Case Digests

G.R. No. 132875-76           February 3, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

Topic: The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is

now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. 
Issue: Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general.
Ruling: The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the
people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest
in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House
of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or
the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most
compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A
police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification
in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law
and apply to all those belonging to the same class. we are constrained to rule against the
accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or
interest, including the police power of the State.

A.C. No. 7399               August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,
vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.

Topic: In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre
invites the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s
speech delivered on the Senate floor. According to Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a
total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the
other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks
that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. In her
comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not
deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of
her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance
with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she
believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public
invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually
inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-
sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

Issue: Whether or not such utterances were covered by the parliamentary immunity as being
privileged speech.

Ruling: Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege

cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. This Court is aware of the
need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity
and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative
and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently
into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its
members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee
rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority
of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses
committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. For the above reasons, the plea of Senator
Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken.
Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter. The Court
wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar,
used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator
has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.

G.R. No. 172131             April 2, 2007

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO J. UNICO, Respondents.

Topic: Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone
congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and
local elections. n her petition filed with the COMELEC, petitioner Chato alleged that during the
canvassing of the election returns before the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Labo (MBC
Labo) from May 10 to 12, 2004, her counsel raised several objections and pointed to manifest
errors or obvious discrepancies in the election returns from various precincts of the municipality
of Labo. Prior to the suspension of proceedings on May 12, 2004, the MBC Labo gave her
twenty-four (24) hours, or until 6:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004, to prove her allegations.Allegedly in
violation of the procedure prescribed in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7166 (An Act Providing
for Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and For Other Purposes), before the expiration of the period granted
and without notice to petitioner Chato or her counsel, the MBC Labo concluded the canvassing
of votes and hastily forwarded the results of its canvass to the Provincial Board of Canvassers
(PBC) of Camarines Norte.  the PBC proclaimed respondent Unico as representative-elect of the
lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. The COMELEC (First Division) found that the
relief sought by petitioner Chato was actually for the re-counting of votes, not merely correction
of manifest errors in the election returns. Further, in seeking to nullify respondent Unico’s
proclamation, petitioner Chato alleged manifest errors in the election returns and that they were
tampered with and prepared under duress. Addressing these contentions, the COMELEC (First
Division) explained that a re-count of votes is not within the province of a pre-proclamation
controversy, which is generally limited to an examination of the election returns on their face. It
observed that under Section 316 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669 (General Instructions for
Municipal/City/Provincial and District Board of Canvassers in connection with the May 10, 2004
Elections), objections to the election returns or certificates of canvass were to be specifically
noted in the minutes of the board. With respect to the manifest errors alleged by petitioner Chato,
the COMELEC (First Division) stated that her objections were general in character as they failed
to specify the election return(s) containing these alleged manifest errors as well as the precinct(s)
from which they came. Under the circumstances, the MBC Labo could not immediately rule on
petitioner Chato’s bare allegations for to do so would have resulted in a fishing expedition.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
in excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolution.

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. The Senate and the House of Representatives now have
their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members," thereby divesting the
Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases
pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). With respect to
the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that
has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution and in Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the
Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.Further, the phrase
"election, returns, and qualifications" has been interpreted in this wise: The phrase "election,
returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting
the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election"
referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could
be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. The Court has invariably held that
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member
of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Stated in
another manner, where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional
elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and
taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress);
hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato’s
petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and
alleged invalidity of respondent Unico’s proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed
to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent
Unico’s proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:

x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who
has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best
addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of
proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the
people’s mandate.

G.R. No. 189466               February 11, 2010

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C.
DOROGA, Respondents.

Topic: In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat
Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007
elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered
voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its
nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not
eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself
was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional
district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list
organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already
confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization
representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the
women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of An Waray
party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid
for an elective office.

Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the
petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked
the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of
Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo. On July 16,
2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but
upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. The latter moved for
reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009,2 prompting Abayon to
file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon as nominees of Aangat Tayo who took the seat at the House of
Representatives that such organization won in the 2007 elections.

Ruling: As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Elections, a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of
Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in
the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the
House of Representatives. It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular
qualification of a nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative
of his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and
Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and
underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction
to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

G.R. No. 185401               July 21, 2009

HENRY "JUN" DUEÑAS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ANGELITO "JETT"
P. REYES, Respondents.

Topic: Petitioner Henry "Jun" Dueñas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito "Jett" P. Reyes were
rival candidates for the position of congressman in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City in
the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. After the canvass of the votes,
petitioner was proclaimed the winner, having garnered 28,564 votes4 as opposed to private
respondent’s 27,107 votes. Not conceding defeat, private respondent filed an election protest ad
cautelam, docketed as HRET Case No. 07-27, in the HRET on June 4, 2007. He prayed for a
revision/recount in 1707 of the 732 precincts in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City so that
the true and real mandate of the electorate may be ascertained. In support of his protest, he
alleged that he was cheated in the protested precincts through insidious and well-orchestrated
electoral frauds and anomalies which resulted in the systematic reduction of his votes and the
corresponding increase in petitioner’s votes. Petitioner filed his answer on June 25, 2007. Not to
be outdone, he also counter-protested 560 precincts claiming that massive fraud through
deliberate misreading, miscounting and misappreciation of ballots were also committed against
him in said precincts resulting in the reduction of his votes in order to favor private
respondent.After the issues were joined, the HRET ordered that all ballot boxes and other
election materials involved in the protest and counter-protest be collected and retrieved, and
brought to its offices for custody.In the preliminary conference held on July 26, 2007, petitioner
and private respondent agreed that, since the total number of the protested precincts was less than
50% of the total number of the precincts in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City, all of the
protested precincts would be revised without need of designation of pilot precints by private
respondent pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules.

The HRET thereafter directed the revision of ballots starting September 18, 2007. Reception of
evidence of the contending parties followed after the revision of ballots in 100% of the protested
precincts and 25% pilot of the counter-protested precincts. The case was then submitted for
resolution upon submission by the parties of their memoranda.In an order dated September 25,
2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision and appreciation of the remaining 75%
of the counter-protested precincts pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules, "[i]t appearing that
the [HRET] cannot determine the true will of the electorate from the initial revision and
appreciation of the 100% protested precincts and 25% counter-protested precincts and in view of
the discovery of fake/spurious ballots in some of the protested and counter-protested
precincts."Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied his motion in an order
dated October 21, 2008. On the same day, the HRET issued another order directing petitioner to
augment his cash deposit in the amount of ₱320,000 to cover the expenses of the revision of
ballots in the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts within a non-extendible period of ten
days from notice.

Instead of complying with the order, petitioner filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts on October 27, 2008. This was denied by the HRET
in Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008, reiterating its order directing the
continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and
recalling its order requiring petitioner to augment his cash deposit. The Tribunal instead ordered
the use of its own funds for the revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
Aggrieved by the HRET’s Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008, petitioner elevated
the matter to this Court.

Issue: whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in issuing Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008.

Ruling: The petition has no merit.

We base our decision not only on the constitutional authority of the HRET as the "sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of its members but also on the
limitation of the Court’s power of judicial review. Guided by this basic principle, the Court will
neither assume a power that belongs exclusively to the HRET nor substitute its own judgment for
that of the Tribunal.

The acts complained of in this case pertain to the HRET’s exercise of its discretion, an exercise
which was well within the bounds of its authority. We are not declaring any winner here. We do
not have the authority to do so. We are merely remanding the case to the HRET so that revision
proceedings may promptly continue, precisely to determine the true will of the electorate in the
2nd legislative district of Taguig City for the 2007-2010 congressional term.

Indeed, considering the paramount need to dispel the uncertainty now beclouding the choice of
the electorate and the lifting of the status quo ante order on June 16, 2009, the revision
proceedings shall resume immediately and the electoral case resolved without delay.

G.R. No. 166715             August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON

S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B.
GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of
Bureau of Customs, respondents.

Topic: This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR
and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality
of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards.
Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly
delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that
matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be
dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the
law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue
targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy
for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC
personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that
it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law. In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, question the petition for being premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet.
Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this Court’s
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of
the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward
system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law.
Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR
and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government
agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will guide
the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional
oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It
ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation
of power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.

Issue: whether or not the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing
rules and regulations of the law is constitutional

Ruling: The petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a

Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of
the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The
constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of
RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect. The Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May
22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of
the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or
other similar laws for that matter). Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all
activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over
the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-
enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x
xx

Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the
perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the
20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the
executive branch and the administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to
make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated
to them.

The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru
legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part
of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area.
While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch
actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision
allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits
Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically
utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an
agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or
disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide
that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only
if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently,
the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively
approves it. Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon
the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the
legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that
would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. With this
backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere,"
the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself,
any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it
exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment
of laws and presentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its
power of confirmation and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to

present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or
through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.

Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad
horizons of its legislative competence. It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the
executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity
with those standards. In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch
or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing
the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the
law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).

G.R. No. 170338             December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.

Topic: More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation
purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention
and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration
on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously
referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings
conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. In the House of
Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero
delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several
versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI
Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged
"original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and
impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the
recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings
indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said
recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this
Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the
respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally
obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He
further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the
records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further
using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the Court has jusrisdiction over the petition

Ruling: The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic.
Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of
judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.
By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory
opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in
which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become
stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as
a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the
issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the
tape recordings and from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the
said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the
recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There is also the widely
publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and
submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. Having been overtaken by
these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all,
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not
intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.

G.R. No. 180643             September 4, 2008

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.

Topic: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In
the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted
that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the
NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”.
In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and
Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in
contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that
he would appear and give his testimony.

Issue: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

Ruling: The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464
(advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive
privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.” 2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor
of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege
remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. In the case at bar, Executive
Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-
making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic
as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy
or foreign relations. Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Respondent Committees further contend that
the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with
such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself
available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11)
hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right
to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.

ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the
Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila,
respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES
ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL
CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE
PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf
of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General,
and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP.,

Topic: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission
and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required
readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on
the independence of the Judiciary.

Issue: Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

Ruling: No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title
fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane
to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a
more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a
repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was
not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this
paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and
nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and
that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both
the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least,
a becoming courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing
that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public
service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself
from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise
extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among
the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the
government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.