(Psychoanalytic Ideas) Phil Mollon - Shame and Jealousy - The Hidden Turmoils-Karnac Books (2002)

Shame and Jealousy
The Hidden Turmoils
KARNAC
SHAME AND
JEALOUSY
Shame and Jealousy is o n e of a series of l o w - c o s t b o o k s u n d e r

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SHAME AND
JEALOUSY
THE H I D D E N TURMOILS
By
Phil Motion
Series Editors
Inge Wise and Paul Williams
KARNAC
LONDON NEW YORK

Published in 2002 by
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Copyright © 2002 Phil Mollon
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To a Bird Called Hope
The bird of hope landed softly on my perch,
With her sweet song she flirted,
And enchanted me,
Then spread her coloured wings,
And I pursued her,
Soaring high,
And low,
We rested in the forest,
Where she dallied with another,
Then the black knight of jealousy,
Riding roughshod in my heart,
Trampled her to death,
And I was ashamed.
Poem by "Pedro"—used with permission

CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix
PREFACE xi
CHAPTER ONE
Shame and jealousy 1
CHAPTER TWO
Further reflections on shame 23
CHAPTER THREE
Psychic murder syndrome 53
CHAPTER FOUR
Jealousy 77
CHAPTER FIVE
Shame in the psychoanalytic consulting room 123
Concluding summary 39
1vii
A note on psychoanalysis for the general reader 143

Viii CONTENTS
REFERENCES 149
INDEX 159
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I
a m extremely grateful to Inge Wise for i n v i t i n g me to w r i t e
this book, and also for her encouragement over the years i n a
variety of ways. This is also an o p p o r t u n i t y to thank various
people whose support helped to sustain me d u r i n g those times
w h e n adverse circumstances made m y o w n psychoanalytic journey
extremely arduous; m a n y must remain nameless, b u t I w o u l d
particularly like to thank m y analyst, Patrick Casement, and
supervisors, Eric Rayner and H a r o l d Stewart; the support of m y
w i f e , Ros, was also crucial. I w o u l d not have been able to w r i t e this
book w i t h o u t the excellent library services of b o t h the Institute of
Psychoanalysis and the Lister Hospital. I w o u l d also like to thank
Lisa W i l l i s for h e l p f u l comments on the manuscript. Appreciation
must also be expressed to the m a n y patients w h o , i n their
willingness to share their most private areas of m i n d , have enabled
the ideas and perspectives expressed here to emerge; w i t h o u t t h e m
there c o u l d be no book.
ix
PREFACE
S
hame and jealousy are h i d d e n t u r m o i l s that pervade h u m a n
life, exerting their secret terror and control f r o m w i t h i n .
Neither is easily acknowledged. Both are " s h a m e - f u l l " . I n
the gaps and clumsy steps i n h u m a n intercourse, i n the misunder
standings, the misperceptions, and misjudgements, i n the blank
m o c k i n g eyes where empathy should be, i n the look of disgust
where a smile was anticipated, i n the loneliness a n d disappointment
of inarticulate desire that cannot be communicated because the
w o r d s cannot be f o u n d , i n the terrible hopeless absence w h e n
h u m a n connection fails, and i n the e m p t y yet rage-filled desolation
of abuse—there i n these holes and missing bits lies shame. Shame is
where w e fail. A n d the most fundamental failure is the failure to
connect w i t h other h u m a n beings—originally the mother. Jealousy
lies i n our perception that there is an other (originally the Oedipal
other, or a sibling) w h o m i g h t succeed i n connecting where w e have
failed.
The baby seeks its self i n the mother's responsive s m i l i n g face.
Similarly the a d u l t seeks affirmation i n the recognition of partner,
f a m i l y , a n d the c o m m u n i t y . Except for those w h o have felt
i n s u r m o u n t a b l y secure i n the love and v a l i d a t i o n of the early
xi
xii PREFACE
care-givers, the threat of the blank look of non-recognition is ever

present—or the look that sees not w h o w e w i s h to be b u t w h o the
other wishes us to be:
The " d r a i n hole" look of the Other sucks out who I am for myself,
reconstituting it through the perception of one who is not myself.
. [Kilborne, 1999, p. 42]
W h e n a person seeks help from a psychoanalyst or psychothera

pist, the situation is saturated w i t h the potential for shame. The
reasons are basically t w o f o l d . First, the emotional information to be
communicated is inherently of a private, and therefore latently
shameful nature. Second, the possibilities of misunderstandings,
failures of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , and inadequacies of empathy are
m a n i f o l d . Astonishingly, this shame-laden quality of the psycho
analytic and psychotherapeutic setting is rarely addressed. Perhaps
this becomes less surprising w h e n the " a l w a y s h i d d e n " nature of
shame is appreciated—for shame that is overt and exposed is like a
fox forcibly d u g out of its lair, w h e n the hounds have exhausted its
capacity to flee and hide. M o s t l y shame lurks unseen.
One of the reasons w e avoid speaking of shame may be because
i t is peculiarly contagious (Lewis, 1971). Hearing of shame evokes
shame (even i f only subtly and slightly). We do not like i t — a n d so
w e prefer to speak of something else, such as guilt or envy.
I first became interested i n shame w h e n w o r k i n g at the
Tavistock Clinic i n the early 1980s. By coincidence, I had several
patients w h o presented w i t h particular problems i n the area of
shame and false self. A t the time relatively little had been w r i t t e n
about shame f r o m a psychoanalytic and psychological point of
v i e w . Thus Nathanson (1987) commented:
Shame seems to be an emotion little discussed in our clinical work.

In the 20 years I have stayed awake at case conferences, attended
lectures professional meetings, and symposia, I have never heard a
single case in w h i c h embarrassment, ridicule, humiliation, morti
fication, or any other of the shame family of emotions was
discussed. ... I began to comprehend that the ubiquity of shame
laden situations was matched by what appeared to be a culture
wide avoidance of pertinent discussion. [Nathanson, 1987b,
pp. v i i - v i i i ]
PREFACE xiii
Since then, the situation has changed enormously. Psychoanalysts,

developmental psychologists, social scientists, and neuroscientists
have a l l made significant contributions to the understanding of
shame. A particularly interesting new field, w i t h considerable
potential to l i n k w i t h psychoanalysis, is that of evolutionary
psychology, w h i c h explores h o w a modern D a r w i n i a n perspective
(on the selection pressures for the transmission of genes) throws light
o n aspects of behaviour and emotion that are otherwise obscure
(Migone & Liotti, 1998). This illuminates b o t h shame and jealousy i n
intriguing n e w ways. I n this book I have tried to d r a w together some
of these strands and indicate their relevance to clinical thinking.
The insights of the consulting r o o m are too valuable to be kept
for psychoanalysts and related practitioners. Therefore I hope that
this exploration of shame and jealousy m a y be accessible to a more
general reader. I have endeavoured to bear this a i m i n m i n d as I
have w r i t t e n . H o w e v e r , some aspects w i l l i n e v i t a b l y appear
p u z z l i n g to a reader w i t h o u t any knowledge of psychoanalysis.
Therefore I have included an appendix briefly o u t l i n i n g some
relevant points about psychoanalytic theory and practice.
A note on clinical illustrations
The book contains n u m e r o u s clinical illustrations, f r o m b o t h

psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Some are fictional
composites, based o n experiences w i t h a n u m b e r of different
patients. Where disguised accounts of w o r k w i t h specific patients
are presented, w r i t t e n permission has been obtained. The principles
regarding use of disguised clinical material i n psychoanalytic
p u b l i s h i n g discussed b y Gabbard (2000) have been f o l l o w e d .
CHAPTER ONE
Shame and jealousy
Panic in the classroom
A
homosexual man i n psychoanalytic psychotherapy was
reflecting upon his residual feelings of anxiety about
revealing his sexual orientation. He suddenly recalled an
incident at school when he was age twelve. A t that time, he had
begun to notice a good-looking boy i n another class and would
often steal a secret glance at him. One day he found himself i n the
same class as this boy and suddenly believed he overheard h i m
making some reference to his looking. Overwhelmed w i t h shame
and panic, and terrified the whole class would discover his secret,
he fled from the room.
An anxious manager
A middle manager was required periodically to make business

presentations to groups of staff. Mostly he managed this reasonably
competently. However, during a period when he was feeling quite
depressed he failed to make adequate preparations and also, to his
1
2 SHAME A N D JEALOUSY
horror, f o u n d that he was unable to ad lib and t h i n k o n his feet i n

the w a y he usually h a d been able to. O n one disastrous occasion he
f o u n d himself completely lost for w o r d s , panicking, unable to think,
sweating profusely, feeling about to f a i n t — a n d basically suffering
a l l the features of a panic attack. H e felt p r o f o u n d l y h u m i l i a t e d a n d
devastatingly shamed b y his o w n failure a n d his vision of the
surprised a n d concerned looks o n the faces of his audience.
F o l l o w i n g this, he felt increasingly anxious about any prospect of
h a v i n g to make any k i n d of public presentation. Eventually he
became completely disabled b y shame anxiety.
A sexual assault
A y o u n g adolescent g i r l was cornered b y a gang of slightly older
teenagers. A y o u t h i n the g r o u p raped her i n f r o n t of the others.
N o n e attempted to help her. Some laughed a n d jeered a n d
encouraged the rapist. F o l l o w i n g this, the g i r l became increasingly
w i t h d r a w n , rarely leaving her house. She was haunted, n o t o n l y b y
the h o r r o r of the assault itself, b u t also b y the image of a l l the faces
l o o k i n g o n at her w i t h o u t concern or empathy a n d b y the t h o u g h t
of the story of her h u m i l i a t i o n being spread maliciously a r o u n d
amongst a l l the y o u t h of the small t o w n . Some months later she
h a d a psychotic b r e a k d o w n , believing that she h a d been i m p r e g
n a t e d b y t h e d e v i l . The a c c u m u l a t i n g shame h a d reached
intolerable levels. Eventually she made a serious suicide attempt.
Shame can be lethal.
Violent responses to shame

A m a n w h o h a d experienced repeated scorn a n d h u m i l i a t i o n f r o m
his mother, i n v o l v i n g physical, emotional, a n d sexual abuse, was
frequently i n danger of falling into states of severely toxic shame.
W i t h his girlfriend he w o u l d often insist that she reassure h i m about
the quality of his physical, mental, and sexual attributes, becoming
enraged i f she d i d n o t successfully support his fragile self-esteem
a n d sense of masculinity. Sometimes, he w o u l d speak scornfully of
other people, p a r t i c u l a r l y older w o m e n , describing t h e m as
S H A M E A N D JEALOUSY 3
"pathetic" and would demand that his girlfriend agree with him. If
she hesitated, he would launch into a tirade about how she was
"pathetic", and on some occasions would terrify her with his
violence. It was clear that this shame-ridden man was continually
projecting his own self-image as "pathetic" into women represent-
ing his abusive mother (i.e. trying to send the shame back where it
came from) and demanding his girlfriend's support in this
projection. If she failed to comply, then he would attempt to force
her, through his violence and intimidation to represent and
experience the quality of "pathetic". Shame can be very dangerous.
The Hungarian psychoanalyst, Grunberger, gives the following
example:
Some years ago there w a s a n account in Canadian a n d other
newspapers of how a drunkard behaved badly in a pub, and the
owner asked him to leave; in other words, he w a s "treated like
dirt". Afterwards he came back armed with a Molotov cocktail and
" b l e w up the joint". There were no survivors. This can be explained
as his desire to make his narcissistic injury null and void by causing
all those who were witnesses to disappear. [Grunberger, 1989, p. 37]
A vision of shame
A male student visited the flat of his new girlfriend, with whom he
was very much in love, clutching a bunch of flowers for his beloved.
Finding the door open, he ventured in. Through the open door to
the bedroom, he saw her having sex with an old boyfriend.
Engrossed in their pleasure, neither of the lovers were aware of his
presence as he stood transfixed in horrified fascination. After a few
seconds, he quickly but quietly retreated, feeling utterly mortified
with shame and embarrassment. Later feelings of humiliation and
anger developed. All that night his heart was pounding with such
force that he feared his chest would burst. Because of these violent
feelings of shame he could not bring himself to contact her. Indeed
he wished, in part, that he might never see her again since he could
not imagine how he could confront her with his observations
without the two of them being consumed with shame and
embarrassment. Shame can powerfully inhibit communication of
what is most important in a relationship.
Pedro an d Natalie
Some years ago I had the interesting opportunity to work with two
people, Pedro and Natalie, who sought help as a couple, presenting
with particular problems of shame and jealousy. Pedro clearly loved
Natalie deeply, enjoying all forms of contact and interaction with
her. H e delighted in hearing her talk of her experiences, her
thoughts, and feelings. In turn he found joy in sharing with her his
most vulnerable hopes and dreams. She clearly loved h i m too.
However, for reasons of fears of feeling trapped and suffocated in
relationships, derived from her childhood experiences with an
invasive and controlling mother, she would be compulsively
promiscuous. She felt shame and guilt about this, but was
convinced that her sexual adventures were necessary for her
psychic survival—representing for her an affirmation of her
autonomy and sense of agency and efficacy. I n order not to hurt
Pedro, she would try to conceal these from him—but they would
usually emerge, partly because Pedro was very perceptive and
attuned to her, and partly because her feelings of guilt would lead
her to betray herself and reveal her deceit.
Pedro described his feelings and reactions at such times of
discovery of her infidelities. He would experience a violent visceral
response—pain i n his stomach, his heart pounding, shivering and
sweating—as his body was clearly flooded with adrenalin. He
would also experience a sense of shock, accompanied by anxiety,
anger, and panic. He would feel confused and disoriented. I n
addition he would feel shame. His sense of shame would be to do
with feeling inadequate as a man, feeling humiliated by the thought
of another man having penetrated the woman he loved, perhaps
giving her more pleasure than he managed to, feeling weak and in
need of reassurance that he was still loved—and, above all, shame
to do with having these strong reactions. This constellation of
1
shame, jealousy, and panic would be exacerbated by Natalie's

tendency to attempt to ward off Pedro's suspicions of her infidelities
by denying and invalidating his intuitions and dismissing them as
his jealous fantasies. Her well-meaning effort to avoid his encounter
with a painful reality would add to the shocking impact of his
eventual discoveries of the truth. Pedro would then feel utterly
betrayed and tricked. Their previous intimacy would suddenly
SHAME A N D JEALOUSY 5
appear to him quite fraudulent. The love she had appeared to give
him would seem devalued, since Pedro now imagined that she
would give the same affection to any of her lovers. Natalie would
become distraught at his reactions, feeling terribly guilty at his
distress. She would endeavour to reassure him of her love in every
way she could. Usually, after a week or two of experiencing her
devoted affection and care, Pedro would forgive her again and
begin once more to enjoy their time with each other—until the next
episode of her infidelity. This painful cycle would repeat endlessly.
Another feature of Pedro's reactions would be that when he
learned of her unfaithfulness he would have an odd sensation that
she had suddenly become a stranger to him. He would feel that
somehow he did not know her. It seems to be a fundamental human
need to feel special and chosen—and much of the time this was
indeed how Pedro felt in relation to Natalie. However, on
discovering her extra-relational sexual liaisons, he would each time
feel suddenly in the position of the excluded one—barred access to
her intimacy that she experienced with an other—and barred from
knowledge of it.
At times Natalie's involvements with other men would go
further than brief sexual encounters. She would occasionally
develop preoccupations with particular men, wanting continuing
contact and, for a limited period, feeling she was in love. After a few
weeks this would pass and her affections would again return to
Pedro. During such times Pedro would sense her preoccupation and
would feel intense anguish because he knew her mind was not open
to his emotional communications. Although Natalie would not
entirely ignore him, he would experience a subtle blankness in her
response to him, as if his messages did not quite penetrate her mind
but bounced off its surface. He would complain she was like a brick
wall. Such remarks would puzzle her. Pedro would himself
withdraw when he found Natalie in such a state, feeling a
combination of shame and despair. His attempts to communicate
with her seemed to him futile.
The painful cycle of interaction would be further driven by
Natalie's experience of feeling her inner privacy to be agonizingly
violated by Pedro's wishes to know of both her desires and her
behaviour in relation to other men. This led Natalie to feel even
more strongly that the integrity of her core self required that she be
6 SHAME AND JEALOUSY
free to pursue other liaisons outside her m a i n relationship w i t h

Pedro, w h i c h she w o u l d otherwise experience as unbearably
suffocating. She w o u l d become even more w i t h d r a w n i n response
to his inquiries. W h i l s t Pedro tried his best to understand her need
for inner space, privacy, and freedom, he experienced d i f f i c u l t y i n
containing his jealousy, further fuelled b y Natalie's resistance to
disclosing her extra-relational fantasies and behaviours. Moreover,
he felt shame over his jealousy, no matter h o w inevitable and
understandable this m i g h t be. He felt that his possessiveness drove
Natalie to her promiscuity. W h e n i n the g r i p of this spiralling
negative interaction, Pedro began to feel very inadequate. Natalie,
i n t u r n , felt immense shame and g u i l t that her c o m p u l s i v e
behaviour caused Pedro such distress. I t was i n their despair at
this repeating pattern of p a i n that this couple, w h o clearly loved
each other dearly, sought psychotherapeutic help. Fortunately, their
c o m m i t m e n t to communication and their increasing empathy w i t h
each other's experience and position p r o v i d e d considerable relief
and the negative interaction gradually decreased i n intensity;
Natalie began to experience less of a threat to her core self, and
consequently was less d r i v e n to secret promiscuity, w i t h the result
that Pedro's jealousy and shame were less and less provoked.
Natalie's mother appeared to have been h i g h l y invasive and
controlling, insisting that her daughter have no secrets f r o m her. She
w o u l d frequently demand to k n o w Natalie's thoughts and feelings.
Natalie's father was ejected b y her mother w h e n Natalie was aged
five. This added to Natalie's image of her mother as terrifyingly
controlling and p o w e r f u l . Her fundamental " i n t e r n a l w o r k i n g
m o d e l " of attachment relationships (Bowlby, 1980) was that she
could be controlled and suffocated. W h i l s t she longed for intimacy
and reliable love, she also desperately needed to feel free. This was a
matter of the protection of her core sense of self and its need for
autonomy. Pedro's mother had not been so invasive, b u t he had
experienced her, at times, as alarmingly distant and w i t h d r a w n . He
recalled h o w she w o u l d often appear deeply preoccupied, such that
she w o u l d be physically b u t not emotionally present. D u r i n g such
periods Pedro's attempts to communicate his emotional needs
w o u l d seem to be ignored or misunderstood b y his mother.
H o w e v e r , Pedro learned as a child that his mother's responsiveness
to h i m w o u l d return after a period of time. The nature of her
SHAME A N D J E A L O U S Y 7
p r e o c c u p a t i o n a n d w i t h d r a w a l was n o t clear to Pedro. H e

w o n d e r e d whether she had experienced episodes of depression or
whether she h a d had an affair d u r i n g part of his childhood.
A l t h o u g h his father h a d been present, he h a d , affectively, not been
very available to Pedro, tending to spend his leisure hours at the
p u b or slumped i n front of the television.
Themes of shame and jealousy with "Natalie and Pedro"
Jealousy and shame are intimately e n t w i n e d i n the tragic interaction

between Pedro and Natalie. She was defending against the threat of
v i o l a t i o n of her core s e l f — a catastrophe i n v o l v i n g u l t i m a t e
exposure of her inner privacy and surrender to control b y an other.
Such v i o l a t i o n of the core self can be experienced as a rape of the
m i n d — i n d e e d of the s o u l — a n d as damaging, potentially, as a
physical rape. The emotional response to v i o l a t i o n is shame.
Natalie's ensuing promiscuity evoked jealousy i n Pedro, also g i v i n g
rise to his feelings of shame associated w i t h a sense of inadequacy.
His spiral of shame gathered its o w n m o m e n t u m as he then felt
shame about his o w n reactions of jealousy, anger, and shame (i.e.
shame about shame). As Natalie w i t h d r e w f r o m h i m and he
experienced her as an emotional " b r i c k w a l l " , he felt his attempts at
communication of his feelings were u n w e l c o m e — a n d again his
response was shame. A n associated experience was his perception
of Natalie as a "stranger" w h e n her infidelities became apparent; at
such times he felt he d i d not k n o w h o w to relate to h e r — h e felt he
d i d n o t know her and felt a w k w a r d , as one m i g h t w i t h a stranger.
D u r i n g periods of l o v i n g intimacy w i t h Natalie, Pedro w o u l d
experience a j o y f u l sense of being special to her, of being her
"chosen o n e " and he w o u l d bask i n the w a r m t h of her affection.
Then each time one of her infidelities became apparent, Pedro
w o u l d feel violently ejected f r o m his place of intimacy w i t h h e r —
t h r o w n i n t o a p r o f o u n d l y p a i n f u l place of exclusion and s h a m e —
and w o u l d feel that he was the stranger, l o o k i n g o n w i t h anguished
envy at the u n i o n of his beloved w i t h an other. I n t u r n , Natalie
w o u l d feel shamefully exposed whenever her sexual adventures
and affairs came to light. A s each struggled w i t h their particular
forms of shame, they f o u n d the only relief lay i n communication,
8 S H A M E A N D JEALOUSY
whereby they could again and again re-find their empathy for one
another. They found that the cure for shame is empathy.
Some of Natalie's shame was to do with feeling violated. Pedro's
was associated with feeling excluded or rejected, and ejected from
his place of feeling " s p e c i a l " and " c h o s e n " . Both of them
experienced shame about certain feelings and behaviours being
exposed to the anticipated disapproval of the other. What do these
various forms of shame have in common? They are all to do with
vulnerability in the expression of emotional need i n relation to the
other person. I n each instance the bond of empathy is breached—
the experience is of falling out of attunement and into a place of
affective loneliness. The experience of subject relating to subject is
lost, perhaps abruptly and with emotional violence. In its place is
the sense of being dismissed as a subject and of becoming an object
to the other.
The positive function of the lie

As Natalie revealed more about her w a y of being and relating, it
became apparent that in many ways she had tended to structure her
life around lies and deception. Despite her clear wish to be truthful,
and her professed valuing of honesty, she was in certain respects a
compulsive liar. Although lies and lying have, in general, highly
negative connotations, being seen as forms of manic manipulation
and exploitation of others, it was possible to discern a more benign
meaning i n Natalie's case. For her, the capacity to lie was an
expression of her autonomy and privacy. Having experienced her
mother as so invasive and controlling, the discovery that it was
possible to lie and conceal truth from her mother was of vital
significance. It was an affirmation of her separateness from her
mother and an indication of her own sense of agency. If she could lie
successfully, it must mean that she had a private core self—wherein
she could discover her own hidden desire, fantasy, and direction. I n
her lies, Natalie would feel triumphant, celebrating her secret
freedom. Conversely, when her lies were exposed she would feel
shame, her inner privacy violated; she would feel deflated and
depressed. However, Natalie's lies also caused her great anxiety in
her adult relationships. Her wish to be able to have a relationship of
SHAME AND JEALOUSY 9
honest intimacy with Pedro conflicted fundamentally with the fact

that her pervasive pattern was to structure her life on lies and
concealment. Each person in her life would know an aspect of her,
but none would know all of her—although each would tend to feel
she was presenting a truthful account of herself. She was terrified of
the leakage between the compartmentalized areas of her life—
although she also longed to be released from her self-imposed web
of lies. The more that Natalie sought honesty in her relationship
with Pedro the greater her anxiety and sense of crisis. Part of the
therapeutic work was for Natalie to discover that honesty did not
have to mean violation of her core self—and to realize that whilst
she certainly had the capacity to lie and conceal successfully, she
could choose to be truthful.
Whilst for Natalie the lie had a positive function, of affirming
privacy and autonomy, its negative aspect is often more apparent.
Through the lie, the child discovers his or her separateness from the
mother. Whilst facilitating the child's process of separation-
individuation, this also evokes a sense of being cut off from
mother's love, according to the formula, "if mother finds out about
my lie she will not love me". The proliferation of the lie means a
continual anxiety of being "found out". Moreover, the compulsive
liar also fails to be truthful to him/her self—and ultimately the
authentic expression of the core self is fundamentally compromised.
The lie is, paradoxically, a failed attempt at preservation of truth—
the truth of the core self.
It b e g i n s w i t h a s m i l e
Wouldn't it be awful if the child looked into the mirror and saw
nothing! [a patient quoted by Winnicott, 1967, p. 136]
In the beginning, mother and baby are normally exquisitely attuned

to one another, engaging in highly synchronized "conversations" of
voice and facial expression. Analysis of videorecorded material
shows that the speed of communicative mirroring of facial
expression is extremely fast—responsiveness at fractions of a
second—indicating that mother and baby are processing each
other's emotional messages far faster than conscious awareness
makes possible (Hietanen et al., 1998; Schore, 2000). However, if the

mother deliberately presents a blank expression, her baby becomes
distressed and withdraws in a manner that gives every impression
of being a precursor of shame (Broucek, 1982).
If the baby smiles and the mother smiles back, the baby feels
recognized and responded to. The baby finds itself in the warmth
of the mother's smile, Her smile means that he or she has the
2
capacity to evoke a response—to evoke her love. This is the

beginning of the baby's sense of efficacy, which I suggest is based
upon the capacity to evoke an emotional response in the other
(Broucek, 1979; Mollon, 1993). If there is no response—a blank
face—or a response that contains no comprehension of the baby's
state, then he or she feels fundamentally impotent, ineffectual,
having no emotional significance.
Winnicott described the mirror role of the mother in terms of her
enabling the baby to see herself. When the mother looks into the
baby's eyes, what the mother "looks like is related to what she sees
there", and because the mother from the beginning holds her baby
in mind as a whole person, the baby who looks into the mother's
face "sees himself or herself" (Winnicott, 1967, p. 131). When this
necessary mirroring communication does not take place, however,
such babies "look and they do not see themselves" (p. 131). Whilst
there are various aspects of the structure and experience of self
(Mollon, 1993), one crucial component concerns the sense of who
one is for the other (originally the mother). If the early experience is
of not existing as a real person for the mother, then a feeling of
unreality w i l l be inherent in the sense of self.
It is the same in adult life too. A person smiles at us—a smile of
genuine affection and friendship—and we feel warmed by the
energy of their love. We feel recognized and valued. If we fail to
elicit a smile when we anticipate or hope for one, then we feel
rejected, diminished, and aware of a drop in our emotional
temperature. Our self-esteem momentarily falls. Whereas in
response to the smile, we feel confident about moving forward,
expecting acceptance, with the absence of the smile, or the blank
face, we feel uncertain, hesitant—and i n the grip of a background
state of shame. Whilst we might try to ignore such subtleties of
experience as we press on with the day to day tasks of life,
nevertheless they are there making their mark on our emotions and
behaviour. I n the case of Pedro and Natalie, Pedro w o u l d feel

p a i n f u l l y uncertain and hesitant w h e n Natalie was i n one of her
w i t h d r a w n and unresponsive states of m i n d .
For the baby w h o experiences the mother's face as responsive
not to the baby, b u t as reflecting only her o w n moods and
preoccupations, the consequences can be serious. W i n n i c o t t
described h o w some babies w i l l learn to, " s t u d y the maternal
visage i n an attempt to predict the mother's m o o d , just exactly as
w e a l l study the w e a t h e r " , and w i l l d r a w emotional conclusions
f r o m the observations:
The baby quickly learns to make a forecast: "Just now it is safe to

forget the mother's mood and to be spontaneous, but any minute
the mother's face will become fixed or her mood w i l l dominate and
my own personal needs must then be withdrawn otherwise my
central self will suffer insult," [Winnicott, 1967]
I n o p t i m u m early life, the small c h i l d w i l l experience many

episodes of pleasurable attunement w i t h his or her mother. These
have a very i m p o r t a n t function i n regulating the child's self-esteem
and reducing the propensity for shame (Schore, 1991). Inevitably,
however, reality presents elements that disrupt the child's sense of
oneness w i t h the mother. I n c l u d e d amongst these d i s r u p t i v e
elements are the child's o w n wishes to separate f r o m the mother
and assert a u t o n o m y — t h e m e s w h i c h Erikson (1950) l i n k e d w i t h the
stage of development concerned w i t h establishing control over the
anal sphincter and the discovery of a choice over whether to c o m p l y
w i t h mother's w i l l or not d u r i n g " p o t t y t r a i n i n g " . Erikson described
this phase as characterized b y a tension between autonomy, o n the
one h a n d , and shame and doubt, o n the other hand.
Seidler (2000) notes that situations of shame are always
"envisaged", i.e. involve exposure to the gaze of others. Since our
sense of self is formed i n the context of relationship w i t h others,
i n v o l v i n g the capacity to envisage oneself i n the eyes of the other
(G. H. M e a d , 1934), it follows that shame is inherent i n the
f o r m a t i o n of the self. A c c o r d i n g to Winnicott's f o r m u l a , the baby's
experience of self rests u p o n the principle " I a m seen, therefore I
exist." H o w e v e r , the gaze of the other ( p r i m a r i l y mother) w i l l n o t
always be a p p r o v i n g and l o v i n g ; as w e l l as at times n o t seeing the
child's subjectivity, her look may be disapproving and hostile,
generating rather global feelings in the small child of being " b a d " .
The problem is that the gaze of the other, even if dysphoria-
inducing, is necessary for the development of the self. Seidler (2000)
comments as follows:
If the gaze of the other is experienced not only as judgemental but as

censorious, and thus as ascribing to the self bad characteristics . . .
the result will be an identification of the self as " b a d " . The urge to
eliminate an other experienced as a disruptive force will then
recursively weaken the self or the subject because it needs the ga2e
of the other as a condition of its existence, [p. 179]
T h e stranger, the father, a n d the primal s c e n e
From the age of about eight months, the child becomes aware of
"strangers" and displays withdrawal and gaze aversion (just like
the " s h y " adult). For the child who wishes to retain all the good
elements of experience in relation to the mother and project the bad
elements into the outer world, the stranger will be felt to embody all
that is threatening to the oneness with mother. When it is the
mother's smiling face that is sought, the unrecognized and alien face
of the stranger will represent the bogey man who will destroy the
child's paradise with the mother. The small child sees that the
mother has some kind of relationship with the stranger, from which
the child is excluded. At the same time, under the pressure of the
drive for separation-individuation, the stranger may take on a
fascination because he also represents the possibility of separation
from the mother.
Perhaps the original stranger is the father. Certainly, as Seidler
(2000) argues, the child's perception of the mother's relationship with
the stranger may be a precursor of the encounter with the primal
scene of the parental relationship and intercourse, from which the
child is excluded. Seidler describes the child's changing desires as the
perception or fantasy of the primal scene is apprehended:
Whereas previously, unconscious union with the mother was

"happiness", that happiness is now located in the "prima l scene",
in accordance with the logic directing that "happiness is where I am
not allowed to be". [Seidler, 2000, p. 191]
W i t h the advent of the p r i m a l scene and the Oedipal position, the

child is placed i n the position of the outsider:
a stranger debarred from the union of two others permitted access

to a forbidden sphere. [Seidler, 2000, p. 191]
A t an earlier stage the child's concern lies w i t h the face, the

attunement of the mother's face and the unfamiliar face of the
stranger, b u t i n the Oedipal position and the fantasy of the parental
p r i m a l scene the father's penis represents the " t i c k e t of a d m i s s i o n "
to f u l f i l m e n t of the w i s h for u n i o n w i t h the mother. Neither gender
of c h i l d w i l l feel adequately equipped anatomically nor psycholo
gically to engage i n sexual u n i o n w i t h the m o t h e r — a narcissistic
trauma emphasized particularly by Grunberger (1989). W h i l s t the
small c h i l d can competently engage i n visual facial communication
of love and desire for u n i o n or affectionate contact w i t h the mother,
the impact of the p r i m a l scene and the Oedipal situation confronts
h i m or her w i t h a d o m a i n of i n t i m a c y that is f o r e i g n a n d
b e w i l d e r i n g — a n d f r o m w h i c h he or she is inherently excluded.
The p a i n of this narcissistic i n j u r y can be p r o f o u n d and is
universally repressed—its impact revealed only t h r o u g h psycho
analysis. As Grunberger notes, i t is " i n f i n i t e l y more difficult to
grasp [than oedipal r i v a l r y ] and has a tendency to resist analysis
u n t i l the e n d " (Grunberger, 1989, p. 37). This deep i n j u r y to self
esteem and the sense of adequacy is re-evoked i n later situations of
adult life w h e n a lover turns to another—as experienced b y Pedro i n
relation to Natalie's infidelities. A novel insight b y Grunberger is
that the classically conceived Oedipal situation of r i v a l r y can
function as a defence against the child's deeper narcissistic i n j u r y of
sexual inadequacy:
... I have insisted many times on the role of the Oedipal interdiction
as a defence against the narcissistic injury expressed in the thought:
" I am not impotent; it is the other person who is blocking the road
(but when I am like him, I shall be able to marry Mother without
exposing myself to the repetition of the same narcissistic injury,
since I shall be an adult myself)." ... things introduce themselves
differently to the girl and to the boy, if only because the narcissistic
injury of the girl is less dramatic and more profound: on the one
hand she can hide her inadequacy from herself or transform it into a
fear of penetration; on the other hand, her injury in the form of penis
envy may stretch across her psychosexual life in general. [Grunberger,

1989, p. 37]
Seidler notes, that from this perspective, the fear of castration,

originally emphasized by Freud, can be understood as anxiety
about loss of the organ that allows the participants of the primal
scene to engage i n a union. Sexuality, both that of the child and that
of the parents is a highly disturbing and disruptive factor destroy
ing the child's dream of endless union with the mother. Seidler
summarizes the situation as follows:
... the oedipal situation stage of development proper is charac

terised by the fact that the previously intended aim of union w i t h a
person is ousted by the awareness of that person's connections w i t h
what was hitherto a stranger; this finds its symbolisation in the
imago of the primal scene. The effect of this is that the child takes
the place of the stranger hitherto thwarting its efforts at establishing
union, and thus excluding it from the state of felicity that has
obviously been realised between the other two. The child thus
relates to the primal scene as a stranger. The perception of its own
sexual need finds its correspondence in body shame, which through
the compounding with the recognition of its own relative sexual
inadequacy takes on a quality approximating that of an "experience
of inferiority". [Seidler, 2000, pp. 198-199]
The child's encounter with sexuality, his or her own and that of the
parents, is inherently disturbing. Sexuality is traumatic, as Bollas
(2000) argues i n his discussion of hysteria:
. . . sexuality destroys the innocence of a self and mother,

transforming the prelapsarian Utopia of "baba" and "mama" into
the world of self and sex object, contaminating the simplicity of
dependence with desire ... Sexuality-in-itself, intensified ... by the
child's auto-erotic stimulations, is the agency of trauma, all by its
fearsome self. [Bollas, 2000, p. 14]
Bollas argues that whilst we cannot remember directly the "sexual

epiphany" at age three, it is relatively easy to remember analogous
disturbance some years later. Although sexual states of mind do
occur at ages seven, eight, or nine, many people tend to remember
these years as relatively idyllic. Bollas describes the disturbance as
puberty arrives:
Then sometime around 10—earlier for some, later for others—bodies

start changing again. With the changing shape of the body, which—
however anticipated and partly welcomed—is to some extent discon-
certing, comes another increase in sexual excitation. The adolescent
feels assaulted by sexual ideas. Sitting in a classroom with childhood
friends of old, suddenly a 13-year-old is deeply excited by another
student, and finds it very hard to think about the lesson. That other
student need not be in the classroom. The instinct is provocation
enough for the adolescent to feel its disruptiveness whilst furtively
daydreaming his or her sex objects. [Bollas, 2000, p. 17]
W e might add to Bollas' account here, the considerable alarm and

shame that pubertal boys can experience when erections and
nocturnal emissions become frequent and unpredictable. The penis
can seem literally to have taken on a life of its own, asserting its
presence all too visibly even when the boy is not consciously
entertaining sexual thoughts.
A woma n with anorexia nervosa described the impact on her of
the precocious arrival of puberty. She felt utterly confused and filled
with shame at the changes in her body. None of her peers had
started menstruating and developing breasts as she had. She felt
overwhelmingly self-conscious and out of control. A deep sense of
rage accompanied her feeling that she had been prematurely
deprived of childhood. Later she completely repudiated her role
as an adult sexual woman, welcoming with considerable relief the
cessation of her periods and loss of her curvy body as she
discovered the "time-reversing" effects of starvation. She took to
reading books and magazines written for girls in early adolescence,
finding comfort and reassurance in their explanations and prepara-
tions for teenage years.
Shame and the false self

Shame a n d false self developments are intimately e n t w i n e d .
False self and failure of the Oedipal position
M a n y psychological problems arise f r o m a failure to negotiate the

Oedipal position as a result of the mother's gratification of the
child's fantasy of successfully excluding the r i v a l father ( M o l l o n ,

1993). A l t h o u g h the child m a y w i s h to claim t r i u m p h a n t possession
of the mother, gratification of this desire can be disastrous
d e v e l o p m e n t a l l y — r e s u l t i n g not only i n fears of being revealed as
an impostor, a child pretending to be g r o w n - u p , b u t also i n a failure
to establish secure boundaries f r o m the mother, and consequently a
continual dread of re-engulfment and loss of self-demarcation. The
Oedipal " L a w of the Father" (Lacan, 1977), that prohibits b o t h
mother and child f r o m consuming each other, has been eluded. This
can f o r m part of the basis of a "false self" development since the
child w i l l be forever t r y i n g to be w h a t the mother wants.
Seidler puts this as follows:
Here the subject is concerned to please the vis-a-vis w i t h a view to

gratifying the regressive wish for total attunement. It w i l l thus
behave in such a way as to correspond to what it takes to be the
other's preferences. The clinical situation in the treatment of such
patients confirms this supposition. What is most difficult is the
separation from the wish to attune and to be accepted without
reserve. Such a phase of treatment is normally characterised not
only by the experience of loneliness but also by despair and the
irruption of the feeling of being at fault that has been so carefully
fended off hitherto. Therapist and patient w i l l come into contact
with shame at a primary level, i.e. when the shame-specific wish to
be recognised becomes susceptible of experience. In such cases, the
incipient capacity for feeling shame is equivalent to the advent of a
new dawn. Perception by the other (or in an internalised form as the
subject's own judgemental function) has then reached a tolerable
stage and no longer demands (subjective) self-abandonment.
[Seidler, 2000, p. 180]
W h a t Seidler seems to be p o i n t i n g to here is the w a y i n w h i c h the

emergence of a more authentic self, f r o m a position of false self
concealment, is associated w i t h shame. I t is precisely the true
elements of self that are felt to elicit disapproval or non-recognition.
W i t h o u t the Oedipal ejection f r o m the dyadic entanglement w i t h
the mother, and the projection into the triadic space, the child m a y
be unable to proceed along the line of separation-individuation. He
or she continues to try to be the child the mother w a n t s — t h e mother's
phallus—rather than following his or her o w n developmental initia
tives. This can be a fulfilment of the mother's grandiosity, where her
child's function is to cast her i n a favourable light. What may appear

as an air of superiority i n some patients w i t h significant degrees of
false self development m a y actually be this k i n d of expression of the
mother's narcissism. I n such a person, their o w n desires and
initiatives, and natural exhibitionism, may be associated w i t h m u c h
shame and anxiety, and as a result may be repressed—emerging only
against great resistance i n the process of analysis or psychotherapy.
These difficulties are described i n detail i n K o h u t (1971).
The shame associated w i t h emergence f r o m a false self position
is to d o w i t h the expectation that the more authentic feelings and
aspirations (the " t r u e self") w i l l not be recognized, understood or
accepted. I t is a k i n to emerging f r o m behind a mask, or t a k i n g off a
costume, or exposing oneself as h a v i n g been a f r a u d or impostor.
The fear is that this w i l l be an embarrassing shock to the other. I n
general, situations of embarrassment always involve some k i n d of
d i s r u p t i o n of the expectations one person has of another. I t follows,
then, that for the person w h o has developed an extensive false self
the more authentic aspects of self w i l l be felt as an embarrassment.
There w i l l tend to be a continual m o n i t o r i n g of the presentation of
"self", so as to f i t i n w i t h the expectations and desires of the other.
This is the basis of embarrassed self-consciousness. Shame and
embarrassment arise i n the j a r r i n g cracks between the expectation of
the other a n d the actual feelings and behaviour of the self.
The person w i t h an extensive false self development has become
trapped i n an i m a g e — t h e image of the c h i l d the mother w a n t e d h i m
or her to be. Instead of h a v i n g felt recognized and accepted as
himself, his o w n potential being n u r t u r e d , the c h i l d has become
inhabited by the mother's fantasy. W h i l s t to some extent a l l h u m a n
identities are false, insofar as w e have to construct a " s e l f " on the
basis of the roles and images available i n the pre-existing culture
into w h i c h w e are b o r n , this process becomes more tilted i n the
d i r e c t i o n of p a t h o l o g y w h e n the m o t h e r ' s narcissism takes
precedence over her concern to recognize and n u r t u r e her particular
child. The more authentic self then becomes a potential embarrass
ment and a source of anxiety, along the lines of, " W h a t if m y
mother/the w o r l d i n general discovers that I a m n o t w h a t they
assume I a m — I w i l l be greeted w i t h h o r r i f i e d shock and r e j e c t i o n —
this possibility is so terrible that I must make absolutely sure that
m y real self does n o t e m e r g e — I must conceal i t f r o m myself".
Short trousers
A twelve-year-old boy i n Britain i n the 1960s, w h e n short trousers

w e r e the n o r m for younger schoolboys, became increasingly
embarrassed because he was the only one left i n his class w h o
h a d n o t g r a d u a t e d t o l o n g trousers. H i s m o t h e r expressed
reluctance to b u y h i m l o n g trousers o n the grounds that she d i d
not like to see children l o o k i n g too g r o w n - u p . The message f r o m
this, and other aspects of his mother's behaviour, was that she
w a n t e d her son to remain a child, w i t h o u t regard for his o w n
experience, desire, and developmental need. A b o u t four-years later,
the y o u n g m a n had managed to acquire long trousers, b u t he became
extremely w o r r i e d and embarrassed because he was increasingly
needing to shave b u t d i d not have a razor or other equipment. He d i d
not k n o w h o w to b r i n g this to his parents' attention, fearing again
that his developing adult b o d y w o u l d be a shocking d i s r u p t i o n of
his mother's image of h i m as a child. O n the other hand he was
afraid that there w o u l d come a p o i n t w h e n the whiskers o n his face
w o u l d suddenly evoke an expression of h o r r i f i e d surprise f r o m his
mother. H e d i d n o t feel he could confide i n his father, w h o was a
rather passive and distant figure, frequently the b u t t of his mother's
criticism and scorn. I n such a situation, pervaded b y potential
embarrassment, the embarrassment that is feared is the embarrass
ment of the other w h e n their expectation is disrupted.
An alarming dream
A m a n i n psychoanalysis was always smartly dressed and clearly

concerned w i t h his appearance and impression on others. He
presented an image of a polite, intelligent and cultured gentleman.
I t was apparent that this very m u c h reflected his mother's desires to
have such a child. D u r i n g the early stages of analysis he w o u l d tend
to speak quietly and w i t h o u t m u c h emotion, always listening
carefully to w h a t the analyst h a d to say. However, d u r i n g one
session he reported w i t h some anxiety a dream i n w h i c h a classical
music concert was interrupted b y the i n t r u s i o n of a violent and
scruffy v a g a b o n d w h o belligerently s t o r m e d the stage. This
presaged an anxious p e r i o d i n the analysis w h e n his m o r e
aggressive and less polite aspects began to emerge. A s this process
developed he experienced m u c h shame and embarrassment.
S H A M E A N D JEALOUSY 19
The entertainer
Another patient, a w o m a n , h a d been b r o u g h t u p to p e r f o r m — h e r
mother h a v i n g taken every o p p o r t u n i t y to p u t her on stage, despite
the patient's natural shyness and dislike of excessive attention. She
had developed the beginnings of a career as a dancer and singer. I n
the analysis she tended to present herself i n entertaining ways,
telling c o l o u r f u l narratives of her life. H o w e v e r , i n her career she
displayed a p a t t e r n of sabotaging her o p p o r t u n i t i e s , i n i t i a l l y
w i t h o u t insight into her active and m o t i v a t e d role i n this. It was
apparent that unconsciously she w i s h e d to o v e r t h r o w the role and
image that her mother h a d foisted u p o n her. Later i n the analysis,
she began to present herself i n a m u c h more subdued w a y and the
lively stories disappeared. Her m o t i v a t i o n to pursue her career as a
performer began to d i m i n i s h . She disclosed, w i t h some shame and
embarrassment, that she was w r i t i n g a novel, b u t was extremely
anxious about the potential reactions of others i f she were to show
t h e m the content. The patient's overtly " e x h i b i t i o n i s t i c " p e r f o r m i n g
self was a "false self", based o n her mother's desire. Behind this was a
repressed " t r u e self", expressed i n the private w r i t i n g — a n d the tenta
tive emergence of this was associated w i t h m u c h shame and anxiety.
Shame emerges at m o m e n t s of our deepest psychological
vulnerability. Exposure to the risk of shame is inherent i n one
person's offer of intimacy w i t h an o t h e r — a n d is a measure of the
value placed u p o n that other. Thus the adolescent b o y m u s t balance
his fear of shame, and the risk of h u m i l i a t i o n and rejection, against
the strength of his desire w h e n he considers approaching a g i r l ,
stuttering and blushing, as he a w k w a r d l y asks her out. This is true
also of the ch ild w h o is w i l l i n g to communicate his or her feelings
and needs to the mother or father. Such willingness is not to be
taken for granted. Repeated rejection, scorn or gross empathic
failure, may lead to an entrenched reluctance to communicate
emotional need and a persisting avoidance of intimacy i n later life.
Too m u c h shame results i n an unconscious decision n o t to risk
further exposure. The " t r u e self" goes into h i d i n g .
Summary and conclusion

Shame and the fear of shame are amongst the most p o w e r f u l of
h u m a n aversive experiences, precipitating panic, rage, and the w i s h

to d i s a p p e a r — a n d , i n extreme cases, homicide, suicide, and even
psychosis. The integrity and preservation of the core self is crucial to
shame. Shame arises b o t h f r o m v i o l a t i o n of the self, and f r o m
exposure of the self w h e n this is not met w i t h the expected or hoped
for empathy. I n a context of empathy, the self and its needs can
safely be exposed and expressed—but w i t h o u t empathy the self
feels threatened. The presence of shame signals a lack of e m p a t h y —
either an actual lack, or a fear of such a lack. Similarly, the cure for
states of shame and h u m i l i a t i o n is e m p a t h y — b u t i n its absence,
shame expands unchecked, becoming increasingly toxic. W h e n i n
the g r i p of shame, the person has no empathy w i t h h i m / h e r s e l f —
and, w i t h o u t the soothing w o r d s or touch of an o t h e r — h a t r e d of the
self m a y g r o w w i t h o u t l i m i t .
By analogy, w e m i g h t picture the core self as like a flower that
can be t i g h t l y f u r l e d ( w i t h d r a w n and protected), b u t under the
impact of the w a r m sunlight (empathy) w i l l u n f o l d , r a d i a t i n g its
colour to other l i v i n g forms and i n v i t i n g intercourse and fertiliza
tion. I f the emotional weather is cold, unexpected or inappropriate
i n some w a y (the risk of shame), then the flower m a y become again
enclosed u p o n itself.
As Seidler comments:
Shame manifests itself when a subject in quest of attunement

encounters something-someone "strange", causing it to recoil back
onto itself. [Seidler, 2000, p. 320]
The y o u n g child's wishes for attunement w i t h the mother, the

enjoyment of basking i n m u t u a l love and the m i r r o r i n g gaze and
s m i l e — K o h u t ' s " g l e a m i n the mother's e y e " — i s disrupted b y
sexuality (as w e l l as other components of mental life that propel the
c h i l d towards separation-individuation). The child's sexual desire,
and his or her recognition of that of the parents, brings a d i s t u r b i n g
and " s t r a n g e " element into the infantile w o r l d . The mother is
recognized as h a v i n g a relationship w i t h the father, f r o m w h i c h the
child is excluded. It is a relationship that the c h i l d does not
understand, however m u c h he or she m a y t r y to conceptualize this
i n terms of his o w n desires and phantasies. I n this respect it is u n l i k e
the r i v a l r y felt w i t h other siblings (Mitchell, 2000). T h r o u g h entry
into the Oedipal position and the encounter w i t h the p r i m a l scene,
the c h i l d is cast into the place of the stranger, the outsider, the one
w h o is excluded f r o m the paradise of u n i o n w i t h the mother.
H o w e v e r , the failure to be cast out of the d y a d w i t h the mother
—a bypassing of the Oedipal position—can have a catastrophic
impact o n development. The child has not then been liberated by the
" L a w of the Father" (Lacan, 1977) and remains imprisoned i n an
image reflecting the mother's desire. Such derailment of the required
trajectory into the triadic space m a y contribute considerably to
pathological degrees of false self development. Aspects of self that do
not f i t the required image w i l l be associated w i t h shame because of
the anticipation that these w i l l be met w i t h disapproval, n o n
recognition, or bewilderment. O n l y the prospect of understanding
and acceptance—perhaps i n psychoanalysis or i n a l o v i n g relation
ship—can enable these to emerge and the threat of shame be faced.
Notes
1. The field of evolutionary psychology offers perspectives on both

promiscuity and jealousy, showing how both may have been selected
for their reproductive advantages (e.g. Buss, 2000).
2. Schore (1994, 1998) presents much developmental and neurobiological
evidence that the early interactions w i t h the mother directly affect the
young child's developing brain, regulating the levels of dopamine and
noradrenaline. Part of the function of the visual facial interaction
between mother and infant appears to be to stimulate the child's brain
and to regulate arousal. Synchronised gaze interactions generate highly
pleasurable states in the infant's brain and these facilitate attachment.
CHAPTER TWO
Shame—further reflections
S
hame involves a h o l e — a hole where our connection to others
s h o u l d be. I n shame w e f a l l o u t of the dance, the
choreography of the h u m a n theatre. A n d i n the deepest
depths of shame w e fall into a l i m b o where there are no w o r d s b u t
only silence. I n this no-place there are no eyes to see us, for the
others have averted their gaze—no-one wishes to see the dread that
has no name.
Shame and schizophrenia

This is sometimes conveyed most v i v i d l y and p a i n f u l l y b y people
suffering f r o m schizophrenia. One patient, Sally, described h o w she
w o u l d observe other people communicating, w i t h w o r d s and
gestures, each person seemingly perfectly " i n s t e p " and h a r m o n
ized w i t h the o t h e r — a n astonishingly intricate interlocking of
sound and movement, determined b y d a u n t i n g l y complex rules of
f o r m a n d content, w h e r e b y each person a p p a r e n t l y conveys
meaning to the other. A s a c h i l d , Sally h a d always experienced
d i f f i c u l t y i n " j o i n i n g i n " w i t h others, despite her intense desire to do
23
so. She had never been able to understand h o w and w h y people

behaved t o w a r d s each other i n the w a y that they d i d , and w h y one
k i n d of behaviour or conversation took place i n one situation, b u t
not i n another. Increasingly Sally's social experiences had been
p a i n f u l a n d discouraging, i n v o l v i n g rejection, teasing and scorn
f r o m her peers w h o had clearly regarded her as o d d . She came to
feel ever more a w k w a r d i n the presence of others, never k n o w i n g
h o w to behave or w h a t to say. Her feelings of shame and self
consciousness intensified, c r i p p l i n g her social capacities even
further. F i n d i n g the social w o r l d almost entirely w i t h o u t r e w a r d
and consistently h u m i l i a t i n g , Sally w i t h d r e w more and more into
her secret alternative w o r l d of inner fantasy. She began to devise her
o w n private code of communication i n v o l v i n g certain gestures and
signals. W h e n i m p o s i n g this o n others she was attempting b o t h to
deny her o w n failure to understand the shared social " l a n g u a g e "
and to make others feel something of the incomprehension and
b e w i l d e r m e n t that was her recurrent experience. By late adoles
cence she h a d become f l o r i d l y psychotic.
Sally's behaviour was pervaded by indications of shame, self
consciousness, and embarrassment. W h e n she first began attending
her psychotherapy sessions, she w o u l d conceal herself behind a pot
plant i n the w a i t i n g area. She w o u l d a v o i d eye contact. She w o u l d
repeatedly apologize i f she felt she m i g h t have behaved i n a p p r o
priately i n some way. Moreover, she w o u l d report excruciating
shame at her recognition that some of her behaviour and remarks
w o u l d indeed be regarded as o d d b y others. Sometimes she w o u l d
attempt to counter her shame b y m a k i n g a p o i n t of explicitly telling
people that she was schizophrenic almost o n first meeting them. It
was apparent that she was extremely anxious about telling me of
her private thoughts, beliefs, and fantasies, for fear that I w o u l d
l a u g h at her or react w i t h shock. Her core fantasy, w h i c h varied i n
its degree of prominence, was that she was the "son of G o d " , w i t h a
secret message for the w o r l d . I describe this as her " c o r e " fantasy
because, although she t o l d me i t was always present i n her m i n d , i t
was the one that she referred to most rarely, and w h e n she d i d so she
was clearly extremely anxious and embarrassed. This self-image, of
the utmost grandiosity, obviously functioned i n part to counter her
feelings of inferiority and inadequacy, b u t was itself associated w i t h
intense shame and for this reason was mostly concealed. I t h i n k i t is
SHAME —FURTHER REFLECTIONS 25
probably the case w i t h many core schizophrenic delusions—they are

concealed because of shame a n d are certainly n o t revealed to the
casual and unempathic enquiries of the general psychiatrist. Probably
it is only w h e n the patient is i n a fairly f l o r i d psychotic state that he
or she w i l l display core delusions o v e r t l y — a t such times of acute
psychosis, shame appears absent. A f t e r w a r d s , w h e n the acute phase
has subsided, the patient m a y suffer terrible shame at the memories
of his or her behaviour. The same is true of those patients w h o at
times experience manic states of m i n d .
W h i l s t there are n o d o u b t m a n y factors converging to produce
the clinical state a n d personality of schizophrenia, an inability to
process a n d respond appropriately to the communicative signals of
others seems crucial. Schizophrenic people have d i f f i c u l t y under
standing others and i n grasping social rules a n d expectations i n the
w a y that most of us are able to d o relatively effortlessly. I t is a k i n d
of social dyslexia. I n this respect there m a y be links w i t h other
conditions i n v o l v i n g failures i n grasping social meaning and i n
understanding the m i n d s of others, such as is f o u n d i n autism and
Asperger syndrome (Concoran, 2000; Frith, 1994). The p r o b l e m m a y
arise f r o m neurobiological abnormalities that result i n difficulties i n
processing emotional and social information, and impairments of the
n o r m a l filtering, focusing and sorting of perceptual stimuli. Such
patients live w i t h the continual threat of engulfment b y cognitive a n d
perceptual chaos—the "black h o l e " of non-meaning (Grotstein, 1977,
1990). Another contributing factor m a y be confusions and contra
dictions inherent i n the communications of the mother, such that the
child w h o becomes schizophrenic cannot " m a k e sense" of her
messages—although I d o n o t w i s h to suggest that this is a p r i m a r y
or essential cause of schizophrenia, w h i c h almost certainly has some
basis i n neurobiology. Whatever the source of the d i f f i c u l t y i n
processing social i n f o r m a t i o n a n d i n responding appropriately, this
i m p a i r m e n t gives rise t o p e r v a s i v e feelings o f shame a n d
i n a d e q u a c y — a n d also then to deep feelings of depression.
Shame and social inadequacy

Shame is a response to f a i l u r e a n d t o e n s u i n g feelings o f
inadequacy—especially a failure w h e n success was expected. Such
instances always involve a sense of failure in the eyes of others. The

spectrum of shame-evoking failure is very wide indeed: e.g. failure
to achieve academically or in a career; failure to possess a desirable
accent, body, clothes, or social skills; failure to be accepted by others
and be included as part of a social group; failure to understand
information; failure to perceive and respond appropriately to the
social requirements of a situation accurately; failure to have
acquired symbols of status and social and material success; failure
to retain control over display of emotion; failure to control one's
body. However, the most fundamental failure, I suggest, is that of
not being able to evoke an empathic response in the other.
Following a hypothesis by Broucek (1979), that the sense of efficacy
forms the basis of the sense of self, we might consider that one of the
most basic forms of efficacy is that of being able to communicate
one's needs and have them understood by the mother or other
primary care-giver. This is also the case in adult life. When we are in
contact with friendly others who display empathic understanding
of our experience and difficulties we tend to feel relatively free of
shame; we feel there is a continuity between our experience and that
of others. It is when we anticipate, or actually encounter
disapproval or incomprehension of our behaviour and emotions
that we experience shame. At such times we feel a discontinuity or
gulf between ourselves and others; we are strangers to each other.
Broucek (1991) suggests that shame may arise in the early
experiences with the mother at those moments when she becomes a
"stranger" to her infant. This could occur as a result of the mother's
changing moods and preoccupations which may alter her behaviour
and facial expression. Broucek points to the evidence of "still face"
experiments (Tronick et al., 1978). Interactions between mothers and
three-month-old infants were filmed under two conditions; in the
first, the mother was instructed to interact as she normally would;
and in the second she was asked to make eye contact but not engage
in facial or verbal interaction. The infants reacted to the still face first
by attempting their normal engagement with the mother, but then
responded either by crying in distress or by slumping down, with
loss of body tonus, turning the head down and averting their gaze
from the mother's face. Broucek agreed with Nathanson (1987a) that
the infants showing the second kind of response were displaying an
early form of shame and that this is also an aspect of the infant's
SHAME — F U R T H E R REFLECTIONS 27
response to strangers (Spitz, 1965). I t is perhaps significant that the

infants first attempted to engage the mother using their usual
behavioural repertoire and then reacted w i t h distress w h e n these
efforts failed. Thus the shame arose w h e n the infant encountered an
emotionally i m p o r t a n t other, the mother, w h o d i d not behave as
expected, and the infant d i d n o t k n o w h o w to respond to her.
Suddenly the relational w o r l d was alarmingly unpredictable. I t is
the same w i t h adults w h e n our social expectations are v i o l a t e d — w e
call i t embarrassment.
Schore (1998) summarizes a great deal of developmental and
neurobiological data regarding facial m i r r o r i n g as a major vehicle of
affect communication, to conclude:
The experience of shame is associated with unfulfilled expectations

and is triggered by an appraisal of a disturbance in facial
recognition, the most salient channel of non-verbal communication,
[p- 65]
He sees shame arising w h e n the y o u n g c h i l d looks to the mother for

the positive emotion-generating function of facial m i r r o r i n g , b u t
finds instead a response indicating disapproval or disgust. Then, i n
place of the anticipated psychobiologically energized state, the child
experiences shame, w h i c h is a r a p i d l y de-energized a n d p a i n f u l
state. Whereas the child's b r a i n i n the positive emotional state of
facial interaction is p r o d u c i n g endogenous opiates that mediate
pleasurable responses, i n the state of shame i t is generating stress
biochemicals, such as corticosteroids, w h i c h induce i n h i b i t i o n and
w i t h d r a w a l . Schore suggests that shame helps the c h i l d to k n o w
w h e n i t is appropriate to w i t h d r a w and become s u b d u e d — a n
a d d i t i o n to the more c o m m o n l y recognized f i g h t - f l i g h t alternatives
w h e n faced w i t h interpersonal threat, shame represents " p a r a
sympathetically mediated passive coping mechanisms . . . [ w h i c h
are] . . . a n alternative b u t equivalent strategy for effectively
regulating social interactional stress" (1998, p. 72). Nathanson
makes a similar p o i n t regarding the safety-seeking emotional
w i t h d r a w a l w h e n a positive and familiar facial m i r r o r i n g is n o t
evoked. H e describes shame as:
a biological system by which the organism controls its affective

output so that it will not remain interested or content when it may
not be safe to do so, or so that it w i l l not remain in affective

resonance w i t h an organism that fails to match its patterns stored in
memory. [1992, p. 140]
W e m i g h t also consider the shame potential arising f r o m

congenital impairments of the capacity to engage i n visual contact
w i t h the mother. Tantam (1991) writes:
M y own hypothesis ... is that Asperger syndrome results from a

failure of congenital gaze reflexes, which ensure that the normal
infant attends to social signals preferentially and locks the normal
infant into the ebb and flow of social interaction. The normal child, it
is hypothesised, learns to anticipate how much gaze they and others
merit, and this leads to the development of an "attention structure"
which is shared with other people. It is from this, I argue, that social
theories evolve. ... According to this hypothesis, the lack of inbuilt
gaze responses results in the person with Asperger syndrome being
unable to acquire the fundamentals of social competence, [p. 180]
The social awkwardness of the person w i t h Asperger syndrome is

regarded as a core feature and many aspects of this, particularly the
aversion of gaze, are clearly related to shame.
Shame and guilt

It is n o t always easy to entirely disentangle shame f r o m guilt.
H o w e v e r , i n general, g u i l t seems to be felt i n response to h a r m f u l or
prohibited actions or phantasies of such actions. These are often of
an aggressive nature. Shame, b y contrast is often to d o w i t h failures
to d o w h a t is expected, a n d is associated w i t h feelings of weakness.
Aggression and g u i l t m a y be preferentially highlighted as a defence
against feelings of weakness a n d s h a m e — o n the basis that i t is
better t o feel strong a n d b a d rather than weak. Jacobson (1965)
comments that "sadistic impulses are apt to induce guilt, w h i l e
masochistic, passive, dependent leanings . . . tend to arouse feelings
of shame a n d i n f e r i o r i t y " (p. 147). She gives the f o l l o w i n g example
of the interplay between shame a n d guilt:
This interplay frequently manifests itself in adolescent masturbation

conflicts. A patient who in his adolescence suffered from compulsive
SHAME — F U R T H E R REFLECTION S 29
masturbation w o u l d develop intense guilt feelings about his

fantasies of " r a p i n g " a girl. He woul d regularly w a r d off such
sadistic impulses by indulging instead in masturbation wit h
passive, regressive fantasies of being spoiled and sexually gratified
by beautiful girls w h o found great pleasure in taking the sexual
initiative. However, this masturbation, whic h woul d rapidly lead to
orgasm, woul d leave him with excruciating feelings of shame and
inferiority, since he regarded his fantasies—correctly—as a mani-
festation of his passivity, his lack of masculinity, and impotence, i.e.
of his castrated self image and his unconscious passive homosexual
(oral and anal) wishes. These feelings woul d immediately result in
new impulses to prove his masculinity by " r a p i n g " girls; inducing
another outburst of guilt feelings, such impulses w o u l d have to be
warded off once more by passive fantasies, [p. 148]
Thus, feelings of weakness, helplessness and passivity—associated

w i t h s h a m e — c a n lead to a w i s h to t u r n the tables a n d t r i u m p h over
the other, g i v i n g rise then to feelings of g u i l t ( L y n d , 1958). This is
extremely c o m m o n , since, as Gedo (1981) a n d G. K l e i n (1976) have
emphasized, a major component of the developing organization of
the self is the transformation of passive experience into a more
active m o d e — t o do actively w h a t was once suffered passively a n d
thereby move f r o m helplessness a n d shame to guilt.
Some authors (e.g. L y n d , 1958; Piers & Singer, 1953) have
suggested that shame is a response to failures to live u p to the ego
ideal, w h i l s t g u i l t results f r o m transgressions condemned b y the
superego. However, shame is a peculiarly global state, casting its
shadow over the w h o l e sense of self, w h i l s t guilt tends to have a
more discrete reference to particular actions (Lewis, 1971; L y n d ,
1958). As Thrane (1979) puts i t , i n guilt w e say " H o w can I have
done thatl"; i n shame w e say " H o w can 7 have done that!".
Shame m a y also give rise to guilt more directly. For example, a
person m i g h t feel shame about a parent, a child, a spouse or other
relative, because of their social inadequacies or b e h a v i o u r a l
peculiarities. Similar shame m a y be felt about one's f a m i l y as a
whole, especially regarding class, cultural, and educational back
g r o u n d , leading to attitudes of awkwardness a n d rejection t o w a r d s
one's k i n . This m a y be pronounced w h e n a person has m o v e d into a
class or cultural group significantly different f r o m his or her origins.
Such shame about others to w h o m one is c o n n e c t e d — c o m m o n
particularly d u r i n g adolescence and early a d u l t h o o d — m a y be

experienced as an extremely p a i n f u l source of guilt a n d feelings of
disloyalty.
Shame and the look
A stand-up comedienne i n t h e r a p y — J u l i e — t a l k e d of her contrast

i n g experiences of being i n front of an audience. W h e n her
performances w e n t w e l l , she w o u l d feel a w o n d e r f u l intoxicating
sense of agency and potency. A t these times the audience w o u l d
appear a d m i r i n g , their responses of laughter a f f i r m i n g her w i t and
skill. This w a s a m i r r o r i n g experience a m p l i f i e d to its m a x i m u m .
The more responsive and engaged the audience became, the more
her delivery of her material seemed to f l o w w i t h effortless panache
and precision of t i m i n g . O n the other hand, w h e n the audience was
unresponsive, she w o u l d experience a m o u n t i n g panic. Terrible
feelings of shame and self-consciousness w o u l d begin to f i l l her
w h o l e being. Her heart w o u l d p o u n d and her skin w o u l d feel cold.
Her delivery w o u l d become increasingly hesitant and she w o u l d
stumble over her words. O n occasion, i n response to jeers, she
w o u l d actually r u n off the stage. A t such times she d i d not at a l l feel
herself to be acting f r o m a centre of her o w n sense of agency,
m i r r o r e d b y an a d m i r i n g audience, empathically responding to her
h u m o u r . Instead she w o u l d feel herself to be an object of the
audience's unempathic and u n f r i e n d l y gaze.
Thus w h e n the audience was responsive and clearly experien
cing pleasure i n her h u m o r o u s communications, Julie w o u l d
experience herself as a subject, an agent w i t h i n her immediate
interpersonal w o r l d . By contrast, w h e n the audience appeared
hostile or unresponsive, she experienced herself as an object of their
scornful g a z e — a l l sense of agency w o u l d r a p i d l y dissipate a n d she
w o u l d feel herself to be socially impotent. A s a chi l d she h a d
developed a role of " p e r f o r m e r " i n the f a m i l y , being fu n n y, d o i n g
little tricks, singing etc. However, she h a d also experienced her
mother as c o n t r o l l i n g and intrusive, preoccupied w i t h Julie's
achievements, and frequently expressing disapproval b y w i t h
d r a w i n g a n d presenting an icy cold demeanour. Julie described her
oscillation between states of m i n d i n w h i c h she felt herself to be i n
SHAME — FURTHER REFLECTIONS 31
the centre of her w o r l d , into w h i c h others could be i n v i t e d , and, o n

the other h a n d , states i n w h i c h she felt pushed to the edge of
someone else's w o r l d . I n this w a y she described the tension,
discussed b y Bach (1980), between w h a t he termed "subjective
awareness", the feeling that the w o r l d is " a l l m e " , and "objective
self-awareness", the sense of being there for someone else.
These patterns were apparent i n the transference. Julie w o u l d
complain at times of feeling treated as an object to be made sense of,
rather than a person to be understood empathically f r o m w i t h i n her
o w n subjective internal position. Interpretations, i f they were n o t
framed as an empathic grasp of her experience, b u t instead referred
to a psychodynamic defence or process, w o u l d be experienced b y
her as controlling and f r ag m e n t i n g ; at such moments she w o u l d feel
objectified, shamed, and i n a state of p a i n f u l self-consciousness. O n
the other h a n d , she w o u l d display a m a r k e d tendency to t r y to f i t
herself i n t o the analyst's f o r m u l a t i o n s — t h i s a l t e r n a t i n g w i t h
rebellious states i n w h i c h she w o u l d fantasize w r e c k i n g the
consulting r o o m , or w o u l d f i l l the session w i t h such a continuous
stream of w o r d s that there was no space for the analyst to speak.
M a n y patients experience some degree of self-consciousness
w h e n feeling that their communications to the therapist are not
immediately understood. I t is as i f at those times the experience is of
being the object of an other's uncomprehending gaze; there is no
sense of a f f i r m a t i o n of c o m m o n h u m a n i t y — o r of Kohut's (1984)
sense of t w i n s h i p , where i t is felt that "here is an other w h o is like
myself". I have also noticed that some patients w h o are particularly
prone to self-consciousness a n d shame have suffered the loss of a
parent or some similar catastrophe i n early life. Such losses cannot
easily be m o u r n e d b y the y o u n g child, especially if the remaining
care-givers are themselves too preoccupied w i t h their loss, or i n
other w a y s are unable to provide empathic and responsive support.
The ch ild is likely to become w i t h d r a w n , shutting off his or her
emotions, perhaps n o t s h o w i n g o u t w a r d l y m u c h evidence of the
internal devastation. A d u l t s observing this m a y t h i n k w i t h some
relief that the child does n o t seem to be very affected. The emotional
reality is that the c h i l d has been t o r n f r o m the empathic matrix,
feeling him/herself to be n o w at the centre of a cold a n d hostile
w o r l d . W h a t then appears to happen is that the c h i l d g r o w s u p
h a v i n g internalized the absence of an empathic response i n the f o r m
of the presence of an unempathic internal object. This unempathic

figure is then projected onto the therapist, leading the patient to
expect a lack of understanding a n d responsiveness. The patient
fears that he or she is gazed u p o n b y an other w h o looks not w i t h
empathy b u t w i t h incomprehension.
For the c h i l d , too m u c h l o o k i n g or too little l o o k i n g are b o t h
damaging to the delicately emerging sense of self. The natural
exhibitionism of the child looks for the " g l e a m i n the mother's eye"
(Kohut, 1971), b u t fears the look that seems to invade and control.
Lewis (1963) describes the role of w a t c h i n g i n a four-year-old
psychotic child. The child showed a peculiar, precocious, embar
rassed, self-consciousness w h i l s t her mother demonstrated a k i n d of
total involvement w i t h her, constantly w a t c h i n g anxiously. Lewis
suggests that the c h i l d seemed to have identified w i t h the mother's
w a t c h i n g — i n this w a y m a i n t a i n i n g a l i n k to the mother, w h i l s t at
the same time a f f i r m i n g her o w n sense of self, w a r d i n g off the
danger of engulfment b y the mother. Merleau-Ponty (1964) has
described an abrupt change i n the child's reactions to the look of the
other. Prior to a certain point, the other's look is encouraging, b u t
after this i t becomes an embarrassment: " e v e r y t h i n g happens as
t h o u g h w h e n he is looked at, his attention is displaced f r o m the task
he is carrying out to a representation of himself i n the process of
carrying i t t h r o u g h " .
One of the major sections of Sartre's Being and Nothingness
dealing w i t h shame is entitled "The l o o k " . H e gives numerous
examples of the phenomenology of becoming the object of the
other's look:
Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity or vice, I have just

glued my ear to the door and looked through the keyhole. I am
alone . . . but all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is
looking at me! [pp. 347-349].
Sartre writes of the shock of realizing that the object of our

perception can suddenly become the subject w h o is v i e w i n g us an
the object:
. . . my apprehension of the Other in the world . . . refers to the

permanent possibility that a subject who sees me may be
substituted for the object seen by me. [p. 345]
W h e n w e perceive the other l o o k i n g at us, w e cannot easily

m a i n t a i n that other i n the position of o b j e c t — w e tend to feel we are
the object:
The Other's look hides his eyes; he seems to go in front of them ... to
perceive is to look at, and to apprehend a look is not to apprehend a
look-as-object in the world (unless the look is not directed upon us);
it is to be conscious of being looked at. The look which the eyes
manifest, no matter what kind of eyes they are, is a pure reference to
myself, [pp. 346-347]
W h e n w e experience our self as the object for an other, w e feel

vulnerable and exposed:
What I apprehend immediately when I hear the branches crackling

behind me is not that there is someone there, it is that I am vulnerable,
that I have a body which can be hurt, that I occupy a place and that I
can not in any case escape from the space in which I am without
defence—in short, that I am seen. [p. 347]
Sartre goes o n to describe h o w our awareness of being an object for

the other contains the realization that this object (this vision of one's
self) that the other sees is essentially u n k n o w a b l e to us. The self as
an object for the other is not the same as our self as the object of our
o w n reflective consciousness:
... it is separated from me by a nothingness which I can not fill since

I apprehend it as not being for me and since on principle it exists for
the Other. Therefore I do not aim at it as if it could someday be given
me but on the contrary in so far as it on principle flees from me and
w i l l never belong to me. Nevertheless I am that Ego; I do not reject it
as a strange image, but it is present to me as a self which I am
without knowing it; for I discover it in shame or pride which reveals
to me the Other's look and myself at the end of that look. It is the
shame or pride which makes me live, not know the situation of being
looked at. [p. 350]
Sartre's examples are of the sudden reversal of the f l o w of

consciousness, f r o m the self-as-subject to the self-as-object (Wright,
1991). The psychologically competent a d u l t is able to balance the
subjective and objective self, so that the inner sense of agency is co
ordinated w i t h an appropriate presentation of self to others, such
that communicative behaviour is continually modified by the

perceptual feedback regarding the other's view and impression of
one's self (Mollon, 1993). This is the interplay of G. H . Mead's (1934)
" I " and the "Me"—a balance which is necessary for the good
functioning of what Lichtenberg (1983) called the "self-as-a-whole"
and the "mental director". However, some people, especially those
corresponding to Winnicott's (1960) account of "false self", seem to
experience themselves as predominantly all " M e " , excessively
preoccupied with the other's image of them and quite out of touch
with their " I " , their own deeper feelings. Shame and feelings of
embarrassed self-consciousness arise when a discrepancy becomes
apparent between actual self and the presented self, or between the
actual self and the image of the self that the other expects. Thus a
person may feel shame when his or her grandiose aspirations are
found to be discrepant with reality and this discrepancy is apparent
to others. However, shame may also arise when the actual self is
revealed to be discrepant with the other's image of one's self,
whether this discrepancy is in a positive or negative direction; to
realize that the other is underestimating one's status or achieve
ments can evoke shame and embarrassment just as much as can
finding one's achievements fall short of the other's expectations. It
seems that embarrassed self-consciousness arises in the gap—in the
sudden jarring disruption of the fitting together of self and other
(Mollon, 1987). Indeed it is a matter of everyday observation that all
instances of embarrassment involve this disruption of social
expectations.
Captured by the mother's narcissism
For some children—and later adults—the threat of this "embarrass

ment" can be a pervasive feature of their interpersonal world,
thereby becoming internalized as a core component of the
personality. This occurs when the mother is experienced as
excessively controlling and demanding, requiring her child to fulfil
her narcissistic needs whilst the child's own exhibitionism and
phase-appropriate grandiosity are neglected. The pressure on the
child is then to fit in with the mother's narcissism and to deny his or
her own developmental initiatives. To some extent this corresponds
to the situation described by Winnicott (1960) in his discussion of
true a n d false self. However, i t is articulated i n more detail i n

Kohut's (1971) account of the vertical split i n certain narcissistic
developments.
For e x a m p l e , K o h u t describes t h e case of M r J, w h o s e
presentation i n the analysis was for some time characterized b y
qualities of grandiosity a n d exhibitionism. D u r i n g one session he
mentioned casually that after shaving i n the mornings he w o u l d
carefully rinse his razor a n d clean the sink before w a s h i n g a n d
d r y i n g his face. I t was not immediately apparent w h y M r J spoke of
this a n d w h y he felt i t to be i m p o r t a n t , b u t K o h u t observed that i t
was recounted i n a somewhat arrogant a n d tense fashion. I n
retrospect K o h u t began to see that this was a n early indication of a
h i d d e n area i n M r J's personality derived f r o m a combination of
vertical a n d horizontal s p l i t s — s u c h that one vertically split sector
was an expression of his accommodation to his mother's narcissism
w h i l s t another sector contained his conscious depression a n d his
o w n repressed grandiose-exhibitionistic strivings. They gradually
arrived at an understanding of h o w M r J's overt v a n i t y a n d
arrogance was l i n k e d to his mother's praise for various of his
performances i n w h i c h he was s h o w n off for the enhancement of her
self-esteem. Thus, i n the example of the shaving routine, M r J was
displaying himself as a " g o o d b o y w h o leaves the sink nice a n d
clean", a quality that presumably w o u l d have gained his mother's
approval. However, his fastidious w a s h i n g of the razor a n d basin
took precedence over attention to his face. K o h u t saw this as an
endopsychic replica of his need for his mother's acceptance of his
displayed b o d y self and her rejection of this. H e explains that M r J's
apparent grandiosity a n d exhibitionism was n o t t r u l y his o w n :
This noisily displayed grandiose-exhibitionistic sector of his

personality had occupied throughout his life the conscious centre
of the psychic stage. Yet it was not fully real to him, provided no
lasting satisfaction, and remained split off from the coexisting, more
centrally located sector of his psyche in w h i c h he experienced those
vague depressions coupled with shame and hypochondria that had
motivated h i m to seek psychoanalytic help. [1971, pp. 180-181]
K o h u t here describes a situation i n w h i c h the child's narcissism a n d

exhibitionism is essentially hijacked b y the mother's narcissism, so
that the exhibitionistic display is essentially hers. The analytic task,
36 SHAME AN D JEALOUSY
as K o h u t sees i t , is to locate the patient's authentic narcissistic needs,

w h i c h are kept i n check (unconscious) b y intense feelings of shame:
Gradually, and against strong resistances (motivated by deep

shame, fear of overstimulation, fear of traumatic disappointment),
the narcissistic transference began to centre around his need to have
his body-mind-self confirmed by the analyst's admiring accep-
tance, [p. 182]
K o h u t a n d M r J eventually came to understand that a crucial fear

was that the analyst w o u l d value the patient only as a vehicle for his
o w n aggrandizement and w o u l d reject h i m i f he displayed his o w n
i n i t i a t i v e s — a transference pattern that precisely repeated his c h i l d
h o o d anxieties i n relation to his mother. M r J's overt grandiosity a n d
exhibitionism h a d been expressed t h r o u g h one side of a vertically
split personality, w h i l s t his o w n authentic narcissistic needs, l i n k e d
w i t h shame, h a d been held i n repression (horizontal split) w i t h i n
the other vertically split sector (Kohut represents this i n a diagram
o n p. 179 of The Analysis of the Self s h o w i n g a combination of
vertical a n d horizontal splitting). A s M r J's wishes to display his
"grandiose-exhibitionistic b o d y self" were identified a n d w o r k e d
t h r o u g h i n the transference, M r J was able to arrive at a p o i n t where,
as he h u m o r o u s l y p u t i t , he could "prefer m y face to the razor"!
The background of a mother w h o required the c h i l d to function
as an extension of herself, i n such a w a y that there was no r o o m for
the child's o w n separate self, does seem to be c o m m o n w i t h patients
w h o are prone to p a i n f u l self-consciousness. I n such cases the child
appears to have colluded w i t h this need i n the mother, often
because the r e w a r d was to remain i n a special or privileged position
i n relation to the mother. This m i g h t be so particularly i f the mother
denigrated the father, so that the child felt preferred to the figure
w h o w o u l d otherwise have been the Oedipal r i v a l . I n these
circumstances, the real r i v a l f o r the mother's love is n o t the father
b u t the false image that the mother has of the child. I t is the dilemma
portrayed i n Oscar Wilde's novel, The Picture of Dorian Gray (B.
Green, 1979). The picture, the image, is loved and i t this that Dorian
wishes to swap places w i t h . By contrast, the unseen and u n m i r r o r e d
self becomes increasingly degenerate, its features distorted b y envy,
represented b y the hideously deteriorating picture h i d d e n i n the
attic. Once the child has made this devil's pact of i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h
SHAME — F U R T H E R R E F L E C T I O N S 37
the image that mother loves, sacrificing his or her true self i n the
service of retaining her love, the h i d d e n corrosive inner develop
ment is then set on its inevitable course. W i t h the possibility of
authentic development thus sabotaged, the person w i l l feel that the
true inner self is increasingly unlovable and must remain hidden.
The ensuing shame and rage may be intense and p r o f o u n d —
erupting sometimes later i n life i n seemingly incomprehensible self
destructive acts of sabotage of the person's achievements (and
sometimes actual suicide). I n such cases the destruction is an
unconscious attempt to break free of the prison of the false self and
the mother's narcissism (even if by destruction of the body).
Shame and exhibitionism
Historically we have castigated the psychological exhibitionist... It

seems to me that we have become excessively narrow-minded in
our thinking to imagine that the art of being seen, being observed,
being noticed, being appreciated and so forth, should be confined to
the celebrity or exhibitionist. Surely, in an emotionally literate
society, everybody needs to be taken seriously, and we ought to
endeavour to provide room so that each and every one of us can
have an arena. [Kahr, 2001, pp. 65-66]
Some degree of shame is c o m m o n l y associated w i t h exposure to the

v i e w of others, even if that v i e w is favourable (Buss, 1980).
C o m p l i m e n t s c o m m o n l y evoke embarrassment. D a r w i n (1872)
noted that an attractive y o u n g w o m a n m i g h t blush i f a m a n gazes
at her, even t h o u g h she k n o w s that his look is a d m i r i n g . This
shame-shyness relating to pleasurable aspects of exhibitionism is
quite n o r m a l . For some, however, conflicts over exhibitionism can
be excruciatingly p a i n f u l .
A y o u n g w o m a n complained of social inhibitions and " p a r a
n o i a " w h e n amongst a c r o w d of people. She feared that everyone
w o u l d be l o o k i n g at her critically and j u d g i n g her. Analysis
revealed that behind this fear lay a strong exhibitionist desire. She
w a n t e d to be the focus of a d m i r i n g attention. I t emerged that w h e n
she h a d been younger she had become used to such a d m i r a t i o n ,
being an only child, and adored by her mother (her father h a v i n g
been absent as a result of divorce). Her fantasies were of being a
wonderful singer and dancer—of performing on stage to rapturous

acclaim. The problem was that she felt her actual achievements did
not match up to her ambitions. Therefore her exhibitionism caused
her intense anxiety. It overstimulated her, evoking a fear of crude
exhibitionistic display that was not harnessed to talent and
achievement worthy of admiration. Her difficulty was self-reinfor
cing, since her conflicts over exhibitionism gave rise to intense
shame, which was the root of her social anxieties, and thereby
inhibited her from developing her actual talent as a singer and also
prevented her from gaining other work achievements that could
provide a realistic basis for self-esteem.
In another case, a patient reported that as a young boy he had
frequently been used as a child performer in variety shows—his
mother being keenly involved in local amateur dramatics. The boy
had not chosen to undertake these performances at his own
initiative and in fact experienced intense anxiety before going on
stage—especially since he was, by temperament, rather shy.
However, his mother had been dismissive of his expressions of
anxiety, thereby teaching him to disregard his own signals of
shame. Moreover, he did not have any particular talent to display
on stage and the "performances" consisted essentially of the
amusement value of a small boy dressed in a costume illustrating
a popular song of the day—such as a "jailbird" outfit to accompany
"jail house rock", which he would then pretend to sing. In
retrospect, it was possible to understand that the boy's exhibition
ism had been overstimulated by this abnormal exposure to a large
and seemingly admiring audience. What exacerbated the problem,
however, was that his mother caused the performances to continue
well past an age when they were at all appropriate, and when the
boy could clearly sense that he was no longer regarded as "cute"
and the audience was no longer unequivocally admiring. In
particular, his peer group became overtly mocking. The boy grew
up to be a man with a marked proneness to shame and social
anxiety.
These examples correspond to situations described by Kohut
(1971), i n which the child's natural exhibitionism had been either
overstimulated or excessively suppressed. As a result, the exhibi
tionism would be repressed. It would not then have the opportunity
to transmute gradually into more mature modified forms that are
g r o u n d e d i n socially a p p r o v e d achievement. R e m a i n i n g thus

infantile and crude i n quality, the desire to e x h i b i t — t o " s h o w o f f "
— w o u l d be feared unconsciously as very threatening. The potential
f l o o d i n g of the psyche w i t h u n m o d i f i e d infantile exhibitionism can
be a source of o v e r w h e l m i n g shame. I n most of Kohut's examples,
the father was absent, as i n the case of the w o m a n described above.
The resulting position (of too m u c h mother and too little father)
m a y mean a failure to progress into the triadic Oedipal position,
leaving the c h i l d insufficiently differentiated f r o m the mother and
w i t h an uncertain sense of self; this can be a crucial component of
excessive shame-proneness ( M o l l o n , 1993).
Shame and the body
A shame prone patient w o u l d frequently speak of his w i s h to be

" p u r e intellect", to be w i t h o u t a b o d y w i t h its needs, its lusts, and
its imperfections. He was critical of the appearance of his o w n b o d y
and those of others, especially that of his girlfriend. I t was apparent
that part of his unconscious hope h a d been that psychoanalysis
w o u l d help h i m achieve a state of e n d u r i n g rationality and a
t r i u m p h of intellect over body. His b o d y was a source of great
shame. I t represented limitations and biological n e e d — a continual
affront to narcissistic aspirations for freedom, perfection, and self
sufficiency. A n d r e Green, i n a discussion of " m o r a l narcissism"
writes:
In the case of the moral narcissist, hell is not other people—

narcissism has eliminated them—but rather the body. The body is
an Other, resurrected in spite of numerous attempts to wipe out its
traces. The body is a limitation, a servitude, a termination ... their
body is their absolute master—their shame. [1982]
The m o r a l narcissist condemns the b o d y and its appetites. It is an

attitude close to the " p r o f o u n d asceticism of adolescence" described
b y A n n a Freud (1966), adolescence being a time of particular
proneness to shame. Green relates m o r a l narcissism to c i r c u m
stances similar to those W i n n i c o t t describes as leading to the
development of false self, where the mother's agenda to have a
particular k i n d of c h i l d prevails over the child's o w n initiatives. He
suggests that the omnipotence attributed to the mother m a y be

reinforced i f i t is associated w i t h the mother's desire to bear a child
w i t h o u t the c o n t r i b u t i o n of the father. M a n y patients w h o are
particularly shame prone do seem to have h a d mothers w h o were
rather controlling and w h o devalued the father ( M o l l o n , 1993).
Sartre also describes the w a y the b o d y can be felt to betray the
self insofar as it exists for the other:
"To feel oneself blushing", "to feel oneself sweating" etc., are
inaccurate expressions which the shy person uses to describe his
state; what he really means is that he is physically and constantly
conscious of his body, not as it is for him but as it is for the other. This
constant uneasiness which is the apprehension of my body's
alienation as irremediable can determine ... a pathological fear of
blushing; these are nothing but a horrified metaphysical apprehen
sion of the existence of my body for the Other. We often say that the
shy man is "embarrassed by his own body". Actually this is
incorrect; I cannot be embarrassed by my own body as I exist it. It is
my body as it is for the Other which may embarrass me. [1956,
pp. 462-463]
The o r i g i n a l Other is of course the m o t h e r — a n d i n shame-prone

people, the b o d y has been felt to belong to her, and is therefore the
object of hatred.
A particular area of shame i n relation to the b o d y concerns
sexuality. Certain German terms illustrate the close association of
shame and sexuality. For example, the genital region is called die
Scham, the pubic m o u n d Schamberg and pubic hair Schambaare.
There is something about sexuality that is inherently intimate to the
self (and one's lover) and w h i c h cannot be shared p u b l i c l y w i t h o u t
some feeling of s h a m e — o r if there is an absence of shame w e feel
something i m p o r t a n t is missing. W h e n I was first t r a i n i n g i n
psychoanalytic therapy I was taught that i t was v e r y i m p o r t a n t to
ask a patient about masturbation fantasies d u r i n g the i n i t i a l
assessment because these were considered to p r o v i d e clues to
crucial conflicts and anxieties. I have always tended to feel reluctant
to make such enquiries, especially i n an initial meeting. A l t h o u g h it
does seem that masturbation fantasies can reveal core desires and
anxieties relating to essential aspects of the self, to ask about these
directly (unless done w i t h the utmost tact) can be experienced as
v i o l a t i n g and i n disregard of the patient's natural shame. This is

especially the case insofar as sexual fantasies can often be under
stood as sexualized narratives about injuries and vulnerabilities i n
the sense of s e l f — t h e core self that must not be violated, as
W i n n i c o t t (1960), K h a n (1972), Stoller (1976) and K o h u t (1971,1977)
amongst others have emphasized.
Some analysts seem inclined to assume that shame associated
w i t h m a s t u r b a t i o n m u s t be to d o w i t h the content of the
accompanying phantasies. I do n o t believe this is necessarily the
case. One patient, Jeanette, reported, w i t h tremendous embarrass
ment, h o w she had learned to masturbate and give herself an
orgasm at the age of seven and had indulged regularly i n this over
the subsequent years, b u t always feeling some sense of shame
afterwards. Her t u r n i n g to her o w n body for pleasurable stimula
t i o n had been given impetus p a r t l y by her feelings of loneliness and
lack of emotional s t i m u l a t i o n — h e r lone parent mother tending to be
preoccupied and often intoxicated. One day, w h i l s t at school aged
14, Jeanette had experienced a sudden " r e a l i z a t i o n " of the nature of
her sexual activities and was overwhelmed w i t h intense feelings of
shame and a terror that others w o u l d k n o w her secret. She had
rushed home and tried to tell her mother, w h o failed to respond i n
an empathic m a n n e r b u t instead reacted w i t h anxiety a n d
disapproval. Subsequently Jeanette developed a disabling social
anxiety, w h i c h turned out to be based on the fear that the w o r d
" m a s t u r b a t i o n " w o u l d crop u p i n conversation and that she w o u l d
go red; naturally her anxiety about blushing and this being seen
tended to b r i n g about the very effect she feared whenever a
conversation t u r n e d to sexual matters. Jeanette's a d u l t feelings of
shame centred not only o n her childhood masturbation, w h i c h she
regarded as excessive, b u t also o n her v i e w of herself as h a v i n g an
abnormal interest i n sex. Discussion of her sexuality i n psychother
apy led to a r a p i d d i m i n u t i o n i n her feelings of shame and
associated anxiety.
The sexual stimulation of one's o w n b o d y can be experienced as
a private addiction, associated w i t h feelings of weakness and thus
shame. Its prominence i n a person's life m a y be felt to be an
indication of his or her inadequacy and inability to f o r m a satisfying
sexual relationship w i t h another person. A n activity of g i v i n g
pleasure to oneself, w h i c h inherently is non-social and private,
inevitably m u s t be associated w i t h shame i f i t is exposed to others.

M a s t u r b a t i o n is the only pleasurable activity that, inherent i n its
nature, is n o t for sharing w i t h others.
Sexuality has m a n y f u n c t i o n s — o b v i o u s l y i n c l u d i n g procreation
a n d the c o m m u n i c a t i o n of love and i n t i m a c y — b u t i t also often
appears associated w i t h the sense of a u t o n o m y a n d i d e n t i t y
(Lichtenstein, 1961). Injuries to the sense of self and its autonomy,
suffered i n the early relationship w i t h the mother, m a y give rise to
sexual behaviours and fantasies that have the unconscious function
of d e n y i n g the anxiety and injury, asserting the survival of the self
(Stoller, 1976). T h r o u g h the unconscious ingenuity of sexual fantasy
the deepest anxiety about the v i a b i l i t y of the psychological-bodily
self is transformed into the source of the most intense pleasure.
Parents often d o interfere w i t h the child's autonomy i n relation
to its exploration of the body's sexuality. A m s t e r d a m and Levitt
(1980) suggest that a c o m m o n source of p a i n f u l embarrassed self
consciousness is the negative reaction of a parent w h o looks
anxiously or disapprovingly w h e n the c h i l d is engaged i n genital
exploration or play. They argue that the mother's disapproval of the
child's autoerotic exploration may be one of the first narcissistic
injuries experienced b y the child. A m s t e r d a m and L e v i t t p o i n t out
that, i n contrast to the " g l e a m i n the mother's eye" w h i c h K o h u t
(1971) emphasized as a f o u n d a t i o n of the child's sense of self,
mothers i n our culture do not n o r m a l l y beam w h i l s t their infants
play w i t h themselves. They argue that i n this w a y the child's dream
of his or her o w n perfection is destroyed and the source of
pleasure—his or her o w n b o d i l y sensations—now produce shame.
Exploration of sexuality has led the c h i l d out of the Garden of Eden.
Shame and depression

Guilt, rather than shame, has tended to be emphasized as one of the
crucial affects (along w i t h anger) i n states of depression. H o w e v e r ,
if one listens to the preoccupations of depressed patients, i t is not
d i f f i c u l t to discern repetitive r u m i n a t i o n s over shameful and
narcissistically injurious events. Indeed, the characteristics of the
"depressive personality", as described b y such authors as Rado
(1928), Fenichel (1946) and A r i e t i and Bemporad (1980)—narcissistic
vulnerability, sensitivity to slights, insults, criticisms and disap

p o i n t m e n t s — m a y all be seen i n terms of proneness to shame.
Certainly depression is, i n part, a narcissistic disturbance, since the
d i s r u p t i o n i n the sense of self and i n self-esteem is quite central
( M o l l o n & Parry, 1984).
W h i l s t depression is often a response to loss, w h a t is n o t always
appreciated f u l l y is the role of the shame and h u m i l i a t i o n inherent
i n the loss. W h e n a relationship ends, there is the p a i n of loss of the
other person, b u t i n a d d i t i o n , for the one w h o is rejected, there is a
narcissistic i n j u r y — t h e feelings of shame, h u m i l i a t i o n , and i n j u r y to
self-esteem. It is c o m m o n for some people consistently to avoid
receiving such an i n j u r y b y ensuring that they are always the ones
w h o end the r e l a t i o n s h i p — b e c o m i n g "serial rejecters", agents of
narcissistic trauma inflicted o n others w h o are left to suffer the
ensuing depression.
Rejection brings shame. Shame evokes rage and hatred of the
self that is the object of shame. Self-esteem plummets. A state of
depression descends. I n such a state, the person feels even more
undesirable and unlovable. Shame, rage, self-hatred, falling self
esteem, depression, and further shame—this tangle of " b r e a k d o w n
p r o d u c t s " of narcissistic i n j u r y (Kohut, 1977)—spiral relentlessly i n
an accelerating negative feedback, c u l m i n a t i n g , i n the case of
vulnerable i n d i v i d u a l s , i n suicide or serious self-harm. Such
i n d i v i d u a l s k n o w that their deteriorating mental state makes them
increasingly unattractive and undesirable and this adds to their
sense of shame. Shame begets s h a m e — a n d the only antidote to
shame is the empathic and affectionate response of another person.
Those w h o are fortunate enough to have experienced sufficient love
and empathy i n childhood are able to d r a w u p o n these internalized
experiences and f i n d their o w n self-directed empathy. For those
w h o have not, shame may expand w i t h o u t l i m i t .
Some people w h o are prone to depression live under the
oppression of a harsh and shame-inducing superego (Cohen et ah,
1954; M o r r i s o n , 1989b) d e r i v e d f r o m experiences w i t h v e r y
demanding and status-conscious parents. I n childhood these people
f o u n d that failure or rebellion led to w i t h d r a w a l of love. The adult
pattern m a y often then be that of an alternation between compliance
w i t h the demands of the internalized parental figures and states of
manic rebellion. For example, one y o u n g w o m a n had g r o w n u p
within a particular ethnic culture in which females were expected to

behave w i t h extreme inhibition and modesty; she would go for long
periods in conformity w i t h these expectations, but periodically
would enter manic phases in which she would reject her traditional
clothing and become sexually adventurous and promiscuous; this
manic phase would then end w i t h a crash into depression and
overwhelming feelings of shame about her preceding behaviour. In
addition to her feelings of shame for herself, she would feel she had
brought shame upon her family.
To some extent the active destructiveness directed towards the
self displayed by certain depressive patients can be understood as
an attempt to avoid feelings of helplessness and shame in response
to rejection. Guntrip (1968) made a similar point when he argued
that sado-masochistic internal object relations function as a defence
against intolerable feelings of weakness and helplessness. I n such a
way, depression can be seen sometimes as an attempt to protect the
sense of self (Mollon & Parry, 1984). For example, one chronically
depressed patient had never managed to separate from her mother,
with whom she maintained a hostile masochistic dependence. She
described how all her life she had felt she had to be something for
other people, whether they be mother, friends, or the therapist in the
transference; she felt she always had to slot into the "vision" that
her mother had for her. This became quite explicit i n the
transference where she felt that to become dependent on the
therapist meant that she would be taken over and would lose all her
autonomy. She made several plans for suicide, which she saw as
one way in which she could escape from the grip of the other and
affirm her own self even if this meant her death. In this way she
could assert that her life belonged to her and was therefore hers to
end. Each time she made these plans she threw out all her personal
possessions and letters and anything that had any emotional
meaning for her. Eventually she became able to say why she did
this. It was, she said, in order to prevent others prying into her
personal belongings after she was dead. Thus she wished to avoid
the sense of shame associated with violation of her core self, even
after death. She was engaged in a lifelong struggle to emerge from
the shame-ridden state of being an object for the other, and to find
and protect the autonomy and integrity of her self—even at the
expense of ending the life of her body.
Embarrassment about the self

It w i l l be apparent f r o m the discussion so far that for those w h o are
prone to shame, the fundamental embarrassment is the self. For
example, M r D w i s h e d to be " a l l things to a l l m e n " . H e w o u l d
adapt his manner, voice, opinions, tastes etc. according to w h o m he
was w i t h . I n this w a y he endeavoured to hide his real self. H i s
greatest fear was that his self w o u l d embarrassingly emerge f r o m its
c a m o u f l a g e — t h a t he w o u l d say or d o something that w a s n o t i n
keeping w i t h the image he w a s attempting to present. A chameleon,
he was continually afraid that his colours m i g h t n o t m a t c h his
s u r r o u n d i n g s . N a t u r a l l y , M r D's real self w a s h i d d e n f r o m
" h i m s e l f " . H e d i d n o t k n o w w h a t he really t h o u g h t or felt or
d e s i r e d — b u t he feared that something f r o m these h i d d e n areas
m i g h t leak out, catastrophically breaking the carefully constructed
blending w i t h the other person(s). Moreover, he feared being
exposed as a fraud. H e w a s n o t sure exactly i n w h a t w a y he w a s a
fraud, b u t he sensed that his w h o l e w a y of presenting himself i n the
w o r l d was fraudulent. H e w o u l d always agree w i t h whatever the
analyst s a i d — i n c l u d i n g interpretations about his false self. The
p r o b l e m w a s that he genuinely d i d n o t k n o w the content of w h a t
lay b e h i n d his false presentation—he s i m p l y feared that whatever i t
was w o u l d embarrassingly break out. I n this w a y his entire being
was pervaded b y the fear of shame a n d embarrassment.
Shame and rage

Whilst one c o m m o n reaction t o shame is a w i s h to w i t h d r a w a n d
hide, another is rage. This is a violent attack o n the persons or
circumstances that have b r o u g h t about a h u m i l i a t i o n . K o h u t (1972)
wrote an i m p o r t a n t paper about shame-based narcissistic rage,
w h i c h he described as follows:
Narcissistic rage occurs i n m a n y forms; they all share, h o w e v e r , a

specific p s y c h o l o g i c a l f l a v o u r w h i c h g i v e s t h e m a d i s t i n c t p o s i t i o n
w i t h i n the w i d e r e a l m of h u m a n a g g r e s s i o n s . T h e n e e d for r e v e n g e ,
for r i g h t i n g a w r o n g , for u n d o i n g a h u r t b y w h a t e v e r m e a n s , a n d a
d e e p l y a n c h o r e d , u n r e l e n t i n g c o m p u l s i o n i n t h e p u r s u i t of a l l t h e s e
a i m s , w h i c h g i v e s n o rest to t h o s e w h o h a v e s u f f e r e d a n a r c i s s i s t i c
injury—these are the characteristic features of narcissistic rage in all

its forms and which set it apart from other kinds of aggression,
[p. 638]
K o h u t gives the example of a patient w h o w o u l d s k i l f u l l y b u t subtly

embarrass and humiliate acquaintances at social gatherings b y
i n t r o d u c i n g some aspect of their national or religious background,
a v o w e d l y i n the spirit of being v e r y open and liberal. Gradually, i n
the course of analysis, he became aware of " a n erotically tinged
excitement" at these moments of the victim's embarrassment and
his u n d e r l y i n g sadism became clear. This led to his recall of
recurrent experiences of shame and rage i n his childhood. I n
a d d i t i o n to r i d i c u l i n g and criticizing h i m i n public, his mother had
insisted o n regularly exposing and inspecting his genitals, osten
sibly i n order to f i n d out whether he had masturbated. A s a result
he had formed vengeful sadistic fantasies, n o w enacted i n his cruel
exposures of his social victims to the gaze of others.
Narcissistic rage is often not subtle at all. The ostracized loner
w h o engages i n a school shooting; terrorist attacks b y groups w h o
feel disempowered and excluded f r o m w o r l d prosperity; the rise of
N a z i Germany after the humiliations of the defeat i n the first w o r l d
w a r — a l l these and m a n y others readily come to m i n d as examples.
Narcissistic vulnerability ( M o l l o n , 1986) and chronic narcissistic
rage derive f r o m childhood experiences of h u m i l i a t i o n and failures
to evoke empathic understanding f r o m care-givers. K o h u t d r a w s
attention to R u t h Benedict's study of narcissistic rage amongst the
Japanese, w h i c h she attributes to methods of childrearing based o n
ridicule and threats of ostracism. Benedict describes h o w :
sometimes people explode in the most aggressive acts. They are

often roused to these aggressions not when their principles or their
freedom is challenged ... but when they detect an insult or a
detraction. [1946, p. 293]
K o h u t links narcissistic rage to the "catastrophic reaction"

sometimes s h o w n b y b r a i n injured patients w h e n faced w i t h an
incapacity to p e r f o r m a task that n o r m a l l y w o u l d be easily
a c c o m p l i s h e d — f o r example, w h e n an aphasic patient is unable to
name a familiar object. This incapacity is clearly a source of s h a m e —
and is particularly h u m i l i a t i n g since, as K o h u t points out, w e tend
to experience our t h o u g h t processes as belonging to the core of our

self. H e compares this to a similar, albeit milder, version of the same
incapacity w h e n w e make a slip of the tongue. Some patients, he
suggests, experience slips of the tongue a n d other expressions of the
unconscious as narcissistic b l o w s a n d i n response " a r e enraged
about the sudden exposure of their lack of omnipotence i n the area
of their o w n m i n d " . Indeed, Freud (1901), i n his o r i g i n a l discussion
of slips of the tongue, noted that these are often f o l l o w e d b y " a trace
of affect" w h i c h " i s clearly i n the nature of shame" (p. 83).
I have often f o u n d that w h e n a patient becomes enraged i n
psychotherapy or analysis, i t is because he or she feels that the
analyst is n o t accurately (empathically) grasping their experience;
instead, the analyst is perceived as persisting i n a p o i n t of v i e w of
their o w n . I t becomes a battle of perspectives. Similarly, I m a y f i n d
myself experiencing some degree of " r a g e " towards a patient i f I
feel that he or she is n o t listening to w h a t I a m actually saying b u t is
persisting i n misperceiving a n d mishearing m y meaning according
to their o w n assumptions. The process is one I have described as
" i d e n t i t y i m p o s i t i o n " , an insistence o n v i e w i n g a person i n a
particular w a y , despite contrary evidence ( M o l l o n , 2001a). I t can be
a pervasive part of some people's childhood experience, s o w i n g the
seeds of chronic narcissistic r a g e — a n d , of course, they w i l l then be
inclined to w a n t to t u r n the tables a n d subject others ( i n c l u d i n g the
analyst or therapist) to the same experience.
Adaptive and maladaptive functions of shame

A l t h o u g h extreme shame can be devastating, leaving a psychic
wasteland i n w h i c h a l l traces of self-esteem are obliterated, the
emerging field of evolutionary psychology (e.g. Buss, 1999) teaches
that all basic emotions ( i n c l u d i n g shame a n d guilt) m u s t have some
adaptive function. A person w i t h o u t shame w o u l d encounter
difficulties i n relation to others. H e or she m i g h t engage i n behaviour
that violates group norms and leads to social exclusion, thereby losing
the support and protection of the group and w i d e r society. Access to
resources and to potential mates m i g h t then be reduced; evolutionary
pressures w o u l d therefore have selected shame for its advantage i n
facilitating reproductive success (Greenwald & Harder, 1998).
Shame is a means by w h i c h society maintains its o w n norms and

values. It is a signal of v i o l a t i o n of these. Pines (1995) comments:
Shame protects our own integrity and tells us if we have been

invaded and exploited as well as telling us that we have failed to
earn our self-respect, and therefore feel exposed to and invaded by
the higher aspects to which we aspire. Guilt will tell us that we have
damaged others and that we can expect retaliation or punishment.
Both shame and guilt are social markers essential to finding our
positions in family and in all subsequent groups. Shame and guilt
teach us through painful but inevitable trial and error how to adapt
ourselves to social roles and how to influence others to adapt to us.
We learn when and how and how much to be open to others: how
to manage appropriate closeness and distance: how not to hurt or be
hurt: modesty, tact, social sensitivity and sympathy are all learnt
this way. And we learn to be human by knowing that what we feel
others also feel. [pp. 350-351]
It is t h r o u g h a sensitivity to shame i n others that w e can show social

kindness, m i n i m i z i n g the potential for our fellow h u m a n beings to
feel embarrassed, inadequate, a w k w a r d , left out, and so on. Social
intercourse always hovers on the edge of potential shame and
embarrassment, since the possibilities of misunderstandings, mis
perceptions, and misjudgements are ever-present. The absence of
feelings of shame can be taken as a signal of being " a t h o m e " ,
amongst friends, and of belonging to the group; one m i g h t say that
" l o v e is n o t h a v i n g to feel shame"!
Some i n d i v i d u a l s are insensitive to signals of shame w i t h the
consequence that they are repeatedly ostracized w i t h o u t f u l l y
realizing w h y and h o w this occurs. This m a y occur either t h r o u g h
social dyslexia or as a result of an active repudiation, or bypassing
(Lewis, 1971) of shame signals because of excessive shame i n
childhood. Certain kinds of narcissistic disturbance (Bateman, 1998;
Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1971; Rosenfeld, 1987), m a y be based i n this
c o m b i n a t i o n of extreme shame-proneness and insensitivity to
shame signals (Harder, 1984). I n manic states of m i n d , a person
m a y become disinhibited, t r i u m p h a n t l y disregarding social norms
and signals of social disapproval, as w e l l as the internalized shame
based prohibitions of childhood (Morrison, 1989b). W h e n the manic
state has passed, the person m a y suffer t e r r i b l e shame o n
recollecting his or her shameless earlier behaviour. The repudiation

of shame signals m a y also give rise to paranoid states (Meissner,
1986); rather than experiencing shame (and associated feelings of
weakness, defectiveness, or inadequacy) d i r e c t l y , the person
experiences feelings of persecution by others. Shame signals are
readily externalized i n this w a y since their o r i g i n is external and
based i n the responses of others.
Conformity to group norms can, of course, be h a r m f u l if the group
is delinquent or destructive. Fears of shame i n relation to a peer group
can lead an adolescent into d r u g addiction or other self-damaging
and antisocial behaviour that is i n conflict w i t h internal m o r a l i t y —
thus leading to feelings of guilt. Paradoxically, some groups value a
repudiation of shame and an embracing of shameless and socially
rebellious behaviour; the result then is shame about feelings of
shame. M u c h of the p r o t o - N a z i philosophy of Nietzsche can be
understood as a relentless w a r against shame (Wurmser, 1999).
The social f u n c t i o n of shame gives a clue to s o m e t h i n g
p r o f o u n d l y disconcerting at the heart of the h u m a n experience—a
h a u n t i n g paradox h i n t e d at i n m u c h of Lacan's w r i t i n g s . We can
1
feel shame if w e are revealed to be i n some respect an i m p o s t e r —

claiming an i d e n t i t y that w e do n o t have. However, there is a w a y i n
w h i c h all h u m a n identities are false insofar as they are derived f r o m
culture ( M o l l o n , 2001a). We all must construct our " i d e n t i t y " out of
the roles, images, and language available w i t h i n the culture into
w h i c h w e are b o r n — a n d especially w i t h i n a particular f a m i l y
w i t h i n the culture. H u m a n beings d o not exist outside h u m a n
c u l t u r e — b u t culture is h i g h l y variable and plastic. A l l selves are
illusory "false s e l v e s " — n o matter h o w vigorously and sometimes
violently they m i g h t be d e f e n d e d — f o r m e d out of this plastic and
elusive substance that pre-exists us and yet continually evolves. The
threat of shame i n its social function binds us to the group, to the
c u l t u r e — a n d to the illusion. But there is always the t h r e a t — a barely
perceptible d r e a d — t h a t the illusion w i l l unravel.
Summary
Shame can be distinguished f r o m guilt, the latter being more

specific and usually related to aggression and transgression, w h i l s t
shame relates more to feelings of inadequacy. There can be

complicated spirals of interaction between shame and guilt, as
shame leads to rage and aggression—the w i s h to d o actively to
others w h a t was suffered p a s s i v e l y — w h i c h leads to guilt, w h i c h
m a y be w a r d e d off b y a retreat to passivity, w h i c h leads to further
shame, and so on.
• Shame can be associated w i t h a very fundamental k i n d of social
i n a d e q u a c y — a sense of not f i t t i n g i n , of not being able to enter the
dance of h u m a n d i s c o u r s e — a n d can be illustrated i n an extreme
f o r m i n some instances of schizophrenia. A f u n d a m e n t a l sense of
inadequacy m a y be felt b y the small child w h o fails to evoke an
empathic response f r o m the mother. Facial m i r r o r i n g between
infant and mother is an i m p o r t a n t vehicle of transmission of affect,
h a v i n g a direct effect on the developing child's b r a i n . The " s t i l l
face" experiments indicate that an absence of the expected facial
m i r r o r i n g can be extremely d i s t u r b i n g to the infant, p r o v o k i n g
p r i m i t i v e shame responses. Shame is, i n other w a y s too, intimately
associated w i t h l o o k i n g and being looked at. A distinction can be
d r a w n between the look of empathy, w h i c h affirms the looked-at
person as subject, and the look w h i c h objectifies and creates shame.
The w o r k of Sartre and of social theorists, such as G. H. M e a d , are
relevant here. Links can also be made w i t h psychoanalytic concepts
of false self, where the being-for-the-other takes precedence over
being-for-self. Embarrassment occurs i n disrupted expectations
that one person has of an o t h e r — t h u s the " t r u e self" can be an
embarrassment w h e n i t conflicts w i t h the "false self" or w i t h the
image that the other has of one's self.
Shame is also associated w i t h conflicts over exhibitionism. This
natural w i s h to display the self to others can be subject to criticism
or to overstimulation, resulting i n its repression; there is then a
chronic fear of crude exhibitionism breaking out i n a destabilizing
m a n n e r — a situation particularly described b y Kohut. Another
personality constellation described b y K o h u t is one i n w h i c h the
child's exhibitionism has, so to speak, been hijacked b y the mother,
so that his or her performance is for the mother's benefit; the child's
" o w n " exhibitionism is repressed and associated w i t h shame.
Shame is intimately associated w i t h sexuality, w h i c h is also
l i n k e d to the sense of self, of p r i v a c y , a n d of a u t o n o m y .
Masturbation, regardless of the content of associated fantasies, is
l i n k e d w i t h shame. I t is a f o r m of pleasure that inherently is asocial.

Parents often express d i s a p p r o v a l of children's m a s t u r b a t i o n ,
causing a significant narcissistic b l o w , a t h w a r t i n g of the child's
developing sense of autonomy, and an increase i n p a i n f u l self
consciousness and shame.
Depressed patients are often suffering f r o m h i d d e n shame,
struggling w i t h the impact of narcissistic injuries. Suicidal pre
occupations m a y express a desire to assert a u t o n o m y — t o retake
possession of one's life b y ending it. Manic states express a rebellion
against shame. Experiences that evoke shame are also likely to
evoke rage—sometimes termed "narcissistic rage". This can be a
significant feature of the aggression f o u n d i n depressive states of
mind.
The field of evolutionary psychology teaches that shame must
have adaptive functions. The signal of shame serves to m a i n t a i n
group cohesion, w h i c h helps t o promote inclusive reproductive
fitness and ensure the protection of the c o m m u n i t y . Some forms of
personality disturbance involve a failure to read shame signals,
either due to an inability to do so or an active repudiation of shame.
This can lead t o paranoid states. Shame promotes identification
w i t h the g r o u p / f a m i l y / c u l t u r e — a n d yet a l l h u m a n identities are
illusory a n d a l l selves are "false selves"—a paradox that means the
threat of shame is ever-present and is structured i n t o the h u m a n
condition.
Note
1. Lacan's o w n work is often difficult for the non-French reader to

understand. One of the best introductions, in my view, is by G u r e w k h
(1999). She outlines Lacan's insight into the illusory sense of self or
subjectivity inherent in the huma n condition. The child is shaped by
social, cultural and linguistic forms that are originally external but are
wove n into the developing "subject":
F r o m structuralism Lacan borrows the idea that the individual does not
start his career in the w o r l d as a subject but becomes shaped by
structural forces that are not graspable phenomenologically.... The fact
that w e believe w e are the sole engineers of our thoughts and feelings,
that w e believe w e are autonomous and cohesive individuals i n control
SHAME A N D JEALOUSY
of out actions, that w e think w e know w h y w e seek analytic treatment,

that w e imagine that the analyst knows something about us that w e
don't know, that w e feel that the analyst is casting judgement upon u s —
these aspects of experience are what Lacan calls meconaissance or
misrecognition. This meconaissance—our usual w a y of being in the
world—gives us access only to a realm of illusion . . . [p. 7]
CHAPTER THREE
Psychic murder syndrome
S
ometimes the mother's rejection of the child's communicative
initiatives, and of his or her needs for understanding and
e m p a t h y are so p r o f o u n d that the d e v e l o p i n g self is
pervaded w i t h shame and distrust. I n such cases the natural w i s h
to make emotional connection w i t h others is t h r o w n p a r t l y into
reverse. The core self is covered by various levels of (unconscious)
disguise and protection against o v e r w h e l m i n g shame. A resulting
pattern of sabotage of intimate attachment relationships can appear
perplexingly destructive, unless the u n d e r l y i n g process and motive
are understood.
The "Stepford Child"

I have noticed the f o l l o w i n g constellation of features occurring
frequently i n patients w h o have experienced their early environ
ment as fundamentally opposed to their authentic self potential.
This psychological e n v i r o n m e n t w a s perceived as i n t e n t o n
"psychic m u r d e r " — w a n t i n g to do away w i t h the child's actual self
and replace i t w i t h an alternative preferred version. A n analogy can
53
be d r a w n w i t h the f i l m "Stepford W i v e s " , i n w h i c h the sinister

"men's c l u b " k i l l the wives and create artificial replicas that look
identical to the original, except that the new versions are completely
compliant w i t h their husbands' desires; here w e m i g h t t h i n k of a
"Stepford C h i l d " . The mother of such a child m a y have been
experienced as extremely controlling, invasive, and lacking i n
empathy. This w o u l d be associated w i t h pervasive shame, b o t h
because the child's need to be understood empathically w o u l d be
continually t h w a r t e d , and because the core self w o u l d be felt to be
i n danger of violation. As a result, the c h i l d w o u l d come to feel that
attachment relationships are fundamentally threatening to the core
self. I n later life, the f o r m a t i o n of attachment, i n v o l v i n g potential
v u l n e r a b i l i t y , w o u l d give rise to anxiety. The stronger the
attachment, the greater the anxiety.
I n w o m e n , this pattern may be associated w i t h promiscuity,
combined w i t h sexual i n h i b i t i o n w i t h i n the m a i n attachment
relationship. This is because sex w i t h i n an attachment relationship
is experienced as violation, modelled on the original perception of
the mother as invasive and controlling. Sex w i t h the attachment
partner is felt to be abusive and an imposition. A n y h i n t of pressure
or expectation of compliance w i t h the partner's desire w o u l d evoke
intense resistance to sexual activity. The w o m a n may be able to
express her sexuality and achieve gratification only w i t h a partner
to w h o m she is not attached, or b y masturbation. By these means,
her sense of agency and autonomy i n relation to her sexuality is
preserved. This protection is of considerable importance since
sexuality—resting o n a knife-edge between shame and p r i d e —
inherently connotes privacy and intimacy w i t h the core self.
Deleting the message
The person w h o has experienced psychic m u r d e r early i n life w i l l be

determined that this should never happen again. Accordingly, he or
she w i l l identify w i t h the " m u r d e r e r " and w i l l continually k i l l off
potential relationships. The unconscious principle here is that it is
better to end the relationship and k i l l off the emotion actively than
to suffer this passively as the one w h o is abandoned or emotionally
destroyed. For example, a patient, Jennifer, described h o w she
PSYCHIC MURDER SYNDROME 55
w o u l d often scornfully rebuff advances f r o m men, especially i f they

seemed to w a n t a n y t h i n g more emotionally intimate t h a n sex. She
spoke w i t h a certain sadistic glee of h a v i n g received a number of
text messages f r o m a m a n w h o was obviously interested i n her. She
d i d not k n o w w h o the m a n w a s — a n d nor d i d she appear to feel any
curiosity to f i n d out by responding to his messages. She took
particular pleasure i n deleting them all, mostly w i t h o u t even
reading them. Some time later, the m a n began another f l u r r y of text
messages. This time she d i d reply to one of them, resulting i n
further correspondence a n d a dinner i n v i t a t i o n . She became
terrified that she h a d a l l o w e d herself to be vulnerable and
experienced a strong impulse to break off the relationship before
it had developed. Her behaviour of deleting the text messages,
before even reading them, could be taken as a v i v i d metaphor for
her sadistic and t r i u m p h a n t elimination of emotional connections
before they can be registered. I n part it was her o w n attachment
seeking emotional self that she sadistically thwarted.
As her activity of psychic m u r d e r was interpreted, Jennifer
began to reflect u p o n a pattern such that the length she allowed a
relationship to last varied i n accord w i t h h o w l o v i n g and decent the
m a n w a s — t h e one w h o had been most l o v i n g lasted a year, w h i l s t
the one w h o had been "a complete b a s t a r d " lasted four years. She
spoke of h o w she w o u l d consciously tell herself that a relationship
w i t h a m a n w h o was abusive towards her should n o t be continued,
b u t she h a d nevertheless stuck w i t h i t , i n contrast w i t h her rejection
of m e n w h o w e r e l o v i n g a n d reliable. I n the l i g h t of an
understanding of the overall syndrome she began to recognize that
the unconscious thought was " a n abusive relationship is preferable
to a l o v i n g one because i t is less dangerous and i t does n o t matter i f
it ends". The basic p r o b l e m here is that love cannot be trusted
because the original object of l o v e — t h e m o t h e r — w a s experienced
as b o t h l o v i n g (in m a i n t a i n i n g the child's physical life) w h i l s t being
murderous towards the child's psyche and personality.
Gradually, the picture that emerged of Jennifer's mother was of
a w o m a n w h o preferred to live w i t h i n a pretence based o n an image
of h o w she t h o u g h t a f a m i l y and a m o t h e r - d a u g h t e r relationship
should be. O n reminiscing about Jennifer's childhood, she w o u l d
refer to f a m i l y activities, as i f i n support of the image of a h a p p y
h o u s e h o l d — b u t these recollections, although correct i n a literal
sense, were completely at odds w i t h the emotional reality experi

enced b y Jennifer, of a family pervaded b y r o w s and little real
communication. Jennifer described h a v i n g never felt emotionally
understood b y either of her parents. This was a continuing source of
great p a i n and rage.
The m u r d e r of relationships can also take place i n relation to the
child of the person w i t h this syndrome. For example, after I had
pointed o u t the process of psychic m u r d e r to Jennifer, she began to
tell me w i t h considerable anxiety and embarrassment that w h e n her
babies were y o u n g she often experienced an impulse to smother
t h e m i n order to prevent them suffering the p a i n inherent i n life and
relationships. Even n o w that they were g r o w n u p , she w o u l d
sometimes w o r r y they m i g h t be killed i n an accident, and then
console herself w i t h the thought that they w o u l d thereby be spared
further potential pain. Another patient w h o h a d left her husband
and y o u n g son decided that i t w o u l d be best to tell her c h i l d that she
had d i e d — a rather radical f o r m of k i l l i n g the relationship. I t is not
that such a mother perpetrates psychic m u r d e r on her o w n c h i l d —
b y being invasive and controlling e t c . — b u t the child, representing
the mother's o w n vulnerable potential self, m a y thus provoke the
same murderous impulses that are experienced internally. Such
mothers do n o t actually m u r d e r their children, and are often
extremely caring and devoted as mothers, b u t the idea of m u r d e r
m a y be there.
N a t u r a l l y , psychic murder w i l l be regularly manifest i n the
transference. Jennifer w o u l d often experience thoughts of breaking
off the therapy. She w o u l d also delay setting off for her session u n t i l
the very last m o m e n t , or even later, feeling very reluctant to come.
Once the psychic m u r d e r syndrome was interpreted to her, she
began to experience an intense eagerness to attend. A pattern
apparent w i t h other patients is that periods of emotional contact
and psychological w o r k , experienced as r e w a r d i n g and encoura
g i n g to the analyst, may be f o l l o w e d b y a seeming destruction of the
apparent progress, resulting i n the analyst feeling p r o f o u n d l y
discouraged. This negative therapeutic reaction should not be
understood as an expression of envy, b u t as a predictable f u n c t i o n
of the defences inherent i n the psychic m u r d e r syndrome.
A further feature of the syndrome is that some of the emotional
components of the attachment relationship m a y be blocked f r o m
awareness. This is part of the same process of k i l l i n g off vulner

ability. To be attached and vulnerable is felt to be very dangerous.
Emotions i n v o l v i n g potential pain are therefore " m u r d e r e d " at birth.
This applies only w i t h i n the attachment relationship, however;
emotions i n other contexts m a y be f u l l y available. Because emotions
are often blocked f r o m emerging into consciousness, they m a y be
expressed purely physiologically i n somatic symptoms. Generalized
non-specific anxiety and somatic tension m a y at times be the
predominant forms of emotion. The blocking of conscious awareness
of emotion m a y p o w e r f u l l y serve the defences against experiencing
vulnerability and danger w i t h i n the attachment relationship; if no
emotion is felt then one cannot be h u r t b y the other.
Characteristics of this constellation m a y be summarized as
follows.
Psychic murder syndrome

1. This is a complex mental organization and process i n w h i c h
emotional experience and relationships are continually " m u r
d e r e d " — a n inner destruction w h i c h repeats an earlier one
recurrently experienced w i t h the care-giver. A n original trauma
is continually re-enacted, b o t h internally and i n relation to
emotional partners. The " p a r t n e r " (whether spouse/lover or
therapist) is inevitably subjected to an experience of the original
trauma (usually w i t h o u t being able to make m u c h sense of
w h a t is happening). The purpose of this mental organization is,
paradoxically, to protect against the danger of further v i o l a t i o n
of the core of the self and its true potential.
2. The p a t t e r n originates i n an early e n v i r o n m e n t that is
experienced b y the c h i l d as fundamentally hostile to his or
her true self. The child's o w n initiatives a n d e m o t i o n a l
communications are systematically rebuffed, mocked, ignored
or actively punished. Instead are substituted the mother's
desires to have a particular k i n d of child. The c h i l d registers
this as a t e r r i f y i n g psychic m u r d e r (although such early
perceptions cannot be elaborated i n language). P r o f o u n d
distrust is established at the core of the c h i l d ' s being.
Attachment relationships are felt to be essentially suffocating
because the original experience was that there was no psychic

space for the child's true potential i n the relationship w i t h the
mother. The mother's presence was experienced as s i m u l t a
neously invasive/controlling a n d abandoning.
3. A core of " p a r a n o i d " confusion develops, based o n the child's
perception that the one w h o is needed and is the source of
comfort and nourishment is also the source of psychic murder.
This state of confusion may be utterly intolerable. The c h i l d
m a y split these perceptions, at times v i e w i n g the mother as
l o v i n g , w h i l s t at other times s w i t c h i n g i n t o the v i e w of her as
m a l e v o l e n t (this s p l i t t i n g is based u p o n the intolerable
perception of actual qualities of the mother rather than the
child's d i f f i c u l t y i n integrating his/her o w n conflicting feelings
of love and hate, as outlined i n Kleinian theory).
4. The c h i l d comes to feel that expression of emotional need and
v u l n e r a b i l i t y is dangerous. Attachment associated w i t h vulner
a b i l i t y is forbidden. I n order to suppress this, the c h i l d
identifies w i t h the psychically m u r d e r i n g environment (a f o r m
of " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the aggressor"). The original psychic
m u r d e r perpetrated by the environment is n o w continually
repeated actively w i t h i n the psyche. Emotions and emotional
meaning are continually "strangled at b i r t h " . [This is some
w h a t similar to Bion's (1959) description of the internalization
of a c o m m u n i c a t i o n - m a n g l i n g mother w h o engages i n "attacks
o n l i n k i n g " . ] The person's experience of emotions w i l l contain
b l a n k areas; to some extent, n o r m a l e m o t i o n s m a y be
experienced i n relation to others w i t h w h o m he or she is not
i n an attachment relationship.
5. A n x i e t y may be felt w h e n emotion threatens to emerge into
awareness. There m a y also be significant tendencies to somatize
emotion, g i v i n g rise to various forms of physical distress. This
occurs because although emotion and associated anxiety are
generated, w i t h physiological concomitants, these are denied
access to consciousness and are thereby prevented f r o m being
processed t h r o u g h the m i n d . Anxiety and somatization m a y
often be the predominant mode of expression of emotion.
6. Because the child's true initiatives and emotions undergo
continual annihilation, there is no basis for a true sense of
identity. Instead there is an elaborate and continual adaptation
to the perceived requirements of others. This w i l l not be

apparent to the external observer w h o w i l l mistakenly perceive
each presentation as " r e a l " . (This is similar to accounts of "false
self" and "as i f " personality.)
7. The basic v i e w of attachment as suffocating m a y give rise, early
i n the child's development, to a dissociative structure of m i n d ,
i n w h i c h a secret area of non-compliance is preserved.
8. A n enforcing structure is developed w i t h i n the m i n d , w i t h the
task of ensuring that true emotional attachment, v u l n e r a b i l i t y ,
and trust do n o t take place b e y o n d a certain point. This
structure, characterized b y c r u e l t y a n d sadism, m a y be
represented i n dreams b y a threatening gang or a murderer
of some k i n d . If the person does begin to develop attachment
and trust b e y o n d the permitted level the internal gang m a y
become very threatening, b r i n g i n g about a severance of the
relationship.
9. The inner psychic m u r d e r m a y not i n i t i a l l y be apparent
externally—for example, to the partner i n a relationship. I t is
the inner emotional connection that is k i l l e d off. U l t i m a t e l y this
also becomes manifest i n the external relationship.
10. Sexual relationships m a y be permitted, p r o v i d e d that these do
not develop i n t o emotional intimacy beyond a certain point.
Initially the " p a r t n e r " m a y be perceived i n terms of the split
perception of " g o o d " (derived f r o m the original splitting of the
perceptions of mother). Sooner or later there w i l l be a switch to
the opposite emotional valence and the partner w i l l be v i e w e d
w i t h intense suspicion. Some of the time there m a y be
recurrences of the intolerable state of confusion, where the
partner is perceived as simultaneously good and b a d (but i n a
confusing rather than integrated w a y ) . The o r i g i n a l inner
m o d e l of relationships as suffocating w i l l be activated. A t this
p o i n t there m a y be a search for an alternative relationship. Such
a sequence m a y be one basis for a pattern of compulsive
promiscuity.
11. Despite the continual inner psychic m u r d e r , there m a y persist a
hope of a relationship i n w h i c h the " t r u e self" can be expressed
and recognized. A t a deep level, this desire w i l l be very
p o w e r f u l . I f a suitable potential partner is f o u n d , there m a y be
an attempt to relate o n a deeper level of intimacy. This
60 S H A M E A N D J E A L O U S Y
endeavour will be accompanied by a combination of intense

hope and anxiety. Some intimacy and trust may be established,
but at a certain point the "anti-trust" enforcement will kick in,
creating a radical disruption of the relationship. There will then
ensue vigorous attempts to sever the relationship and drive the
partner away, at the same time as some struggles to maintain
• the relationship. This is a time of intense conflict and turmoil,
both internally and in the external relationship.
12. The motives for driving the partner away are both to preserve
the core of true self potential from violation, and to protect the
partner from permanent psychic murder. The partner may be
perceived as an innocent victim who has stumbled unknow
ingly into a dark area of hidden sado-masochism. This gives
rise to intolerable feelings of guilt and anxiety.
13. One paradox is that the greater the sense of trust that is
established in the relationship, the greater the sense of danger
and inner pressure to murder the emotional attachment. Deep
feelings of confusion, uncertainty and paranoia are stirred up.
This can create the sense that the relationship that contains
most " g o o d " is also the most "bad"—the deeper the love and
trust, the greater the fear and turmoil.
14. The experience of the partner (or the therapist if the context is
psychotherapy/psychoanalysis) gives some clue to the internal
processes of psychic murder. There will be moments, or even
prolonged periods, of emotional contact and communication of
emotional meaning—but these will be abruptly and unexpect
edly terminated, creating feelings in the partner of traumatic
confusion, disappointment, and betrayal. Attempts to commu
nicate emotionally will be met with a bewildering blankness
(like an utter failure of the communicative aspects of projective
identification).
15. Most of these processes take place unconsciously, but the
person will often be aware of some aspects without being able
to grasp the whole.
Characteristics of psychic murder syndrome
• A n uncertain sense of identity. The person may adapt their

presentation fluidly according to the perceived requirements
PSYCHIC M U R D E R S Y N D R O M E 61
of the context. He or she w i l l often feel in some way

inauthentic.
A subtle sense of being somehow different from others
(sometimes giving rise to fantasies of being an alien, for
example). This may also be associated w i t h feeling never
genuinely known or understood by others.
A n altered experience of emotion. At times the person may not
feel emotions and may be in a numbed or detached state of
mind. This may not be particularly unpleasant since there is an
absence of emotional pain. At other times, there may be fleeting
experiences of emotion before they are suppressed. Varying
patterns of partial experiencing and partial suppressing of
emotions may develop. Anxiety may be felt as emotion
threatens to emerge into awareness.
Anxiety and somatization may often be the predominant forms
of emotional expression.
Attachment relationships are experienced as potentially suf
focating.
Dissociative states of mind and behaviour, involving promis
cuity or other activities not "permitted" within the main
attachment relationship. These represent the fundamental
rebellion against the perceived suffocating qualities of the
attachment relationship.
Emotional or sexual promiscuity may occur.
A n internal prohibition against emotional attachment relation
ships involving vulnerability. This may be associated with an
internal organization that becomes vigorously, and even
violently, activated if vulnerability is developed beyond a
permitted point.
Intense conflict between a wish for authentic emotional contact
and the belief that such contact, in the context of an attachment
relationship, is fundamentally dangerous.
Emotional relationships are repeatedly killed off. This psychic
murder begins internally, but eventually becomes manifest in
the external relationship. The partner's experience w i l l be of
hope and emotional connection being established, only to be
followed repeatedly by a traumatic and confusing destruction
of affective contact. This may occur not only in core attachment
relationships, but also i n other "friendships".
Some related theories—Kalsched, Rosenfeld, Winnicott, Bion
Kalsched's "self-care system and the psyche's auto-immune reaction"

Donald Kalsched, a Jungian analyst, has described a similar
destructive organization derived from childhood trauma and abuse.
He sees this as like a kind of psychic autoimmune disease in which
the protective system attacks the person's own emotional vulner-
ability and feelings of shame. The abused child's aggression cannot
be expressed towards the abuser if he or she is a primary care-giver,
and so it is directed towards the child's own vulnerability and
emotional need. Kalsched describes a dream dreamt by a patient
immediately after she had for the first time allowed herself to feel
vulnerable in response to the analyst's departure for a summer
vacation. The night before the dream she had written a long letter to
the analyst saying she must break off her therapy because she was
becoming "too dependent". The dream was as follows:
I a m in m y room, in bed. I suddenly realise I have forgotten to lock

the doors to m y apartment. I hear someone come into the building
downstairs, w a l k to m y apartment door—then walk in. I hear the
footsteps approach the door of my room . . . then open it. A very tall
man with a white ghost-like face and black holes for eyes walks in
with an axe. He raises it over m y head and brings it down! . . . I
wake in terror. [Kalsched, 1996, p. 15]
In reality the patient usually double-locked the door to her bedroom

and also carefully checked the outer door to the apartment.
Kalsched comments:
In the dream, the ghost-like man apparently has access to both

doors, just as her father had had unrestricted access to the bedroom
where she slept and also to her body. Often my patient—when only
8 years old—had heard his footsteps approach her room before his
regular sexual violations of her. [p. 15]
Kalsched hypothesizes that the patient's admission of feelings of

dependence and vulnerability in the previous session had been
experienced as a dire threat of re-experiencing intolerable mental
pain—the pain of need in relation to a care-giver, who might reject
the need and instead impose abuse. The self-care system, based on
identification with the aggressor (abuser) then came into play to

sever her experience of vulnerability and need—and also to "split
off" (with the axe) the memories of abuse, located in bodily
experience, thereby preventing these entering the mind.
Kalsched summarizes the function of the self-care system as
follows:
Like the immune system of the body, the self-care system carries out
its functions by actively attacking what it takes to be "foreign" or
"dangerous" elements. Vulnerable parts of the self's experience in
reality are seen as just such "dangerous" elements and are attacked
accordingly. These attacks serve to undermine the hope in real object
relations and to drive the patient more deeply into fantasy. A n d just
as the immune system can be tricked into attacking the very life it is
trying to protect (auto-immune disease), so the self-care system can
turn into a "self-destruct system" which turns the inner world into a
nightmare of persecution and self-attack. [Kalsched, 1996, p. 24]
Rosenfeld's account of destructive narcissism and internal mafias
The Kleinian analyst, Herbert Rosenfeld (1971) described destruc-

tive organizations within the mind that are opposed to dependent
relationships with others. He linked these to the operation of envy,
as a manifestation of the death instinct. Driven by envy, the
narcissistic character wishes to deny need and dependence:
In terms of the infantile situation, the narcissistic patient wants to

believe that he has given life to himself and is able to feed and look
after himself. When he is faced with the reality of being dependent
on the analyst, standing for the parents, particularly the mother, he
w o u l d prefer to die, to be non-existent, to deny the fact of his birth,
and also to destroy his analytic progress and insight regarding the
child in himself, which he feels the analyst, representing the parents,
has created. Frequently at this point the patient wants to give up the
analysis but more often he acts out in a self-destructive w a y by
spoiling his professional success and his personal relations, [p. 247]
Rosenfeld gives the example of a patient who dreamt of a small

boy in a comatose condition; the patient stood nearby but did
nothing to help and felt contemptuous of the doctor treating the
boy. The dying boy clearly represented the patient's dependent self,
which the patient prevented from gaining help. A n y progress in the

analysis tended to be countered by an upsurge of scornful and
belittling thoughts about the analyst and an emotional withdrawal.
Rosenfeld described the existence of gang-like organizations
within the mind of the narcissistic patient:
The destructive narcissism of these patients appears often highly

organised, as if one were dealing with a powerful gang dominated
by a leader, w h o controls all the members of the gang to see that
they support one another in making the criminal destructive work
more effective and powerful. However, the narcissistic organisation
not only increases the strength of the destructive narcissism, but it
has a defensive purpose to keep itself in power and so to maintain
the status quo. The main aim seems to be to prevent the weakening
of the organisation and to control the members of the gang so that
they will not desert the destructive organisation and join the positive
parts of the self or betray the secrets of the gang to the police, the
protecting superego, standing for the helpful analyst, w h o might be
able to save the patient. Frequently when a patient of this kind makes
progress in the analysis and wants to change he dreams of being
attacked by members of the Mafia or adolescent delinquents and a
negative therapeutic reaction sets in. This narcissistic organisation
. . . seems to have the purpose of maintaining the idealisation and
superior powers of the destructive narcissism. To change, to receive
help, implies weakness and is experienced as wrong or as a failure
by the destructive narcissistic organisation which provides the
patient with his sense of superiority." [p. 249]
Rosenfeld does not locate the origins of this narcissistic constel-

lation in any traumatic or damaging childhood experience, other
than that created by the patient's own innate feeling of envy which
are hostile to the feeding mother. Thus, Rosenfeld sees the murderous
hostility as residing within the infant, deriving from the envy
component of the death instinct. It is not difficult to see in Rosenfeld's
account a role of shame and humiliation. A s he puts it, "to receive
help implies weakness". Within his system, the narcissist aims to
avoid the humiliation of displaying need or vulnerability.
James Grotstein (2000) has suggested that the internal gangs
described by Rosenfeld might often originate when the child has
dissociated from a dysfunctional family, substituting instead an
imagined internal "little family", of which he or she is the head.
PSYCHIC M U R D E R SYNDROME 65
Winnicott's "false self"
The theory of the "false self—based on excessive compliance with

the mother's wishes and expectations—developed by the psycho
analyst and paediatrician, Donald Winnicott, is well-known. It is
worth examining his account in some detail to see the similarities
and differences with the theory of psychic murder syndrome.
Winnicott (1960) described a range of forms of false self, differing
in degrees of severity:
At one extreme: the False Self sets up as real and it is this that
observers tend to think is the real person. In living relationships,
work relationships, and friendships, however, the False Self begins
to fail. In situations in which what is expected is a whole person, the
False Self has some essential lacking. At this extreme the True Self is
hidden, [pp. 142-143]
There are various lesser degrees of False Self which are more in the
direction of health and normality. These allow the True Self to
remain as a potential, protected by the False Self.
Winnicott believed the False Self develops in the early infant
mother relationship. Countering some of the excessively intra
psychic focus of certain psychoanalytic theorizing of the time, he
emphasized the absolute dependence of the infant on the care
giving environment:
To get to a statement of the relevant developmental processes it is

essential to take into account the mother's behaviour and attitude,
because in this field dependence is real, and near absolute. It is not
possible to state what takes place by reference to the infant alone, [p. 144
145 italics in the original]
Winnicott saw the True Self as depending upon the mother's

capacity to meet the infant's "spontaneous gesture or sensory
hallucination", the result of this being that the child is able to use a
symbol:
... the mother's adaptation is good enough and in consequence the

infant begins to believe in external reality which appears and
behaves as by magic (because of the mother's relatively successful
adaptation to the infant's gestures and needs), and which acts in a
way that does not clash w i t h the infant's omnipotence. On this basis
the infant can gradually abrogate omnipotence. The True Self has a
spontaneity, and this has been joined up w i t h the world's events.
The infant can now begin to enjoy the illusion of omnipotent
creating and controlling, and then can gradually come to recognise
the illusory element, the fact of playing and imagining. Here is the
basis for the symbol which at first is both the infant's spontaneity or
hallucination, and also the external object created and ultimately
cathected. [p. 146]
Thus, according to Winnicott's account, the mother supports the

infant's illusion of being the agent at the centre of his or her world.
Because of this support, the infant can gradually distinguish illusion
from reality and can develop an area of play and imagination. By
contrast, the mother whose adaptation is not "good enough"
requires too much adaptation and compliance from the infant. This
excessive compliance is the False Self—an important function of
which is to hide the True Self. Winnicott describes extreme cases
where compliance is so pronounced that spontaneity is absent:
In the extreme examples of False Self development, the True Self is

so well hidden that spontaneity is not a feature in the infant's living
experiences. Compliance is then the main feature, w i t h imitation as
a speciality, [p. 147]
A very crucial point in Winnicott's thinking here is that the False

Self is a defence—"a defence against that which is unthinkable, the
exploitation of the True Self, which would result in its annihilation"
(p. 147). The False Self manages to hide the vulnerable True Self—
the core that must be protected at all costs. Violation of the core
would be feared as a rape and pillage of one's soul. Winnicott
described, in brackets, one kind of circumstance in which the True
Self can be violated:
(If the True Self ever gets exploited and annihilated this belongs to
the life of an infant whose mother was not only "not good enough"
... but was good and bad in a tantalisingly irregular manner. The
mother here has as part of her illness a need to cause and to
maintain a muddle in those who are in contact w i t h her. This may
appear in a transference situation in which the patient tries to make
the analyst mad ... There may be a degree of this which can destroy
the last vestiges of an infant's capacity to defend the True Self),
[p. 147]
PSYCHIC MURDE R SYNDROME 67
I n this passage Winnicott hints at a more active—perhaps

malevolent—hostility on the part of the mother towards the child's
True Self. This may be closer to the idea of psychic murder
syndrome. However, mostly Winnicott seems to be describing
maternal incompetence in responding to the child's initiative rather
than active hostility towards the True Self. This failure of the infant-
mother relationship would lie in the realm of shame—the child's
experience of not receiving the empathic understanding and
recognition that is required. Winnicott's account does not describe
the active internal destruction of emotion and relationship, in
identification with that originally experienced from the mother,
which is found in psychic murder syndrome.
Bion's theory of "attacks on linking"

W. R. Bion, a psychoanalyst within the Kleinian tradition, who made
significant developments in the understanding of schizophrenic
thought and the psychotic parts of the mind, described processes
whereby certain patients "attack" the links between elements of the
mind, such as thoughts, emotions, perceptions, and memories. The
result is a destruction of meaning and of the capacity for normal
thought.
Bion's clinical illustrations are not easy to summarize. He
describes a patient who at times would develop a pronounced
stutter that would have the effect of scattering his few words over a
period of as much as a minute and a half; at one point the patient
spoke of a difficulty in falling asleep and then remarked that he
could not think because he was " w e t " . Bion interpreted as follows:
From what I knew of this patient, I felt that ... somehow the
wetness referred to an expression of hatred and envy such as he
associated w i t h urinary attacks on an object. I therefore said t h a t . . .
he was afraid of sleep because for him it was the same thing as the
oozing away of his mind itself. Further associations showed that he
felt that good interpretations from me were so consistently and
minutely split up by him that they became mental urine which then
seeped uncontrollably away. Sleep was therefore inseparable from
unconsciousness, which was itself identical with a state of mind
lessness which could not be repaired. He said " I am dry now".
[Bion, 1959, p. 95]
Some readers might find Bion's example somewhat obscure.

However, since he first formulated the idea, many analysts
recognize some quite common phenomena as being related forms
of "attacks on linking". Thus some patients may talk endlessly, but
in such a way that it is extremely difficult for the analyst to grasp
any underlying links between the diverse topics of the narrative.
Meaning does not gradually emerge and organize around themes
and anxieties, in the way that it does with other patients. There may
be a kind of scattering of meaning, so that the analyst's experience is
of having to gather together the scraps of dispersed emotional
communication and piece them together like fragments of code. The
emotional link between patient and analyst may similarly be
severed, so that the patient acts as if there is no link.
According to Bion (1959), following the proposals of Melanie
Klein (1957), these destructive attacks are driven by the patient's
(and baby's) inherent hatred and envy of the feeding breast—"the
inborn characteristics ... producing attacks by the infant on all that
links him to the breast, namely, primary aggression and envy"
(p. 104). However, in addition, the mother may contribute to this by
failing adequately to receive and process the infant's anxiety. Bion
saw these psychotic processes as originating in the infant's
relationship to the "part-object", the mother's breast. One of Bion's
conceptual innovations at the time was to emphasize the emotional
functions of the breast. He wrote:
The conception of the part-object as analogous to an anatomical
structure, encouraged by the patient's employment of concrete
images as units of thought, is misleading because the part-object
relationship is not with the anatomical structures only but with
function, not with anatomy but with physiology, not with the breast
but with feeding, poisoning, loving, hating, [p. 102]
Bion suggested that one of the important functions of the mother

is to be receptive to the child's communication of anxiety and to
transform this by her empathy and thought, so that her responses to
the child are soothing. According to Bion, the child's transmission of
anxiety is by projective identification—a process that Klein
described as a phantasy of locating part of the self in the object,
but which Bion elaborated as an actual communication (the precise
mechanism of which is unspecified). When this communicative
process between infant and mother proceeds w e l l , the baby is soothed

and his or her mental development is facilitated. H e reconstructed the
early development of the patient i n his example as follows:
My deduction was that in order to understand what the child

wanted the mother should have treated the infant's cry as more
than a demand for her presence. From the infant's point of view she
should have taken into her, and thus experienced, the fear that the
child was dying. It was this fear that the child could not contain. He
strove to split it off together w i t h the part of the personality in
which it lay and project it into the mother. A n understanding
mother is able to experience the feeling of dread, that this baby was
striving to deal with by projective identification, and yet retain a
balanced outlook. This patient had to deal w i t h a mother who could
not tolerate experiencing such feelings and reacted either by
denying them ingress, or alternatively by becoming a prey to the
anxiety which resulted from introjection of the infant's feelings,
[p. 1041
I n this passage, Bion is describing a mother w h o could n o t

tolerate k n o w i n g the baby's anxiety and w h o therefore rejected his
communication. I n this w a y the mother engaged i n an "attack o n
l i n k i n g " , g i v i n g rise to an internal mother that continued to do this.
H o w e v e r , B i o n emphasized that the p r o b l e m arises f r o m a
combination of internal and external factors. The lack of receptivity
of a mother contributes to the f o r m a t i o n of an internal mother
hostile to emotional communication, b u t the malignant develop
ment is also d r i v e n b y the infant's o w n envy and hatred. Bion
explains his v i e w as follows:
The seriousness of these attacks is enhanced if the mother displays

the kind of unreceptiveness which I have described, and is
diminished, but not abolished, if the mother can introject the
infant's feelings and remain balanced; the seriousness remains
because the psychotic infant is overwhelmed with hatred and envy
of the mother's ability to retain a comfortable state of mind •
although experiencing the infant's feelings. This was clearly brought
out by a patient who insisted that I must go through it w i t h him, but
was filled w i t h hate when he felt that I was able to do so without a
breakdown. Here we have another aspect of destructive attacks
upon the link, the link being the capacity of the analyst to introject
the patient's projective identifications. Attacks on the link, therefore,
are synonymous with attacks on the analyst's, and originally the

mother's, peace of mind. The capacity to introject is transformed by
the patient's envy and hate into greed devouring the patient's
psyche; similarly, peace of mind becomes hostile indifference,
[pp. 105-106]
Thus, in his account of the development of "attacks on linking",

Bion describes the role of a mother who is unreceptive to the child's
emotional communications—rather like Winnicott's description of
the mother who fails to respond to the child's True Self. The attack
on emotional meaning continues within the child's own mind, in
identification with the communication-rejecting mother. However,
Bion sees the process as driven, or at least greatly exacerbated, by the
infant's envious attacks on the mother's function, which transform
his or her perception of her intention and activity. Through the
operation of envy, a " g o o d " mother can be transformed in the child's
perception into a " b a d " mother. This emphasis upon the contribution
of the child's innate envy and hatred, and their interplay with the
actual characteristics of the parents, is a recurrent feature of the
Kleinian tradition within psychoanalysis.
However, I have noticed that often patients who appear very
attacking of the analyst's attempted communications will cease to
be so when they feel that their experience and anxiety are properly
understood. What may fuel attacks which appear full of hatred and
envy is a perception that the analyst is convinced of the correctness
of his or her view. At such times, the analyst is perceived as serenely
secure in a belief in his or her intellectual, emotional and moral
truth—and as unreceptive to the patient's communications of
anguish. This tends to repeat a childhood perception of the mother
as walled off from the child's distress and as self-righteous in her
view of herself and of her maternal functions. The " c u r e " for the
patient's (and child's) hostile state of mind is an empathic response
from the analyst (or mother) that expresses a recognition and
understanding of the distress, including particularly the analyst's
(or mother's) contribution to that distress. This indicates how the
distress is closely related to shame, the cure for which is also an
empathic response. A further related point is that if a patient is
frequently in states of great agitation and confusion, then it is quite
to be expected that he or she might feel some envy, alongside
gratitude, if the analyst appears always calm, thoughtful, and able
to make sense of the patient's turbulent m i n d . A c k n o w l e d g i n g this

does not i m p l y that the patient has an unusual level of constitu
tional envy, b u t simply recognizes that those w h o are i n a state of
anguish and despair may envy those w h o appear to have peace of
m i n d . This envy can be diminished to the extent that the patient can
recognize that the analyst is struggling and, to some extent, suffering
w i t h them i n the exploration of their anguish.
Comparisons with psychic murder syndrome

The theories of Kalsched, Rosenfeld, Winnicott, and Bion all have
some similarities w i t h the f o r m u l a t i o n of psychic m u r d e r syndrome.
Kalsched's is perhaps closest, i n his account of the child's i d e n t i f i
cation w i t h the hostile or abusive care-giver, such that the "self-care
system" turns against his or her o w n vulnerability; i n this w a y the
abuse is continued internally. Rosenfeld also describes internal
attacks o n the person's feelings of dependence and v u l n e r a b i l i t y —
b u t a t t r i b u t e s these to the aggressive (envious) aspects of
narcissism, w h i c h a i m to deny dependence or need and to sustain
illusions of being self-created and self-sufficient. The early role of
the environment is n o t considered. Bion describes attacks o n
emotional meaning and the infantile l i n k to the breast, w h i c h , like
Rosenfeld, he attributes to the w o r k i n g s of envy. However, i n
addition, Bion considers the contribution of the mother i n her lack
of receptivity to the child's communications of anguish. W i n n i c o t t
gives an account of False Self development and a suppression of the
True Self, d e r i v i n g f r o m a failure o n the part of the mother to
respond creatively to the c h i l d ' s o w n gesture or i n i t i a t i v e .
A c c o r d i n g to W i n n i c o t t , the " g o o d e n o u g h " mother supports the
child's illusions of omnipotence u n t i l the child is ready to surrender
these i n the face of r e a l i t y — a n d thus, b y i m p l i c a t i o n , the mother
protects the c h i l d f r o m too early and too much awareness of
dependence, so that envy is not u n d u l y provoked. The mother
w h o fosters a c o m p l i a n t False Self development requires an
excessive adaptation b y the child to her initiatives.
The f o r m u l a t i o n of psychic m u r d e r syndrome is i n some ways
close to Winnicott's theory of the False Self, b u t i n a d d i t i o n indicates
h o w the attempted " m u r d e r " of the True Self is continued
internally, and h o w the attacks o n emotional relationships are
perpetrated compulsively a n d unconsciously. Such development

does n o t require overt abuse (although this m a y occur), b u t is based
on the child's perception that his or her authentic self is n o t
recognized or accepted, and that, instead, an alternative version is
required b y the mother. A n important feature of this process is that
the mother is perceived as hostile to the authentic self, and as invasive
and controlling—threatening the core of the self. The damaging effect
is probably greatest if the father is either absent, or collusive w i t h the
mother's stance, or is himself abusive a n d rejecting. T h r o u g h this
experience, a p r o f o u n d distrust of attachment relationships is
established. This does n o t mean that attachment is then avoided
completely, b u t that the person's later attachment relationships w i l l
be pervaded b y intense conflict a n d a n x i e t y — a n d that the anxiety
w i l l motivate repeated attacks o n the relationship and u p o n the
sense of emotional vulnerability. The process is n o t seen as d r i v e n
b y the child's envy, as portrayed i n the theories of Rosenfeld a n d
B i o n — b u t i f such a factor were i n operation, i t w o u l d no d o u b t
c o m p o u n d the d i f f i c u l t y of the situation considerably.
Toxic shame associated with sexual abuse
A teenage g i r l , w h o r a n away f r o m home to L o n d o n , suffered a

terrifying gang rape w h e n lured to a flat where she h a d been
expecting to receive care and protection after being " b e f r i e n d e d " b y
a m a n she h a d met i n the street. The gang, w h i c h included t w o
w o m e n , imposed a variety of sexual humiliations a n d physical
injuries, w h i l s t t a u n t i n g her verbally. H e r immediate reaction w a s
to dissociate, feeling that she was n o t really present a n d that i t w a s
not really happening. This dissociation made her a l l the more
helpless a n d passive i n her response to the situation. A f t e r w a r d s ,
she became very disturbed, developing chronic symptoms of post
traumatic stress, w i t h severe anxiety, panic, intrusive flashback
images, a n d a pervasive distrust of others. W h e n she was seen i n
psychotherapy some years later, one of the most difficult problems
to address w a s her strongly established belief that she w a s " a s l a g "
w h o h a d been asking to be raped. Basically she believed that the
rape w a s her fault. Associated w i t h this belief was o v e r w h e l m i n g
shame, such that she v i e w e d herself as n o t f i t to l i v e — a n d d i d
indeed engage i n frequent acts of self-harm w h i c h were at times life

threatening.
It is not easy to convey the depth and intensity of such toxic
s h a m e — f o r i t is of a quality that is a q u a n t u m leap f r o m the
distressing feelings of chagrin, embarrassment, and disappointment
i n the self, that most of us are prone to experience f r o m time to time.
This shame is l e t h a l — i t poisons the soul and completely corrodes
any vestiges of self-esteem. N o pride or pleasure i n the self can
survive its onslaught. I t m a y be related to w h a t Fonagy et al. (2002)
refer to as "ego-destructive shame". They see this as arising w h e n a
child is subject to very severe interpersonal trauma and abuse that
cannot be processed and alleviated via the capacity for mentaliza
tion. The latter is " t h e process b y w h i c h w e realise that h a v i n g a
m i n d mediates our experience of the w o r l d " (p. 3) and "involves
b o t h a self-reflective and an interpersonal c o m p o n e n t . . . [ w h i c h ] . . .
provide the child w i t h a capacity to distinguish inner f r o m outer
reality, intrapersonal mental and emotional processes f r o m inter
personal c o m m u n i c a t i o n s " (p. 4). This mentalization capacity is
thought to derive i n part f r o m the mother's relating to the child as a
person w i t h a m i n d . H o w e v e r , i n the case of the child's experience
of a mother w h o appears hostile, the c h i l d m a y be inhibited f r o m
developing mentalization because a perception of the mother's m i n d
m a y be too threatening. W i t h o u t the capacity for mentalization,
shame is experienced and experienced i n a m u c h more concrete and
absolute w a y . I t is as if the n o r m a l experience i n shame, of w a n t i n g
to disappear, is experienced as a compelling and concrete annihila
t i o n of the self. Fonagy et al. (2002) comment:
. . . brutalisation in the context of attachment relationships generates

intense shame. This, if coupled with a history of neglect and a
consequent weakness in mentalisation, becomes a likely trigger for
violence against the self or others, because of the intensity of the
humiliation experiences when the trauma cannot be processed and
attenuated via mentalisation. Unmentalised shame, which remains
unmediated by any sense of distance between feelings and objective
realities, is then experienced as the destruction of the self. We have
called it "ego-destructive shame" [pp. 12-13]
I n the case of the w o m a n w h o was raped b y a gang, she took into

herself the mockery and insults—particularly the accusation of being
a " s l a g " — a n d then for years continually replayed the accusation

internally. This and other terms of abuse w o u l d be endlessly recycled
by inner hallucinatory voices u n t i l she w o u l d relieve the tension b y
some act of self-harm. She recalled that it had been particularly the
t w o w o m e n i n the gang w h o had taunted her w i t h such insults. It
seemed likely therefore that the w o m e n had been engaged i n an act
of projective identification, or "imposed i d e n t i t y " (Mollon, 2001a,
2002), whereby unwanted aspects of their o w n self-image were
forcibly evoked i n the victim. She was then left i n a state of having
been invaded, or colonized, by an "alien self" (Fonagy et al, 2002).
W h i l s t severe and sadistic interpersonal trauma d u r i n g adult life
can engender a deeply disturbed and altered state of m i n d , w h i c h can
be persistent, more c o m m o n l y the psychiatric clinician encounters
the damage caused b y recurrent abuse i n childhood. M a n y of the
patients w i t h various forms of "borderline personality disorder",
w h o suffer disabling anxiety, m o o d swings, unstable relationships,
and tendencies to self-harm, report childhood backgrounds i n v o l
v i n g physical, sexual and emotional abuse w i t h i n h i g h l y disturbed
families (Allen, 2001; M o l l o n , 1996, 2002). I n such instances, the
damage is not simply due to the fact of suffering abuse, b u t it is also
crucially to do w i t h the meaning of this occurring at the hands of
those to w h o m the child w o u l d naturally t u r n to for nurturance and
protection. Fonagy et al. (2002) argue as follows:
Why should the brutalisation of affectional bonds, whether in the

context of relationships w i t h parents or with intimate peers, be
associated w i t h such an intense and destructive sense of self-disgust
verging on self-hatred? Once again, there is a paradox: the shame
concerns being treated as a physical object in the very context where
special personal recognition is expected. Overwhelming mental
pain is associated with experiencing a discrepancy between the
representation of an actual self, based on how one is being treated,
and the representation of the ideal shape of the self Qoiie & Sandler,
1967). The expectation of being seen and understood as a feeling
and thinking person, which is created by the attachment context,
clashes violently with the brutalised person's objectification and
dehumanisation. Shame is a higher order derivative of this basic
affect of pain. Unbearable shame is generated through the
incongruity of having one's humanity negated, exactly when one
is legitimately expecting to be cherished, [p. 426]
I n this w a y , Fonagy and his colleagues manage to l i n k the early idea

of shame as arising f r o m intrapsychic discrepancy between the actual
self and ideal self, proposed b y Piers and Singer (1953), w i t h the
shame arising f r o m the interpersonal experience of abuse b y care
givers w i t h i n an attachment relationship.
A further aspect of the shame arising f r o m interpersonal trauma
and abuse is the intensely negative v i e w of self that m a y be
maintained i n order to preserve a good image of the abusive parent.
Fairbairn (1952) called this the " m o r a l defence". Shengold (1989)
described something similar i n his discussion of " s o u l m u r d e r " . He
explains a subtle aspect of t h i s — t h a t the abused child may f i n d it
more tolerable to preserve a delusional view of the self as " b a d " and
the care-giver as " g o o d " than to suffer the "annihilation of identity,
of the feeling of the self" that w o u l d f o l l o w f r o m perceiving the care
giver accurately and experiencing the " t e r r i f y i n g intensity of fear and
rage" (p. 26). Thus i t is better to v i e w the self as b a d than to have the
self annihilated. Such reversals of responsibility can be very
entrenched and quite extreme. For example, one patient, w h o had
been extensively sexually abused by her father over m a n y years,
refused to accept the t e r m "abuse", arguing that she h a d permitted
the sexual activity. W h e n asked at w h a t age her father first abused
her, she carefully rephrased the question and replied " I first allowed
m y father to touch me sexually was w h e n I was age three".
There are m a n y aspects of the sense of self that are damaged b y
interpersonal abuse w i t h i n an attachment relationship ( M o l l o n ,
1993, 1996, 2001). I n particular, the sense of agency or efficacy
(Slavin & Pollock, 1997), i n c l u d i n g the sense of being able to evoke
an appropriate and empathic emotional response i n the other, may
be severely impaired. The result is w h a t K o h u t (1972) called
"narcissistic r a g e " — a n o v e r w h e l m i n g shame-fuelled s t o r m of
unmanageable affect that smashes like a tidal w a v e onto the fragile
functioning of the abused person's ego. This state of being flooded
b y shame and rage m a y b r i n g about further shame.
Summary
A complex personality organization may be discerned i n some

patients w h o have experienced their childhood relationship w i t h
their mother as consistently opposed to their o w n authentic

initiatives. As a result of this perception of maternal hostility to
their " t r u e " self, there is a retreat f r o m the n o r m a l w i s h to make
emotional contact w i t h others. The c h i l d becomes o u t w a r d l y
compliant, at least to some extent, w h i l s t i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h the
psychically murderous environment, continually k i l l i n g off poten
tial emotional relationships. The internal psychic m u r d e r is end
lessly repeated i n order to prevent the danger of reaching out
emotionally and vulnerably and again experiencing annihilation
f r o m the external o t h e r — b e t t e r to take control of the k i l l i n g off and
repeat it actively and internally rather than suffer i t passively f r o m
outside. Emotions are felt to be dangerous, because of their
association w i t h v u l n e r a b i l i t y , a n d are therefore c o n t i n u a l l y
blocked, becoming expressed instead somatically. Sexual relation
ships are experienced as invasive and abusive. The account of
psychic m u r d e r syndrome m a y be compared w i t h some other
similar psychoanalytic descriptions—Rosenfeld's " i n t e r n a l m a f i a " ,
Bion's "attacks o n l i n k i n g " , Kalsched's "self-care system", and
Winnicott's "false self". None of these other formulations capture
the idea of the child's (unconscious) perception of the mother's
p r o f o u n d hostility to his or her true self.
The childhood background of patients suffering f r o m psychic
m u r d e r syndrome w o u l d probably not appear grossly abusive.
Such trauma may be quite subtle. H o w e v e r , where there has been
severe interpersonal trauma and abuse, perhaps i n c l u d i n g sexual
abuse, the c h i l d m a y g r o w u p to be an adult i m b u e d w i t h toxic
shame. This is o v e r w h e l m i n g , sweeping all self-esteem away. I t m a y
be related to w h a t Fonagy and colleagues call "ego destructive
shame" and Shengold calls " s o u l m u r d e r " . Sometimes it may be
lethal. The person w h o has been extensively abused as a child m a y
live continually o n the edge of a precipice—ever i n danger of being
t r i p p e d , b y the inevitable "slings and a r r o w s " of everyday life, into
an inferno of narcissistic rage and toxic shame.
CHAPTER FOUR
Jealousy
"Jealousy is one of those affective states, like grief, that may

be regarded as normal. If anyone appears to be without it,
the inference is justified that it has undergone severe
repression and consequently plays all the greater part in
his unconscious mental life"
Freud, 1922, p. 223
" A person w h o suffers an instinctual frustration experiences

intense unpleasure, and w e take it as a matter of course that
he should feel hatred against the frustrating object. Nor does
it seem to us a problem that he should feel envy toward
another person w h o is more gratified than he—that is, that he
should identify that person with himself and experience the
more bitterly the contrast between this empathy of his
imagination and the unpleasant reality and, out of this
contrast, should develop aggressive tendencies against the
luckier one. Jealousy is obviously a combination of this envy
with that hatred . . . "
Fenichel, 1935, p. 349
77
J
ealousy erupts v i o l e n t l y , often w i t h o u t w a r n i n g , b r u t a l l y
t r a m p l i n g o n feelings of love and trust. The effect can be
traumatizing for b o t h the one w h o feels it and the one to w h o m
it is directed. Its torment is intense and insistent, accompanied
b y p o w e r f u l physiological concomitants, the w h o l e b o d y shaking
and pulsating w i t h shock. Some people rarely experience the
t u r m o i l of jealousy—instead they create i t i n others (White, 1980;
W h i t e & M u l l e n , 1989). These are the agents of jealousy, the ones
w h o always t u r n away first, and w h o thereby force their partner to
suffer (projectively) w h a t they repudiate f r o m their o w n experience.
Jealousy is such a ubiquitous and intense emotion that w e m i g h t
w o n d e r w h a t function i t serves. It does not make for happiness.
Indeed i t can often be so disruptive to a relationship that it brings
about the very abandonment or betrayal that is feared. Jealousy is
often regarded as fundamentally destructive. Popular self-help and
inspirational literature urges sufferers to strive to overcome their
possessiveness and to attend to their o w n u n d e r l y i n g feelings of
insecurity (Ellis, 1998; Lobsenz, 1975; Schoenfeld, 1 9 7 9 ) — t h e
i m p l i c a t i o n being that a secure person w i t h healthy self-esteem
w o u l d n o t experience jealousy. Thus jealousy is regarded as a sign
of weakness, of inappropriate possessiveness—and so the p a i n of
jealousy is m i x e d also w i t h shame. Shame and jealousy fuel each
other: the perception of a r i v a l contains the idea of one's o w n
inadequacy compared to an other, and hence gives rise to shame
and j e a l o u s y — w h i c h gives rise to further shame and feelings of
i n a d e q u a c y — i n t u r n g i v i n g rise to further j e a l o u s y — a n d so on. The
Oedipal s i t u a t i o n — t h e childhood prototype of later j e a l o u s y —
i n e v i t a b l y contains shame since the c h i l d is b o u n d to feel
inadequate i n comparison to the adult r i v a l . Naive idealism m a y
confound the shame of the jealous adult. Thus, the anthropologist
Margaret M e a d , i n an early paper, w r i t t e n w h e n she was aged
about 30, denounced jealousy as "undesirable, a festering spot i n
every personality so afflicted, an ineffective negativistic attitude
w h i c h is more likely to lose than to gain any g o a l " and speculated
that i t m i g h t be possible to eliminate or reduce jealousy by, for
example, the Soviet experiments i n socialism, or t h r o u g h l i v i n g i n a
cosmopolitan city such as L o n d o n or N e w York! (Clanton & Smith,
1998, p. 127). Even some recent commentators have suggested that
jealousy is derived f r o m capitalist society and culture (Bhugra, 1993)
JEALOUSY 79
— b u t Buss (2000) observes that "Cultures i n tropical paradises that

are entirely free of jealousy exist only i n the romantic m i n d s of
optimistic anthropologists, a n d i n fact have never been f o u n d "
(p. 32). N e u (1980) comments:
It was one of the hopes of the sixties (as of many other periods) that
by restructuring social relations it might be possible to eliminate
jealousy and other painful, "bourgeois", passions. This was the hope
that inspired many in the commune movement. It has been largely, I
think, a failed hope. Jealousy, envy and possessiveness reasserted
themselves despite the best efforts to keep them down. [p. 427]
Violent feelings of jealousy, often h i d d e n before e r u p t i n g w i t h

cataclysmic force, m a y shatter b o t h m i n d a n d body. Indeed m a n y
studies show that jealousy is a root cause of m u c h violence and even
m u r d e r against sexual partners (Buss, 2000). So w h a t is jealousy for?
Does i t i n fact have a useful function?
Evolutionary perspectives
Nonjealous men and women, however, are not our ancestors,
having been left in the evolutionary dust by rivals with different
passionate sensibilities. W e all come from a long lineage of
ancestors w h o possessed the dangerous passion. [Buss, 2000, p. 5]
The recently emerged f i e l d of e v o l u t i o n a r y (or D a r w i n i a n )

psychology and psychiatry (e.g. Buss, 1999, 2000; Gilbert & Bailey,
2000; Stevens & Price, 2000; T h o r n h i l l & Palmer, 2000) suggests 1
some i m p o r t a n t functions of jealousy that are inevitable products of

processes of n a t u r a l selection for reproductive fitness. F r o m this
perspective, jealousy has evolved as a necessary safeguard to detect
and defend against the threat of sexual deception and i n f i d e l i t y that
threaten the propagation of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s genes. A c c o r d i n g to this
evolutionary v i e w , i t is the absence of jealousy i n a relationship that
w o u l d be abnormal.
W h i l s t earlier psychoanalytic t h i n k i n g d i d see psychopathology
as rooted i n evolutionary h i s t o r y — f o r example, Freud's theory of
the p r i m a l hoard (1913, 1939)—such ideas were n o t g r o u n d e d i n a
clear n e o - D a r w i n i a n understanding of the primacy of the principle
of r e p r o d u c t i v e success (as opposed to i n d i v i d u a l survival).

Contemporary evolutionary perspectives—which are compatible
w i t h m o d e r n psychoanalytic frameworks based o n attachment
theory (Migone & L i o t t i , 1998; L i o t t i , 2000)—consider that "traits
are selected n o t on the basis of arbitrary definitions of happiness,
w e l l - b e i n g or social conformity, b u t b y their effects on reproduction
rates i n subsequent generations" (Gilbert, 1998, p. 354). Success i n
transmitting genes to the next generation, rather than the survival (or
well-being) of the individual, is the g u i d i n g principle behind the
evolutionary selection of behaviour (Barkow et al., 1992; H a m i l t o n ,
1964)—but i t is i m p o r t a n t to understand that this p o w e r f u l
m o t i v a t i o n o n behalf of the genes is to a large extent inaccessible
to conscious awareness and is not experienced as a m o t i v a t i o n .
A c c o r d i n g to this principle, m e n and w o m e n w i l l have evolved
different attitudes towards m a t i n g , and different modes of sexual
jealousy, as a result of the asymmetry of their positions i n relation to
propagation of their genes. Conflicting desires may be present
w h i c h reflect the impact of older and newer reproductive strategies.
For example, on the one h a n d , males w i l l have evolved a desire to
impregnate as m a n y females as possible, i n competition w i t h other
males, i n order to maximize transmission of their genes; o n the
other h a n d , the development of large brained infants, whose
" p r e m a t u r e " b i r t h means that m u c h care has to be invested i n
t h e m b y the mother, has given rise to the reproductive value of
stable and committed relationships. I n the transition to Homo sapiens
and the development of a h u n t e r - g a t h e r i n g w a y of life, males were
required b y females for more than just their sperm. Females,
therefore, i n selecting a mate, seek evidence of the capacity for
c o m m i t m e n t and kindness, as w e l l as indicators of status and
health. There are inherent tensions i n this evolutionary history. For
example, w i t h i n m e n there may be competing and contradictory
inclinations towards promiscuous reproduction and the establish
ment of a stable family; i n contemporary Western society, a c o m m o n
pattern is for the promiscuous reproductive strategy to be pursued
first, f o l l o w e d later by the strategy based on a committed relation
ship. Glantz and M o e h l (2000) comment as follows:
As men became more reliable mates and parents, they became more
valuable resources for women. Consequently, there was pressure
JEALOUSY 81
for women to compete for males and their resources. With the
formation of a male-female bond, infidelity became a bigger issue,
especially for the male who, more likely to invest in one female,
deeply feared being cuckolded. Similarly, females deeply feared loss
of emotional commitment of their mate to another, and males were
thus required to exhibit commitment and put limits of their
promiscuity. Pursuing additional mating opportunities would
grievously offend his mate and might compromise the survival of
their existing children. In this complex situation, the "best"
reproductive strategy became unclear and elusive. ... It is in man's
genetic interest to mate w i t h many women, but doing so w i l l not
necessarily make him happy. Ever since hunter-gatherer times, men
have also been endowed w i t h a desire for a family, children and
emotional bonds as well as for multiple mating opportunities.
Consequently, in men, phylogenetically older and newer reproduc
tive strategies are in eternal conflict, [pp. 181-188]
The reproductive strategies of men and w o m e n are b o t h inter

dependent and in conflict. For example, since w o m e n m a y seek
evidence of commitment before mating, some m e n m a y have evolved
strategies of p r o v i d i n g false cues to commitment. I n t u r n , w o m e n
m a y then have evolved increased abilities to detect deception:
As women developed the ability to detect deception, they imposed

selection pressures on men to become better deceivers. And so the
co-evolutionary spiral continues, w i t h each increment in one sex
producing reciprocal evolutionary change in the other. Adaptations
in one sex lead to counter-adaptations in the other, and those in turn
lead to further counter-adaptations and counter-counter-adaptations.
As long as the strategies of the sexes are in some degree of conflict,
this co-evolutionary spiral w i l l continue unabated. At the current
moment in time, we are poised in the middle of this spiral, w i t h
women being excellent detectors of deception, as indicated by their
superiority over men in decoding nonverbal signals. Men, in turn, can
be notoriously skilled at deceiving women. [Buss, 2000, pp. 44-45]
Gender differences in jealousy
M e n m a y have evolved m u c h stronger reactions of jealousy to the

idea of the w o m a n h a v i n g sex w i t h another m a n , as opposed to
emotional i n f i d e l i t y , w h i c h m a y be more i m p o r t a n t to the w o m a n .
This evolutionary difference between the sexes is because, prior to

the a v a i l a b i l i t y of contraception, a female's i n f i d e l i t y c o u l d
potentially have far more severe genetic consequences than the
i n f i d e l i t y of the male. W h i l s t the female always " k n o w s " that 50%
of her offspring's genes are hers, the male can r u n the risk of caring
for offspring that are not his o w n (i.e. do n o t carry his genes) if the
female has been sexually u n f a i t h f u l . There is n o reciprocal
reproductive risk to the female if the male is u n f a i t h f u l ; her
reproduction and transmission of her o w n genes are not i n any w a y
compromised b y the male's infidelity. W h a t the female does have to
lose is the resources and protection if the male abandons her for
another—i.e. if the relationship and b o n d i n g is threatened. Thus,
w h i l s t there are p a i n f u l costs of infidelity for b o t h males and
females, the genetic costs are quite different and m u c h higher for
males. Moreover, w h a t complicates the relationship between the
sexes even further is that there may be reproductive benefits to the
female if she is secretly u n f a i t h f u l ; various factors, i n c l u d i n g
phenomena called " s p e r m r e t e n t i o n " and " s p e r m c o m p e t i t i o n "
(Birkhead & Moller, 1998) mean that, although retaining her mate is
an i m p o r t a n t m o t i v a t i o n , b y being sexually u n f a i t h f u l a w o m a n can
maximize her chances of her egg being fertilized b y a sperm
carrying superior genes. Buss (2000) refers to this as a " ' m i x e d '
m a t i n g strategy—ensuring devotion and investment f r o m one m a n
w h i l e acquiring good genes f r o m another" (p. 162).2 A study
showed that w o m e n w h o are h a v i n g affairs are more likely to
engage i n their illicit sexual liaisons w h e n they were ovulating,
w h i l s t sex w i t h their husbands was most likely to occur w h e n they
were n o t ovulating (Buss, 2000).3 Thus, i n terms of strategies of
reproduction evolved prior to the development of contraception, it
w o u l d appear that the w o m e n i n the study w o u l d have sex w i t h
their illicit partner at a time w h e n they were likely to conceive,
w h i l s t sex w i t h their regular partner w o u l d seem to be i n the service
of retaining his loyalty rather than directed towards r e p r o d u c t i o n —
reproductive strategies that w o u l d be essentially non-conscious,
even t h o u g h acting as a strong determinant of behaviour. Buss
(2000) notes that although m e n are generally recognized to be more
promiscuous than w o m e n and that this impression is supported b y
scientific studies, there is also evidence that female i n f i d e l i t y m a y
also have been selected b y evolution:
JEALOUSY 83
If ancestral women were naturally inclined to be flawlessly faithful,

men would have had no evolutionary catalyst for jealousy. ... The
intensity of men's jealousy provides a psychological clue that betrays
women's desire for men other than their regular partners, [p. 17]
W h i l s t females m a y have evolved a tendency to be sexually

u n f a i t h f u l , males m a y have evolved strategies of preventing this.
Thus, males are more prone to extremes of sexual g u a r d i n g and
sexual jealousy (Symonds, 1979; W i l s o n & Daly, 1992; Buss et al,
1992; Buss, 2000), Gilbert et al (2000) d r a w attention to the line i n
the Beatles song " R u n for y o u r l i f e " ( f r o m the LP Rubber Soul),
w h i c h v i v i d l y illustrates male jealousy w i t h the stark w o r d s :
I'd rather see you dead little girl than to be with another man.
Empirical studies, using objective physiological measures as

w e l l as subjective reports, show that m e n p r o d u c e stronger
responses than w o m e n , of jealousy i n general, a n d to sexual
infidelity i n particular, w h i l s t w o m e n react more to emotional
infidelity (Buss et al, 1992; Buss, 2000). This f i n d i n g holds across
cultures (Buunk et al, 1996) and is not accounted for b y a belief that
if a w o m a n has sex she is likely also to be emotionally i n vol ved
(Wiederman & Kendell, 1999). The caricature of the possessive and
controlling male, jealously g u a r d i n g his mate as i f she were a part of
his territory, and fiercely w a r d i n g off other r i v a l males, m a y
represent a p r o f o u n d l y " p o l i t i c a l l y incorrect" and pre-feminist
m o d e of b e h a v i o u r — b u t i t m a y actually express the genetic
p r o g r a m m i n g evolved over many thousands of years. Buss (2000)
comments:
Co-evolutionary logic tells us that men have evolved strategies to

prevent reproductive losses by guarding their wives more diligently
and punishing them for signs of straying through verbal abuse,
emotional manipulation, jealous rages, beatings, and sometimes the
threat of death. ... Women's infidelity, in turn, has become more
cryptic, enigmatic, and deceptive over evolutionary time to evade
these costs, [p. 176]
I n c o m i n g into conflict w i t h contemporary c u l t u r a l values,

w h i c h denigrate male attitudes of control and possession towards
w o m e n , such evolved reproductive strategies can be a source of
shame for the m a n (Glantz & M o e h l , 2000). The educated " N e w

M a n " m a y t r y to be non-possessive, enlightened and l o v i n g ,
relating to his female partner as a free i n d i v i d u a l entitled to her
a u t o n o m y — b u t then m a y be shocked and ashamed w h e n he finds
to his dismay that an older phylogenetic programme is suddenly
triggered, releasing violent physiological responses a n d seemingly
the most unrefined of male behaviour. Bailey (1987) comments as
follows on our embeddedness i n early phylogenetic b r a i n responses
that can be a source of shame and guilt:
We must acknowledge that our species possesses the neural

hardware and many of the motivational-emotional proclivities ...
of our reptilian ancestors, and, thus our drives, inner subjective
feelings, fantasies and thoughts are thoroughly conditioned by
emanations from the R-complex. The reptilian carry-overs provide
the automatic, compulsive, urgency to much human behaviour,
where free w i l l steps aside and persons act as they have to act, often
despising themselves in the process for their hatreds, prejudices,
compulsions, conformity, deceptiveness and guile, [p. 63]
The male w h o experiences jealousy as a result of perceiving that

his partner has been, or potentially m a y be, sexually u n f a i t h f u l w i l l
suffer shame also as a direct result of his self-perception of failing i n
sexual competition and of falling i n social r a n k i n g (Gilbert &
McGuire, 1998). Shame is part of the constellation of submissive and
subordinate behaviour, designed (by evolution) to be adaptive i n
a v o i d i n g i n j u r y f r o m more d o m i n a n t competitors. I n today's
society, the jealous male is caught i n a pincer between phylogen
etically older responses and the need to adapt to current c u l t u r a l
v a l u e s — t h e combination of w h i c h may force h i m into a deepening
spiral of shame that can be experienced as catastrophic. W h e n he
attempts to avoid the shame inherent i n losing his mate to another
male, he m a y fall back o n older responses of fighting off the r i v a l
and t r y i n g to control the behaviour of the female; however, this then
brings h i m crashing u p against the shame of behaving i n w a y s that
are against current societal values. Thus he may, as if his life were
an emotional p i n b a l l machine, bounce between these t w o sources of
shame, along the w a y d o w n smashing into other agonies of guilt,
helplessness and d e s p a i r — t h i s w h o l e constellation appearing quite
unmanageable at times. I have heard such experiences described b y
JEALOUSY 85
a number of male patients, w h o also report h o w the w o m a n i n the

situation looks o n w i t h apparent bemusement and scorn at the
intensity of the man's state of agitation; because their reproductive
strategies and needs are different, albeit complementary, m e n and
w o m e n have d i f f i c u l t y understanding some of each other's most
p r i m i t i v e and compelling emotional responses.
The need to combine evolutionary and psychodynamic explanations

If the theory of e v o l u t i o n is taken seriously, as p r o v i d i n g at least a
partial explanation of h u m a n characteristics, then w e must accept
that non-consciously our behaviour and emotions are d r i v e n and
organized by strategies to maximize the successful propagation of
our genes. These reproductive strategies w i l l be at w o r k i n our
4
attachment-seeking and m a t i n g behaviours, and i n our care and

n u r t u r e of our children. M o s t l y , these m o t i v a t i o n a l forces are n o t
available to introspection and direct awareness. W h i l s t evolutionary
theory looks at the developmental history of the species as it has
adapted to changing environments and to competing demands,
psychoanalysis examines the development of the i n d i v i d u a l m i n d
and the adaptations that have had to be made w h i l s t g r o w i n g u p
w i t h i n the f a m i l y of origin. Both perspectives are necessary for an
understanding of the i n d i v i d u a l .
Psychoanalysis and evolutionary psychology are somewhat
similar and overlapping frameworks. Both are developmental and
b i o l o g i c a l theories, l o o k i n g for an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of present
behaviour i n the light of earlier circumstances. Both see conflict,
anxiety, and unhappiness as inherent i n the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n — a n d
locate jealousy as an unavoidable feature of this. Similarly, b o t h
consider that h u m a n misery can be alleviated b y understanding and
accepting h u m a n nature. Both theories are w i d e - r a n g i n g and are
open to criticisms that they are difficult to prove or d i s p r o v e — a n d
b o t h tend to evoke strong emotional reactions.
A further p o i n t of contact between psychoanalysis and e v o l u
tionary psychology is that b o t h emphasize sexuality (i.e. reproduc
tion) i n one w a y or another as the ultimate m o t i v a t i o n - d i r e c t i n g
behaviour. W h i l s t Freud's original emphasis directly u p o n sexuality
— l i b i d o and E r o s — w a s superseded i n later psychoanalytic theoriz
i n g by a focus o n the infant's seeking of relationship, n u r t u r e , and
attachment w i t h the care-giver; these aspects of m o t i v a t i o n too can

be seen as part of the broad evolved strategy of ensuring repro
ductive success. Indeed, contemporary psychoanalytic attachment
theory, derived f r o m B o w l b y (who was himself a significant D a r w i n
s c h o l a r — B o w l b y , 1991) is highly compatible w i t h evolutionary
perspectives. Fonagy et al. (2002), commenting o n the replacement
of the earlier n o t i o n of " s u r v i v a l of the fittest" w i t h the theory of
"inclusive fitness" (Wenegrat, 1990)—in w h i c h the survival of close
relatives sharing c o m m o n genes may be favoured as m u c h as that of
the i n d i v i d u a l — s e e attachment as crucial to this:
The concept of "inclusive fitness" places attachment theory at the

center stage of evolutionary socio-biology as a key behavioral
mechanism mediating the establishment of genetic proximity, for
attachment is the process that ensures that we know whose survival
w i l l advantage the reproduction of our genes, [p. 122]
Moreover, they see attachment as serving m u l t i p l e evolutionary

f u n c t i o n s — f o r example: the facilitation of the care of children; a
marker of those w i t h w h o m one should not mate because of the
biological risks associated w i t h incest; a marker for reciprocal
altruism.
W h i l s t evolutionary theory can offer insights into the deep
(distal) motivations that structure h u m a n behaviour to ensure
r e p r o d u c t i o n of g e n e s — m o t i v a t i o n s w h i c h are inaccessible to
conscious awareness and introspection—psychoanalysis describes,
and makes accessible to conscious awareness, the (proximal)
emotions, impulses, conflicts, and anxieties that have arisen t h r o u g h
e v o l u t i o n a r y selection, a n d w h i c h h u m a n beings struggle to
regulate and integrate i n their daily lives and relationships. It is
w i t h i n the realm of psychoanalysis that w e can locate the early roots
of jealousy i n the Oedipus complex, i n envious and greedy wishes
towards the mother, and i n r i v a l r y w i t h siblings, and where w e can
also discern the contribution of mechanisms of defence, such as
projection, w h i c h act to enhance jealousy, or such as denial or
disavowal, w h i c h act to block perceptions that w o u l d otherwise
give rise to jealousy. Undoubtedly, more w o r k needs to be done on
the interface between evolutionary theory and psychoanalysis. Of
crucial significance here is that b o t h perspectives see jealousy as
inherent h u m a n tendencies.
JEALOUSY 87
A jealous w o m a n
Some w o m e n become alarmed if the m a n shows any sexual interest,

even i f of only the most r u d i m e n t a r y nature, i n another w o m a n . For
example, one violently jealous patient w o u l d covertly check her
partner's pulse rate as they watched television together. If she felt
that his pulse rate was increasing w h e n an attractive w o m a n
appeared o n the screen, she w o u l d smack h i m around the face.
Similarly, if she noticed that he looked at a w o m a n i n the street, she
w o u l d berate h i m fiercely. U s u a l l y her m a n w o u l d appear
genuinely bemused at her accusations, protesting that he was not
aware of h a v i n g looked or felt any sexual interest i n another
w o m a n . A s w e explored the meaning of her reactions, she disclosed
her belief that i f her partner loved her he w o u l d not show any
interest at all i n other w o m e n . Therefore she felt that if he looked at
a w o m a n i n the street or on television this m u s t mean that he d i d
not love her and m i g h t therefore leave h e r — a n d moreover, she felt
it meant she was defective i n some w a y . This patient experienced
some relief w h e n the evolutionary perspective was explained to her.
It was pointed o u t that the male b r a i n has probably been selected
t h r o u g h e v o l u t i o n i n terms of a continuous scanning for attractive
w o m e n , whereas the female brain m a y n o t have developed this
characteristic to the same extent. This made sense to her a n d she h a d
not thought about her husband's behaviour i n this w a y before. She
remarked (referring to her partner's l o o k i n g at w o m e n i n the street)
" O h y o u mean its like a r e f l e x — l i k e he can't help i t — h e doesn't
even k n o w he is d o i n g i t — t h a t ' s w h a t he s a y s — h e is not aware of
l o o k i n g " . She began to see that her partner's l o o k i n g at other
w o m e n d i d not mean that he was going to leave h e r — a n d , i n fact,
he d i d appear to be extremely devoted to her.
W h i l s t part of this patient's jealousy responded to a biological
explanation, another aspect required a psychodynamic interpreta
tion. I n the past she h a d been extremely promiscuous, using her
capacity to attract m e n as a source of self-esteem and feelings of
power. She still resorted to sex addictively as a means of soothing
and restoring a sense of well-being. Fortunately her partner was
usually able and w i l l i n g to oblige her desire for sex several times a
day. H o w e v e r , w i t h some exploration, she was eventually able to
acknowledge that she still experienced at times the o l d urges to p i c k
u p m e n promiscuously whenever her m o o d a n d self-esteem became

at all dysphoric. It was possible to p u t to her the hypothesis that she
was projectively attributing to her partner her o w n impulses to be
promiscuous w h i c h she was attempting to deny w i t h i n herself. She
could then see that her suspiciousness of her partner, such that she
w o u l d quiz h i m about w o m e n that he m i g h t have seen d u r i n g his
day at w o r k , was really an expression of her o w n repudiated wishes
to be u n f a i t h f u l . As a result of this insight she became aware of her
conflict between her impulses to resort to her o l d methods of
restoring self-esteem t h r o u g h promiscuity and her feeling n o w that
this was incompatible w i t h her love for her partner. H o w e v e r , it
was possible to clarify that her impulses to restore her self-esteem
t h r o u g h promiscuous sex d i d not i m p l y any lack of love for her
partner since such sexual encounters were always utterly deperso
nalized. A n o t h e r crucial p o i n t was that she d i d n o t herself
experience sexual desire for other m e n — w h a t she desired was to
be the object of their desire and i n that w a y to experience sexual
p o w e r — a n essentially narcissistic exercise. If she focused o n
another m a n i t was i n order to seduce h i m — n o t because she
desired h i m . Therefore, if she noticed her partner's eyes straying
towards another w o m a n she w o u l d conclude that he was operating
o n the same basis of p l a n n i n g a promiscuous adventure (rather than
that he was instinctively d r a w n to look at an attractive female).
A g a i n , this clarification of the difference between her previously
established pattern of the use of promiscuity to restore self-esteem
and her partner's reflex l o o k i n g at other w o m e n p r o v i d e d her w i t h
some relief.
The man who was not jealous

Some years ago I saw a chronically depressed m a n — M r W — w h o s e
self-esteem and self-image were negative i n the extreme. He rather
f l o r i d l y spoke of his v i e w of himself as the " l o w e s t of the l o w " and
of his place at " t h e b o t t o m of the ladder", and described himself as
" a z e r o — a n o t h i n g " . He also frequently referred to himself as "a
t w a t " — a w i d e l y used derogatory t e r m that originally is slang for
female genitals. M r W talked of his v i e w that most other m e n were
more intelligent than h i m , as w e l l as being more attractive to
JEALOUSY 89
w o m e n and generally more able. A l t h o u g h educated to a h i g h level,

he said he had not been able to progress i n his career beyond the
first r u n g . H i s generally submissive and deferential stance was
apparent i n relation to m e — f o r example, he w o u l d ask permission
to remove his jacket on an extremely h o t day. M r W was so
emphatic about his general worthlessness and his i n f e r i o r i t y
compared to other m e n that I began to suspect his l o w self-esteem
was serving a defensive f u n c t i o n of placing h i m outside the arena of
potential competition w i t h other men. This hypothesis began to
make sense i n terms of w h a t emerged of his early Oedipal situation.
M r W's biological father h a d left w h e n he was i n his first year and
he had no conscious memories of h i m . U n t i l age five he h a d his
mother to himself. H o w e v e r , she then married a m a n f r o m a quite
different race and culture, w h o m M r W experienced as " a fierce
stranger" a n d utterly terrifying. I t was apparent f r o m M r W's
recollections that he had feared greatly for his physical safety if he
p r o v o k e d his stepfather's anger. Thus it seemed likely that M r W's
Oedipal wishes to remain close to his mother and to eliminate the
"fierce stranger" r i v a l w o u l d have been a source of considerable
anxiety, resulting i n a wholesale r e p u d i a t i o n of his competitive
strivings and the a d o p t i o n of extreme submission b e h a v i o u r — h i s
self-denigratory thoughts being an internal f o r m of submission
behaviour. M r W was startled by this interpretation, b u t f o u n d i t
meaningful. He talked of h o w he always w o r e an o l d tie that was
t h i n and f r a y e d — c l a i m i n g that his self-esteem was so l o w that he d i d
not feel he deserved a " w i d e " tie of the k i n d that most m e n w o u l d
wear. He felt this was a " s i g n a l " to other m e n that he was at the
b o t t o m of the pecking order or, as he rather histrionically p u t i t , he
was " n o higher than microbes on the floor". The phallic symbolism of
the tie was o b v i o u s — i t was as i f he was displaying a visual statement
that his penis was " t h i n " and of no competitive threat. H i s frequent
reference to himself as a " t w a t " similarly declared his presentation
of himself as castrated and therefore h a v i n g no r i v a l phallus.
Alongside M r W's fear of evoking retaliation for any potential
competitive strivings, there was another anxiety of a more narcis
sistic nature. It became apparent that his self-mockery and expres
sions of extreme contempt for himself were attempts to ensure that
his abilities could never be overestimated by his colleagues or by
anyone else w i t h w h o m he came into contact. By presenting himself
as the "lowest of the l o w " he endeavoured to prevent the possibility

of being given a task w h i c h m i g h t be beyond his capacities. I n this
w a y he pre-empted the possibility of w h a t w o u l d be experienced b y
h i m as catastrophic h u m i l i a t i o n and shame if he were to fail. Thus he
f o u n d narcissistic safety i n his exaggeratedly l o w self-esteem.
M r W d i d have a g i r l f r i e n d , although he felt he w a s of n o value
to her and d i d n o t see w h y she stayed w i t h h i m . I n v i e w of his l o w
self-esteem a n d image of himself as undesirable, I expected h i m to
experience strong feelings of jealous anxiety that his g i r l f r i e n d
w o u l d t u r n to other men. To m y surprise M r W completely denied
any jealousy initially. I t was as i f he felt that should his g i r l f r i e n d
leave h i m this w o u l d be only w h a t he d e s e r v e d — a n d w o u l d
therefore be an event to accept stoically and w i t h o u t resistance. H i s
absence of jealousy seemed to reflect his h a v i n g placed himself
entirely outside the realm of competition w i t h other men. However,
as M r W ' s defences against his Oedipal strivings were explored he
suddenly began to speak of his desire for a very attractive w o m a n at
w o r k a n d his hatred, envy, and jealousy of her high-achieving
husband w h o headed the company, and w h o m he regarded as
h a v i n g everything that M r W w a n t e d — i n t e l l i g e n c e , ability, con
fidence, success, and a beautiful w i f e . I t w a s apparent that, behind
his exaggerated self-mockery a n d o p t i n g o u t of competition and
placing himself at the b o t t o m of the pecking order, lay the opposite
feelings a n d (Oedipal) fantasies—of being the most successful m a n
w i t h the most beautiful w i f e . Whilst initially repudiated, his feelings
of jealousy were p o w e r f u l l y albeit latently present.
One striking feature of M r W ' s presentation was h o w his
particular constellation of repudiation of competition was entwined
w i t h extreme forms of shame. H e illustrated v i v i d l y the process
whereby shame leads to retreat d o w n the social h i e r a r c h y — t h i s
retreat, w h e n taken beyond a certain socially acceptable p o i n t ,
becomes itself a source of shame, thus g i v i n g rise to toxic shame and
the sense of being u n f i t for h u m a n society. A t the deepest biological
level, the shame concerns being reproductively unfit.
Freud's insights regarding jealousy

Freud's m a i n c o n t r i b u t i o n specifically concerning jealousy w a s his
JEALOUSY 91
1922 paper, "Some neurotic mechanisms i n jealousy, paranoia and

h o m o s e x u a l i t y " . H e states his v i e w that n o r m a l jealousy is
ubiquitous and is derived f r o m b o t h the current situation and,
unconsciously f r o m the childhood O e d i p a l situation and sibling
rivalry. It combines grief, narcissistic i n j u r y (to self-esteem) and self
criticism:
It is easy to see that essentially it is compounded of grief, the pain

caused by the thought of losing the loved object, and of the
narcissistic wound, in so far as this is distinguishable from the other
wound; further of feelings of enmity against the successful rival,
and of a greater or lesser amount of self-criticism which tries to hold
the subject's own ego accountable for his loss. Although we may
call it normal, this jealousy is by no means completely rational, that
is, derived from the actual situation, proportionate to the real
circumstances and under the complete control of the conscious ego;
for it is rooted deep in the unconscious, it is a continuation of the
earliest stirrings of the child's affective life, and it originates in the
Oedipus or brother-and-sister complex of the first sexual period.
[Freud, 1922, p. 223]
Here he describes a variety of pathological forms of jealousy

d e r i v i n g f r o m projection and related mechanisms of defence. Freud
argues that projected jealousy is common, d e r i v i n g f r o m a person's
denial and projection of his or her o w n impulses to be u n f a i t h f u l . H e
comments:
It is a matter of everyday experience that fidelity, especially that

degree of it required in marriage, is only maintained in the face of
continual temptations. Anyone who denies these temptations in
himself w i l l nevertheless feel their pressure so strongly that he w i l l
be glad enough to make use of an unconscious mechanism to
alleviate his situation. He can obtain this alleviation—and indeed
acquittal by his conscience—if he projects his own impulses to
faithlessness on to the partner to whom he owes faith. [Freud, 1922,
p. 224]
N o r m a l l y , Freud points out, social convention tolerates m i l d

degrees of f l i r t a t i o n outside marriage, so that the "inevitable
tendency to unfaithfulness w i l l thus f i n d a safety valve and be
rendered i n n o c u o u s " [p. 224]. However, the pathologically jealous
person does n o t tolerate such flirtation, appearing t o believe that i t

w i l l inevitably lead to actual i n f i de l i t y . The force of this conviction
derives f r o m the projection, w h i c h w i l l always f i n d some justifica
t i o n because of the inevitability of some degree of temptation i n the
partner to be unfaithful. The jealous person does n o t project where
there is n o suitable match:
They let themselves be guided by their knowledge of the

unconscious, and displace to the unconscious minds of others the
attention which they have withdrawn from their own. O u r jealous
husband perceived his wife's unfaithfulness instead of his own; by
becoming conscious of hers and magnifying it enormously he
succeeded in keeping his o w n unconscious. [Freud, 1922, p. 226]
A more serious k i n d of delusional jealousy arises f r o m projection

not merely of impulses to be u n f a i t h f u l per se, b u t also of repressed
homosexual impulses:
A s an attempt at defence against an unduly strong homosexual

impulse it may, in a man, be described in the formula: "I do not love
him, she loves h i m " . [Freud, 1922, p. 225]
Of course the equivalent process m a y occur i n a w o m a n . I n one case

t o l d to the author, a w o m a n experienced intense and p a i n f u l
jealousy i n her heterosexual relationships, continually alert to any
i n d i c a t i o n or possibility of her partner's i n f i d e l i t y — b u t this
tendency to be jealous faded considerably once she h a d a c k n o w l
edged her homosexuality and had settled into a lesbian relationship.
H o w e v e r , Freud also described a contrasting process whereby
intense jealousy i n childhood can give rise to homosexuality. This is
rather the reverse of the process whereby homosexuality gives rise
to jealousy. I n such instances the y o u n g b o y h a d a strong
attachment to the mother and intense jealous r i v a l r y against
brothers, i n v o l v i n g death wishes. Eventually this hostility suc
cumbed to repression and u n d e r w e n t a transformation, such that
the o r i g i n a l rivals then became the first homosexual love-objects.
This transformation of hate into love is quite opposite to the
process Freud described for paranoia, i n w h i c h r e p u d i a t i o n o f love
for a same sex figure undergoes repression a n d transformation into
hatred. Freud suggested that the transformation of rivalrous hatred
JEALOUSY 93
into love m a y often occur after the mother has praised another r i v a l
boy.
An example of jealousy based on projection

It is not h a r d to f i n d examples illustrating Freud's f o r m u l a t i o n of
jealousy based o n projection. One w o m a n demonstrated this rather
v i v i d l y , and also showed h o w a cycle of jealousy can be self
reinforcing. She described h o w she w o u l d , at times, enter states of
delusional and intense jealousy, continually checking to see whether
her husband was seeing other w o m e n , and scarcely containing
herself f r o m b u r s t i n g i n o n his place of w o r k i n order to catch h i m i n
his supposed infidelities. I n i t i a l l y she rebuffed the analyst's enquiry
into her o w n possible wishes to be u n f a i t h f u l — b u t then confessed
that recently she had indeed f o u n d herself t h i n k i n g a lot about her
previous b o y f r i e n d , w h o m she actually regretted h a v i n g left. She
had heard that he was getting m a r r i e d , although she k n e w that he
had continued to pine for her l o n g after she had left h i m . W h i l s t she
recognized that b o t h their lives had m o v e d on, she nevertheless
found herself contemplating h o w life m i g h t have been if she had
stayed w i t h h i m . Such thoughts evoked considerable g u i l t and
anxiety, for she loved her husband and was devoted to her children
that she n o w had w i t h h i m . The analyst p u t to her that she m a y
have been dealing w i t h her feelings of g u i l t and anxiety about her
secret thoughts about her previous b o y f r i e n d (her internal affair) b y
projectively a t t r i b u t i n g t h e m to her h u s b a n d — " i t is not me w h o
wants to be u n f a i t h f u l b u t h i m " . Once this was p u t to her, the
patient could see very clearly h o w this was the case. It was then
possible to understand h o w her cycle of jealousy c o u l d be self
reinforcing: her projection onto her husband of her o w n impulses to
be u n f a i t h f u l meant that she felt insecure w i t h h i m ; this insecurity
made her more inclined to fantasize about the life she c o u l d have
had w i t h her previous b o y f r i e n d ; her anxiety a n d g u i l t about such
thoughts and impulses gave rise to increased projection, resulting i n
increased i n s e c u r i t y — a n d so on i n a positive feedback loop. A
related l o o p — o n e w h i c h is c o m m o n i n cycles of j e a l o u s y — w a s that,
as she tormented her husband w i t h her jealousy, she felt sure she
m u s t be d r i v i n g h i m a w a y f r o m her t h r o u g h her intolerable
behaviour, w h i c h then increased her suspicion that he w o u l d w a n t
to t u r n to another w o m a n — w h i c h fuelled her jealous rage, w h i c h

she felt sure w o u l d lead h i m to reject h e r — a n d so on.
Riviere's elaboration of Freud's formulation of jealousy

I n a remarkable paper i n 1932, Joan Riviere elaborated on Freud's
insights into the projective processes i n v o l v e d i n jealousy, s h o w i n g
the deeper and e a r l i e r — " p r e - O e d i p a l " — f o r m s of greed and envy
that lay behind a w o m a n patient's jealous preoccupations. These
were seen as d e r i v i n g f r o m the relationship to the p r i m a l scene of
the parental relationship and to sadistic wishes to deprive the
parents of a l l their possessions and gratifications.
She described the case of a y o u n g m a r r i e d w o m a n w h o sought
analysis because of a lack of response d u r i n g intercourse and also
certain inhibitions. The jealousy arose as a transitory s y m p t o m
d u r i n g the a n a l y s i s — t a k i n g the f o r m of suspicions that her husband
was h a v i n g affairs and also beliefs that her husband had w r i t t e n
letters to the analyst. Riviere f o u n d that a l thou g h the patient herself
showed some tendencies to be flirtatious, these d i d not seem
plausibly to be the basis of her jealousy since she talked about her
flirtations quite openly. Instead, Riviere noticed that the patient
w o u l d indulge i n outbursts of self-condemnation regarding her
flirtations whenever, i n the previous session, there had been some
new insight into her unconscious l i f e — g i v i n g rise to the hypothesis
that her g u i l t about her o w n impulses towards i n f i d e l i t y were
serving some defensive purpose i n relation to the analysis. Never
theless, the patient's jealousy was at times so persecutory i n
character that Riviere was convinced that something was being
projected, even i f it was unclear w h a t .
Eventually Riviere was able to elucidate " a specific unconscious
phantasy-situation w h i c h took shape i n her life i n ever-varying
f o r m s " . This " d o m i n a n t phantasy" consisted of " a n impulse or an
act o n the patient's part of seizing and obtaining f r o m some other
person something she greatly desired, thus r o b b i n g and despoiling
h i m or her". W h i l s t her conscious w i s h was to w i n the love of her
husband, children, and all those around her, w h a t this " l o v e " meant
to her was that they w o u l d surrender completely to her, i n such a
w a y that they w o u l d give u p all rights and possibilities of pleasure
JEALOUSY 95
for themselves. I n her flirtations she w a n t e d to rob another w o m a n

of her husband and the pleasures he gave her. She w a n t e d the
analyst's husband to die a n d also w a n t e d to possess h i m herself. For
her, all pleasures h a d to be at some other person's expense. I n every
situation she h a d t o be i n a preferential position over others. Her
envy of the analyst w a s masked b y an attitude of contempt that
became the p r e v a i l i n g m o o d i n the transference. Riviere concluded
that i t was whenever there was a danger that the unconscious
phantasy m i g h t be realized, especially i n some b o d i l y w a y relating
to sexuality, illness or death, the patient's anxiety w o u l d develop to
an extent that i t c o u l d be relieved only b y projection of the
impulses:
So in the jealous moods she declared that her husband and his other
women were robbing her of everything, taunting, outraging her,
stripping her of his love, of her o w n self-respect and self-confidence,
casting her off, a victim, utterly helpless and destitute. But this was
precisely what in countless ways, as in her flirtations, she was
unconsciously endeavouring to do to all around her. [p. 419]
Riviere described the patient's recurrent masturbation phantasy

w h i c h captured the unconscious desire: A y o u n g g i r l is i n a doctor's
consulting r o o m , being undressed a n d then examined b y h i m ; there
is another w o m a n i n the background. The analysis revealed that the
doctor represented her father, w h i l s t the w o m a n i n the background
stood for the mother to be robbed and despoiled. I n line w i t h
Riviere's Kleinian theoretical f r a m e w o r k , she saw the patient's
desire as being to rob the mother of her b o d y contents:
. . . the mother was, as one might say, a double object in herself,

consisting of two parts: namely herself and her possessions; the
father (or his penis, the agent) was one of her possessions, of which
she wa s to be robbed. The mother's possessions consisted ultimately
of her breasts, milk and her body-contents: faeces, children and the
father's penis; of all these she was to be despoiled, [p. 420]
Riviere reasoned that " s i m p l e genital Oedipus desire a n d jealousy"

played little p a r t i n the patient's phantasies. Instead these were
rooted i n envy a n d sadistic impulses f r o m the early oral phase of
development, w h e r e i n others were regarded n o t as w h o l e persons
b u t as " p a r t objects": " M e n were n o t really persons and f u l l objects

to the patient's unconscious; a m a n was either a penis or was the
owner of a penis. W o m e n were also part-objects, i.e. apprehended
as divisible i n t o part-objects" (p. 420). Riviere suggested that this
unconscious perception of others as part objects contributed to the
r e l a t i v e i n d i f f e r e n c e s h o w n b y such patients t o the actual
personalities of others. One further p o i n t made b y Riviere was that
the bitterness of the jealous person's preoccupation w i t h real or
imagined infidelities on the part of their spouse is that u n c o n
sciously these are imagined as retributions for his or her o w n
aggressive intentions d u r i n g early childhood.
FenichePs contribution
Another i m p o r t a n t early paper was that of Otto Fenichel i n 1935, i n

w h i c h he draws u p o n some of the points made b y Riviere and, like 5
her, gives an example of a patient w h o had unconsciously wished to

rob her mother.
Fenichel begins w i t h t w o p u z z l i n g features of jealousy. First, he
makes the p o i n t that jealousy is not necessarily strongest where a
previous state of love has been greatest—and that, i n fact, those
w h o are most inclined to be jealous may often be those w h o are
incapable of deeper forms of love and w h o change their love-objects
continually. Secondly, he notes that another surprising feature of
jealousy is that it tends to be an obtrusive and supervalent idea.
Regarding the first point, Fenichel argues that those prone to
jealousy tend to be " o r a l l y f i x a t e d " people whose self-esteem is
unusually dependent u p o n receiving l o v e — a n external locus of self
esteem. This need to take i n "narcissistic supplies" f r o m the
environment is similar to that s h o w n b y depressive and other
patients w i t h " o r a l " or " s e l f - r e g a r d i n g " neuroses—as described
originally b y Rado (1928).
Fenichel relates this narcissistic quality to the role of unconscious
h o m o s e x u a l i t y — d r a w i n g u p o n Freud's hypothesis regarding p r o
jected homosexual impulses i n delusional jealousy and paranoia. He
postulates that the use of projection and the homosexual object
choice are b o t h archaic and narcissistic:
JEALOUSY 97
... projection ... which characterises the paranoid mechanisms

contained in jealousy, is an archaic mechanism which points to the
persistence of a relatively narcissistic stage. The homosexual object
is closer to the narcissistic object, that is to the subject's own ego,
than is the heterosexual object, [p. 352]
Fenichel's clinical example
Fenichel gives a clinical example. A m i d d l e aged w o m a n relapsed

into a severe neurosis characterized b y anxiety, depersonalization
and hysterical conversion symptoms. I n i t i a l l y she reported that the
symptoms h a d arisen after her husband h a d become impotent.
H o w e v e r , i t later emerged that her symptoms had arisen only after
she had begun to suspect that her husband was seeing another
w o m a n and she had developed the conviction that he w o u l d be
f u l l y potent w i t h her r i v a l . Her symptoms thus arose i n the context
of " a n intense and t o r t u r i n g jealousy w h i c h u n t i l then h a d been
quite u n k n o w n to her". Moreover, it transpired that she herself had
often been sexually unresponsive to her husband and had never
been particularly keen on intercourse w i t h h i m , r e l y i n g instead on
periodic masturbation w i t h particular fantasies.
The patient r a p i d l y developed a d e m a n d i n g attitude towards
the analyst, s h o w i n g distinctly " o r a l " incorporative qualities. For
example, she declared that it was only w h e n the analyst talked to
her that she felt w o r t h y of respect and that after analytic hours
w h e n she felt he h a d not talked enough she w o u l d visit a pastry
shop and consume a cake. W i t h o u t the narcissistic supplies f r o m the
analyst to " m a i n t a i n " her, as she p u t i t , she experienced anxiety,
depersonalization and feelings of worthlessness. (In the more
contemporary terms of K o h u t i a n self-psychology, this w o u l d be
described as a m i r r o r i n g transference, i n w h i c h the analyst is
required to f u n c t i o n as a " s e l f o b j e c t " — i . e . to f u n c t i o n as p a r t of the
patient's narcissistic economy.)
D u r i n g the analysis the patient's jealousy increased, taking the
f o r m of t o r t u r i n g thoughts about w h e n and where and h o w he
m i g h t be seeing the other w o m a n , w i t h compulsive fantasies of their
sexual intimacy. Eventually she declared that she c o u l d n o t tolerate
h a v i n g to t h i n k of her husband " g i v i n g his p e n i s " to another
w o m a n . Fenichel concluded that she thought of her husband's
penis, unconsciously, as a source of oral supplies of the k i n d she

sought f r o m the a n a l y s t — t h e attention and interest that bolstered
her self-esteem t h r o u g h the supply of w o r d s . H o w e v e r , the p o i n t
was striking that she d i d n o t feel deprived of such supplies s i m p l y
b y her husband's impotence, b u t b y the idea of another w o m a n
receiving w h a t she d i d not.
A relevant part of the background w a s that the patient's father
h a d an affair w i t h a m a i d a n d w h e n the mother discovered this she
h a d p o u r e d her heart o u t to the patient. Therefore, Fenichel
reasoned that the patient's situation w i t h her husband related to
the repressed Oedipus complex:
The thought that her husband might be with another woma n was
intolerable because the husband, by being unfaithful, became a
father-figure. The patient, afraid of retribution, felt: " N o w I get
what as a child, identifying myself with the maid, I did to m y
mother." [p. 356]
H o w e v e r , Fenichel pointed to deeper sources of w h a t emerged

as the patient's conception of sexual intercourse as " a r o b b i n g of
w h a t is n o t given freely". A p p a r e n t l y , at puberty a g i r l friend t o l d
her of seeing a f a r m labourer h a v i n g sex w i t h a g i r l standing u p .
This image became a persisting source of great excitement for the
p a t i e n t — a n d f r o m then o n , her masturbation fantasies always
p i v o t e d a r o u n d there being a w o m a n w a t c h i n g a couple h a v i n g
i n t e r c o u r s e — w i t h the detail that the m a n h a d left the w a t c h i n g
w o m a n for the other w o m a n . Fenichel considered that the patient's
excitement required that she empathize simultaneously w i t h b o t h
w o m e n — " w i t h the robber and the robbed one". This could then be
l i n k e d w i t h her " s p l i t " feeling associated w i t h her experience of
depersonalization—"she w a s split into a r o b b e r - w o m a n and a
robbed w o m a n " . Fenichel concluded:
The unconscious masturbation fantasies which had been reinforced

by the husband's unfaithfulness may be formulated more or less as
follows: " I want to take my father from m y mother, as the maid did.
When I have a husband, what happened to m y mother will happen
to m e . " [p. 356]
Consciously the patient hated b o t h her mother a n d her sister.

She reproached her mother for almost e v e r y t h i n g — a n d Fenichel
JEALOUSY 99
deduced that the f o r m u l a for these disappointments i n her mother

must have been: "She h a d taken something f r o m me to give i t to
others". The theme of robbery and of one w o m a n t a k i n g f r o m
another w o m a n became more pronounced, based around the
unconscious idea: " I take another w o m a n ' s food away f r o m h e r "
or " I f they take m y food away, I w i l l get i t back b y robbing ( m y
mother's b o d y ) " (p. 357). A s the analysis continued, memories
emerged of childhood kleptomania. She recalled stealing chess
pieces f r o m her father and t h r o w i n g them into the t o i l e t — a n d then
remembered d o i n g the same w i t h various belongings of her mother.
Fenichel l i n k e d these actions w i t h her hatred against her younger
sister " w h o m — i n accordance w i t h an anal theory of b i r t h — s h e h a d
wanted to remove again i n this fashion". H e concluded: "The
meaning of all these actions was: " I get for myself w h a t is w i t h h e l d
f r o m me. I take revenge for the love that was taken f r o m me. I w a n t
to get back w h a t I l o s t " (p. 357). A t one p o i n t i n the analysis, d u r i n g
discussion of a dream relating to anal impulses of childhood, the
patient suddenly hallucinated an intensely strong taste and k n e w
that this w a s the taste of faeces. Fenichel concluded that although
the patient could n o t remember d o i n g so, "there c o u l d be n o doubt
that she h a d engaged i n coprophagic activities i n order to " g e t back
w h a t she had l o s t ' " (p. 358).
Fenichel's overall understanding of his patient's jealousy w a s
that i t was based o n oral-sadistic wishes t o rob her mother. W h e n
her early relationship w i t h her mother h a d been disturbed b y the
arrival of her sister, her first reaction h a d n o t been to t u r n to her
father b u t to become fixated to a fantasy: " I a m being robbed and I
r o b " . This f i x a t i o n h a d been enhanced at puberty by, first of all, the
stimulation of her Oedipus complex b y her father's involvement
w i t h the m a i d , and then her g i r l friend's story of the voyeur scene—
a story w h i c h easily acted as a "screen experience" for the more or
less contemporary situation of her father and the m a i d , and her
fantasies about this. Fenichel concluded:
Her jealousy, her feeling that any triangular situation w a s
intolerable, and yet having always to think of such a situation,
corresponds to an attempt to repress her o w n oral sadism and
nevertheless to gratify it. The motive of her repression w a s fear of
retribution. This was naturally reinforced whe n the patient felt that
she had actually been robbed of something, [p. 358]
Melanie Klein's contribution
Melanie Klein's made a substantial c o n t r i b u t i o n to the under

standing of jealousy i n w h a t is arguably her finest p a p e r — " E n v y
and g r a t i t u d e " (1957). D r a w i n g u p o n Abraham's v i e w that envy is
an " o r a l " character trait, she describes some of the early expressions
of envy i n the infant's relationship to the breast and the feeding
mother, and outlines h o w it forms the basis of jealousy. K l e i n
believed that the infant's relationship to the breast f o r m e d the basis
of feelings of security:
Under the dominance of oral impulses, the breast is instinctively felt

to be the source of nourishment and therefore in a deeper sense, of
life itself. This mental and physical closeness to the gratifying breast
in some measure restores, if things go well, the lost prenatal unity
with the mother and the feeling of security that goes with it.
[pp. 178-179]
She described h o w a variety of external factors can interfere w i t h

the infant's relationship to the breast, i n c l u d i n g difficulties at b i r t h ,
the quality of the mother's care and feeding, and the mother's state
of m i n d . H o w e v e r , i n this paper, K l e i n particularly emphasized the
role of envy i n i m p e d i n g the relationship to the breast. She d i s t i n
guished between envy and jealousy as follows:
Envy is the angry feeling that another person possesses and enjoys
something desirable—the envious impulse being to take it away or
to spoil it. Moreover, envy implies the subject's relation to one
person only and goes back to the earliest exclusive relation with the
mother. Jealousy is based on envy, but involves a relation to at least
two people; it is mainly concerned with love that the subject feels is
his due and has been taken away, or is in danger of being taken
away, from him by his rival. In the everyday conception of jealousy,
a man or a woman feels deprived of the loved person by somebody
else. [p. 181]
K l e i n l i n k e d envy w i t h greed. She described the latter as " a n

impetuous and insatiable craving, exceeding w h a t the subject needs
and w h a t the object is able and w i l l i n g to g i v e " , w h i c h " a i m s
p r i m a r i l y at completely scooping out, sucking dry, and d e v o u r i n g
the breast", whereas " e n v y not only seeks to rob i n this w a y , b u t
also to p u t badness, p r i m a r i l y bad excrements and bad parts of the
JEALOUSY 101
self i n t o the mother, a n d first of a l l i n t o her breast, i n order to spoil

and destroy h e r " (p. 181). K l e i n d r e w attention to the expression " t o
bite the h a n d that feeds", w h i c h captures the idea of attacking the
breast out of envy of its goodness and capacity to feed. I n jealousy
there is a fear of losing that w h i c h is loved, whereas i n envy the
g o o d object is itself attacked. K l e i n quotes Crabb's E n g l i s h
Synonyms: "The envious m a n sickens at the sight of enjoyment.
H e is easy o n l y i n the misery of others" (Klein, p. 182). She notes
that e n v y is classed amongst the " s e v e n d e a d l y s i n s " , a n d
comments, " I w o u l d even suggest that i t is unconsciously felt to
be the greatest sin of all, because i t spoils and harms the good object
w h i c h is the source of l i f e " (p. 189).
Klein argued that jealousy arises out of the original envy towards
the feeding breast, and forms part of the early Oedipal situation:
"Jealousy is based o n the suspicion of and rivalry w i t h the father,
w h o is accused of h a v i n g taken away the mother's breast and the
m o t h e r " (p. 196). She adds that disturbances i n the early relationship
to the mother, because of environmental factors or the strength of
envy, complicates the r i v a l r y w i t h the father i n the Oedipal situation:
The development of the Oedipus complex is strongly influenced by

the vicissitudes of the first exclusive relation w i t h the mother, and
when this relation is disturbed too soon, the rivalry w i t h the father
enters prematurely. Phantasies of the penis inside the mother, or
inside her breast, turn the father into a hostile intruder. This phantasy
is particularly strong when the infant has not had the full enjoyment
and happiness that the early relation to the mother can afford him
and has not taken in the first good object with some security. Such a
failure partly depends on the strength of envy. [p. 197]
She describes h o w the phantasy of the mother's breast or b o d y

containing the father's penis, or of the father containing the breast or
the mother, f o r m the basis of a c o m m o n phantasy of the " c o m b i n e d
parents". This is particularly provocative of envy because the
parents are then felt to be i n continuous intercourse and p r o v i d i n g
each other w i t h never-ending pleasurable sexual gratification.
H o w e v e r , w h e n envy is not too excessive, Oedipal jealousy can
become a means of m o d i f y i n g i t because the hostility then is
directed at a r i v a l (the father or siblings) so that one figure is still
loved:
With the boy, a good deal of hate is deflected onto the father who is
envied for the possession of the mother; this is the typical Oedipus
jealousy. With the girl, the genital desires for the father enable her to
find another loved object. Thus jealousy to some extent supersedes
envy; the mother becomes the chief rival. The girl desires to take her
mother's place and to possess and take care of the babies which the
loved father gives to the mother. The identification w i t h the mother
in this role makes a wider range of sublimations possible. It is
essential also to consider that the working-through of envy by
means of jealousy is at the same time a defence against envy.
Jealousy is felt to be much more acceptable and gives rise much less
to guilt than the primary envy which destroys the first good object,
[p. 198]
H o w e v e r , she argued that i f the little girl's t u r n i n g to the father is

d r i v e n b y excessive envy of the m o t h e r — a r i v a l r y that is " m u c h less
due to love of the father than to envy of the mother's possession of
the father a n d his p e n i s " — t h e n the father is seen as an appendage
to the mother and the desire is to rob her mother of this. K l e i n
explained h o w this m a y become a pervasive and repeating pattern:
Therefore in later life, every success in her relation to men becomes

a victory over another woman. ... If the man is mainly valued
because his conquest is a triumph over another woman, she may
lose interest in him as soon as success has been achieved. The
attitude towards the rival woman then implies: "You (standing for
the mother) had that wonderful breast which I could not get when
you withheld it from me and which I still wish to rob you of;
therefore I take from you that penis which you cherish." The need
to repeat this triumph over a hated rival often strongly contributes
to the search for another and yet another man. [p. 200]
Thus K l e i n describes h o w jealousy, w h e n based o n envy, gives rise

to the w i s h to rob the r i v a l , w h o o r i g i n a l l y represents the mother.
W h e n this w i s h to rob is projected, then the jealous person lives i n
continual fear of being robbed b y a rival.
Early origins of jealousy
The v a l i d i t y of Freud's view of jealousy arising i n the t w o

JEALOUSY 103
constellations of, first, the child's triangular Oedipal r i v a l r y and,

second, his or her resentment of siblings, can readily be f o u n d i n
everyday observation of children. W h i l s t Oedipal r i v a l r y m a y be
slightly more h i d d e n (but not very much), hatred of siblings is
usually quite overt and obvious. M i t c h e l l (2000) has recently argued
that the role of sibling jealousy i n personality development has
tended to be relatively neglected w i t h i n psychoanalysis.
W i s d o m (1976) describes the case of a t w e l v e - m o n t h - o l d boy
w h o developed anxiety, nightmares, intolerance of separation f r o m
his mother, and a fear of strangers, after a baby brother was born.
His overt reactions to being s h o w n the baby oscillated m a r k e d l y
between t w o contrasting a t t i t u d e s — o f s m i l i n g w i t h delight and of
displaying dismay and apparent bewilderment. W h e n the b o y
awoke f r o m his nightmares he could not easily be soothed b y the
parents. After a w h i l e , a different tactic was adopted. The baby's
cradle w o u l d be b r o u g h t into the presence of the b o y — w i t h the
result that he immediately became calm. W h i l s t this reaction seems,
on the face of i t , somewhat p u z z l i n g , the author hypothesizes that
the presence of the baby acted as a reassurance, first, that he had not
been harmed by the boy's hostile phantasies, and, second, that the
baby d i d not have a privileged place w i t h the mother. After seeing
the baby, the boy w o u l d express pleasure, b u t then t u r n away and
demand contact w i t h the mother. His attitude t o w a r d s his mother
showed ambivalence, however, since he w o u l d sometimes bite her
severely. H e also displayed some signs of regression—such as,
sleeping i n a position he h a d previously abandoned, l i k i n g to climb
on his mother's breast i n a w a y he h a d not done for some months,
l i k i n g to lie i n his mother's a r m w h e n feeding, and becoming less
resistant to nappies.
Another development was that d u r i n g the day he l i k e d to spend
as m u c h time as possible w i t h his father, to the exclusion of other
people, b u t then at n i g h t this was reversed a n d he w o u l d only be
interested i n his mother. The author speculates that this expressed
the little boy's Oedipal w i s h to take i n as m u c h as possible of his
father i n order to repossess his mother:
A s s u m i n g that h i s b a s i c n e e d n o w w a s to m a k e s u r e of h a v i n g h i s
mother as the m a i n object of h i s a t t a c h m e n t , i n h i s day-time
a c t i v i t i e s h e c o u l d b e s t a c h i e v e this g o a l u p o n O e d i p u s t h e o r y b y
absorbing as much of his father as he could; indeed it was noted

how remarkable it was to see him making imitative movements of
his father driving the car and trying to use a shovel to get coal out of
a coalscuttle to put on the fire; through this introjective identifica
tion he would feel restored and would try to get back his mother in
the evening. [Wisdom, 1976, p. 367]
Yet another aspect of the little boy's attempts to adapt to his

feelings of jealousy was s h o w n i n evidence of identification w i t h the
mother and to relate to the baby as if i t were his o w n child. For
example, he w o u l d t r y to brush the baby's hair a n d p u t away the
hairbrush i n the w a y that his mother d i d .
By four weeks after the baby's b i r t h , there was an observation
suggesting that the boy had come to terms w i t h his jealousy partly
by transforming this into tender feelings and a concern to protect
the baby. The brothers were out i n the garden, one i n a carry-cot
and the other i n a p r a m ; the baby awoke a n d began w h i m p e r i n g ;
the older boy began screaming l o u d l y u n t i l one of the parents came
and attended to the baby, w h i c h then restored calm to b o t h . This
happened three t i m e s — a n d o n the t h i r d occasion the boy actually
pointed to the baby. W h e n the baby was taken indoors, the boy
remained h a p p i l y outside alone.
Jealousy and envy

Jealousy and envy are often c o n f u s e d — a n d indeed do seem to have
overlapping meanings. I n a paper attempting to clarify these
meanings, Spielman (1971) comments that the t w o w o r d s are often
used interchangeably or i n conjunction w i t h one a n o t h e r — a n d that
"even the same colour, green, is associated w i t h b o t h emotions, as
i n the popular phrase 'green w i t h envy' and i n Shakespeare's
Othello: 'jealousy—the green-eyed m o n s t e r ' " (p. 59). O n the w h o l e ,
envy is regarded as the more p r i m i t i v e and simpler e m o t i o n — a
w i s h to possess w h a t the other has. H o w e v e r some authors, such as
K l e i n (1957) consider that envy also may contain the w i s h that the
other person not have the desired t h i n g or quality, w h i l s t others
describe this as an attribute of jealousy. Thus Spielman (1971) states:
" e n v y bespeaks the desire to have w h a t someone else has; jealousy
JEALOUSY 105
is this as w e l l as w a n t i n g the other person not to have i t " (p. 59). He

goes on to describe envy as follows:
In envy one is unhappy that another person possesses something

one would like to have for oneself and feels inferior because of not
having it. This may be a thing, a person, or both; or it may be a
quality such as success, reputation, or happiness. Envy may also
include admiration of the envied thing or person, covetousness
towards the envied thing, hatred or resentment of the person
possessing the envied thing, a wish to harm the envied person, and,
perhaps, a wish to rob the person of the envied thing. Crucial to the
definition is that the interpersonal configuration is a two-person one
in which the other person has possession of that which is envied,
[p. 60]
Regarding jealousy, he comments:
In jealousy one experiences apprehension, anxiety, suspicion, or

mistrust concerning the loss of a highly valued possession, or the
diversion to another, a third person, of affection and love. It is often
associated w i t h an attitude of vigilant guarding against the
threatened loss and an effort to preserve the status quo, to maintain
possession. In sexual love this might involve an attempt to exact
exclusive devotion from the love object. The possession, or valued
"good", in jealousy tends to be a person or the affection of a person
rather than an inanimate object or quality, but this is not always so.
Rivalry with a third person is typically involved and highlights a
crucial aspect of jealousy; it occurs in a three-person situation in
which the jealous person fears a third person w i l l intrude upon a
two-person relationship and take possession, [p. 61]
Thus Spielman emphasizes the distinction between envy and

jealousy p r i m a r i l y i n terms of whether it is a two-person or three
person situation. H o w e v e r , he sees jealousy as the more complex
emotion, w h i c h contains envy as a component. Jealousy includes a
sense of loss or threat of loss, w h i c h is not inherent i n envy. Also the
jealous person may be more inclined towards self-blame for failures
(e.g. i n losing a lover to a rival). I n a d d i t i o n , jealousy, especially i n
its more pathological forms, m a y include elements of projection of
the person's o w n disavowed heterosexual, homosexual, and hostile
wishes. This projection m a y also contribute to a paranoid trend i n
jealous individuals.
"Penis envy"
Freud referred to envy only i n his concept of penis envy:
If we penetrate deeply enough into the neurosis of a woman, we not

infrequently meet with the repressed wish to possess a penis like a
man. We call this wish "envy for a penis" and include it in the
castration complex. [Freud, 1917, p. 129]
I n an earlier w o r k o n children's sexual theories, Freud describes the

origins of this envy:
It is easy to observe that little girls fully share their brother's opinion of
it. They develop a great interest in that part of the boy's body. But this
interest promptly falls under the sway of envy. They feel themselves
unfairly treated. They make attempts to micturate in the posture that
is made possible for the boys by their possessing a big penis; and
when a girl declares that "she would rather be a boy", we know what
deficiency her wish is intended to put right. [Freud, 1908, p. 218]
A l t h o u g h this n o t i o n has been m u c h debated (e.g. Gallup, 1982;

M i t c h e l l , 1974; Torok, 1970), i t m a y sometimes emerge i n a rather
clear and obvious w a y i n the case of w o m e n w h o have felt that
brothers were favoured because of their gender. For example, one
w o m a n always felt that her b i r t h had been a great disappointment
to her parents because they had w a n t e d a boy. She felt that n o t h i n g
she d i d was ever of interest or pleasure to her parents. When her
younger brother was b o r n she perceived that, b y contrast, they
clearly were delighted w i t h h i m . She noticed that he possessed an
organ between his legs, like the one she had observed o n her father.
This h i g h l y visible piece of anatomy was the only obvious physical
difference between t h e m — a n d therefore i t seemed to her, i n her
child m i n d , that this must be the reason w h y he was loved and she
was not. The penis then readily came to symbolize for her a l l the
advantages, power, and love that she felt were u n f a i r l y bestowed o n
males. Her lack of the phallus (as it m i g h t be termed i n its symbolic
function) was a focus of deep feelings of shame and inadequacy. Of 6
course it is not the actual organ that is envied, b u t w h a t it is felt to

represent. Torok (1970) comments: "Penis envy is always envy of an
idealised penis. . . . It is obvious that this always means: 'the t h i n g
whatever i t is that one doesn't have oneself " (p. 139).
JEALOUSY 107
Envy, jealousy and shame
Envy, jealousy, and shame are intimately related. Shame reflects our
sense of being disconnected, separate, inferior, misunderstood, or
e x c l u d e d — a n d then envy and jealousy may closely f o l l o w . I n a
panel discussion of these three emotions, Reisenberg-Malcolm
(reported b y De Paola, 2001) described a patient w h o experienced
shame whenever the analyst said something about w h i c h he h a d
not thought before, reacting like a person stabbed. This p a i n f u l
experience of shame appeared to be triggered b y a feeling that an
infantile state of oneness w i t h the analyst i n the transference had
been " c u t " , so that the patient was then confronted w i t h the reality
that the source of the interpretations was the analyst; at such
moments he w o u l d feel separate and inferior. A t other times, the
same patient w o u l d display envy and jealousy whenever he was
confronted w i t h his lack of exclusive ownership of the analyst
w h o m he could potentially experience as a needed and longed-for
figure. Jealousy w o u l d express his w i s h for an exclusive relation
ship, w h i l s t e n v y w o u l d lead h i m to a d o p t an aloof a n d
t r i u m p h a n t - c o n t e m p t u o u s stance.
I n the same panel discussion, M o r r i s o n and Lansky pointed to
the w a y i n w h i c h envy, contempt, and shame are all concerned w i t h
comparison of self to other. I n envy the other is exalted and hated,
w h i l s t i n contempt the other is despised and lowered i n comparison
w i t h an exalted self. If envy is consciously experienced, then i t is
accompanied by shame, w h i c h M o r r i s o n and Lansky v i e w as the
core emotion i n negative self-evaluation. Shame can f u n c t i o n as a
w a r n i n g of threats to connection w i t h the other and can initiate
attempts to repair or restore the b o n d ; on the other h a n d , envy and
contempt represent attempts to remove oneself f r o m the other's
p o w e r to threaten rejection or loss. I n this w a y , M o r r i s o n and
Lansky v i e w envy and contempt as expressions of a shame-derived
vision of the " d e a t h i n s t i n c t " , Thanatos—a protective w i t h d r a w a l
f r o m needed figures; they contrasted this w i t h a Kleinian v i e w of
envy as a f o r m of p r i m a r y aggression emanating f r o m Thanatos (De
Paola, 2001).
Thus shame erupts w h e n a g u l f arises between self and o t h e r — a
d i s r u p t i o n of empathy, understanding, acceptance, or a t t u n e m e n t —
resulting then i n an evaluation of self as lacking or inferior i n some
108 SHAME AN D JEALOUSY
w a y . Closely f o l l o w i n g shame m a y be envy, as the other is perceived

as desired, separate, and unavailable. Jealousy m a y come into play
as more favoured rivals are seen as potentially taking the place of
intimacy w i t h the other, f r o m w h i c h the self has been ejected.
Contempt a n d devaluation of the other m a y be a defence against
shame, envy, a n d jealousy.
Jealousy based on valid unconscious perception
It is not u n c o m m o n for those i n the listening professions to hear a

person berating h i m or herself for their excessive jealousy and
suspicion of their spouse, only to learn later that the partner was
indeed being u n f a i t h f u l . The " j e a l o u s " one h a d attempted to
disavow their accurate perceptions and intuitions, preferring to
believe that they were suffering f r o m pathological or u n f o u n d e d
jealousy, especially if this was the " e x p l a n a t i o n " offered b y the
u n f a i t h f u l partner. This is illustrated v i v i d l y i n the findings of one
psychiatrist w h o specialized i n w o r k w i t h couples where one
partner displayed " m o r b i d jealousy". Often the husband w o u l d
appear to be suffering delusions of jealousy. Since the psychiatrist
believed that such jealousy was an incurable psychiatric condition,
he often advised the couples to separate or divorce. However, he
routinely f o l l o w e d u p his patients after some months. He was sur
prised to discover that many of the wives had subsequently become
openly i n v o l v e d w i t h the v e r y m e n about w h o m the husbands had
been jealous. Thus the " d e l u s i o n a l " husband must have been
accurately registering signs of i n f i d e l i t y , b u t because this was
denied b y the w i f e , he w o u l d conclude that the idea was irrational
and that he required psychiatric help (reported b y Buss, 2000).
A male patient i n analysis w i t h the author described t o r m e n t i n g
anxiety and feelings of jealousy after the w o m a n he loved reported
receiving a phone call f r o m a m a n she had met i n a nightclub. The
w o m a n assured h i m that w h i l s t she had engaged i n kissing this
m a n w h i l s t d r u n k at the nightclub, she h a d no serious emotional or
sexual interest i n h i m . The patient felt perturbed because, although
she h a d acknowledged going to the nightclub, the w o m a n had
initially denied h a v i n g given the m a n her phone number. N o t
surprisingly, he struggled w i t h a sense of uncertainty about the
JEALOUSY 109
situation and tried to convey to the w o m a n the intense and

anguished nature of his jealousy and his fantasies of her sexual
infidelity. She protested that his jealous fantasies were extremely
destructive to their relationship and pleaded w i t h h i m to try to keep
these i n check. The patient endeavoured to p u t aside his strong
intuitive sense that the w o m a n had already h a d sex w i t h the m a n
f r o m the nightclub. He tried to rest i n the w o m a n ' s assurance of her
love for h i m and his desire to trust her. Indeed he k n e w that she
tended compulsively and impulsively to have short-lived l u s t f u l
preoccupations and brief sexual adventures w h i c h d i d not include
emotional i n v o l v e m e n t — a n d w h i l s t he d i d not like these, he
tolerated them. She insisted that her heart and her love remained
f i r m l y and deeply w i t h h i m . A l l of this background added to his
feeling of devastation and betrayal w h e n the w o m a n eventually
confessed some time later that she had indeed become seriously
sexually and emotionally i n v o l v e d w i t h the nightclub m a n — a n d
that she had engaged i n considerable deception about this. Because
the patient had indeed trusted her, and had w a n t e d to dismiss his
anxieties as pathological jealousy and a sign of his inability to trust,
he was p r o f o u n d l y shocked and traumatized w h e n the t r u t h
emerged. He was left feeling that he could not trust a n y t h i n g the
w o m a n had ever said to h i m — a n d nor could he trust his o w n
judgement. His ensuing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder
were quite m a r k e d — w i t h anxiety, depression, suicidal preoccupa
tions, sleep disturbance, and intrusive flashback images of the
w o m a n ' s confession of infidelity. I n the analysis i t was possible to
l i n k these reactions to his infantile experience w h e n his mother had
become depressed and w i t h d r a w n d u r i n g his second year of life
f o l l o w i n g a stillbirth (an event w h i c h he had been t o l d about b u t
could not, of course, remember directly). I t seemed likely that this
early experience had predisposed h i m to be very alert to indications
of a w o m a n ' s degree of emotional involvement or w i t h d r a w a l f r o m
h i m — a n d to l i n k w i t h d r a w a l i n some w a y w i t h the idea of a r i v a l
for the woman's emotional attention. Thus his perceptions of his
friend's w i t h d r a w a l and i n f i d e l i t y , her sexual fantasies, and her
state of m i n d i n relation to h i m , were probably h i g h l y a c c u r a t e — b u t
disavowed i n response to her w i s h to deny t h e m and his w i s h to
believe her.
Another patient reported to his analyst (not the author) that he
1 10 SHAME AND JEALOUSY
had the impression that a friend, also i n analysis w i t h the same

analyst, was having an affair since he had seen her w i t h another m a n
at a concert. The analyst, concerned about preserving confidentiality,
emphasized to the patient that he was m a k i n g u n w a r r a n t e d
inferences f r o m the evidence—that a l l he had seen was the w o m a n
i n the company of another m a n , b u t this d i d n o t mean that she was
h a v i n g an affair. W h e n i t later emerged that the patient's inference
h a d been entirely correct he felt angry that the analyst h a d , i n effect,
invalidated his accurate perception. He felt, probably correctly, that
this had been done i n order to reduce the analyst's anxiety about
dangers of potential breaches of confidentiality.
A related phenomenon may arise f r o m a childhood attempt to
d i s a v o w accurate perceptions of being unloved. A w o m a n talked of
her continual doubts about her partner's love and fidelity. She
continually accused h i m of h a v i n g affairs a n d w o u l d f l y into rages
triggered b y her suspicions. A t other moments she w o u l d severely
condemn herself for her " i r r a t i o n a l " jealousy. I n exploring her
c h i l d h o o d experiences, w h a t emerged was that she h a d never felt
convinced of her mother's love for her. It seemed that she h a d i n fact
often perceived her mother as subtly w i t h d r a w n a n d hostile
towards h e r — b u t , w h e n asked, her mother w o u l d always assure
her that she d i d love her. The patient w a n t e d to believe her mother's
assertion of love, b u t to d o so meant that she h a d to disavow her
(probably accurate) perception of her mother's hostility. A t times
she w o u l d be i n an intolerable state of confusion about whether she
was loved or h a t e d — a n d this confusion w o u l d be evoked regularly
i n relation to her adult partner. Eventually i t became clear that her
partner was i n fact u n f a i t h f u l — a n d so i n this w a y too her pattern of
attempting to disavow her accurate b u t d i s t u r b i n g perceptions
repeated the childhood experience.
As a general principle, i t appears that i f one p a r t y to a
relationship, whether this be a parent or an adult partner, professes
love for the other, b u t that other person perceives this not to be the
case, sensing instead indications of hostility, i n f i d e l i t y or betrayal,
there is then a situation that can evoke intense distress, anxiety, and
confusion. The w i s h to believe the protestation of love is i n
competition w i t h the perception (whether conscious or uncon
scious) that this is n o t true (Freyd, 1996)—and the ensuing sense of
confusion can severely undermine a person's grasp of reality and
JEALOUSY 111
confidence i n their o w n judgement. It is the p r o b l e m of accurate

perception or i n t u i t i o n being invalidated as paranoia.
Fenichel's example of unconscious perception

Fenichel (1926) gives a n d interesting a n d v i v i d example of
unconscious perception that is h i g h l y relevant to the d i s a v o w a l of
awareness that could give rise to v a l i d jealousy. A y o u n g m a n , i n
analysis w i t h Fenichel, h a d a relationship w i t h a w i d o w consider
ably older t h a n he. He w i s h e d to be free of her b u t "she held onto
h i m w i t h all her m i g h t and occasionally made scenes of jealousy".
H o w e v e r , "she anxiously o v e r l o o k e d — a s far as was p o s s i b l e — a l l
the indications he gave of his intention to break w i t h h e r " (p. 94).
One m o r n i n g "after lengthy internal struggles", the y o u n g m a n
picked u p a g i r l i n the street, chatted and w a l k e d w i t h her and sat i n
the park s m o k i n g cigarettes before t a k i n g her to a restaurant. I n the
evening, w h e n undressing, he noticed that he had lost one of his
cuff links; he felt annoyed w i t h himself since he had noticed the l i n k
was loose w h e n he had been w a l k i n g i n the park. The f o l l o w i n g
day, he visited his older friend and was astonished to see on her h a l l
table a c u f f l i n k identical to the one he had lost. H i s i n i t i a l reaction
was to feel alarmed that the w o m a n h a d placed i t there i n order to
display her awareness of his sexual adventure the previous day.
H o w e v e r , o n asking her where she h a d obtained i t , she replied that
she had been shopping i n an area where she d i d not usually go and
h a d discovered a park; o n resting on a bench she h a d noticed the
cuff l i n k o n the g r o u n d . He asked w h a t time this had been and she
t o l d h i m one o'clock, w h i c h was i n fact around the time he h a d been
there w i t h the g i r l . H o w e v e r , it was apparent that the w o m a n had
no conscious awareness that the cuff l i n k was his.
Fenichel comments o n the unconscious c o n t r i b u t i o n of b o t h
parties:
T h r o u g h o u t the t i m e h e s p e n t i n the p a r k , the p a t i e n t h a d a b a d

c o n s c i e n c e a b o u t h i s u n f a i t h f u l n e s s , a n d t h o u g h t of w h a t h i s f r i e n d
w o u l d s a y if s h e s a w h i m there; h i s w h o l e p s y c h o l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n
w a s s u c h a s to l e n d itself to a n u n c o n s c i o u s b e t r a y a l . F u r t h e r m o r e ,
j u s t before h e sat d o w n o n the b e n c h h e h a d n o t i c e d the o p e n cuff
l i n k , a n d h a d t h u s offered h i s u n c o n s c i o u s , a s it w e r e , a c o n v e n i e n t
o c c a s i o n for a s e l f - b e t r a y a l . A s for the w o m a n , it i s s t r i k i n g , first that
she should pick up the link and take it home, and then that she
should put it down in an unusual place so that her friend would see
it on entering and would be reminded of his misdemeanour. If she
had seen him with the girl and had wanted to confront him w i t h a
corpus delicti, she could not have done better. These circumstances
admit of only one explanation. The only part which chance played
in the business was that both of them had come at the same time to
the park which was unknown to them before. A l l the rest was
unconscious purposive action at lightening speed. The man sitting
on the bench saw the woman nearing; without being in the least
aware of it, he was overcome be a storm of feeling in his doubt
whether or not he should reveal himself; he decided not to and left
the bench quickly with his companion, but not without fulfilling his
self-betraying tendency by shaking his arm so that the loose cuff
link dropped down. The woman must also have seen and
recognised the man. But she did not want to see anything . . . " [p. 95]
Fenichel notes that the patient was i n i t i a l l y " v e r y m u c h

astonished" b y this interpretation, b u t then remembered a further
detail. H e and the g i r l had decided to stay i n the p a r k for one more
cigarette, b u t very suddenly, i n the m i d d l e of the cigarette, he had
j u m p e d u p and said to the g i r l that they really m u s t go immediately.
Fenichel hypothesized that this was the m o m e n t that he had
unconsciously caught sight of the w o m a n . He concludes:
Thus not only did the two parties, as though by agreement,

immediately repress their having seen each other, since that would
have been unpleasant for both; the woman also immediately
understood the meaning of the loss of the cuff link and reacted
accordingly. Indeed she did exactly what the behaviour of the man
secretly challenged her to do. When he jumped up and ran away,
but lost his link in so doing, he was saying to her: "You are not to
notice that I have sat here with a girl; but you are to know i t ! " And
that is what she did. [p. 96]
The case of Celine—a frenzy of shame and jealousy

Celine, an attractive and h i g h l y intelligent w o m a n i n her early
twenties, sought psychoanalytic help because of her patterns of
t o r m e n t i n g anxiety, jealousy, and depression that were recurrent i n
JEALOUSY 113
her relationships w i t h men. She was f r o m a w e a l t h y French

background, b u t h a d come to Britain to study, i n the hope that a
n e w environment w o u l d free her f r o m her anguish. I n terms of
psychiatric diagnosis she w o u l d have been described as h a v i n g a
borderline personality d i s o r d e r — a n d this was indeed her v i e w of
herself, h a v i n g read some relevant literature.
F r o m the beginning of the therapy, she displayed pronounced
jealousy, as w e l l as o v e r w h e l m i n g feelings of shame. She was
m a r k e d l y sexually seductive, openly speaking of her desires to
engage the analyst i n a sexual r e l a t i o n s h i p — a n d expressing rage
w h e n he declined her offer. She v i e w e d his refusal as a personal
rejection, despite his efforts b o t h to m a i n t a i n and to explain a
psychoanalytic stance. Indeed she seemed to v i e w the refusal of a
sexual relationship as evidence that the analyst regarded her w i t h
contempt and f o u n d her d i s g u s t i n g — a t such times she appeared
infused w i t h feelings of shame and w o u l d be tearful. Moreover, she
became violently jealous of other patients, w h o m she fantasized
were receiving more or better attention f r o m the analyst. If she saw
evidence of the existence of other patients she w o u l d f l y into a rage,
accusing the analyst of f a v o u r i n g these rivals. Often she w o u l d
demand physical contact w i t h the analyst and express anguish
w h e n this was refused. Her desperation about her need for b o d i l y
engagement was expressed w i t h v i v i d clarity w h e n she shouted i n
one session " D o y o u w a n t me to cut myself or take m y clothes off?".
Thus her stance towards the analyst i n the early weeks and months
w a s characterized m a i n l y b y a c o m b i n a t i o n of rage, sexual
overtures, and the seeking of physical contact, all pervaded b y
shame and jealousy.
Her early associations to these feelings towards the analyst were
of memories and f a m i l y accounts of her mother h a v i n g often been
depressed i n the first few years of her life, so that Celine m i g h t be
left for l o n g periods w i t h o u t stimulation, without being physically
touched or held, a n d i n unbearable states of boredom. These impres
sions began to t h r o w some l i g h t o n her feeling that she m u s t f i l l the
sessions w i t h emotional f i r e w o r k s of rage and sexuality, otherwise
the analyst w o u l d be w i t h d r a w n f r o m her like her mother. I t was
also apparent that Celine felt she must always seek e x c i t e m e n t —
t h r o u g h rage, t h r o u g h sexual p u r s u i t s a n d p r o m i s c u i t y , a n d
t h r o u g h the use of s t i m u l a t i n g recreational drugs. Such p u r s u i t of
1 14 SHAME AND JEALOUSY
excitement was clearly an attempt to avoid the states of severely

dysphoric under-stimulation that may often have been a feature of
her childhood.
Celine's experience of c h i l d h o o d appeared to have been
pervaded (and invaded) b y her parents' sexuality. She reported
that her mother had affairs, w h i c h Celine f o u n d herself d r a w n into.
For example, she recalled intercepting phone calls f r o m one of her
mother's lovers and shouting abuse d o w n the line at h i m . She
seemed to describe her parents as either f i g h t i n g each other, or
spending hours together i n the b e d r o o m h a v i n g sex, or as h a v i n g
affairs w i t h other people. There were many indications i n Celine's
behaviour a n d communications that she believed people are
motivated p r i m a r i l y b y s e x — a n d that the only w a y she could be
valued was sexually. Her self-esteem w o u l d be h i g h i n the early
stages of a relationship w i t h a m a n — w h e n she w o u l d feel
intoxicated w i t h her sense of her sexual power and desirability.
A p a r t f r o m such times, she was generally inclined to experience
herself as worthless and u n w a n t e d . Moreover, i t w o u l d often
appear that i f she were not evoking sexual desire she felt she d i d not
really exist—basically that she d i d not exist i n the m i n d of the other.
Brief account of a session
D u r i n g a session f o l l o w i n g the ending of a relationship that had

become repeatedly physically abusive, Celine described various
complicated sexual liaisons. She h a d started a relationship w i t h a
new m a n . I n some states of m i n d she felt f u l l of love towards h i m . I n
other states, she felt f u l l of contempt, w i t h t r i u m p h a n t feelings of
rage and pleasure i n the idea that she can destroy a man's heart. She
talked of h a v i n g sex w i t h various other people i n her boyfriend's
house. O n hearing the sound of another couple m a k i n g love i n the
adjoining bedroom, she was filled w i t h intense jealousy and envy.
I n retaliation she w o u l d endeavour to make her o w n lovemaking as
noisy as possible. She also made a p o i n t of inflicting prominent love
bites o n her boyfriend's neck, w i t h the a i m of evoking jealousy i n
another m a n i n the house. W h e n the analyst commented that she
seemed n o t to be a l l o w i n g herself any time and mental space to
come to terms w i t h the ending of her previous relationship, she
replied that she was extremely frightened of w h a t she m i g h t feel if
JEALOUSY 115
she were o n her o w n . She thought she was desperately t r y i n g to

keep away f r o m feelings of loneliness—and indeed t h o u g h t she
could n o t bear to be on her o w n for more t h a n a few minutes.
In further exploration, the analyst clarified the f o l l o w i n g w i t h
her. Her real need was for someone to talk to about h o w she was
f e e l i n g — b u t mostly she felt there was no such person available. She
needed a mental r e l a t i o n s h i p — t o have someone h o l d her i n m i n d , so
that she could also begin to h o l d her o w n thoughts and feelings i n
m i n d . W h e n she f o u n d there was no-one available to p r o v i d e a
mental relationship (such as w h e n she could not come to her
psychotherapy session), she resorted to a bodily, sexual relationship.
I n place of emotional communication she w o u l d create a situation i n
w h i c h she was engaged i n continual sexual activity, whether i n
fantasy or actuality. Celine then talked of desires to combine a
physical and mental r e l a t i o n s h i p — a n d also spoke of desires for a
physical relationship w i t h a w o m a n . The analyst related these
points to w h a t seemed likely to have been her early longings to be
held and caressed b y her mother and to have her mother's
t h o u g h t f u l a t t e n t i o n — s u c h needs n o w being expressed t h r o u g h
the sexual m o d a l i t i e s of the adult. Celine agreed w i t h this
f o r m u l a t i o n — a n d talked again of w h a t she had been t o l d of her
mother's post-natal depression. She added that she h a d noticed that
a c h i l d of a post-natally depressed f r i e n d h a d g r o w n to be
particularly difficult and demanding. Celine spoke of relief that
the analyst was able to t h i n k about her and offer these ideas.
Sibling rivalry
Often Celine w o u l d become preoccupied w i t h her boyfriend's

previous girlfriends, fearing that he m i g h t t u r n to one of t h e m
a g a i n — a n d often raging at h i m for his retrospective i n f i d e l i t y ( i n
h a v i n g h a d girlfriends before her). Some of her vengeful fantasies
were extremely sadistic. For example, she imagined scenarios i n
w h i c h she w o u l d force her b o y f r i e n d to torture and m u r d e r these
rivals i n front of h e r — a fantasy w h i c h she f o u n d intensely erotically
exciting. Associations led to thoughts of her younger sister, w h o m
she had quite consciously hated i n her childhood, although she was
very f o n d of her as an adult. Celine remarked that she h a d been
extremely jealous as a child, just as she was n o w extremely jealous
as a w o m a n . She spoke of h o w she could never trust her boyfriend's

assurance of his l o v e — a n d h o w this somehow related to the
intolerable fact of his h a v i n g had other girlfriends, and therefore he
could still potentially be attracted to other w o m e n . The analyst
commented that she m i g h t have experienced any reassurances of
love f r o m her parents as lacking i n sincerity since they had clearly
refused to get r i d of the hated r i v a l b a b y — t h a t they h a d not assured
her that they were so blissfully h a p p y w i t h her that they had no
desire for any other child. Celine expressed relief and amusement as
such feelings and fantasies were made explicit.
Celine also at times disclosed a very paranoid part of her m i n d
that was continually suspicious of w h a t m i g h t be going o n i n the
other person's m i n d . This w o u l d be apparent i n the transference,
where she m i g h t feel the analyst was secretly fed u p w i t h her and
was p l a n n i n g to end her therapy. However, it w o u l d often be very
pronounced i n relation to her boyfriend. She w o u l d o n occasion
search t h r o u g h his belongings for evidence of his h a v i n g been
u n f a i t h f u l . Sometimes she w o u l d become convinced that he w a n t e d
to t h r o w her out o n the street and direct his love to a r i v a l w o m a n .
Associations led to childhood fantasies that the arrival of her sister
meant that she was to be eliminated and replaced b y this new one.
She recalled her p r o f o u n d suspicion w h e n her parents gave her a
soft toy, telling her that it was a present f r o m the baby. Her natural
incredulity at the idea of a baby g i v i n g her a present left her feeling
she could not trust a w o r d her parents said.
Rivalry with mother
A recurrent impression was that d u r i n g her c h i l d h o o d Celine had

felt oppressed by her mother's sexuality and p a i n f u l l y excluded
f r o m the sexual relationship between her parents and between her
mother and her lovers. This combination of stimulation and exclusion
had clearly filled her w i t h rage and envy. A s an adult she took
pleasure i n f l a u n t i n g her o w n sexuality and i n feeling t r i u m p h a n t
over her mother (and the analyst i n the transference). For example,
d u r i n g one session she spoke of her exciting and frequent sexual
activities w i t h her new b o y f r i e n d — a n d then remarked o n h o w she
felt i t was possible to tell f r o m people's appearance whether they
were h a v i n g m u c h sex or not, and h o w she thought her mother was
JEALOUSY 117
not, and h o w she perceived her mother as " d r i e d u p " . She talked
w i t h t r i u m p h a n t glee of h o w she w o u l d like to tell her mother about
her o w n w o n d e r f u l l y pleasurable sex life. I t became apparent that
one of her unconscious motivations behind her feeling that she must
have sex very frequently was to have more sex t h a n her p a r e n t s —
a n d i n that w a y to u n d o her p a i n f u l sense of c h i l d h o o d exclusion
and deprivation. A s she left this particular session, she remarked
h u m o r o u s l y that she was g o i n g home n o w to have s e x — t h u s
p l a y f u l l y placing the analyst i n the position of the one w h o is
enviously left out and deprived.
A sexual fantasy of triumph over mother
Celine described a sexual fantasy w h i c h she had insisted her

b o y f r i e n d enact w i t h her. I n the fantasy he was her mother's lover
and she was aged about 11; he confessed to her (in the fantasy) that
he was really interested i n her and h a d become her mother's lover
only i n order to be close to Celine; he h a d intercourse w i t h her and
she imagined the physical experience of an 11-year-old g i r l h a v i n g
sex w i t h a mature m a n . Celine f o u n d this fantasy enactment
intensely sexually exciting. She h a d n o t t h o u g h t of the fantasy
before and had certainly never enacted i t . Such events had never
happened i n reality w i t h her mother's l o v e r — o f that she h a d no
doubt. H o w e v e r , w h a t had happened was that her mother h a d
become so preoccupied w i t h her lover that she h a d neglected Celine
emotionally, just as she was entering puberty. A t this time her father
too had embarked o n an affair. W h e n this was discussed i n her
therapy, Celine h a d n o d i f f i c u l t y i n seeing that her fantasy
represented a c h i l d h o o d w i s h — a t r i u m p h a n t reversal of her actual
experience of being h u m i l i a t i n g l y abandoned b y her mother i n
favour of her lover. I n the fantasy she robbed her mother of her lover.
Bisexuality
A t one p o i n t , w h e n Celine was speaking of her o v e r w h e l m i n g

jealousy and rage about her boyfriend's previous girlfriends, the
analyst began to w o n d e r whether this m i g h t be an expression of her
struggles w i t h her o w n homosexual l o n g i n g s — t h a t she was i n a
rage at her b o y f r i e n d because of envy that he h a d intimacy w i t h
w o m e n w h i l s t she d i d not. I n response, Celine acknowledged very

strong and persisting longings for physical and emotional intimacy
w i t h w o m e n . It became clear that w h e n she was i n an intimate
relationship w i t h a m a n , the homosexual part of her felt very
neglected and left out. Moreover, i t became possible to understand
h o w , a l t h o u g h she valued relationships w i t h men, i n c l u d i n g that
w i t h her analyst, these left her chronically frustrated and dis
appointed because the m e n were not w o m e n . She spoke of feeling
that m e n cannot understand w o m e n . O n the other h a n d , she felt
that a homosexual w o m a n w o u l d n o t be interested i n her. These
feelings could be l i n k e d w i t h her early experiences w i t h her
depressed and w i t h d r a w n m o t h e r — h e r o r i g i n a l feeling that the
first w o m a n i n her life had not been interested i n her. Celine began
to see that her tendency to be compulsively promiscuous was i n
part an expression of her frustrated w i s h for intimacy w i t h a
w o m a n — a n amplification of her heterosexuality as a defence
against her homosexuality. Moreover, she could understand that
her jealous preoccupations w i t h her boyfriend's previous girlfriends
and her continual thoughts that he m i g h t be u n f a i t h f u l to her were
to some extent a reflection of her projections of her o w n homosexual
wishes. Thus her bisexuality created a triangle of j e a l o u s y —
whichever polarity of her sexuality was being satisfied, the other
polarity w o u l d feel excluded and deprived.
Biological features
Biological aspects of Celine's sexuality also became apparent

eventually. I t became clear that her times of greatest temptation
towards promiscuity occurred w h e n she was o v u l a t i n g and there
fore most likely to become pregnant i f contraception were not used.
I n fact, she reported that she had f o u n d herself at such times
w a n t i n g to beg the m a n not to use a c o n d o m — b e h a v i o u r w h i c h was
at odds w i t h her conscious desire to a v o i d pregnancy. Her
p r o m i s c u i t y and impulse to place herself i n danger of becoming
pregnant w o u l d , however, be consistent w i t h evolved tendencies
for a female to seek sperm f r o m other sexually desirable males
w h i l s t m a i n t a i n i n g her regular r e l a t i o n s h i p — t h e " m i x e d m a t i n g
strategy" described b y Buss (2000). Another feature of her reactions
that c o u l d be v i e w e d as congruent w i t h a D a r w i n i a n perspective
JEALOUSY 119
was her tendency to become particularly incensed b y the t h o u g h t of

her b o y f r i e n d h a v i n g had sexual involvements w i t h w o m e n of a
different racial g r o u p ; she d i d not m i n d so m u c h the t h o u g h t that he
had been w i t h other w o m e n of similar southern European looks like
her o w n . This could be seen as reflecting a k i n d of loyalty to her o w n
racial (genetic) g r o u p — a n d a fear of other genes being favoured.
Comment
Celine demonstrated m a n y of the features of jealousy described i n
earlier psychoanalytic w r i t i n g s : projection of her o w n heterosexual
and homosexual impulses, the roots of jealousy i n her c h i l d h o o d
feelings of exclusion and deprivation (in the Oedipal situations, i n
relation to her younger sister, and i n relation to the parents' lovers),
and the w i s h to rob or t r i u m p h over her mother. Celine was
continually a t t e m p t i n g , unconsciously, to reverse and t r i u m p h over
her p a i n f u l c h i l d h o o d feelings of being excluded and u n w a n t e d . She
w o u l d be either the one w h o creates jealousy i n the other (through
her promiscuity) or the one w h o suffers the agony of jealousy and
feelings of exclusion. I t was also apparent h o w sexuality (and the
e v o k i n g of sexual desire i n the other) can incorporate the expression
of m a n y desires and needs that are not essentially sexual—such as
the w i s h for physical contact and the w i s h to matter to another
person a n d to have a place i n his or her m i n d .
Summary
Jealousy is a violent and potentially dangerous passion. I t is f o u n d
i n a l l cultures. A t t e m p t s to eliminate i t have failed. Pop psychology
portrayals of jealousy as reflecting i m m a t u r e insecurity seem naive.
E v o l u t i o n a r y p s y c h o l o g y explains h o w jealousy m u s t be a
b e h a v i o u r a l response selected b y evolutionary pressures, and
therefore m u s t serve an adaptive f u n c t i o n that relates i n some
w a y to the reproduction of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s genes. F r o m this
perspective, jealousy appears to f u n c t i o n as a p a r t i a l safeguard
against sexual treachery and deception. W o m e n tend to be more
jealous of the possibility of emotional i n f i d e l i t y , whereas m e n react
m u c h more strongly to the idea of their partner h a v i n g sex w i t h
another m a n . This m a r k e d gender difference is probably because of

the danger that, for the man, an u n f a i t h f u l female partner means
that he runs the risk of u n k n o w i n g l y caring for offspring that d o not
carry his genes. By contrast, the w o m a n does not suffer any
reproductive disadvantage if her m a n has sex w i t h another w o m a n ,
b u t she does risk losing his care and protection of her and her
children i f his emotional attachment shifts to a rival.
There are conflicts and anxieties inherent i n the interplay of male
and female reproductive strategies. Both men and w o m e n m a y have
evolved tendencies to be u n f a i t h f u l , because of potential reproduc
tive advantages i n d o i n g so, and b o t h m a y also have developed
capacities to detect deception. Evolutionary selection has p r o v i d e d
the deep structuring of h u m a n behaviours and motivations, i n order
to facilitate the transmission of genes, b u t these causes are distal and
not available to introspection.
Evolutionary theory and psychoanalysis can be v i e w e d as
c o m p l e m e n t a r y — t h e former describing the development of the
species and the latter the development of the i n d i v i d u a l . Both lay
emphasis u p o n sexuality as a fundamental force behind h u m a n
m o t i v a t i o n s — a n d b o t h see jealousy as inherent i n the h u m a n
condition. Psychoanalysis exposes the more p r o x i m a l emotions,
impulses, anxieties, and conflicts that drive h u m a n b e i n g s — a n d the
mechanisms of defence that are c o m m o n l y used to manage p a i n f u l
or frightening feelings and impulses. Freud described various forms
of jealousy rooted i n the childhood Oedipus complex, and i n r i v a l r y
w i t h s i b l i n g s — a n d also jealousy that can arise f r o m projection onto
the partner of either heterosexual or homosexual impulses to be
u n f a i t h f u l . Riviere and Fenichel described clinical cases w h i c h
showed deeper roots of jealousy i n early feelings of deprivation and
wishes to rob the mother. Melanie K l e i n made a major c o n t r i b u t i o n
to understanding h o w jealousy can g r o w out of early feelings of
greed and envy. Direct observation of children can readily reveal
jealousy, f r o m a very early age. Various distinctions have been
made between jealousy and e n v y — m a i n l y based around the p o i n t
that jealousy involves three people, whereas envy, essentially, does
not. Quite often feelings of jealousy m a y be v a l i d reactions based o n
accurate perceptions or i n t u i t i o n s — b u t if these are denied b y the
partner, the jealous person may conclude that he or she is suffering
f r o m irrational feelings or even a delusion.
JEALOUSY 121
Notes
1. The field of evolutionary psychology has been criticized by some—for

example, Rose and Rose (2000). Certainly it should not be assumed that
an evolutionary perspective necessarily invalidates or marginalizes
other frameworks, such as the sociological—nor that the inherent
plasticity of human behaviour can be ignored.
2. Studies of the incidence of paternal discrepancy indicate a surprisingly
high incidence of children having genetic fathers w h o are different from
those who believe they are the father. Baker and Bellis (1995) averaged a
number of studies across Europe, Africa, North America, and Oceania,
to give an estimate of 9%. Buss (2000) reports the case of a medical
researcher w h o conducted a large scale study of the genetics of breast
cancer, w h i c h involved D N A fingerprinting of parents and their
children; she found a paternal discrepancy rate of 10%, but was afraid
to publish this finding for fear of jeopardizing her funding!
3. In a extensive study, several thousand married women were asked to
record their sexual desires every day for a period of twenty-four
months, by placing a cross on a chart each day that they experienced
sexual desire. Basal body temperature was used as a measure of the
phase of the menstrual cycle. The peak of sexual desire coincided with
the point of maximum fertility—and women were five times more
likely to experience sexual desire w h e n they were ovulating than when
they were not.
4. Evolutionary psychologists do not intend that their perspective be
viewed as a justification or " e x c u s e " for abusive human behaviour.
Rather, it is hoped that an understanding of how behavioural responses
may have been selected by evolution can help in modifying or
containing these w h e n they are disapproved of by society.
5. The formulations of Riviere and Fenichel were also supported by a later
paper by Pao (1969).
6. Melanie Klein's (1957) theory of envy suggests that each gender may
envy the attributes of the other. The mother's life-giving breasts and her
capacity to create babies inside may be a particular focus of envy—as
can the intercourse of the parents. A child's w i s h to have these
capacities and functions (to have the penis, the breasts, or the capacity
to bear children) coupled with an awareness of not having these, can
engender deep feelings of inadequacy and shame.
CHAPTER FIVE
Shame in the psychoanalytic

consulting room
" A s with panic anxiety, most patients prefer to flee from

shame rather than face it. To confront shame therefore
requires a leap of faith on the part of the patient that they will
not be abandoned by the analyst and will be able to tolerate
the pain of the underlying affect"
Bronheim, 1998, p. 83
S
hame a n d the threat of shame are pervasive features of
h u m a n life. We are social beings, concerned w i t h f i n d i n g a
place of recognition, approval and value i n the complex
society that h u m a n beings have created. If w e fail to f i n d such a
place, there is nowhere else to go. W i t h o u t a positive place i n
society, w e must identify w i t h the marginalized, the outcasts, the
scape-goats—or else inhabit a no-place of psychosis. F r o m the
beginning of our lives, w e strive to be understood, to be loved a n d
to love. A s adults, w e need to make our contribution to the social
w o r l d , t h r o u g h w o r k , t h r o u g h m a t i n g , a n d t h r o u g h the protection
and raising of the next generation. If w e fail i n any of these areas, w e
feel shame. There is m u c h that can go w r o n g — m a n y w a y s i n w h i c h
123
to feel defective, inadequate, incompetent, unacceptable, unlovable,

and an outcast. Moreover, i t is n o t only our o w n failings that can
lead to shame. Others m a y force us to feel shame t h r o u g h their
ridicule and h u m i l i a t i n g c r i t i c i s m — o r t h r o u g h overt hostility a n d
abuse. W e m a y as children have been given the message not only
that an aspect of our behaviour was unacceptable, b u t that our very
being was b a d and defective. Even w h e n the creation of shame was
not the intention, w e can feel this t h r o u g h the failures of connection
a n d empathic attunement i n our c h i l d h o o d interactions w i t h
parents or other care-givers.
People w h o seek the help of analysts or psychotherapists w i l l be
r i d d l e d w i t h experiences of s h a m e — o f one k i n d or another. This
does n o t mean they w i l l necessarily be aware of such feelings, for
shame i n its nature tends to be h i d d e n . Shame is a source of
s h a m e — a n d w h a t is shameful is concealed. Signals of shame m a y
be consistently ignored (Harder, 1984), perhaps resulting i n the
personality style of the " t h i c k s k i n n e d " narcissists described b y
Rosenfeld (1987) and Bateman (1998)—or the " o b l i v i o u s " (as
opposed to " h y p e r v i g i l a n t " ) narcissists described b y Gabbard
(1996). Thus, many patients (perhaps particularly those w i t h border
line personality disorders) may present, somewhat confusingly, w i t h
a mixture of excessive shame and a tendency to ignore appropriate
signals of s h a m e — w i t h the result that i n their general life they
recurrently behave i n ways that evoke feelings of shame, w i t h o u t an
understanding of h o w and w h y this occurs. Hypervigilance to issues
of status and comparison w i t h others m a y combine w i t h a deficiency
i n the capacity to attend to signals of violating social norms. Such
people m a y be extremely prone to experience shame and rage, and
yet also m a y behave seemingly shamelessly a n d i n w a y s that shame
others. I n responding to such a presentation i t w o u l d be easy to
c o m p o u n d their experience of shame.
The core of shame and vulnerability i n narcissistically disturbed
patients m a y be covered b y layers of protective strategies and
organizations—such as the "psychic retreats" described b y John
Steiner (1993a, 2000, 2002). These m a y be sufficiently successful
m u c h of the time so that the person is not really aware of the extent
of their potential feelings of shame. A mental structure character
ized b y arrogance, feelings of superiority, and c o n t e m p t — o r the
"grandiose self" described b y Kernberg (1975), consisting of a
S H A M E I N THE P S Y C H O A N A L Y T I C C O N S U L T I N G R O O M 125
fusion of the images of ideal other, ideal self, a n d actual s e l f — m a y

w a r d off the real vulnerability a n d shame, awareness of w h i c h m a y
be feared unconsciously as threatening a catastrophe. However, the
entry into analysis or therapy w i l l be feared as a potential path to
just such a catastrophe. The very fact of seeking help can be felt as a
shameful admission of inadequacy.
It is i m p o r t a n t to recognize that severe shame experienced i n
childhood is indeed a catastrophe—a psychic d e v a s t a t i o n — a n d to
r e t u r n there w o u l d be felt to involve a descent into madness a n d
annihilation. If, despite this unconscious dread, the patient does
b r i n g his or her vulnerable a n d fragile self, then the responsibility
given to the analyst/therapist is awesome. The responsibility is to
provide a safe environment i n w h i c h the early t u r m o i l s of shame
can be revisited a n d w o r k e d t h r o u g h — b u t also, crucially, to avoid
actively reshaming the patient. The latter can be extremely difficult
i n the face of the provocation of being made t o suffer some partial
elements of the patient's toxic experiences t h r o u g h projective
identification a n d other interpersonal manoeuvres.
The shame threats perceived, consciously or unconsciously, i n
the psychoanalytic situation are various: the acknowledgment of
need a n d v u l n e r a b i l i t y (especially b y a m a n , a n d perhaps
particularly i n relation to a male a n a l y s t — f o r reasons n o w given
explanation b y evolutionary psychology ) m i g h t be experienced as
1
a shameful " o n e - d o w n " position (Harder, 1990); the inability to

understand one's o w n m i n d a n d the idea that some of one's o w n
communications are unconscious m a y similarly seem h u m i l i a t i n g ;
the analyst m i g h t fail to understand w h a t the patient attempts to
describe of his or her experience; the analyst m i g h t v i e w the patient
as w e i r d — a fear associated w i t h feeling different a n d n o t f u l l y
h u m a n ; the analyst m i g h t m o c k or criticize the patient, recreating
the shaming scenarios of childhood; the analyst m i g h t laugh at the
p a t i e n t — e i t h e r overtly or i n private; the analyst m i g h t n o t like the
patient; the patient m i g h t fail to interest the analyst; the patient
m i g h t n o t be competent as a p a t i e n t — e . g . m i g h t n o t be able to
communicate properly or f o l l o w the i m p l i c i t rules of the analysis;
there m i g h t be any number of potential misperceptions a n d failures
of m u t u a l understanding between analyst a n d patient (perhaps
partly due to differences of background, nationality or culture).
There are some features of the psychoanalytic situation that act
to m i n i m i z e shame. For example, the use of the couch, w h i c h avoids

facial contact between patient and analyst, is a brilliant device for
helping the patient to feel more free i n exploring and c o m m u n i
cating their most private inner thoughts, feelings, and fantasies—
precisely the aspects of one's m i n d that are n o r m a l l y concealed. It is
w e l l k n o w n that Freud claimed to have invented the couch
procedure because he d i d not like to be stared at b y his patients
a l l day l o n g . Thus the analyst's feelings of shame are also
m i n i m i z e d , despite the discussion of material that w o u l d , i n any
other situation, n o r m a l l y evoke shame. The regularity of the
psychoanalytic setting and its peculiarity, as w e l l as the avoidance
of ordinary social conversation, a l l serve to distinguish i t as a special
place i n w h i c h the n o r m a l contexts of shame do not apply.
O n the other hand, there are aspects of the psychoanalytic
setting a n d encounter that can, i f n o t m a n a g e d sensitively,
significantly evoke shame a n d thereby impede a n d distort the
therapeutic process. First of a l l , the patient m a y not k n o w w h a t to
expect w h e n v i s i t i n g an analyst for the first time. This means that he
or she does not k n o w w h a t behaviour is appropriate to the
situation. There is a tendency i n psychoanalytic circles to regard the
search for cues r e g a r d i n g expected b e h a v i o u r as s o m e h o w
p a t h o l o g i c a l — a n expression of a "false self", or a chameleon-like
"as i f " personality. Perhaps i n an extreme f o r m it is, b u t i t is also a
n o r m a l and necessary part of social intercourse. A stance adopted
b y m a n y analysts, o n seeing a patient for the first time, is one of
g i v i n g m i n i m a l cues as to w h a t he or she m i g h t speak of, and
s i m p l y w a i t i n g expectantly. I n a d d i t i o n , visual facial cues m a y be
restricted. The rationale for this is that i t allows the patient's
concerns and anxieties to emerge more clearly, w i t h m i n i m a l
shaping b y the analyst. This m a y be true to some extent, b u t the
stance is abnormal i n terms of h o w h u m a n beings behave towards
each other i n most other situations. The patient is deprived of
n o r m a l l y expected cues and therefore he or she w i l l be reacting to
an abnormal s i t u a t i o n — o n e w h i c h is m a x i m a l l y likely to evoke
shame and social anxiety. Moreover, the patient's communicative
initiatives are not met w i t h the facial, verbal, and b o d y language
responses that he or she w o u l d n o r m a l l y elicit w h e n talking to
another person a n d w h i c h usually communicate reciprocally
messages of acceptance, understanding and empathy. I t is somewhat
SHAME IN THE P S Y C H O A N A L Y T I C C O N S U L T I N G ROOM 127
like the " s t i l l face" experiments (Tronick et ah, 1978) where the baby
w i t h d r a w s because his or her communicative initiative is m e t w i t h
an u n w e l c o m i n g response.
The restricted social a n d personal cues offered b y the analyst,
combine w i t h an expectation that the patient reveal a great deal of
extremely personal and perhaps inherently shame-related i n f o r m a
tion. M a n y patients w i l l n o t protest about this, p a r t l y because the
issues are difficult to i d e n t i f y a n d articulate, and also because the
p o s i t i o n the patient is i n is s h a m e f u l — a n d therefore w i l l be
concealed. Some t i m e ago, an unusually assertive a n d articulate
patient explained the p r o b l e m to me. She protested that I w a s
behaving i n a v e r y strange w a y , n o t g i v i n g her feedback, s h o w i n g
little b o d y language, n o t responding to her h u m o u r , a n d so on.
H o w d i d I expect her to be open and to talk to me about her inner
feelings a n d thoughts w h e n I w a s so closed, concealing so m u c h of
myself? She w a s p o i n t i n g o u t that the d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n the shame
economy w a s p r o f o u n d l y asymmetrical! Fortunately, because she
presented her experience of me a n d of m y w a y of behaving so
clearly, w e were able to explore the anxieties that lay b e h i n d i t . W e
were able to understand, for example, that she n o r m a l l y relied o n
her conversational a n d interactional skills, i n c l u d i n g her capacities
to f l i r t , as a means of p r o v i d i n g her w i t h a sense of c o n t r o l — t h i s
b e i n g v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o her i n the context of a c h i l d h o o d
characterized b y chaos. H e r i n a b i l i t y to experience her familiar
sense of control w h e n t a l k i n g to m e gave rise to a quiet, b u t
m o u n t i n g , feeling of p a n i c — t h e anxiety of disrupted expectations.
Moreover, w e saw that m y lack of a conventional interactional
response to her led her to feel that I d i d n o t like her, w a s n o t
interested i n her, and d i d n o t care about her. H e r anxieties were a l l
i n the area of shame a n d shame-anxiety. Eventually she d i d disclose
an extremely shame-laden, vulnerable, a n d h i d d e n core of her
personality. One m i g h t say that this capacity t o reveal latent
u n d e r l y i n g anxieties is precisely the value of the " n e u t r a l " psycho
analytic stance. This is t r u e — b u t o n l y i f the issues become
sufficiently apparent to be addressed. The patient h a d been t h i n k i n g
of breaking off her therapy because of her d i s t r e s s — a n d the nature
of this h a d n o t been apparent to me u n t i l she forcibly a n d rather
courageously b r o u g h t i t to m y attention. A less assertive patient
m i g h t s i m p l y have left w i t h o u t i n d i c a t i n g clearly w h y . I t is
i m p o r t a n t to recognize that the psychoanalytic stance and style m a y

sometimes create considerable shame-anxiety because of the
d e p r i v a t i o n of n o r m a l visual, verbal, and body-language cues.
A second potential source of shame i n the psychoanalytic
situation can lie i n the experience of the analyst's interpretation. I f
this is perceived as a quasi-oracular pronouncement w h i c h reframes
the patient's communications i n terms of meanings that were not i n
any w a y consciously intended, then inevitably shame w i l l result.
This is because the expected understanding of the communication is
absent. I n place of an empathic response there is substituted quite a
different meaning. For some, narcissistically vulnerable, patients,
this bypassing of the empathic response (the understanding f r o m
w i t h i n their o w n frame of reference) may be intolerable—even i f the
interpretation is recognized as essentially correct i n certain respects.
Rosenfeld (1987) recognized that sometimes such a scenario can
lead to impasse. Steiner's (1993b) discussion of patient-centred and
analyst-centred interpretations may also relate to this problem.
Some of Heinz Kohut's examples
Kohut's w r i t i n g s contain many examples of patients w h o could

tolerate analysis only if particular emphasis was placed u p o n
empathy i n the f r a m i n g of the analyst's comments. A n y deviation
f r o m the patient's o w n perspective w o u l d be experienced as
psychologically annihilating. Such patients are p r o f o u n d l y shame
prone a n d extremely sensitive to the manner i n w h i c h the analyst
speaks to t h e m
The hobby
One of Kohut's examples (1996) concerned a patient w h o h a d a
hobby w h i c h his previous analyst had apparently belittled because
he spent so m u c h time and money on i t and had lost several jobs as
a result. E v e n t u a l l y the man's shame about the h o b b y h a d
d i m i n i s h e d sufficiently that he was able to speak to K o h u t about
it. H e talked of w h a t i t meant to h i m , h o w enjoyable i t was, and so
on. K o h u t listened for about 40 minutes, speaking only w h e n the
patient asked if he understood some technical detail. Then K o h u t
SHAME IN THE P S Y C H O A N A L Y T I C C O N S U L T I N G R O O M 129
asked w h e n the hobby had started. The patient told h i m , b u t was then
silent for the rest of the session and for many sessions afterwards.
Kohut's later understanding of this sequence was that the patient had
reached a point where he could attempt to share his interest and
excitement w i t h the analyst, h o p i n g for a m i r r o r i n g response of
interest i n r e t u r n — b u t after 40 minutes or so, K o h u t had felt
compelled to be " a n analyst" b y i n q u i r i n g about the origin of the
hobby. The implicit message of his simple enquiry (not even an
interpretation) was that the patient should undertake analytic w o r k
rather than enjoy talking about the h o b b y — a n d the patient's response
was to w i t h d r a w , i n shame and anger, for a considerable time.
Tone of voice
I n another example, K o h u t described the reactions of a severely

disturbed m a n w h e n he announced that he w o u l d be a w a y for a
week. The patient shifted to a near delusional grandiose and
paranoid state of m i n d i n response. K o h u t attempted a variety of
interpretations of the meaning of his announcement, b u t none made
any difference u n t i l he stumbled u p o n the crucial p o i n t that it had
apparently been his tone of voice that h a d p r o v o k e d the patient's
w i t h d r a w a l and regression. The patient had experienced this as
unempathic and d e f e n s i v e — a n d K o h u t recognized that the patient
had been correct i n his perception of this since he had indeed feared
a stormy response to his announcement. A f t e r this sequence h a d
been explored and interpreted, the patient returned to a less
disturbed state of m i n d .
The dream of the fish
In a t h i r d example, K o h u t (1971) described a more healthy patient,

at a later stage of analysis, w h o b r o u g h t some diaries to a session
and read t h e m to the analyst. F o l l o w i n g this, the patient h a d a t w o
part dream:
he had been fishing and had caught a big fish which he proudly
brought to his father; however, the father was not admiring but was
critical; i n the second part, he saw Christ on the cross, suddenly
slumping, his muscles relaxing as he died.
F r o m this reaction, expressed t h r o u g h the dream, K o h u t deduced

that the patient m u s t have detected some lack of enthusiasm o n the
analyst's part w h e n he b r o u g h t the diaries and h a d reacted w i t h
shame. H e thought i t was quite likely that he, the analyst, m a y have
indeed perceived the reading of the diaries as an i m p e d i m e n t to the
more direct and spontaneous p r o d u c t i o n of analytic material. O n
reflection, he thought he m a y not f u l l y have appreciated the
emotional meaning of the patient's b r i n g i n g of the diaries, that had
not been a resistance to analysis b u t an analytic g i f t — l i k e the fish i n
the dream. Therefore he concluded that the dream illustrated h o w
the patient's m o o d had slumped i n response—he had felt deflated,
and had resorted to a masochistic merger fantasy represented b y the
dream's allusion to the biblical account of Christ's reunion w i t h God
the Father. The childhood background p r o v i d e d a further context
for the patient's response. H i s father had tended to be self
preoccupied and had responded negatively and critically to the
child's progress i n whatever area—just like the father i n the dream.
A critical patient
A further example (Kohut, 1984) concerns a patient w h o had seen a
number of analysts and therapists p r i o r to approaching Kohut. He
was extremely critical of all of them, describing t h e m as completely
lacking i n empathy. He was also very critical of his p a r e n t s —
describing his mother as h a v i n g been totally involved w i t h her
church and its dogma, w h i l s t his father had been w i t h d r a w n and
u n i n v o l v e d w i t h the patient as a child. The presenting p r o b l e m was
a chronic feeling of unreality,
K o h u t was somewhat uneasy about taking on this patient,
particularly i n v i e w of his relentless criticism of previous analysts
and the possibility of an u n d e r l y i n g paranoid psychosis. Despite
this reservation, they d i d proceed to w o r k together and the patient
established an essentially positive attitude towards the analyst and
seemed accepting of many of Kohut's interpretations. H o w e v e r , an
a l a r m i n g deterioration took place after about a year, f o l l o w i n g
K o h u t ' s b e i n g a w a y for several weeks. The patient became
d o m i n a t e d b y headaches and could talk of little else. Moreover,
the quality of these evolved f r o m a more ordinary physical p a i n to a
k i n d of unspeakable discomfort that seemed more psychological
SHAME IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC CONSULTING ROOM 131
t h a n physical. K o h u t tried to l i n k the patient's headaches to the

break i n the analysis, interpreting feelings of abandonment, loss of
support, and anger. The patient d i d n o t f i n d these interpretations
h e l p f u l , p o i n t i n g out that he had n o t felt upset w h e n K o h u t had
been away, nor i n i t i a l l y on his return. Then some further material
suggested another interpretive possibility. K o h u t p u t to the patient
that perhaps as a result of analytic w o r k the patient had become
more open to emotional interactions w i t h the w o r l d and that as a
consequence he was n o w facing anxieties and tensions f r o m w h i c h
previously he h a d w a l l e d himself off; this development was leaving
h i m continually t r a u m a t i z e d a n d overburdened b y emotional
impingements. The patient reacted favourably to this interpretation,
p r o v i d i n g further confirmatory material and generally appearing
m u c h brighter and more cheerful. H o w e v e r , after a few sessions
exploring this theme, the patient began to criticize K o h u t severely,
accusing h i m of lacking all understanding and of r u i n i n g h i m . He
also complained of people i n his environment w h o were upsetting
h i m w i t h their behaviour or manner.
K o h u t comments i n his account of this analysis that the patient's
complaints about h i m were always based around real flaws i n his
emotional response, even if these were exaggerated. Eventually
some understanding of the patient's experience of K o h u t began to
emerge. A p p a r e n t l y he had felt that Kohut's interpretations, b o t h
about the break and about his sense of impingement, h a d been
c o r r e c t — b u t he had experienced them as intellectually generated
rather than being based i n a true empathy w i t h w h a t he felt. The
impression that K o h u t h a d presented ideas f r o m his o w n p o i n t of
v i e w , rather than w o r k i n g f r o m the patient's p o i n t of v i e w , had
repeated aspects of the trauma of his early life w i t h his self
preoccupied parents. K o h u t notes:
The patient, as I finally grasped, insisted—and had a right to

insist—that I learn to see things exclusively in his wa y and not at all
in my way. [1984, p. 182]
A s Kohut's stance altered along these lines, the patient presented

further material t h r o w i n g new light o n the paternal transference.
His reproaches became more focused. Specifically he complained
that b o t h K o h u t and his father h a d w a n t e d h i m to look u p to t h e m
rather than responding to his o w n ideas and initiatives.
Thus, i n this case a n d i n the other examples, a patient is

described whose childhood background h a d been characterized b y
a lack of responsiveness t o , or active discouragement of, his o w n
initiatives. These rage a n d shame p r o m o t i n g circumstances were
then repeated i n the transference experience a n d interaction w i t h
the analyst. K o h u t describes h o w he h a d t o adapt to the patient's
need t o have his or her o w n p o i n t of v i e w given privilege over the
analyst's p o i n t of view. H e comments:
To hammer away at the analysand's transference distortions brings

no results; it only confirms the analysand's conviction that the
analyst is as dogmatic, as utterly sure of himself, as walled off in the
self-righteousness of a distorted view as the pathogenic parents . . .
had been. Only the analyst's continuing sincere acceptance of the
patient's reproaches as (psychologically realistic), followed by a
prolonged (and ultimately successful) attempt to look into himself
and remove the inner barriers that stand in the w a y of his empathic
grasp of the patient, ultimately have a chance to turn the tide. [1984,
p. 182]
By the analyst's being w i l l i n g to accept a n d thereby validate the

patient's experience a n d point of v i e w , the analysis became able to
move o n t o w a r d s a deeper understanding of the transference.
Shame in the transference

If shame has been a particular feature of the patient's childhood
experience, then inevitably there w i l l be shame i n the transference.
Both patient a n d analyst w i l l experience i t . Even i f the emphasis is
mostly u p o n the patient's sense of shame, or fear of shame, there w i l l
be moments w h e n the tables are turned a n d the analyst is made to
experience shame (in the f o r m of feeling exposed, criticized, a n d
revealed to be inadequate). A shame-prone patient m a y often have
an accurate perception of real areas of narcissistic vulnerability i n
the analyst and these w i l l be exploited i n order to inflict shame. The
analyst m i g h t endeavour to adopt an empathic stance and to a v o i d
shaming the patient. To begin w i t h this m a y seem to lead to a
favourable response i n shame-prone patients. K o h u t notes that
sometimes an i n i t i a l positive development is then f o l l o w e d b y an
SHAME IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC CONSULTING ROOM 133
alarming deterioration, w i t h a barrage of criticism against the

analyst. H e asks w h y there is this i n i t i a l period of calm before a
s t o r m — a n d answers as follows:
What happens is nothing else but the transference clicking into

place. Thus during the calm before the storm, the analyst and the
patient have jointly explored the patient's traumatic past, allied in
the shared pursuit of a goal; once the storm breaks loose, however,
the analytic situation has become the traumatic past and the analyst
has become the traumatising selfobject of early life. [1984, p. 178]
Minimization of shame in the consulting room
A l t h o u g h shame is inevitable i n the transference, i f shame has been

a feature of the patient's c h i l d h o o d background, i t is i m p o r t a n t to
try to m i n i m i z e shame i n the non-transference aspects of the
relationship. W i t h o u t a non-transference area existing alongside the
transference, w e w o u l d have a transference psychosis i n w h i c h the
"as i f " nature is lost and the analyst is perceived as being really like
the shaming figures of childhood. This m a y indeed be w h a t
happens sometimes i n the states of impasse that can arise w i t h
shame-prone patients.
W h a t complicates the situation is that the u n d e r l y i n g shame a n d
fear of shame m a y n o t be obvious (Retzinger, 1998). Instead the
patient's presentation m a y be one of aloof w i t h d r a w a l , arrogance,
concealment, h o s t i l i t y — a n d a generally rather obscure m o d e of
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . This is because shame is h i d d e n . Shame is
shameful! I t is never expressed overtly and directly. Patients s i m p l y
d o not come along to an analyst or therapist saying " m y p r o b l e m is
that I suffer f r o m excessive shame". By contrast, patients m i g h t
quite easily say that they suffer f r o m excessive guilt, since that is
m u c h less shameful. Because the shame is h i d d e n , the analyst m a y
be d r a w n to respond to other more overt aspects of the presentation,
especially the apparent h o s t i l i t y . This can t h e n lead to a n
interpretive stance that is s h a m i n g — e v e n t h o u g h this w o u l d n o t
be the analyst's intention. Narcissistic rage m a y then be p r o v o k e d .
This m a y further conceal the u n d e r l y i n g s h a m e — a n d m a y lead to
interpretive foci that are experienced as h u m i l i a t i n g a n d evoke more
shame. I n such a w a y , a n impasse can develop. Lewis (1971), i n
s t u d y i n g m a n y transcripts of psychotherapeutic sessions, f o u n d
that unidentified and unanalysed shame was very often the basis of
negative therapeutic reactions and impasse.
Rosenfeld (1987) describes this p r o b l e m i n relation to w h a t he
calls " t h i n skinned narcissists" w h o are shame prone:
They are hypersensitive and easily hurt in everyday life and

analysis. Moreover, when the sensitive narcissistic patient is treated
in analysis as if he is the "thick-skinned" patient he w i l l be severely
traumatised. The analysis and the patient may be brought near to
collapse, especially if the destructive aspects of a patient's
behaviour are constantly repeated in the analyst's interpretations.
Such patients can end the analysis very much worse off than before.
In my experience the "thin-skinned" narcissistic patients were, as
children, repeatedly severely traumatised in their feelings of self
regard. They seem to have felt persistently and excessively inferior,
ashamed and vulnerable, and rejected by everybody. ... such
traumatised and vulnerable people find it very difficult to cope with
any trauma or failure. However, one has to be particularly on guard
not to add to these traumas by making mistakes in our analytic
approach which humiliate such people and put them down. These
mistakes are very difficult to remedy afterwards, [pp. 274^275]
H o w e v e r , it is n o t easy to avoid shaming certain patients.

A l t h o u g h a cold and distant analytic stance can be experienced as
discouraging to communication of shameful areas because of the
threat of further shame, an ostensibly friendly and supportive style
can be experienced as patronizing. The emergence of vulnerability
i n a patient w h o has h i d d e n w i t h i n some k i n d of psychic retreat
(Steiner, 1993), perhaps behind a facade of arrogance, can be
potentially h u m i l i a t i n g and that person m a y be extremely sensitive
to the quality of the analyst's response. I t really is a matter of using
a sense of tact to determine w h a t k i n d of stance f r o m the analyst is
most tolerable and h e l p f u l to the particular patient. W h a t m a y be
u n h e l p f u l is a stance that privileges the communication of " t r u t h "
regardless of h o w this is experienced b y the patient.
I n m y o w n efforts to avoid evoking unnecessary shame i n the
consulting r o o m , I have f o u n d certain styles of speaking to the
patient to be helpful. First, I t r y to acknowledge and perhaps
articulate the patient's experience f r o m an empathic position. Then,
i n m a k i n g interpretations that go beyond the empathic surface, I t r y
to indicate h o w m y idea about w h a t is going o n derives f r o m the
S H A M E IN THE P S Y C H O A N A L Y T I C C O N S U L T I N G R O O M 135
patient's o w n communications. I n this w a y , m y stance is one of

t r y i n g to understand more of w h a t the patient is t r y i n g to tell me,
consciously a n d unconsciously—rather than appearing to present a
v i e w of m y o w n . This is perhaps somewhat along the lines of the
stance of " l e a r n i n g f r o m the p a t i e n t " , discussed b y Casement (1985,
1990, 2002). I also t r y to make m y o w n thought processes explicit so
that the patient can f o l l o w m y reasoning a n d inferences. I n these
w a y s I t r y to avoid appearing like an oracular authority m a k i n g
interpretive pronouncements, b u t instead endeavour to convey a
sense that I a m a fellow h u m a n being struggling to use m y specialist
knowledge to understand the patient a n d to share this under
standing w i t h him/her. Finally I t r y to behave i n as " n o r m a l " a w a y
as possible w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g an analytic s t a n c e — g i v i n g ordinary
vocalizations of understanding, encouragement, a n d emotional
response occasionally (i.e. noises that are n o t necessarily words),
and some facial response i f the patient is sitting u p rather than l y i n g
o n the couch. H o w e v e r , I obviously d o n o t always succeed i n this,
as evidenced b y the comments of the patient I described above.
There is one area i n w h i c h I take a v i e w w h i c h m a y be at odds
w i t h that of some other analysts. I t h i n k that w h i l e transference
interpretations, about the patient's unconscious conflicts i n relation
to the analyst, are extremely important, they should be used
sparingly. This is because too m u c h attention to the transference can
evoke i n h i b i t i n g shame and can undermine the patient's o w n efforts
at autonomous strivings for understanding. If most of the analyst's
comments relate to the patient's relationship w i t h the a n a l y s t — a n d
particularly i f m u c h of w h a t the patient says is reformulated as
unconsciously referring to that r e l a t i o n s h i p — t h e patient m a y come
to feel self-conscious about speaking, w o n d e r i n g w h a t the analyst is
going to make of it. A g a i n this relates to the shift of the locus of
meaning f r o m the patient's frame of reference to that of the analyst.
Another aspect of this is that i f every communication is taken as
unconsciously a transference c o m m u n i c a t i o n — w i t h the implication
that this is the most i m p o r t a n t aspect—then the patient's o w n
autonomous strivings after understanding m a y be invalidated,
resulting i n a pattern of chronic undetected shame pervading the
analysis. Sometimes patients m a y have v a l i d insights into their o w n
motivations and preoccupations; a n d sometimes m a y be engaging
i n i m p o r t a n t analytic w o r k t h r o u g h t h i n k i n g a n d exploring their
o w n thoughts, feelings, and fantasies, w i t h o u t the need for a n y t h i n g

f r o m the analyst other than his or her attention and reverie. To
impose an interpretation or other analytic activity w h e n none is
required can be like a parent unnecessarily interfering w i t h a child's
exploration and practice at a new s k i l l — a n interference that w o u l d
tend to evoke shame and rage. This rage w o u l d n o t be an expression
of " e n v y " of the skills of the parent or analyst, b u t of frustration at
the b l o c k i n g of strivings after autonomy. The analytic f u n c t i o n — o f
being able to discern and t h i n k about communications f r o m the
unconscious—is a learnable skill w h i c h patients w i l l indeed learn
and carry out if allowed to do so. W h e n the patient is actively
exploring i n this w a y , there m a y be no need for the analyst to say
very m u c h at all d u r i n g a session—a style of w o r k that w o u l d
contrast w i t h the rather active approach favoured b y m a n y analysts
today, b u t one w h i c h m i g h t be congruent w i t h a more classical
approach.
One of Kohut's examples described above concerned a patient
w h o b r o u g h t some o l d diaries to the session and proceeded to read
them aloud to the analyst. K o h u t acknowledged that, as " a n a l y s t " ,
he m a y have felt slightly uneasy about this deviation f r o m more
direct and spontaneous communication, b u t nevertheless believed
the b r i n g i n g of the diaries was an i m p o r t a n t analytic " g i f t " and was
useful to the process of understanding. A colleague t o l d me of a
situation m a n y years ago w h e n he was first seeing an analyst.
F i n d i n g the interaction w i t h the analyst extremely difficult and
frustrating, he suddenly felt m o v e d to w r i t e an account of his
experience w i t h the analyst and his o w n perception and under
standing of it. The process of w r i t i n g d i d indeed release some n e w
insights into w h a t was going on. W i t h some anxiety and shame he
took the piece of w r i t i n g to his analytic session, proposing to read i t
aloud. The analyst was not dismissive of the w r i t i n g , b u t asked if
the patient m i g h t talk about it rather than reading it. A l t h o u g h the
patient complied w i t h this suggestion, he felt that something was
lost i n n o t h a v i n g the o p p o r t u n i t y to present the more carefully
articulated w r i t t e n account. Probably m a n y analysts w o u l d have
responded s i m i l a r l y , b u t I w o n d e r i f the insistence o n the
spontaneous interaction m a y paradoxically inhibit and eclipse other
potentially i m p o r t a n t modes of communication and emotional
g r o w t h that at times present themselves. W h a t is clear is that the
SHAME IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC C O N S U L T I N G ROOM 137
threat of potential shame may inhibit the patient from exploring

other ways of being and communicating in the analytic situation—
for example, even something as simple as trying a chair rather than
the couch.
It may not only be psychoanalytic patients who are inhibited by
shame. Psychoanalysts tend to form communities with strong group
cohesion, the mutual support being very important since the work
is so difficult and unusual. Psychoanalysis, as an occupation, is
regarded by most people as rather odd and few outside the pro
fession have much understanding of it. It is not readily comparable
to any other activity and way of life. Therefore it is only amongst
other analysts that we find empathy and understanding of our work
and daily experience. The lack of ready understanding found
amongst society generally means that declaring one's occupation
and identity as a psychoanalyst may be a source of shame as well as
pride. It also means that the acceptance of other analysts is of
particular importance—with an inevitable result that deviations
from group cultural norms w i l l be exceptionally liable to evoke the
threat of shame. The psychoanalytic culture is likely therefore to be
particularly conservative.
Shame pervades the psychoanalytic situation. It cannot be
eliminated. However, I hope that these few remarks here may help
to highlight its significance and facilitate sensitivity to factors that
may increase or diminish its presence and power. We may thus
more easily discern the vulnerabilities and privacies that lie hidden
beneath the patient's social cover and complex layers of defence.
Then, in the warmth of recognition by an other, and touched by the
healing filaments of empathy, the broken, banished, frozen, and
fragile parts—imprisoned in shame—may be released and woven
into the fabric of the personality—the human connection restored.
Note
1. A hypothesis prevalent amongst evolutionary psychologists is that men

tend to be less inclined than women to express negative emotion
because reproductive success involves greater competition between
men than between women (e.g. Archer, 1996). Expression of emotional
distress between men would, according to this view, tend to be
regarded as a sign of weakness and lead to a loss of status, and

therefore a lowering of reproductive attractiveness to women. This
would be the "distal" evolutionary explanation of the widely recog
nized differences in emotional expression between men and women. In
more "proximal" psychoanalytical terms, the same tendencies might be
experienced as a fear of passivity or homosexuality. Either way, they
would be associated with shame.
Concluding summary
I
t is possible to summarize the preceding discussion b y a few
points. For the benefit of the non-specialist reader, I have tried
to w r i t e these i n a simple and clear w a y , eschewing psycho
analytic terms.
• M a n y people suffer f r o m c r i p p l i n g feelings of shame (and

embarrassment, self-consciousness, and shyness). These are
exaggerations of feelings that are quite n o r m a l and necessary.
By contrast, some other people m a y fail to recognize appro
priate signals of s h a m e — a n d may behave i n w a y s that are
"shame-less".
• Shame pervades h u m a n life, b u t is often h i d d e n . One of its
functions is to encourage conformity to the p r e v a i l i n g g r o u p
and culture. Some people experience rejection b y a group
because they fail to be sensitive to signals of shame.
• Active shaming, especially i n c h i l d h o o d , can be v e r y h a r m f u l to
a person's self-esteem. Chronic rage can be one result. Wishes to
t u r n the tables and shame others can also be prominent. Severe
abuse i n c h i l d h o o d can result i n toxic shame, w h i c h can be
devastating.
139
• H o w e v e r , a person m a y be greatly influenced b y feelings of

shame even w h e n he or she has not suffered active shaming.
This is because shame arises f r o m all manner of failures of
connection and understanding between one h u m a n being and
another. If a c h i l d expresses a need, b u t this is not understood
and met empathically, the c h i l d w i l l experience shame. The
subtlety and pervasiveness of such processes m a y be part of the
reason w h y shame is often overlooked.
• Repeated experiences i n childhood of psychological needs not
being recognized, understood empathically, accepted and met,
m a y lead to those needs being concealed. A "false s e l f m a y
d e v e l o p — b u i l t u p o n shame—such that an adaptation to the
parental expectations hides the more authentic feelings and
needs.
• Shame is a p o w e r f u l inhibitor of honest emotional communica
tion. Some people develop personalities organized around the
concealment and repudiation of feelings of weakness, neediness,
vulnerability, and inadequacy. A facade of strength, confi
d e n c e — a n d particularly arrogance—may be presented. I n some
cases, there m a y be an internal t u r n i n g against a part of the
m i n d associated w i t h s h a m e — a n inner cruel oppression of the
emotionally needy part.
• Shame is about feelings of inadequacy. Whilst feelings of
i n a d e q u a c y can be attached to f a i l u r e s i n any h u m a n
endeavour, the most f u n d a m e n t a l sense of inadequacy is
s o c i a l — a r i s i n g originally i n the relationship w i t h the mother.
• The early facial m i r r o r i n g relationship w i t h the mother is a
p o w e r f u l w a y ' i n w h i c h emotion is transmitted. The mother's
smile or lack of i t has a direct effect o n the chemistry and
development of the infant's brain. A face that is not responsive
i n the w a y the baby expects is extremely d i s t u r b i n g to the
i n f a n t — a n d evokes shame.
• I t is the same w i t h adults. A smile w i l l alter the recipient's b r a i n
chemistry and induce pleasure.
• The lack of an expected smile is like an encounter w i t h a
stranger. Indeed the so-called "stranger anxiety", often s h o w n at
around eight-months of age, has some of the qualities of a
shame reaction. A little later, w h e n children have to come to
terms w i t h the relationship between the parents that excludes
CONCLUDING SUMMARY 141
them—the Oedipus situation and the primal scene—he or she

has become the stranger and experiences not only shame but also
jealousy.
Childhood rivalries with siblings may also lay down a template
for later feelings of jealousy. Perceptions or fantasies of a rival
being preferred will give rise to feelings of shame, as well as
anger.
Jealousy is inherent in human behaviour and emotion and
cannot be eradicated. It is an inevitable emotional corollary of
the need to compete for limited resources, including sexual and
reproductive resources (i.e. competition for a mate). Sexual
jealousy has probably evolved as a very strongly entrenched
strategy for protecting the transmission of one's own genes.
This applies particularly to men. Men in general display
stronger reactions to situations that might evoke explicitly
sexual jealousy—the danger of the partner being impregnated
by another man—whilst women show stronger reactions to the
prospect of losing the man's love and loyalty.
The belief that jealousy is a sign of personality flaws, low self-
esteem or insecurity, or abnormal wishes to control the partner,
can be misleading and harmful, leading to additional and
unnecessary feelings of shame. Both men and women have
evolved emotional radar for detecting infidelity in their sexual
partner. Attempting to deal with jealousy in a relationship by
trying to ignore or cognitively minimize such feelings may be,
as Buss (2000) notes, like responding to a fire by switching off
the smoke alarm.
Jealousy can, however, certainly be exacerbated by psycho-
dynamic factors, especially by unconsciously attributing to the
other (projection) the person's own (heterosexual and homo-
sexual) impulses to be unfaithful. Unconscious fears of
retaliation for early feelings of rivalry and greed towards the
mother can also play a part.
Childhood experiences of abandonment and deception by care-
givers can also predispose a person to enhanced reactions of
jealousy. Doubts about parental love, perhaps based on accurate
perceptions of hostility, ambivalence, and neglect, may mean that
in later life the person cannot trust their partner's love and will
anticipate rejection, deception, and betrayal.
• The encounter with a psychoanalyst or psychotherapist is

fraught with potential shame. Some aspects of the psycho
analytic stance can function to elicit underlying anxiety (and in
that respect are useful), but at the same time can evoke shame
(which can be inhibiting). There are ways in which the analyst
can minimize the potential for unnecessary shame. This is
important because patients w i l l communicate only those
aspects of their emotions that they expect to be understood
and accepted; the rest will simply be concealed and may remain
unconscious. Signals of shame tell the patient what is safe and
what is not safe to attempt to communicate—but these signals
are registered unconsciously.
• Fundamentally, shame is about a broken connection between
one human being and others—a breach in the understanding,
expectation, and acceptance that is necessary for a sense of
being a valued member of the human family. The cure for
shame is the empathy provided by an other.
A note on psychoanalysis for the
general reader
S
ince some readers may not be familiar w i t h the theory and
practice of psychoanalysis, I have outlined a few brief notes
below. These give only a s i m p l i f i e d general outline, b u t i t is
hoped that they m a y provide a context w h i c h helps to make the rest
of the text more accessible.
A developmental view
Psychoanalysis takes a developmental v i e w of the emotional and

mental health difficulties of the adult, seeing these as rooted, to a
large extent, i n the interpersonal experiences between c h i l d and
parents (or other significant care-givers) i n the first few years of life.
Later stages are not ignored, since each phase of life poses its o w n
challenges—and adolescence is particularly i m p o r t a n t — b u t the
earliest years are regarded as the most crucial, since this is the
period w h e n the developing b r a i n and personality are at their most
vulnerable. This is also the time w h e n the child is b u i l d i n g u p an
internal m a p or m o d e l of the w o r l d , i n c l u d i n g the w o r l d of other
people and relationships. The expectations of h o w other people w i l l
143
respond to one's needs are laid down during these first few years
and continue to influence our emotions and behaviour for the rest of
our life.
Transference
During psychoanalysis (or psychoanalytic psychotherapy), the
analyst endeavours to bring to the light of consciousness the
patient's (or analysand's) deep wishes, fantasies, and anxieties
derived from childhood (and from the child parts within the mind
of the adult) and to show how these are influencing the person
unconsciously and contributing to difficulties that person is
experiencing. An important focus of the exploration is the patient's
relationship with the analyst—particularly in its more unconscious
aspects. Those features of the relationship that are derived
(transferred) from the childhood experiences and from the infantile
parts of the adult are called the "transference".
Free association
The patient in analysis is not given any direction or structure
regarding what to talk about, other than the request that he or she
attempt as far as possible to speak freely of whatever comes to
mind. This free-flowing kind of discourse is called "free association".
An excellent discussion of this can be found in Bollas, 2002. In
practice it is not really possible to speak entirely freely, because the
person endeavouring to do so will encounter various anxieties and
resistances—such as feelings of shame, fears of the analyst's
disapproval, and so on. Much of the analytic work involves
understanding these inner resistances.
The unconscious mind

Through the use of free association, and also through attention to
dreams, it becomes possible to understand the more unconscious
parts of the mind. Freud first discerned some of the features of the
A NOTE ON PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR THE GENERAL READER 145
unconscious mind through his study of dreams. He found that the

unconscious mind contains wishes, feelings, fantasies, and percep
tions that are repressed from consciousness because they are
disturbing. A variety of defences are used against awareness of
troubling elements of potential awareness. Analytic work involves
undoing these defences and thereby expanding the area of
consciousness. I n addition to containing aspects of emotional life
that are repressed from consciousness, the unconscious mind also
has its own mode of "thinking" and representing ideas, which is
quite different from that of the conscious mind (Mollon, 2001b).
Freud described aspects of this mode in his outline of processes
employed in generating the images of dreams.
The Oedipus complex
Psychoanalysis is a field with many different points of view and

emphasis, as groups of analysts have explored different clinical
states using a variety of theoretical frameworks. Freud originally
gave particular emphasis to the Oedipus complex, wherein the child
wishes to be close and special to one parent whilst feeling hostile
and rivalrous with the other—giving rise to anxieties about
retaliation. I n the Oedipal situation, the little boy may fear
castration—an idea that is sometimes thought of in literal terms
and sometimes more metaphorically as a deprivation of power.
Little girls may unconsciously fear analogous damage to their own
internal organs. The Oedipus complex is still seen as important by
most analysts, but many other areas of developmental difficulty and
conflict have also been identified. Some analysts, particularly those
working in the tradition of Melanie Klein, tend to emphasize
difficulties arising from the child's o w n inherent hostility and
fantasy—describing h o w the small child's angry and hostile
fantasies colour and distort his or her perception of the world.
Others, such as those developing the attachment theory of John
Bowlby, emphasize how the child builds up internal models of the
world based on real interactions and relationships (rather than
upon fantasy). Most analysts see the inner world of models of
relationships as derived from a combination of fantasy and actual
experience.
The primal scene

Some analytic theorists place importance o n the child's feelings of
envy a n d p a i n f u l exclusion f r o m the intimate relationship between
the parents. The child's encounter w i t h the parents i n intercourse
(either i n reality or i n the child's fantasy) is sometimes called the
primal scene.
Instinct and object

Readers n e w to psychoanalysis are often puzzled b y the use of the
t e r m " o b j e c t " to refer to people w i t h w h o m one has a relationship.
The o r i g i n of this convention lies i n Freud's conceptualization of the
developmental stages of the sexual instinct, or lib id o. I n his original
theorizing, he d i d n o t really t h i n k i n terms of relationships b u t i n
terms of instinctual satisfaction a n d frustration. The sexual instinct,
d u r i n g its different phases of development, w a s seen as h a v i n g
changing aims and objects. A l t h o u g h later psychoanalysts d i d
emphasize relationships, the convention of using the t e r m " o b j e c t "
has persisted.
Narcissism
A l t h o u g h h u m a n beings clearly seek relationships w i t h others f r o m
the b e g i n n i n g of life, people can also w i t h d r a w their love or desire
for others and m a y instead become preoccupied w i t h their o w n
physical or mental self. This is called narcissism. I t m a y be associated
w i t h grandiosity and e x h i b i t i o n i s m — a n d shame. A n A m e r i c a n
psychoanalyst called Heinz K o h u t made an i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n
b y suggesting that narcissism is n o t inherently an unhealthy
tendency, b u t actually has its o w n line of development f r o m more
p r i m i t i v e to more mature forms. For example, crude grandiosity
a n d exhibitionism m a y develop later into a pleasure i n p u r s u i n g
goals a n d displaying realistic achievements. W h e n analysts speak of
narcissistic vulnerability or narcissistic injury, they are referring to
sensitivities i n the area of self-esteem a n d self-image.
A NOTE ON PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR THE GENERAL READER 147
Results of psychoanalysis
When analysis works well, the patient will gradually achieve a

greater self-knowledge and self-acceptance, so that he or she is less
driven by unconscious forces which create frustrating repetitive
patterns of emotion and behaviour. This enables an increased inner
freedom of thought and choice about how to respond and relate to
others. The person's sense of self will have expanded and there will
be greater integration of previously repressed or split-off parts of
the mind and personality.
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INDEX
anxiety, 1-2, 57, 58, 68-69, 127-128

clinical examples
Asperger syndrome, 25, 28

embarrassment about self, 45
attachment relationships, and

jealousy based on projection, 93-94
psychic murder, 54, 56-58, 61,

jealousy based on valid
72, 76
unconscious perception,
attachment theory, 86, 145

108-110, 111-112
attacks on linking, 58, 67-71

jealousy based on wish to rob
autonomy, 6, 8, 11, 42, 44, 51

mother, 94-96, 97-99, 117
jealousy i n women, 87-88
Bion, W. R., 58, 67-71

psychic murder syndrome, 54-56
bisexuality, 117-118
shame and depression, 43-44
body, and shame, 39-42

shame and exhibitionism, 35-36,
Bollas, C , 14-15
37-38
borderline personality disorder, 74,

shame and false self, 18-19
113
shame and jealousy, 4-8, 88-90,
breast, and envy, 68, 100

112-119
Broucek, F., 26
shame and mother's narcissism,
Buss, D. M. , 78-79, 81, 82-83, 118,
35-36
141
shame and schizophrenia, 23-24
shame and the look, 30-31
castration anxiety, 14, 145

shame-anxiety, 1-2
catastrophic reaction, in brain

shame in psychoanalytic
injured patients, 46-47

consulting room, 128-132
159
160 INDEX
sibling jealousy, 103-104, 115-116

free association, 144
toxic shame, 2-3, 72-74

Freud, S., 47, 126
combined parents, phantasy of, 101

on jealousy, 77, 90-94, 120
contempt, 107, 108

on penis envy, 106
core self, violation of, 7, 9, 20, 41, 54,

on sexual instinct, 146
57, 66
on unconscious mind, 144-145
culture, and false self, 49, 51
gaze of the other, 11-12, 30-34
death instinct (Thanatos), 107

gender differences, in jealousy,
defences, 145
81-85, 119-120
delusions, 24-25
grandiose self, 124-125
depression, 42-44, 51
grandiosity, 35-36, 146
developmental view, in
greed, 100
psychoanalysis, 143-144
Grotstein, J. S., 64
Grunberger, B., 3, 13-14
ego-destructive shame, 73
guilt, 28-30, 48, 49-50
embarrassment, 17,18, 27, 34,45, 50
emotional infidelity, 81-82, 83,

homosexuality, 1, 92, 96-97, 117-118
119-120
empathy, 7-8, 20, 70-71, 128-132,

identity imposition, 47, 74
142
inclusive fitness theory, 86
envy, 63
instincts, 146
and attacks on linking, 68, 69,

internal mafias, 63-64
70-71
internal models, 145
and jealousy, 95-96, 100-102,

interpretations, 31, 128, 135
104-105, 107-108, 120
penis envy, 106

jealousy, 4-8, 77-121, 141
Erikson, E. H., 11
agents of, 78
evolutionary psychology
based on valid unconscious
and jealousy, 79-86, 118-120

perception, 108-112
and shame, 47, 51, 125

cycles of, 93-94
exhibitionism, 35-36, 37-39, 50, 146

early origins, 102-104
and envy, 95-96, 100-102,
facial mirroring, 9-10, 26-28, 50,140

104-105, 107-108, 120
failure, 25-26
evolutionary perspectives, 79-86,
false self
119-120
and culture, 49, 51

Fenichel on, 96-99
and embarrassment, 17, 45, 50

Freud on, 90-94
and failure of Oedipal position,

gender differences in, 81-85,
15-17, 21
119-120
shame and development of,

Klein on, 100-102
15-19, 21, 140

and Oedipal position, 78, 89, 91,
Winnicott on, 65-67, 71

101-103
father, 12-15, 39
and oral fixation, 96, 97
Fenichel, O., 77, 96-99, 111-112, 120

and projection, 91-92, 93-94,
Fonagy, P. et ah, 73, 74-75, 86

96-97, 105, 119, 141
INDEX 161
Riviere on, 94-96

narcissistic injury, 13, 42-43, 146
and shame, 78, 83-84, 90,

narcissistic rage, 45-47, 51, 75,
107-108, 112-119, 141

133
and sibling rivalry, 103-104,

thin skinned narcissists, 134
115-116, 141
objects, 146
Kalsched, D., 62-63, 71

Oedipal position
Klein, M v 100-102, 120

and child as stranger, 13, 14,
Kohut, R , 31, 136

20-21
on empathy in analysis, 128-132

false self and failure of, 15-17, 21
on narcissism and exhibitionism,

and jealousy, 78, 89, 91, 101-103
35-36, 38-39, 50, 146

Oedipus complex, 145
on narcissistic rage, 45-47, 75
on shame in transference, 132-133

paranoia, 49, 92, 96-97
part-objects, 68, 95-96
L a w of the Father, 16, 21

penis envy, 106
lie, positive function of, 8-9

primal scene, 12-15, 20-21, 146
looking/being looked at, 30-34, 50

projection, and jealousy, 91-92,
93-94, 96-97, 105, 119, 141
manic states, 43-44, 48-49, 51

projective identification, 68-69, 74,
masturbation, 40-42, 50-51

125
men, jealousy in, 80-85, 119-120,

promiscuity
141
and psychic murder syndrome,
mentalization capacity, 73
54, 59, 61
mirroring, 9-10, 26-28, 30, 50, 140

and reproductive strategies,
mirroring transference, 97
80-81, 82-83, 118
moral narcissism, 39-40

psychic auto-immune reaction,
mother
62-63
and attacks on linking, 68-70

psychic murder syndrome, 53-76
and false self development,

psychoanalysis
16-17, 65-67
developmental view, 143-144
good enough, 65-66, 71

and evolutionary theory, 85-86,
and mirroring, 9-10, 26-27, 50,

120
140
general outline, 143-147
narcissism of, 16-17, 34-37

results of, 147

psychoanalytic consulting room,
54, 55-56, 57-58, 72, 75-76

shame in, 123-138, 142
and "still face" experiments,

psychoanalytic stance, 126-128
26-27, 50
puberty, 14-15
unconscious wish to rob, 95-96,
98-99, 102, 117, 119

rage, narcissistic, 4 5 ^ 7 , 51, 75, 133
rejection, 43, 44
narcissism, 146
reproductive strategies, 80-86, 118,
destructive, 63-64, 71
119-120
moral, 39-40
reproductive success principle,
of mother, 16-17, 34-37

79-80
162 INDEX
Riviere, J., 94-96, 120

and rage, 45-47, 51, 75
Rosenfeld, H., 63-64, 71, 134

and schizophrenia, 23-25
and social inadequacy, 25-28
Sartre, J.-P., 32-33, 40

toxic, 2, 72-75, 76, 90, 139
schizophrenia, 23-25, 50
in transference, 132-133
Seidler, G. H 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20
v violent responses, 2-3
self
shame-anxiety, 1-2, 127-128
embarrassment about, 45
Shengold, L., 75
gaze of other and formation of,

sibling jealousy, 103-104, 115-116,
11-12
141
as object for other, 32-34

slips of the tongue, 47
violation of core self, 7, 9, 20, 41,

smile, and mirroring, 9-10, 140
54, 57, 66
social dyslexia, 25, 48
see also false self

social inadequacy, 25-28, 50, 140
self-care system, 62-63, 71

somatization of emotion, 57, 58, 61
self-consciousness, 30-31, 34, 36

soul murder, 75
sexual abuse, 72-75, 76

Spielman, P. M , 104-105
sexual assault, 2, 72-74

"Stepford Child", 53-54
sexual fantasies, 4 0 ^ 1
"still face" experiments, 26-27, 50,
sexual infidelity, 80-84, 119-120

126-127
sexuality
stranger
in evolutionary theory and

awareness of, 12, 140
psychoanalysis, 85-86, 120

child as, 12-13,14, 20-21,140-141
and Oedipal position, 14-15, 20

father as, 12

mother as, 26-27
54, 59
suicidality, 44, 51
and puberty, 14-15
and shame, 40-42, 50-51

thin skinned narcissists, 134
shame, 1-52, 139-140

toxic shame, 2, 72-75, 76, 90, 139
about others, 29-30

transference, 144
adaptive and maladaptive

interpretations, 31, 135
functions, 47-49, 51
mirroring, 97
and body, 39-42

psychosis, 133
and depression, 42-44, 51

shame in, 132-133
ego-destructive, 73
and exhibitionism, 37-39, 50

unconscious mind, 144-145
and false self, 15-19, 21, 140
and guilt, 28-30, 48, 49-50

vertical splitting, 35, 36
insensitivity to signals, 48-49,

violent responses to shame, 2-3
124, 139
and jealousy, 78, 83-84, 90,

Winnicott, D. W., 10, 11, 34-35,
107-108, 112-119, 141

65-67, 71
and the look, 30-34

Wisdom, J. O., 103-104
in psychoanalytic consulting
women, jealousy in, 81-83, 87-88,
room, 123-138, 142

119-120, 141
Shame and Jealousy is the latest volume in the "Psychoanalytic Ideas

Series", published for the Institute of Psychoanalysis by Karnac.
In this groundbreaking book, shame and jealousy are examined as
hidden turmoils; as basic human feelings found in everyone but often
suppressed and neglected. An unfulfilled need, unanswered plea for
help, and failure to connect with and understand other people are all
underlying causes for shame and feeling inadequate. Mollon argues
that feelings of shame form an intrinsic part of the analytic encounter
but 'astonishingly, this shame-laden quality of the psychoanalytic and
psychotherapeutic setting is rarely addressed/
This lucidly written and much-needed volume explores the profound
effects shame and jealousy can have on self-esteem and how this can
eventually lead to a chronic condition.
'In the gaps and clumsy steps in human intercourse, in the misunder
standings, the misperceptions and misjudgements, in the blank
mocking eyes where empathy should be, in the look of disgust where
a smile was anticipated, in the loneliness and disappointment of
inarticulate desire that cannot be communicated because the words
cannot be found, in the terrible hopeless absence when human
connection fails, and in the empty yet rage-filled desolation of abuse
there in these holes and missing bits lies shame. Shame is where we
fail/
Phil Mollon from the Preface
Phil Mollon is a psychoanalyst of the British Psychoanalytical Society.

He is also a psychotherapist (Tavistock Society) and a clinical
psychologist. For many years he has been interested in shame,
narcissism, and other disturbances in the experience of self, which he
explored in his Ph.D research and in two previous books (The Fragile
Self and Releasing the Self: The Healing Legacy of Heinz Kohut). He
has also written about the impact of trauma on the self (Multiple Selves,
Multiple Voices) and the nature of traumatic memory (Remembering
Trauma and Freud and False Memory). He works within the National
Health Service and in private practice in Hertfordshire.
ISBN 185575918-7
KARNAC
* Pembroke Buildings
LONDON NW10 6RE
cbooks
9H781855»759183'

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Shame and Jealousy

The Hidden Turmoils

Shame and Jealousy is o n e of a series of l o w - c o s t b o o k s u n d e r

Other titles in the Psychoanalytic Idea Series:

Dreaming and Thinking

LONDON NEW YORK

A subsidiary of Other Press LLC, New York

Copyright © 2002 Phil Mollon

Phil Mollon asserts the moral right to be identified as the author

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A C L P . for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 1 85575 918 3

Edited, designed, and produced by The Studio Publishing Services Ltd,

Printed in Great Britain

With her sweet song she flirted,

And enchanted me,

Then spread her coloured wings,

And I pursued her,

We rested in the forest,

Where she dallied with another,

Then the black knight of jealousy,

Riding roughshod in my heart,

Trampled her to death,

And I was ashamed.

Poem by "Pedro"—used with permission

Shame and jealousy 1

Further reflections on shame 23

Psychic murder syndrome 53

Shame in the psychoanalytic consulting room 123

A note on psychoanalysis for the general reader 143

care-givers, the threat of the blank look of non-recognition is ever­

reconstituting it through the perception of one who is not myself.

. [Kilborne, 1999, p. 42]

W h e n a person seeks help from a psychoanalyst or psychothera­

Shame seems to be an emotion little discussed in our clinical work.

Since then, the situation has changed enormously. Psychoanalysts,

A note on clinical illustrations

The book contains n u m e r o u s clinical illustrations, f r o m b o t h

Shame and jealousy

Panic in the classroom

A middle manager was required periodically to make business

horror, f o u n d that he was unable to ad lib and t h i n k o n his feet i n

Violent responses to shame

shame, jealousy, and panic would be exacerbated by Natalie's

free to pursue other liaisons outside her m a i n relationship w i t h

p r e o c c u p a t i o n a n d w i t h d r a w a l was n o t clear to Pedro. H e

Themes of shame and jealousy with "Natalie and Pedro"

Jealousy and shame are intimately e n t w i n e d i n the tragic interaction

The positive function of the lie

honest intimacy with Pedro conflicted fundamentally with the fact

In the beginning, mother and baby are normally exquisitely attuned

makes possible (Hietanen et al., 1998; Schore, 2000). However, if the

capacity to evoke a response—to evoke her love. This is the

behaviour. I n the case of Pedro and Natalie, Pedro w o u l d feel

The baby quickly learns to make a forecast: "Just now it is safe to

I n o p t i m u m early life, the small c h i l d w i l l experience many

If the gaze of the other is experienced not only as judgemental but as

T h e stranger, the father, a n d the primal s c e n e

Whereas previously, unconscious union with the mother was

W i t h the advent of the p r i m a l scene and the Oedipal position, the

a stranger debarred from the union of two others permitted access

A t an earlier stage the child's concern lies w i t h the face, the

care-givers, the threat of the blank look of non-recognition is ever

W h e n a person seeks help from a psychoanalyst or psychothera

... the oedipal situation stage of development proper is charac

A stand-up comedienne i n t h e r a p y — J u l i e — t a l k e d of her contrast

For some children—and later adults—the threat of this "embarrass