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CASE DIGESTS in Natural Resources and Environmental Law

16. Balboa v Farrales GR 27059

FACTS:

Sometime in the year 1913, the plaintiff Buenaventura Balboa filled with the Bureau of Lands an
application for homestead, No. 10619, under the provisions of Act No. 926, covering a tract of land in
Culis, Hermosa, Bataan. On July 1, 1919, said Act No. 926 was repealed by Act No. 2874.

On August 11, 1924, said Buenaventura Balboa, for and in consideration of the sum of P950, sold said
land to the defendant Cecilio L. Farrales.

On March 6, 1926, the plaintiff commenced the present action for the purpose of having said sale
declared null and void on the ground of lack of consent on his part and fraud on the part of the defendant,
and on the further ground that said sale was contrary to, and in violation of the provisions of section 116
of Act No. 2874.

The trial judge rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter
to return to the plaintiff the land

ISSUE:
which of the two Acts — 926 and 2874 — shall be applied in determining whether the sale in question is
valid or not?

RULING:

Act 926 applies and the sale is valid.

The moment the plaintiff had received a certificate from the Government and had done all that was
necessary under the law to secure his patent, his right had become vested before the patent was issued.
His right had already vested prior to the issuance of the patent, and his rights to the land cannot be
affected by a subsequent law or by a subsequent grant by the Government to any other person.

It follows, therefore that the sale of the land in question by the plaintiff Buenventura Balboa to the
defendant Cecilio L. Farrales does not infringe said prohibition, and consequently said sale is valid and
binding, and should be given full force and effect.

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17. Dicman v Carino GR 146459
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18. Director of Lands v IAC GR 73002

FACTS

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the IAC affirming a
decision of the CFI of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc. of 5 parcels of land, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe.

The appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation
duly organized in accordance with the laws
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real
properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took
place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the
ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation
until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who
were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the
possession is already considered from time immemorial;
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land
occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public
land or within the public domain;
8. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was
duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela,
have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and
the negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the
townsite of Maconacon, Isabelaon and which donation was accepted by the Municipal
Government of Maconacon, Isabela.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS:
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● the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long
after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable
law;

● and since section 11 of Article XIV OF 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations
or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to
exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in
1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to
decree registration in favor of Acme.

PERTINENT PROVISION

Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a b o n a d e claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against
the government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure . These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof.

ISSUE

W/N the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter
in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in
mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except
in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares. - YES
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RULING

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981.

● If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the
negative

● If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional
prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously
does not apply.

If it is accepted — as it must be — that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition,
there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973
Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and
owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acme's
right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution
that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in
public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or
"imperfect" title.

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.

The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of
the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot
defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then
perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must
be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than
procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be
confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973
Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience
to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
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19. Lu Do and Lu Ym Corp v Aznar Brothers Realty Co. GR 143307

FACTS:

An 8,485 square meter land was the subject of both an award of Foreshore Lease in favor of respondent

Aznar Brothers Realty Company and of the subsequent Miscellaneous Sales Application filed by

petitioner.

On July 21, 1965, petitioner took possession of the subject property. Petitioner’s occupation

of the land was by virtue of a purported provisional permit alleged to have been issued by the Bureau of

Lands. The Director of Lands rendered a decision revoking the award in favor of respondent and

directing the re-auction of the subject land. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was

denied. Respondent appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources. The Minister reversed the decision

of the Director of Lands, upholding the award of the land in favor of respondent and ordering petitioner

to remove the improvements on the land, otherwise, the same would be forfeited in favor of the

government.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA Ruled in favor of respondent. A petition for review was filed by

petitioner before the Court but it was dismissed. In 1995, petitioner filed with the Lands Management

Bureau, the instant Motion to Suspend Enforcement of Decision, To Rebid Land in Dispute and/or To

Quash Order of Execution. Petitioner argued that the land in question should be rebidded in view of

dissolution of respondent partnership by reason of the death of two of its partners; and because the

questioned land is no longer a proper subject of a foreshore application, it, having ceased to be a

foreshore land and having been transformed into an area suitable for industrial/commercial purposes.

The Secretary of the DENR held that said motion is a mere dilatory ploy and an attempt to relitigate

settled issues. A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order was denied. The Office of the

President dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and motion for reconsideration. Petitioner sought relief with

the CA. It argued that the Decision of the Director of Lands which was favorable to it and which revoked
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the award of the lease to respondent had already become final and executory, hence, the Minister of

Natural Resources can no longer reverse the same in its decision. The CA dismissed the petition for lack

of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has a legal personality to file an action for revocation or for the rebidding of

the contested land.

RULING:

No. In actions where the ultimate relief sought is the reversion of the land to the government, it is the

latter which has the legal personality to file the suit. The rationale is that since the land subject of the

action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and

the grantee.

In the instant case, the final and executory resolution of the Court which sustained the award of the

grant to lease the contested land in favor of respondent effectively obliterated any right which

petitioner might have had as an applicant of a grant over the land. As far as any suit to disqualify or

revoke the award to respondent is concerned, petitioner is a stranger with no legal personality to

maintain such action. This is because the revocation of the award will not vest any right on petitioner.

Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name

of the real party-in-interest, or one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.

Real interest means present and substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a

future, contingent, subordinate consequential interest.

Here, the suit filed by petitioner should be dismissed for lack of the requisite real interest. And even

granting that petitioner is a legitimate holder of a temporary permit to occupy the land, said permit will

not vest him legal personality to seek the revocation of respondent’s award. Being merely temporary, its

permit may be revoked at any time by the Secretary of the DENR.

The petition is denied.

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20. Marasigan v IAC GR L-69303

FACTS:

In 1974, a deed of absolute sale was executed by Fe Bazar in favor of Maria Marasigan. However, in
1975, Maria Marron was declared the owner of the subject property in a land registration case. She filed a
motion for execution which was granted. The spouses, Bazar, refused to surrender their title and to
execute the deed of sale in Marron’s favor.

In 1978, when Marasigan had the title registered, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a TCT naming
Maria Marasigan as the new owner, the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by Marron on the
Bazar’s title was carried over on the said new title.

ISSUE:

Whether the party who bought the property with a notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of her title
has a better right over the party in whose favor the notice of lis pendens was made.

RULING:

No. The Court affirmed the ruling of the appellate court which ruled in favor of the party how had the
notice annotated and who won the litigation over the property.

The Court reiterated the established rule that:

… the filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a notice of the particular litigation
referred to therein and, therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire on the property is subject to the
eventuality of the suit. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity,
the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the
judgment or decree shall have been entered; otherwise, by successive alienations pending the litigation,
its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. … (Laroza v. Guia, 134
SCRA 341).