16. Salazar vs.

Achacoso
HORTENCIA SALAZAR vs. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue
warrants of arrest and search.

Rosalie Tesoro filed complaint in POEA against petitioner Hortecia Salazar for illegal recruitment.
Having ascertained that the petitioner operates a recruitment agency, public respondent Achacoso issued
his challenged Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 stating to CLOSE the recruitment agency being
operated and the seize documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment. POEA with its team members accompanied by policemen and media men
proceeded to petitioners’ residence. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted
for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. Petitioner requested to return the
confiscated costumes and contend that the acts of POEA team members violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."

ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly
issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

RULING: No.

Under the new Constitution, which states:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.

The SC reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article
38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the SC affirmed the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue
warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose
of deportation.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

17. PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. and JENS PETER HENRICHSEN vs.
KLAUS K. SCHONFELD G.R. No. 166920, February 19, 2007 CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: Klaus Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen and resident of New Westminster, British Columbia,
Canada. He had been a consultant in the field of environmental engineering and water supply and
sanitation. PaciCon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) herein petitioner, is a corporation duly established and
incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The primary purpose of PPI is to engage in
the business of providing specialty and technical services both in and out of the Philippines. It is also a
subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan. Jens Peter Henrichsen, director of PCIJ, is based
in Tokyo, Japan.

Henrichsen commuted from Japan to Manila and vice versa, as well as in other countries where PCIJ had
business.

PCIJ decided to engage in consultancy services for water and sanitation in the Philippines. In 1997,
Schonfeld is employed by PCIJ through Henrichsen, as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation
Department. However, PCIJ assigned him as PPI sector manager in the Philippines. His salary is to be
paid partly by PPI and PCIJ.

Respondent Schonfeld however received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that his employment has
been terminated for the reason that PCIJ and PPI has not been successful in the water and sanitation sector
in the Philippines. By electronic mail however, Henrichsen subsequently informed him to stay put in his
job after August 5, 1999 until such time that he would be able to report on certain projects and discuss all
the opportunities he had developed.

Schonfeld then eventually filed money claims, unpaid salary, leave pay air fare from Manila to Canada
and cost of shipment of goods to Canada. PPI partially settled the money claims but refused to pay the
rest.

This prompted Schonfeld to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners PPI and Henrichsen
with the Labor Arbiter. In his complaint, he alleges that PPI failed to notify DOLE of its decision to close
one of its departments which resulted in his dismissal, and that they failed to notify him that his
employment was terminated after August 4, 1999.

PPI moved to dismiss on the following grounds: 1. The LA had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, 2.
the venue was improperly laid. Further, it averred that respondent Schonfeld was a Canadian citizen, a
transient expatriate who had left the Philippines. He was also employed and dismissed by PCIJ, a foreign
corporation with principal office in Tokyo, Japan. Under lex loci contractus, the complaint should have
been filed in Tokyo. Lastly, under Section 12 of the General Conditions of Employment attached to his
letter of employment, any employment-related dispute should be brought before London Court of
Arbitration.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. On appeal, the NLRC
agreed with the disquisitions of the Labor Arbiter and affirmed the latter’s decision in toto. On the issue
of venue, the appellate court declared that, even under the January 7, 1998 contract of employment, the
parties were not precluded from bringing a case related thereto in other venues. While there was, indeed,
an agreement that issues between the parties were to be resolved in the London Court of Arbitration, the
venue is not exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other forum
other than in the Philippines. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the proper venue for the present complaint is the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC and
not the Court of Arbitration in London

RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by
this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while they are
considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general
rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words.
They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to
restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose
and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them. I

n the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court
save —," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," or words of equal import were stated in the
contract. It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any
complaint arising out of the employment contract.

Petitioners contend that respondent should have filed his Complaint in his place of permanent residence,
or where the PCIJ holds its principal office, at the place where the contract of employment was signed, in
London as stated in their contract. By enumerating possible venues where respondent could have filed his
complaint, however, petitioners themselves admitted that the provision on venue in the employment
contract is indeed merely permissive.
18.
19. JAKA v. Pacot DOCTRINE

Sanction should be stiffer when employer fail to comply with the notice requirement when
dismissal is based on authorized causes.

FACTS

Respondents Darwin Pacot, et.al. were hired by the Petitioner Jaka Food Processing Corp.
(JAKA) until their services were terminated in August 1997 because the corporation was in dire
financial straits. However, JAKA failed to comply with the notice requirement under Article 283
of the Labor Code, which provides that a written notice must be served to affected employees at
least one (1) month before the intended date of termination. Thus, the Respondents filed a case of
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared the termination illegal and ordered Jaka to reinstate the
Respondents with full backwages; otherwise, Jaka is ordered to pay the Respondents with
separation pay. On appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the LA
decision was affirmed in toto, only to be modified upon Motion for Reconsideration. Jaka went
to the Court of Appeals, which only modified the decision of the NLRC but still awarded
separation pay.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the Respondents are entitled to separation pay.

2. Whether or not the Respondents are entitled to nominal damages.

RULING
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. In all cases of business closure or cessation of
operation, the affected employee is entitled to separation pay. However, the Supreme Court ruled
that as an exception to this general rule the closure of business or cessation of operation due to
serious business losses or financial reverses. In which case, the right of the affected employee to
separation pay is lost for obvious reasons. In the present case, the Respondents did not assail the
fact that JAKA was suffering from serious business losses. Hence, they are not entitled to
separation pay.

2. The Court ruled in the affirmative. If the dismissal is based on an authorized cause, and the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the
dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative. This
is different when the dismissal is based on just causes whereby dismissal was initiated by the an
act imputable to the employee.

In the present case, JAKA was suffering from serious business loss which prompted them to
terminate the employment of the Respondents. However, it is also established that JAKA failed
to comply with the notice requirement under Art. 283. As such, it is proper to award nominal
damages to the Respondents, although dismissal was considered legal.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the CA is SET ASIDE. New order holding the legality of
dismissal, but Jaka is ordered to pay nominal damages to the Respondents.
20. Auto Bus Transport vs Bautista
G.R. No. 156367. May 16, 2005

Facts:

Bautista, a driver-conductor of the Autobus transport, was dismissed after his failure to pay an
amount demanded by the company for the repair of the bus damaged in an accident caused by
him.

He receives compensation by way of commission per travel.

Bautista complained for illegal dismissal with money claims for nonpayment of 13th month pay
and service incentive leave pay against Autobus.

Auto Bus’ Defenses:

1. Bautista’s employment was replete with offenses involving reckless imprudence,

gross negligence, and dishonesty supported with copies of letters, memos,
irregularity reports, warrants of arrest;
2. In the exercise of management prerogative, Bautista was terminated only after
providing for an opportunity to explain:

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint however awarded Bautista his 13th month pay and
service incentive leave pay.

Auto Bus appealed. NLRC deleted the 13th month pay award. In the CA, NLRC’s decision was
affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to service incentive leave pay.

Held: Yes.
Under Article 95 of the Labor Code, every employee who has rendered at least one year or
service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay. In Section 1,
Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, the rule shall
apply to all, except… (d) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is
unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely
commission basis, or those who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of
the time consumed in the performance thereof.

Petitioner’s contention that Bautista is not entitled to service incentive leave because he is paid
on a purely commission basis must fail. The phrase following “Field personnel” should not be
construed as a separate classification of employees but is merely an amplification of the
definition of field personnel defined under the Labor Code.

Bautista neither falls under the category field personnel. As defined, field personnel are those
whose performance of service is unsupervised by the employer, the workplace being away from
the principal place of business and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty. Bus companies have ways of determining the hours worked by their drivers
and conductors with reasonable certainty. The courts have taken judicial notice of the following:

1. Along the routes traveled, there are inspectors assigned at strategic places who board
the bus to inspect the passengers, the punched tickets, and the conductor’s reports;
2. There is a mandatory once-a week car barn or shop day, where the bus is regularly
checked;
3. The drivers and conductors must be at specified place and time, as they observe
prompt departure and arrival;
4. At every depot, there is always a dispatcher whose function is to see to it that the bus
and crew leaves and arrives at the estimated proper time.

By these reasons, drivers and conductors are therefore under constant supervision while in the
performance of their work.
21. CONSOLIDATED FOOD CORP. vs. NLRC, et al.
SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated OCT 11 2000.

G.R. No. 118647 (Consolidated Food Corporation, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission and
Wilfredo M. Baron.)

Private respondent Wilfredo M. Baron filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court's Decision of 23
September 1999 which reversed the finding of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) that he was constructively dismissed. He alleges that the findings of fact of the NLRC must be
accorded respect and finality; there is substantial evidence that he did not abandon his job but was
constructively dismissed hence illegally dismissed; and, he was denied his right to due process.

After a careful perusal of the grounds discussed by respondent Baron, this Court finds that these matters
have already been fully and exhaustively discussed in the Decision of this Court. Although factual findings of
the NLRC are entitled to respect and finality when supported by substantial evidence, this Court will not
uphold erroneous conclusions of the NLRC when the latter committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at
its decision or when the findings of facts from which the conclusions were based were not supported by
substantial evidence.1 Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110388, 14 September
1995, 248 SCRA 183. In this case, the Court takes exception to the rule that the findings on technical
matters by NLRC are conclusive and binding upon this Court since it is clear that a palpable and
demonstrable mistake had been committed and should be rectified.

The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that
respondent Baron was constructively dismissed because he was subjected to various audits concerning his
sales activities and was transferred from Baguio City and re-assigned to the main office. Records show that
there was substantial evidence of the existence of irregularities committed by respondent Baron in the use
of funds entrusted to him which he failed to account for. Re-assignments made by management pending
investigation of irregularities allegedly committed by an employee fall within the ambit of management
prerogative and cannot be considered as amounting to constructive dismissal.

Moreover, contrary to the contention of respondent Baron that he was denied due process when he was
dismissed, records show that during the audit and investigation on the alleged fraud he committed against
petitioners, he was given every opportunity to raise his defenses and explain the discrepancies in the funds
in his possession. It also appears from the records that when respondent Baron absented himself from the
company without leave from 18 March to 13 April 1991 he was sent two (2) notices, one on 13 April 1991
and another on 18 April 1991 requiring him to explain his unauthorized absences. Indeed, respondent Baron
sent a letter to petitioners on 29 April 1991 explaining his alleged unauthorized absences. However instead
of returning to work on 15 May 1991 as he promised in his reply letter to petitioners and justify his cause.
respondent Baron filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for alleged constructive dismissal on 14 May 1991
and did not report for work anymore. Although this Court ruled that respondent Baron was not
constructively dismissed, we nonetheless ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay respondent Baron
his unpaid salaries and proportionate 13th-month pay for the period of his new assignment from 1 January
1991 to 15 March 1991 as well as attorney's fees for the recovery of his unpaid wages.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration of private respondent Wilfredo M. Baron is DENIED and this.
denial is FINAL. Let copies of the Resolutions of 26 August 2000, 6 December 1991 and 16 February 2000
intended for Atty. Edgardo M. Tamoria, counsel for public respondent NLRC, but returned unserved with
notations "Deceased," together with this Resolution, be sent to the NLRC at its offices at PPSTA Building,
Banawe Street, corner Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.
22.