believed in the possibility of driving the Americans from the
city, for the army was disorganized and its morale badly shaken after
its latest reverses. In addition, the populace of Mexico City, as well
as the members of the ayuntamiento, had seemed lethargic and un-
cooperative in all efforts to defend the city. The combination of cir-
cumstances induced Santa Anna to abandon the capital without
further delay. It was one of the most fateful decisions of the war.
The army carried out this decision immediately, and by one in
the morning of September 14 most of the soldiers were on the move
1 Correspondence relating to military requisitions and siege preparations can
be found in AA, legajo 2264, expedient 10.
14 Manuel Andrade to Ayuntamiento de Mexico, Mexico, D. F., August 13,
1847, in AA, legajo 2265, expedient 17.

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 235

to the nearby village of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The departure of the

troops while the city was under siege raised the danger of anarchy,
for even as Santa Anna's soldiers began their withdrawal, looting
broke out in the central area.
The ayuntamiento held the second of the important meetings on
the night of the 13th, and, forewarned of the military evacuation,
made a hard decision of its own. Shortly before midnight it appointed
a committee of three to approach General Scott and arrange for the
surrender of the city. The committee was instructed to insist on cer-
tain terms, particularly the exclusion of counterguerrillas from Mex-
ico City and protection of public and Church property.'5 Scott re-
fused to negotiate surrender terms, however, and sent a stiff note to
the council stating that some people within the city were still firing
on his troops. If the firing did not halt within an hour, he warned,
he would treat the city as if it had been taken by assault-in other
words, it would be sacked. This threat was enough for the ayunta-
miento, and though it was already well past midnight, cease-fire
orders were immediately circulated throughout the capital.'6
The morning of September 14 dawned over an uneasy city. De-
spite the ayuntamiento's cease-fire orders, the sound of sporadic gun-
fire indicated that some citizens and stray soldiers had not given up
the fight. The worried council dispatched a letter to Scott disclaiming
all responsibility for the firing and requesting an early meeting with
him, as soon-the note said-as he had rested.'7 Scott ignored any
touch of graciousness, however, as long as Mexicans were still firing
at his troops and bluntly informed the ayuntamiento that he would
turn his artillery on every building that he suspected of harboring
even a single sniper. The ayuntamiento quickly issued another
proclamation exhorting the inhabitants of the capital to give up their
resistance. "While Mexicans were able to fight," the proclamation
read, "they fought nobly. And when fortune deserted us, when the
army abandoned the capital, it became clear that further hostilities
on our part, instead of helping the country, would be imprudent, and
even censurable under these circumstances. Leave to the nation,
then, affairs that concern it and it alone. 'The duty of the unarmed
16 Secretaria del Ayuntamiento de Mexico to E. S. Gral. en Gefe del Ejercito
Norte Americano, Mexico, D. F., September 13, 1847, in AA, legajo 2265, ex-
pediente 17. The counter-guerrillas were Mexican nationals hired by Scott to
fight guerrillas, and were despised by most Mexicans.
16 Memorandum of Leandro Estrada, Mexico, D. F., September 14, 1847, in
AA, legajo 2265, expedient 25.
'" Ayuntamiento de M6xico to Gral. Winfield Scott [rough draft], M6xico,
D. F., September 14, 1847, in AA, legajo 2265, expedient 25.

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 236 HAIM I MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
inhabitants of the capital is to conduct themselves in a moderate and
peaceful manner. "e18
With the support of the ayuntamiento assured, Scott began to
move into the city. Snipers continued to fire at his troops, and he
kept his promise to return fire with artillery. His cannon, together
with the appeal of the ayuntamiento, soon brought even scattered
resistance to an end. Meanwhile, refugees erroneously informed
Santa Anna that the resistance against Scott amounted to a mass up-
rising. Abandoning a march toward the American supply base at
Puebla, he headed for the capital again, hoping to find Scott be-
leaguered and ready for the kill. When he reached the Garita de
Peralvillo in the city's edge, he learned otherwise.19 Disheartened
and embittered at the role of the ayuntamiento, he turned his army
once again from the city, but before he left, he drafted a blunt letter
to Manuel Reyes y Veramendi :20

I have just been presented a poster written by yourself, [wrote Santa Annaj
which has been posted on the street corners, prohibiting the people from
combatting the barbarous enemy that is now plundering the populace and
temples, and violating our women. As such conduct is unworthy of a Mexi-
can, I warn you on behalf of the nation that if you repeat your offense
with a similar act I shall deal with you as a traitor. I shall do the same
with the individuals that make up the ayuntamiento if they help in any
way to dampen the enthusiasm of Mexican citizens who are rightly defending
their homes, their children, and their wives.

Santa Anna concluded by warning Veramendi to dissolve his

council rather than furnish supplies to the Americans. Veramendi
was shocked and surprised at Santa Anna 's rebuke, which he re-
garded as "no less cruel than unmerited. "21 He drafted an immedi-
ate response, protesting the purity of his motives and calling atten-

18 Three different versions of the ayuntamiento 's proclamation were issued;

copies of them can be found in AA, legajo 2265, expedient 25, hojas 133-135.
19 Ram6n Alcaraz et al. (eds.), Apuntes para la historia de la guerra entre
Mexico y los Estados-Unidos (M6xico, D. F., 1848), 339; Jose Maria Roa Barcena,.
Recuerdos de la invasion norte-americana (M6xico, 1947), III, 142-143.
20Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna to Manuel Reyes y Veramendi, Guadalupe,.
September 15, 1847, in AA, legajo 2268, hoja 136. Santa Anna published the
exchange of letters between himself and Veramendi, omitting Veramendi's letter
of September 16 (see fn. 24), in his Detalle de las operaciones ocurridas en 1a:
defensa de la capital de la repfbTlica, atacada por el ejercito de los Estados-
Unidos del Norte, en el anlo de 1847 (Mexico, 1848), 42-50. Santa Anna's second
letter in the exchange (see fn. 23) was also published in the Hispanic American.
Historical Review, XXIV (November 1944), 614-617, with an introduction and
commentary by Robert S. Chamberlain.
a' Manuel Reyes y Veramendi to Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna [copy], Mexico
D. F., September 15, 1847, in AA, legajo 2268, hojas 143-144.

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 237

tion to his long service to his country. His proclamation, he insisted,

as well as the rest of his conduct had "neither sprung, nor could it
spring, from any origin than to spare the innocent people of this
capital the disasters, the sorrow, the weeping, and the desolation to
which it has been cruelly condemned. "22 Veramendi noted that no
requests for aid or supplies had yet been received from Scott's head-
quarters, but "if they do you need not doubt that I shall bear closely
in mind my duty to my country and my duty to myself." He closed
his letter by threatening to resign his office because of Santa Anna's
rebuke, while continuing privately to "deplore the painful and dan-
gerous situation into which the heroic nation . . . has been led."
The slur on his own leadership did not escape Santa Anna, and
he initiated a second exchange of letters in which the lines of division
between the two men were even more clearly drawn. Santa Anna
again condemned Veramendi for the " shameful " and " reprehensible "
nature of his " antipatriotic proclamation, " charging that only
cowardice or loss of reason could have prompted a man to take such
action. He also reacted strongly to Veramendi's complaint of hav-
ing been abandoned, and rose in defense of the army :23

After your reprehensible conduct you try to blame the army for abandoning
the capital, when it is well known that it fought hand to hand for fifteen
straight hours, defending it with the sacrifice of a great part of its strength,
and if it did evacuate it had powerful reasons for doing so, as you should
well know.

Santa Anna's position was thus clearly defined. The actions of

Veramendi and the ayuntamiento in easing Scott 's entry into the
city had been shameful, if not treasonous; circumstances had not
warranted cooperation; and its continuance would bring severe
repercussions for the members of the city's ruling body. Veramendi
was unwilling to accept this interpretation, however, and he attempted
to place the actions of the ayuntamiento in perspective :24

In simple response to your criticism I must tell you that the ayuntamiento
and I receive pleasure and honor in being Mexicans, Mexicans who believe
sincerely in the protection of the sacred treasures of our unforutnate coun-
try. We would never, much less in these times, have soiled ourselves with
the slightest action carrying the connotation of humiliation or disgrace, to
say nothing of treason. Nor shall we soil ourselves, no matter what dangers
22 Ibid.

2Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna to Manuel Reyes y Veramendi, Guadalupe,

September 15, 1847, in AA, legajo 2268, hojas 145-146.
2' Manuel Reyes y Veramendi to Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna [copy], M6xico,
D. F., September 16, 1847, in AA, legajo 2268, hojas 147-148.

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 238 HAHR I MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
we face. We are not ignorant of our duties as Mexicans and as public of-
ficials, and nothing shall stop us from fulfilling them. We shall adopt
measures which are in the interests of this populace, which has been led
through ill-fortune into its suffering, whenever it is within our power to do
so. And if the error to which we are susceptible as mere men, if loss of
reason or cowardice cause us to fail in our duties, we shall submit our actions
at the proper time so that competent legal authority, and the severe tribunal
of public opinion can pronounce the inevitable judgment which we earn.

Veramendi's second letter to Santa Anna ended the dialogue, for

on September 16 Santa Anna abandoned his plans for returning to
the capital and turned again toward Puebla. At the same time he
announced his resignation as president of Mexico. Already, on Sep-
tember 7, he had provided that if he were captured the presidency
would devolve upon his constitutional successor, the president of the
Supreme Court, Manuel de la Pefia y Pefia. Now, discouraged by de-
feat and anxious to lighten his burdens, he formally transferred
executive power to this man.25
In effect, Santa Anna was turning his civil authority over to the
moderados to make of it what they could, but the federal govern-
ment had in most respects virtually ceased to exist. Pefia y Penfa
established a headquarters of sorts in Toluca and began the task
of reorganization. Working on the assumption that the various
state governments in Mexico were still operating effectively, he
appealed to the governors to send representatives to the city of
Queretaro, where he intended to convene the national congress and
establish a temporary capital.26 Through these efforts deputies were
gradually induced to come to Queretaro, though it took more than a
month to establish a congressional quorum.
The members of the ayuntamiento had good reason to be relieved
by the transfer of the presidency, for not only did this neutralize
the threat posed by Santa Anna, but it enabled them to work closely
again with their fellow moderados in directing national policy. In
the meantime, the occupation of the capital was producing problems
of its own. Reports that gangs of hoodlums were terrorizing sections
of the city increased the ayuntamiento's anxiety to restore law and
order, but to do so would require further cooperation with the Ameri-
cans.27 The council struck up a working relationship with the office
25 See Manuel de la Pefia y Pelia, Colecci6n de los docurmentos mas importantes
relatives a la instalaci6n y reconocimento del gobierno provisional del Ecsmo.
Sr. Presidente de la Suprema Corte de Justicia (Mexico, 1847), 4-5.
26 Ibid., 10-12.

27 On September 15 residents of the barrio of Santa Anna, for instance, com

plained to the ayuntamiento that a "multitude of criminals" who "have neither

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 239

of General John Quitman, whom General Scott had appointed mili-

tary governor in the capital, and however friendless the arrangement,
it proved effective in bringing the city under control. Scott's troops
gradually spread throughout the city, taking quarters for the most
part in public buildings. When they expostulated at the sight of
rocks and other missiles piled on the roofs of several dwellings for
obviously hostile use, the ayuntamiento ordered the objects removed
at once.28 A friar named Celedonio Domeco de Jarauta had emerged
as a hero in the street fighting against Scott; mounted on a charger
and alternately brandishing flag and lance he led the residents of the
barrios of Santa Catarina and Santa Ana in spirited attacks against
the Americans.29 The ayuntamiento promptly protested to the office
of the archbishop and asked church authorities to discourage further
fighting.30 Gradually all open resistance to the Americans came to
an end, and public order was marred only by random acts of violence
by Mexicans or occupation troops.
With the return of public order the ayuntamiento achieved a ma-
jor objective. An urban police force working in concert with the
American military police once more patrolled the city, and civil and
criminal courts resumed their functions, broadening their jurisdiction
to all matters not deemed to be "political cases" or involving Ameri-
can military personnel. Meanwhile the government of the Federal
District had ceased to exist, for its officials fled with Santa Anna's
army. The ayuntamiento moved in to fill the void and put the entire
District under its control.3'

love for country nor love of order" had taken advantage of turbulent conditions
to embark on a campaign of robbery and murder against the "honored families"
of the neighborhood. See AA, legajo 2265, expedient 25.
28 See George Davis to Manuel Reyes y Veramendi, Mexico, D. F., Septem-
ber 17, 1847, and a circular issued by the ayuntamiento on the same date in AA,
legajo 2265, expedient 25.
29 Antonio Garcia Cubas, El libro de mis recuerdos (Mexico, 1960), 573-574.
Shortly after this incident Father Jarauta left Mexico City to lead a group of
guerrillas against the Americans. In July 1848, he joined Mariano Paredes y
Arrillaga in an attempted revolution against the Queretaro government because
of its willingness to sign a peace treaty with the United States. Captured in
Guanajuato on July 18, Jarauta was immediately executed. See Jose Ram6n
Malo, Diario de sucesos notables (Mexico, n.d.), I, 338.
30 Manuel Reyes y Veramendi to Capitular Vicar of the Archbishopric of
Mexico [rough draft], Mexico, D. F., September 19, 1847, in AA, legajo 2265,
expedient 28.
21 The Federal District consisted of the City of Mexico and surrounding terri-
tory, including the villages of Tacubaya, Chapultepec, Santa Fe, Tacuba, Guada-
lupe, Azeapotzalco, Los Reyes, San Angel, Mixocac, and Mexicalingo. Its normal
relationship to the capital was analogous to the relationship between a Mexican
state and a city within that state.

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 240 HAH MAY I DENNIS E. ]BERGE
A particularly difficult problem was the collection of taxes in the
absence of the federal government, for it was compounded by two
special demands which Scott made upon the ayuntamiento. The first
was that the city assume responsibility for feeding the three thou-
sand Mexicans whom he had taken prisoner in recent battles; the
second was that the council make a $150,000 "contribution" to the
American army for the purchase of supplies, care of wounded soldiers
and "other necessary military purposes. " 32 In order that the
ayuntamiento might be able to honor these demands, Scott authorized
it to assume all tax collecting powers within the city, including those
formerly held by the federal government. The city took over the
federal tobacco monopoly and the mail revenues, and it reinstituted
the unpopular alcabalas-the internal customs levied largely on farm
produce at the city gates on its way to market.33 Even these measures
did not produce the $150,000 quickly enough to suit Scott, and the
ayuntamiento was forced to borrow the money privately. The price
of poverty ran high, for in addition to pledging repayment from
future tax returns, the city was forced to pay a commission of fifteen
percent to the money lenders.34
Scott's severe demands upon the ayuntamiento cut short any hope
that the two authorities might submerge their differences in a spirit
of free cooperation. The primary purpose of the ayuntamiento
was to insure the safety of the city, and though it acceded to Scott's
financial demands it became recalcitrant when this safety was
threatened. As early as October 5 signs of friction began to appear.
The newspaper El Monitor Republicano reported several "outrages"
committed against Mexicans by American patrols or individual
soldiers, and when the American military authorities threatened to
punish the newspaper for libelous actions they learned that the re-
ports were based on police reports supplied by the ayuntamiento.
The North American, an English-language occupation newspaper,
subsequently observed that " things look a little squally for the
Seflor Reyis [sic] Veramendi and his Secretary. "35 Relations be-
tween the avuntamiento and the occupation authorities grew even

32 Lt. Col. Ethan A. Hitchcock to Ayuntamiento de Mexico, Mexico, D.

September 16, 1847 and Memorandum of Leandro Estrada, Mexico, D. F., Sep-
tember 16, 1847, in AA, legajo 2265, expedient 28 and legajo 2268, hoja 218.
" Proclamation of the Office of the Civil and Military Governor [J. A. Quit-
man], Mexico, D. F., September 22, 1847, in AA, legajo 2268, hoja 218.
"' Alejandro Berrange and J. M. Lozqueti to Ayuntamiento de Mexico, Me-
xico, D. F., September 25, 1847 and Memorandum to Leandro Estrada, Mexico,
D. F., September 25, 1847, in AA, legajo 2268, hojas 221-222.
" The North American (Mexico), October 15, 1847.

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 241

cooler during the following two months, as the city administration

increased its opposition to Scott's demands.
One factor that influenced the actions of the ayuntamiento during
October and November was the gradual re-establishment of the federal
government at Queretaro under the control of moderados. Pefia y
Pefia and his cabinet, convinced that it would be foolhardy to con-
tinue the war, were determined to sign a peace treaty quickly under
as favorable terms as possible.36 As the ayuntamiento found the di-
rection of national interests in the hands of men it could trust, it
became more willing to accept temporary hardship that might
strengthen Pena y Pen-a's bargaining position. A general stiffening
became noticeable in the attitude and actions of the ayuntamiento. It
took an interest in Mexican officers still in the city and gave money to
several of them-which The North American claimed enabled the of-
ficers to rejoin the army-and clashed with the military government
over other Mexican officers still held prisoner.37
The increased independence of the ayuntamiento provoked corre-
sponding hostility on the part of the Americans, first in the occupa-
tion press, and then in the actions of the military government. Two
English-language newspapers had been established in the capital by
journalists following Scott's army, The North American and Daily
American Star. The North American, edited by William A. Peoples,
began to complain about the ayuntamiento around the first of No-
vember, attacking the council's support of Mexican army officers and
its alleged laxness in the upkeep of city streets and the Alameda.38
The newspaper also questioned the way in which the ayuntamiento
dispensed the tax revenues which it had inherited from the federal
government. Once raised, the question of taxation quickly became a
major issue.39 The alcabala was especially unpopular among the
urban poor, on whom it weighed heavily, and among peasants carrying
their produce to market. The extreme liberals in Mexico City-the
"8 Luis de la Rosa, "Exposici6n con que el Ministro de Relaciones presenta al
Congreso Nacional el tratado de paz celebrado entre Mexico y los Estados-Unidos
de America," in Mexico, Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores, Alqgunos documents
sobre el tratado de Guadalupe y la situacion de Mexico durante la invasion
americana (Mexico, 1930), 174.
8 Note of Manuel Reyes y Veramendi to Ayuntamiento, Mexico, D. F., Oc-
tober 25, 1847, in AA, legajo 2264, expedient 1. See also The North American,
October 29, 1847 and the Daily American Star (Mexico), November 4,
1847.
38 The North American, October 29, November 9, 1847.
" As early as November 5th the ayuntamiento was forced to declare its will-
ingness to make a public accounting of its funds. See The North American, No-
vember 5, 1847.

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 242 1HAHR I MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
puros-opposed this tax because it discriminated against the lower
classes, but the less egalitarian ayuntamiento saw in it mainly an im-
portant source of revenue. This difference of opinion on a single
measure exemplified the more general division between moderados and
puros when it came to the practical task of governing.
The Americans now intervened in what would ordinarily have
been a purely domestic issue. On December 17 The North American
endorsed the views of a Mexican "study group" which attacked the
alcabalas as vicious and also accused the ayuntamiento of influencing
municipal court justices to prejudice their decisions against any
Mexican known to have had friendly dealings with the Americans.40
At the same time, General Scott intervened in the taxation issue by
prohibiting the collection of alcabalas after January 1.41 By this
time, the ayuntamiento had other problems besides the collection of
alcabalas and was fighting for its own existence. Scott's decision on
the taxation issue was but part of a general move against the coun-
cil, and he had already decided upon its removal, to judge from his
other actions.
According to a law of July 14, 1830, elections for the ayuntamiento
were to be held each December. Residents of the capital speculated
whether the elections would actually be held in 1847, for the suspen-
sion of federal authority and the imposition of martial law by the
Americans clearly created a special situation, and there was room for
argument that the normal elective process should be suspended
until after the occupation had ended. There were two other im-
portant reasons for suspending the elections. The personnel of the
ayuntamiento seemed to have gained a following in Mexico City for
their growing independence from the Americans, but their enforced
cooperation with Scott in some areas had also created enemies.42 A
well-organized puro group, led by the able Francisco Suarez Iriarte,
promised hot opposition in the elections. In short, the re-election of
the existing ayuntamiento was not a certainty.
In Queretaro, where Pedro Anaya had been elected interim presi-
dent to succeed Pefia y Pefia, this fact also became evident, and the
moderado government did not want to see the ayuntamiento replaced.
Consequently Anaya decreed on November 26 that "at no point in the
Republic in possession of the enemy shall elections of any kind be
held. " He added that "at those places in which . . . elections are
cancelled, the present authorities will continue in the discharge of

40 The North American, December 17, 1847.

41 Ibid.
42 Roa Bdrcena, Recuerdos de la invasion norte-americana, III, 205.

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 243

their functions until circumstances shall permit the election to go on

in conformity with the laws."43 In Mexico City The North Ameri-
can scorned Anaya 's order: "Now if it should happen that the
Yankees take upon themselves to order this election," it conjectured,
"what will become of this proclamation? We tremble for it."44
Despite the likelihood of American opposition, the ayuntamiento
canceled the forthcoming elections on December 1.45 At the same
time it notified Scott that the reason for the cancellation was not
Anaya 's decree but fear that the elections would lead to public
disorder and violence.46 Unfortunately for the ayuntamiento, it had
misjudged its timing, for it was in the midst of another major con-
troversy. Near the beginning of October a contingent of 4000 Ameri-
can troops had left Veracruz under General Robert Patterson to re-
inforce Scott in the capital, and Scott had asked the ayuntamiento
for a list of public buildings to house the additional soldiers. The
ayuntamiento complied on November 26, but the list included either
buildings that were already occupied by Scott's own troops or that
were, according to the Daily American Star, unfit for habitation.47
This apparent lack of cooperation on the part of the ayuntamiento,
following its other controversies, tipped the scales against it. On De-
cember 10 Military Governor Persifor Smith announced that "any
decree of the Mexican General Government, affecting or modifying
the political rights of those living in the territory occupied by the
American Army, is null," and added that any attempt to enforce the
decree would be punished. " The people of the city of Mexico, " Smith
warned, "have the right to make their municipal elections without
any interruption. " 48
The actions of the military government forced the ayuntamiento
into a new and more difficult position and allowed the puro organi-
zation to seize the initiative. The Election Law of 1830 provided for
the indirect election of ayuntamiento members, and Veramendi had
originally fixed December 5 as the date for the selection of electors by
the general public. When he decided to cancel the elections the puros
went ahead with their campaign. According to their leader, they
polled "hundreds of people in every one of the city's districts" to
"Daily American Star, December 2, 1847.
4 The North American, December 3, 1847.
" Daily American Star, December 11, 1847.
" Roa Bdrcena, Recuerdos de la invasion norte-americana, III, 206.
" Daily American Star, December 11, 1847.
48 Ibid. Smith became military governor in November when Quitman re-
turned to the United States.

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 244 HAHM MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
produce a list of 117 secondary electors.49 These electors met for the
first time on December 12, set December 19 for the election of the
ayuntamiento, and chose a man to preside over them. Their choice
was Francisco Suhrez Iriarte, a puro statesman from Toluca who
was technically still a member of the Chamber of Deputies, al-
though he had remained in Mexico City. In his new position Suarez
Iriarte at once became acknowledged leader of the move to install
a new ayuntamiento.
Manuel Veramendi and his council moved with haste and some
awkwardness to thwart the puros. On December 11 the ayuntamiento
reversed its position on the elections. 'Two days later it gave public
notice that because of Scott's order primary elections would be held
on December 19-the same day the puros were holding their own
secondary elections. The ayuntamiento scheduled its own secondary
elections (i.e., for moderado candidates) on December 26.50 It also
notified Scott's headquarters of the elections, and on December 17
Veramendi asked General Smith for heavy patrols on the 19th, for he
feared that "various turbulent persons" might try to impede his
elections.51 Veramendi also appealed to the Second Criminal Court
in Mexico City for an indictment of Suarez Iriarte and his followers
on charges of violating Anaya's decree of November 26, disobeying
"supreme and superior authorities," and being "the authors of a
popular insurrection."
The decision of the court, handed down on December 13, was a
severe setback to the ayuntamiento. The court first declared that the
decree of November 26 had not been widely enough publicized in Mex-
ico City to be considered promulgated, "nor could it in any case bind
its inhabitants, finding themselves occupied, as they do, by enemy
forces." Citing Reinoso and Vattel as authorities, the judge declared
that because the people of Mexico City had lost the protection and sup-
port of their government the ties that bound them to this body had
been dissolved, so that it was questionable whether the puros had vio-
lated a properly constituted law. He concluded that it would be impos-
49 Francisco Suarez Iriate, Defensa pronunciada ante el gran jurado el 21 de
marzo de 1850, por Francisco Sudrez Iriarte, acusado en 8 de agosto de 1848 por
el Secretaria de Relaciones en aquella fecha, de los crimenes de sedici6n contra
el Gobierno de Queretaro e infidencia contra la patria en sus actos como president
de la asamblea municipal de la Cuidad y Distrito de Mexico (Mexico, 1850), 11.
Veramendi, however, claimed that the list of electors was actually drawn up by
a group of six men. See El Monitor Repu~blicano (Mexico), December 20, 1847.
50 Proclamation of Manuel Reyes y Veramendi, M6xico, D. F., September 13,
1847, in Suarez Iriarte, Defensa, 61-62.
C1 El Monitor Rephblicano, December 19, 1847.

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 245

sible to prosecute them "when no one knows, as I have said, that there
was actually and in fact a crime, and the place, day, and hour in
which it was committed. 2 's2
Though the court's logic contained some flaws, its decision all but
ended the hopes of the moderado ayuntamiento for successfully
prosecuting its own elections. On November 19 the council persisted
in holding its futile primary elections; on the same day the puro
electors, with the obvious support of the Americans, chose their own
ayuntamiento. The Veramendi council then made its last desperate
move, a bitter note to the office of the American military governor,
which it also released to El Monitor Republicano. In this letter it
denounced the Americans for acts of violence committed during the
occupation-forcefully occupying Mexican homes, destroying prop-
erty, and killing Mexican civilians. The ayuntamiento also protested
the puro election and appealed to General Smith not to permit "the
illegal enthronement of these demagogues without country, without
conscience, and without honor.... .. 53
Anyone might have predicted the American reaction to the
ayuntamiento's action. On December 23 Smith notified the council
that its reference to the American occupation was highly offensive,
particularly since it had released the letter at the same time to El
Monitor Republicano. He demanded that the ayuntamiento publish a
retraction and apology in the same newspaper on the morning of
December 24. When it refused, Smith wrote that "the bad faith
and improper conduct of the present ayuntamiento have made them
agents unworthy of administrating the affairs of their fellow citi-
zens.... I now declare that their functions cease from this moment. " '55
This was the end of the struggle for the moderado ayuntamiento,
and its members passed from the immediate scene, perhaps with
sighs of relief. For eight months they had groped their way through
the threat of siege and the reality of enemy occupation, searching
for a course of action that would keep their city-and perhaps its
social order-intact, without injuring ill-defined national interests.
The rise of moderados to power in the national government following
Santa Anna's resignation had seemed to promise a working arrange-
ment, for while the Queretaro government was admittedly moving
52 Decision of Second Criminal Court, Mexico, D. F., December 13, 1847, i
Sualrez Iriarte, Defensa, 62-64.
" El Monitor Republicano, December 20, 1847.
" The North American, December 28, 1847.
"Persifor Smith to Ayuntamiento, Mexico, D. F., 1847, in Su'rez Iriarte,
Defensa, 65; The North American, December 28, 1847.

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 246 HAHR I MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
toward peace negotiations, subordinate agencies of government might
strengthen its hand by using firmness toward the Americans. Any
difficulties created for individual Mexicans would be tempered by
the knowledge that a peace treaty might soon be signed, and the ordeal
ended.
By the time Smith dissolved the ayuntamiento in December, Santa
Anna 's treason charges of September had receded safely into the
background, and, particularly outside Mexico City, the Veramendi
council had won the reputation of being patriotic. Guadalajara
honored Veramendi by choosing him as deputy in congressional elec-
tions then being held, and the official newspaper of the Queretaro
government praised him for his services to the country.56 More re-
wards were to come.
The dissolution of the moderado ayuntamiento cleared the stage
for a different cast, provided by the puro electors. Their meeting of
December 19 resulted in the choice of Francisco Suarez Iriarte as
first alcalde, and with him a council of twenty-one members.57 This
group took office on December 24, endorsed by the American mili-
tary governor. A strong indication of its policies was a program
which its electors adopted on December 17. "The District has all
the ingredients for a perfect body politic," they declared. All it
needed was "a social organization adopted to the century in which
we live" and a simple honest system of government.58 With the
Queretaro government apparently helpless, "the solemn moment is
not far from coming when the [national] authorities will announce
that it is every man for himself." Accordingly, the electors instructed
the ayuntamiento that it must assume control of domestic affairs "to
preserve the independence of its [Mexico's] internal administration."
If this happened, a "new confederation" would give Mexico a posi-
tion of respect among nations and establish "peace, order, prosperity,
and freedom of thought and conscience at home."
What the electors really had in mind as the ayuntamiento 's
actions soon confirmed-was a highly decentralized state in which
6 Los Debates (Queretaro), February 26, 1847.
7 The men chosen to be alcaldes were Antonio Garay, Tiburcio Canlas, Anselmo
Zurutazo, Miguel Lerdo, Agustin Jauregui, Ramon Aguilera, and Justo Maredo;
as regidores, Jose Maria Arteaga, Adolfo Hegewish, Manuel Garcia Rejon,
Federico Hube, Juan Palacios, Leodoro Ducoing, Cayetano Salazar, Enrique
Griff on, Joaquin Ruiz, Pedro Vander-Linden, Jacinto P6rez, and Marcos Torices;
as sindicos, Miguel Buenrostro and Ignacio Nieva. See Suarez Iriarte, Defensa,
65-67. The organization of the new ayuntamiento duplicated preceding councils,
but the democratically oriented puros preferred to be known as the "Municipal
Assembly," and this title was generally used by Suarez Iriarte and his council.
58 The North American, December 29, 1847.

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 247

the province and the municipality were to become the basic units of
Mexican political life. The ayuntamiento would assume powers
broad enough to make Mexico City and the Federal District almost
sovereign; but while controlling their own internal affairs they would
be linked to others in a "new confederation," the Mexico of the
future. As the ayuntamiento proclaimed, it was "an immense plan,
capable alone of overturning the principles that have ruled the Re-
public-if one can refer to disorder and general confusion as prin-
ciples. "59
Decentralized power was thus the key to the puro program. The
old tax system, which the electors described as "vicious," and all
government monopolies were to be replaced by a simple direct tax
"distributed equitably on the basis of wealth."60 All fueros were to
be eliminated, a civil registry established, and trial by jury made
standard practice in the administration of justice. This was not in
all ways a model puro program, for on such important issues as the
Church, the Army, and public education both the electors and the
ayuntamiento were silent, but there was enough to reveal the direc-
tion they were taking. The council also outlined its policy toward the
occupation forces, though somewhat vaguely; it would "keep itself
constantly between the people and the army, so that the demands
made by it [would] fall with the least possible sacrifice" upon the
people of the city.
While the Queretaro government looked on affairs in Mexico City
with some alarm, events at the national level were quite enough to
occupy its attention. Anaya called for congressional elections so that
a new legislature might convene in January, but the legislators were
slow to arrive at Queretaro. One of their first tasks was to elect a
new president, but because they could not reach a quorum Manuel de
la Pefia y Pefia resumed the office until the election could be held.
Weak and tentative as it was, the Queretaro government had au-
thorized commissioners to carry on peace negotiations with Nicholas
P. Trist. These began on January 2 at Mexico City.
Pefia y Pefia admitted that his administration was in a weak bar-
gaining position, but he argued that the greatest source of its weak-
ness, as well as the greatest danger to Mexico, lay in the American
domination of the frontier provinces, the major ports, and the capital.
Enemy control of the frontier provinces threatened secession and per-
manent loss, while occupation of the port cities deprived the govern-

"El Municipal (Mexico), December 26, 1847.

60 The North American, December 29, 1847.

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 248 HAHR I MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
ment of its major source of revenue, the tariff. In the capital, declared
Peora, some Mexicans "are plotting treacherously against the na-
tionality of the country . . ., fighting for power, usurping municipal
authority, taking possession of the little wealth that poor city still has,
and seeking support for their crimes in the forces of the invader."'6
The official government newspaper expanded the theme by suggesting
that the puro ayuntamiento was pandering to the Yankees, and con-
trasted this with the attitude of the puro deputies at Queretaro who
attacked the moderados as quitters and solidly supported the continua-
tion of the war at all costs :62

It is well known [said Los Debates], because the puros themselves boast of
it, that the [Mexico City] puros have amalgamated with the Americans.
How can you reconcile this amalgamation with that constant cry of "War!
War !" that obviously makes the ostensible difference between puros and
moderados [in Queretaro]. Because the same people think one way in
Queretaro and another in Mexico City? Is it not permissible, without being
considered foolish, to suggest that private interests inspire these attitudes?

Despite denouncements from the Queretaro government, the

ayuntamiento pushed ahead with its program. One of its first steps
was to eliminate all fueros within the Federal District, and, perhaps
more important, it abolished the existing system of taxation in favor
of a simple schedule of direct taxes levied against property owners.63
It also attempted to overhaul Mexico City's system of law enforce-
ment.
In the process it moved into a working relationship with the
American military government which permitted critics to charge
collaboration with the enemy. The Veramendi ayuntamiento had re-
lied upon a system of armed patrols to keep order, but Suarez
Iriarte maintained that these patrols were both expensive and inef-
fective, and that when trouble appeared at one point, they usually
managed to patrol elsewhere. He arranged to have the Americans
provide a security force of four hundred men stationed at five points
61 Los Debates, January 12, 1848.
62 Ibid. The reference to puro inconsistencies stemmed from the fact that
puro legislators at Queretaro opposed the government 's attempts to end the war,
and advocated widespread guerrilla warfare against the occupation army. See
Exposicion o Programa de los Diputados pertenecientes al Partido Puro o Pro-
gresista sobre la presente guerra, con maotivo de una proposici6n del Sr. Otero e
imputaciones de ciertos peri6dicos que se publican en la Capital, bajo la influencia
del Conquistado, y que se dejan correr libremente por el actual Gobierno de la
TJni6n (Queretaro, 1847), 1-22.
68 A list of taxes collected by the ayuntamiento was published in March
1848, and can be found in Suarez Iriarte, Defensa, 68-112.

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 249

throughout the city, and then disbanded the Mexican patrols, at a

saving (he said) of ten thousand pesos a month.64
Suarez Iriarte attributed the rapport that developed between the
military government and the puro ayuntamiento to a policy of "con-
trolled moderation and chivalry" toward the Americans.65 He ac-
cepted whatever odium attached to this policy, insisting that the main
responsibility of the ayuntamiento was to protect people and city, and
that this required the understanding and cooperation of the Ameri-
cans. To support his contention the military government liberalized
its policies in several respects. Corporal punishment, both barbarous
and humiliating to Mexicans, was abandoned by military tribunals in
cases involving Mexican citizens, and Mexican courts received wider
jurisdiction over criminal cases. The Americans exercised the par-
doning power more liberally than before, and in one notable instance
Suarez Iriarte succeeded in obtaining the release of Senator Mariano
Otero, who had been imprisoned for violent public denunciation of the
American army. Ironically, Otero later led the clamor against Suarez
Iriarte which brought about the latter's trial for treason.
In Queretaro criticism of the ayuntamiento continued to grow.
Negotiations with Trist progressed steadily if painfully, and most of
the moderados hoped to conclude a peace treaty that would limit
Mexican losses to the frontier provinces. But the actions of the puros
threatened to frustrate this design on two counts. At the national
level they pushed for a continuation of the war to the death, while in
Mexico City their ayuntamiento seemed to be flirting dangerously
with the Americans. Either course of action, if carried too far, might
undermine the work of the moderados.66
A good example of moderado suspicions was a banquet which the
ayuntamiento held for the Americans on January 29. Its occasion
was the completion of a survey which Army topographical engineers
had made at the request of the ayuntamiento to establish the level of
lakes surrounding the city as. a basis for flood control measures. The
lakes had frequently overflowed into city streets during high water,
and the complicated survey was beyond the normal resources of the
city, so that the banquet might well have seemed a deserved courtesy.67
""Ibid., 23.
65 Ibid., 24.
6" The moderados charged that many puros clamored for more war, not be-
cause they really wanted it, but because they wanted to defeat the peace treaty
and work for the annexation of Mexico to the United States. See Los Debates,
February 5, 1848.
67 For the report of the U. S. Army engineers see SuArez Iriarte, Defensa,
127-147.

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 250 HAHR I MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
Nevertheless, moderados regarded the whole affair as scandalous and
accused the ayuntamiento of "prostituting" itself to the Americans
and "clamoring and crying hoarsely for annexation. "68
The presence of the Americans in Mexico City was undoubtedly a
source of strength to the ayuntamiento, and it took advantage of this
strength. But it also looked forward to the day when the Americans
would be gone. The official newspaper of the city government sup-
ported the peace negotiations, and at the same time it announced the
ayuntamiento's determination to pursue a program of decentraliza-
tion after the war ended.69 The puros intended to transform the Fed-
eral District into a semi-independent state "with a commitment to the
recognition of a legally elected Mexican government, but without
consenting to its residency here."
The puro ayuntamiento reached one final understanding with the
military government before their relationship came to an end. General
Scott was prepared to occupy much of Mexico indefinitely if the
peace negotiations failed, and he hoped to make the Mexicans bear
much of the cost of the occupation. The military government conse-
quently assigned the ayuntamiento a quota of $400,000 a year, payable
in quarterly installments, as part of a general tribute to be laid upon
Mexico for the support of the occupation.70 But the military govern-
ment was willing to tender a quid pro quo. When it announced the
new levy, it also decreed that in order "to insure tranquility and
good order in the neighborhood of the city of Mexico" the entire Val-
ley of Mexico was to be annexed to the Federal District, under the
jurisdiction of the ayuntamiento, "for all purposes of police and
revenue." The chance for increased revenue was less important to
the ayuntamiento than the extension of its authority to areas that sup-
plied much of Mexico City's food. It responded with a new schedule
of direct taxes to raise the funds Scott demanded, and the burden
again fell primarily upon property owners, who protested strongly.71
Meanwhile, peace negotiations continued through January between
Trist and the Mexican commissioners, and they signed a treaty at
Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2. The Mexican Congress would
not ratify the treaty until it managed to obtain a quorum, which was
not to happen for three months. During that period Trist dispatched
a copy to the United States for consideration by the U.S. Senate. In
Mexico it seemed to be a time for political drifting, but from

68 Los Debates, February 5, 1848.

" El Municipal, February 4, 1848.
70 El Municipal, February 6, 1848.
71 El Municipal, February 20, 1848.

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 251

Queretaro the moderados moved to reestablish their control over the

capital. Though treaty negotiations had been concluded, hostilities
still existed formally between Mexico and the United States, and
while these continued, it seemed likely that the American army would
support the actions of the ayuntamiento. Ignacio Mora y Villamil
and Benito Quijana, two leading moderados, were thus sent to Mexico
City to arrange an armistice and, if possible, to end the reign of the
puros.
They arrived on the evening of February 17, the day before Wil-
liam 0. Butler was to replace Scott as commanding general. While
Scott had felt constrained from signing an armistice, being under
orders to prosecute the war vigorously, Butler was willing to assume
that Trist's treaty would be ratified by both sides, and he appointed
Generals William Worth and Persifor Smith to negotiate with the
Mexican commissioners. Two days later he ordered the ayuntamiento
to suspend action on the tax levy imposed by Scott pending the com-
pletion of negotiations. Alarmed over the implications of the move,
the council members resigned in a body on February 24.72 On the
next day nearly all of them returned to duty, but only briefly. They
had read the intentions of the Mexican armistice commission cor-
rectly, for Quijano and Mora y Villamil pushed successfully for
withdrawal of American support of the ayuntamiento.
At this point there was actually little reason for Butler to con-
tinue this support. He assumed that the occupation would end
shortly, and if it did, the levy which Scott had placed on the Mexi-
cans would be unnecessary. More important, the moderados, as the
group responsible for the peace treaty, now held first claim to Butler's
good will. As a result, Butler agreed to an armistice on February 29
that preserved the existing occupation zones, rescinded Scott's levy,
restored freedom of action to Mexicans in matters of taxation and
public administration, and permitted elections in Mexican municipal-
ities in accordance with "established law," even to the point of with-
drawing American troops from occupied cities on election day.73
Butler's swing to the support of the moderados placed the puro
ayuntamiento in an untenable position. Unpopular with Mexico City
property owners and suspected of treason for their dealings with
Scott 's military government, the puros were now laid open to a
direct assault by the moderado national government endorsed by
Butler. The outcome was certain. On March 7 the Queretaro govern-
" Daily American Star, February 25, 1848.
" Daily American Star, March 7, 1848.

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 252 HAHR I MAY I DENNIS E. BERG]
ment reactivated the Federal District as a separate political unit and
appointed Juan Marla Flores as governor with the understanding that
the removal of the puro ayuntamiento was to be his first undertak-
ing.74 He acted at once to dissolve the ayuntamiento, and he ap-
pointed Manuel Reyes y Veramendi and the former members of the
moderado ayuntamiento to the positions which they had held before
the controversial December elections.75 There was no effective op-
position to the appointments, and moderados returned triumphantly
to Mexico City.
The struggle for power in the Mexican capital was over. The re-
turn of the moderados marked the end of conflict between municipal
and national governments, and through the months that followed until
the treaty was ratified and the American occupation ended, the
municipal government of Mexico City operated amid relative calm.
Veramendi, the symbol of the moderado administration, had already
been honored by election to the Chamber of Deputies, but the reap-
pointment of his ayuntamiento, however partisan, also indicated ap-
proval of its conduct during the American occupation.
Not all were so charitable. Santa Anna, temporarily discredited
and ordered into exile, fought with characteristic energy against his
humiliation. He blamed Mexico's defeat on the moderados, and par-
ticularly on the ayuntamiento, because, he said, it "did nothing for
the common defense" and was responsible for the loss of the capital
to Seott.76 Mariano Otero levied charges that were more painful than
Santa Anna's, if only because they came from a fellow moderado.
Otero, who became Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the summer of
1848, was critical of both the puro and moderado ayuntamientos and
charged the Veramendi group with mismanagement of funds during
the occupation. The accusation seemed important enough to draw a
detailed defense from the ayuntamiento.77
The experience of the puro ayuntamiento, however, was more un-
pleasant than that of the moderados. Here, too, the first alcalde had
been the dominant force in the administration, and after his ayun-
7' Daily American Star, March 9, 1848.
76 There was one exception to this: Juan Palacios, who had served under
Veramendi, had also joined with Suirez Iriarte and been a member of the puro
ayuntamiento; he was not reappointed to office.
76 Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna, Manifiesto del general de division, Benemerito
de la Patria Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna, 4 sus conciudadanos (Mkxico, 1848),
8, passim.
77 Ayuntamiento de Mexico, Manifiesto del ayuntamiento 4 los habitantes de
la Capital, sobre las causas del mal estado que guarden los ramos puestos bajo
el cuidado de los capitulares (M6xico, 1848), 3-24.

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 253

tamiento had been turned out of office, Suarez Iriarte found himself
the subject of increasing attack. Following the evacuation of the
occupation forces, the government issued orders for his arrest on
charges of treason.78 Suhrez Iriarte argued that since he had been
-a congressional deputy while first alcalde, he had the right to be
judged by the Chamber of Deputies. The State complied by calling
-upon the Chamber to act as a grand jury, and Mariano Otero filed
-formal charges on behalf of the government before it. Suarez Iriarte
-was indicted as the leader of a movement which "named a municipal
assembly, endowed it with faculties contrary to the national constitu-
tion, and established an authority that has left an indelible mark of
shame on the history of our age."79
The trial of Suarez Iriarte was delayed until March 1850, and all
the bitterness and frustration of the occupation were then brought into
focus again as he faced his accusers, openly accepting responsibility
for the actions of his ayuntamiento. Otero's specific charges against
-him were that he had helped to organize the election of the ayun-
tamiento in violation of the government decree forbidding municipal
Selections, that he had refused to permit officials of the national gov-
eernment to operate within the Federal District, and that he had
,ordered his police force to arrest enemy deserters and surrender them
to the American military government.80
More serious than these charges were several allegations which
,Otero inserted into the indictment. Although these were not sub-
jected to the rules of evidence, they nevertheless set the tone for the
trial. Otero declared that Suarez Iriarte had attempted "to conspire
against the constitution of his country; to make public defense more
difficult, putting the nationality of his homeland in danger, . . .
voluntarily making himself an instrument of the enemy, lending them
assistance they had not requested," and even plotting to bring about
the annexation of Mexico by the United States.81 These allegations
amounted to a charge of treason, and it was clear that this was the real
issue before the Chamber. It was treason in a general sense, how-
ever, or according to personal definition, for neither Otero nor the
Chamber made any reference to violations of statute law.
Suarez Iriarte appeared before the Chamber as his own chief de-
fender. He admitted his responsibility for the policies condemned by
78 Roa BArcena, Recuerdos de la invasion norte-americana, II, 217.
79 SuArez Iriarte, Defensa, 112-113. The full text of Otero 's accusation is
found on pages 112-118.
" El siglo diez y nueve ( xexico), March 22, 1850.
81 SuArez Iriarte, Defensa, 114-115.

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254 HAMR I MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
Otero, but rejected the allegations of treason, insisting that his ac-
tions stemmed from a sense of public responsibility. The national
government, he said, had "abandoned [Mexico City] to the discre-
tion of the enemy," reducing its citizens to a struggle for simple sur-
vival. Even survival was hampered by the stumbling leadership of
the moderado ayuntamiento, which not only failed to preserve law
and order, but even invited harsh treatment of Mexicans by pointless
antagonism toward the American military government.82 So much
had happened to strain the bonds that held society together, he said,
that the capital could easily have fallen into complete chaos, with
worse results than the "bloody spectacle" that enveloped Paris
during its greatest cholera epidemic. The only human agency that
could save the city was a truly public-spirited ayuntamiento. For
this reason alone, declared Suarez Iriarte, he had joined the move-
ment to replace the moderados when the time for elections drew near.
The puro leader devoted only a small part of his defense to the
specific counts in the government's indictment. He insisted that his
election had been legal, conducted in accordance with the Election
Law of 1830, while the general government "did not have the power
to control the disposition of a public authority it had abandoned."
For this reason, its decree prohibiting the election had been invalid.83
Concerning the return of deserters to the Americans, he pointed
out that this arrangement was made only after treaty negotiations had
been concluded. Suarez Iriarte denied that he had refused to recognize
the Queretaro government. Following his election he had been will-
ing to work out an arrangement with the officials, he said, but those
who came to Mexico City had been singularly uncooperative. "I
will add," he went on, "that the previous ayuntamiento had refused
to recognize Don Ignacio Barrera, named by the government to ad-
minister the aduana of this city, and though his legally proper ap-
pointment had been disregarded, none of the members of that body
has been the object of a persecution as cruel as that which I suffer. "84
The heart of his defense, however, lay not in a refutation of the
specific charges against him, but in an explanation of the reasons for
his ayuntamiento 's policies. His major objective, he said, was to
interpose the ayuntamiento between the Mexican people and the
American army, thus shielding Mexico City from the worst effects
of the occupation and, indeed, averting a reign of terror. He attained
his objective, he maintained, simply by adopting a firm but reasonable
82 Ibid., 8-10.
83 Ibid., 12.
84 Ibid., 37.

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 A MEXICAN DILEMMA 255

attitude toward the military government. As a result, tensions had

diminished in the capital; the Americans ceased their harsh treat-
ment of Mexican citizens; the judicial system was reformed; law and
order returned to the city; and a breakdown of social order was
averted. The ex-alcalde asserted that "whatever suspicions some may
have wished to heap upon me, I swear by all that is sacred that I
have no other object but to work in the public interest. ."5 He
said 86

It was not personal gain we were after, or we would have fled far from the
site of danger, as others did, to seek the support and votes given so plenti-
fully to us during times of peace. Ours was not a splendid service-as with
those who win great victories-but the employment of a modest hand
which, in the presence of the enemy, restored in part that which had been
destroyed, and conserved and defended that which had not yet been taken....
We retired with tranquility of conscience because we had done our work
well, to receive with resignation the barbs of slander and calumny until the
day of national justice came. It has arrived at last, and whether the judg-
ment of my country be adverse or favorable, I wish its good fortune from
my heart.

Suarez Iriarte's appeal was futile, for though the respected and
elderly Juan de Dios Cafiedo also spoke persuasively in his defense,
the Chamber voted 48 to 27 to uphold the indictment.87 Even though
his case never went from the Chamber into the courts, he was im-
prisoned for several months until he finally became ill. Released
then, he died a short time later. It was a tragic end to the career of
a man who had established a reputation as a responsible and able
politician, and whom even a politically conservative Mexican historian
soon described as "a man of undeniable genius. "88
While Veramendi succeeded in his search for a policy that would
identify the actions of his ayuntamiento with national interests,
Suarez Iriarte failed and paid a high cost for his failure. Yet their
actions and those of their two councils present many parallels. Both
defied the authority of the national government during a tense period
in pursuit of their own policies; both entered into working arrange-
ments with the occupation forces to preserve the interests of Mexico
85 Ibid., 53.
86 Ibid.

87 Periodico official del supremo gobierno de los Estados-Unidos Mexicanos

(Mexico), March 21, April 1, 1850. Cafiedo, usually identified as a puro,
was harshly criticized by some moderados for his spirited defense of Suarez
Iriarte. A week after the trial ended he was murdered in particularly brutal
fashion, and though it was eventually determined that he was killed by burglars
many suspected initially that the murder was political, which added to the grim
atmosphere surrounding Suarez Iriarte's trial.
88 Roa Ba6rcena, Becuerdos de la invasion norte-americana, III, 218.

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 256 HAR MAY I DENNIS E. BERGE
City; and both assumed powers normally exercised by the national
government, including those of taxation. Su'rez Iriarte's attempt to
decentralize the Mexican federation and erect a kind of city-state
set his policies apart from Veramendi's; yet this stemmed from the
same disenchantment with the national government that did so much
to shape the policies of both men. Only when the moderados obtained
control at Queretaro did Veramendi coordinate his direction of Mex-
ico City with the objectives of the national government. This suggests
that he gave his allegiance, not to the government itself but to
moderado leadership.
Suarez Iriarte was not as fortunate as Veramendi in his political
affiliation, for the puros had no hope of gaining political control at
Queretaro, and he had no faith in the moderados. Puros at the na-
tional level, moreover, advocated war to the death against the Ameri-
cans. This was hard to accept in the capital where people lived un-
der the enemy sword, and where there was so little evidence that the
nation as a whole would also be willing to fight to the end. Suarez
Iriarte thus drew upon his political convictions and his concept of the
municipality in a search for standards of conduct, and the result was
personal disaster.
It would have been difficult for a Mexican of the period to find
much in the experience of either the moderado or puro ayuntamiento
that held promise for the future of Mexico, but this promise seems
more obvious in retrospect. To begin with, men like Suarez Iriarte
created what Charles Hale has called the "great intellectual ferment"
that characterized Mexican politics during and after the war years
and restored a lost sense of meaning to political action in Mexico.89
Mexicans continued to manhandle their political institutions, but both
the moderado and puro ayuntamientos had demonstrated that if these
institutions could not excite the loyalty of Mexican citizens unaided,
they could win it through association with a political movement, at
least among those who believed in the movement. The task of unifying
and institutionalizing such a movement on a national scale would be a
work of generations, and it was not realized until after the Mexican
Revolution and the ultimate formation of the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional. But a few Mexicans established a premise during
the war of the 1840s-that political principles furnish the basic moti-
vation for public policy. This premise was the beginning of Mexico's
political regeneration, and the actions of the Mexico City ayunta-
miento made an important contribution to this beginning.
89 Charles A. Hale, "The War with the United States and the Crisis in Mexi-
can Thought," The Americas, XIV (October 1957), 153-173.

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