SEPTEMBER 18, 2022

Memorize: Articles 427 to 439

Title II. - OWNERSHIP

CHAPTER 1
OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL

Art. 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights. (n)

Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law. 

The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order
to recover it. (348a)

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property. (n)

Art. 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls,
ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon. (388)

Art. 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such manner as to injure the
rights of a third person. (n)

Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference of another with the
same, if the interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened
damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from the interference, is much
greater. The owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for the damage to
him. (n)

Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the
property. (n)

Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must
rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. (n)

Art. 435. No person shall be deprived of his property except by competent authority and
for public use and always upon payment of just compensation. 

Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts shall protect and, in a
proper case, restore the owner in his possession. (349a)
Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest
of health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless
he can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. (n)

Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under
it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which
he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and
ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation. (350a)

Art. 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other property on
which it is found. 

Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the State or any
of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the
finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of the treasure. 

If the things found be of interest to science of the arts, the State may acquire them at their
just price, which shall be divided in conformity with the rule stated. (351a)

Art. 439. By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any hidden and unknown deposit of
money, jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful ownership of which does not
appear. (352) 

Ownership
A. Concept of Ownership (Art. 427)
Characteristics of Ownership
Rights Included in Ownership (Art. 428)

Ownership is the independent and general right of a person to control a thing particularly in his
possession, enjoyment, disposition, and recovery, subject to no restrictions except those imposed
by the state or private persons, without prejudice to the provisions of the law.

Q: Is possession different from ownership?

A: Yes, juridically speaking, possession is distinct from ownership. It is true that a registered
owner has a right of possession over the property as this is one of the attributes of ownership.
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the
owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the
property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he
chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to
prosper.
CASES:

#1 Javier v. Veridiano, G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994

Doctrine: A judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other

issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means
constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.

FACTS:
On January 1963, Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No. 1641, Ts
308 of Olongapo Townsite Subdivision in Olongapo City. On December 1970,

Javier filed Civil Case no. 926 (CC 926) for forcible entry against Ben Babol for entering
a portion of the southwestern part of Lot 1641, Ts 308. The case was dismissed since the
court considered the portion outside Lot 1461. The case became final and executory on
April 1973.

Subsequently, Javier was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an Original

Certificate of Title was issued in her favor. Meanwhile, Babol who was the defendant in CC 926
had sold the portion he was occupying to Rosete. 4 years after the finality of CC 926, Javier
instituted a Civil Case No. 2203-0 (CC 2203-0) for quieting of title and recovery of
possession. Rosete moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The CFI of Zambales
dismissed the case.

Res judicata - Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive (cannot be contradicted) of the rights of the parties
or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.
- The matter decided
-   res judicata, the matter cannot be raised again, either in the same court or in a
different court. A court will use res judicata  to deny reconsideration of a matter.[1]
- The doctrine of res judicata is a method of preventing injustice to the parties of a
case supposedly finished but perhaps also or mostly a way of avoiding unnecessary
waste of judicial resources. Res judicata does not merely prevent future judgments
from contradicting earlier ones, but also prevents litigants from multiplying
judgments, and confusion.

ISSUE:

W/N the first case on forcible entry was res judicata against the second case on quieting of title.
(NO)
RULING:

For res judicata to arise, four requisites must concur: Final judgment, Court with competent
jurisdiction, judgment based on merits, identity of parties and cause of action.
The Court said that in the two cases, there were identity of parties because Respondent, having
acquired the contested land by sale and tradition, is a successor in interest.

However, there was no identity of the causes of action. In forcible entry, the only issue is prior
possession and not ownership. In accion reivindicatoria, the issue is the ownership. The Court
held that the second case was actually an accion reivindicatoria as Petitioner set up title for
herself, prayed that Respondent to be ejected and that she be declared the owner. Thus a final
judgment on forcible entry or detainer is NOT a bar against to an action for determination
of ownership.
#2 Bustos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120784-85, 24 January 2001

Fajardo died intestate

He had four (4) children, namely: Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed
Fajardo.
the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition[5] of the estate of Paulino Fajardo.
Manuela sold her share to
Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale
At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral... the cadastre was conducted, and the
property involved in the partition case were specified
The share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses,... includes Lot... of the Masantol Cadastre...
was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B.
Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to her
brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.
Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga a complaint for partition claiming the
one fourth (¼) share of Manuela which was sold to him.
During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died.
the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo.
Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot... to spouses Venancio Viray and
Cecilia Nunga-Viray.
the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55 rendered a decision in favor of
Moses G. Mendoza,... Moses sold the subject land to spouses Warlito Bustos and Herminia
Reyes-Bustos.
, spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray,... filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court... an action for unlawful detainer... against... spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses G.
Mendoza, who were in actual possession as lessees of the husband of Trinidad,... The
municipal circuit trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray.
he trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but were stayed when spouses
Bustos filed with the Regional Trial Court,... the regional trial court rendered a decision,... to
pay the private respondents... the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the two
cases,... Moses Mendoza is declared as owner of the ¼ undivided share previously owned by
Manuela Fajardo; and the decision of the Regional Trial Court... is... affirmed but MODIFIED
Issues:
The issue raised is whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the
unlawful detainer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to
possession on the ground that the decision has become final and executory. This means that
the... petitioners may be evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court declared
petitioners as the lawful owners of the land.
Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the
ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of
exceptions. In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal,[20] the Supreme
Court reiterated the rule "once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial
duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special
and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to...
direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O. G. 579); whenever it is
necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual v. Tan, 85 Phil. 164); or when certain
facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the...
execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354)."
In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now
legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by
ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice.
Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership
to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.
Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical
consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners of the property.[21] One
of the essential attributes of ownership is possession. It follows that as... owners of the
subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. "An owner who cannot
exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of ownership--the right to possess, to use and
enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to... recover or vindicate
and to the fruits--is a crippled owner."

#3 Heirs of Roman Soriano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128177, August 15, 2001

A person may be declared the owner of a property but he may not be entitled to possession. The
exercise of the rights of ownership is subject to limitations that may be imposed by law.
Although declared to be the lawful owner, such owner cannot automatically evict the physical
possessor of the land unless it has been determined that no rights of the possessor will be
violated by such eviction.
FACTS:

A piece of land located in Lingayen, Pangasinan is the disputed property in this case. Said land
was originally owned by one Adriano Soriano, subsequently it was leased for a period of 15
years to the Spouses David and Consuelo.

RAMON SORIANO, son of Adriano and herein petitioner, acting as caretaker/tenant of the
property during the duration of the lease. Upon the death of Adriano the lot he owned was
divided into TWO and given to his heirs. One of the lots inherited was sold to the Spouses
ABALOS, here. The other lot was also bought by the Spouses Abalos although not completely
(only ¾ of the lot). The lots in question were subsequently registered in the name of the Spouses
Abalos. The courts later declared them to be the undisputed owners thereof. Soriano questions
their ownership of the land and so filed cases against the spouses. Currently Soriano is still in
possession of the land claiming rights of “Security of Tenure” as a tenant of the land.

ISSUE:

May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof?

RULING/RATIO:

No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Possession is the holding of a thing
or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a
thing with or without right. A judgment of ownership does not necessarily include possession
as a necessary incident. Such declaration pertains only to OWNERSHIP and does not
automatically include possession. This is especially true in the case at bar wherein petitioner is
occupying the land allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. The court says “allegedly”
due to the fact that there is still a pending case in the DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform
and Adjudication Board) on the issue. The issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to
rest by final judgment; however the right of possession is yet to be resolved. The Tenancy Act,
which protects the rights of agricultural tenants, may limit the exercise of rights by the
lawful owners. The exercise of the rights of ownership yields to the exercise of the rights of an
agricultural tenant. Since the rights of Soriano to possess the land are still pending litigation in
the DARAB he is protected from dispossession of the land until final judgment of said court
unless Soriano’s occupancy is found by the court to be unlawful.
#4 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999

Doctrine: Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing
pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by
law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner,
one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale.

Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without
right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner
and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself
or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his
belief be right or wrong.

Facts:

Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, was registered, sold with the consent
of his wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her
husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos).

On March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan. On March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcia’s Title was
cancelled and in its stead Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-108412/545 was issued in the
name of the Magpayos. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered at the Makati
Register of Deeds and annotated on the Magpayos title.

The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the

Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was consolidated in favor of
PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo’s title and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138233
was issued in its name. The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity,
hence, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale,
PBCom which was the highest bidder bought the land. On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos
filed at the RTC of Makati a complaint seeking the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage, public auction sale, and PBCom’s title docketed as Civil Case No. 11891. This
complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute. On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over
the land which was granted. Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo’s brother,
Jose Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it and filed
a motion for Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which motion was denied.

Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the instant
suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged, inter alia, that he inherited the land
as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. Garcia, and that PBCom acquired no right
thereover. In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the mortgage executed by the
Magpayo spouses in favor of PBCom was void. The Magpayo spouses could not have
acquired the said property merely by the execution of the Deed of Sale because the
property was in the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia, was not in
possession and hence could not deliver the property merely by the execution of the document.

On appeal, CA held that Garcia’s assertion that ownership over the disputed
property was not transmitted to his sister and her husband-Magpayo spouses at the time of
the execution of the Deed of Sale as he was still in actual and adverse possession thereof.
Since the execution of the deed of sale by Atty. Pedro V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos took
place earlier or on August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim, Garcia was not in possession of
the property at the time of the execution of said public instrument.

Furthermore, it appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the property
which was registered in his name and that the deed of sale was likewise registered,
then the sale was consummated and the Magpayos were free to exercise the attributes of
ownership including the right to mortgage the land.

When the land is registered in the vendor’s name, and the public instrument of sale is also
registered, the sale may be considered consummated and the buyer may exercise the actions
of an owner. That the Magpayos’ title, TCT No. S-108412, was issued four (4) days following
the execution of the deed of real estate mortgage is of no moment, for registration under the
Torrens system does not vest ownership but is intended merely to confirm and register the title
which one may already have on the land.

Issue:
Whether Garcia’s possession is in a concept of an owner.

Held:
No. Garcia’s possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen into
ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was that of an intruder,
one done in bad faith (to defeat PBCom’s Writ of Possession).

His possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner. This is so because as early
as 1981, title thereto was registered in the name of the Magpayo Spouses which title was
subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased by PBCom in a public auction sale
resulting in the issuance of title in favor of the latter in 1985.

The Court stressed that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will
in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership
confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of
sale. Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they
owned when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand,
possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to
possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession
may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession
of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who
claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in
another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or
wrong.

The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for
his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner
was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was
not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership. On the other hand, petitioner’s
subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother’s share in the conjugal asset is
belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory of the estate
submitted by his father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the
property was no longer considered owned by petitioner’s parents.

The Court upheld the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBCom by the
Magpayo spouses is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the property
was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does not
confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership over a particular property. The
deed of sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and
authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership. All said, the Magpayo
spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.

#5 Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 129609 and 135537, 29 November
2001
FACTS:

 ORRACA Bldg. is owned by the Republic of the Phil. Which was leased to Rodil
Enterprises.
 Rodil Ent. Entered into a subleased contract with the private respondents who are
members of ORRACA Tenants Assoc. Inc. (Association).
 Rodil offered to buy the building, while pending for appraisal of market value of the
property, ASSOCIATION offered to lease the same building.
 Pending action for Rodil’s offer to buy the bldg., Rodil request for another renewal of the
lease for 5 years.
 The Management suspend the request of Rodil for renewal of lease for 5 years because
Association’s offer to lease was more beneficial to the Republic.
 The management issued a temporary occupancy permit to ASSOCIATION.
 A new custodian was designated to manage the ORRACA Bldg.
 Renewal of lease was entered into by Rodil and the new management for the bldg for 10
years.
 Rodil filed an action of unlawful detainer against the members of ASSOCIATION.
 MTC ruled in favor of Rodil and was affirmed by RTC
 CA on appeal reversed the decision of the RTC
 Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the renewal contract between Rodil and the Republic is valid.

HELD: YES.

We rule for RODIL. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition
over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception.

The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter
into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the
REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements
required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present.

Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with the
REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject property was merely by virtue of
acquiescence. The records clearly show this to be the case. The REPUBLIC merely issued a
"temporary occupancy permit" which was not even in the name of the respondents Bondoc,
Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear or Chua but of respondent ASSOCIATION. Since the
occupation of respondents was merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of possession of the
latter remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it chose.
Unfortunately for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises to RODIL
by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992.

#6 Isaguirre v. De Lara, G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000 Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No.
146082, 30 July 2004

#7 Abejaron v. Nabasa, G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001

Doctrine: For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is

essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing
evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.

Facts:
Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and
claimant of a 118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in
Silway, General Santos City. In 1945, petitioner Abejaron and his family started
occupying the 118-square meter land. At that time, the land had not yet been
surveyed. They fenced the area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing
and a small store. In 1949, petitioner improved their property to become a two-
storey house made of round wood and nipa roofing. Abejaron also introduced
several improvements on the land including a store, 5 coconut trees on the
property of controversy, and avocado and banana trees. All this time that the
Abejarons introduced these improvements on the land in controversy, respondent
Nabasa did not oppose or complain about the improvements. Knowing that the
disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only his house, and
not the disputed land, for taxation purposes.

Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the

remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. Nabasa built his
house about four (4) meters away from petitioner Abejaron’s house.
Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in
controversy. Abejaron merely watched them do the survey and did not thereafter
apply for title of the land on the belief that he could not secure title over it
as it was government property. Without his (Abejaron) knowledge and consent,
however, Nabasa “clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully applied
for and caused the titling in his name” of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953,
including petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion. Petitioner imputes bad
faith and fraud on the part of Nabasa because in applying for and causing the
titling in his name of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, Nabasa represented himself to
be the actual and lawful possessor of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, including
petitioner Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion despite knowledge of Abejaron’s
actual occupation and possession of said portion.
On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of Title No.
P-4140 pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-4) 2877 covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-
154953 including therein the lot occupied by the petitioner.

On March 12, 1982 an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent
Nabasa before Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.

Issue:
Whether the allegation of fraud has been proven for the action for
reconveyance to prosper. (NO)

Held:
An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another’s name after one year from the date of the decree so long as the property
has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action does not seek to
reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration but
only purports to show that the person who secured the registration of the
property in controversy is not the real owner thereof. Fraud is a ground for
reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is
essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing
evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. Such was not performed
by the petitioner.

Abejaron’s 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public

Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity
of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and
possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to
him. Petitioner claims that he started occupying the disputed land in 1945. At
that time, he built a nipa house, a small store, and a fence made of wood to
delineate his area. This nipa house was improved in 1949 into a two-storey house.
The small store was also made bigger in 1950. The wooden fence was also changed
to a fence made of hollow blocks. The two-storey house, bigger store, and hollow-
block fence all stand to this day. In 1951, petitioner planted coconut trees near
his house. While the petitioner has shown continued existence of these
improvements on the disputed land, they were introduced later than January 24,
1947. He has failed to establish the portion of the disputed land that his
original nipa house, small store and wooden fence actually occupied as of January
24, 1947. In the absence of this proof, we cannot determine the land he actually
possessed and occupied for thirty years which he may acquire under Sec. 48(b) of
the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is the fact that the disputed land was
surveyed, subdivided into and identified by lots only in the 1970’s. Therefore,
prior to the survey, it would be difficult to determine the metes and bounds of
the land petitioner claims to have occupied since 1947 in the absence of specific
and incontrovertible proof.

Also, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land
for taxation purposes. While tax receipts and tax declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership
acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property or supported by other effective proof. Even the tax declarations and
receipts covering his house do not bolster his case as the earliest of these was
dated 1950.

Petitioner’s evidence does not constitute the “well-nigh incontrovertible”

evidence necessary to acquire title through possession and occupation of the
disputed land at least since January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands of
whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be
“well-nigh incontrovertible.” As petitioner Abejaron has not adduced any evidence
of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of title,
or homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action for
reconveyance.

#8 Javier v. Lumontad, GR. No. 203760, December 3, 2014

Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. v. Ando, GR. No. 195669, May 30, 2016

B. Principle of Self-help (Art. 429) and State of Necessity (Art. 432)

CASES:
German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 177 SCRA 495 caisip v. People
36 SCRA 17
Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No.
192999, 18 July 2012

C. Use Injuring Rights of Third Persons (Art. 431)

CASE:
Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, 6 November 1990