690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cha ws. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 124520, August 18, 1997. Spouses NILO CHA and STELLA UY CHA, and UNITED INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CKS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. ~ G@ontracts;| Stipulations contained in a cont a contrary to policy.—The core issue to be resolved in this case is Sao not the aforequoted paragraph 18 of the lease contract entered into between CKS and the Cha spouses is valid insofar as it provides that any fire insurance | policy obtained by the lessee (Cha spouses) over their merchandise inside the leased premises is deemed assigned or transferred to the lessor (CKS) if said policy is obtained without the prior written consent of the latter. It is, of course, basic in the law on + FIRST DIVISION. eo1 VOL. 277, AUGUST 18, 1997 691 Cha vs. Court of Appeals contracts that the stipulations contained in a contract cannot be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Same; Insurance; No contract or policy of insurance on property shall be enforceable except for the having an ii —Sec. 18 of the Insurance Code provides: “Sec. 18, No contract or policy of insurance on property shall be enforceable except for the benefit of some person having an insurable interest in the property ineured.” A nenllfe inslratle polley ouch ee therfireinguraneot policy taken by petitionerspouses over their |merchandise is primarily @ contract of indemnity. Insurable interest in the "property insured must exist at the time the insurance takes effect and at the time the loss occurs. The basis of such requirement ofinsurable interest in property insured is based on sound public ‘policy: to prevent a person from taking out an insurance policy on property upon which he has the ry. In such a case, the contract of insurance is a mere wager which is void under Section 25 of the Insurance Code. Same; Same; Leases; The lessor cannot be validly a beneficiary of a fire insurance policy taken by a lessee over his merchandise, and the provision in the lease contract providing for such automatic assignment is void for being contrary to law: and/or public policy—the insurer cannot be cot the proceeds of the policy to a person who has no insurable interest in the property insured.—Therefore, respondent CKS cannot, under the Insurance Code—a special law—be validly abeneficiary of the fire insurance policy taken by the petitioner-spouses over their merchandise. This insurable interest over said merchandise remains with the insured the |Cha spouses ‘The automatic assignment of the policy to CKS under the provision of the lease contract previously quoted is void for being contrary to law and/or \publié policy. The proceeds of the fire insurance policy thus rightfully belong to thé spouses) Nilo: Cha: and_ Stella: Uy:Cha (herein co-petitioners.) The insurer (United) cannot be compelled to pay the proceeds of the fire insurance policy to a person (CKS) who has no insurable interest in the property insured, PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. 692 692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ~ Cha vs. Court of Appeals Jose Angelito B. Bulao for petitioners. Jara & Eduardo for private respondent. PADILLA, /J.: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside a decision of respondent - Court of Appeals. The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: 1. Petitioner-spouses Nilo Cha and Stella Uy-Cha, as lessees, entered into a/lease contract with private respondent. CKS. Development Corporation (hereinafter CKS), as lessor, on 5 October 1988, 2. One of the stipulations of the one (1) year lease contract states: “18. x x x. The LESSEE shall not insure against fire the chattels, merchandise, textiles, goods and effects placed at any stall or store or space in the leased premises without first obtaining the written consent and approval of the LESSOR. If the LESSEEobtain(s) the insurance thereof without the consent of the “LESSOR then the policy is deemed/assigned and transferred to the LESSOR for its own benefit; x x x." 3. Notwithstanding the above stipulation in the lease contract, the Cha spouses insured against loss by fire the merchandise inside the leased premises for Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) with the United Insurance Co. Inc. (hereinafter United) without the written consent of private respondent CKS. 4, On the day that the lease contract was to expire, 5. When CKS learned of the insurance earlier procured by the Cha spouses (without its consent), it wrote the insurer (United) a demand letter asking that the!proceeds of the insurance contract (between the Cha spouses and United) be 1 Rollo, p. 50. 693 VOL. 277, AUGUST 18, 1997 693 Cha vs. Court of Appeals paid directly d on its lease contract) with the eS. 6. United refused to pay CKS. Hence, the latter filed a complaint against the Cha spouses and United. 7. On 2 June 1992, the i h 6, Manila, rendered a decision ordering therein defendant United to pay CKS the amount of 335,063.11 and defendant Cha spouses to pay P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of suit. 8. On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 39328 rendered a decision dated 11 January 1996, attains baal alt decision, deleting however the exemplary damages and attorney's fees. A motion for reconsideration by United was denied on 29 March 1996. In the present petition, the following errors are assigned by petitioners to the Court of Appeals: 1 ‘THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT THE STIPULATION IN THE CONTRACT OF LEASE TRANSFERRING THE PROCEEDS OF THE INSURANCE TO RESPONDENT IS/NULL AND VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICYste THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THE CONTRACT OF LEASE)” ENTERED INTO AS A CONTRACT OF ADHESION AND THEREFORE THE QUESTIONABLE PROVISION THEREIN ‘TRANSFERRING THE PROCEEDS OF THE INSURANCE TO RESPONDENT MUST BE) RULED) OUT IN FAVOR OF ‘PRNITIONER UL THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING PROCEEDS OF AN INSURANCE POLICY TO APPELLEE WHICH ~* Penned by Judge Roberto M. Lagman. + Penned by Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales with Justices Fidel P. Purisima and Fermin A. Martin, Jr., concurring. 694 694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cha vs. Court of Appeals IS NOT PRIVY TO THE SAID POLICY IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE INSURANCE LAW IV THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING PROCEEDS OF AN INSURANCE POLICY ON ‘THE BASIS OF A STIPULATION WHICH IS VOID FOR BEING WITHOUT CONSIDERATION AND FOR BEING TOTALLY DEPENDENT QN THE WILL OF THE RESPONDENT CORPORATION. ‘The Gore issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the aforequoted paragraph 18 of the lease contract entered into between CKS and the Cha spouses is valid insofar as it provides that the Tesooe (Cha spouses) over their terchandise inside the leased premises is deemed assigned or transferred to the lessor (CKS) if said policy is obtained |without the prior written consent of the latter. It is, of si cts the law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Sec. 18 of the Insurance Code provides: eon property shall be | enforveable except for the benefit of some person having an insurable interest in the property insured.” Anon-life insurance policy such as the fire insurance policy taken by petitioner-spouses over their merchandise is primarily a contract of indemnity. Insurable interest in the -property insured must exis and at the time the loss occurs. The basis of such requirement of insurable interest in property insured is based on 2 Rollo, p. 18, 8 Article 1409(j), Civil Code. 4 Section 19, Insurance Code, 695 VOL. 277, AUGUST 18, 1997 695 Cha us. Court of Appeals sound public policy: to prevent person from taking out an insurance policy on property upon which he has no insurable interest and collecting the proceeds of said policy in case of loss of the property. In such a case, the contract of insurance is a mere wager which is void under Section 25 of the Insurance Code, which provides: “SECTION 25. Every stipulation in a policy of Insurance for the payment of loss, whether the person insured has or has not any interest in the property insured, or that the policy shall be received as proof of such interest, and every policy executed by way of gaming or wagering, is In the present case, it cannot be denied that CKS has no” insurable interest in the goods and merchandise inside the leased premises under the provisions of Section 17 of the Insurance Code which provide: “Section 17. The measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured might be damnified by loss or injury thereof.” Therefore, respondent CKS cannot, under the Insurance Code—a special law—be validly a’ beneficiary of the fire insurance policy taken by the petitioner-spouses over their merchandise. This insurable interest over said merchandise remains with the insured, the Cha spouses. — The automatic assignment of the policy to CKS under the provision of the lease contract previously quoted is void for being contrary to law and/or public policy. The proceeds of the fire insurance policy thus rightfully belong to the spouses Nilo Cha and Stella UyCha (herein co-petitioners.) The insurer (United) cannot be compelled to pay the pl i i fho get eet he Tait of the Cha spouses to CKS for violating their lease contract in that the Cha spo. btained a fire insur-ance policy over their own merchandise, without the consent of CKS, is a separate and distinct issue which we _ do not resolve in this case. 696696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cha us. Court of Appeals WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 39328 is SET ASIDE and a new decision is hereby entered, awarding the proceeds of t policy to petitioners SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., d., concur. Judgment set aside, award of proceeds of fire insurance policy ordered given to petitioners Nilo Cha and Stella Uy- Cha. Notes—In a case arising from a vehicular collision where the driver, the registered owners, the beneficial owners, and the insurer were sued, a compromise agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the insurer resulting in the dismissal of the case as against the insurer does not redound to the benefit of the other defendants. (Imson vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 58 [1994)) If the insured property is destroyed or damaged through the fault or negligence of a party other than the assured, then the insurer, upon payment to the assured will be subrogated to the rights of the assured to recover from the wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has been obligated to pay. (Coastwise Lighterage Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 796 [1995]) ——000— 697 © Copyright 2022 Central Book Supply, Inc. 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