The adaptivedecision

maker
John W. Payne
FuquaSchoolof Business
Duke Uniuersity

JamesR. Bettman
Fuqua Schoolof Business
Duke Uniuersity

Eric J. Johnson
The Wharton School
Uniaersityof Pennsylaania

l$LHCaNrsRrDGE
qP UNTVERSITY PRESS
 2

in decisionmaking
Contingencies

Introduction
By now, our basicpremiseis apparent:Irrdividualsdisplay-agreat
deal of flexibility in making decisions.In their highly influential
reviewof behavi,oral decisiontheory,Einhorn and Hogarth (1981)
notedthat "themostimportantemPiricalresultsin theperiodunder
review have shown the sensitivityof judgment and choice to
seeminglyminor changesin tasks"(p. 61).More than a decadeof
,.s.ur.h iinceEinhornind Hogarth'sreviewhasstronglyreafftrmed
that informationprocessing in decisionmaking,asin other areasol
cognition,is highiycontingenton the demandsof the task.The same
individual will use many differentkinds of strategiesin making a
decision,contingentufon such factors as how information is
displayed,the nature of the response,and the complexityof the
prout.*. This chapterhas two purposes.First, we briefly dehnea
numberof decisionstrategiesthat have beenproposedto describe
judgmentand choice.second,we reviewthe researchshowingthe
i*p-u.t of differenttask and contextvariableson the useof decision
strategies bY an individual-
Beforewe reviewtheliterature,severalaspectsof our point of view
needto be madeexplicit.First, in order to keep the scopeof the
chaptermanageable, we focus on preferentialdecisions;inferences
for.."sts receivemuch more limited attention. Preferential
"nd
decisionprobiemsare typically describedusing three basic com-
ponents:(t) ti,. alternaiivesavailable to the decisionmaker; (2)
eventsor contingencies that relateactionsto outcomes,as well as
the associatedprobabilities of those events;and (3) the values
associatedwith the outcomes.Values are often basedon multiple
objectives,such as maximizingsafetyand minimizing cost.These
iniormationalelements, alongwith a goalstatement(suchas"choose
 in decisionmaking
Contingencies 2l
thepreferred alternative"), representthetaskenvironment presented
to a decision maker.Outsidethelaboratory, decision problems often
are not presented in a completedform. For example,alternatives
may not be givenbut may haveto be generated (Keller& Ho, 1988;
Gettys, Pliske, Manning,& Casey,1987).Nevertheless, it remains
usefulto definedecisionproblemsin terms of thesethree basic
components of alternatives, and values.
uncertainties,
The decisionmaker'sinternalrepresentation of the taskenviron-
mentis the individual's problem (or
space setof knowledgestates)
(Newell& Simon,1972). A typicalexampleof a decisionproblemis
theseiection of an automobile. Eachcaris characterized by different
mileage,attractiveness, safetyrecord,passenger capacity,and so
forth. The valuesof someof theseattributesmay be known with
reasonable certainty(e.g.,a specificcar'senginesize).However,the
value of other attributesis uncertain,such as the reiiability or
durability of a newly introducedcar. Of course,the individual's
representation will generailybe selective and wili not includeall
features of thecar.Anotherexampleis thechoiceamongtwo simple
lotteriesor gambles.Each lottery is dehnedby a probabilityof
winningor losingand a specifiedamountto be won or lost.
Whenpresented suchpreferential
to subjects, choiceproblemsare
usually "weil structured"(Langley,Simon,Bradshaw,& Zytkow,
1987). That is,subjectsaretypicallygivena specified setof alterna-
tivesand a setof attributevaluesto be usedin solvingtheproblem.
It is importantto note,however,that preferential problemsoften
haveelements that maketheir solutiondifficult.For example,con-
flictis typicallypresent, in thesensethat no oneoptionis beston all
attributesof value,andconflicthasiongbeenrecognized asa major
sourceof decisiondifhculty(Shepard,1964).The task alsomay be
unfamiliarin the sensethat a rule for resolvingthe conflictcannot
readilybe drawn from memory.Thus,solvingdecisionproblems
oftenis not the kind of "recognizeand calculate"processassociated
with expertise in a task domain(Chi et al., 1988).This is true even
for the simplestlaboratorydecisiontasks.Rather,decisionmaking
is oftencharacterizedby tentatiueness,
search,and the useof relatiuely
"weak"methods (heuristics)that aremorerepresentative of novicelike
problemsolving(Langleyet al.,1987).
A secondaspectof our viewpointconcernsthe terms taskeffects
and context effects,which have often been usedinterchangeably
in the literature.For the DurDoses of this book. we distineuish
22 The adaptiuedecisionmaker
betweenthetwo.Taskeffectsdescribethosefactorsassociated with
the generalstructuralcharacteristicsof the decisionproblem,includ-
ing response mode,numberof alternatives, numberof outcomesor
attributes,time pressure, informationdisplaymode,and agenda
constraints. Contexteffectsreferto thosefactorsassociated with the
particularvaluesof the objectsin the specilicdecisionset under
consideration, includingsimilarityand the overallattractiveness of
alternatives. In general,the valuesof context factorsare more
dependent on individualperceptions thanthevaluesof taskfactors.
Finally,weviewdecisionmakingasconsisting of suchinterrelated
subprocesses asinformationacquisition, evaluationof information,
and the expressionof a decision.The literature reviewfocuseson
thosetask and contextinfluences that resultin (1) a changein the
salienceand useof informationin the environment,andlor (2) a
changein the processes usedto combineinformationinto a judg-
ment or choice.lFor example,a changein responsemode may
resultin the sameevaluation(combination)strategybeing used
but with attentionfocusedon differentinformation.Alternatively,
the changein response mode may resultin the useof a different
evaluationprocess. Thus,observed contingentdecisions may result
from the effectof a task or context variableon the acquisition
(salience)of theinformationusedor on thestrategyusedto combine
the informationor both. Mellers,Ord6frez,and Birnbaum(1992)
haverecentlyemphasized a similardistinctionbetweentheencoding
(salience)of informationand theintegration(evaluation) of multiple
itemsof informationin their examinationof preference reversals(see
the sectionon responsemode effectsin this chapter).

Decisionstrategies
Beforeconsideringhow individualsflexiblyusevariousstrategies
in responseto differentdecisiontasks,we outline someof the more
t Goldsteinand Busemeyer (1992)havesuggested that ratherthan affectingeither
the encodingor combinationof attributeinformation,task and contextfactors
impactthe criterionusedby a decisionmakerto decidewhetherthe evidencein
favorofonealternativeor anotheris suflicientto warrantan expressed preference.
Although we do not doubt that the useof a criterion for decidingis sometimes
part of the decision-makingprocess,we feelthat the evidencepresentedhereis
overwhelmingly supportiveof the useof multipledecisionstrategiesratherthan
useofa singlecriterion-dependent strategy.Further discussion ofthis point can
be found in chaDter3.
 in dectsion
Contingencies nmking 23
commonstrategies used.A varietyof suchdecision-making strategies
hasbeenidentified, and descriptions of someof thesestrategies and
theirpropertiesaregivenhere.Eachstrategycan be thoughtof as
a method(a sequence of operations)lor searchingthrough the
decisionproblemspace.That searchmay reflectinformationabout
suchaspects as the relativeimportanceof an attribute- weightor
salience(e.g.,safetyis more importantthat comfort);cutoifvalues
specifyinga minimal acceptable level for attributes(e.g.,the gas
mileagecannorbe lessthan 20 milesper gallon);and differential
preferences across attributelevels
(e.g.,a lossoi$10hurtsworsethan
thepleasure of a gainof $10).Searchis oftenserective, and different
strategieslimit the amount or type of informationprocessed in
variousways.
Beforeexaminingthe specihcstrategies, however,somegeneral
aspects of decisionprocesses needto be addressed. First,as noted
earlier,decisionproblemsoften involve conflict among values,
because no oneoptionbestmeetsall of our objectives. Someof the
decisionstrategies used by peoplecan be thought of as conflict
confrontingandothersasconflicravoiding(Hogarth,19g7). That is,
somedecision processes confrontand resoiveconfljctby considering
the extentto which one is willing to trade off more of one valued
attribute(e.g.,economy)for lessof anothervaluedattribute(e.g.,
safety).other strategies do not as explicitlyconfrontand resolve
tradeoffsamongvaluedattributes.Second,particularevaluation
strategies can eitherbe usedalone or in combinationwith other
strategies.some typical combinationsare discussedafter the
individualstrategies havebeenpresented. Third, strategies
can be
eitherconstructed on thespotor their usecouldbe planneda priori
(seechapter5 for furtherdetails). For example, Bettman(1979, p. 33)
has suggested that "choiceheuristicsmay not be storedin their
entiretyin memory,but may exist only as fragments - subparts
which are put togetherconstructivelyat the time of making a
decision."Fourth, strategies differ in both how effortfulthey are
to useand how accuratethey are likely to be (seechapter3). For
example, a heuristicthat only considered informationon oneattri-
bute(e.g.,thelexicographic heuristic)mightbe lesserfortfuland less
accurate for sometypesof decisions than a heuristicthat examined
a largerproportionof the availableinformation.
24 The adaptiuedecisionmaker

of choiceProcesses
Descriptions
The weightedadditiue(WADD) rule,The weightedadditiverule
considers thevaluesof eachalternative on all therelevantattributes
andconsiders a//therelativeimportances or weightsof theattributes
to thedecisionmaker. Further, the conflictamongvaluesis assumed
to be confrontedand resolvedby explicitlyconsideringthe extent
to which one is willing to tradeoff attributevalues,as reflectedby
the relativeimportancesor weights.A rule like WADD involves
substantialcomputationalprocessingof the information.The
WADD rule deveiopsan overallevaluationof an alternativeby
multiplyingthe weighttimesthe attributevaluefor eachattribute
and summingtheseweightedattrifute valuesover all attributes.It
is assumedthat the alternativewith the highestoverallevaluation
is chosen.Giventhat the weightedadditiverule processes all of the
relevantprobieminformationand resolves conflictingvaluesexplicitly
by considering tradeoffs, the WADD rule (or somevariantof it) is
oftenviewedasa normativeprocedurefor dealingwith preferential
decisionproblemsof the type consideredin this book (see,e.g.,
Keeney& Raiffa,1916).
Exactlyhow peoplethink of "weights"within the contextof the
WADD rule is the subjectof investigation. Thereis someevidence
that weightsaresometimes localin interpretation,in that therelative
weightsreflectthe rangesof attributevaluesacrossthe alternatives
in the choice set- that is, the greater the range,the greaterthe
importanceof the attribute(Goldstein,1990).At other times,the
weightgivento an attributeseems to beinterpreted by subjects more
globally,for example,safetymight alwaysbe viewed as much more
importantthan costs,without much consideration of local ranges
of values(Beattie& Baron,1991).Anotherissuerelatedto weights
is whetherthe influenceof the weights on preferences reflectsan
addingor averaging process. In an averaging model, the weights
are constrainedto sum to one; that is, they are normalized(see
Stevenson, Busemeyer, & Naylor, 1990,for a discussion of adding
vs.averagingmodels).
Two strategiesrelatedto the WADD rule may be usedin making
decisionsunderrisk, the expectedvalueand expectedutility rules.
The expectedvaluerule involvesmultiplyingthe value(i.e.,mone-
tary amount)of eachpossibieoutcomeof a lotteryby its probability
of occurrence. Theseproductsof the valuesand probabilitiesare
 Contingencies
in decision
making Zs
thensummedover the outcomesto arriveat the expectedvalueof
thelottery.Thismultiplyin-e andsummingprocess is assumed to be
repeatedlor aii the lotteriesin a choiceset.It is further assumed
that thelotteryor gambiewith the highestEV will be chosen.The
expected utility rule differsfrom rhe EV rule in that the utility of
eachoutcomeis substitutedfor its monetaryvalue.This valuation
(utility assessmenr) aspectof the EU rule expandsthe domain to
which tbe EU rule appliesbeyondmonetarygambles;it may also
requireaddjtionalprocessing effort.However,the generalprocess-
ing assumptions of both modeisareverysimilar.
The EV rule, and especialiythe EU role, are also viewedas
normativerulesfor choice.Thus,in the literatureone can seethe
EV and EU rules used as both proposeddescriptionsof actual
behaviorand as normativepr.r.riptions for behavior.However,
while peoplesometimesmake decisionsin ways consistentwith
procedures like the WADD, EV, and EU rules,more oftenpeoole
appearto makedecisions usin,esimplerchoiceprocesses (heuristics).
some oi the more commonchoiceheuristicsare describedin this
chapter.Eachheurisricrepresents a differentmethodior simplifying
searchthroughthe decisionproblemspaceby limiting the amount
of informationprocessed and/ormakinghow informationis processed
easler.

The equalweight( EQW) heuristic.This processingstrategyex_

aminesall the alternativesand all the attribute valuesfoi each
alternative.
However,the equalweightstrategysimplifiesdecision
makingby ignoringinformationabout the relativeimportanceor
probabiiityof eachatrdbute.An overallvaluefor eachalternative
is obtajnedby simplysummingthevaruesfor eachattributefor that
alternative.
This assumes that the attributevaiuesareexpressed,
or
canbe expressed, on a commonscaleof value.Hencethis heuristic
is a specialcaseof the weightedadditiverule. The equalweight
rule hasbeenadvocatedas a highly accuratesimplificationof the
decision-making process(Dawes,1979;Einhorn& Hogarth,1975).
A variationof this rule that has beenadvocatedfor usein risky
choiceis the equiprobableprocedure,in which probability in-
formationis ignoredand the alternativewith the highestaverage
payoffselected (Thorngate,1980).o. Huber(1999)referencesempiii-
cal work documentingthe use of an equal weight heuristicin .
riskychoice.
 26 The adaptiuedecisionmaker
The satisJicing(SAT) heuristic.Satisficingis one of the oldest
heuristicsidentifiedin thedecision-making literature(Simon,1955).
With this strategy,alternatives are considered one at a time;in the
ordertheyoccurin theset.This heuristiccomparesthevalueof each
attributeof an alternativeto a predelinedcutofflevel,oftenthought
of as an aspirationlevel.If any attdbutevalueis belowthe cutoff,
thenthat alternativeis rejected.The hrst alternativethat hasvalues
that meetthe cutoffsfor all attributesis chosen.If no alternatives
passall the cutoffs,the cutoffscan be relaxedand the processre-
peated,or an alternativecan be randomlyselected. An implication
of the satisficingheuristicis that choicewill be a functionof the
order in which a decisionmaker evaluatesalternatives. That is, if
alternativeA and alternativeB both passthe cutoffs,thenwhether
A or B is chosenwill dependon whetherA or B is evaluatedfirst.
Therewill be no comparisonof the relativemerit of arternative A as
comparedwith alternativeB. A variationof this procedureis the
conjunctivemodeiproposedby Coombs(1964),Dawes(1964),and
Einhorn(1970).

The lexicographic ( LEX ) heuristic.The lexicographicprocedure

determinesthe most important attribute and then examinesthe
valuesof all alternatives on that attribute.The alternativewith the
bestvalueon the most importantattributeis selected. If two alter-
nativeshave tied values,the secondmost important attributeis
considered,and so on, until the tie is broken. For example,a
consumer may alwaysbuy the cheapest brand.Sometimes the LEX
strategyincludesthe notion of a just-noticeable difference (JND).If
severalalternatives are within a JND of the bestalternativeon the
mostimportantattribute(or any attributesconsidered subsequently),
they are considered to be tied (Tversky,1969).This versionof the
LEX ruleis sometimes calledlexicographic-semiorder(LEXSEMI).
A consequence of usinga lexicographic-semiorder decisionrure
is that a personmay exhibitintransitivities in preferences in which
X > Y, Y > Z, andZ > X. The followingexampledecisionproblem,
adaptedfrom Fishburn(1991),illustratesthat potential.professor
P is aboutto changejobs.Sheknowsthat if two offersarefar apart
on salary(e.g.,more than $ 10,000apart),then salarywill be the
determiningfactor in her choice.otherwise,the prestigeof the
universitywill be dominant.She eventuallyreceivesthree offers,
described in part asfollows:
 in decisionntaking
Contingencies 27
Salary Prestige
X $65,000 Low
Y $ 50,000 High
Z $58,000 Medium
SheprefersX to Y on thebasisoi the bettersalaryof X. Because
I and Z arelessthan $ 10,000 apartin salary,sheprefersY to Z on
the basisof thegreaterprestige.ShealsoprefersZ to X on thebasis
of prestige.Thus,X > Y, Y > Z, andZ > X, an intransitivepattern
of preferences.The generalassumption is that rationalityin choice
requires althoughFishburn( 1991)presents
transitivityin preferences,
somearguments why it may be reasonable for peopleto sometimes
violatetransitivity.

The elimination-by-aspects (EBA) heuristic.First describedby

Tversky(1.972), an EBA choicestrategybeginswith determination
of the mostimportantattribute(Tverskyactuallyassumed that the
attributeis selected probabiiisticaily, with the probabilitythat an
attributeis selected beinga functionof its weightor importance).
Then, the cutoff vaiue for that attribute is retrieved,and all
alternativeswith valuesfor that attribute below the cutoff are
elimjnated. Onecaninterpretthisprocess asrejectingor eliminating
alternatives that do not possessan "aspect";the "aspect"is dehned
as havinga valueon the seiected attributethat is greaterthan or
equalto thecutofflevel.The EBA process continues with thesecond
most important attribute,then the third, and so on, until one
alternativeremains.Note that while an EBA processviolatesthe
idea that one should use all relevantinformationin making a
decision,it doesreflectrationalityin theordereduseof theattributes.
This "partial" rationalityin processing characterizes most choice
heuristics.

The majorityof conJirmingdimensions (MCD) heuristtc.Described

by RussoandDosher(1983), theMCD heuristicinvoivesprocessing
pairsof alternatives.
The valuesfor eachof the two alternatives
are
comparedon eachattribute,and the alternativewith a majorityof
winning(better)attributevaluesis retained.
Theretainedalternative
is then comparedwith the next alternativeamong the set of
alternatives.
The processof pairwisecomparisonrepeatsuntil all
alternativeshavebeenevaluatedand the hnal winningalternative
hasbeenidentified.
28 The adaptiuedecisionmaker
The MCD heuristicis a simplifiedversionof a more general
model of choicecalled the additive difference(ADDIF) model
(Tversky,1969).In that processingstrategy,the alternativesare
.otnpu.LOdirectlyon eachdimension,and the difference between
the subjectiu.u"iu"s of the two alternatives on that dimension is
determined.Then a weightingfunction is applied to each difference
and the resultsaresummedover all dimensionsto obtain an overall
relativeevaluationof the two alternatives.Under Somecondi-
tions,the additivedifferencerule and the WADD rule will produce
identicalpreference orderings,althoughthe two rulesdifferin some
aspectsoi processing(seeTversky, 1969,for a further discussion
of how th; ADDIF and WADD modelsare related).The MCD
heuristicsimplifresthe additivedifferencemodel both by ignoring
attributeweigntsand by codingthe attlibute differences in a binary
fashion,so that only the direction of the difference, but not its
magnitude,is considered.
A variation on the additive differenceprocess,proposed by
Aschenbrenner, Bockenholt,Albert, and Schmalhofer (1986),is to
processthe attribute differencessequentially, accumulating the
summeddifferences until the summedadvantageof one option over
anotherexceeds somecriterionvalue.Bockenholt,Albert,Aschen-
brenner,andSchmalhofer (1991)suggest that thecriterionvaluemay
reflectthe balancethe decisionmaker desiresbetweenthe effort
invoivedin a decisionprocess and thequalityof thechoiceprocess.

Thefrequencyof good and badfeatures( FRQ) heuristic.Alba and

Marmoistein(1987)suggestthat decisionmakersmay evaluateor
choosealternatives basedsimply upon countsof the good or bad
featuresthe alternativespossess. To implementthis heuristic,a
p".ron would needto devilop cutoffsfor specifyinggood and bad
Then the decision-aker would countthe numberof such
ieatures.
features.Dependingupon whetherthe decisionmaker focusedon
goodfeatures,bad fiatures,or both,differentvariantsof the heuristic
iould arise. Note that this heuristic could be viewed as the
applicationof a voting rule to multiattributechoice,wherethe
attributescan be viewedas the voters.

Combinedstrategies.Individualssometimesuse combinationsof
Typicaliy,combineddecisionstrategieshave an initial
strategies.
are eliminated,and then a second
phase,wheri poor-alternatives
 in decisionntaking
Conttngencies 29
phaseexamining the remainingalternativesin moredetail(payne,
1976).One suchcombinedheuristicthat is frequentlyobservedin
decisionbehavioris an elimination-by-aspects
plusweighted
additive
strategy.EBA is usedto reducethe numberof alternativesto some
smallnumber(e.g., two or three),and thena weightedadditiverule
is usedto seiectamongthoseremainingalternatives.

other heurisrics. Severaleven simpler heuristicsalso have been

proposed.A frequentstrategyfor choiceo[ this sort is the habitual
heuristic:choose what one choselast time. A relatedheuristic,
mentionedin chapter1 and suggested by P. Wright (1975),
is alfect
referral.An individuaisimpiyelicitsa previouslyformedevaruation
for each alternativefrom memory and selectsthe most highiy
evaluatedalternative.
No detailedattributeinformationis considered.
Note that both of theseheuristicsare only relevantfor repeated
choices.

Generalproperties
of chotcestrategtes
The strategieswe havediscussed arejust someof thoseproposedto
describechoicebehavior.Thesestrategies havecomefroma nurnber
of discipiines
and havebeendescribed usingverydifferentkinds of
formaiisms. As a result,in orderto compareand contraststrategies
for choice,researchers
haveoftendescribed themusingfairlybroad
and -elobalcharacteristics.Severalof thesecharacteristics
are con-
siderednext.

Contpensatory Dersusnoncompensatory. A centraldistinctionamong

strategiesis the extent to which they make tradeoffsamong
attributes.
Decisionstrategies (suchasweightedadditive)that make
tradeoffsare called compensatorystrategies, whereasstrategies
(suchas lexicographic)that do not maketradeoffsare callednon-
compensatory. The key to this distinctionis the ability of a good
valueon oneattributeto makeup for badvalueson otherattributes.
A lexicographic strategyis noncompensatory because a bad value
on the most important attdbute will ensurethat an aiternative
would neverbe chosen,no matterhow good it is on anotherattri-
bute.A weightedadditivemodel is compensatorybecausegood
valueson one attributecan offsetbad vaiueson another.Finally.
somerules,Iike the majorityof conhrmingdimensions (MCD) rule,
30 The adaptiuedecisionmaker
arepartiallycompensatory in that the total numberof advantages
for anaiternativedoesmatter,but therelativesizesof theadvantages
do not.
This distinctionbetweencompensatoryand noncompensatory
rulesis relatedto how a strategydealswith conflict.Compensatory
rules confront conflict,whereasnoncompensatory rules avoid it.
Hogarth (1987)has suggested that peopie hnd making explicit
tradeoffsemotionallyuncomfortable. Thus, decision makers may
avoid strategiesthat are compensatory not only becausethey are
difijcult to execute(cognitive effort)but also becausethey require
the explicitresolutionof diffrcultvalue tradeoffs(conflicts)2.

Consistentnersusselectiueprocessing. A related aspectof choice

strategiesis the degree to which the amount of processingis
consistent across
or selective alternativesor That is,is the
attributes.
sameamountof informationexaminedfor eachalternativeor attri-
bute,or doesthe amountvary?In general,it hasbeenassumed that
moreconsistentprocessing acrossalternativesis indicativeof a more
compensatorydecisionstrategy(Payne, 1976).Consistentpro-
cessingsometimesinvoivesexaminationof all informationfor every
alternativeand attribute. A more variable (selective)processing
pattern,on the other hand,indicatesa strategyof eliminatingalter-
nativesor attributesusing only part of the information available,
without considering whetheradditionalinformationmight change
the decision.

Amountof processing, A third generalprocessingcharacteristicis

the total amount of processing. A key distinctionamongdecision
rulesis whetherthey explicitlyignore potentiallyrelevantinforma-
tion in solvinga decisionprobiem,and thus reducethe amountof
informationprocessed, or attemptto processall relevantinforma-
tion. Whether processingis consistentor not, the total amountof
information examinedcan vary, from quite cursory to exhaustive.
For somestrategies, such as EBA, lexicographic,and satisficing,
the total amount of informationprocessed is contingentupon the
particularvaluesof the alternativesand cutoffs.
2 As an exampleof this avoidanceof tradeoffs,Gregory,Kunreuther,Easterling,
and Richards(1991)notethat the unwillingness ofpeopleto considertradingoff
increases in environmentalrisksfor money(economicbenehts) is onereasonwhy
the siting of hazardouswastedisposalfacilitiesis so controversial.
 Contingencies
in decision
ntaking 3l
A lternatiue-hased uersusattribute-basedprocessing.A fourth aspecr
of processing concernswhetherthe searchand processing of alter-
nativesproceedsacrossor within attributesor dimensions. The
formeris often calledholisticor alternative-based and the latter
dimensional or attribute-basedprocessing.In alternative-basedpro-
cessing, multiple attributesof a singlealternativeare considered
beforeinformationabout a secondalternativeis processed. In
contrast,in attrjbute-based processing,the valuesof severalalter-
nativeson a singleattributeareprocessed beforeinformationabout
a secondattributeis processed. Russoand Dosher(1983)suggest
that attribute-based processing is cognitivelyeasier.

Formationof eualuations. The strategiesdifferin termsof whether

or not an overallevaluationfor eachaiternativeis explicitlyformed.
In the equal weightor weightedadditiverules,for example,each
alternativeis givena scorethat represents
its overallevaluation. on
the otherhand,rulessuchas lexicographic or EBA eliminatesome
alternatives and selectotherswithout directlyforming an overall
evaluation.

Quantitatiue t)ersus
qualitatiuereasoning.Finally,the strategies
also
differ in terms of the degreeof quantitativeversusqualitative
reasoningused. Some strategiesinclude quantitativereasoning
operations.For exampie,the equal weight method involves a
summingof values,and thefrequency heuristicrequirescounts.The
weightedaddingruleincludestheevenmorequantitativeoperation
of multipiyingtwo values.In contrast,the reasoningcontainedin
the other strategiesdescribedpreviouslyis more qualitativein
nature.That is, most of the operationsfor a strategysuchas EBA
involvesimplecomparisons of values.Tverskyet al. (1988)makea
similar distinctionbetweenqualitativeand quantitativethinking.
Hegarty,Just, and Morrison (1988)also have recentlyexplored
strategydifferences that involvea distinctionbetweenqualitative
and quantitativereasoningin makinginferences aboutmechanical
systems.
The various decisionstrategiesor rules we have describedre-
presentdifferentcombinations of thesegeneralproperties.Table2.1
characterizes eachof the major strategiesin termsof five of these
properties.Consistentwith our conceptionof strategiesas par-
ticularsequences of mentaland elfectoroperations(seechapter1),
 'qt

o.^
EE
'>- ==u
=Y:> >,9
'!: > c€
L ^ . - ^

:4-
<,^t
(tv4v
cd-J
a -/ zzz)))zz t^J t^l t^t t^l -l
vvvvvvvv
;(€

c)ho
ilo
.9 a i.2
<i.
qo
coFe
fr"Et :P

6) ll
Bar
!
i6)
x@
qx
F -t ()x
i3 ?.=
.6r=
->:
' - ^ L ^ = 3
-/tr
:F.. oJ
JFJFJFFJ I! .E
: g; S oo
x.<

9.=
7 -Q E
(J;(} . -:x
.= rD ."=
=>()
vr\=
9>,
U\'; U (JQ ocnal)()
.4

v) *
tt
',tl

n rl
c>
E.FI, z z >
v)
tv
z x.9
i= x
L
q) h
oil
L 2.4 *X
C)T- '-H
o.a) X
l\ tr>=
iliO
()98 UQUZZZOO
nt=
< 5
o \(q
e.i >q
q tl

,-
!

() Q Fri Lx Ee
}?8il;f,>E s'<. <a
 Contingenciesin decisionntaking aa
JJ

Table 2.2. Operationsusedby choice heuristics

Heuristics comparisons Eiiminations concatenations

WADD + +++
ADDIF + + +++
EQW + ++
EBA 'i -r
+
SAT ++ +
LEX ++ +
MCD ++ .L
rT
FRQ ++ +
Note:within eachtypeof operation,
thenumberof pluses indicates
the
relative
extentto whicheachheuristic
utilizes
thattypeof operation.
For
keyto abbreviations,
seeTable2.i.

the variousstrategiescan also be classifiedin terms of different

combinations of operations.
For example, thewADD ruleobviously
involvesoperationsthat concatenatithe valuesof two or more
attributes,for example,adding two valuestogether.The lexico-
graphicdecisionrule,on the other hand,doesnot includeexplicit
concatenation operations,but doesinvolvemany comparisonsof
onealternative's valueon an attributeagainstthe valueof another
alternativeon the sameattribute.Further,somerules,suchasEBA
o1 sAT, inciudeexpliciteliminationoperations. Table 2.2 offersa
classification
of eachof the major decisionstrategies in termsof the
extentto whichsuchoperationsas comparisons, eliminations,and
concatenation processesare utilized.In chapter3, we will expand
upon the setof operatorsusedto describethe variousstrategies in
orderto developa measureof decisioneffort.
Thesestrategies may bedifferentiallyavailableacrossindividuals.
A person'srepertoireof strategies may dependupon many factors,
suchascognitivedevelopment, experience, and moreformai training
andeducation- By 12yearsof age,for example, childrenknow many
but
!t]f!gS_ies, they applythem iessconsisrenilythan aduits(Kiayman,
1985). Individualsmayaisoacquirenewstrategies through.*p.ri.n..
with a broad varietyof choicetasks.Finally,formali.u.hing .un
provideindividualswith new strategies theycan use(e.g.,Larrick,
Morgan,& Nisbett,1990).