MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee vs.

FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant (58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974)

Facts: Florentino Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Millian Pilapil, as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughters minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child, Melchora Cabanas, the right to act as trustee citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code and the consideration of the childs welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy. Issue: Whether the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from the deceased. Ruling: With the provisions Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code as basis, the decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant, Francisco Pilapil. Article 320 states that the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." And Article 321 states that "The property which the child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives. With the added condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another rational consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept that "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."

G.R. No. L-9959 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,p lain tiffappellee, vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant On June 3, 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Dominions then provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint. Bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank?

HELD: The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as parents of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III (Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007)

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque III, et al.
Posted in Uncategorized by admin on 27 Feb 2010
G.R. No. 173034 (October 9, 2007)

In this case, the Court noted the provision of CEDAW on pregnancy and lactation, and set the constitutional parameters for the implementation of a law promoting breastfeeding, among others. Facts: Petitioners sought to nullify A.O. No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations x x x (RIRR) of E.O. 51, or what is popularly known as the Milk Code. The Milk Code was issued by President Corazon Aquino on 28 October 1986, by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the President under the Freedom Constitution. [In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. (Such subjects are similarly covered under the CEDAW.)] More than a decade later, on 15 May 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR (which was to take effect on 7 July 2006). Subsequently, on 28 June 2006, the Petitioner, representing its members-manufacturers of breast milk substitutes, assailed the RIRR by positing the latters invalidity as it contained provisions that were deemed unconstitutional, such as several preambular clauses to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, and that, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breast milk substitutes. Held: The petition was partially granted. 4(f), 11 and 46 of the RIRR were declared null and void for being ultra vires. Noting that CEDAW only provides, in general terms, that the country must diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, the Court held that 4(f) and 11 of the RIRR insofar as it absolutely prohibited the advertising, promotion, and marketing of breast milk substitutes, and 46, as it provided for administrative sanctions not found in the Milk Code. The questioned rules went beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of the said law. However, the rest of the RIRR were deemed constitutional, especially those relating to the power delegated to the Department of Health to ensure that there is adequate, consistent and objective information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements and related products; and the power to control such information.

Mejoff vs Director of Prisons 90 Phil 70

Facts Boris Mejoff, a Russian, was captured as a Japanese spy by the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps on March 18, 1948. He was turned over to the Phil Commonwealth Government for appropriate disposition. His case was decided on by the Board of Commissioners of Immigration who declared him as an illegal alien. The Board ordered his immediate deportation. In the meantime, we was placed in prison awaiting the ship that will take him back home to Russia. Two Russian boats have been requested to bring him back to Russia but the masters refused as they had no authority to do so. Two years passed and Mejoff is still under detention awaiting the ship that will take him home. This case is a petition for habeas corpus. However, the respondent held that the Mejoff should stay in temporary detention as it is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens. It further states that is has the right to do so for a reasonable length of time.

Issue Whether or not Mejoff should be released from prison awaiting his deportation.

Ruling The Supreme Court decided that Mejoff be released from custody but be placed under reasonable surveillance of the immigration authorities to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines in its constitution adops the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nations. Also, the Philippines has joined the United Nations in its Resolution entitled Universal Declaration of Human Rights in proclaiming that life and liberty and all other fundamental rights shall be applied to all human beings. The contention that he remains a threat of to the security of the country is unfounded as Japan and the US or the Phils are no longer at war.

Mejoff vs Director of Prisons 90 Phil 70 (1951)

Facts: This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a decision of this Court on July 30, 1949. "The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Thereafter, the People's Court ordered his release. But the Deportation Board taking his case up found that having no travel documents, Mejoff was an illegal alien in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After the corresponding investigation, the Immigration Board of Commissioners declared on April 5, 1948 that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designated port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In October 1948, after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities moved him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention while arrangements for his departure are being made. Two years having elapsed since the aforesaid decision was promulgated, the Government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although, it should be said in fairness to the deportation authorities that it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not Boris Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation. Ruling: The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Moreover, Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution of the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation." And in a resolution entitled, "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights," and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "all human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2); that "every one has the right to an

effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9 ); etc. Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: that the petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. No costs will be charged.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESTEBAN MALABANAN, defendant-appellant. A. Santos, for appellant. Attorney-General Araneta, for appellee.

TORRES, J.: Shortly before 6 o'clock on the morning of the 8th of November, 1906, Felino Malaran, a prisoner and assistant jailer, reported to the foreman Pedro Pimentel that Esteban Malabanan had taken some bread out of a tin can that was in the jail; Malabanan being resentful at this and also because he had received a severe blow with a cane from the said assistant jailer, attacked the latter after breakfast with a small knife, and wounded him in the chest, the right arm, and in the back. Raymundo Enriquez, another assistant jailer, upon seeing what was taking place, tried to separate them and prevent the accused from further attacking Malaran, but he did so with such bad luck that he also was wounded with the knife in the right side near the abdomen, and in consequence of said wound Raymundo Enriquez died of peritonitis and hemorrhage of the spleen eleven days thereafter. Quintin de Lemos, another assistant jailer, who also tried to stop Malabanan, was wounded in the chin. Foreman Paulino Canlas, upon becoming aware of what was going on, ordered the opening of the door of the department where detachment No. 6 of the prisoners was confined, and Malabanan upon seeing him come in tried to attack him; thereupon Canlas took hold of a stick to defend himself and to take away from Malabanan the knife he held, which, like the hand and the clothes of the accused, was covered with blood. As soon as the accused was disarmed Canlas blew his whistle to call the inspector, who on his arrival at the place where the fight had taken place ordered the three wounded men to the hospital and the aggressor locked up in the cell. It was ascertained from the accused that the knife had been found by him among the bamboo kept within the department of the detachment, and it was recognized by him when the same was exhibited. Dr. Edwin C. Shattuck, the prison surgeon, in a sworn declaration, stated that Raymundo Enriquez died eleven days after entering the hospital in consequence of a dagger wound received in the left side and abdominal cavity, affecting the spleen, death being the result of subsequent peritonitis and hemorrhage. Felino Malaran had eight wounds, the most serious of which were on his left shoulder, left wrist, breast, and right hip. Quintin de Lemos had only a wound in the chin. Information being filed by the foreman Paulino Canlas accusing Esteban Malabanan of the crime of homicide for having inflicted on Raymundo Enriquez a mortal wound, from the result of which he died in Bilibid Prison, Manila, and proceedings being instituted by reason thereof, judgment was rendered on the 6th of December, 1906, sentencing the accused to the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, from which judgment the counsel for the accused has appealed.
lawphil.net

The facts stated above, duly proven by the testimony of eyewitnesses, constitute the crime of homicide, defined and punished by article 404 of the Penal Code, no qualifying circumstance being present in the fact that the accused inflicted on the assistant jailer Raymundo Enriquez a serious wound in the right side near the abdomen from which he died a few days later, to

determine that a more serious classification should be made of the crime, and a heavier penalty imposed. The accused pleaded not guilty, and notwithstanding the allegations he made in his defense and his denial that the knife held by him with which he inflicted the mortal wound which caused the death of Raymundo Enriquez belonged to him, there is no question as to his responsibility as the convicted author of the violent death of Raymundo Enriquez, who, as has been seen, did not give the accused any reason for attacking him but merely approached while the latter was attacking Felino Malaran in order to separate them and prevent the accused from continuing his assault on Malaran, for fear a homicide might ensue, to which pacific intervention Malabanan responded with a cut in the right side near the abdomen of the unfortunate Enriquez with the knife with which the accused was provided, as shown in the proceedings. In the commission of this homicide there is no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance to be considered, and as to whether or not the accused was illtreated or provoked prior to his assaulting jailer Malaran, a question which will be considered in the case for lesiones graves, such a circumstance can not be dealt with in the present proceedings instituted by reason of the violent death of Raymundo Enriquez, who was seriously wounded simply because he intervened for the purpose of separating Malabanan, the aggressor, from Malaran, his victim; therefore, the proper penalty should be imposed in its medium degree. In view of the foregoing considerations it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, provided, however, that Esteban Malabanan shall be sentenced to the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, to suffer the accessory penalties of article 59 of the code, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs of the proceedings. So ordered. Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-6082

March 18, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant. C.W. Ney for appellant. Attorney-General Villamor for appellee. CARSON, J.: The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial. We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence, the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472). The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed, unless the evidence discloses that having made the arrest, the defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the complaining witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him brought before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested. But so far as we can gather from the extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True, three days were expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities. It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the

arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order were supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers. The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.