Late Ancient Platonism in Eighteenth-Century German Thought

International Archives of the History of Ideas 227
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Leo Catana
Late Ancient
Platonism in
Eighteenth-
Century German
Thought
INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS
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EVIDENCE IN THE AGE OF THE NEW

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Leo Catana
Late Ancient Platonism

in Eighteenth-Century
German Thought
Leo Catana
Division of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities
University of Copenhagen
Copenhagen, Denmark
ISSN 0066-6610 ISSN 2215-0307 (electronic)

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Preface
This book comprises four chapters that were originally published in several periodi-
cals and one collective volume. Chapter 2 was published, in 2017, in Biography,
Historiography, and Modes of Philosophizing: The Tradition of Collective
Biography in Early Modern Europe, which is edited by Patrick Baker. Chapter 3
appeared in Apeiron and Chaps. 4 and 5 in The International Journal of the Platonic
Tradition, both in 2013. This chronology does not quite reflect the genesis of these
publications, since Chap. 1 was developed first and presented at a workshop at the
Humboldt University already in 2010. However, the four chapters were planned
from the outset as a coherent and chronologically ordered account of the way in
which late ancient Platonism was interpreted in the eighteenth-century Germany. I
owe thanks to the editors, journals, and publishers for allowing me to reuse the
material. Chapters 1 and 6 are new. In the former, I position my book in the context
of current debates on the eighteenth-century thought; in the latter, I argue that this
book is relevant to modern Plato scholarship.
The four chapters in the present book have been revised to a considerable extent
since they first appeared. In addition to standardization in terms of layout, reference
system, cross-references, etc., I have revised each of the four chapters, integrating
recent studies and responding to criticism and suggestions that I have received in the
meanwhile. In particular, in 2016, the four chapters were submitted to the Faculty
of Theology, University of Copenhagen, for the degree of doctor of theology
(Habilitationsschrift): my opponents – George Boys-Stones in particular but also
Camilla Serck-Hanssen and Carsten Pallesen – offered valuable criticisms and sug-
gestions, which forced me to reconsider and, in several cases, revise and rewrite the
originally published texts. Needless to say, the responsibility for the result is entirely
mine.
In quotations from the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Latin texts, I have
expanded abbreviations, changed “&” to “et,” “u,” and “v,” omitted accents, and
changed “j” uniformly to “i.” Otherwise, I have retained the orthography and punc-
tuation of the editions I have used. I have modernized the capitalization and accents
in quotations from Greek.
v
vi Preface
The German text in Chap. 2 – C. A. Heumann, “VI. Das Leben Plotini vom
Porphyrio beschrieben,” in Acta philosophorum 1.1 (1715) – has been edited by me
and Tue Søvsø. The English translation of that text, including its notes, was done by
me. The German text in Chap. 2 is a diplomatic edition of the copy held in the Royal
Library, Copenhagen (catalogue: Filos., 151). The letters in Fraktur are transcribed
as Roman letters. Latin and French words are rendered in italicized Roman letters.
Greek words are reproduced in Greek letters. The irregularity in the size of space
between words is not reproduced. It is noted, however, when the original lacks a
space. “&” is transliterated as “et” in passages written in Latin. There are some
deviations from modern German orthographic conventions, such as “kan” for
“kann” and the spelling of words with “ck,” along with the practice of writing
“GOtt” (presumably a means of showing respect for the divinity, whose first letter,
according to the norms of the language, was already capitalized; “Gott” would have
been indistinguishable in this sense from all other nouns). The punctuation and
spelling of the original have been retained. Emendations are given in the footnotes.
The division into paragraphs follows that of the original text. In the English transla-
tion, however, large paragraphs have been broken down into smaller ones.
Heumann provides many notes to this text. These notes are indicated in his main
text with a Roman letter or an asterisk in parentheses. In the present edition, such
notes are reproduced in the footnotes as Roman letters. Any information added to
Heumann’s own notes is put in square brackets. All orthographic footnotes keyed to
the German text are by Tue Søvsø. All footnotes in Arabic numerals are by me.
References are to page and line number, e.g., “14.4” refers to page 14, line 4, in the
German text. Running titles are not counted in the line numeration.
The German text was transcribed and annotated by Tue Søvsø in collaboration
with me. We have benefitted from Finn Gredal Jensen’s knowledge of the eighteenth-
century punctuation, for which we thank him. Translation and notes are by me. I
would like to thank Kathrin Maurer, Martin Mulsow, Anthony Ossa-Richardson,
Marianne Pade, Anna Lena Sandberg Rasmussen, Giannis Stamatellos, Tue Søvsø,
and Paola Zambelli for their assistance.
Copenhagen, Denmark Leo Catana

Contents
1 The German Enlightenment: Modern Interpretations�� 1

1.1 Eighteenth-Century Germany Intellectual Life
and the Enlightenment�� 1
1.2 Lutheranism and Eighteenth-Century German,
Intellectual Culture�� 8
1.3 Platonism in Eighteenth-Century Thought
and the Historiography of Philosophy�� 10
1.4 The Thesis of the Book. Survey of Its Chapters �� 13
References�� 17
2 From persona to systema: Heumann’s Dethronement
of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus and the Biographical
Model for Writing the History of Philosophy�� 21
2.1 Heumann’s Cultural Context: Lutheran anti-Platonism�� 21
2.2 Heumann’s Negative and Positive Program for Writing
the History of Philosophy �� 24
2.3 Heumann’s Argumentative Strategy in his Commentary
on Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus�� 29
2.4 Heumann’s Influence upon Eighteenth-
and Nineteenth-Century General Histories of Philosophy�� 31
VI. Das Leben Plotini vom Porphyrio beschrieben.�� 34
VI. The Life of Plotinus Described by Porphyry �� 46
References�� 60
3 The Origin of the Division Between Middle Platonism
and Neoplatonism�� 65
3.1 Introduction�� 65
3.2 Brucker’s Historiographical Categories: ‘System’,
‘Eclecticism’, and ‘Syncretism’�� 67
3.3 Historiographical Assumptions in Brucker’s
Reconstruction of the Secta Eclectica�� 71
vii
viii Contents
3.4 Brucker’s Reconstruction of the System

of the Secta Eclectica�� 77
3.5 The Secta Eclectica: Brucker’s Legacy in General
Histories of Philosophy�� 81
3.6 Problems in Brucker’s Reconstruction of the Secta Eclectica�� 84
3.7 Brucker’s Alternative Guides to Plato: Cicero,
Alcinous and Apuleius�� 88
3.8 Conclusion�� 90
References�� 90
4 Changing Interpretations of Plotinus: The Eighteenth-Century
Introduction of the Concept of a ‘System of Philosophy’�� 95
4.2 Brucker’s Use of the Historiographical Term ‘System
of Philosophy’�� 99
4.3 Plotinus’ Use of the Term ‘System’�� 104
4.4 The Term ‘System of Philosophy’ Entering Eighteenth-
and Nineteenth-Century Plotinus Scholarship�� 108
4.5 Early Determinations of the Architecture of Plotinus’
System: Its Principles�� 112
4.6 Hermeneutic Problems Caused by the System-Concept�� 121
Appendix�� 124
Is Plotinus’ Philosophy Characterised by the Term ‘System’
or ‘System of Philosophy’?�� 124
References�� 128
5 Thomas Taylor’s Dissent from Some Eighteenth-Century
Views on Platonic Philosophy: The Ethical and Theological
Context�� 133
5.2 Platonic Ethics: Divine Likeness�� 136
5.3 Some Eighteenth-Century Critics of Neoplatonism:
Warburton and Brucker �� 140
5.4 James Mill. Taylor’s Anonymous Critic of 1804 and 1809,
Emulating Brucker�� 143
5.5 Brucker’s Rejection of the Biographical Model �� 146
5.6 Christian Revelation and its Significance to Brucker’s
Historiography�� 148
5.7 Brucker and the Eighteenth-Century Campaign against
Platonic Virtue Ethics�� 153
5.8 Taylor’s Legacy�� 157
6 Afterword. Schleiermacher and Modern Plato Scholarship�� 165
Index�� 171
Chapter 1
The German Enlightenment: Modern
Interpretations
1.1 Eighteenth-Century Germany Intellectual Life

and the Enlightenment
The present book examines a period in the history of thought that is commonly
labelled the Enlightenment, that is, the period from ca. 1650 to ca. 1780. Before I
introduce the theme of my book, it may be useful to provide the reader with an
overview of some of the most influential research publications dedicated to the
intellectual life of the Enlightenment.
The Enlightenment has enjoyed a marked interest among historians of philoso-
phy and intellectual historians in the twentieth century, and this interest has increased
in the twenty-first century. In 1932, Ernst Cassirer published Die Philosophie der
Aufklärung, where he affirmed the proud characterization of the eighteenth century
as a “philosophical century” (“Philosophisches Jahrhundert”), because it questioned
inherited traditions and deep assumptions embedded in human thought and action.
It was indeed a critical philosophy.1 One example of this critical element we find,
according to Cassirer, in the French Enlightenment philosopher Denis Diderot and
his Encyclopédie (first edition 1751–1772), whose accounts of intellectual tradi-
tions no longer depended upon inherited doxographical accounts, but on indepen-
dent analysis and systematic exposition.2
This favourable characterization of the Enlightenment was echoed and, in some
respects, reinforced by Peter Gay in his widely read book, The Enlightenment. An
Interpretation (1966). The critical component highlighted by Cassirer meant, as
Gay saw things, that religious authorities were questioned in the Enlightenment
period, and that the age as a whole was anti-clerical and anti-Christian, moving
Cassirer 1932, xi.

1
E.g. Cassirer 1932, 301–302.

2
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 1

L. Catana, Late Ancient Platonism in Eighteenth-Century German Thought,
International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales
d’histoire des idées 227, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20511-9_1
2 1 The German Enlightenment: Modern Interpretations
close to atheism.3 According to Gay, philosophy and religion were now widely sepa-
rated—philosophical reasoning had become autonomous in regard to religious
authorities. This interpretation was soon met with criticism, and one of the promi-
nent critics was Robert Darnton, who was not convinced by Gay’s claim about the
Enlightenment as an age in which reason had become autonomous; his scepticism
applied to Catholic and Protestant countries alike.4
It is a common tenet in the works of Cassirer and Gay that they searched for
some essence unifying the Enlightenment movements found in various European
countries. Such an essentialist approach was abandoned by J. G. A. Pocock, a mem-
ber of the Cambridge School of Intellectual History during the 1960s and 1970s. In
his works on the history of early modern political philosophy, he defended the view
that one should differentiate between different forms of Enlightenment in different
European countries. Hence, the phenomenon of Enlightenment should be analysed
according to national contexts.5 The present study is in line with Pocock’s view as
far as it is contextual and abstains from synthesis—I shall set out the precise delin-
eation of the study below. The reason for this choice on my part is fairly straightfor-
ward: It would be rash to make a synthesis before we have a thorough understanding
of its parts. If we did so, we would run the risk of imposing pre-conceived schemes
on our material, resulting into distorted reconstructions, possibly ignoring impor-
tant sources. In the case of the Enlightenment, even when restricted to Germany, we
do not find ourselves in such a privileged situation, where we have a thorough
understanding of its parts—on the contrary, there is a huge sub-terrain of unexam-
ined texts composed in Latin and German in Eighteenth-century Germany by little-
known authors. This book is an attempt to understand some of these unexamined
texts and to reconstruct their peculiar context. Admittedly, I point out that these texts
had an impact on contemporary and later thinkers, but I am not claiming that they
constitute more than a part of what we call the Enlightenment.
Another tenet that we find in the characterizations by Ernst Cassirer and espe-
cially Peter Gay is the anti-thesis between Enlightenment philosophy and religion.
This has been a widely accepted claim in the twentieth century, and in some
instances it has prompted a considerable degree of euro-centric proudness. In the
context of the German Enlightenment, Hans-Erich Bödeker re-assessed this rela-
tionship in an important article from 1989: Contrary to common belief, religion was
not an anti-thesis to Enlightenment philosophy, but an integral part of it.6 Following
the line of interpretation suggested by Bödeker, Thomas Ahnert published his
Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment (2006), which similarly
argued that religion played an important role in German philosophy around 1700.
Bödeker and Ahnert have not discussed the texts which I discuss in this book, but
my analysis nevertheless tends to converge with the general view defended in their
publications. I argue that in the context of German, eighteenth-century history of
3
Gay 1967–1970, I: 2–27.
4
Darnton 1971, 113–124.
5
This view is also explained in Pocock 2008.
6
Bödeker 1989, 145–195.
1.1 Eighteenth-Century Germany Intellectual Life and the Enlightenment 3
philosophy, religion and philosophy were integrated elements, and that religion had
the upper hand in this integration.
The pluralistic and contextual approach practised and defended by Pocock has
been forcefully sidestepped by Jonathan Israel, who, much like Cassirer and Gay,
has claimed a unifying component in the Enlightenment. Between 2001 and 2010,
he has published a widely discussed trilogy on Enlightenment thought in support of
this view—a view that has also attracted substantial criticism.7 In his first volume,
Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750, Israel
argues against national contextualizations of the European Enlightenment. Instead,
he depicts it as “a single highly integrated intellectual and cultural movement, dis-
playing differences in timing, no doubt, but for the most part preoccupied not only
with the same intellectual problems but often even the very same books and insights
everywhere from Portugal to Russia and from Ireland to Sicily.”8 The unifying com-
ponent in the European Enlightenment is, Israel contends, the so-called Radical
Enlightenment, allegedly inspired by Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) and the
Spinozism that he and his followers fostered across Europe. According to Israel,
radical Enlightenment was in opposition to moderate Enlightenment, which was
more conservative and much more integrated with clerical and political institutions.
It was the struggle between these two trans-national movements and, at the end, the
triumph of the radical Enlightenment, that gave the European Enlightenment its uni-
fied character:
Many scholars will, I assume, be rather surprised by the prominence given here to the role
of Spinoza and Spinozism not only on the continent but even in the British context where,
historiographically, there has been a persistent refusal to acknowledge that Spinoza had any
influence at all. Yet a close reading of the primary materials strongly suggests, at least to
me, that Spinoza and Spinozism were in fact the intellectual backbone of the European
Radical Enlightenment everywhere, not only in the Netherlands, Germany and France, Italy
and Scandinavia but also Britain and Ireland.9
Enlightenment, Israel continues, secularised “all institutions and ideas” and “demol-
ished all legitimation of monarchy, aristocracy, woman’s subordination to man,
ecclesiastical authority, equality, and democracy.”10 In this dramatic change, Radical
Enlightenment played a huge role that has not, still according to Israel, been prop-
erly recognised. In his next volume, Enlightenment Contested (2006), he contends
that even though the moderate Enlightenment in many places and phases of the
Enlightenment was more influential in regard to societal institutions than the radical
Enlightenment, it was the latter which, in the long run, provided secular values like
tolerance, personal freedom, democracy, equality, freedom of speech and sexual
emancipation.11
7
Israel 2001, 2006, 2010.
8
Israel 2001, v.
9
Israel 2001, vi.
10
Israel 2001, vi.
11
Israel 2006, 11–12, 511–512.
I am not in a position to judge Israel’s synthesis of the European Enlightenment,

but based on the texts that I have examined and presented in this book, I tend to
agree with the drift of those critics who have rejected Israel’s reconstruction of the
Enlightenment as schematic and largely distorted and undocumented.12 Since I am
not offering a new synthesis of the Enlightenment, there is no reason for me to relate
my present book to the main claim in Israel’s trilogy. There is, however, one aspect
in his trilogy that has relevance to the present work, namely his references to histo-
ries of philosophy produced in Germany in the eighteenth century. In his 2006 vol-
ume, he dedicates an entire section to the emergence of history of philosophy in
Germany in this period, which, he contends, is critical and free of theological prem-
ises, and which epitomises the tolerance characteristic of the Enlightenment.13 He
describes Enlightenment historians of philosophy in the following manner:
While all Enlightenment blocs battled to advance toleration, combat superstition, and
secure greater freedom of thought from theological and political authority, critical histori-
ans of philosophy had special grounds for eyeing the exclusive claims to truth of most
modern and ancient systems with suspicion and laid particular stress on the need to be
undogmatic and to leave no niche unexplored in the work of scholarly scrutiny.14
In other words, among historians of philosophy we do find the opposition between

philosophy and religion claimed by scholars like Cassirer and Gay, and the histori-
ans of philosophy incarnated this ideal of the Enlightenment philosopher, whose
works were free of theological prejudices; they were critical and independent.
Two German historians, Christoph August Heumann (1681–1764) and Johann
Jacob Brucker (1696–1770) were instrumental to the new critical history of philoso-
phy developed in Germany in the eighteenth century. I shall give a fuller introduc-
tion to them below, but in this context I shall only point out their main contributions
to German, eighteenth-century history of philosophy in order to make sense of
Israel’s claim. In the 1710s and 1720s, Heumann published a series of articles on the
ideal methodology of the history of philosophy in the journal Acta philosophorum,
refusing the earlier biographical model, ultimately going back to Diogenes Laertius
(third century C.E.) and his Lives of the Famous Philosophers, where past philoso-
phers’ lives and thinking had been reported historically. Heumann argued for a new
model in which the systems of past philosophers were identified and assessed.
Inspired by Heumann’s precepts for writing the history of philosophy, Brucker com-
posed his five-volume Latin Historia critica philosophiae, which came out in its
12
See, for instance, the criticism raised against Israel 2001, 2006 in by McMahon 2007, 614–616.
McMahon argues convincingly that Israel misrepresents his material in order to make it fit into his
pre-conceived scheme. See also the points made about Israel’s 2001 volume in Kors 2003, 459–
460. According to Kors, Israel under-estimates the role of orthodox theologians and philosophers
in Enlightenment philosophy. Ruler 2007 has criticised Israel’s 2006 volume for over-estimating
the role of Spinoza and Spinozism in the context of secularization. For further criticism of Israel’s
interpretation, see Erdozain 2017.
13
Israel 2006, 409–542, has a section, “Intellectual Emancipation”, dedicated to the emergence of
history of philosophy in the Eighteenth century; German histories of philosophy are at the centre
of this section.
14
Israel 2006, 479.
first edition in 1742–1744, and which was reprinted in 1767, to which an appendix
was added. Brucker’s work was the most detailed, the longest and the most influen-
tial history of philosophy produced in the eighteenth century. A much abbreviated,
English translation of Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae, translated by Enfield,
came out in 1791. What does Israel make of these two historians of philosophy?
In Israel’s 2001 volume, he only refers a few times to Brucker’s work, always in
footnotes and in a peripheral manner. In his 2006 volume, on the other hand, he
considers Brucker’s work at length in the above-mentioned section, “Intellectual
Emancipation”. In his 2011 volume, neither Heumann nor Brucker is mentioned.
What does he say in his 2006 volume? Citing Brucker’s explanation of eclecticism,
Israel explains:
His [i.e. Heumann’s] student Brucker, equally keen to reconcile history of philosophy with
Christian tradition through pure reason, held that the only true eclectic is he who lays aside
all prejudgements based on authority and antiquity, embracing only clara et evidentes prin-
cipia, that is whatever is clearly demonstrated wherever he finds it.15
From this citation we get the impression that Brucker was inspired by the philo-
sophical method of René Descartes, advanced in his Discours de la méthode (1637),
and that Brucker, the historian of philosophy, did not rely on theological premises at
all. I tend to think that such a characterization is misleading.
If Brucker had applied such rigorous eclectic method within his history of phi-
losophy, he could rightfully be credited with the emancipatory role mentioned
above. The problem with Israel’s reading is that he ignores passages which manifest
confessional and theological premises, as I have argued elsewhere.16 As argued in
this book, I find it hard to attribute to Heumann and Brucker the undogmatic and
emancipative role cited above. Although they liked to declare themselves free of
prejudgements, one should bear in mind that they did not subscribe to a modern,
completely non-biased concept of prejudgement; they regarded Revelation as com-
prising truths which surpassed the limits of human reason—truths which should
not, according to them, be categorised as ‘prejudices’ but simply as truths that we
must accept by faith because they surpass human reason. In other words, reason was
an aid to faith—it did not oppose faith.17 I discuss this theological element and its
significance in the writings of Heumann and Brucker extensively in the present
book, typically finding myself questioning Israel’s assertions. Generally speaking, I
tend to see the historiographical work of Heumann and Brucker as an extension of
their confessional position, that is, Protestantism and Lutheranism. One of the pres-
ent book’s claims to originality rests on the identification, articulation and docu-
mentation of the links between their historiographical work and their theological
orientation. In the present book I consider material not considered thoroughly by
Israel, namely Heumann’s critical work on Laertius’ biographical model of writing
the history of philosophy, especially its application to late ancient Platonism.
15
Israel 2006, 477–478.
16
Catana 2008, 147–192.
17
Compare Israel’s interpretation with Catana 2008, 147–191; and Catana 2010, 70–73.
One last publication should be mentioned in this survey of approaches to the

Enlightenment, namely Martin Mulsow’s Moderner aus dem Untergrund, Radikale
Frühaufklärung in Deutschland 1680–1720, which came out in 2002; an English
translation came out in 2015. His overall argument is that German Enlightenment
had a more independent nature than often thought, and he examines a variety of
fairly unknown material, thereby making a genuine contribution to our knowledge
about the period. Heumann and Brucker are mentioned a few times, but they are not
key figures in his account. We do find a chapter in Mulsow’s book, however, which
deals with the reception of Plato in the early German Enlightenment.18 As he
explains, in the Renaissance the idea of a philosophia perennis had been widely
accepted, claiming a fundamental harmony between early Christianity and ancient
Platonism. As Mulsow explains: “Because Plato was supposedly in contact with the
biblical patriarchs, it seemed understandable that his philosophy contained triads
that were recognised by the early Church Fathers as Trinitarian premonitions of the
Logos doctrine from the Gospel of John.” This idea of a Platonic philosophia peren-
nis was strongly rejected in Germany in the seventeenth century by Daniel Georg
Morhof (1639–1691) and the students of Christian Thomasius (1655–1728). This
Platonism was examined by critical philologists, who examined the key texts under-
pinning the Platonic philosophia perennis, and it was accused of nourishing the
“enthusiasts” and Pietists in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century.19
Mulsow examines two treatises targeting this philosophia perennis, namely
Jacques Souverain’s Le Platonisme dévoilé (1700) and Nikolaus Hieronymus
Grundling’s Plato atheos (1713).20 This rejection of a Platonic Philosophia perennis
among German Enlightenment theologians and philosophers obviously informed
the two historians of philosophy dealt with in the present book, Heumann and
Brucker. However, the present book has a different focus compared with that of
Mulsow: It does not deal with the decline of Plato’s philosophia perennis in
eighteenth-century Germany, but with the reception of two ancient philosophers
who were influenced by Plato, but who had also developed their own independent
philosophies, and whose reception was fairly independent of the reception of the
philosophia perennis, namely Plotinus (204/5–270 CE) and Porphyry (234?–305?
CE).
As we shall see in the present book, these late ancient Platonists were drawn into
the battle against Pietists in the context of German theology around 1700. This
peculiar reception of Plotinus and Porphyry in eighteenth-century Germany has not
been examined by Mulsow or Israel. Admittedly, Sylvain Matton (1992), Michael
Heyd (1995) and Giovanna Varani (2008) have carried out important historical stud-
ies of the reception of Plotinus and Porphyry in eighteenth-century Germany, but
much work is still needed in regard to the reception of their ethical and religious
18
Mulsow 2002, 175–296. In this work, he does not examine the reception of Plotinus and Porphyry
in German Enlightenment thought.
19
Mulsow 2002, 175–176.
20
Mulsow 2002, 175–205. For an analysis of Heumann’s interpretation of philosophia perennis, in
this case Hebrew philosophy, see Mahlev 2015.
theories, and in particular in regard to the intersection between their ethical and
religious theories, on the one hand, and eighteenth-century German theology and
history of philosophy, on the other hand. Hopefully, this book will remedy this
omission.
The work by Varani, Pensiero ‘alato’ e modernità. Il neoplatonismo nella storio-
grafia filosofica in Germania (1559–1807), deserves special attention, because it
focuses on some of the same topics as the present book. One of the major claims is
that the interpretations of Plotinus presented by Dietrich Tiedemann, Wilhelm
Gottlieb Tennemann and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century marked a radical improvement on the Plotinus interpreta-
tion presented by Marsilio Ficino in the fifteenth century.21 In the present book,
Chap. 4, I present a different perspective: I argue that Tiedemann, Tennemann and
Hegel, in their respective readings of Plotinus, carried on historiographical assump-
tions derived from Heumann and Brucker, which were decisively informed by theo-
logical assumptions, and which were historigraphically problematic or even
untenable.
Varani does a good job mapping historically a host of references to late ancient
Platonists in the context which she deals with, i.e. Germany 1559–1807. One of the
strengths of her book is its clearly defined scope. The disadvantage of this strategy
is that she does not always connect these references to other developments that took
place within the same context, and which intersected with the reception of late
ancient Platonists. Let me point out three examples. First, Varani does not pay atten-
tion to the rejection of the biographical tradition as a legitimate and adequate
medium for narrating the history of philosophy, including the philosophy of indi-
vidual late ancient Platonists, which took place in the eighteenth century in Germany.
Heumann was instrumental to the dethronement of this biographical tradition in the
1710s, and his interpretation of late ancient Platonists was closely linked to this
dethronement, as I explain in Chap. 2.22 Second, Varani does not connect her analy-
sis of the reception of late ancient Platonists to the emergence of a new methodol-
ogy for the history of philosophy, which took place in the same context, Germany
1559–1807. One case in point is the very same Heumann, whose ‘Einleitung zur
historia philosophica’ (1715–1716) was important to his understanding and evalu-
ation of late ancient Platonists. Unfortunately, Varani by-passes this text, even in her
analysis of Heumann’s understanding and evaluation of late ancient Platonists.23
Third, apart from very few passing comments, Varani rarely relates her references to
late ancient Platonists among seventeenth- and eighteenth-century German authors
21
Varani 2008, 23–28, 405–475.
22
Varani 2008, 229–231, thus deals with Heumann’s ‘Das Leben Plotini vom Porphyrio bescrieben’
(Heumann 1715b), but she does not connect it to Heumann’s overall endeavour to dismantle the
biographical tradition, and she does not connect Heumann’s review of Porphyry’s Plotinus biogra-
phy to his text on Laertius, that is, Heumann, ‘V. Diogenes Laertius De vitis philosophorum’
(Heumann 1715c).
23
Varani 2008, 228–240 (dedicated to Heumann), does not engage with Heumann’s ‘Einleitung zur
historia philosophica’ (Heumann 1715–1716).
to contemporary or near-contemporary religious movements within Protestantism,

although such phenomena affected the understanding and evaluation of these late
ancient Platonists. For instance, Quietists and Pietists were accused of using these
late ancient Platonists in support of their theologies, which, in turn, coloured the
reception of these Platonists.
1.2 Lutheranism and Eighteenth-Century German,

Intellectual Culture
Martin Luther was born in 1483 and died in 1546. In 1520 he published the theo-
logical writings that decisively broke with the Catholic Church and eventually
paved the way for the Protestant reformation.24 The historians of philosophy dis-
cussed in this book were active in between the 1690s and the 1810s. Even though
both Luther and these later figures mainly lived in Germany, one still has to admit
that they were widely separated from Luther in time, and one may ask how these
eighteenth-century historians of philosophy were influenced by Luther and his
reformation?
Luther’s publications of 1520 led to his exclusion from the Catholic Church in
1521. What some might have hoped would put an end to his criticism of Catholicism,
now turned out to be the opposite: From his home in Wittenberg he orchestrated the
reformation in the 1520s through a huge output of theological and liturgical writings
and intense dialogue with other critics of Catholicism, e.g. Erasmus of Rotterdam
(1466–1536) and Ulrich Zwingli (1484–1531). Catholicism, as they knew it, was
certainly a theological position, but it was also a political power structure, in which
the Pope, Rome and the enormous institutional network of the Catholic church had
a deep impact in those European countries that it controlled. From the 1520s
onwards, tensions between Catholics and Protestants kept rising in Germany and
outside Germany, and these fractures had deep and tangible political consequences.
In Germany, followers of Luther presented the Augsburg Confession in 1530 in an
attempt to state their position in their negotiations with Catholics, though it would
be wrong to claim that the negotiations settled the conflict between the two parties.
Finally, in 1555, the Peace of Augsburg settled the conflict between Catholics and
Lutherans, and the fractions that existed on both sides, by dividing Germany into
Catholic and Lutheran states. A similar movement took place outside Germany. In
1534, the English king Henry VIII broke with the Catholic Church, and in 1559
Queen Elizabeth I introduced the reformation in England. In 1536, the reformation
was introduced in Denmark and Sweden. In 1541, the French reformer John Calvin
(1509–1564) brought the reformation to Geneva, Switzerland, which in turn spread
to South-east France and the Netherlands. In 1560, Calvin’s reformation came to
Scotland. In the period 1545–1563, the Catholic Church arranged a series of
24
For Martin Luther and his reformation, see Killy and Vierhaus 1995–2003, VI: 536–538.
1.2 Lutheranism and Eighteenth-Century German, Intellectual Culture 9
eetings to counter the reformation in Europe, but unsuccessfully: In sixteenth-

m
century Europe, the monopoly of Catholic theology was broken, and in many
European countries the political dominance of Catholicism was something of the
past.25
This theological and political re-shaping of Germany in the sixteenth century
was decisive to German intellectual life in the seventeenth century, and one may
claim that the reformation in Germany remained a decisive impulse on most levels
until the middle of the eighteenth century. The downfall of Catholicism did not
mean that the political power exerted by Catholicism simply evaporated, but that it
was replaced by other forms of political power and social control. In German,
Lutheran states this meant that the Lutheran church, the state and educational insti-
tutions were harmonised.26 The above-mentioned Christian Thomasius was a major
figure in early German Enlightenment and he played a key role in this process,
especially in the context of learning and university culture.27 The historian and phi-
lologist Heumann, a key figure in this book, belonged to the school of Thomasius.28
To anticipate my argument in this book, Heumann’s work on Plotinus and Porphyry
can to some extent be understood within that triadic culture of state, church and
learning, as I shall clarify in the Chap. 2. Jacob Brucker was a historian and a min-
ister in the Lutheran church29; his Historia critica philosophia was explicitly apolo-
getic, as I have argued in my 2008 book on Brucker, and as I shall argue in Chaps.
2 and 3 in the present book.30
Heumann and Brucker are now almost unknown, so let me add a few words
about them. Heumann was born in 1681 in Allstedt (Thüringen). He studied theol-
ogy at the university in Jena, and subsequently taught philosophy there from 1702
to 1709. In addition, he preached in the university church in Jena in the same period.
In 1709 he became head of the theological school (theologische Seminar) in
Eisenach and served at the same time as a collaborator at the Gymnasium in the
same city, where he lectured on philosophy. In 1717 he was promoted and became
head and professor of the Gymnasium in Göttingen, and in 1729 he defended his
doctorate of theology at the university of Helmstedt. The Gymnasium in Göttingen
was granted status of a university from 1734, and Heumann was subsequently
appointed professor of literature at the faculty of philosophy; in 1745 he was
appointed professor of theology at that institution. He lectured on church history
and biblical exegesis, and he was a very prolific writer. He died in Göttingen in
1764.31
25
For Luther’s reformation, its confessional divisions and development in sixteenth-century
Europe, see Bagchi and Steinmetz 2004.
26
Hsia 1989.
27
For Thomasius and his role in German Enlightenment, see Ahnert 2005, 2006.
28
For Heumann, see Cassius 1768 and Sparn 1988.
29
François 1998, 99–109.
30
Catana 2008, 147–191.
31
Killy and Vierhaus 1995–2003, V: 9; Krumwiede 1972.
Brucker was born in Augsburg in 1696. In the period 1715–1720, he studied

theology in Jena under the supervision of Johann Franz Buddeus (1667–1729), an
important German Lutheran theologian, who firmly believed that philosophy could
and should serve theology in its fight against what he conceived as atheism. In 1724,
Brucker became head of the grammar school (Latein Schule) in Kaufbeuren. In
1744, the year when the fifth and final volume of his Historia critica philosophiae
was published, he was appointed minister of the Lutheran church in Augsburg. He
remained in that position until his death in 1770,32 and he confirmed the Augsburg
Confession on several occasions throughout his career.33 So much for the lives of
Heumann and Brucker. Now let me turn to their work as historians of philosophy.
1.3 Platonism in Eighteenth-Century Thought

and the Historiography of Philosophy
As mentioned earlier, the present book has a fairly restricted focus. It examines the
reception of late ancient Platonism. It does not deal with the reception of ancient
Platonism in its totality, but only with late ancient Platonism, that is, the Platonism
developed by Plotinus (204/5–270 CE) and Porphyry (234?–305? CE).34 It does not
deal with other ancient philosophical movements outside Platonism, such as
Aristotelianism, Stoicism etc., although these non-Platonic movements also enjoyed
a considerable interest in the same period and place, eighteenth-century Germany.
The “reception” in question is similarly restricted. Its earliest references are to the
seventeenth century and its latest references are to the early twentieth century, but
attention is mainly focused on the first half of the eighteenth century, since this is
where we find the most influential re-interpretations of late ancient Platonism. In
terms of geography, special attention is paid to Germany, since this is where the key
interpreters were based and worked. In one chapter (five) I extend my focus to
England, but even here the main impulse comes from Germany. Having said so, one
should bear in mind that print culture transcended national borders, especially
because some of the central texts produced in Germany in this period were composed
in Latin and had a wide, European circulation. This applies to the two key interpret-
ers, Heumann and Brucker. For instance, Brucker’s Latin Historia critica philoso-
phiae (5 vols, first edition 1742–1744; it was reprinted in 1767, where volume 6 was
added as an appendix), was cited and paraphrased extensively in Denis Diderot’s
Encyclopédie, which was in French.35 Likewise, Heumann’s critical essays on
Plotinus and Porphyry, written in German, were subsequently integrated into general
histories of philosophy, which were mainly written in German in the eighteenth cen-
32
Killy and Vierhaus 1995–2003, II: 149.
33
Alt 1926, 51, 86. For this issue, see François 1998.
34
For Plotinus, see Gerson 2014; for Porphyry, see Emilsson 2015.
35
For Diderot’s use of Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae, see Proust 1962, 233–293, 548–
555; Casini 1962, 259 n. 95.
1.3 Platonism in Eighteenth-Century Thought and the Historiography of Philosophy 11
tury, but which also inspired general histories of philosophy written in other European
languages in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. So even though I focus on
a rather isolated episode in the eighteenth century, its effects were widespread.
The time and place mentioned above was not only an important scene for innova-
tive re-interpretations of late ancient Platonism; it was also an important scene for
the development of history of philosophy as a philosophical discipline. Reports of
past philosophy certainly existed before the eighteenth century, for instance in the
form of Laertius and his Lives of the Famous Philosophers, which had been redis-
covered in the fifteenth century, but such reports had primarily been seen as a branch
of history or philology, not as a branch of philosophy.36 All this changed radically in
the eighteenth century, and the very same authors, Brucker and Heumann, also
played an instrumental role in the development of a philosophical history of phi-
losophy. To some extent one may even claim that their development of a new history
of philosophy went hand in hand with their re-interpretation of late ancient
Platonism, as will become clear in Chap. 2.
I have contributed to our understanding of the emergence of eighteenth-century
German history of philosophy in my book entitled The Historiographical Concept
‘System of Philosophy’: Its Origin, Nature, Influence and Legitimacy, published in
2008. How does the present book relate to my earlier publication? The short answer
is that the present book complements my earlier book by examining new material
which was not dealt with in the 2008 book, and which pertains to a relatively inde-
pendent research area calling for independent analysis and presentation. In my 2008
book, I presented an analysis of one key concept in Brucker’s Historia critica phi-
losophiae, namely ‘system of philosophy’, which he presented in his ‘Preliminary
dissertation’ at the beginning of the work.37 Brucker used this concept as a criterion
of inclusion in his history of philosophy—only those past thinkers who worked out
systems of philosophy deserved to be included; and as a precept for analysis and
presentation of past philosophy—the historian of philosophy should identify the
principles in a past philosopher’s system of philosophy and reconstruct the connec-
tions between these principles and the doctrines stated by the same philosopher
within the various compartments of philosophy, e.g. ethics. In my 2008 volume I
argued that Brucker keyed this methodological concept to two other methodological
concepts, namely ‘eclecticism’ (successful construction of systems of philosophy,
carried out by independent-minded philosophers) and ‘syncretism’ (unsuccessful
attempts to construct systems of philosophy, carried out by philosophers enslaved
by traditions). I argued that these three concepts were consistently employed in
Brucker’s account of past philosophers, and I discussed three cases in point, namely
his accounts of Plato, Aristotle and Giordano Bruno.38 Finally, I discussed the
36
For the rediscovery of Laertius’ Lives, see Tolomio 1993.
37
The ‘Dissertatio praeliminaris’ can be found in Brucker 1742–1767, I: 3–45. This methodologi-
cal aspect is dealt with in Catana 2008, 11–34.
38
For Plato, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 627–728; for Aristotle, see I: 776–839; for Bruno, see V: 6,
7, 9–10, 12–62, and VI: 809–816. I examine Brucker’s account of Plato in Catana 2008, 73–94; his
account of Aristotle on 94–108; and his account of Bruno on 35–62.
i mplications of Heumann’s and Brucker’s confessional stance, that of Lutheranism:

They both held that Revelation and philosophy had to be distinguished, and that the
limitations of human reason implies that human beings should respect Revelation as
authoritative in some contexts, e.g. metaphysics and the human soul’s afterlife.39
This view was translated into Brucker’s periodization, in which Martin Luther’s
reformation played a decisive role: It provided intellectual freedom to philosophers
to select principles in their respective systems of philosophy, that is, it paved the
way for eclecticism, which Brucker esteemed highly.40 In the remaining part of the
book I demonstrated how Brucker’s methodology for the history of philosophy
shaped general histories of philosophy produced over the following centuries, right
up till the twentieth century.41
One may say that my 2008 book was proleptic as far as it traced the impact of
Heumann and Brucker on later histories of philosophy. The present book, on the
other hand, one might call retrospective; its main focus is not on the new model for
writing the history of philosophy that Heumann and Brucker developed, but on the
old model that they discarded, namely the biographical tradition inherited from
Diogenes and others. Late ancient Platonism is one case in point, and it is a very
interesting one, because it reveals some of the theological motives that led Lutherans
like Heumann and Brucker to abandon the biographical model.
In the present book I draw on my knowledge about the development of the his-
tory of philosophy, but first of all I present material that was not dealt with in the
2008 volume. In Chap. 2 I present Heumann’s review of Porphyry’s Plotinus biog-
raphy, which had been prefixed to several editions of Plotinus’ Enneads.42 I also
describe its cultural and religious context as well as its argumentative strategy; the
review makes it clear why Heumann, as a Lutheran, is keen to get away from the
biographical model, especially when it comes to the history of ancient Platonism,
where the biographical model supported forms of personal religiosity that was
adverse to his agenda as a Lutheran. In addition, I bring the first-ever English trans-
lation of this review.
In Chap. 3 I pass on to Brucker’s establishment of a historiographical divide
between what came to be called Middle Platonism (ca. 80 B.C.E to ca. 220 C.E.),
on the one hand, and Neoplatonism (ca. 200 C.E. to ca. 550 C.E.), on the other. The
philosophies of Plotinus and Porphyry belonged to the latter. In this chapter I draw
on my earlier work of the concepts ‘system of philosophy’, ‘eclecticism‘and ‘syn-
cretism’, analysed in my 2008 book, but in the present book I show how Brucker,
inspired by Heumann’s review of Porphyry’s Plotinus biography, over 300 pages
employs these concepts on material that was not discussed in the 2008 book,
39
See Catana 2008, 147–168.
40
See Catana 2008, 169–177.
41
See Catana 2008, 193–329.
42
Heumann, ‘VI. Das Leben Plotini vom Porphyrio beschrieben’ (Heumann 1715b). This text was
not included in Catana 2008.
1.4 The Thesis of the Book. Survey of Its Chapters 13
including late ancient Platonism.43 According to Brucker, Neoplatonism was char-

acterised by syncretism and therefore despicable. One last word on terminology. In
my 2008 book I used the label ‘Neoplatonism’ about the philosophies of Plotinus,
Porphyry and their ancient followers. However, the research that underpins the pres-
ent book has led me to abandon this label and to speak of ‘late ancient Platonism’
instead, mainly because I have come to the conclusion that the label ‘Neoplatonism’
is illegitimate and misleading. I shall explain all this more fully in Chap. 3. In this
Chap. 3 it becomes clear why Brucker shared some of Heumann’s religious con-
cerns with Platonism, especially its idea of enthusiasm, furor, as a means to com-
municate with the divine.
The fourth chapter in the present book similarly transcends my 2008 publication.
Its focus is narrowed down to Plotinus, the main exponent of late ancient Platonism,
who, as said above, was not examined in my 2008 volume. In this chapter I examine
the hermeneutical implications of Brucker’s new method in the case of Plotinus:
What does it mean that Plotinus’ philosophy is now understood against the back-
ground of the concept of a system of philosophy? How does Brucker’s new interpre-
tation differ from the one that could be found in the earlier biographical account of
Porphyry? And to what extent was this new interpretation integrated in later general
histories of philosophy composed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries?
Chapter 5 similarly goes beyond the 2008 book. It examines how the English trans-
lator and Platonist Thomas Taylor (1758–1835) was met by fierce opposition by his
English critics, who were influenced by Brucker’s interpretation of late ancient
Platonism, especially by his criticism of the philosophies of Platonists like Plotinus
and Porphyry. This material was not included in the 2008 publication.
1.4 The Thesis of the Book. Survey of Its Chapters
The present book brings together material that has been published separately over
the last years in various journals and one collective volume, but which was origi-
nally conceived of as one coherent account. The thesis of this book is threefold.
First, that ancient Greek Platonism was re-interpreted in a radically new manner in
eighteenth-century German thought. Second, that this re-interpretation has not been
examined sufficiently among modern historians of philosophy—in particular, the
role of religion has been under-estimated. And third, that this eighteenth-century
re-interpretation is of relevance to some modern approaches to ancient Platonism.
Chapter 2 outlines the historical context of the eighteenth-century German rein-
terpretation of ancient Platonism. It does so by pointing out the intersection of four
disciplines in that century, namely history, philology, theology and history of
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 162–188, deals with Middle Platonism; in II: 189–462, he deals with
43
Neoplatonism. A few of these pages I discussed in a very peripheral manner; see Catana 2008, 74
n. 45 (discussing Brucker 1742–1767, II: 163.17–22), 74 n. 47 (discussing Brucker 1742–1767, II:
163.17–22, 165.20–166.4).
p hilosophy. One key figure in that context was Heumann, a German Lutheran theo-
logian, philologist and philosopher, as mentioned above. Heumann rejected the bio-
graphical tradition as a legitimate medium for writing the history of philosophy,
since he thought that this tradition had failed to root out fables and to assess in a
philosophical manner the philosophical systems elaborated by the past philosopher(s)
it portrayed. He used Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus to exemplify these characteristics,
which he claimed were inherent in the biographical tradition. Heumann’s devastat-
ing review of Porphyry’s biography fitted into his overall project, namely to work
out a new methodological foundation for the history of philosophy, focusing not on
the philosophers but on their respective philosophical systems.
In Chap. 2 I argue that Heumann’s review of Porphyry’s biography was premised
on theological assumptions deriving from his Lutheran stance, and that Porphyry’s
biography was in fact ill-suited to exemplify the biographical tradition used in the
pre-modern period to write the history of philosophy; this biography exhibits sev-
eral features that are peculiar to late-antique Platonic (or Neoplatonic) biographies,
but not to the ancient tradition of collective biographies exemplified by Diogenes. I
conclude that Heumann’s exemplification was a straw man fallacy, though an influ-
ential one, and that we need to reconsider some of the negative views about the
biographical tradition which we have inherited from him and his followers, directly
or indirectly. Heumann established a new philosophical genre—the history of phi-
losophy, as we have known it since the early modern period—and he thereby trans-
formed our sensibility towards what philosophy had meant before him; after
Heumann, the focus was no longer on the past philosopher as a model of emulation
(the philosopher’s persona), but on the past philosopher’s complex of philosophical
theories and arguments, his system (systema).
It has been known for several decades that Heumann’s precepts for writing the
history of philosophy shaped later eighteenth-century history of philosophy. It has
not been observed, however, that his precepts were primarily a theologically moti-
vated reaction against the uses of philosopher biographies in contemporary and
near-contemporary philosophy and theology, especially within the Platonic tradi-
tion that had been revitalised by Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499). I hope that my intro-
ductory essay will set out this theological context, which has been missing in
accounts of Platonism in eighteenth-century German thought as well as in our
knowledge about the emergence of history of philosophy in the eighteenth century.
Chapter 2 also contains a transcription of Heumann’s review of Porphyry’s Life of
Plotinus, as well as the first-ever English translation of this review, supplied with
notes that explain this theological context.
In Chap. 3 I move on from Heumann’s writings on ancient Platonism, published
in Germany in the 1710s, to the most influential interpretation of ancient Platonism
that was produced in the eighteenth century, namely the one by Jacob Brucker in the
1740s. As mentioned above, Brucker was a German historian and Lutheran minister
who wrote the most comprehensive history of philosophy written in the eighteenth
century, namely his Historia critica philosophiae, which was first published in five
volumes in Leipzig in 1742–1744, and which was reprinted in 1767, comprising an
appendix in one volume.
1.4 The Thesis of the Book. Survey of Its Chapters 15
It has been known for some time that Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae
implemented the methodological precepts for writing the history of philosophy that
had been laid down by Heumann, and that Brucker’s work institutionalised the his-
tory of philosophy as a philosophical discipline in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. In my Chap. 3 I describe a facet that has escaped most scholars, namely
how Brucker established an influential historiographical divide in regard to ancient
Platonism, namely the divide between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism.
According to Brucker, ancient Platonists like Apuleius (fl. 155 C.E.) and Alcinous
(second or third century C.E.), belonged to Middle Platonism, whereas the Platonists
Plotinus (204/5–270), Porphyry (234?–305?) and Iamblichus (fourth century C.E.)
belonged to Neoplatonism. I argue that three historiographical concepts were deci-
sive to Brucker’s historiographical divide: ‘system of philosophy’, ‘eclecticism’ and
‘syncretism’. By means of these concepts, he characterised Middle Platonism and
Neoplatonism as opposing philosophical movements, the former being a genuine
form of Platonism, the latter a false form. Brucker did not speak of ‘Neoplatonism’,
but of secta eclectica, an eclectic sect; the term ‘Neoplatonism’ was only coined in
Germany in the 1770s and 1780s, but on the basis of Brucker’s historiographical
divide between these two periods of ancient Platonism. It is new to most scholars
that the divide between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism derives from Brucker’s
Historia critica philosophiae. In Chap. 3 I argue that the arguments advanced in that
work for this historiographical divide do not support the strong divide, and that we
ought to abandon it in our understanding of ancient Platonism; partly because it is
untenable as it stands in Brucker’s work, and partly because it obscures more than it
reveals.
Chapter 4 explains the interpretative consequences of Brucker’s concept of a
system of philosophy in regard to Plotinus’ philosophy, that is, the chief philosopher
among the so-called Neoplatonists. It has frequently been assumed in histories of
philosophy from the eighteenth century onwards that Plotinus’ philosophy made up
the core of the Neoplatonic system of philosophy, and readers have been left with
the impression that Plotinus himself intended to work out a system of philosophy. I
argue in this chapter that this assumption was introduced relatively late, in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, and that it was primarily made possible by Brucker’s
methodology for the history of philosophy, to which the concept of a ‘system of
philosophy’ was essential. The historical identification of the period in which
Neoplatonism (Plotinus in particular) was attributed with a system of philosophy is
an important prerequisite for a rational discussion of the nature, method and aims of
Neoplatonic philosophy, including that of Plotinus, since such an identification
allows us to distinguish between the ideas conveyed by the original texts of these
late ancient Platonists, on the one hand, and our modern and tacit assumptions about
their philosophical content, on the other hand.
I argue that Brucker’s account of Plotinus’ philosophy in his Historia critica
philosophiae is permeated by the assumption that Plotinus intended to construct a
system of philosophy, and that this was a novelty compared with earlier interpreta-
tions of Plotinus. In order to corroborate this argument, I point out that the concept
is absent from Ficino’s commentary from the fifteenth century, and that it remained
absent in interpretations produced between the fifteenth and eighteenth century.

Finally, in this chapter I argue that the assumption of a ‘system of philosophy’ in
Plotinus is historically inadequate: We do not find this concept in Plotinus’ writings,
and his own statements about method point in other directions. Even worse, this
interpretative scheme conceals some important tenets of Plotinus’ philosophy.
This interpretation by Brucker has largely been ignored among modern Plotinus
scholars and historians of philosophy. The German historian of philosophy, Eduard
Zeller, active in the second half of the nineteenth century, is typically regarded as
the first to give a satisfying account of Plotinus’ philosophy as a whole. I argue, on
the other hand, that Zeller finalised a tradition initiated in the eighteenth century.
Very few Plotinus scholars have examined the interpretative development prior to
Zeller. Schiavone (1952a, b) and Bonetti (1971), for instance, have given little atten-
tion to Brucker’s introduction of the concept of a ‘system of philosophy’. The pres-
ent analysis, then, has value for an understanding of Plotinus’ Enneads. It also
explains why “pre-Bruckerian” interpretations of Plotinus appear alien to the mod-
ern reader; the analysis may even serve to make some sense of the hermeneutics
employed by Renaissance Platonists and commentators, who are often eclipsed
from the tradition of Platonism.
Chapter 5 leaves Heumann and Brucker behind in order to focus on the “post-
Bruckerian” reception of ancient Platonism. The main figure of this chapter is not
located in Germany, but in England, and the chapter illustrates the extent to which
Heumann’s and Brucker’s views on ancient Platonism were circulated on an inter-
national level in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The case in point is the
English Plato translator and Platonist Thomas Taylor (1758–1835). In 1804 he pub-
lished The Works of Plato, comprising Floyer Sydenham’s (1710–1787) and his
own English translations of Plato’s dialogues and letters. The publication also
included both men’s introductions and notes. Taylor, in his introductions and notes,
rejects the historiographical divide between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism,
explained in my Chap. 3. In this Chap. 5 I look at the scholarly discussion about a
proper understanding of Plato’s works, which followed immediately after the publi-
cation of The Works of Plato in 1804. This discussion, I argue, was substantially
informed by the interpretation of Plotinus proposed by Heumann and especially
Brucker in the eighteenth century.
Thomas Taylor’s interpretation of Plato’s works in 1804 was condemned as
guilty by association immediately after its publication. Taylor’s 1804 and 1809
reviewer thus made a hasty generalisation in which the qualities of Neoplatonism,
assumed to be negative, were transferred to Taylor’s own interpretation, which made
use of Neoplatonist thinkers. For this reason, Taylor has typically been marginalised
as an interpreter of Plato. Taylor’s reviewer was probably James Mill (1773–1836),
who is primarily known for his systematization of Jeremy Bentham’s (1748–1832)
utilitarianism.
Chapter 5 does not deny the association between Taylor and Neoplatonism.
Instead, it examines the historical and historiographical reasons for the reviewer’s
assumption that Neoplatonic readings of Plato are erroneous by definition. In par-
ticular, it argues that the reviewer relied on, and tacitly accepted, ethical and
References 17
theological premises going back to the historiography of philosophy developed by

Jacob Brucker in his Historia critica philosophiae. These premises were an integral
part of Brucker’s Lutheran religiosity and thus theologically and ethically biased. If
these premises are identified, articulated and discussed critically—which they have
not been so far in connection with Taylor’s reception—it becomes less obvious that
the reviewer was justified in his assumption that the Neoplatonic reading was erro-
neous by definition. This, in turn, leaves Taylor’s Plato interpretation in a more
respectable position.
Chapter 6 is an afterword to the book. It asks if and how the eighteenth-century
German reception of late ancient Platonism had any impact upon German nineteenth-
century Plato scholarship, in particular that of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–
1834). He is often perceived as the first modern Plato interpreter.44 I argue, however,
that he was less original than normally assumed, since he was decisively influenced
by the denigration of the biographical tradition, which had been so conspicuous in
German eighteenth-century scholarship keyed to late ancient Platonism.
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Chapter 2
From persona to systema: Heumann’s
Dethronement of Porphyry’s Life
of Plotinus and the Biographical Model
for Writing the History of Philosophy
2.1 Heumann’s Cultural Context: Lutheran anti-Platonism
Christoph August Heumann (1681–1764) was a German Lutheran theologian, phi-

lologist and philosopher; he belonged to the school of Christian Thomasius (1655–
1728), a key figure in eighteenth-century German Protestant philosophy and its
harmonization of state, church, and educational systems.1 Heumann rejected the
biographical tradition as a legitimate medium for writing the history of philosophy,
since he thought that this tradition had failed to root out fables and to assess in a
philosophical manner the philosophical systems elaborated by the past philosopher(s)
it portrayed. He used Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus to exemplify these characteristics,
which he claimed were inherent in the biographical tradition. Heumann’s devastat-
ing review of Porphyry’s biography fitted into his overall project, namely to work
out a new methodological foundation for the history of philosophy, focusing not on
the philosophers but on their respective philosophical systems. I argue that
Heumann’s review of Porphyry’s biography was premised on theological assump-
tions deriving from his Lutheran stance, and that Porphyry’s biography was in fact
ill-suited to exemplify the biographical tradition used in the pre-modern period to
write the history of philosophy; this biography exhibits several features that are
peculiar to late-antique Platonic (or Neoplatonic) biographies, but not to the ancient
tradition of collective biographies exemplified by Diogenes (early third century
C.E.). I conclude that Heumann’s exemplification was a straw man fallacy, though
an influential one, and that we need to reconsider some of the negative views about
the biographical tradition which we have inherited from him and his followers,
directly or indirectly. Heumann established a new philosophical genre—the history
of philosophy, as we have known it since the early modern period—and he thereby
transformed our sensibility towards what philosophy had meant before him; after
For Heumann’s debt to Thomasius, see Mühlpfordt 1989.

1

22 2 From persona to systema: Heumann’s Dethronement of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus…
Heumann, the focus was no longer on the past philosopher as a model of emulation
(the philosopher’s persona), but on the past philosopher’s complex of philosophical
theories and arguments, his system (systema).
The works of the ancient Platonists Plotinus (204/5–270) and Porphyry (234?–
305?) were much debated in Northern Europe around 1700. In 1699, the orthodox
Lutheran Friedrich Christian Bücher (1651–1714) published his Plato mysticus in
pietista redivivus. Here Bücher accused the theologian Jakob Spener (1635–1705),
the founder of contemporary Pietism, of using Plotinus, Porphyry, and other ancient
Platonists in support of his unorthodox beliefs.2 The two movements were in paral-
lel, according to Bücher, and Pietism itself was a form of updated crypto-Gnosticism.3
To Bücher, ancient Platonism—especially that of figures like Plotinus, Porphyry,
and Iamblichus (fourth century C.E.)—was more than just one of several ancient
philosophical schools. It was a theologically dangerous movement that played an
active role in the ongoing struggle for confessional identity within Protestantism,
namely among the Pietists led by Spener: the Platonic theory of the individual
human soul and its direct communication with the divine realm bypassed the church
and its clergymen and could lead to unwelcome changes in the political and eccle-
siastical structures of contemporary Protestantism.4 Quietists too had been accused
of using Plotinus’ philosophy in support of their theological doctrine ten years
before Bücher had made public his accusation. Caspar Exner had thus claimed that
Plotinus was the “grandfather” (“Gross-Vater”) of contemporary Quietists in his
Quietismus Sacer (1689).5
Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus reported that Plotinus had a god as his companion
spirit (daemon) (10), and that Plotinus experienced a personal unification with the
divine four times in his life (23). As a whole the biography epitomized one feature
of Platonism to which Bücher was strongly opposed, namely the Platonic theory of
noetic ascent towards the One facilitated by the soul’s higher virtues. This theory
had been expounded in Plotinus’ Enneads I.2 and Porphyry’s Sententiae 32, both
ultimately rooted in Plato’s theory of the human soul’s assimilation to the divine,
found in the Theaetetus (176a–b).6 Bücher objected that such a theory was not war-
ranted by the Bible, or by Luther, and that its claim about a personal, unificatory
experience with the One bypassed Christology. For these reasons Bücher rejected
2
Bücher 1699, A2r–A4v, B4r, C1v. For Bücher’s criticism of ancient Platonism, see Glawe 1912,
103–105; Lehmann-Brauns 2004, 187–222; Ebeling 2007, 110–111. Bücher’s anti-Platonism is
not studied in Tigerstedt 1974, 1977. Remarkably, Bücher is given an entry neither in the
Allgemeine deutsche Biographie nor in the Neue deutsche Biographie.
3
For the “Gnostic” Simon Magus (mentioned in Acts 8.9-24) and revived ancient and more recent
Platonism, see Bücher 1699, 9.
4
E.g. Bücher 1699, B4r, C1v, 70. For the confessional struggle, see Hsia 1989. For the threat of
changes in political and ecclesiastical structures, see Lehmann-Brauns 2004.
5
Exner 1689, 44. I owe this reference to Kristian Mejrup. For the relationship between Quietism
and Pietism in the late seventeenth century, see Peschke 1981.
6
For Plotinus’ virtue ethics, see Schniewind 2003. For Porphyry’s virtue ethics, see Smith 1974,
25–26, 48, 50, 59–61, 59 n. 10, 76–77, 96, 104–105, 113, 116, 118, 128, 134–135, 147–148, 153.
For the development of ancient Platonic ethics, see Karamanolis 2004, 73–105.
2.1 Heumann’s Cultural Context: Lutheran anti-Platonism 23
the Platonic theory of noetic ascent leading to Platonic furor or enthusiasmus. For
the same reason he rejected the Platonic works of Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) and
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494).7 Bücher’s anti-Platonism was to some
extent in line with Lutheranism, as Lutheran theology had from the outset contained
various doctrines that were difficult to reconcile with ancient Platonism. Luther’s
doctrine of iustitia sola fide, for instance, was incompatible with the Platonic idea
of the divine origin and nature of the human soul, as well as with the notion that the
soul returned to the One by turning within.
Bücher was soon met with criticism from Spener himself and his colleague
Balthasar Köpke (1646–1711), and it is unlikely that the somewhat crass Bücher
had many open followers in the academic world.8 Nevertheless, Bücher’s theologi-
cal concerns were probably shared by many other Lutherans confronting Platonism
in the first decades of the eighteenth century, since they did echo theological tenets
in Lutheranism. We can thus observe a number of Lutheran theologians taking part
in a virtual campaign against Platonism and its virtue ethics between the 1690s and
the 1740s: Michael Gottlieb Hansch (1683–1749), Johann Lorenz Mosheim (1693–
1755) and Jacob Brucker (1696–1770), just to mention a few.9 By and large,
Heumann’s critical review of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus fits into this Lutheran
background. In his review, he rejected the claim about Plotinus’ unification with the
divine as fraudulent (§§VIII–X), and he explained Porphyry’s account of it as a sign
of weak judgment and an indication that the intentions behind Porphyry’s biography
of his master (§§IV–V, XX) were fraudulent. Also, Heumann complained vehe-
mently that Plotinus was depicted as if he were equal to Christ in spiritual stature
(§V), and he compared Platonists like Plotinus with the Gnostic Simon Magus (§V).
All this connects Heumann with the Lutheran opposition to contemporary Pietism
and its alleged revival of ancient Platonism, though it would be misleading to reduce
Heumann to an exponent of orthodox Lutheranism.10
7
Bücher 1699, e.g., B4r, C1v–C2r, 30–37. Compare with Lehmann-Brauns 2004, 206–211, who
claims that to Bücher ancient Platonism was first of all a “system of emanation” (“Emanationssystem”,
206). Bücher, however, did not characterize ancient Platonism as a “system”—this phrase entered
Plato and Plotinus scholarship in the eighteenth and nineteenth century; for this development, see
Catana 20008 and chapter 4 in the present book. Although Lehmann-Brauns 2004 does mention
Platonic virtue ethics in passing (210, 212–213), he tends to ignore the central role which Platonic
virtue ethics plays in Bücher’s criticism of Spener.
8
Spener replied to Bücher in the ‘Vorrede’ to a publication by Balthasar Köpke, Sapientia Dei. For
contemporary criticism of Bücher, see Lehmann-Brauns 2004, 193–196, 237–242.
9
For their rejection of the Platonic virtue ethics formulated by Plotinus, Porphyry, and other
Neoplatonists, see Hansch 1716, especially 55–57, 71, 88–92; Brucker 1742–1767, II: 457–462.
This attack on Platonic and Neoplatonic virtue ethics has been ignored in Tigerstedt 1974 and
1977. For a broader attack on Platonism, see also Mosheim 1725. For Mosheim’s anti-Platonism,
see Mulsow 1997, 75–85; Schneider 1997, 179–184; Schmidt-Biggemann 1997, 193–210.
10
Heumann praises Luther and his Reformation on several occasions, e.g. Heumann 1715–1716,
578, 588, 607–608, although he also admits that Lutherans may err (21).
2.2 Heumann’s Negative and Positive Program for Writing

the History of Philosophy
Heumann was a prolific writer who contributed to a variety of fields such as biblical
exegesis, political philosophy, psychology, the history of literature, and the history
of philosophy.11 Despite his impact on eighteenth-century philosophy, none of his
works has yet been edited or translated into English, relatively few have been stud-
ied seriously, and little is known about the possible connections between his inter-
ests in these apparently disparate fields. Heumann is perhaps best known for his
involvement in the philosophical journal Acta philosophorum (Halle, 1715–1727),
though this output represents only a small fraction of his entire production. Heumann
himself was the author of most of the material that appeared in this journal. Its full
title is Acta philosophorum. Dass ist: Gründl[liche] Nachrichten aus der Historia
philosophica, Nebst beygefügten Urtheilen von denen dahin gehörigen alten und
neuen Büchern, or in English: Acts of the Philosophers. That is: Important News
about Philosophical History, to which Judgments about Old and New Books from
this Field have been Added. As the title indicates, the main interest is in “philosophi-
cal history” (historia philosophica), which is to be distinguished from the “history
of philosophy” (historia philosophiae), the former being a more philosophical dis-
cipline, the latter a more historical discipline. Heumann used the label “philosophi-
cal history” because it was common in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries
and was thus an available term, although we also find polemical overtones in his use
of it. He confides in his preface to the first issue of the Acta philosophorum that the
journal’s original subtitle was not “philosophical history” (historia philosophica),
but “philosophy’s philosophical history” (historia philosophiae philosophica); he
intended to combine philological analysis, typical of the prevailing philosophical
history, with philosophical analysis, which was lacking in contemporary or near-
contemporary work in the discipline. However, since his Acta philosophorum did
not provide a complete “philosophical history” of philosophy, but only precepts and
fragments of such a history, he settled for the more modest subtitle “philosophical
history” (historia philosophica).12
The prevalent mode in this seventeenth- and eighteenth-century “philosophical
history” was biographical, ultimately taking its impetus from Diogenes and his
Lives.13 Laertius’ text had been rediscovered in the fifteenth century, and since then
it had served as an important source of information about ancient philosophy.14 The
various Lives in Laertius’ collection had often been used as introductions in printed
editions of an individual philosopher’s opera omnia. One example is Laertius’
11
For Heumann’s life and writings, see Freudenberg 2001.
12
For the subtitle, see the Heumann 1715a, A5r. For Heumann’s contribution to the methodology
of the history of philosophy, see Braun 1973, 67–90; Longo 2011, 399–432; Catana 2008,
159–165.
13
Heumann, 1715c, especially 322.
14
For the rediscovery of Laertius, see Gigante 1998 and the bibliography in Kahle 2017, 41. n. 7.
2.2 Heumann’s Negative and Positive Program for Writing the History of Philosophy 25
b iography of Plato, which had been prefixed in full to numerous editions of Plato’s
works from the fifteenth century onwards. Likewise, Porphyry’s biography of
Plotinus had been used as an introduction to Plotinus’ collected works since they
first appeared in the fifteenth century.15 More importantly, the biographical form
employed by Laertius had gained recognition as a respectable model for writing the
history of philosophy: his model had inspired a host of biographical works from the
fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Heumann’s immediate predecessors,
seventeenth-century historians of philosophy like Thomas Stanley (1625–1678),
Gerardus Vossius (1577–1649), Georg Horn (1620–1670) and Johann Jonsius
(1624–1659), had modeled their outlines of philosophy’s past on Laertius’ Lives.16
Heumann’s overall ambition in the Acta philosophorum was to separate the his-
tory of philosophy from history in general, as well as to outline a method for a new
philosophical discipline dedicated to this novel approach. The discipline based on
this methodological innovation should be called neither “history of philosophy” nor
“history of the philosophers”, as in the case of Laertius’ collective biography, since,
as I shall explain below, it would make use of a method that was philosophical and
distinct from that of history.
The first issue of the Acta philosophorum, published in 1715 and written by
Heumann himself, is shaped by this ambition. It is composed of seven sections. The
first three are chapters of Heumann’s ‘Einleitung zur historia philosophica’, a text
on the methodology of the history of philosophy (its remaining four chapters are
scattered in the second, third and fourth issues of the Acta philosophorum, all pub-
lished in 1715 and 1716). Three of the remaining four sections (i.e., which were not
part of the ‘Einleitung zur historia philosophica’) in the first issue are biographical
accounts; section six is a critical review of Porphyry’s Plotinus biography. The final
section in the first issue is a review of Jonsius’s De scriptoribus historiae philo-
sophicae. Hence, in this first issue, the first three sections on methodology are
related to the three subsequent sections on biographies. Methodology and biogra-
phy are thus connected themes: in the sections on methodology Heumann argues
that a new discipline should replace the earlier biographical tradition, and in the
sections on biographies he frequently seeks to demonstrate the weaknesses inherent
in the biographical tradition.
In the first chapter of the ‘Einleitung zur historia philosophica’, Heumann
explains the difference between “philosophical history” (historia philosophica) and
“the history of philosophy” (historia philosophiae): “History of philosophy” is a
philological and historical discipline within which historians like Vossius, Horn and
Stanley worked. These men were primarily philologists, not philosophers, Heumann
15
O’Brien 1982, I: 143–186.
16
Heumann 1715–1716, 34–35, includes Horn and Vossius in the group of historians who follow
the model of Laertius. The earlier histories of philosophy are Thomas Stanley, History of
Philosophy (London, 1655); Gerardus Johannes Vossius, De philosophia et philosophorum sectis,
Libri II. (The Hague, 1658); Georg Horn, Historiae philosophicae libri septem: Quibus de origine,
successione, sectis & vita philosophorum ab orbe condito ad nostram aetatem agitur (Leiden,
1655).
states. By contrast, “philosophical history” should be a discipline that requires phil-

osophical as well as philological and historical skills. The kind of philosopher
required is one who is not only able to read philosophical texts, uproot their fables,
and report the texts, i.e. a philologist and a historian in Heumann’s terminology, but
one who is also able to assess the truth-value of their doctrines and to pass judgment
on their logical deductions without prejudice. These requirements transcend the
skills of a philologist, according to Heumann, whereas a philologically trained phi-
losopher is able to meet these demands.17
What is meant by ‘judgment’ and ‘prejudice’? It is not entirely clear whether
these terms are to be understood as logical or normative, but Heumann’s example of
a thinker who does not follow his precepts—Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and his
use of Chaldean theology as a source of Greek and Persian thought—suggests that
it may be both.18 Freedom from ‘prejudice’ should not be understood in the modern
sense, i.e. as a completely non-biased approach to the past, but in the light of
Heumann’s Lutheran conception of the relationship between philosophy and revela-
tion. To Heumann, revelation is a divinely inspired and privileged source of truth
that provides a corrective to human reason, and the historian of philosophy should
indeed rely on this corrective in his judgments of past philosophers. This even
applies to the greatest philosophical minds of antiquity, whose doctrines should be
measured against revealed truth.19 According to modern idiom, ‘prejudice’ means
17
Heumann 1715–1716, 34–35: “Doch hieraus erheilet freylich dieses, daß niemand die Historiam
Philosophicam recht tractiren und dociren könne, ohne der da selbst ein Philosophus ist. Wie denn
aus eben dieser Ursach diese Historie noch so viele Defecte hat, weil die meisten von denen, so sie
bißher beschrieben haben, mehr Philologi, als Philosophi, gewesen sind, z. B. Vossius, Hornius,
Stanleius, etc. Und haben wir allerdings gute Ursach, einen Unterschied zu machen inter Historiam
Philosophiae und inter Historiam Philosophicam. Denn eine rechte Historia Philosophiae muß
auch Philosophica seyn, das ist, man muß alles gründlich untersuchen, so wohl die veritatem fac-
torum, als dogmatum”. In agreement with this view, Heumann 1715c, 343–344, states that Laertius’
collective biography is an instance of “history of philosophy” (historia philosophiae) or “history
of the philosophers” (historia philosophorum): “Denn ein anders ist Historia Philosophiae oder
Philosophorum, ein anders Historia philosophica: wie ich schon in dem ersten Capitel meiner
Einleitung § XVII [cited in this note] erinnert habe. Gleichwie auch ein anders ist sententia
Philosophi, ein anders sententia philosophica oder, wie Gellius redet [Noctes atticae XIII.8], phi-
losopha. Ebenermaßen ist ein grosser Unterschied inter vitam philosophi und vitam philosophi-
cam, inter uxorem philosophi und uxorem philosophicam, u.d.g. denn das heisset Historia
philosophica, eine Historie, die recht philosophisch gemacht ist, das ist, in welcher nicht nur die
Warhrheit der Erzehlungen gründlich untersuchet, und die Fabeln ausgemertzet werden, sodern
darinnen man auch der Leute Thun und Meynungen philosophice untersuchet, so daß man bey
jenem die eigentliche Absichten nebst denen angewandten Mitteln genau endecket, bey diesen
aber die origines errorum, wie acuh die consequentien einer jeden Meynung deduciret: und was
sonsten nach ein Philosophus, wenn er die Historie tractiret, in acht nimmet.” Heumann thus calls
Laertius a historian (historicus), not a philosopher (philosophus) (341); Laertius’ power of judge-
ment, essential to the philosopher, was too weak (348).
18
Heumann 1715–1716, 35, n. t.
19
Heumann 1715–1716, 183, claims that a philosopher cannot rely on merely human reason and
authority (“menschliche Auctorität”) alone but should seek instruction in revelation as well.
Heumann thus condemns Epicureans and others on this ground; see 235.20–236.16. Heumann’s
compatriot Johann Georg Walch (1693–1775) agreed. In his popular Philosophisches Lexicon he
2.2 Heumann’s Negative and Positive Program for Writing the History of Philosophy 27
that some key assumption is made prior to a discussion, and that is precisely what
Heumann does when accepting Christian revelation as a corrective for human
reasoning.
Heumann does not regard his faith in, and reliance on, divine revelation as a
‘prejudice’ but as a fact that transcends the narrow confines of human understand-
ing. Admittedly, Heumann occasionally states that the historian of philosophy
should avoid those prejudices that are imposed by religion or church, but on such
occasions Heumann clearly has in mind the prejudices imposed by Catholicism;
here his anti-Catholic polemic is particularly manifest.20 When Heumann’s precepts
are later put into practice in Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae, the historian’s
‘judgment’ does concern the truth-value of past philosophers’ doctrines and the
logical validity of their arguments, but even more important are their normative and
theological conformity with Protestant doctrine.21 The history of philosophy
endorsed by Heumann and Brucker was intended to support the Lutheran church of
which they were part, and their programmatic statements about freedom from preju-
dice should be understood in terms of these confessional premises and not taken at
face value.22
The ideal historian of philosophy, in Heumann’s view, will possess these philo-
logical and philosophical skills and thus be able to reconstruct and assess the sys-
tems of philosophy produced by past philosophers. In the preface to the first issue
of the Acta philosophorum, Heumann spells out that the ultimate aim of this novel
history of philosophy is to save his readers from the difficult and time-consuming
task of retrieving and reading the books of past philosophers; the history of philoso-
phy does a service to these readers by reconstructing and expounding the history of
successive systems of philosophy for them.23 This is the way Heumann sought to
supplant that part of the biographical tradition that had accounted for past philoso-
phers, and it constitutes his positive program for the history of philosophy.
What does Heumann mean by “system of philosophy”? The phrase “system”
(systema) was a keyword in seventeenth-century theology and science, and Heumann
held that human reason not guided by revelation transgresses the proper limits of freedom of
thought and degenerates into naturalism; see Walch 1726b and 1726e.
20
Heumann 1715–1716, 588.
21
For the normative dimension, see for instance Brucker 1742–1767, I: 832.14–835.6, where he
condemns Aristotle as an atheist because his doctrine of the first mover, eternally absorbed in
contemplation and indifferent towards his creation, violates the Christian doctrine of God as some-
one who cares for his creation. The confessional qualification of the concept of ‘prejudice’ has not
always been observed; see, for instance, Israel 2006, 409–512, who when analyzing the role of the
history of philosophy, especially that of Brucker, writes (479): “While all Enlightenment blocs
battled to advance toleration, combat superstition, and secure greater freedom of thought from
theological and political authority, critical historians of philosophy had special grounds for eyeing
the exclusive claims to truth of most modern and ancient systems with suspicion and laid particular
stress on the need to be undogmatic and to leave no niche unexplored in the work of scholarly
scrutiny.”
22
Brucker 1742–167, I: 21.10–23.25, makes explicit this apologetic purpose of his history of
philosophy.
23
Heumann 1715a, A3v–A4r.
probably latches on to this term in order to transfer its authority to his novel meth-
odology. He explains that a system of philosophy consists of three elements: (a) a
limited number of principles (principia), that is, premises of a general nature from
which a logical deduction can be made; (b) logical deductions (deductiones) from
these principles; and (c) the resulting conclusions or doctrines of the system of phi-
losophy. The historian of philosophy should be able to assess the internal consis-
tency of the ensuing complex of doctrines.24 Such a procedure entitles the historian
of philosophy to be called “systematic”. Laertius’ biographical collection, on the
other hand, did not conform with this methodology.
Heumann’s positive method for the history of philosophy may have been inspired
by René Descartes and his Discours sur la méthode (1637), which prescribed that
sound scientific reasoning should be based on clear and distinct ideas, that is, prin-
cipia, from which deductions should be made. However, we should be cautious and
not assume that Heumann regarded Descartes as he has come to be understood in
the nineteenth century, namely as the founder of early modern philosophy; to
Heumann’s compatriot and follower, Brucker, Descartes was first of all a philoso-
pher who practised eclecticism and eclecticism was, still according to Brucker,
characterized by its use of principles and deductions from them. Hence, even though
Descartes’s method may have been one early source for Heumann’s positive pro-
gram for writing the history of philosophy, his method was probably filtered through
German, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century eclecticism.25
The problem with Laertius as a historian of philosophy, according to Heumann,
is that he was no philosopher; instead he was only a historian (historicus) who sim-
ply reported past philosophers’ opinions without exercising his own power of judg-
ment.26 Furthermore, Laertius’ biographical accounts belong to a rhetorical genre.
They are eulogies, in which one should not expect prejudices to be rooted out; on
the contrary, prejudices, understood as positive bias favouring the portrayed phi-
losopher, are integrated as uncritical praise. Strangely, although Heumann did pub-
lish a critical review of Laertius’ Lives—the source of the biographical tradition that
he intended to replace—it was his review of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus that
24
Heumann 1715–1716, 250. See also 264, 450. This was accepted by Brucker 1742–1767, I:
15.10–18.
25
For Descartes as an eclectic philosopher, see Brucker 1742–1767, V: 10. For Brucker on eclecti-
cism, see I: 3–4. For Brucker’s notion of eclecticism, see Catana 2008, 22–31. For eclecticism as
a wider phenomenon in German intellectual culture, see Albrecht 1994. To Brucker, the first eclec-
tic philosopher in the modern period was Giordano Bruno (1548–1699), he deals with him in
Brucker 1742–1767, V: 12–62; he praises Bruno for his pioneering eclecticism in V: 38. Descartes
came to be seen as the founder of early modern philosophy in the nineteenth century, partly
because of the French historian Victor Cousin (1792–1867) and his lectures in the 1820s and
1830s, subsequently published in his Cours de l’histoir de la philosophie; see Cousin 1841, 52–60,
81–83, 362–369, 373. Several twentieth-century historians of philosophy have questioned the role
of Descartes in early modern philosophy; see Garber 1988; Ariew 1992; Cottingham 1993;
Haakonssen 2004.
26
Heumann 1715c, 341, 348.
2.3 Heumann’s Argumentative Strategy in his Commentary on Porphyry’s Life… 29
p rovided a “test-case” (“Probe”) (§I) for revealing the weaknesses of Laertius’ bio-
graphical model.
2.3 Heumann’s Argumentative Strategy in his Commentary

on Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus
Heumann’s 1715 review of Porphyry’s Plotinus biography was provoked, he claims,

by two authoritative publications, namely Bayle’s entry on Plotinus in the
Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697), and Fabricius’ Greek-Latin edition of
Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus (1711).27 Porphyry’s biography had become available in
Latin by means of Ficino’s translation of 1492, where it was prefixed to Plotinus’
Enneads. This Latin translation of The Life of Plotinus was reprinted in 1561 and
1580, and in 1580 it appeared together with the Greek text.28 Although Heumann
thinks highly of the works of Bayle and Fabricius, he is dissatisfied with their analy-
sis, or rather their lack of analysis, of the biographical genre within which Porphyry
worked. Crucially, he laments, the two critics had not understood how fraudulent
and misleading this genre was, and how inadequate the genre was as a medium for
writing the history of philosophy.
The argument presented by Heumann in his critical review of Porphyry’s Life of
Plotinus runs as follows: Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus is representative of the bio-
graphical genre going back to Laertius, and Porphyry’s account is unreliable and
fraudulent; therefore the biographical genre is unreliable and fraudulent. Is this a
sustainable argument?
One may question one of the premises in Heumann’s argument, namely that
Porphyry’s biography is representative of the biographical genre. First, it is open to
debate to what extent one can legitimately speak of biography as a well-defined and
homogenous genre, even when restricted to the literary production of classical
antiquity. Second, one may also ask how this genre looked “from the inside”; that
is, how did ancient biographers themselves view the genre? Which typologies, if
any, did they apply to it?29 These two questions go beyond the scope of this essay,
and I shall have to pass them over. But I would like to venture some observations
regarding a third consideration, namely the extent to which Porphyry’s biography
was representative of the biographical writing employed in so-called “history of
philosophy” or “history of the philosophers,” first by Laertius and later by
seventeenth-century authors. As I intend to show, Porphyry’s biography was not as
representative as Heumann assumed.
One difference is that Porphyry’s biography is mainly about a single philosopher,
Plotinus, whereas Laertius’ Lives presents a whole series of philosophers. All these
27
For Fabricius’ 1711 edition, see O’Brien 1982, I: 156.
28
O’Brien 1982, 153–156.
29
For a survey of biography as a genre in antiquity, see Berschin and Görgemanns 1996–2003.
accounts together make up a history of philosophy. Another difference is that the

Life of Plotinus, unlike Laertius’ Lives, is written by the subject’s student, as
Heumann himself points out (§V). Laertius, who was not a philosopher but only a
historian, did not belong to any sect, not even the Epicurean or the Platonic sect,
which he otherwise presented in a favorable manner.30 Hence, the master-student
relationship is absent from Laertius’ Lives.
As has recently been observed by Berschin and Görgemanns, Porphyry’s biogra-
phy also stands out from the ancient biographical tradition by its marked praise of
its subject’s virtues.31 According to them, this feature is characteristic of a limited
number of biographies of late-antique Platonists. Porphyry’s portrait thus resembles
Marinus’ biography of Proclus (412–485) and Damascius’ biography of Isidorus
(ca. 450–ca. 520). In Marinus’ biography, for instance, we find Proclus praised in
accordance with a preconceived scheme of virtues. Laertius does praise the por-
trayed philosophers from time to time, but he does not structure his accounts accord-
ing to preconceived schemes of ethical virtues. Most importantly, however, Laertius
adds quite a bit about the portrayed philosophers’ ideas.
Porphyry’s biography primarily describes Plotinus’ life, his way of living and
philosophizing, and we find little discussion of his philosophical ideas. Admittedly,
Porphyry does give a survey of Plotinus’ texts, but he says very little about Plotinus’
philosophical theories or arguments. This is in contrast to Laertius, who not only
offers an account of a given subject’s life, but who also, at least in some cases, pro-
vides an account of the subject’s ideas. One example is Laertius’ account of Plato,
where we are presented first with his life (III.1–46), then with his writings and their
order (III.47–66), then with his key doctrines (III.67–80), and finally with his philo-
sophical distinctions (III.80–109). In this particular instance Laertius’ outline of
Plato’s ideas takes up half the space of the entire biography. Needless to say,
Laertius’ analysis differs from modern interpretations, but the point is that we do
indeed find an interpretation of Plato’s ideas in Laertius’ exposition.
In light of these differences between Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus and Diogenes’s
biographical collection, Heumann’s argument turns out to be a straw man. He criticizes
Porphyry’s biography, using it to discredit a genre on the assumption that it is represen-
tative of that genre; however, the genre is not adequately represented by Porphyry’s
biography. Hence, the argument is invalid. Nevertheless, Heumann’s attack on the bio-
graphical model, and late ancient Platonism in particular, fits into the anti-Platonic
trend outlined in section 1 above, and it carried conviction. Heumann’s ironic vilifica-
tion of Plotinus and Porphyry may also have worked rhetorically to create a sense of
cultural and religious community among his readers, as well as a corresponding sense
of distance from the Egyptian culture out of which Plotinus developed.32
30
Heumann 1715c, 341–344. For Laertius’ relationship to the Epicureans and Skeptics, see Long
1972, xvii–xviii.
31
Berschin and Görgemanns 1996–2003, 685.
32
For an example of the ironic treatment of Plotinus, see Heumann 1715b, §XIX: “Eventually, he
[Plotinus] suffered the fate of all: he died.” See also Heumann’s reduction of Plotinus to a fraudu-
lent practitioner of black magic in §§VI and X.
2.4 Heumann’s Influence upon Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century General Histories… 31
It is unlikely that Heumann, with his review of The Life of Plotinus, intended to
intervene in a debate about the possible role of Platonism in contemporary Quietism
and Pietism, since this discussion had come to an end well before 1715, with the
result that neither Quietists, Pietists or other parties within Protestantism wished to
subscribe to the theological components inherent in late ancient Platonism. It would
be anachronistic to assume that Heumann intended to enter this discussion with his
1715 review. However, it is likely that he intended to exploit this background in his
criticism of the biographical tradition: by picking Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus as an
example of the biographical tradition, he could be pretty sure that his readers would
be sceptical about the theological elements embedded in the Platonism of Plotinus
and Porphyry, even before reading the first page in Heumann’s review. This would
mean, in turn, that his criticism of the biographical tradition as such would be more
digestible to his readers.
2.4 Heumann’s Influence upon Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-

Century General Histories of Philosophy
Heumann’s critical review of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus made its mark on accounts
of Plotinus included in subsequent histories of philosophy. From the eighteenth to
the first decades of the nineteenth century, they strove to describe Plotinus’ philoso-
phy as a system, and they referred disapprovingly to Porphyry’s biography, often
praising Heumann for his critical and fair assessment of it. With Hegel’s lectures
(1800s-1830s, published by Michelet 1833–1836), the situation changed. He did
not cite Heumann’s critical review in his account of Plotinus, and he defended late-
antique Platonism, or Neoplatonism, from the charge of “enthusiasm”
(“Schwärmerey”).33 Nevertheless, Porphyry’s biography was published only once in
the eighteenth century (Paris, 1747).34 Before Hegel’s rehabilitation of Neoplatonism,
scholars only seemed willing to make use of Porphyry’s biography outside the uni-
versity context; examples are the poet Giacomo Leopardi (1813–1814) and the
Platonist and translator Thomas Taylor (1817). The only exception inside the schol-
arly community was the philologist Friedrich Creuzer, who published excerpts of
the text in 1805.
Heumann’s positive program shaped Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae, the
most comprehensive and most influential general history of philosophy of the
33
Hegel 1959, XIX: 37–69, provides an account of Plotinus’ philosophy; no mention is made of
Heumann’s critical review of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus. Nevertheless, Hegel does express an
ironic distance towards this text of Porphyry and the link it posits between Plotinus’ biographical
circumstances and his thought, and this distance may owe something to Heumann (e.g. Hegel
1959, XIX: 37). For his arguments against the characterisation of Neoplatonism as “Schwärmerey”,
see XIX: 42–47. For Hegel’s readings of the late-antique Platonists, see Halfwassen 1999.
34
O’Brien 1982, I: 157.
e ighteenth century.35 Brucker’s declared purpose was to give an account of the sys-
tems of philosophy produced from antiquity to the present day. Although Brucker
praised Laertius’ Lives as an important source of information for ancient philo-
sophical texts which had otherwise been lost (e.g. Epicurus’ letters), he criticized it
as a deficient history of philosophy: Laertius had not paid sufficient attention to his
subject’s ideas; he did not possess the required power of judgment; and he had been
misled by (pagan) beliefs.36 Brucker praised Heumann for his denigration of
Laertius’ Lives and joined him in lamenting Laertius’ weak judgment. Brucker sim-
ilarly approved of Heumann’s “test” of Laertius’ biographical model, namely the
latter’s review of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus.
Heumann’s and Brucker’s critical view of Laertius’ model did not mean that
biographical information was barred from the ensuing tradition of general histories
of philosophy—only that it served a new and subordinate purpose, namely to map
out the historical circumstances in which individual philosophers construed their
respective systems of philosophy. Brucker, for instance, advised the historian of
philosophy to outline the following circumstantiae in relation to each past thinker,
in order to see how these circumstances influenced his system: the philosopher’s
temperament, education, teachers, adversaries, patrons, lifestyle, and, finally, the
people with whom the philosopher lived.37
The nexus between the persona, or virtus, of the philosopher and his philoso-
phy—which was crucial to a philosopher like Plotinus and was stressed by Porphyry
in his biography—was severed in Brucker’s account of past philosophers. Brucker’s
intention was not to offer a past philosopher’s life and works for the reader’s emula-
tion so much as to describe a depersonalized complex of philosophical proposi-
tions.38 Heumann had anticipated this transformation of the sensibility towards past
philosophy. As he had explained when setting out the difference between Laertius’
biographical model and proper history of philosophy, there is a vast difference
35
E.g. Brucker 1742–1767, I: 32.26–34, who subscribes to Heumann’s criticism of Laertius’
model. Brucker 1742–1767, II: 217.37–218.33, which contains an account of Plotinus, praises
Heumann’s 1715 review of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus and agrees that it was typical of Laertius’
model. (Brucker 1742–1767, II: 217 n. a, refers explicitly to Heumann’s 1715 review of Porphyry’s
Life of Plotinus.) The anonymous reviewer (perhaps James Mill) of The Works of Plato, translation
and commentary by Thomas Taylor, 5 vols. (London, 1804), in Edinburgh Review 14, April (1809),
cited the Heumann-inspired criticism of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus stated in Brucker 1742–1767,
II:218.11–22; see [Mill] 1809, 196.
36
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 32.21–33. I: 32.26–29 reads: “Licet enim supinam in eo negligentiam
et aliquam quoque in attendendo ad mentem veterum philosophorum incuriam, judicii item in
tanto argumento proditam paupertatem, nimiamque credulitatem culpaverint, viri docti.” These
“learned men” (viri docti) probably include Heumann, to whom Brucker refers immediately
afterwards.
37
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 15.29–36. Some of these circumstantiae are also mentioned in I:
11.21–30.
38
Heumann 1715–1716, 296, is fully aware that Platonism as a way of life is separate from
Platonism as a sophisticated and well-informed philosophical position. For philosophy as a culti-
vation of the philosopher’s persona, see Hadot 1995; Celenza 2005; Condren, Gaukroger, and
Hunter 2006; Condren and Hunter 2008.
2.4 Heumann’s Influence upon Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century General Histories… 33
between the “life of the philosopher” (vita philosophi) and the “philosophical life”
(vita philosophica): the study of past philosophical texts should not lead to a way of
life guided by the example of the past philosopher, but to a detached and deperson-
alized intellectual activity in which philosophical systems were examined and
developed.39 One cognitive strategy was thus blocked, namely the one based on the
reader’s mimetic intimacy with the philosopher portrayed in a biography, as in the
case of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus. Heumann’s review of Porphyry’s biography
suggests that the only past figure deserving of such “intimacy” is Christ, namely in
the guise of the imitatio Christi (§V); no philosopher deserves this, and certainly not
a pagan philosopher like Plotinus, since all philosophers are nothing but human
beings. Brucker, who belonged to the Lutheran church like Heumann, tacitly insti-
tutionalized this Christological view by means of his systematic history of systems
of philosophy.
How did Heumann and Brucker’s view on philosopher biographies change the
way in which past philosophy was understood, if at all? One may argue that a bio-
graphical account of some past philosopher did not, in itself, inform the account of
the philosophy that went with it. For instance, Diogenes’ biographical account of
Plato’s life did not in itself inform Diogenes account of Plato’s philosophy. The
same may be said in regard to Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus, which did not in itself
inform Plotinus’ Enneads. However, the reader might employ a reading technique
in which he or she asked him- or herself, ‘what would it mean to live like such or
such a philosopher?’ For instance, ‘what would it mean to live a life of Plato?’ In
that case, the biographical account of a philosopher, for instance the one written
Diogenes, might be read as an ethically instructive supplement to the philosophical
account, for instance Diogenes’ account of Plato’s philosophy. In order to support
this idea about a reading technique, one might consider the widespread method in
ancient and Renaissance ethics, according to which moral agents emulate ethically
ideal persons, that is, exempla.40 To the reader, the biographical account in a phi-
losopher’s biography may thus serve the same purpose. It is precisely such a reading
technique which Heumann attacks in his review of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus (e.g.
§5).
So, from a cognitive view-point, it is possible for the reader to combine the bio-
graphical and the philosophical account in a philosopher’s biography, using the bio-
graphical account as a form of moral guidance. Such a use might especially apply
to the less original sectarian person seeking some sort of ethical and philosophical
guidance, or it may apply to persons from the broader public sphere, who do not
have a professional interest in, or dedication to, philosophy proper, but who simply
seek moral guidance. However, it is also possible for any reader not to combine
these two accounts in his or her reading: It is fully possible for the reader to bypass
the biographical account and move directly to the concepts, arguments and theories
attributed to the philosopher by the biographer in the account of his philosophy, and
39
Heumann 1715c, 343–344.
40
See Ricklin 2006; Frazier 2013; Van Hoof 2010 and 2014; Nikolaidis 2014; Baker 2017.
to engage with those concepts, arguments and theories in a very direct and critical
manner, eventually leading to dissatisfaction with the philosophical content.
What I refer to when speaking about the ‘biographical model’ is the ancient tra-
dition in which the two cognitive possibilities mentioned in the paragraph above are
left open to the reader, because many of these biographical accounts are so lively
and detailed, endowed as they often are with narrative and literary qualities, that
they allow the reader to engage in a kind of emulation through his or her reading.
This form of biographical presentation is abandoned by Heumann and Brucker—
not because they drop biographical information completely, but because they prefer
a much more economical and historical-critical way of rendering the biographical
components, which is ultimately aiming at an understanding of the alleged system
of the portrayed philosopher. As I shall explain in chapter six, this transformation of
the biographical tradition, undertaken by Heumann and Brucker, has had a profound
and lasting effect.
[138]
VI. Das Leben Plotini vom Porphyrio beschrieben.
Inhalt
§I. Was hier unser Vorhaben sey §II. Urtheil von der Lateinischen Ubersetzung
dieser Lebens-Beschreibung §III. Anmerckung von dem Nahmen Plotinus §IV. Zu
welcher Zeit Porphyrius diese Lebens-Beschreibung gemacht habe §V. [139]
Entdeckung der Absicht/ so Porphyrius bey dieser Schrifft gehabt §§VI-VII. Urtheil
von des Plotini spiritu familiari §VIII. Plotini würkliche Vereinigung mit GOtt
§IX. Was von dem Zeugniß zu halten/ so das oraculum dem Plotino gegeben §X.
Plotini Allwissenheit und göttliche Macht §. XI. Warum Plotinus sein Vaterland und
seine Eltern verläugnet §XII. Plotini Leben biß auf sein 40tes Jahr §XIII. Wenn und
wie viel Bücher der Plotinus geschrieben §XIV. Etliche judicia der Alten von
Plotino, daß er eben nicht sonderlich gelehrt gewesen sey §XV. Bekräfftigung der-
selben §XVI. Hochachtung des Plotini zu Rom bey seinen Leb-Zeiten §XVII.
Seine Discipel, wie auch seine Lehr-Art §XVIII. Seine Lebens-Art §XIX. Sein Tod
§XX. Wahres Contrefait des Plotini und Porphyrii
I. [Was hier unser Vorhaben sey]
Wir sind allhier keines weges des Vorhabens/ von des berühmten Plotini Philosophie
zu handeln/ und die verschiedene Urtheile vom ihm anzuführen/ sondern nur seine
Lebens-Beschreibung durchzugehen/ wie solche Porphyrius aufgesetzet. Jenes soll
unten geschehen/ wenn wir auf die Historie der Platonischen Philosophie kommen
VI. Das Leben Plotini vom Porphyrio beschrieben. 35
werden. Anietzo wollen wir nur eine Probe geben/ wie man die Vitas Philosophorum
mit Behutsamkeit und Verstande lesen müsse.
I I. [Urtheil von der Lateinischen Ubersetzung dieser

Lebens-Beschreibung]
Es ist dieses Leben Plotini vor seinen Operibus zu finden/ wie solche nebst Marsilii
Ficini Lateinischer Ubersetzung zum erstenmahl Griechisch [140] ans Tageslicht
getreten in folio A. 1580. Es hat aber solches auch der offt belobte Herr Fabricius
seiner Bibliothecæ Græcæ(a)41 einverleibet/ und zwar solcher gestalt/ daß er es in 26.
Capitel eingetheilet/ und mit einigen kurtzen/ aber gelehrten Anmerckungen hin
und wieder erläutert hat. Was die Ubersetzung anlanget/ so hat Herr Fabricius viele
fehler in derselben angemercket/ und zugleich verbessert: Doch hat er vergessen/
die version des ersten Worts im andern Capitel zu ändern/ und vor colico morbo zu
setzen coeliaco, Bayle hat dieses(b)42 angemerckt/ und zwar mit Recht. Denn
Celsus(c)43 zeiget gar deutlich den Unterschied zwischen diesen beyden Kranckheiten.
Es wäre auch zu wünschen/ daß dieselbe version noch accurater von jemanden
examiniret und gebessert würde/ indem sie solches allerdiengs von nöthen hat. Ich
will nur ein paar Exempel geben. Gleich die ersten Worte: Πλωτῖνος ὁ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς
γεγονὼς Φιλόσοφος hat er also gegeben: Plotinus, Philosophus nostro sæculo sin-
gularis. Nun stehet im Griechischen kein ‘singularis,’ sondern es heisset schlecht
hin: nostræ ætatis Philosophus. Ich habe zwar gedacht/ vielleicht hätte Ficinus in
seinem Exemplar vor γεγονὼς gehabt γεννᾶιος, und dieses durch ‘singularis’ über-
setzet: gleich wie Eusebius(d)44 Porphyrium nennet: τὸν γεννᾶιον Ἑλλήνων [141]
Φιλόσοφον, und wie Diogenes Laertius, lib. IX. n. 61. vom Pyrrhone schreibet/ daß
er γενναιότατα (‘nobilissime’) philosophiret habe: Allein weil ich observiret/ daß
er auch an andern Orten dieser Version zu weilen paraphrasiret/ und nicht stricte
bey dem Grund-Texte geblieben/ so habe ich diese conjectur fahren lassen.
Unterdessen ist gedachte Version nicht zu billigen/ indem45 er da durch dem Leser
ein Vorurtheil machet/ und zugleich wieder die Pflicht eines Dolmetschers handelt/
als welcher de suo nichts hinzuthun darff. Ich will aber auch einen locum anzeigen/
den er gantz falsch übersetzet hat. Es ist der Anfang des 4ten Capitels/ welchen er
also vertiret: Scribit autem intentissimo quodam acumine & intellectu multiplici,
--- --- sæpe ex ipsa re, de qua agit, mirifice patitur. hier sind zweene Schnitzer
begangen. Denn das erste: ἐν δὲ τῷ γράφειν σύντομος γέγονε καὶ πολυνοῦς heis-
set: Wenn er etwas schriebe/ so war er sehr kurtz und ‘concis,’ aber hinter seinen
Worten stack gar ein grosser und weitläuftiger Verstand. Das andere aber: πολλὰ
ἐκπαθῶς φράζων, heisset: er redete vieles/ vom ‘affect’ der massen eingenommen/
41
(a) Lib. IV. cap. 26. p. 91–147.
42
(b) Diction. Crit. V. Plotin. p. 2455 am Rande.
43
(c) Lib. IV. cap. 12. & 13.
44
(d) Præpar. Evang. Lib. V. cap. 14.
45
There is some ink in front of ”er” but it cannot be identified as neither a sign nor a letter.
daß er gantz ausser sich selbst gesetzet war. (Also warnet Plutarchus, (e)46 man solte
nicht im Zorn ἐκπαθὴς und brutal seyn.)
[142]
III. [Anmerckung von dem Nahmen Plotinus]
Ehe wir noch des Plotini Leben vornehmen/ so wollen wir nur kürtzlich etwas von
seinem Nahmen berühren/ ingleichen von der Zeit/ da Porphyrius dasselbe
beschrieben hat. Es sind aber dieses drey recht rare Nahmen/ Plotus, Plotinus, und
Plotina. Man kan sie mit höchsten Recht und κατ᾽ ἐξοχὴν nomina propria nennen/
weil diejenigen/ welche dieselben gefuhret/ sie mit wenigen/ oder wohl gar nie-
mand gemein gehabt haben. Zum wenigsten ist mir nur ein eintziger Plotus bekannt/
nemlich der Comicus, den man gewöhnlich Plautum nennet; nur ein eintziger
Plotinus, nemlich unser Philosophus; und endlich nur ein eintzige Plotina, des
Käysers47 Trajani Gemahlin.
IV. [zu welcher Zeit Porphyrius diese Lebens-Beschreibung gemacht habe]
Was die Zeit betrifft/ da diese Lebens-Beschreibung abgefasset worden/ so hat uns
dieselbe Porphyrius nicht unbekandt gelassen/ ob er sie gleich so gar accurat nicht
determiniret hat. Denn im vierdten Capitet [i.e. Capitel] meldet er/ daß er 29. Jahr
jünger gewesen/ als Plotinus: und im drey und zwantzigsten gedencket er einer
Sache/ die sich in seinem 68ten Jahre zugetragen. Also ist er ohngefehr 70. Jahr alt
gewesen/ als er dieses Leben aufgezeichnet hat. Da nun Plotinus in 66ten Jahre
verstorben ist/ wie im andern Capitel berichtet wird; so hat dazumahl Porphyrius in
seinem 37ten Lebens-Jahr gestanden: und folglich hat er vitam Plotini etliche und
30. [143] Jahre nach dessen Tode geschrieben. Wir haben diesen Umstand zu wis-
sen dazu nöthig/ daß wir erkennen/ daß es ihm leichte gewesen sey/ von einem
Manne/ der schon vor etliche und 30. Jahren gestorben/ ein und andere Lügen zu
erzehlen/ indem er nicht leicht von jemanden des Betrugs kunte überführet werden.
Denn wo waren wohl ausser dem Porphyrio noch mehr 70. Jährige Männer/ die sich
rühmen kunten/ vor 30/ ja 40. und 50. Jahren mit dem Plotino genau bekandt gew-
esen zu seyn? So ist denn Porphyrius an statt eines aufrichtigen Historici ein Land-
Lügner/ der seine Leser mit selbst erdichteten oder doch von andern ausgeheckten
Fabeln abspeiset? Möchte jemand fragen. Worauff ich kurtz antworte mit Ja, und
solches auch erweisen will.
(e) Pædagog. cap. IX.

46
This word is spelled differently in different passages of the text. For ”Käysers”, see also 152.22 in
47
Heumann’s text; or ”Kaysers” see 146.8, 156.24.

V. [Entdeckung der Absicht/ so Porphyrius bey dieser Schrifft gehabt]
Ich will mich dabey nicht lange aufhalten/ wie wohl es auch nicht gäntzlich zu
übergehen ist/ daß Porphyrius des Plotini Schüler gewesen/ und er es also vor keine
Tod-Sünde gehalten/ seinem Præceptori zu Ehren das wahre mit dem Falschen zu
vermischen/ und alles grösser zu machen/ als es sich in der That befunden:
absonderlich da ihn dieser sein Præceptor jederzeit gelobet/ und einsmahls(e[∗])48
gesaget/ Porphyrius wäre zugleich ein guter Poët, und ein Philosophus, und ein
Hierophanta: Daß es also hieß: Manus manum scabit. Wie den der Affect und [144]
die Partheylichkeit sich offenbahrlich verräht/ indem er gar nichts böses/ auch nicht
den geringsten Fehler/ von ihm meldet: Da er doch ein Mensch gewesen/ und also
manche Schwachheit an sich gehabt haben muß. Nur dieses will ich dem Leser zu
bedencke geben/ daß Porphyrius mit allem Fleiß den Plotinum abmahlet/ als einen
Platonischen Philosophum, der zur Vollkommemheit49 gelanget/ ja der eben/ wie
dort(f)50 Simon Magus, etwas grosses gewesen wäre/ und mit GOtt in genauester
Vereinigung gestanden hätte. Nun beliebe sich der gelehrte Leser zu erinnern/ daß
Philostratus des Apollonii, und Jamblichus des Pythagoræ Leben beschrieben/ in
der Absicht/ einen grossen und göttlichen Mann vorzustellen/ und dadurch die
Heyden zu bereden/ daß es im Heydenthum eben so grosse Männer gegeben hätte/
als Christus gewesen: Wie ich denn zu anderer Zeit erweisen will/ daß ebendiese
intention auch unser Porphyrius in seinem vita Pythagoræ gehabt habe: So wird
man leichtlich auf den Verdacht kommen/ Porphyrius habe auch durch des Plotini
Lebens-Beschreibung dem dazumahl mit Gewalt überhand nehmenden Christenthum
Einhalt thun/ und der damahls florirenden Platonischen Philosophie eine neue
Stütze geben wollen. Also würde es noch zu wenig gesagt seyn/ wenn ich spräche/
es sey diß mehr ein Panegyricus, als eine Historie: ja es [145] ist noch nicht genug/
wenn ich das Porphyrische vitam Plotini mit denen vitis Sanctorum im Pabstthum
vergleichen wollte/ in welchen die Leute nicht beschrieben werden/ wie sie gewe-
sen sind/ sondern wie man gewünschet/ daß sie möchten gewesen seyn/ nemlich als
halb-götter: sondern ich muß sagen/ es sey dieses vita Plotini des Porphyrii
Evangelium, worinne er den Plotinum als einen GOtt beschreibet/ der eben wie
Christus Wunder gethan/ und zukünfftige Dinge gewust/ mit einem Worte/
allmächtig und allwissend gewesen sey.
VI. [Urtheil von des Plotini spiritu familiari]
Nun was ich gesaget habe/ muß auch bewiesen werden. Daß Plotinus einen GOtt/
vermuthlich den Apollinem, zum spiritu familiari gehabt habe/ solches gibt
Porphyrius dadurch zu erkennen/ wenn er(g)51 schreibet/ es hätte ihm Eustochius, der
48
(e[∗]) Vita Plotini cap. XV. [Heumann uses note e twice.]
49
“Vollkommemheit” and “Vollkommeinheit” are both possible readings.
50
(f) Actor. VIII. 9.
51
(g) Cap. 2.
bey des Plotini Tode gewesen/ erzehlet/ daß kurtz vor des Plotini Tode ein Drache
oder eine grosse Schlange sich sehen lassen/ welche unter des Plotini Bette hin und
in ein Loch/ so in der Wand gewesen/ gekrochen sey: Worauff er denn alsobald
seinen Geist aufgegeben. Fraget jemand/ wer denn dieser Drache gewesen/ so wuste
Porphyrius wohl/ daß ein jeder Heydnischer Leser sagen würde/ es sey diß Apollo
oder sonst ein GOtt gewesen. Denn die Heyden stunden in der Einbildung/ daß
Apollo in dieser Gestalt zu erscheinen pflege/ wie denn auch dessen Sohne dem
Æsculapio, ein Drache oder eine grosse Schlange zum Wahrzeichen bey- [146]
gefüget wurde. (h)52 So gab auch die Olympias, des grossen Alexandri Mutter/ vor/
sie wäre nicht vom Philippo, sondern von einem Gotte/ der ihr in Gestalt eines
Drachens oder grossen Schlange beygelegen hätte/ geschwängert worden: wie sol-
ches Plutarchus(i)53 und Justinus(k)54 erzehlen. Eben dieses soll auch des Scipionis
Africani Mutter begegnet seyn/ Gellius(l)55 gedencket ingleichen der Atiæ, Kaysers
Augusti Mutter/ welche/ als sie einsmahls/ des Gottes-Dienstes wegen/ eine Nacht
in dem Tempel des Apollinis schlieff/ gleichfalls von einem Drachen beschlaffen
worden/ nach Suetonii(m)56 Zeugniß. Gleichwie nun auch Pythagoras und Plato von
einigen vor Sohne des Apollinis gehalten wurden; Also suchet auch Porphyrius dar-
zuthun/ daß Plotinus wo nicht ein leiblicher Sohn des Apollinis, doch zum wenig-
sten sein familiairer Freund gewesen sey/ der ihn nicht eher biß in dem Tode
verlassen habe. Es ist aber dieser pia fraus nicht das erste mahl vom Plotino, oder
vielmehr vom Porphyrio, begangen worden/ sondern wir finden ein gleiches
Exempel in der Historie(∗)57 des Heraclidis Pontici. Denn dieser hielt in seinem
Hause einen jungen Drachen/ und zog ihn auf. Als er nun sterben wolte/ so befahl
er einem seiner besten Freunde/ er solte doch seinen (des Heraclidis) Leib nach
seinem Tode verbergen/ und an dessen statt einen Drachen in sein Bette legen/ NB.
Damit die Leute hierdurch mochten auf die Gedanken gebracht werden/ er sey gen
Himmel gefahren/ und in das Collegium der Götter58 aufgenommen worden. Also
heisset es meistentheils: Nihil fit, quod non factum sit prius.
VII.
Daß aber Plotinus einen GOtt/ und keinen gemeinen Geist/ zum spiritu familiari
gehabt [147] habe/ bekräfftiget Porphyrius im zehenden Capitel mit des Plotini
eigenem Zeugnisse. Es lautet aber seine Erzehlung also: Es kam ein Egyptischer
Priester nach Rom/ und als er mit dem Plotino bekandt wurde/ so sagte jener zu
52
(h) Vid. Cellarius Antiq. Medic. cap. 2. §. 6. & 7. Woltereckii Electa rei nummariæ p. 33. sq.
53
(i) In Vita Alexandri, gleich im Anfange.
54
(k) Hist. lib. XI. cap. XI. §. 3.
55
(l) Noct. Attic. lib. VII. cap. 1.
56
(m) In vita Augusti cap. 94.
57
(∗) Vid. Diogenes Laërt. lib. V. num. 89.
58
Due to some ink over the “o” it is hard to tell whether there is an umlaut or not. The same word
is spelled as “Götter” elsewhere in the text; see 147.19.
diesem/ er wolte ihm seinen spiritum familiarem in sichtbarlicher Gestalt zeigen. Zu

diesem Ende wären sie in den Tempel der Göttin Isis gegangen/ und da habe der
Egyptier den spiritum familiarem citiret. Allein es sey kein gemeiner Dæmon,
sondern gar ein GOtt erschienen. Worauff der Egyptier gesaget: O glückseeliger
Plotinus, der du nicht einen schlechten Geist/ sondern einen GOtt zum Schutz-
Engel bekommen hast! Es hat sich aber auch Plotinus hierauff nicht wenig eingebil-
det. Denn/ wie in eben diesem Capitel erzehlet wird/ als ihn Amelius einstens bat/
mit zum Opffer zu gehen/ so antwortete Ihm Plotinus: Die Götter sind schuldig zu
mir zukommen/ nicht aber ich zu ihnen.
VIII. [Plotini würkliche Vereinigung mit GOtt]
Ferner erzehlet(n)59 Porphyrius, es habe Plotinus in der Platonischen Philosophie es

so weit gebracht/ daß/ da er durch alle vom Platone vorgeschriebene Stuffen in die
Höhe gestiegen/ er endlich GOtt selbst gesehen hätte/ der denn keine Gestalt/ auch
keine idee gehabt hätte/ sondern eine substanz gewesen wäre über alles/ das man
verstehen könte. Dieses desto glaublicher zu ma- [148] chen/ setzet Porphyrius
hinzu/ daß er ebenfalls im 68ten Jahre seines Alters es so weit gebracht hätte/ daß er
einmahl zur Vereinigung mit GOtt gelanget wäre. Doch lässet er dem Plotino einen
Vorzug/ wenn er schreibet/ daß dieser viermahl den finem Philosophiæ, nemlich die
unionem cum DEO, erlanget und genossen hätte.
I X. [Was von dem Zeugniß zu halten/ so das oraculum dem Plotino

gegeben]
Ja/ spricht er ferner/ das Oraculum sebsten [i.e. selbsten] des Apollinis hätte dem
Plotino nach seinem Tode das Zeugniß(o)60 gegeben/ daß er einer von den grössesten
Philosophis gewesen sey/ und nunmehr in der Ewigkeit mit Platone und Pythagora
die höchste und gantz unbeschreibliche Glückseligkeit genösse. Doch hier kan ich
nicht umhin/ stille zu stehen/ und den Porphyrium Lügen zu straffen. Es ist nemlich
dieses eine Poetische Lügen/ und zweiffele ich nicht/ es sey Porphyrius, der sonsten
ein guter Poët(p)61 gewesen/ selbst dieses in Versen verfasseten Oraculi auctor. Denn
daß alle solche Verse pure Betrügereyen der heydnischen Pfaffen und Götzendiener
gewesen/ bezeuget klärlich mitten im Heydenthum Cicero lib. II. de divinatione.
Daher auch kein Zweiffel ist/ daß alle oracula, die in des Zosimi Historie in ziemli-
cher Anzahl vorhanden/ bloß zu dem Ende erdichtet sind/ damit man die Heyden
noch in ihrer Blindheit erhalten und vom Christenthum [149] abhalten möchte. Da
also das vom Porphyrio angeführte62 Oraculum unstreitig einen Menschen zum
59
(n) Cap. 23.
60
(o) Cap. 22.
61
(p) Cap. 15.
62
It is hard to tell whether there is an umlaut over the “u” or not.
Vater hat/ Porphyrius aber selbst ein versifex63 gewesen/ und diese invention ihm als
ein vortrefliches Mittel vorgekommen/ seinen Zweck zu erreichen/ so weiß ich
nicht/ ob ich unrecht thue/ wenn ich sage/ daß wir Porphyrium allhier recht auf der
Lügen64 und in dem Betruge ertappet haben.
X. [Plotini Allwissenheit und göttliche Macht]
Wir gehen aber noch weiter/ und wollen sehen/ wie auch Porphyrius seinem Plotino
eine göttliche Macht und Allwissenheit beygeleget habe. Es ist ihm nicht genug/
daß er Cap. 14. schreibet/ es habe Plotinus vieles geredet per enthusiasmum und aus
göttlicher Eingebung: ingleichen er sey ein vollkommener Geometra, Arithmeticus,
Mechanicus, Opticus und Musicus gewesen. Wobey es doch recht lächerlich klin-
get/ wenn er hinzusetzet/ er hätte diese Wissenschaften niemahls in praxin gebracht/
jedoch sey die theorie bey ihm gewesen: welches eben so viel gesagt ist/ als er habe
es wohl verstanden/ nur er habe es nicht können von sich geben. Es ist/ sage ich/
dieses dem Porphyrio nicht genug/ sondern er spricht cap. XI. es habe der Plotinus
auch wahrsagen können. Er suchet dieses mit dreyen Histörigen zu bestätigen. Das
erste lautet folgender gestalt: Es war einer gewissen Frauen eine kostbare Hals-
Kette gestohlen worden. Plotinus ließ alsobald alles Gesinde vor sich kommen/ und
sa- [150] he einen nach dem andern an. Hierauf sagte er: dieser ist der Dieb; und es
traff auch richtig ein. Zum andern sagte er von dem jungen Polemone, er wurde
verliebt werden/ aber auch frühzeitig[.] Und auch dieses ist eingetroffen. Drittens so
wollte sich einmahl Porphyrius ums Leben bringen/ diß merckte ihm Plotinus
gleich ab/ und sagte zu ihm: Er sollte es unterlassen/ es käm dieses von seinem
melancholischen Temperamente her/ er sollte deßwegen die Lufft verändern und
von Rom wegreisen. Was aber die übermenschliche Macht des Plotini betrifft/ so
erzehlet Porphyrius im 10ten Capitel eine recht artige Historie davon/ aus welcher
wir deutlich ersehen können/ daß entweder Porphyrius seine Leser vor tumme Leute
halten müsse/ oder selbst des tummen Jungens leiblicher Bruder sey. Lasset uns
doch nur die Geschichte anhören. Olympius, ein Platonischer Philosophus, trachtete
Ober-Meister in der Philosophie zu seyn/ und gönnete dahero dem Plotino nicht nur
nicht seine gute renommée/ sondern zog ihn auch bey andern Leuten durch als einen
gar schlechten Potentaten in der Philosophie; Ja er suchte Plotinum gar zu behexen.
Aber was geschahe? Plotinus verstund diese Kunst auch/ und noch besser. Daher
behexte er den Olympium dermassen/ daß er krumm und lahm wurde.
A spot of ink makes the reading of “r” slightly uncertain.

63
64
XI. [Warum Plotinus sein Vaterland und seine Eltern verläugnet]
Wir sehen zugleich hieraus/ daß der sonst scharffsichtige Bayle seinem Amte als ein
Criticus [151] nicht satisfaction gethan/ wenn er in seinem Dictionnaire(∗)65 dem
Porphyrio in grosser Leichtgläubigkeit fast alle diese Historien nachbetet/ und des
Scribenten betrügliche Absicht nicht gemercket hat. Doch wir wollen nunmehr auch
diejenigen Historien erzehlen/ welche in dem Porphyrischen vita Plotini der
Wahrheit gemäß zu seyn scheinen: dabey wir doch hin und wieder unsere
Anmerckungen einstreuen werden. Und zwar erstlich auf das Vaterland des Plotini
und dessen Eltern zukommen/ so hat Porphyrius keines von beyden gewust: wiewohl
Suidas meldet/ es sey Plotinus aus Lycopolis in Egypten bürtig66 gewesen.
Porphyrius aber machet sich seine Unwissenheit gantz gut zu Nutze/ und(q)67 spricht/
es habe Plotinus deßwegen von seinen Eltern und von seinem Vaterlande nicht
reden wollen/ weil er sich geschämet hätte/ daß er gebohren wäre/ das ist/ daß seine
Seele den Leib als ihr Wohnhauß oder gar als ihr Gefängniß hätte beziehen müssen.
Welches wie es nach den Platonischen Lehr-Sätzen deutlich genug schmecket/ also
kan es endlich auch wohl wahr/ und von dem Plotino in der That geschehen seyn.
XII. [Plotini Leben biß auf sein 40tes Jahr]
Wie sich Plotinus in seiner Kindheit und Jugend aufgeführet/ davon gedencket
Porphyrius nichts/ ohne daß er Cap. 3. aus des Plotini [152] Munde selbsten
erzehlet/ es sey dieser biß ins achte Jahr seines Alters noch ein Säugling gewesen/
und/ wenn ihn gedürstet/ so sey er zu seiner Amme gegangen/ und habe ihr die
Brüste entblöset und daran gesogen: biß ers endlich/ nachdem ihm die Amme einen
scharffen Verweiß deßwegen gegeben/ unterlassen hätte. In eben diesem Capitel
meldet er/ es habe Plotinus im acht und zwantzigsten Jahr seines Alters Lust bekom-
men/ die Philosophie zu studiren. Welches zwar eben kein feiner Ruhm ist/ daß die
Liebe zur Weißheit so späte in sein Hertz gekommen: woraus sich schliessen lässet/
daß er die vorhergehende Jahre in Mußiegang68 und liederlichen Leben zugebracht/
und erst mit dem männlichen Alter/ da der Ehrgeitz sich reget/ zu studiren angefan-
gen habe. Er hat aber zu Alexandrien den Platonischen berühmten69 Philosophum,
Ammonium, zu seinem Lehrmeister erwehlet/ dessen auditor er auch zehn biß eilff
Jahr gewesen. Nach dieser Zeit/ nemlich in seinem 39ten Jahre/ ist er ein Soldat
worden/ und mit des Käysers Gordiani Armée in Persien gezogen/ um da selbst70/
wie es Porphyrius ausleget/ die Philosophiam Persarum zu studiren/ und hernach
gar in Indien zu reisen/ um auch die Philosophiam Indorum zu erlernen. Als aber
65
(∗) Voce Plotin.
66
67
(q) Cap. I.
68
Both “u” and “e” are unclear in this word; it may also read “Mußiagang.”
69
70
The space between “da” and “selbst” is lacking in the original text.
der Kayser umgebracht worden/ so hat er desertiret/ und sich nach Antiochien sal-
viret: von dar er nach Rom gekommen in dem 40ten Jahre seines Alters.
[153]
XIII. [Wenn und wie viel Bücher der Plotinus geschrieben]
Er hat aber/ wie Porphyrius in eben diesem Capitel fortfähret/ nicht alsobald zu
Rom seine Philosophie dociret. Die Ursach dessen war diese. Es hatte Plotinus
nebst Herennio und Origene (welcher von dem Kirchen-Lehrer gleiches Nahmens
zu unterscheiden ist/) sich vereiniget/ ihres Præceptoris, des Ammonii, Lehren
geheim zu halten/ und nicht andern mitzutheilen. Herennius aber und Origenes
hielten ihr Wort nicht. Daher machete sich auch Plotinus weiter kein Gewissen/ die
Ammonischen lehren guten Freunden in der conversation zu communiciren. Wie
denn/ als Plotinus ins dritte Jahr zu Rom war/ Amelius sich zu ihm machte/ der auch
24. Jahr bey ihn geblieben ist. Doch schrieb Plotinus noch nichts/ sondern ließ diß
anstehen biß in sein 49stes oder 50stes Jahr. Um diese Zeit(r)71 fieng er an/ Bücher zu
schreiben/ und hatte deren in seinem 59sten Jahre/ da Porphyrius nach Rom gekom-
men/ und sein Schüler worden/ schon 21. verfertiget. In den folgenden(s)72 sechs
Jahren/ so lange nemlich Porphyrius bey ihm geblieben/ hat er noch andere 24.
Tractätgen geschrieben: und nach der Zeit(t)73 noch neun andre/ welche zusammen
54. Stücke ausmachen/ und alle noch vorhanden sind. Es ist aber recht lächerlich/
wenn Porphyrius schrei- [154] bet/ es habe Plotinus seine ersten 21. Bücher
geschrieben κατά πρώτην ἡλικίαν, in seiner ersten Jugend: daher dieselben
Schriften auch noch unreiff und von schlechtem Nachdrucke wären. Denn da haben
wir einen Knaben von fünfzig Jahren/ als zu welcher Zeit Plotinus erst angefangen
hat sich in Schrifften hervor zuthun.
XIV. [Etliche judicia der Alten von Plotino, daß er eben nicht sonderlich
gelehrt gewesen sey]
Ob nun gleich Porphyrius aus diesem seinen Lehrmeister einen ungemein grossen
Philosophum zu machen bemühet ist/ so finden wir doch allerhand Anzeigungen/
daß andere Leute eben nicht viel Wesens aus ihm gemachet/ und daß er auch in der
That nicht unvergleichlich gelehrt gewesen sey. Denn des Olympii nicht wieder zu
gedencken von welchem schon oben Meldung geschehen/ so bekennet Porphyrius(u)74
selbst/ daß viele den Plotinum beschuldiget/ als sey er ein plagiarius des Numenii,
71
(r) Cap. 4.
72
(s) Cap. 5.
73
(t) Cap. 6.
74
(u) Cap. 17.
eines gleichfalls Platonischen Philosophi. Er setzet zwar hinzu/ es habe Plotinum

Amelius, sein Discipel, wieder diese calumnie in einer besondern Schrifft
vertheidiget: weil aber so wohl diese/ als auch des Numenii Opera, verlohren gan-
gen/ so müssen wir dieses lassen dahin gestellet seyn. Denn Porphyrius gedencket(x)75
noch anderer/ die damahls auch den Plotinum vor einen einfältigen und gar nicht
hochgelahrten Mann gehalten hätten. Doch [155] spricht er/ es sey dieses die Ursach
gewesen/ weil sich Plotinus nicht groß gemachet/ auch nicht syllogistice procediret
hätte/ sondern seine disputationes recht familiaire discourse gewesen wären. Wie
denn er selbst/ der Porphyrius, anfänglich in diesen Gedancken gewesen wäre:
allein/ nachdem er des Plotini mentem penetriret/ so habe er seine Meynung geän-
dert/ und Plotinum vor einen grossen Philosophum gehalten. Er erzehlet(y)76 weiter/
daß eben dieses dem berühmten Critico, Longino, wiederfahren/ der auch anfän-
glich keinen sonderlichen Staat aus dem Plotino gemachet/ sondern ihn gar geringe
geschätzet habe: endlich aber habe er ihn nach Würden/ das ist/ sehr hoch
æstimiret.
XV. [Bekräfftigung derselben]
Daß aber Plotinus auch in der That nicht gar zu gelehrt müsse gewesen seyn/ lässet
sich daher schliessen/ weil er im Schreiben die Sylben nicht recht getheilet/ und
auch sonsten wieder die Orthographie pecciret hat. Porphyrius(z)77 suchet zwar die-
ses damit zu bemänteln/ daß er alle seine Gedancken auf die res gerichtet/ und
hierüber der Worte vergessen hätte. Allein Porphyrius verräth sich selbst/ daß diß
eine kahle Entschuldigung sey/ wenn er alsobald hinzusetzet/ Plotinus habe zugleich
von der Philosophie etwas schreiben/ und doch auch mit jemanden von welt- [156]
lichen Geschäfften discouriren können/ ohne daß er in seiner Philosophischen
Andacht wäre gehindert worden: er hätte also zugleich geredet78/ und doch auch
immer fort geschrieben. Nun sage ich: Ergo hätte er noch viel leichter auf die
Orthographie Achtung geben können/ wenn er sie verstanden hätte. Ich schliesse
zugleich hieraus/ daß Porphyrius des Plotini Schrifften nach eigenen Gefallen ver-
bessert/ und ihnen ein Ansehen gemacht habe: ob er gleich nur so viel(a)79 bekennet/
daß ihm Plotinus aufgetragen/ die Orthographie zu emendiren.
75
(x) Cap. 18.
76
(y) Cap. 19. 20. 21.
77
(z) Cap. 8.
78
In the original text there is a small vertical sign close to the slash.
79
(a) Cap. 7.
XVI. [Hochachtung des Plotini zu Rom bey seinen Leb-Zeiten]
Nichts destoweniger hatte Plotinus auch seine admiratores, worunter nicht nur etli-
che Römische Rathsherrn(b)80 waren/ sondern auch selbst der Kayser Gallienus
nebst seiner Gemahlin. Denn diese hielten ihn dermassen in Ehren/ daß sich auch
Plotinus(c)81 die Freyheit nahm/ sie zu bitten/ sie möchten ihn doch eine Stadt bauen/
und ihr von seinem Patriarchen/ dem Platone, den Nahmen Platonopel beylegen: er
wollte daselbst eine civitatem Platonicam aufrichten. Doch des Kaysers Ministri
waren klüger/ und hinderten dieses: weil sie wohl die Thorheit dieses Philosophi
erkannten/ da er meinete/ es sey in der That müglich/ eine Republique nach der Idea
Platonica auffzurichten. Wie wir denn freylich hieraus zur Gnüge überzeuget
werden/ [157] daß der Plotinus die Natur der Menschen/ aus welchen doch seine
Republique bestehen solte/ gar schlecht müsse verstanden haben. Unterdessen lebte
doch auch bey andern Leuten Plotinus in grossem Ansehen/ und berichtet(d)82
Porphyrius, daß viel vornehme Leute vor ihrem Tode ihm die Auffsicht über ihre
Kinder und ihre Verlassenschafft anvertrauet hätten: Er spricht auch/ diese so
vielfältigen Sorgen hätten doch seine Gedancken nicht zerstreuet/ sondern sein
Gemüthe wäre stets auffs meditiren gerichtet gewesen: man habe ihn auch die 26.
Jahre über/ da er sich zu Rom auffgehalten/ offt zum Schiedsmanne erwehlet: dabey
er sich so auffgeführet/ daß er niemanden von der Obrigkeit zum Feinde gehabt
hätte.
XVII. [Seine Discipel, wie auch seine Lehr-Art]
Was seine Lehrlinge betrifft/ so hat er so wohl auditrices als auditores, gehabt. Von
jenen werden(e)83 dreye nahmhafft gemachet/ von diesen aber(f)84 eilffe/ nehmlich
Amelius, Paulinus, Eustochius, Zoticus, Zethus, Castricius, Marcellus, Sabinillus,
Rogatianus, Seraphion, und unser Porphyrius. Er hat also keine grosse Anzahl von
Schülern gehabt. Von seiner Lehr-Art etwas zu gedencken/ so war er(g)85 in dispu-
tiren munter und freudig anzusehen/ er schwitzete auch offt vor Eifer/ dabey er doch
gantz gelassen [158] und freundlich war: wie er denn einsmahls gantzer drey Tage
mit dem Porphyrio disputiret über die Frage: wie die Seele mit dem Leibe verknüpf-
fet sey?
80
(b) Ibid.
81
(c) Cap. 12.
82
(d) Cap. 9.
83
(e) Ibid.
84
(f) Cap. 7.
85
(g) Cap. 13.
XVIII. [Seine Lebens-Art]
Was seine Lebens-Art anlanget/ so ist Wunder/ daß Porphyrius so gar wenig
Nachricht davon ertheilet. Denn er meldet ein einzigmahl/ und zwar nur im vor-
beygehen/ daß er im Speissen mäßig gewesen/ und öffters gefastet habe.[(h)]86 Doch
meldet er auch cap. 2. daß er in Kranckheiten seinen Leib gar schlecht gewartet
habe: ja er habe (nemlich vermöge seiner Platonischen Lehrsätze/) seinen Leib so
geringe geachtet/ daß er sich auch durchaus nicht habe wollen abmahlen lassen.[(i)]87
XIX. [Sein Tod]
Endlich hieß es auch mit ihm: Mortuus est: Er ist aber an einer abscheulichen
Kranckheit gestorben/ und recht bey lebendigem Leibe verfaulet/ deßwegen auch
seine Freunde sich gescheuet/ ihn zu besuchen: wie solches Porphyrius(k)88 erzehlet/
und noch ausführlicher Julius Firmicus Maternus, dessen Worte auch Herr
Fabricius(l)89 anführet.
XX. [Wahres Contrefait des Plotini und Porphyrii]
Diß ist also des Plotini Leben/ wie uns solches Porphyrius hinterlassen hat. Wir
lernen [159] aus demselben noch zu guter letzt/ daß so wohl Plotinus, als Porphyrius,
Leute gewesen/ die erstlich kein gutes judicium gehabt/ (siehe §. XIV. und XVI.)
ferner am præjudicio auctoritatis laboriret/ (§. V, XI. und XIII.) drittens leichtgläu-
big gewesen/ (§. VII.) ingleichen von altvettelischen Aberglauben eingenommen/
(§. VI, VII. und X.) wie auch betrügerisch/ (§. V. VI, IX.) und endlich zur
Enthusiasterey (§. VIII und X.) geneigt/ und/ welches aus diesem allen erfolget/ von
einem melancholischen Temperament/ (welches auch Porphyrius(m)90 ausdrücklich
von sich gestehet/) und alo [i.e. also] grosse Philosophi zu werden unfähig gewesen
sind. Wir wollen dieses zu anderer Zeit noch deutlicher darthun/ wenn wir sonderlich
des Plotini Bücher in Betrachtung zu ziehen Anlaß finden werden.
86
[(h)] Cap. 8. [Note (h) does not appear in the main text but only in the apparatus; it has been
placed it in the main text by LC.]
87
[(i)] Cap. 1. [Note (i) does not appear in the main text but only in the apparatus; it has been placed
it in the main text by LC.]
88
(k) Cap. 2.
89
(l) Bibl. Græc. lib. IV. cap. 26. §. 5. p. 154.
90
(m) Cap. XI.
VI. The Life of Plotinus Described by Porphyry91
Contents
§I. Our present purpose §II. Assessment of the Latin translation of this biography
§III. Some remarks regarding the name ‘Plotinus’ §IV. When Porphyry composed
this biography §V. Determination of Porphyry’s intention when writing this text
§§VI-VII. Assessment of Plotinus’ familiar spirit §VIII. Plotinus’ actual unifica-
tion with God §IX. What is to be made of the testimony about Plotinus given by the
oracle §X. Plotinus’ omniscience and divine power §XI. Why Plotinus disavowed
his country and his parents §XII. Plotinus’ life up to the age of forty §XIII. How
many books Plotinus wrote and when §XIV. A few judgments of Plotinus made by
the ancients, to the effect that he was not particularly erudite §XV. Corroboration of
these judgments §XVI. Admiration for Plotinus in Rome during his lifetime §XVII.
His disciples and his teaching style §XVIII. His lifestyle §XIX. His death §XX. A
true depiction of Plotinus and Porphyry
I. [Our present purpose]
In this context our purpose is certainly not to give an account of the philosophy of
the famous Plotinus and the various judgments passed on him. Instead, we simply
intend to go through his biography as narrated by Porphyry. Plotinus’ philosophy
will be dealt with below, when we discuss the history of Platonic philosophy.92 All
we shall do on this occasion is to offer an example illustrating the fact that bio-
graphical accounts of philosophers (vitae philosophorum)93 must be read with care
and sound reason.
91
“VI” in the title refers to the section number in the first issue of the first volume (1715) of Acta
philosophorum. The preceding sections deal with the usefulness of ‘philosophical history’ (sec. 1),
the meaning of the term ‘philosopher’ (sec. 2), the concept of philosophy (sec. 3), Xanthippe,
the wife of Socrates (sec. 4), Socrates’ biography (sec. 5).
92
Heumann does not distinguish verbally between ‘Platonists’ and ‘Neoplatonists’; this termino-
logical divide was not introduced until the 1770s and 1780s. For this terminological development,
see Meinhardt 1984 and chapter 4 in the present book. Platonism is discussed in Heumann 1715d,
467–471; Heumann 1715–1716, 23, 47, 51–53, 56–57, 60–61, 196, 201, 296, 583; Heumann
1715c, 340; Heumann 1716. Throughout these pages Heumann claims that poor judgment and
superstition were characteristic of Platonic philosophers, and that Platonism and Christianity
should be kept apart. He tends to reject the Church Fathers’ claim (most notably in Augustine, De
civitate dei 8.4–9) that Platonism was closer to Christianity than any other philosophical school of
ancient Greece.
93
The phrase vitae philosophorum was a Latin title commonly used for biographical collections of
ancient philosophers, of which Laertius’ Vitae philosophorum was the most famous. Heumann’s
article on Laertius’ collection uses the title Vitae philosophorum, or De vitis philosophorum; see
Heumann 1715c, 321–367. To what extent Porphyry’s Vita Plotini is representative of this bio-
graphical tradition, of which Laertius was a part, is an open question. Berschin and Görgemanns
1996–2003, II: 685, observe that there is a distinct interest in ethical virtues in so-called Neoplatonic
VI. The Life of Plotinus Described by Porphyry 47
II. [Assessment of the Latin translation of this biography]
The Life of Plotinus is to be found at the beginning of Plotinus’ collected works,

such as in the edition, first published in folio in 1580, in which the Greek text is
accompanied by Marsilio Ficino’s Latin translation.94 The highly praised Mr.
Fabricius has also integrated this Plotinus biography into his Bibliotheca Graeca,
(a)95
where he divided it into 26 chapters and commented on it occasionally in short
but erudite notes.
Regarding the translation, Fabricius observed many errors in it, and he even
improved upon it. Yet he neglected to change the translation of the first word in the
second chapter; he should have replaced colico morbo [sick with the colic] with
coeliaco [sick in the stomach]. Bayle pointed out this omission, (b)96 and rightly so.
For Celsus(c)97 quite clearly shows the difference between these two diseases. It
would also be desirable if someone examined the translation in greater detail and
improved upon it, since it is in need of this. I shall offer only a few examples.
Ficino rendered the very first words (Πλωτῖνος ὁ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς γεγονὼς Φιλόσοφος)
like this: “Plotinus, Philosophus nostro sæculo singularis” [“Plotinus, the unparal-
leled philosopher of our time”]. However, the Greek text does not say that he was
“singularis” [“unparalleled”] but instead calls him simply “nostræ ætatis
Philosophus” [“a philosopher of our time”]. I thought that perhaps Ficino’s copy
read γεννᾶιος [meaning ‘noble’] instead of γεγονὼς [meaning ‘era’/‘time’], and
that this gennaios had been translated as “unparalleled”. Similarly, Eusebius(d)98
calls Porphyry τὸν γεννᾶιον Ἑλλήνων Φιλόσοφον [i.e. “that noble philosopher of
the Greeks”], and Diogenes Laertius, Lives IX.61, also writes about Pyrrho that he
had philosophized in a very noble manner (γενναιότατα, nobillissime).99 I reject
this conjecture simply because I have observed that Ficino sometimes paraphrased
biographies, e.g. Porphyry’s of Plotinus, Damascius’ of Isidorus (ca. 450–ca. 520 CE), and
Marinus’ of Proclus (412–487 CE).
94
Ficino’s Latin translation of Plotinus was first printed in 1492, though without the Greek text.
The first Greek-Latin edition of the Life of Plotinus appeared in 1580: Porphyry, Plotini vita,
eiusque librorum series, in Plotinus, Operum philosophicorum omnium libri LIV in sex enneades
distributi, Greek and Latin text, editioin, translation and commentary by Marsilio Ficino (Basel,
1580); see O’Brien 1982, I: 151–155.
95
(a) Porphyry, Plotini vita, eiusque librorum series (1711), Latin translation by Marsilio Ficino,
notes by Johann Albert Fabricius, in Bibliotheca graeca, ed. Johann Albert Fabricius, 14 vols.
(Hamburg, 1708–1728); see Fabricius 1708–1728, IV: 91–147. [For this edition, see O’Brien
1982, 156. Johann Albert Fabricius (1668–1736) was a German classical scholar and biographer;
see Petersen 1998.]
96
(b) Bayle 1722, III, 2455: marginal note.
97
(c) Aulus Cornelius Celsus, De medicina libri octo brevioribus Rob. Constantini, Is. Casauboni
aliorumque scholiis ac locis parallelis illustrati, ed. Theodoor Jansson Almeloveen (Amsterdam,
1713), 4.12–13; see Celsus 1713, 220–223. [Celsus (ca. 25 BCE-ca. 50 CE) was a Roman encyclo-
pedist known for his De medicina, which was published several times in the early modern period.]
98
(d) Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 5.4. [Eusebius was a Christian apologist active in the 4th
century.]
99
Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 360–ca. 270 BCE) was a Greek philosopher known as a Skeptic.
in other passages of this translation and did not stick closely to the original text.100
However that may be, one cannot accept the proposed translation, since Ficino
thereby imposes a prejudice upon the reader. Moreover, he fails to fulfill the duty of
a translator, who is not allowed to add anything of his own.
I shall also indicate a passage which Ficino translated completely wrong. We find
it at the opening of the fourth chapter, which he translates: “Scribit autem intentis-
simo quodam acumine et intellectu multiplici. … sæpe ex ipsa re, de qua agit, miri-
fice patitur” [“But he writes with a very attentive acuity and many thoughts … he
[is] often wonderfully affected by the matter at hand”].101 Here two errors have been
made. First, ἐν δὲ τῷ γράφειν σύντομος γέγονε καὶ πολυνοῦς means:102 “When he
wrote something, he was very brief and concise, but behind his words there was a
vast and rambling mind.” Second, πολλὰ ἐκπαθῶς φράζων, means:103 “He said a lot
out of emotion, so infatuated that he was put completely out of his mind.” (Thus,
Plutarch(e)104 warns that one should not become ἐκπαθὴς [that is, heated] and brutal
when one is in a state of anger.)
III. [Some remarks regarding the name ‘Plotinus’]
Before we proceed to Plotinus’ life, we shall briefly discuss his name at the time of
Porphyry’s writing. There are three fairly rare names: Plotus, Plotinus and Plotina.
One can rightly call them proper names κατ᾽ ἐξοχὴν [par excellence, i.e. names
proper to them], since those who held these names shared them with few or even no
one. To my knowledge there is only one Plotus, namely the comic poet commonly
called Plautus;105 only one is called Plotinus, namely our philosopher; and, finally,
only one is called Plotina, namely the wife of the Emperor Trajan.106
100
The 1580 edition reads γεγονὼς. Neither in Henry and Schwyzer’s editions of Porphyry’s Vita
Plotini 1.1 (Plotinus 1951–1973 and 1964–1982), nor in Brisson’s edition (Porphyry, La vie de
Plotin, 1.1) do we find γεννᾶιος recorded as a manuscript reading. Heumann finds it unlikely that
γεννᾶιος was changed erroneously to γεγονὼς when the 1580 edition was printed, for which rea-
son he rejects this conjecture. Instead, Heumann suggests that Ficino imposed a new meaning on
the original text in his Latin translation. For a discussion of the translation of γεγονὼς, see the note
to Brisson’s edition.
101
Porphyry, Plotini vita (1580), β5r, lines 19–20 and 22–23 (= Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711),
115.21–23, 115.26–28; = Porphyry, La vie de Plotin, 14.1–4, 154.) Heumann erroneously refers to
the fourth chapter (“4ten”) rather than the fourteenth.
102
These Greek words are cited from Porphyry, Plotini vita (1580), β5r, lines 14–15.
103
These Greek words are cited from Porphyry, Plotini vita (1580), β5r, lines 16–17.
104
(e) Plutarch “De liberis educandis,” ch. 7 [In Plutarch, Moralia I: 4–68].
105
Titus Maccius Plautus (ca. 254–184 BCE), a Roman playwright.
106
Pompeia Plotina (d. 121/122 CE) was the wife of the Roman Emperor Trajan (53–117 CE).
IV. [When Porphyry composed this biography]
Regarding the time when this biography was composed, Porphyry has not left us
uninformed, although he has not reckoned the time very accurately. He says in
chapter four that he was twenty-nine years younger than Plotinus.107 Moreover, in
chapter twenty-three Porphyry refers to an event in the sixty-eighth year of his own
life. So he was roughly seventy years old when he composed this biography. Since
Plotinus died in his sixtieth year, as stated in chapter two, Porphyry must have been
in his thirty-seventh year. Accordingly, he wrote the Life of Plotinus some thirty
years after Plotinus’ death.
It is relevant for us to know these circumstances in order to understand that it was
easy for him [Porphyry] to tell one or two lies about a man who had died some thirty
years before, since no one could easily expose the fraud. For (other than Porphyry)
how many seventy-year-old men were there who could boast of having known
Plotinus intimately some thirty, forty, or fifty years earlier? Hence, one may ask
whether Porphyry, rather than being a reliable historian, is a great liar who fobs off
on his reader fables invented by himself or inherited from others. To this I reply with
a short ‘yes’, and I shall prove it in what follows.
V. [Determination of Porphyry’s intention when writing this text]
I shall not dwell for long on a certain fact, though one cannot ignore it entirely,
namely that Porphyry was Plotinus’ student and therefore did not regard it as a mor-
tal sin to honour his master by mixing up truth with falsehood, thus exaggerating
everything. This is particularly important, since his master always praised him and
once said(e[∗])108 that Porphyry was an able poet, a philosopher, and a hierophant [i.e.
a high-priest] all at once. That is to say, “Manus manum scabit” [“One hand scratches
the other”].109 Porphyry’s affection and bias reveals itself openly, since he neither
speaks ill of Plotinus nor reports any errors on his part. Yet Plotinus was only a
human being, for which reason he must have had his weaknesses as well.
All I shall ask the reader to do is to reflect on the fact that Porphyry took pains to
depict Plotinus as a Platonic philosopher who had reached perfection; in fact, he
even depicted him, like(f)110 Simon Magus, as someone great, someone who had
107
Porphyry, La vie de Plotin, 4.9, says that he was 30 (triakonta) years younger than Plotinus.
108
(e[∗]) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 15.
109
Heumann may be alluding to a proverb, mutuum scabere, “to praise one another”, or “you
scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours”. He may also be alluding to Plato, [Axiochus] 366c, where
Socrates refers to a verse by Epicharmus, which reads in Ficino’s Latin translation, “Manus manum
fricat; da aliquid et aliquid cape” (“one hand rubs another – give something and take something”).
Ermolao Barbaro rendered this passage “manus manum scabit” in a letter to Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola; see Pico 1557, I: 391. I owe these latter references to Patrick Baker.
110
(f) Acts 8.9.
been unified with God in the most intimate manner.111 As the learned reader will
recall, Philostratus had written a life of Apollonius, and Iamblichus a life of
Pythagoras, with the intention of depicting a great and divine human being and
thereby of persuading the pagans that there had been men just as great as Christ in
the pagan world.112 As I intend to demonstrate on another occasion, our Porphyry
had the very same intention in his biography of Pythagoras. Taking all this into
consideration, one will easily arrive at the suspicion that Porphyry also intended
with his biography of Plotinus to decrease the dominion of Christianity that was
then taking over with great force, and to provide new support for the Platonic phi-
losophy flourishing in that period.
Hence it would not suffice if I said that it is more of a panegyric than a history; it
would not even suffice if I compared Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus with the Catholic
Lives of the Saints, where people are not described as they really were but as one
wishes they had been, that is, as demigods.113 Instead I have to declare that this Life
of Plotinus is Porphyry’s gospel, in which he describes Plotinus as a god who, just
like Christ, performed miracles and knew future events. In short, Porphyry describes
him as omnipotent and omniscient.
111
Simon Magus was a magician and religious figure who converted to Christianity, and whose
conflict with Peter is recorded in Acts 8.9–24: he wanted to buy the ability to communicate the
Holy Spirit to others from Peter, but his petition was refused. Heumann 1715–1716, 51, regard
Simon Magus as a Platonic philosopher. Hansch 1716, 58–60, held that Simon Magus introduced
false doctrines into the Christian Church. Mosheim 1725, 36, saw him as one of the internal ene-
mies of Christianity. Walch 1726d, 1426, 1431, lists Simon Magus as a sorcerer and an enemy of
Christianity. For Simon Magus in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Northern European thought,
see Glawe 1912, 101, 104; Heyd 1995, 98; Mulsow 1997, 60–61, 72–77. For Simon Magus in
antiquity, see Edwards 1997.
112
Flavius Philostratus (170–247 CE) wrote a biography of Apollonius of Tyana (first century CE).
Iamblichus (fourth century CE) wrote a biography of Pythagoras (ca. 560–ca. 490 BCE).
113
Thomasius 1712, 20–21, similarly considers the Lives of the Saints and similar accounts to be
fables.
VI. [Assessment of Plotinus’ familiar spirit]
What I have claimed above must now be proved. Porphyry insinuates that Plotinus
had a god, probably Apollo, as his familiar spirit,114 when he(g)115 writes that
Eustochius, who had been present at Plotinus’ death, told him [i.e. Porphyry] the
following: shortly before Plotinus passed away, a dragon or large snake appeared
and crept into a hole in the wall under Plotinus’ bed, whereupon Plotinus gave up
his spirit.116
If anyone had asked who this dragon was, Porphyry knew well what any pagan
reader would reply, namely that it was Apollo or some other god.117 According to the
pagan imagination, Apollo usually appeared in this guise, just like his son
Aesculapius, who was assigned a dragon or large snake as his token. (h)118 Likewise
Olympias, the mother of Alexander the Great, claimed that she was not impregnated
by Philip but by a god who slept with her in the guise of a dragon or a large snake,
114
Translated from spiritus familiaris. We do not find this phrase in Ficino’s Latin translation of
Porphyry’s Plotini vita (1711), 1–26, pp. 91–147. In Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), 10, p. 111.7, we
find the expression daemon familiaris used for the familiar demon revealed by the Egyptian priest
to Plotinus (= Porphyry, Plotini vita (1580), β4r, line 54–55). Here the Latin phrase daemon famil-
iaris is translated from the Greek expression ὁ οἰκεῖος δαίμων; see Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711),
10, p. 111.6–7 (right column) (= Porphyry, La vie de Plotin, 10.18, p. 152.) For this daemon famil-
iaris in Porphyry’s Vita Plotini 10, see Brisson 1992, II: 469–472.
Heumann departs from Ficino’s Latin translation, and from the Greek text. I am not sure if
spiritus familiaris was intended as a technical term in magic or just a free translation on Heumann’s
part. In §X below, Heumann stresses that Plotinus was an able sorcerer; his rendering of daemon
familiaris as spiritus familiaris in §VI may be interpreted as Heumann’s effort to depict Plotinus
as a simple-minded adherent of folk-belief, sorcery, black magic, and witchcraft. This would fit
with the treatment of sorcery provided by two of Heumann’s contemporaries, namely Christian
Thomasius (1655–1728) and Johann Georg Walch (1693–1775). In his 1712 publication, De orig-
ine ac progressu, Thomasius equates ancient Platonism, especially Iamblichus and his theurgy,
with the kind of witchcraft common in folk-belief (Thomasius 1712, 20); Thomasius rejects witch-
craft and sorcery completely, since it has no basis in the Bible (6). Walch 1726d, in his entry
“Hexerey”, which refers to this work of Thomasius (e.g. col. 1418), mentions the ancient assump-
tion that Apollo was a companion spirit as typical of the erroneous beliefs held among learned
magicians and sorcerers (cols 1424–1425). In col. 1418, Walch claims that Pythagoreans and
Platonists practiced sorcery and evoked spirits (“Geistern”). In cols. 1427–1428, he discusses sor-
cery in ancient Egypt. For a typology of spirits in eighteenth-century German thought, see also
Walch’s entry on ‘Geist’, in Walch 1726c. For magic in the Renaissance and Early Modern period,
see Zambelli 2007.
115
(g) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 2.
116
Heumann refers to Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), 2, pp. 94–95 (= Porphyry, La vie de Plotin,
2.12–34, p. 135).
117
The connection is via the Python; Apollo’s epithet is Pythius.
118
(h) Salomon Cellarius, Origines et antiquitates medicae post praematurum illius excessum
emendatiores auctioresque editae (Jena, 1701). ch. 2, §§6–7, pp. 9–12; Christioph Woltereck,
Electa rei nummariae, sive selectae dissertationes de rarioribus numis antiquis tam Graecis, quam
Latinis (Hamburg, 1709), 33.
as Plutarch(i)119 and Justin(k)120 report. This is also supposed to have happened to the
mother of Scipio Africanus, Aulus Gellius(l)121 informs us in his Noctes Atticae.
According to the testimony of Suetonius, (m)122 something similar happened to Atia,
the mother of the Emperor Augustus: a dragon laid with her while she slept in the
temple of Apollo, where she had gone to participate in a religious service. The same
applies to Pythagoras and Plato, who were considered by some to be sons of Apollo.
Thus Porphyry strove to evoke the same effect: if Plotinus was not a biological son
of Apollo, he was at least a familiar friend of Apollo, who only left him (Plotinus)
upon his (Plotinus’) death.
This pious fraud123 is not employed for the first time in the case of Plotinus, or
rather in the case of Porphyry, since we also find an example of it in the history of
Heraclides Ponticus.(∗)124 This man kept and raised a young dragon in his house.
When he was about to die, he ordered one of his best friends to hide his (Heraclides’)
body after his death and to put a dragon into his bed instead. Nota bene. He did this
so that people would be led to think that he had passed into heaven and been accepted
into the circle of the gods. Hence it is said: “nothing is done which has not been
done before.”
VII.
That Plotinus had a god, and not simply a spirit, as his familiar spirit, is affirmed by
Porphyry in chapter ten by means of Plotinus’ own testimony. His story runs as fol-
lows. An Egyptian priest came to Rome. As he got to know Plotinus, the Egyptian
said to him that he would reveal Plotinus’ familiar spirit to him in visible form. In
order to do this they entered the temple of the goddess Isis, and there the Egyptian
called forth the familiar spirit. Surprisingly, it was no ordinary demon [daemon] that
appeared but a god. To this the Egyptian exclaimed: How blessed you are, Plotinus,
you who have received no mean spirit but a god as your guardian angel! Because of
this Plotinus became very arrogant; as narrated in the same chapter, when Amelius
asked him to go with him to sacrifice, Plotinus replied: the gods must come to me,
not I to them.
119
(i) Plutarch, Vita Alexandri 1.2.17–23. [In Plutarch, Vitae parallelae, II.2, 153.]
120
(k) Marcus Junianius Justin, Historiae Philippicae ex recensione Joannis Georgii Graevii cum
eiusdem castigationibus (Leiden, 1683), book 11, ch. 11, §3, p. 241. [Marcus Junianius Justinus
was a historian active in the Roman Empire (dates unknown).]
121
(l) Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 7.1. [Actually 6.1.]
122
(m) Suetonius, Vita Augusti, in Suetonius, De vitae Caesarum 2.94.
123
The phrase “pious fraud” (pia fraus) is also found in Thomasius 1712, 31.
124
(∗) Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.89. [Heraclides Ponticus lived 390–310 BCE.]
VIII. [Plotinus’ actual unification with God]
Porphyry further reports(n)125 that Plotinus advanced in Platonic philosophy to such

a degree that he passed through all the steps prescribed by Plato.126 Ultimately he
saw God Himself, who had no shape or form but rather was a substance transcend-
ing everything that one can comprehend. In order to make this more credible,
Porphyry adds that in his sixty-eighth year he himself had advanced to such a degree
that he had once been unified with God. Porphyry, however, accepts Plotinus’ supe-
riority, writing that the latter had reached and enjoyed the aim of philosophizing, i.e.
unification with God, four times.
I X. [What is to be made of the testimony about Plotinus

given by the oracle]
Furthermore, Porphyry says that the very oracle of Apollo testified(o)127 about
Plotinus, after his death, that he (Plotinus) had been one of the greatest philoso-
phers, and that he enjoyed the highest, wholly ineffable beatitude together with
Plato and Pythagoras for all eternity. Here, however, I cannot remain silent and let
Porphyry’s lie pass without censure. For this is a poetic lie, and I do not doubt that
it is Porphyry himself, a good poet, (p)128 who is the author of this versified
oracle.129
The second book of Cicero’s De divinatione—a work written in pagan times—
makes it sufficiently clear that all such verses were pure deceptions of pagan priests
and idolators. Hence there is no doubt that all oracles, very many of which are found
in Zosimus’ history, were invented simply in order to maintain the pagans in their
blindness and keep them away from Christianity.130 Since the oracle reported by
Porphyry surely has a human being as its author, and since Porphyry himself was a
versifier and would have seen this trick as an effective means to his goal, then I do
not find it completely unreasonable to say that here we have caught Porphyry amidst
his lies and deceptions.
125
(n) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 23.
126
Heumann may be alluding to the ladder of love; see Plato, Symposium 210a-212b. He may also
be alluding to Porphyry, Sententiae 32, where we find the cardinal virtues systematised according
to their role in noetic ascent. Hansch 1716, 90–92 and passim, discusses this scheme of the virtues.
Similarly, Brucker 1742–1767, II: 460–462, gives a (dismissive) exposition of these virtues.
127
(o) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 22. [See Goulet 1982.]
128
(p) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 15.
129
Compare with Porphyry’s Philosophia ex oraculis, along with Antonie van Dale’s discussion of
it in his Dissertationes de oraculis ethnicorum (Amsterdam, 1683), 15 and 62. I owe this reference
to Anthony Ossa-Richardson.
130
Zosimus (fl. 490–510 CE) was a Byzantine historian. His Historia nova was published several
times in the early modern period.
X. [Plotinus’ omniscience and divine power]
But we shall proceed further now, to see how Porphyry assigned divine power and
omniscience to his Plotinus. For Porphyry it is not enough to claim, as he does in
chapter fourteen, that Plotinus said many things through enthusiasm and divine
inspiration.131 Plotinus is also called a perfect geometer, arithmetician, mechanic,
optician, and musician. In this connection it sounds rather silly when he adds that
Plotinus never practiced these arts but remained at a theoretical level; which is as
much as to say, he understood these arts but he was not able to teach them.132
All this, I claim, is not enough for Porphyry; on the contrary, in chapter eleven he
says that Plotinus was also capable of divining. He strives to corroborate this with
three stories. The first runs as follows. A precious necklace had been stolen from a
certain lady. Plotinus gathered all the domestic servants around him and looked at
one after another, after which he said: “This person is the thief.” And he was indeed
right. According to the second story, Plotinus prophesied that the young Polemon
would fall in love but also die at an early age. And this too happened. The third story
goes that Porphyry wanted to commit suicide. Plotinus sensed this straightaway and
said to him that he should not do it; the wish to die was caused by his melancholic
temperament, and thus he should leave Rome and breathe some fresh air.133
Regarding Plotinus’ superhuman power, Porphyry narrates a characteristic story
in chapter ten.134 From this story we clearly understand that either Porphyry held his
readers to be fools or he himself was Stupidity’s younger brother. But let us hear the
story. Olympius was a Platonic philosopher who strove to become a master in phi-
losophy. Therefore he not only envied Plotinus his good reputation but also circu-
lated the rumour that Plotinus had only little power in philosophy; he even tried to
bewitch Plotinus. But what happened? Plotinus was also a master of this art, and an
even greater one: he bewitched Olympius so thoroughly that the latter turned into a
lame hunchback.135
131
Compare with Heumann’s criticism of Ficino’s translation of this passage in Vita Plotini, 14, as
translated by Heumann in §II above: here in §X Heumann seems to follow Ficino’s translation
despite his earlier criticism of it.
132
Compare with Aristotle, Metaphysics I.12, which reads: “the sign of knowledge or ignorance is
the ability to teach” (trans. Tredennick).
133
These three stories are found in Porphyry, La vie de Plotin, 11.
134
Heumann is probably alluding to the story about Plotinus using astral power against one of his
enemies, found in Porphyry, Vita Plotini, 10.
135
Walch 1726d, 1417 mentions this as one possible effect of bewitchment.
XI. [Why Plotinus disavowed his country and his parents]
From this we can see immediately that the otherwise acute Bayle has not fulfilled
his role as a critic. For he repeats most of these stories with great credulity in his
Dictionnaire(∗)136—and without noticing the fraudulent intention of their author.
Nevertheless, we also want to relate those stories from the Life of Plotinus that seem
to be true, sprinkling in our own observations here and there.
Let us first deal with the story about Plotinus’ native land and his parents.
Porphyry knew nothing of either. Suidas reports, however, that Plotinus was born in
Lycopolis in Egypt.137 Still, Porphyry makes good use of his ignorance. He(q)138
claims that Plotinus did not want to speak of his parents and his country because he
was ashamed that he had been born, that is, that his soul had been forced to inhabit
his body as its dwelling-place or even as its prison. This explanation certainly has
the flavour of Platonic doctrine and thus may even be true and reflect the facts about
Plotinus.
XII. [Plotinus’ life up to the age of forty]
Porphyry relates nothing about how Plotinus behaved as a child and as a young man,
apart from in chapter three, where it is said, by Plotinus himself, that he was breast-
fed until the age of eight. When he got thirsty he went to his wet nurse and bared her
breasts in order to suck; he finally stopped after she rebuked him harshly.
In the same chapter Porphyry reports that Plotinus became interested in studying
philosophy at the age of twenty-eight. The fact that his love for wisdom emerged so
late in life does not redound to his glory: From this we can infer that he had spent
the previous years of his life in idleness and lasciviousness, and that it was only
when he reached maturity, when ambition manifests itself, that he began to study.
Plotinus chose Ammonius [i.e. Ammonius Saccas], the famous Platonic philoso-
pher from Alexandria, as his teacher, with whom he studied for ten or eleven years.139
After this period, in his thirty-ninth year, he became a soldier and went to Persia
with the Emperor Gordian and his army. He did so, according to Porphyry, in order
to study Persian philosophy, planning to travel on to India and to become familiar
with Indian philosophy as well. When the Emperor was killed, however, Plotinus
deserted and escaped to Antioch, whence he came to Rome in his fortieth year.
136
(∗) See Bayle 1722.
137
Suidae Lexicon, IV: 151. Heumann adhered to the erroneous tradition, deriving from a misread-
ing of the title of the Lexicon, “Suda”, according to which the author of this work was a person
named Suidas.
138
(q) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 1.
139
Porphyry, La vie de Plotin, 3.
XIII. [How many books Plotinus wrote and when]
Plotinus did not disseminate his philosophy through lectures straightaway when he
came to Rome, as Porphyry says in the same chapter [i.e. chapter three]. The reason
for this was that Plotinus had made an agreement with Erennius140 and Origen141 (to
be distinguished from the Church Father of the same name142) to keep secret the
teaching of their master, Ammonius, and not to disclose it to others. Erennius and
Origen, however, did not keep their promise. Consequently, Plotinus no longer saw
any reason not to share his knowledge about Ammonius’ teaching with good friends
in private conversation.
During Plotinus’ third year in Rome Amelius came to him, staying with him for
twenty-four years. Plotinus still wrote nothing, postponing it until he was in his
forty-ninth or fiftieth year. Then(r)143 he began to write books, and by the time he
reached his fifty-ninth year, when Porphyry came to Rome and became his student,
he had already composed twenty-one books. Over the following six years, (s)144 the
period in which Porphyry stayed with him, Plotinus wrote another twenty-four trea-
tises; and after this period(t)145 nine more, making a total of fifty-four pieces, which
are all extant.
It is rather ridiculous when Porphyry claims that Plotinus wrote his first twenty-
one books “κατά πρώτην ἡλικίαν”, “in his first youth”,146 and that that is why these
writings were still immature and written by an untrained hand. For then we would
be talking about a fifty-year-old “boy”, which is the age at which Plotinus first
began to write.
IV. [A few judgments of Plotinus made by the ancients, to the effect that

X
he was not particularly erudite]
Although Porphyry takes pains to present his instructor as an exceptionally great

philosopher, we nevertheless find indications that other people did not take particu-
lar note of him and that he was in fact not incomparably erudite. Without repeating
what Olympius thought of him, already mentioned above,147 we should observe that
Porphyry himself admits(u)148 that many accused Plotinus of having plagiarized
140
Erennius was a disciple of Ammonius but is otherwise unknown. See Porphyry, La vie de Plotin,
3.24, 3.29, 3.30.
141
For this Origen, another disciple of Ammonius, see Porphyry, La vie de Plotin, 3.24, 3.29.
142
For the distinction between the Church Father Origen (184/185–253/254 CE) and the Origen
mentioned in Porphyry, La vie de Plotin, 3.24, 3.29, see Brisson 1982, 113–114.
143
(r) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 4.
144
(s) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 5.
145
(t) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 6.
146
Porphyry, La vie de Plotin, 6.28, p. 146.
147
See §X above.
148
(u) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 17.
Numenius, also a Platonic philosopher.149 Porphyry adds that Amelius, a disciple of

Plotinus, had defended Plotinus against this accusation in a specific text.150 But
since both this text and the works of Numenius have been lost, we must set this
question aside.
Then Porphyry goes on to refer(x)151 to still others who held that Plotinus was a
simple-minded man, in no way erudite. However, the cause of this, he says, is that
Plotinus was not arrogant and did not adopt a syllogistic method; instead his dispu-
tations consisted of dialogues among friends. A similar view was held by Porphyry
himself at the outset; it was only after he had grasped Plotinus’ thought that he
changed his opinion and came to regard him as a great philosopher.152 Porphyry also
relates(y)153 that the same thing happened to the famous critic Longinus,154 who
assigned Plotinus no special status at first but instead had a very low opinion of him.
Ultimately, though, Longinus came to esteem him according to his worth, that is,
highly indeed.
XV. [Corroboration of these judgments]
It is possible to deduce that Plotinus could not, in reality, have been very learned,
namely from the fact that in his writings he did not divide the syllables correctly and
that he generally violated the rules of orthography.155 Admittedly, Porphyry(z)156
sought to cloak this by arguing that Plotinus devoted his mind entirely to ideas and
therefore neglected his language.157
The only problem is that Porphyry betrays himself, suggesting that this is a hol-
low excuse. For he adds that Plotinus was able to produce philosophical writings
while simultaneously discussing mundane matters with other people—and without
being hindered in his philosophical meditation. In short, he spoke while continuing
to write at the same time. And so I say: If he had understood the rules of orthogra-
phy, then he could have paid greater attention to them. I also deduce that Porphyry
improved upon Plotinus’ writings according to his own whims, and that he turned
149
Numenius’ works were read aloud in the circle of Plotinus and his students (Porphyry, La vie de
Plotin, 14.12). Plotinus was accused of plagiarizing Numenius in 17.1, 17.18, 18.3, 21.4.
150
151
(x) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 18.
152
Porphyry, La vie de Plotin, 18.8–10, p. 160.
153
(y) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), chs. 19, 20, 21.
154
The Platonic philosopher [Cassius] Longinus, to whom Porphyry refers in Vita Plotini 19, is not
normally now identified with “the famous critic” Longinus, author of Peri hupsous (On the
Sublime); see Fyfe and Roberts 1991, xxi. For the Longinus to whom Porphyry refers, see Brisson
1982, 91–95.
155
Porphyry, La vie de Plotin, 8. Here “Orthographie”, translated as “rules of orthography” (i.e.
spelling), may also mean “grammatical rules” or “style” in general.
156
(z) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 8.
157
them into something distinguished, though he claims(a)158 only that Plotinus had
entrusted him with the task of correcting his orthography.
XVI. [Admiration for Plotinus in Rome during his lifetime]
Despite all this, Plotinus had his admirers, among whom we not only find several
members of the Senate(b)159 but also the Emperor Gallienus himself and his wife. For
these people held him in such high esteem that Plotinus(c)160 took the liberty of ask-
ing if they would build a city for him and call it Platonopolis, after his own master,
Plato. Plotinus’ intent was to establish a Platonic republic. The Emperor’s ministers
were wiser, however, and stopped this from happening. For they fully compre-
hended the folly of this philosopher, who actually thought it possible to erect a
republic according to the Platonic ideal.161 This alone is sufficient to convince us
that Plotinus must have understood human nature—upon which his republic would
have had to stand—very poorly indeed.
Meanwhile, Plotinus continued to be highly regarded by others. Porphyry has
it(d)162 that many people of high rank, before their death, entrusted him with the
supervision of their children and their estate. He also says that these manifold duties
did not disturb Plotinus’ thoughts; instead, his mind was continuously absorbed in
meditation. In the course of the twenty-six years which he spent in Rome, he was
often chosen as an arbitrator; he acted in such a way that he never made an enemy
of any of the authorities.
XVII. [His disciples and his teaching style]
Regarding his pupils, he had both women and men in his audience. Three of the
former are mentioned by name, (e)163 compared to eleven of the latter, (f)164 namely
Amelius, Paulinus, Eustochius, Zoticus, Zethus, Castricius, Marcellus, Sabinillus,
Rogatianus, Serapion, and our Porphyry. Thus he did not have a great number of
students. As for his teaching style, he(g)165 appeared joyous and friendly in discus-
sions. His fervour often put him into a sweat, though he remained calm and kind all
158
(a) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 7.
159
(b) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 7.
160
(c) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 12.
161
For this theme, see also Heumann 1716. Brucker 1742–1767, I: 726.26–28, similarly held
Plato’s political philosophy in low regard. For this theme, see Neschke 1992. For political philoso-
phy in the Platonic tradition, see O’Meara 2003; Smith 2005.
162
(d) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 9.
163
(e) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 9.
164
(f) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 7.
165
(g) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 13.
the same. Once he discussed for three days with Porphyry the question of how the
soul is united with body.
XVIII. [His lifestyle]
As far as his lifestyle is concerned, it is curious that Porphyry provides so little

information about it. He reports only once, and then merely in passing, that Plotinus
was moderate in his meals and that he often fasted.[(h)]166 He also says in chapter 2
that during illnesses Plotinus took quite poor care of his body. In fact, he held his
body in such low regard (in accord with his Platonic precepts) that he utterly refused
to have his portrait made.[(i)]167
XIX. [His death]
Eventually, he suffered the fate of all: he died. He died, however, from an abomi-
nable disease that made his living body decay. For this reason his friends avoided
visiting him, as is related by Porphyry, (k)168 and, in still more detail, by Julius
Firmicus Maternus, who is also cited by Mr. Fabricius. (l)169
XX. [A true depiction of Plotinus and Porphyry]
So, this is Plotinus’ life as it has been passed down to us by Porphyry. It remains for
us to draw some conclusions from it. First, both Plotinus and Porphyry were men
who lacked sound judgment (see §§XIV and XVI).170 Second, they were beholden
to the prejudice of authority (see §§ V, XI and XIII).171 Third, they were credulous
166
[(h)] Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 8.
167
[(i)] Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 1.
168
(k) Porphyry, Plotini vita (1711), ch. 2.
169
(l) Johann Albert Fabricius, Bibliotheca graeca (1708–1728), IV: 154. [Julius Firmicus Maternus
was a Sicilian philosopher who described Plotinus’ death some sixty years later in his Mathesis,
1.7.14–22. ed. Monat, I: 72–75. For Maternus’ account, see Grmek 1992.]
170
The sentence is slightly ambiguous. It may also mean that Plotinus and Porphyry “lacked a good
reputation”, as explained in §§XIV and XVI. Heumann, however, states in his 1715–1716, 599
(chapter 6), that Porphyry and Plotinus lacked sound judgment and that their natural talents for
philosophical reflection were poor; on this occasion he refers explicitly to p. 159 of his ‘VI. Das
Leben Plotini vom Porphyrio beschrieben’, Acta philosophorum 1.1 (1715): 138–159 (i.e.
Heumann 1715b). In Heumann 1715–1716, 196 (chapter 4), 583, 599 (chapter 6), he claims that
Plato also lacked sound judgment.
171
According to Heumann’s precepts for writing the history of philosophy, this is a major error,
since the genuine historian of philosophy should be free of such prejudices (as he understood the
term) and should likewise distance himself from prejudice in his description and analysis of past
philosophers’ texts and in his account of their lives; see my introductory essay above. For this
theme, see Catana 2008, 162–165. This view became instrumental in Brucker’s Historia critica
philosophiae; see Catana 2008, 147–159.
people (§VII), gripped, moreover, by a superstition appropriate to old women (§§VI,

VII, X); they were fraudulent, too (§§V, VI, IX). Finally, they were inclined towards
enthusiasm (§§VIII and X) and were, as follows from all this, of a melancholic
temperament (as Porphyry(m)172 explicitly admits in his own regard) and thus inca-
pable of becoming great philosophers.173 We shall clarify this issue at some other
time, when we find the occasion to discuss Plotinus’ books.174
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Chapter 3
The Origin of the Division Between Middle
Platonism and Neoplatonism
3.1 Introduction
In the 1740s, when the German historian and Lutheran minister Johann Jacob
Brucker (1696–1770) established the history of philosophy as a philosophical disci-
pline, he characterized Neoplatonism, as we now call it, as an ‘eclectic sect’ and as
‘Alexandrian philosophy’. By means of this terminology, he intended to separate
Neoplatonism from the earlier Platonic tradition, Middle Platonism in particular.
These two phases of ancient Platonism differed by nature, according to Brucker. In
the last third of the eighteenth century, the labels ‘eclectic sect’ and ‘Alexandrian
philosophy’ were replaced by the term ‘Neoplatonism’.1
Brucker’s characterization of Neoplatonism as an eclectic sect did not come out
of the blue. Diogenes had stated in his Lives (I.21) that a certain Potamo of
Alexandria had practised an eclectic method in philosophy: ‘not long ago an eclec-
tic school was introduced by Potamo of Alexandria, who made a selection from the
tenets of all the existing sects.’ (Translation by R. D. Hicks.) In the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, it was debated whether this Potamo mentioned by Laertius
was identical with the Potamo mentioned in Porphyry’s Vita Plotini (9).2 Brucker
refused the identification, but claimed that Alexandrian theology introduced sectar-
ian eclecticism into Alexandrian philosophy, thereby distorting genuine Greek
Platonism. Brucker’s compatriot, the Leipzig professor Gottfried Olearius (1672–
1715), theologian and philologist, had prepared this view of so-called Alexandrian
1
I should like to thank George Karamanolis and Troels Engberg-Petersen for their comments to
parts of this chapter, which were presented at The Centre for Neoplatonic Virtue Ethics, University
of Copenhagen on May 12, 2011. Likewise, I should like to thank Tue Søvsø, Giannis Stamatellos
and Mark Rene Røge for the critical comments to early drafts of this chapter.
2
For the debate in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on the historical identity of Potamo, see
Matton 1992, 655–656. For the debate on this issue in recent scholarship, see Runia 1988 and
Hadot 1990. For the Potamo of Alexandria mentioned by Laertius, see Hatzimichali 2011.

66 3 The Origin of the Division Between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism
philosophy in 1711. It was Brucker, however, who cemented a sharp historiographi-

cal divide between Middle Platonism (ca. 80 BCE to ca. 220 CE) and Neoplatonism
(ca. 200 to ca. 550 CE), identifying eclecticism and sectarianism as distinctive fea-
tures of the latter.3 Hence, Brucker is no unimportant source of one of our concepts
in history of philosophy, ancient eclecticism, or Neoplatonism.
Despite the considerable work that has been lavished on ancient eclecticism, the
meaning of the ancient ‘eclectic sect’ in Brucker’s work has not yet been examined.
Nor has its methodological implications for our interpretation of Neoplatonism
been discussed.4 This is important, partly in order to understand the historical devel-
opment of this historiographical tool in the eighteenth century, and partly in order to
reflect critically about one concept which is current in modern terminology and
historiographical practice relating to Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. In par-
ticular, Brucker’s characterizations of the two periods are crucial to the divide
between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, and to the widespread assumption
that this terminological divide represents a discontinuity in ancient Platonism.
In this chapter I examine the foundation of the eighteenth-century historiograph-
ical concept of eclecticism. In the course of my argument, I discuss some of its
unfortunate implications for our understanding of ancient Neoplatonism and its
place in the Platonic tradition. I conclude that we ought to give up the division
between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, since it is artificial and misleading. It
3
Brucker separated his accounts of Middle Platonism (Brucker 1742–1767, II: 162–188) and
Neoplatonism (II: 189–462), emphasizing the fundamentally different philosophical methods
employed within these two movements, as I explain below. Compare this with previous accounts
of this period in ancient Platonism, which did not distinguish these periods, and which did not
claim a radical shift in method: Alsted 1630, II: 2010–2022, did not articulate such a division.
When Alsted accounted for the ‘Socratic school’, that is, Platonism—explicitly mentioning
Platonists from the Old Academy (e.g. Speusippus), the New Academy (e.g. Carneades) and
Neoplatonism (e.g. Porphyry and Plotinus)—he did not separate Neoplatonism from the tradition
of Platonism (II: 2020). Horn 1655 characterized the Platonism of Plotinus and his adherents as a
threat to Christian philosophy, but not as eclecticism (269–278). Vossius 1658 contended that
Plotinus was ‘not foreign to’ (‘nec… alienus fuit’) the ‘elective sect’ (‘secta electiva’) of Potamo
of Alexandria (mentioned in Laertius, Lives I.21) (II: 109). However, Vossius did not make much
of this and characterized Plotinus as a successor of Platonic theology (I: 143). Jonsius 1659, 286–
308, offered a historical account of Neoplatonists from Plotinus to Olympiodorus (495–570) with-
out referring to the notion of eclecticism. Bayle 1722 (identical with the 1697 first edition),
presented Plotinus as a “Platonic philosopher” (“Philosophe Platonicien”) without qualifying his
philosophy as eclecticism (2454–2457). [Olearius] 1711 had prepared this idea articulated in
Brucker, Historia critica philosophiae, as I explain below. Walch 1726a, I: cols 594–596, referred
approvingly to the account of ancient eclecticism found in [Olearius] 1711.
4
Neither of these two tasks has been undertaken in the following literature on ancient eclelcticism:
Zeller 1919–1923, III.1: 547–564, follows to a considerable extent Brucker’s characterization of
Neoplatonism as eclecticism. We find no examination of these two issues in Nieke 1972; Hager
1983; Holzhey 1983; Meinhardt 1984; Dreitzel 1991, 288–292; Schneider 1998. Franz 2003,
19–24, addresses Brucker’s juxtaposition of Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, the latter
explained as eclecticism; Franz seems to think that the division is justified (Franz 2003, 20–21).
Donini 1988, 23–33, rightly objects to Zeller’s characterization of Neoplatonism as eclecticism,
but does not extend his exploration to include Brucker.
3.2 Brucker’s Historiographical Categories: ‘System’, ‘Eclecticism’, and ‘Syncretism’ 67
is, first of all, an outcome of a theological debate of the eighteenth century that has
little value to a modern examination of ancient Platonism.
3.2 Brucker’s Historiographical Categories: ‘System’,

‘Eclecticism’, and ‘Syncretism’
Brucker, in his Historia critica philosophiae (1742–1767), broke with the biograph-
ical model of writing the history of philosophy, as exemplified by Laertius. He also
broke with those seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century historians, like Thomas
Stanley, who followed the model of Laertius.5 Such historians, Brucker contended,
ignored the systems of past thinkers, and they failed to exercise their critical power
of judgement.6 Contrary to these predecessors, Brucker wanted to write a ‘critical
history of philosophy’ (historia critica philosophiae), which should assess two
issues: First, was the system a logically coherent complex of principles (principia)
and deductions made from these principles? And did it cover all branches of phi-
losophy? Second, were the principles in the system, and the doctrines derived from
them, in conformity with Protestant doctrine? I shall not deal with the second nor-
mative issue here, focusing my attention instead on the first.7
What did Brucker mean by ‘system of philosophy’? He stipulates four features:
(a) A system of philosophy, comprising principles and doctrines within various
branches of philosophy, is autonomous in regard to other, non-philosophical
disciplines such as medicine, astronomy, theology, etc.
(b) All philosophical doctrines within a system of philosophy are deduced from
one or a few principles. (Here the term ‘principle’ is used in the logical sense of
a hypothesis.)
(c) A system of philosophy, made up of doctrines deduced from principles, com-
prises all branches of philosophy.
(d) The doctrines stated within the various branches of philosophy are internally
coherent.8
This essentialistic idea of past philosophy, consisting of such philosophical systems,
may appear anachronistic to a modern historian of philosophy. However, it con-
formed to trends in the contemporary methodology of science, and it transformed—
at least in the eyes of Brucker’s contemporaries—the history of philosophy into a
respectable philosophical discipline: It was no longer a history, it was no longer
antiquarianism; it was the ‘critical history of philosophy’ (historia critica
philosophiae).
5
Malusa 1993, 161–370.
6
For Stanley as a follower of Laertius, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 36.24–28.
7
For this normative issue, see Catana 2008, 147–191.
8
For these four features, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 3.6–16, 15.10–18, as pointed out in Catana
2008, 51.
The historiographical concept of a system of philosophy was a methodological

innovation of seventeenth-century philosophy and science, which Brucker applied
universally to past philosophy from Thales onwards.9 Brucker’s historiographical
concept gained a dominant role in the ensuing tradition of general histories of phi-
losophy. It is important to note, however, that before the seventeenth century the
axiomatic-deductive methodological ideal was unknown as an all-embracing
method for determining the doctrinal content of the various branches of a given
philosophy. Of course, logical demonstration from premises had been known since
Aristotle, but although this method allowed philosophers to use key concepts across
his or her writings, it did not require the philosopher to depart from the same few
premises in all of his or her theories, as in the case of Brucker’s system concept; on
the contrary, Aristotle had proposed a pluralistic methodology in which different
branches of philosophy were dealt with from different premises, depending on the
matter at hand.10
Brucker’s historiographical concept is thus inadequate and anachronistic when
applied to texts belonging to the pre-modern period. Admittedly, the term ‘system’
(in Greek σύστημα, in Latin systema) was known in antiquity in various contexts,
such as organization theory, musicology, biology and astronomy, but it was not
employed in a methodological context before the seventeenth century.11 Hence, the
methodological concept denoted by the term ‘system’ was foreign to pre-
seventeenth-century philosophy.12 This is not to say that pre-modern philosophy
was without method and order, only that these methods and orders were different
and must be approached independently of Brucker’s generic system concept.
Below I examine Brucker’s application of the concept ‘system of philosophy’
and two other concepts which are related to the system concept, and which are cen-
tral to his characterization of Neoplatonism, namely ‘eclecticism’ and ‘syncretism’.
The first of these two concepts, ‘eclecticism’, denotes a successfully construed sys-
tem of philosophy, characterized by the philosopher’s independent selection of prin-
ciples in the system. Moreover, there is an internal logical coherence among these
principles themselves, and the derivations made from these principles are logically
valid. The eclectic philosopher is the hero in Brucker’s narrative, as I shall explain
in a moment.
The second concept is ‘syncretism’, denoting an incoherent and unsuccessfully
construed system of philosophy, typically undertaken by an unoriginal thinker
enslaved by the prejudices of one or several traditions.13 The outcome of syncretism
9
For its employment on Thales, see Catana 2008, 64–72.
10
Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics I.3.
11
See Ritschl 1906 and Catana 2008.
12
Here I side with Hadot 1995, 76. For a discussion of the inadequacy of the historiographical
concept in regard to philosophy produced before the seventeenth century, see Catana 2008, 35–145.
13
For Proclus as an example of an ancient syncretist, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 325.20–326.5.
For a Renaissance Platonist and syncretist, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who (according to
Brucker) was enslaved by traditions and thus burdened with their prejudices; see Brucker 1742–
1767, IV: 59.38–60.4. For ancient eclecticism, see Nieke 1972; Donini 1988; Dillon 1988;
3.2 Brucker’s Historiographical Categories: ‘System’, ‘Eclecticism’, and ‘Syncretism’ 69
is a patchwork of incoherent principles and doctrines.14 A syncretistic philosopher’s

reason is ensnared by the prejudices of traditions and authorities and therefore
unable to choose freely the principles that are foundational to the system. The syn-
cretist’s reason may be hampered by an uncontrolled imagination, provoked by a
medical condition caused by an excess of black bile or melancholy. Given this poor
cognitive constitution, a syncretist is unable to advance sound and valid premises
that are understandable to a human mind; instead, the syncretist offers, at best, beau-
tiful postulates, which are not reasoned, but which one can choose to believe in, if
persuaded.15 As we shall see, Neoplatonic philosophers were syncretists, devoid of
the cognitive skills pertinent to admirable eclecticism.
Before Brucker, the term ‘syncretist’ had acquired negative connotations at
Lutheran universities in Wittenberg and Helmstedt at the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury, denoting theological positions that were perceived as heterodox.16 Although
Brucker mainly used the term ‘syncretist’ in a historiographical context, not in a
theological, his use tacitly affirmed these negative connotations among Lutherans,
and the usage was in harmony with his occupation as a Lutheran minister.
According to Brucker, there were two important eclectic movements in the his-
tory of philosophy, that of ancient Neoplatonism, and that of early modern philoso-
phy. René Descartes (1596–1650) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1648–1716)
feature as eclectics from the second movement. Brucker represented Neoplatonism,
or the secta eclectica, as he called it, as one single and multi-authored system of
philosophy; the systems of modern eclectics, on the other hand, he represented as
individual systems of philosophy elaborated by individual philosophers.17
Hatzimichali 2011. For eclecticism in Brucker and his contemporaries, see Albrecht 1994 and
Schneider 1998. For ‘eclecticism’ versus ‘syncretism’ in Brucker, see Franz 2003, 21–22; Catana
2008, 11–34.
14
For Brucker on syncretism, see Catana 2008, 22–31. Diderot 1755, 270[a], retains this
distinction.
15
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 444.20–23: “Non enim rationes dari, aut ex principiis deduci conclusio-
nes, aut ullo modo veritatis characteres in ea. re detegi posse ab intellectu humano contendit, sed
artifici tantum in hac arte pulchra credendum esse postulat.” Plotinus is depicted similarly; see II:
227.10–18.
16
Franz 2003, 22 n. 14.
17
For the ancient secta eclectia, i.e. Neoplatonism, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 189–462. For
Descartes as an eclectic philosopher, see V: 10.33–40; for Leibniz as an eclectic philosopher, see
V: 11. Diderot 1755 similarly distinguishes between ancient eclecticism (270–283, 285–293) and
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century eclecticism (271, 283–285). Diderot’s account of the system in
ancient eclecticism, in Diderot 1755, 285–292, relies heavily on Brucker 1742–1767, II: 393–462,
although he omits some of the orthodox parts, e.g. Brucker’s comparison of Christian Trinity with
the Neoplatonic system (Brucker 1742–1767, II: 410–411). Diderot mentions Brucker by name in
the entry (Diderot 1755, 273, 283, 292, 293). Like Brucker, Diderot 1755, 285–292, depicts ancient
eclecticism as a multi-authored system of philosophy. Nevertheless, Diderot’s entry on eclecticism
as a whole is not without philosophical and theological dissent from Brucker: he tends to compare
eclecticism and Christianity from a non-confessional and critical position (e.g. Diderot 1755, 272),
whereas Brucker looks at eclecticism, especially Platonism, from the view point of a Christian
(Brucker 1742–1767, I: 21.10–23.25). For Brucker’s influence on Diderot, please see Casini 1962.
Contrary to modern parlance, where eclecticism tends to be synonymous with

unoriginal and worthless philosophy, Brucker regarded eclecticism as original and
esteemed it highly; the eclectic philosopher is able to choose his principles and use
them to construe a system of philosophy in an original, emancipated and indepen-
dent manner. Brucker to some extent identifies himself with the eclecticism, which
was—somewhat paradoxically—popular in German philosophy at his time.18
In the ‘Praefatio’, Brucker explains the method of eclectic philosophy from the
sixteenth to the eighteenth century in the following words:
Eclectic philosophy, after many wars, is indeed restored, victorious and powerful, having
thrown off and trampled upon the sectarian mode of philosophizing. Having cast off this
mean and unworthy yoke from human reason, and having cast off that slavish clinging to
authority and prejudice of antiquity, some great and acute minds began to select true and
universal principles, not by consulting the opinions of others, but by consulting their own
[inner] lights. On these principles they began to erect conclusions and, thanks to their medi-
tation, to build for themselves their own personal system of philosophy; these great minds
began to store up truths from scattered sects, separating them from dogmas and connecting
[the truths] to their convenient and apt place in the system. They did not approve or admit
anything that did not appear demonstrated and certain according to the judgment of their
reason and according to the clarity of truth.19
As this quotation conveys, eclectic philosophizing conformed to Brucker’s require-

ment of genuine philosophy. It was system building. His words about the victorious
progress of eclecticism pay tribute to the eclecticism of his own German philosophi-
cal culture.20 As mentioned above, he also regards ancient Neoplatonism as a sort of
eclecticism, but how does he fit ancient eclecticism into these historiographical
categories?
18
For this background, see Albrecht 1994 and Schneider 1998.
19
Brucker 1742–1767, V: 3.22–4.11: “Nempe restituta tandem et post multas pugnas victoria potita
est philosophia eclectica, eiecta et conculcata sectaria philosophandi ratione. Abiecto enim indigno
humana ratione hoc iugo, et contemto servili auctoritatis et antiquitatis praeiudicio coeperunt
magna quaedam et acuta ingenia non aliorum quidem placita, sed sua lumina consulere, principia
vera, universalia, certa seligere, conclusiones iis inaedificare, et suae meditationis beneficio pro-
prium atque domesticum sibi philosophiae systema condere; veritates autem per sectas omnes
sparsas, separatas suisque dogmatibus iunctas in commodum aptumque systematis sui locum repo-
nere: nihil vero probare et admittere, quod non rationis iudicio et veritatis evidentia sibi demonstra-
tum certumque videretur esse.” This passage is also cited in Catana 2008, 24. Casini 1962, 259, n.
95, points out that Diderot’s entry ‘Éclectisme’ in his Encyclopédie is based on Brucker’s concep-
tion of ‘eclecticism’ as it appears in his Historia critica philosophiae.
20
For eclecticism as a positive ideal in contemporary Germany philosophy, see Albrecht 1994;
Schneider 1998; Franz 2003, 21–22.
3.3 Historiographical Assumptions in Brucker’s Reconstruction of the Secta… 71
3.3 Historiographical Assumptions in Brucker’s

Reconstruction of the Secta Eclectica
Brucker divided the history of philosophy into three periods. The first runs from the
beginning of the world until the emergence of the Roman Empire in the first century
BCE. The second begins at the time of Christ’s birth, coinciding, roughly speaking,
with the rise of the Roman Empire, and it lasts until the alleged crisis of scholasti-
cism in the thirteenth century. The third and last period is initiated by the revival of
learning in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and continues up till Brucker’s
own time. The second period is subdivided into two parts: The first comprising non-
Christian philosophies, that is, Hellenic (or ‘pagan’, in Brucker’s terminology),
Jewish and Arabic philosophies; the second comprising Christian philosophy pro-
duced between Christ’s birth and the thirteenth century.21
Ancient eclectic philosophers are placed in the first part of the second period and
include Alexandrian, Athenian and Roman philosophers active between ca. 200 CE
and ca. 550 CE.22 The exposition begins with Potamo of Alexandria and Ammonius
(both third century CE), it includes key figures like Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus,
and it ends with Hypatia (370–405) and Damascius (ca. 462–540). This periodiza-
tion implies that Neoplatonists had the chance to follow Christ’s teaching, but
tended not to do so. On the contrary, according to Brucker they damaged the
Christian church.23 All this makes his account of Neoplatonism delicate, since it
touches upon eighteenth-century German theological discussions of confessional
identity.
The characterisation of Neoplatonism as eclectic is noteworthy. Brucker was not
the first to label Platonism of late antiquity an ‘eclectic sect’. The above-mentioned
Leipzig professor Gottfried Olearius had done so too. He had published a Latin
translation of Thomas Stanley’s History of philosophy in 1711, supplied with sev-
eral supplements, and among them we find a section on Neoplatonism, ‘De secta
eclectica’, where Olearius discussed whether the Potamo of Alexandria mentioned
in Laertius’ Lives I.21 was identical with the Potamo mentioned in Porphyry’s Vita
Plotini 9, an orphan in the care of Plotinus during his stay in Rome. Olearius rejected
the identification.24 Nevertheless, he claimed that Alexandrian philosophers intro-
duced eclecticism into the thought of Plotinus and Porphyry, and that eclecticism
21
The first period is described in Brucker 1742–1767, I: 46–1357. For the second period, see II:
3–1069, and III: 3–912. For the third period, see IV: 3–785, and V: 3–923. For the first part of the
second period, see II: 3–1069, and III: 3–240. For the second part of the second period, see III:
241–912.
22
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 189–462
23
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 357.31–358.17. As Brucker makes clear here, he sides with Mosheim
and Olearius in their anti-Platonic position. For Brucker’s apologetic motivation for the writing his
history of philosophy and his view on Platonism, especially ancient and Renaissance Neoplatonism,
as a threat to Christianity, see also I: 21.10–23.25.
24
[Olearius] 1711, 1206: “Fuere autem pr[a]eter istum Potamones alii duo … Alter ex Porphyrii
fuit aequalibus, atque inter alios viros illustres eius aetatibus ab eo censetur in vita Plotini.”
was later on transferred to Athens through various Neoplatonists coming from

Alexandria.25
Brucker himself rejected the identification, just as Olearius had done.26 He
claimed, however, that Alexandrian philosophers introduced eclecticism, or rather,
syncretism, into subsequent Platonism. These Alexandrian philosophers failed to
fulfil the requirements of the genuine eclectic philosopher and degenerated into
syncretism. The decisive impulse in this direction was not philosophical, but theo-
logical: Alexandrian philosophers adopted a syncretistic method taken from the reli-
gious sphere, implying that vulgar superstition was reconciled with Alexandrian
philosophy in a syncretistic manner.27 The claim is remarkable. Alexandrian phi-
losophers’ views on contemporary religions were complex but far from all-
embracing and uncritical—Plotinus’ Ennead II.9 Against the Gnostics being one
example; Porphyry’s criticism of Christianity being another.28 To Brucker, however,
these Neoplatonists were all ‘Alexandrians’ and ‘syncretists’, and these terms, espe-
cially the former, remained in control until the end of the eighteenth century, in
some countries even longer, after which its replacement, ‘Neoplatonists’, was
coined, as I shall explain below.29 Brucker’s intervention into the philological and
historical debate over the identity of Potamo was intriguing: He resolved the Potamo
debate by claiming that the religious and cultural syncretism of Alexandria influ-
enced Alexandrian philosophy decisively, not an isolated historical figure named
Potamo, whosoever he was. At the same time, Brucker inserted Alexandrian phi-
losophy into a conceptual scheme focused on system building—a scheme, which
was to remain powerful in the ensuing history of philosophy.
The French thinker Denis Diderot summed up the seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century debate over the identification of Potamo in his entry ‘eclectisme’, published
in his Encyclopèdie (1751–72). Here he retained the identification. Moreover, he
regarded the Potamo mentioned in the Vita Plotini as a philosopher practising a ver-
sion of eclecticism in which several philosophical systems were combined into one.
Diderot read Porphyry’s vague terms πολλάκις ἓν (Vita Plotini 9.11) as πολλάκις
εἰς ἓν, referring, according to Diderot, to Potamo combining several systems of
philosophy into one. The Greek term for system (σύστημα), however, is absent in
Porphyry’s Vita Plotini, as well as in Laertius’ Lives I.21, so Diderot clearly read
25
[Olearius] 1711, 1209–1216.
26
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 190–191, 193, 202–204.
27
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 191.1–28, 321–330, 358.18–360.4, Brucker relies to a considerable
extent on [Olearius] 1711. Olearius is not mentioned as the translator and author to the supple-
ments, but Heumann 1715c, 331 n. z, Walch 1726a, I: col. 594, and Brucker 1742–1767, I: 36.29–
31, provide this information. Brucker refers approvingly to Olearius in his section on Neoplatonism;
see, for instance, Brucker 1742–1767, II: 190 n. c. [Olearius] 1711, 1220, mentions the Greek term
for ‘systema’, but he does not relate it to ‘syncretismus’. In the same text, 1206, Olearius refers to
Potamo of Alexandria (Laertius, Lives I.21) and Clement of Alexandria (Stromata I.7) as examples
of eclectics.
28
For Porphyry’s criticism of Christianity, see Barnes 1973.
29
For the emergence of the term ‘Neoplatonism’ in the 1770s and 1780s, see Hager 1983;
Meinhardt 1984; Franz 2003.
more into these passages than they could support.30 Rather curiously, Diderot
regarded Potamo in the Vita Plotini as a father to an orphan in Plotinus’ care—not
as an orphan in Plotinus’ care himself. This implied, to Diderot, that Potamo flour-
ished as a philosopher at the end of the second century and the beginning of the
third. Having made this dubious chronology, Diderot claimed that Potamo passed
on his eclecticism to Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus’ teacher mentioned in Vita Plotini
3. In this way Potamo’s eclecticism entered Neoplatonsim.31
Diderot subscribed to Brucker’s view that Alexandrian philosophers introduced
eclecticism (or rather syncretism) into Neoplatonism: Religious syncretism in
Alexandria spread to moral philosophy and then to other parts of Alexandrian phi-
losophy. Alexandrians approached philosophy just as they approached religion.
They were timid minds unable to free themselves from prejudices of tradition and
authorities, and they only re-circulated and re-organised existing philosophical
views without demonstrating the heroic courage obligatory to a true eclectic phi-
losopher, who should always be ready to abandon authorities and traditions.32
Diderot also took over Brucker’s interpretation of Neoplatonism and regarded
ancient eclecticism as a multi-authored system of philosophy. As demonstrated by
Casini, Diderot was directly influenced by Brucker in numerous instances, and this
is one of them. Diderot’s entry thus corroborated Brucker’s interpretation of the
secta eclectica.
At this point we must separate two discussions. One is historical and concerns
the question of whether the two references to Potamo in Laertius and Porphyry
concern the same historical person or not. This issue is still debated, but I shall not
enter the discussion. Another discussion is conceptual and concerns the meaning of
‘eclecticism’ in Laertius and Brucker respectively. No matter whether the first ques-
tion is answered by affirmation or negation, this second question remains unre-
solved. To the best of my knowledge, this second issue has not been addressed so
far.
We should discriminate between the rather loose meaning of ‘eclecticism’ in
ancient philosophy (e.g. Laertius’ Lives I.21 and Clement of Alexandria’s Stromata
I.7) and the much more narrow meaning assigned to the term by Brucker. Brucker
30
Diderot 1755, 273–274. On 273[b], Diderot thus renders Porphyry’s Vita Plotini 9.11 as follows:
“qu’il [Potamo] se plaisoit à entendre sur une philosophie dont il jettoit les fondemens, ou qui
consiste à fondre plusieurs systèmes en un.”
31
Diderot 1755, 274–276.
32
Diderot 1755, 271[b]: “La philosophie éclectique, qu’on appelle aussi le ‘Platonisme réformé’ et
la ‘philosophie alexandrine’, prit naissance à Alexandrie en Egypte, c’est-à-dire au centre des
superstitions. Ce ne fut d’abord qu’un sincrétisme de pratiques religieuses, adopté par les prêtres
de l’Egypte, qui n’étant pas moins crédules sous le regne de Tibere qu’au tems d’Hérodote, parce
que le caractere d’esprit qu’on tient du climat change difficilement, avoient toûjours l’ambition de
posséder le système d’extravagances le plus complet qu’il y eût en ce genre. Ce sincrétisme passa
de-là dans la morale, et dans les autres parties de la philosophie. Les philosophes assez éclairés
pour sentir le foible des différens systèmes anciens, mais trop timides pour les abandonner,
s’occuperent seulement à les réformer sur les découvertes du jour, ou plûtôt à les défigurer sur les
préjugés courans: c’est ce qu’on appella ‘platoniser’, ‘pythagoriser’, etc.”
held that the method (methodus) of this ancient eclectic sect consisted in the phi-
losopher’s selection of doctrines or placita (corresponding to principia) from other
sects; these doctrines or placita were subsequently combined into a system (sys-
tema) that was internally coherent. This endeavour was undertaken in meditation,
and the result was an ‘edifice’ (aedificium) of doctrines. In other words, Brucker
thought that Neoplatonists were intent on the kind of system building outlined
above. The following words of Brucker are found on the opening page of the lengthy
account of Neoplatonism, placed immediately after his account of Middle Platonism:
As we have narrated above, the Platonic sect gave birth to an eclectic philosophy of a mon-
strous kind and of a monstrous name, if the name [eclecticism] is assigned the original
meaning. For a sect is said to be something which follows mainly one philosopher’s way of
philosophizing and the system of doctrines which he construed for himself; the eclectic
method, on the other hand, is one which, from the propositions of all the sects, chooses
those for itself, which are closest to the truth and suitable for being put together through
their own [i.e. the eclectics’] meditations. On the basis of these [propositions or medita-
tions] it [the eclectic method] builds its own edifice of doctrine[s]. Hence it is clear that the
sectarian philosophy fights the eclectic to such a degree that they cannot possibly be forced
into one single body. If we are willing fully to accept the appellation [‘eclecticism’], eclec-
tic philosophy is not new, but very old, and is most characteristic of the most excellent men
and all founders of sects.”33
This quotation needs some clarification. The term ‘sect’ (secta) is used in two dif-
ferent senses. In the first line, Brucker uses the term in the neutral sense of a school
preserving a body of philosophical theories, e.g. those of Plato, as was the case in
Middle Platonism. In the third line Brucker uses the word in the negative sense of a
group of philosophers who are intellectually unable to emancipate themselves from
inherited philosophical traditions and to philosophise in a free and independent
manner; these philosophers lack the intellectual robustness and courage required
from the genuine philosopher, that is the eclectic philosopher. As the above quota-
tion conveys, the very notion of an eclectic sect is an absurdity, since eclecticism
and sectarianism denote two mutually exclusive methods. This quotation also
reveals one of the paradoxes in Brucker’s idea of eclecticism: Although he con-
ceived of eclecticism as something positive, he also maintained that eclecticism
could degenerate into something negative, that is, if it was infected with sectarian
modes of philosophizing. This is precisely what happened to the ancient eclectic
sect, Neoplatonism.
33
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 189.4–14: “Platonica, quam hucusque enarravimus, secta eclecticam
genuit, monstrosi nominis generisque philosophiam, si nomen nativa significatione adhibeatur.
Secta enim cum dicatur, quae unius potissimum philosophi rationem philosophandi, quodque sibi
construxit, systema doctrinarum sequitur; eclectica vero methodus ea. sit, quae ex omnium secta-
rum placitis ea. sibi eligit, quae veritati propiora sunt, et propriis meditationibus iungi apta; exque
iis proprium doctrinae excitat aedificium; clarum inde est, sectariam philosophiam adeo repugnare
eclecticae, ut in unum redigi corpus nequeant. Nec si proprie appellationem accipiamus, eclectica
philosophia nova est, sed antiquissima, maximisque viris sectarumque conditoribus omnibus usita-
tissima.” These opinions or truths are used as principles in their systems (189.28). Brucker regards
this method as similar to the one used “by us”, including such figures as Leibniz (190.1–2).
The key concepts in Brucker’s above description of ancient eclecticism are found
in his own essentialistic statements about the nature of philosophy. He thus mea-
sures ancient Neoplatonism against the methodological ideal of eclecticism, as he
understood the concept. This feature becomes even clearer in the pages following
the above quotation, where he locates the ‘origin of the eclectic sect’ (origo sectae
eclecticae) among the Egyptians.34
This methodological ideal of ancient eclectics, Brucker continues, resembles that
held by prominent philosophers of his own time, e.g. Descartes and Leibniz.35 If one
compares the method assigned to ancient Neoplatonism with Brucker’s generic
statement about philosophy, obviously alluding to seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century eclecticism, it turns out that they are very similar, reflecting Brucker’s his-
torically naive assumption that late antique and early modern philosophers adhered
to the same method. This concept of ancient eclectic philosophers was not found in
Laertius’ Lives I.21.
In his account of Neoplatonism, Brucker makes at least two assumptions about
ancient eclectics which are not present in Laertius or other ancient thinkers referring
to eclectic philosophy. First, Brucker relates ancient eclecticism to the system con-
cept: Ancient eclectic philosophizing, he claimed, was intent on system building.36
Brucker is clearly anachronistic in his universal retrojection of a generic ideal of
philosophizing onto the entire history of philosophy, including ancient
Neoplatonism.37 In his reconstruction of these past systems, he typically distorts
Laertius and other ancient accounts of philosophers by interpreting the ἀρχαί of
ancient philosophers as logical principles from which a deduction can be made
(principia), whereas they had been intended as ontological principles. One example
is Thales’ theory that water is the beginning (ἀρχή) of the universe, which is clearly
intended in the ontological meaning of the word, not in the logical meaning.38
Second, Brucker connects the concept of ancient eclecticism with another con-
cept, syncretism (syncretismus). Although ancient philosophers had used the term
‘syncretism’, it was not used as a dialectical counterpart to ‘eclecticism’, and nei-
ther of the two concepts were conceived within a wider concept of philosophical
method framed within the concept of a system of philosophy.39 Even in Laertius’
Lives I.21, ‘syncretism’ is not listed as a counterpart to ‘eclecticism’. Nor had
Olearius, Brucker’s near-contemporary, related the two terms.40
34
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 190.33–193.13.
35
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 190.1–2.
36
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 189.4–190.32.
37
Catana 2008, 35–113. Franz 2003, 21–22, does not distinguish between these two meanings of
‘eclecticism’.
38
For the anachronism of this concept in philosophy produced before the seventeenth century, see
Catana 2008, 63–113. For Brucker’s dubious reconstruction of Thales’ philosophy, see 63–72.
39
Here I agree with Donini 1988, 21 n. 15. Walch 1726a, I: cols 593–594, had employed a concep-
tual scheme in which syncretism was the dialectical counterpart to eclecticism.
40
[Olearius] 1711, 1218–1220.
What are the consequences of Brucker’s conceptual innovation in regard to

Neoplatonism? Neoplatonists were ‘infected’ with syncretism, he holds. One
instance is Proclus, whose reason and power of judgment, essential to system build-
ing, had been ruined by religious superstition and Platonic enthusiasm (furor or
enthusiasmus).41 Brucker routinely perpetuated this criticism of past philosophers
with some inclination towards Platonism, so we should not infer from this judge-
ment that he was familiar with Proclus’ writings in great detail.42 If only enthusi-
asm, understood as deificatio, had been an isolated phenomenon in Proclus but
otherwise extrinsic to Neoplatonism, the damage would not have been too great, but
it was a general feature of Neoplatonism; deificatio was regarded as the highest
form of felicity and the aim of philosophizing among Neoplatonists—a conception
that conflicted with Protestant theology, since it left little room for Scripture as a
privileged source of truth and moral instruction.43
This aim of philosophy, deificatio and its enthusiasm, also corrupted the Platonic
system of philosophy as understood by Neoplatonists, since it ruined the power of
judgement, vital to system building. For this reason, among others, the ancient secta
eclectica was first of all a syncretistic sect in the eyes of Brucker.44 In his ‘Praefatio’,
he had stated explicitly that the Platonic theory of furor was an error that had entered
Christianity, and that his motivation for writing this history of philosophy was to
combat this error.45 He spelled out this contradiction between ancient Platonism and
Christianity on several occasions—Proclus being the main target.46
Brucker denied that Platonic furor or enthusiasmus was caused by cognitive con-
tent. According to him, the Neoplatonists’ so-called noetic ascent, or amor, was a
non-cognitive state, falsely interpreted by the Neoplatonists themselves as an ele-
vated and cognitive state. According to Brucker, however, their enthusiasm was
caused by a medical condition—an excesses of melancholy producing simulacra
and images in their disturbed brains.47 This accusation was not new. Ancient
Neoplatonists themselves had debated the divide between physiologically and noet-
ically caused states of enthusiasm.48 Renaissance thinkers with some inclination
towards Neoplatonism had distinguished such charlatans, suffering from medical
41
E.g. Brucker 1742–1767, II: 318.33–319.3, 325.20–31, 330.30–39, 331.37–332.2,
363.31–366.24.
42
Brucker raises the same accusation against alleged syncretists like Pico and Ficino (Brucker
1742–1767, IV: 59.38–60.4), who picked up the “Alexandrian philosophy” (IV: 59.3). Brucker
claims that Bruno’s undisciplined imagination and weak power of judgement led him to accept
prejudices, turning his system into a ‘monster’ (monstrum) rather than an apt and rational system
(V: 38.15–20). In fact, Bruno never intended to build a system of philosophy; see Catana 2008,
35–62.
43
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 21.10–23.11.
44
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 325.20–326.5, 336.19–34, 363.31–367.41.
45
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 21.10–31.
46
E.g. Brucker 1742–1767, II: 332.13–18, 336.17–19. 462.18–22.
47
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 366.25–367.3. Brucker may well reflect the medical criticism of melan-
choly, which had been advanced by Meric Casaubon, among others; see Heyd 1995, 44–92.
48
E.g. Iamblichus, De mysteriis III.25; Porphyry, De abstinentia III.24.
3.4 Brucker’s Reconstruction of the System of the Secta Eclectica 77
and physiological states, from genuine contemplative men, who undertake a real
noetic ascent, whose cognitive content was not doubted.49 Brucker—probably influ-
enced by Meric Casaubon’s (1599–1671) medical critique of enthusiasm in his
Treatise concerning Enthusiasm (1656)—did not make such a distinction, but cat-
egorically disposed of the Platonic furor as a misinterpreted physiological state.
Hereby Brucker rejected the endeavour of Renaissance thinkers like Ficino, Pico
and Bruno to establish a philosophical theology, which was to a considerable extent
based on the doctrine on Platonic furor.50
3.4 Brucker’s Reconstruction of the System of the Secta

Eclectica
How did Brucker represent this ancient eclectic sect within his conceptual frame-
work? As explained above, he did not account for the individual philosophers
belonging to this eclectic sect as in the case of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
eclectic philosophers, but chose to offer one single and comprehensive account of
all philosophers belonging to this ancient sect. This choice was based on his belief
that all ancient eclectics shared a common impulse (religiously motivated syncre-
tism and sectarianism), and this feature justified the implicit assumption that ancient
eclecticism was a multi-authored, propositional complex developed by thinkers
scattered all over the Mediterranean region over a period of 300 years.
In his accounts of past philosophers, Brucker typically outlines the historical
circumstances (circumstantiae) relevant to their systems of philosophy, and then
passes on to the principles in their respective systems. These principles are typically
of a metaphysical nature, and from them he ‘deduces’ doctrines within the various
compartments of philosophy, ending up with their ramifications in practical phi-
losophy.51 To note in passing, these connections are not the result of logical deduc-
tions in the strict sense, but Brucker clings to the terminology typical of logic (e.g.
principium, deduco, etc.), probably in order to give his account an air of certainty
and authority. He follows a parallel procedure in the case of the ancient eclectic sect.
There he first gives a historical outline of the philosophers belonging to this sect,
though without entering their respective contribution to the collective, philosophical
system.52 He then offers some general observations on this movement (generales
observationes de philosophia sectae eclecticae), including some religious reserva-
tions against the sect, claiming that these observations and religious weaknesses are
representative of the system of ancient eclecticism as a whole.53 These general
49
Ficino 2002 (De amore) VII.3–13. Bruno made this distinction in his typology of noetic ascent,
the fifteen contractiones; see Catana 2005, 7–19.
50
For this tradition, see Nelson 1958.
51
For the precept, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 15.10–18. For its practice, see Catana 2008, 35–113.
52
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 189–357.
53
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 357–392.
observations correspond roughly to the circumstances normally expounded in con-

nection with individual thinkers in his history of philosophy.
Finally, Brucker exhibits the system of the ancient eclectics. Here it is possible
to discern the contours of his usual procedure, beginning with theoretical philoso-
phy and proceeding to practical philosophy.54 In this reconstruction he cites various
passages from different eclectic philosophers, e.g. Plotinus, Porphyry, Macrobius
and the Chaldaean Oracles, in order to reconstruct a single system of philosophy
worked out collectively by these Neoplatonists. Needless to say, he typically cites
these sources out of context. However, this reconstruction follows from his own
precepts for the historian of philosophy, who should indeed identify and articulate
such a system.55 The corresponding methodological ideal, however, was foreign to
ancient and Renaissance Platonism, as argued above. Admittedly, a Neoplatonist
like Proclus was no stranger to axiomatic-deductive modes of argumentation and
exposition, but that in itself does not turn Proclus into a system builder as conceived
by Brucker.
Brucker’s reconstruction starts out with an account of so-called eclectic dialec-
tics, explaining Plotinus’ criticism of, and alternative to, Aristotle’s Categories.
Here Brucker relies on Ennead VI.1. This account anticipates his exposition of
Plotinus’ theory of emanation and its theory of ontological dependencies.56 Brucker
then moves on to the foundational metaphysical principles in eclecticism and its
conception of the divinity.57 The first principle in this system is that of the One and
its overflowing, as explained in Plotinus’ Ennead V.1. Brucker reasons that the
eclectic system of philosophy was an ‘emanative system of philosophy’.58 In order
to fit Plotinus’ texts into his system concept, he interprets these passages as if the
One denoted not only a beginning (Greek ἀρχή, Latin principium) in the ontological
sense, but also in the logical sense of a premise in a syllogism: The One is the foun-
dational principle in his entire system, it is the very ‘key’ (clavis) that opens up the
entire edifice of his ‘emanative’ system, as Brucker explains.59 Aristotle too had
used the term ἀρχή in the logical sense of a premise in a syllogism, but he distin-
guished this logical sense from the ontological sense.60 On this background one
wonders whether the Bruckerian “key” to the eclectic system is more suitable for
“locking up” the ideas of Neoplatonism than for “unlocking” them. At any rate, the
54
For the account of the system, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 393–462.
55
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 15.10–18. For a critical analysis of the Bruckerian interpretation of
Proclus as a system builder, see Beierwaltes 1987.
56
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 393.1–395.27
57
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 395.28–410.15
58
For the One as the first principle in the eclectic system, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 395.35–
400.34. Brucker, at least on some occasions, relies on the Greek-Latin 1580 edition of Plotinus’
Enneads: The quotation from Plotinus, Enneads III.8.9, in Brucker 1742–1767, II: 396 n. s, fits
with this 1580 edition.
59
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 395.38–396.3: “Primum et genuinum totius systematis emanativi princi-
pium, nempe fontem fontium omnium, omnibus priorem innuit Plotinus, sicque clavem porrigit,
qua totum systematis aedificium referari potest.”
60
Compare with Aristotle, Metaphysics V.1.
3.4 Brucker’s Reconstruction of the System of the Secta Eclectica 79
first principle thus identified by Brucker is not only a first principle in Plotinus’
system, it is the first principle in the system of ancient eclecticism and features,
according to Brucker, in various Neoplatonic thinkers belonging to the sect.61
The second principle in the eclectic system is Intellect (intellectus), ontologi-
cally dependent on the One. Again, Brucker relies on Plotinus’ Ennead V.1.62 The
hypostasis Soul (anima) is ontologically dependent upon the second principle,
Intellect, but is not regarded as a principle by Brucker.63 The third principle is the
World Soul (anima mundi). Together with the two other principles, it became,
Brucker explains, a rival among ancient eclectics to the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity.64
The doctrine of the three principles in the eclectic system, as reconstructed by
Brucker, implies at least four things. First, Porphyry’s ordering of Plotinus’ Enneads,
crucial to Brucker’s exposition of the eclectic system, is reversed in Brucker’s
account: Roughly speaking, Porphyry had placed ethics first (Ennead I), then natu-
ral philosophy (Enneads II-III), psychology (Ennead IV) and metaphysics (Enneads
V–VI); Brucker begins with metaphysics, where he locates three principles in the
eclectic system on the basis of Ennead V.1; he then moves on to natural philosophy
(including psychology) and ends with ethics, citing Ennead I.2. Brucker’s order was
new, and it was instrumental to modern Plotinus scholarship.65
Second, Brucker’s order was not only novel and somewhat ahistorical and for-
malistic, it also conformed with his otherwise outspoken hostility to Neoplatonic
ethics. According to Brucker, the aim of Platonic philosophy was the individual
Platonic philosopher’s experience of furor.66 Ancient eclectic philosophers explained
this cognitive state by means of the four cardinal virtues, as they understood the
virtues. Brucker, however, reduced this psychological state to a non-cognitive state
caused by an excess of melancholic fluids in the brain, provoking all sorts of phan-
tasms.67 This medical rejection of furor fitted well into his explicit theological rejec-
tion of Platonism as a kind of philosophical theology; this objection was clearly
stated in the preface to the entire work.68 In Brucker’s systematic account of the
ancient eclectic sect, Platonic furor and its related doctrine of virtue ethics are thus
presented as an insignificant appendix to the metaphysical system, even though
furor was an important aim of this way of philosophizing, and even though Porphyry
had ordered Plotinus’ works quite differently.
Let me move on to the third implication of Brucker’s determination of the three
principles in the eclectic system. The ἀρχαί in Plotinus’ thought were not intended
61
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 396.31–33.
62
For Intellect, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 398.12–400.34.
63
For Soul, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 398.12–399.15, 400.35–405.26.
64
For World Soul as the third principle, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 405.27–28. For the World Soul
and its vexed relationship to the Christian Trinity, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 405.28–411.17.
65
See Chap. 4 below.
66
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 363.31–366.24.
67
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 366.25–367.41.
68
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 21.10–31.
as hypotheses in an axiomatic-deductive argument, but as first principles in the

ontological sense. As such, the One is non-discursive and non-propositional.
Brucker, however, imposes a uniform, propositional rationality on a philosophical
theory, i.e. Neoplatonism, in which the limit between non-discursive and discursive
rationality is essential.
Fourth, Brucker claims that the eclectic emanative system, based on the idea of
the overflowing of the One, was a serious distortion of Plato’s system, which was a
‘dualistic system of philosophy’, based on two principles, god and matter.69 The
emanative system of philosophy resembled—at least in the eyes of Brucker—the
atheistic and monistic system of Spinoza, which Brucker perceived as a threat to
Christian transcendentalism.70 This theological objection becomes very clear in
Brucker’s criticism of Neoplatonic virtue ethics, as we shall see below.
Having established the One, Intellect and World Soul as principles in the system
of eclecticism, Brucker considers the identification of these three principles with the
Christian Trinity. Augustine had explained the theory of hypostases among the pla-
tonici against the background of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, complaining
that the Platonists had not dealt with the subject in a clear manner (De civitate dei
X.23, 29).71 Brucker, on the other hand, refused the identification as illegitimate and
condemnable, implying that Neoplatonism should not be regarded as a guide to this
Christian doctrine. It was wrong, for instance, to equate the Neoplatonic idea of the
World Soul with the Christian idea of the Holy Spirit.72 This is an important exam-
ple of Brucker’s distinction between Christianity and Christianizing Platonism, and
the example connects well with his ambition governing his history of philosophy as
a whole, to detach Christianity’s intellectual roots from Platonism, and to defend a
purified version of Christianity and its intellectual genealogy leaving greater scope
for Christian revelation.73
After Brucker’s theological excursus, he moves on to various ramifications of
these principles in natural philosophy, especially in psychology and cosmology.
Once again, Plotinus’ Enneads are used as an important source.74 Eclectic theology
is the next subject considered in his systematic exposition. The account of this topic
is not based on Plotinus, however, but on Iamblichus, especially his De mysteriis
69
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 395.28–396.10, 407.5–40. Diderot 1755, 286, retains this characteriza-
tion of Plotinus’ philosophy.
70
Bayle 1722, III: 2455 n. D, makes the startling comment that Plotinus’ philosophy resembles the
monistic philosophy of Spinoza.
71
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 410.16–411.17, distinguishes emphatically between the Christian doc-
trine of the Trinity and the Neoplatonic ontological hierarchy with the One, Intellect and Soul or
World Soul.
72
Brucker argues against this identification in Brucker 1742–1767, II: 398.21–399.15, 406.33–
411.17. Similarly, in his account of Plato, Brucker warns against this conflation. For an equation of
the World Soul in Plato and the Holy Spirit in Christianity, see I: 703.5–29, 704.30–706.11. For the
unsatisfactory systematization produced by the alleged, Neoplatonic reading of Plato, see also I:
703.26–29.
73
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 21.10–23.25.
74
For psychology and cosmology, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 411.18–431.19.
3.5 The Secta Eclectica: Brucker’s Legacy in General Histories of Philosophy 81
aegyptiorum. Brucker seems to assume that the system reconstructed in Plotinus’

writings also underlies Iamblichus’ theology.75
Finally, Brucker reaches the so-called practical part of the eclectic system, its
virtue theory, ultimately derived from the first-mentioned three principles.76 The
‘Plotinian psychology’, which in turn presupposes Plotinus’ hierarchy of being, is
the foundation of the moral philosophy in eclecticism.77 In his account of eclectic
psychology, Brucker observes Plotinus’ view in Ennead I.1.11–12 that the human
soul cannot sin by itself, but only when it is joined with the body in a compound;
Brucker notes that this is a ‘miserable foundation for a moral philosophy’.78 Brucker
also notes that Plotinus’ idea of the One as the source and aim of the individual soul
is foundational to the Platonic theory of enthusiasm—a view which he elaborates at
length elsewhere.79 Brucker reports the various degrees of virtue among
Neoplatonists, but he ends up condemning their virtue theory in strong terms as
utterly unchristian.80
The higher virtues, as the ancient eclectics, e.g. Proclus, understood and prac-
tised them could certainly not pass as genuine Christian virtues, according to
Brucker, although some Platonists had claimed this. In fact, this eclectic doctrine of
virtue amounted to nothing but ‘stupid emulation’ (stulta aemulatio).81 At this point
Brucker’s motive for writing his Historia critica philosophiae emerges: He wanted
to expurgate Christianity from various strains of Platonism, Neoplatonism in par-
ticular, that had entered the religion and now posed a danger to it—and his account
of ancient eclecticism was a Lutheran counterblast to this challenge, presented in
the form of an unbiased, systematic exposition. Brucker reinserts revelation into a
privileged position and dethrones the Platonic theological and ethical pretension to
oneness with the divine through the exercise of the higher virtues.
3.5 The Secta Eclectica: Brucker’s Legacy in General

Histories of Philosophy
Brucker did not use the Latin terms for ‘Neoplatonism’ and ‘Neoplatonist’ in his
Historia critica philosophiae. In the ancient, medieval and Renaissance periods,
ancient Platonists had uniformly been called platonici, and Brucker continued this
tradition. He thus used the phrase platonici when referring to philosophers like
Plato, Alcinous, Plotinus and Proclus. Recently, Hager and Meinhardt have
75
For theology, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 431.20–457.33.
76
For moral philosophy, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 457.34–462.22.
77
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 419.14–17.
78
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 416 n. p.
79
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 417 n. w.
80
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 462.15–22.
81
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 462.2–22. Similarly, Brucker condemns Plotinus, and other Neoplatonic
philosophers infected with Platonic enthusiasm, from the ‘Christian republic’; see II: 231.16–19.
demonstrated that the term ‘Neoplatonism’ emerged in German scholarship in the

last third of the eighteenth century with historians of philosophy like Büsching
(1774), Meiners (1786), Eberhard (1788), Fülleborn (1793) and Buhle
(1796–1801).82
Although Brucker did not invent the terms ‘Neoplatonism’ and ‘Neoplatonist’,
his historiographical concept of a system of philosophy, as well as his ideas of
eclecticism and syncretism, were decisive to those subsequent German historians
who did invent these terms, since they were shaped by the semantics of these three
Bruckerian concepts. Hager and Meinhardt have not paid sufficient attention to this
conceptual dependence upon Brucker’s key concepts. In fact, these eighteenth-
century German historians of philosophy regarded Neoplatonism as ancient
Alexandrian eclecticism, and they justified the label ‘Neoplatonism’ on the basis of
Brucker’s distinction between genuine Platonism and the so-called eclectic, or
rather syncretistic, Platonism of the Alexandrians. The German historian of philoso-
phy Büsching, among the first to use the German phrase for ‘Neoplatonism’,
expressed this view eloquently in 1774:
Hence, they [the Alexandrian philosophers] were, and were called, eclectics. However, they
preferred to be seen as adherents of Plato, whose doctrines on god, soul and the universe
they liked better than what other philosophers had thought about these matters. Moreover,
they preferred to be called Platonic philosophers. Posterity, however, has called them
Neoplatonists [neuen Platoniker] in order to distinguish them from the ancient and genuine
Platonists. One would not inflict any injury upon them by calling them enthusiasts, since
their system and its ornament bears witness to the fact that they were men of this kind.83
For Büsching and subsequent historians of philosophy of his period, the term
‘Neoplatonism’ thus came to denote a discontinuity in the Platonic tradition, a cor-
ruption of genuine ancient Platonism, and a low point in the history of
philosophy.84
82
Hager 1983; Meinhardt 1984.
83
Büsching 1772–1774, II: 471 spoke of the ‘Ursprung der eklektischen Philosophie der neuern
Platoniker’. In II: 472, Büsching distinguished genuine ancient Platonism from Neoplatonism:
“Also waren und hieβen sie [Alexandrian philosophers, mentioned II: 471–472], Eklektiker.
Jedoch sie wolten insonderheit für Anhänger des Plato angesehen seyn, dessen Lehrsätze von Gott,
der Seele und Welt, ihnen besser gefielen, als was andere Philosophen davon gelehret hatten, und
lieβen sich also auch gern Platoniker nennen. Die Nachwelt aber hat sie zum Unterschied von den
alten und ächten Platonikern, die neuen Platoniker genannt. Man thut ihnen nicht unrecht, wenn
man sie für Enthusiasten ausgiebt, denn ihr System und desselben Ausschmüchung, bezeuget es,
dass sie dergleichen gewesen.” For the theological and medical accusation against enthusiasts in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Heyd 1995, 44–92.
84
The following historians of philosophy can be seen in the historiographical tradition established
by Brucker: Meiners 1782 (ignored by Meinhardt 1984) spoke of Neoplatonism (“Neu-Platonisches
Philosophie”, 6, 7, 9 et passim), or the Neoplatonists (“neuen Platonikern”, 8, or “neuern
Platonikern”, 9, et passim). He characterized these Neoplatonists as eclectics, led by Potamo and
Ammonius, who combined different philosophical systems (9–16; “System’” is mentioned on 10,
13, 14, 16). Eberhard 1788, 211–221, picks up the main features of this tradition, reusing the term
“Neoplatonic” (“neu-platonischen”, 211; or “Neuplatonische”, e.g. 212). He characterizes the
Neoplatonic philosophy as “eclectic” “eclectischen”, 212), and he brings forward Brucker’s con-
tention that the Alexandrian philosophers construed a system (213). Eberhard refers approvingly
3.5 The Secta Eclectica: Brucker’s Legacy in General Histories of Philosophy 83
The Germans were at the forefront of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century scholarship, and their historiographical categories and evaluations were
perceived as authoritative and reliable, although they were at times imbued with
considerable religious prejudices. However, given the status of these categories and
evaluations in the scholarly community, they spread to other countries. One exam-
ple is the British philosopher James Mill. In 1809, he attacked Thomas Taylor’s
interpretation of Plato for its debt to these abominable “Alexandrian” philosophers.85
As Mill’s vehement attack testifies, it was not necessary at this point in history to
argue for a negative view of these Alexandrians—everyone assumed that they were
bad philosophers, and all a critic had to do was to claim that some Plato interpreta-
tion was associated with Neoplatonism for it to lose credibility in the scholarly
community.
Hegel later questioned the legitimacy of the term ‘Neoplatonism’ in his lectures
on the history of philosophy, pointing out the presence of non-Platonic elements as
well. He also denied the common characterization of Alexandrian philosophy as
eclectic, in the negative sense of the word; that is, as an unoriginal and incoherent
sampling of various philosophical doctrines. Nevertheless, he still regarded
Alexandrian philosophy as an all-embracing synthesis of all past philosophical sys-
tems—Plotinus’ philosophy being a rare example of an internally coherent synthe-
sis.86 Although Hegel’s positive evaluation and serious exposition of the so-called
Alexandrian philosophy marks a turning point in the reception of Neoplatonism, his
interpretation was still indebted to previous interpretations on at least two counts.
First, as with Brucker, Büsching and other historians of philosophy, Hegel held that
this development of the Platonic tradition did not bring the Neoplatonists closer to
genuine Platonism; on the contrary, it was very far from the original Platonism.
Second, Hegel retained the characterisation of Neoplatonism, and of Plotinus in
particular, as eclectic, though not of a defective and sectarian kind, intent on system
building. Thereby he remained largely within the historiographical tradition initi-
ated by Brucker.
to Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae (219), and he regards Justinian’s closure of Plato’s
Academy as an adequate ending of “heathen’” (“heidnische”), that is, Hellenic philosophy, after
the rise of Christianity (222). Fülleborn 1793, 70–85, uses the term “Neoplatonism” and its cog-
nates as a well-established term, largely relying on the tradition going back to Brucker and Meiners.
Buhle 1796–1804, IV, refers to Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae (181): Buhle uses the term
“Neoplatonism” and its cognates (e.g. 211), and he reports several of features that had become
standard in the interpretation of Neoplatonism (183–215). However, Buhle is among the first to
reject Mosheim’s theological and orthodox Protestant criticism of Neoplatonism (215–9).
85
[Mill] 1809, 191–200, 211 [[Mill] 2001, 152–166, 179], uses the phrase ‘Alexandrian’ for
ancient Neoplatonic philosophers, typically with strong negative connotations. For Mill’s view on
Neoplatonism, see Chap. 5 below.
86
We find an exposition of Neoplatonism in Hegel 1959, XIX: 3–96. For non-Platonic elements in
Neoplatonism, see XIX: 10, 40. For Hegel’s rejection of Alexandrian philosophy as eclectic, see
XIX: 33. For Alexandrian philosophy (including Plotinus’) as a synthesis of previous systems, see
XIX: 33. The last-mentioned claim should be seen on the background of Hegel’s general view on
the history of philosophy as a series of philosophical systems which are ‘aufgehoben’ into subse-
quent ones; see XVII: 35–80.
Eduard Zeller carried on the tradition going back to Brucker, though not without
polemical outbursts. Zeller is above all the late nineteenth-century historian of phi-
losophy whose account of ancient Greek philosophy is still important, still reprinted
(the latest reprint from 2006) and still cited as an authority. As observed recently by
Christoph Horn, Zeller rejected the concept of Alexandrian philosophy as ‘superfi-
cial’ and inadequate, and Zeller was clearly targeting the interpretation and evalua-
tion of Neoplatonism found in earlier generations of nineteenth-century German
historians of philosophy.87 Nevertheless, Zeller characterized Neoplatonism as
eclecticism, verging on syncretism, and he adopted the Bruckerian system concept
in his assessment of the movement.88 At this point it should be observed that Zeller,
and other modern historians of philosophy, did not understand eclecticism as
Brucker had done—to Zeller, it merely meant some random selection of doctrines
from the philosophical tradition, not the same as in the thought of Brucker. Laertius,
Brucker and Zeller thus upheld three different conceptions of eclecticism.89 Zeller
also retained Brucker’s division between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. In
short, Brucker’s influence is considerable, even after Zeller.90
3.6 Problems in Brucker’s Reconstruction of the Secta

Eclectica
There are several problems in the reconstruction of the secta eclectica. First, it con-
strues a discontinuity between Platonists and this eclectic sect, i.e. Neoplatonism,
on the basis of a methodological ideal, which was absent and unintended among
Neoplatonic philosophers, but superimposed on their writings, namely that of
87
Horn 2010, 138. On 138–139, Horn identifies Schleiermacher’s Plato interpretation of 1804 as
the first attack on the so-called Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato that had any substantial influ-
ence upon German scholarship. I think it would be reasonable to pay attention to the anti-Platonic
campaign—attacking Neoplatonists on theological, philosophical, philological and medical
grounds— that emanated from Leipzig publishers between 1715 and 1744, counting figures like
Olearius, Heumann, Hansch, Mosheim, and Brucker; the latter certainly did have a considerable
influence on German scholarship, and on the history of philosophy in particular. Remarkably, this
widespread anti-Platonic campaign has largely been ignored among historians of philosophy
working on the eighteenth century.
88
For Zeller’s use of the historiographical concept eclecticism in regard to Neoplatonism, see
Zeller 1919–1923, III.1: 547–564. See also the critical discussion of Zeller on this point in Donini
1998 and Beierwaltes 1989, 1182–1191. Compare with Horn 2010, 142, who praises Zeller’s inter-
pretation of Neoplatonism as adequate and nuanced.
89
To Laertius, an “eclectic school” makes selections from the doctrines of existing sects (e.g. Lives
I.21). To Brucker, “eclecticism” typically denotes an internally coherent complex of doctrines
derived from one or a few general theories, or principles, which have been chosen among existing
philosophical principles. To Zeller, “eclecticism” merely means a random collection of doctrines
from the philosophical tradition.
90
Compare my analysis with Hager 1983, 101, claiming that the term “Neoplatonism” is
justified.
3.6 Problems in Brucker’s Reconstruction of the Secta Eclectica 85
eclecticism, as Brucker understood the concept. This distance was enforced by the
inward-looking nature of the respective systems in Plato and Neoplatonism, based
as they were, according to Brucker, on their respective, over-arching principles.
Brucker’s account thus obscures instances of continuity between Plato and
Neoplatonists, as in the case of Platonic ethics emphasizing divine likeness.91
Second, Brucker’s novel way of presenting Neoplatonic philosophy, namely in
the form of a system based on metaphysical principles, implies that a variety of
philosophical areas, such as natural philosophy and political philosophy, are best
explained when understood against the background of these asserted metaphysical
principles. This unilateral, metaphysical contextualization hinders us from under-
standing areas in Neoplatonic thought that may be explained on their own, or which
may be contextualized to fields outside the alleged system.92
Third, the phrase ‘eclectic sect’ negates the explicit statements of intent of
ancient Neoplatonists, claiming that they are legitimate heirs to the philosophy of
Plato and the “pre-Platonists” (e.g. Plotinus, Ennead V.1.8).93 This self-understanding
conflicts with Brucker’s definition of eclectics, who choose doctrines from all
sects.94 Brucker and his like-minded colleagues want us to believe that what mat-
tered to Neoplatonists was to combine the doctrines or principles from the systems
of the various ancient philosophical schools almost as if they were placed on an
equal footing, with the exception of Plato’s philosophy.95 This way of thinking cer-
tainly obscures the fact that some Neoplatonists regarded themselves as legitimate
heirs not only to Plato, but also to the “pre-Platonists”, including Parmenides and
Heraclitus, to whom Plotinus refers frequently.96
Fourth, Brucker’s account fails to explain the positive statements about method
advanced by the Neoplatonists themselves. One example is Plotinus’ Ennead III.7.1,
which does not even point in the direction of an eclectic method even in the vague
sense of the word. In fact, one could ask on a more general level, where is the evi-
dence for the claim that Neoplatonists regarded their method as eclectic? One may
even ask how widespread this method was in ancient philosophy. I find it hard to
come up with more than a few insubstantial examples.
Fifth, Brucker’s complaint against Neoplatonists, that they were sectarians and
syncretists with a corrupt faculty of reason, was accompained by a new accusation;
Neoplatonists excelled in allegorical reasoning, though not because they were
91
Plato, Theaetetus 176a-b; Alcinous, Didaskalikos 28; Plotinus, Enneads I.2.1. For this instance
of continuity, see Annas 1999, 52–69. On 53, Annas points out that this idea in the Theaetetus
176a-b and Didaskalikos 28 has often been ignored by Plato scholars. For this theme in Plato, see
also Sedley 1999.
92
For recent studies in Neoplatonic natural philosophy, see Wilberding 2006; Chiaradonna and
Trabattoni 2009. Similarly, for political philosophy, see O’Meara 2003.
93
For Plotinus and the Presocratics, see Stamatellos 2007.
94
Compare with Brucker 1742–1767, II: 189.4–14.
95
For this tendency, see also Meiners 1782, 10, who claims that Alexandrian philosophers sought
to harmonize different philosophical schools, especially the Platonic and the Aristotelian.
96
For Plotinus’ use of Presocratic thinkers, see Stamatellos 2007.
excellent exegetes of Plato, but because this mode of reasoning was the only form
open to them and their disturbed brains, ruined as they were by enthusiasm.97 This
accusation becomes standard some time after Brucker.98 Though it is true that
Neoplatonists occasionally did advance allegorical interpretations, and that alle-
gorical interpretation is subject to all the weaknesses of unrestricted subjectivism,
two things need to be pointed out. The first is that allegorical interpretation was an
integral part of Plato’s works, as he admits himself.99 Hence it was not completely
illegitimate to pursue a hermeneutics, which sought to uncover such allegorical
meanings. The second thing is that the label ‘allegorical interpretation’ is not a full
and adequate indication of the methods employed by ancient and Renaissance
Neoplatonists. In addition, they also used standard philosophical methods such as
analysis of philosophical concepts, theories and arguments. Some Neoplatonists,
e.g. Proclus, openly profess a pluralistic hermeneutics when faced with Plato’s writ-
ings.100 The accusation of being allegorical implied, however, that subsequent histo-
rians of philosophy tended to ignore these non-allegorical analyses.
Sixth, Brucker’s codification of philosophical originality, in the form of success-
ful construction of philosophical systems, implies that philosophical discourse that
falls outside this form—the commentary, for instance—fails to qualify as proper
philosophy worthy of the attention of the historian of philosophy. These are “only”
commentaries and can be ignored in general histories of philosophy. However, as
Richard Sorabji and George Karamanolis have recently demonstrated, it would be a
gross mistake to reduce ancient commentators to anything like that; they were most
certainly able to produce original and challenging ideas.101 When we get to
Renaissance commentators, e.g. Marsilio Ficino’s commentary on Plotinus, we also
find Brucker ignoring important texts. To this day, most of these Renaissance com-
mentaries, including Ficino’s commentary on Plotinus, are not even edited or trans-
lated, let alone analyzed and discussed, by historians of philosophy.
Seventh, the characterisation of the secta eclectica as syncretist had normative
implications. Syncretism was perceived as an inferior philosophy and reproached
by Brucker. This applies to syncretism in both ancient and Renaissance Neoplatonism,
especially the latter, which was perceived as a real threat to the kind of theology
favoured by Brucker.102 This normative degradation was reinforced by external fac-
tors, especially the institutionalization of the history of philosophy, relying heavily
on Brucker’s conceptual schemes. This occurred when courses in the history of
philosophy began to flourish in philosophy departments in the nineteenth and
97
See for instance the exposition of Proclus method in Brucker 1742–1767, II: 325.20–31, 333.12–
23, 359.30–37.
98
E.g. Tennemann 1798–1819, VI: 10, 17, juxtaposes the Neoplatonists’ allegorical interpretation
of Plato with a proper systematic exposition.
99
E.g. Plato, Gorgias 493a-c.
100
Proclus, In Timaeum I.68.15–22. I owe this reference to Karamanolis. For hermeneutic tech-
niques among Neoplatonists, see Tarrant 2000.
101
Sorabji 1990; Karamanolis 2006.
102
Brucker 1742–1767, IV: 59.38–60.4, rejects Renaissance Neoplatonism as syncretism.
3.6 Problems in Brucker’s Reconstruction of the Secta Eclectica 87
twentieth centuries, and this institutional setting gave Brucker’s narrative momen-
tum. Brucker’s idea of the history of philosophy, including his historiographical
concepts like ‘system of philosophy’, ‘eclecticism’ and ‘syncretism’, was affirmed
and adopted by most eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians of
philosophy writing general histories of philosophy, Frederick Copleston perhaps
being the latest example.103 Given this educational and institutional context,
Neoplatonism was left little room for fair play, since Bruckerian precepts had the
upper hand. This unfavourable historiographical determination of Neoplatonism
induced subsequent historians of philosophy to treat it disrespectfully in their gen-
eral histories of philosophy, and it probably led quite a few nineteenth- and twenti-
eth-century philosophy departments to scale down their introduction to
Neoplatonism, thus cementing its low status.
Finally, Brucker’s assessment of Egyptian or Alexandrian philosophy, decisive to
the development of the eclectic sect, meant that Egyptian philosophy was now seen
as an intrusion into and distortion of Greek philosophy. Compared with earlier
accounts of the history of philosophy, Brucker stood out by identifying the begin-
ning of the history of philosophy in Greece, namely with Thales, and by regarding
philosophical movements in the Middle East as distortions of that Greek philoso-
phy. Earlier Renaissance accounts had identified the Middle East, Egypt in particu-
lar, as the origin of Greek philosophy. In the Renaissance tradition of prisca
theologia (ancient theology), Egypt had been seen as the source of Plato’s philoso-
phy.104 After Brucker, however, Europe’s intellectual roots were to be found inside
Europe itself.105
These problems can be seen as objections against Brucker raised from the per-
spective of modern historical scholarship, which seeks a critical account of past
philosophers that is independent of confessional ties. Brucker, however, was no
such scholar. As he states in his preface, his motivation for writing the massive Latin
volumes on philosophy’s past was to serve Christianity and its church.106 For him, it
was less important if Neoplatonism was separated from the earlier Platonic tradition
in an unhistorical manner, or if Europe’s philosophical tradition was somewhat mis-
represented as a self-contained unit; the important point to him was that the
Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato was disqualified, because it posed a theological
threat.
This disqualification meant that Christians could now deal with Plato without
accepting his metaphysical and ethical idea about divine likeness, which was
strongly emphasised by the Neoplatonists, and which bypassed Scripture as a
103
For Brucker’s influence, see Catana 2008, 193–282. For one late follower of Brucker’s precepts
about history of philosophy as the history of philosophical systems, see Copleston 1985, I.
104
For this Renaissance tradition, see Walker 1972. For Brucker’s re-orientation, see Blackwell
1997.
105
Compare with Bernal 1985, I: 3–4 et passim, who claims that romanticism introduced a euro-
centric model. For discussions of non-Hellenic origins to Hellenic philosophy, see also contribu-
tions in Isis 83 (1992).
106
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 21.10–31.
p rivileged source for our knowledge of truth and bliss. The Plato reconstructed by
Brucker was one in which deificatio and furor played no central role, if any at all; it
was a reconstruction in which Plato was primarily a metaphysician presenting a
doctrine of ideas. The passages in Phaedo 69c and Theaetetus 176a-b, vital to
ancient Platonism and its theory of divine likeness, were now out of sight; Alcinous’
Didaskalikos 28 and Plotinus’ Enneads I.2.1 and IV.7.10 were no longer considered
central to our understanding of the aim of Platonic philosophy.107
3.7 Brucker’s Alternative Guides to Plato: Cicero, Alcinous

and Apuleius
If Neoplatonists were unreliable guides to Plato’s philosophy, who were reliable

guides in the eyes of Brucker? Cicero and the Middle Platonists Alcinous and
Apuleius, Brucker answers in his exposition of Plato’s philosophy.108 They pre-
dated Neoplatonism and its perverse interpretation of Plato, for which reason they
could be used as a pure and uncontaminated source to Plato’s philosophy. Brucker
explains:
Let us look back, however, to those among the ancients, who were less infected by detest-
able syncretism, as the school of Plotinus, and who must therefore be considered to have
reported Plato’s doctrines in a somewhat purer form. Among these, the first place is unques-
tionably owed to Cicero. In the Academica, an elegant and brief treatise, he reported, in a
very eloquent form, Plato’s doctrines, which were taught in the Academy. To this we can
rightly add Apuleius and also Alcinous, who, most satisfactory of all, paid attention to the
order and connection in the Platonic philosophy…109
Accordingly, Brucker uses Cicero and the Middle Platonists Alcinous and Apuleius
to present Plato as a system builder. Brucker interpretes the two ἀρχαί (matter and
107
For this rediscovery, see Annas 1999, 52–71; Karamanolis 2004.
108
For Plato’s philosophy, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 627–728. For an analysis of Brucker’s inter-
pretation of Plato, see Catana 2008, 73–94.
109
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 669.13–23: “Respiciemus tamen ad eos quoque ex veteribus, qui detest-
abili syncretismi peste non tantopere, ut Plotini schola, infecti, aliquanto purius Platonis dogmata
enarravisse censendi sunt. Inter quos sine controversia Ciceroni primus locus debetur, qui in
Academicis quaestionibush eleganti compendio Platonis decreta, qualia in Academia docebantur,
purissimo sermonis genere enarravit. Huic merito addimus Apuleiumi atque Alcinoum,k qui, ut
omnium optime ad ordinem nexumque philosophiae Platonicae attendit, ita dux erit nobis in iti-
nere, quo ipsius Platonis, nullum philosophiae suae ordinem, systema nullum in scriptis suis
sequentis, sed cuncta in dialogis dispersa ratione enarrantis, doctrinas ex eius colloquiis eruemus.”
Note h reads: “Lib. I. c. 5. seqq.” (= Cicero, Academica I vff., ed. Reid). Note. i reads: “Libris tri-
bus, de dogmate Platonis, quorum primis de philosophia naturali, secundus de morali, tertius de
rationali agit.” (= Apuleius, De Platone et eius dogmate I-II, ed. Beaujeu. Apuleius’ work only
contains the first two books, not a third on logic, as Brucker says; see Beaujeu, ‘Introduction’, 49,
52). Note k reads: “In delineatione doctrinae Platonis, quam quoque historiae philosophicae suae
inservit Stanlei. P. IV. p. 326.’” (= Alcinous, Doctrinae Platonis lineamenta autore Alcinoo, in
Stanley, Historia philosopiae vitas, opiniones, resque gestas et dicta, 326–357.)
3.7 Brucker’s Alternative Guides to Plato: Cicero, Alcinous and Apuleius 89
God) reported in Plato’s Timaeus 32c-33a and in Alcinous’ Didaskalikos 9 as the

two general theories, so-called principles of Plato’s system, from which Plato alleg-
edly deduced the doctrines in his system.110 This system underlies Plato’s otherwise
unordered dialogues, Brucker holds.111 In fact, these ἀρχαί were not logical prem-
ises, principles, in the Timaeus and Didaskalikos, but ἀρχαί in the ontological sense
of beginning. Neither Cicero, Alcinous nor Apuleius assigned a system to Plato, at
least in the sense used by Brucker. Moreover, Brucker did not offer a Middle
Platonic account of Plato. Instead, he used these Middle Platonists—especially
Alcinous—as a pretext for a reconstruction of Plato’s philosophy that was entirely
his own, and which was deeply dependent upon his system concept. The Middle
Platonists certainly did offer pedagogical systematizations of Plato’s philosophy,
but they were different from that of Brucker.112 On the background of this misread-
ing, Brucker uses Alcinous as a guide to Plato’s system, claiming that it was a ‘dual-
istic system of philosophy’. This system is then presented in opposition to the
Neoplatonic ‘emanative system of philosophy’.113 Hence, Brucker reasoned, genu-
ine Platonism was fundamentally different from Neoplatonism.
110
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 677.11–16: “Certe Platonici ipsi eclecticae scholae priores nunquam
aliter magistrum intellexerunt, nec Cicero,ss Apuleius,t Alcinous,u et ipse quoque, his iunior
Chalcidiusw tradiderunt, quam, admisisse Platonem principia prima duo, Deum et materiam, hanc
vero esse, ut Apuleii verbis utamur, improcreabilem incorruptamque: hisque demum adiici ideam.”
Note ss reads “Q. q. Academ. l. I. c. 6” (= Cicero, Academica I vi 22–24, ed. Reid, 121–126). Note
t reads: “De dog. Plat. l. I. p. m. 284” (= Apuleius, De Platone et eius dogmate I v 190, ed. Beaujeu,
63). Note n. u reads: “c. 12. Stanlei. p. 338” (= Alcinous, Doctrinae Platonis lineamenta autore
Alcinoo xii, 338). Note w reads: “Opp. p. 3. Comm. in Tim. c. 13. § 305” (=?).
111
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 669.13–23.
112
Compare with Tigerstedt 1974, 1977, who does not examine the meaning of Brucker’s concept
system of philosophy, and who therefore fails to differentiate Brucker’s introduction of this histo-
riographical systematization from the systematizations of the Middle Platonists. Tigerstedt 1974,
68, thus ignores the fact that Brucker imposed this category on Plato, and that it was foreign to the
Neoplatonists: “But though Tennemann’s Kantian interpretation of Plato did not carry conviction,
he nevertheless bequeathed two ideas of great importance to the Platonic scholars of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. The first was the belief that Plato had a philosophic system. This assump-
tion was, of course, no invention of Tennemann’s, for it was more or less shared by all earlier
Platonists, save the New Academy, and can be traced back to Plato’s immediate successors in the
Old Academy, Speusippus and Xenocrates, though it culminated in the Neoplatonists.” Compare
also with Burnyeat 2001a, 106, who states: “Alcinous’ Plato is still a systematic thinker, albeit in
a Hellenistic rather than NeoPlatonic mould”. If “systematic” implies that Alcinous’ professed a
system in the Bruckerian sense of the word, I disagree. I also disagree with Franz 2003, 24, who
argues that Brucker re-introduced Plato’s system as it had been explained among these Middle
Platonists. For a full analysis of Brucker’s interpretation of Plato, see Catana 2008, 73–94, 109–
113. Kant 1998, A316/B372, paraphrases Brucker’s account of Plato (Brucker 1742–1767, I: 726–
727?), referring explicitly to Brucker. For Kant’s use of Brucker’s Plato interpretation, see
Mollowitz 1935; Fistioc 2002, 15–36; Serck-Hanssen and Emilsson 2010.
113
For the view that Plato’s dualistic system was perverted into an emanative system by
Neoplatonists, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 364.4–9: “Quod ut facilius fieret, relicto, quod Plato
assumerat, systemate dualistico, emanativum ab iis ex philosophia Orientali revocatum et admis-
sum, et per varios emanationum fontes, gradus, naturas, modos, classes, totus rerum et visibilium
et invisibilium orbis, maxime vero infinita naturarum spiritualium et inteligibilium series deducta
3.8 Conclusion
I think there are lessons to be learned from the above analysis. One is that we, as
historians of philosophy, do not have good reasons to accept the assumption that the
Neoplatonists collaborated on a single and highly sophisticated theoretical com-
plex, an eclectic system of philosophy. It is implausible that such a project could get
off the ground, given the vast distances in time, place and philosophical preferences
of the co-writers involved. Besides, it is in urgent need of textual evidence. Also, it
does not accommodate the explicit statements of intent advanced by the Neoplatonists
themselves.
Furthermore, two specific problems stand out in relation to Neoplatonism. First,
the characterization of Neoplatonism as a system of philosophy, which is more or
less coherent internally, invites us to understand the complex of philosophical theo-
ries pertaining to Neoplatonism as a self-contained and inward-looking unit; it hin-
ders us from understanding the connections made by so-called Neoplatonists
between philosophical and non-philosophical areas. As outlined above, the applica-
tion of the concepts ‘eclecticism’ and ‘system of philosophy’ to Neoplatonism
introduces a series of problems to our interpretation of the texts themselves. Second,
the divide between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism is justified on the part of
Brucker by means of assumptions that are untenable. Hence it becomes very diffi-
cult to maintain a divide between the two periods which is not only chronological,
but which concerns the very nature of these two phases of Platonism. I think we
ought to abandon the divide completely, since it cannot be justified in the essential-
istic manner proposed by Brucker. Given the fact that the division obscures more
than it reveals, we would be better off without it.114
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Boys-Stones.
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Chapter 4
Changing Interpretations of Plotinus:
The Eighteenth-Century Introduction
of the Concept of a ‘System of Philosophy’
4.1 Introduction
The term ‘historiography’ can take on a variety of meanings in the context of phi-
losophy.1 In this chapter I use the term ‘historiography of philosophy’ to denote two
things. Firstly, the history of interpretations of a specific topic, in this case Plotinus’
philosophy. Secondly, the general methodological concepts or schemes employed
by historians of philosophy, in this case those working on Plotinus’ texts, when
expounding the philosophical content of a given work. I also speak of such concepts
as ‘historiographical concepts’. My intention is to analyse and discuss these two
issues in relation to Plotinus’ philosophy from the fifteenth century to the present:
in this period Plotinus’ Enneads became available to the West through Ficino’s 1492
Latin translation, and the history of philosophy was established as a philosophical
discipline by the German Lutheran minister and historian Jacob Brucker. His
Historia critica philosophiae (first edition 1742–44) was one crucial work in this
respect. Ficino’s contribution was acknowledged immediately and has remained so
ever since. Brucker’s methodological concepts, engrafted upon the ensuing history
of philosophy, have not been articulated to the same extent—not even among
Plotinus scholars—although they have had, and in some quarters still have, a marked
effect upon the interpretation and evaluation of Plotinus’ philosophy.
The literature pertaining to historiography, even when defined as above and
restricted to Plotinus, is vast. It can be divided into three interconnected groups, of
which the first two relate to the history of history of philosophy and to the history of
Plotinus interpretation. The last group is concerned with methodology.
The first group of studies deals with the emergence and development of general
histories of philosophy from the seventeenth century onwards. Plotinus typically
features in such general histories of philosophy, where his texts are subjected to the
For the concept of the historiography of philosophy, see Passmore 1972. I should like to thank
1
Giannis Stamatellos, Matthew Gaetano and James Snyder for their comments.

96 4 Changing Interpretations of Plotinus: The Eighteenth-Century Introduction…
methodology applied generally. Through the studies of Braun (1973) and Santinello
(1979–2004) we have begun to know more about the history and the nature of his-
tory of philosophy and its changing methodology.2 Below I shall connect my analy-
sis with this group of studies, insofar as it is relevant to Plotinus’ historiography.
The second group of studies is concerned with the history of Plotinus interpreta-
tion from the fifteenth century onwards. Here we find studies by Schwyzer (1951),
Schiavone (1952a, b), Bonetti (1971), Tigerstedt (1974), Matton (1992), O’Meara
(1992, 1993), Horn (2009) and others, who examine the reception of Plotinus’
Enneads in this period.3 I shall use their work as one point of departure, observing
that these scholars have failed to identify and examine one crucial methodological
concept employed on Plotinus’ texts, namely the concept of a ‘system of philoso-
phy’, which was invented by eighteenth-century German historians, Brucker fore-
most among them.
The third group is concerned with the methodology applied to ancient philo-
sophical texts by historians of philosophy.4 In this third group we find Michael
Frede, largely adopting analytic philosophy’s historiography of ancient philosophy.
None of the scholars in the third group discusses the concept that I intend to
examine.
None of the studies mentioned in the second group explains when, where, how
or why the historiographical concept ‘system of philosophy’ was applied to Plotinus’
texts in the eighteenth century.5 Nor do they, or indeed other Plotinus scholars, pres-
ent a thorough study of those figures that were instrumental to the development of
the system concept in the eighteenth century, and its subsequent introduction into
Plotinus scholarship: namely, the Germans Christoph August Heumann (1681–
1764) and Jacob Brucker (1696–1770).6 In the writings of Schwyzer, Schiavone and
Bonetti, for instance, it passes for a truism that Plotinus had a system and there is no
effort to identify the historical origin of this assumption. These scholars tend to
assume, conforming to the tradition going back to Brucker, that ancient philoso-
phers like Plotinus strove to formulate philosophy in the guise of so-called systems,
without defining what this word means.
2
Braun 1973; Longo 1986; Santinello 1979–2004.
3
Schwyzer 1951, cols 471–592; Schiavone 1952a, 45–76; Schiavone 1952b, 97–108; Bonetti
1971, 487–511; Tigerstedt 1974; O’Meara 1992, 58–60; O’Meara 1993, 111–119; Horn 2010,
137–152. See also the inventory in O’Brien 1982, 143–186.
4
Frede 1987, 1988, 1992; Mann 1996; Kenny 2005.
5
One example of an authoritative survey of Plotinus’ philosophy and its reception is Schwyzer
1951; on col. 589, where Schwyzer offers a survey of Plotinus’ reception in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, he ignores the works of Bayle, Mosheim, Heumann and Brucker.
6
In addition to the studies indicated above, I have examined the following bibliographies, where I
have searched the words ‘Heumann’, ‘Brucker’, ‘historiography’, ‘system’. For the period up till
1949: Mariën 1947–1949, 389–627. For the period 1951–1971: Blumenthal 1987, 528–570. For
the period 1971–1986: Corrigan and O’Cleirigh 1987, 571–623. For the period 1950–2000: Dufour
2002. For the period 2000–2009: Dufour 2010.
4.1 Introduction 97
If we leave studies of Plotinus’ reception and focus instead on studies of his

philosophy, we find the same assumption. Eduard Zeller (1814–1908), the great
nineteenth-century historian of philosophy, thus structured his interpretation of
Plotinus according to this concept, as I explain below. In 1949, the Plotinus scholar
Mariën praised Zeller’s exposition as “the first complete and satisfying account of
the fundamental ideas in Plotinus”.7 In the twentieth century, the term ‘system’
retained its currency and can be found among even the most authoritative Plotinus
scholars, e.g. Bréhier, Schwyzer and Armstrong.8 Armstrong thus claimed in the
Preface to his Loeb translation of the Enneads from 1966, that Plotinus’ Enneads
“give us ... an extremely unsystematic presentation of a systematic philosophy”.9 If
we pass on to the twenty-first century, we see that the historiographical role of the
system concept is diminished in Plotinus scholarship, although we still find scholars
like Una Juárez, who, in a study from 2002, assumes that Plotinus had a system, and
makes it his main task to explain its nature.10 He does not question its very
existence.
Of course, we need to be careful and distinguish between the various meanings
of the phrase ‘system’ when used as a historiographical term—the strong sense we
find in eighteenth-century authors like Brucker has certainly evaporated when we
come to thinkers like Bréhier and Armstrong. The latter scholars did not attribute to
Plotinus a fully-fledged system in the deductive sense. Instead, the system concept
is typically watered down to a loose, regulative ideal. To many modern historians of
philosophy, the term ‘system’ simply denotes a complex of philosophical theories
or a scheme of interpretation. However, the fact that the term remains in use raises
the suspicion that some of its original meanings are still intact and deserve attention
and critical discussion if historians of philosophy wish to attain a reasonable degree
of self-reflection. Below I list further reasons for examining the historical context
and methodological implications of this term.
One reason is that the term, and the concept denoted by it, tend to guide the nar-
rative scheme adopted in the reconstructions of past thinkers’ ideas. The analysis set
forth in the present chapter offers interpretive detachment from the narrative scheme
laid down by this concept. On a more specific level, there is a discrepancy between
Porphyry’s arrangement of Plotinus’ Enneads, on the one hand, and the narrative
order chosen by many modern Plotinus scholars accounting for the Enneads, on the
other. In Porphyry’s arrangement, the order is as follows, roughly speaking: Ethics
(I), natural philosophy (II–III), the human soul (IV), and the three hypostases (V–
VI). By contrast, modern Plotinus scholars often reverse that order in their accounts,
beginning with three hypostases, eventually turning to Plotinus’ natural philosophy,
7
Mariën 1947–1949, 458.
8
Bréhier 1924, xxxviii; Schwyzer 1951, cols 547–550; Armstrong 1966, viii, xiv, xv.
9
Armstrong 1966, viii. Among many other examples of historians of philosophy who, at least
nominally, attribute a system of philosophy to Plotinus, we find Dodds 1973; Gatti 1996, 13–14;
Davidson 2019, 44.
10
Una Juárez 2002.
psychology, and (if at all) ethics.11 I argue below that the modern scheme originates
with the Bruckerian concept and its adaptation to Plotinus’ texts in the nineteenth
century, and that it is extrinsic to Plotinus’ Enneads.
Second, the term ‘system’ is a contingent methodological invention from the
eighteenth century, and Brucker’s system concept tends to divide modern interpreta-
tion of Plotinus from that of Renaissance thinkers, to whom the concept ‘system of
philosophy’ was unavailable. The interpretations of pre-Bruckerian Platonists are
often scorned by modern historians as ‘unsystematic’, or ‘allegorical’, and therefore
omitted from the view of modern historians of philosophy working on the Platonic
tradition. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that pre-Bruckerian thinkers had a
truer knowledge of ancient philosophers like Plotinus, simply because they had not
been influenced by Brucker’s ideas. Instead, my point is that we should not reject
the interpretations of Renaissance thinkers solely on the ground that they do not
conform to the methodological idea of a system. There may be other and very good
reasons for rejecting Renaissance interpretations, but to count this among them
would be anachronistic.
The third reason for analysing the concept has to do with its normative function
of exclusion in philosophy and history of philosophy. The intended force of
Brucker’s concept is to include past thinkers in the canon of the history of philoso-
phy on the basis of their demonstrable conformity with this concept; those philoso-
phers who failed to produce a system, were termed “syncretists” and degraded,
others were left out. Hence, inclusion in the canon depended upon the historian’s
ability to advance a convincing determination of that system. It was therefore neces-
sary to posit the existence of a system in Plotinus’ philosophy, in order to justify his
position in the canon. If his texts did not yield easily to this procedure, the last resort
was to claim that the system is somehow hidden in the texts. Armstrong’s paradoxi-
cal statement—cited above—about Plotinus’ philosophy as an “unsystematic pre-
sentation of a systematic philosophy”, is one example of such an oblique strategy.
However, an analysis of the system concept allows us to reject this criterion of
inclusion as anachronistic and illegitimate in regard to ancient philosophers, includ-
ing Plotinus.
What I want to argue in the following is basically twofold. First, the idea of
philosophical systems in ancient philosophies is a historiographical invention of the
eighteenth century, employed on Plotinus in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
(Sects. 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5). And second, it is erroneous to assume that Plotinus pre-
sented a system of philosophy, or even intended to do so (Sect. 4.3). In the final
section (4.6) I point out some hermeneutic problems caused by this historiograpical
concept.
11
This tendency may be changing; see O’Meara 1993, and Dillon and Gerson 2004.
4.2 Brucker’s Use of the Historiographical Term ‘System of Philosophy’ 99
4.2 Brucker’s Use of the Historiographical Term ‘System

of Philosophy’
Before the seventeenth century, the Greek term systêma, and its corresponding Latin
term, systema, were not used in the context of methodology, but in various other
contexts: The organization of a government;12 the organization of an institution;13
harmonies in music;14 the composition of a literary work;15 a biological organism
(including man), consisting of several parts;16 and, finally, in an astronomical con-
text, denoting the universe and its parts.17
In addition to these classical meanings, the term took up a methodological mean-
ing within the sciences of the seventeenth century.18 More than a hundred
seventeenth-century works were thus titled ‘system’.19 As I have argued elsewhere,
this methodological use spread to the history of philosophy, established by Brucker
as a philosophical discipline in the eighteenth century.20 The system-concept was
applied retrospectively to all past philosophers for the first time in Brucker’s Historia
critica philosophiae (1742–1767). He believed that all past philosophers since the
Ionian natural philosophers had aimed to construct a system.
Brucker’s views about philosophical systems may be summarised as follows:
(a) A system of philosophy, comprising principles and doctrines within various branches of phi-
losophy, is autonomous with regard to other, non-philosophical disciplines such as medicine,
astronomy, theology, etc.
(b) All doctrines within a system of philosophy are deduced from one or a few principles. (Here
the term ‘principle’ is used in the logical sense of a hypothesis.)
(c) A system of philosophy, made up of doctrines deduced from principles, extends over all
branches of philosophy.
(d) The doctrines stated within the various branches of philosophy are internally coherent.21
All this implies a specific hermeneutic procedure for the historian of philosophy, as
explained by Brucker:
In order to pass a sound and proper judgment on the propositions of philosophers, it is
necessary to reconstruct the whole system on the basis of their writings. First of all, the
general principles, which constitute the foundation underlying the entire edifice of doc-
trines, should be reconstructed; on these [general principles] the conclusions should be
12
E.g. Plato, Leges 686b; Aristotle, Ethica nicomachea 1168b32.
13
E.g. Polybius 21.13.11.
14
E.g. Plato, Philebus 17d.
15
E.g. Aristotle, Poetica 1456a11.
16
E.g. Aristotle, De generatione animalium 740a20, 758b3.
17
E.g. Fulgentius, Mythologiae 3.9. A search for the term ‘systêma’ and its cognates on Thesaurus
Linguae graecae does not reveal methodological uses of the term in ancient philosophy.
18
Ritschl 1906, cols 26–40. Stein 1968, 2–6, similarly claims that the system-concept was not used
in a methodological context in ancient philosophy.
19
For a list of titles, see Ritschl 1906, Anhang, i–vii.
20
Catana 2008, 11–34.
21
For these four features, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 3.6–16, 15.10–18.
erected, conclusions that derive of their own accord from these sources [the general prin-
ciples]. For since it is the main task of the philosopher to deduce the special ideas from
some general principles by means of an apt connection, you [i.e. the historian of philoso-
phy, to be distinguished from the past philosopher] should prefer, due to higher merit, the
interpretation that aptly conforms with, and internally coheres with, the form and order of
the whole system, even though it seems to suggest something else at first sight.22 (Brucker’s
italics.)
There are two main problems with the practice of these novel historiographical
precepts. First, Brucker confuses two distinct meanings of ‘principle’ (in Latin prin-
cipium, in Greek archê), namely a logical meaning (that is, a hypothesis from which
a deduction is made), and an ontological meaning (that is, the beginning of the
universe). For instance, Thales’ dictum that water is the beginning, in Greek archê,
should not be taken in the logical, but in the ontological meaning. Brucker, however,
confounds these two meanings when he identifies the so-called principle in Thales’
system of philosophy.23 Second, Brucker ignores the fact that the methodological
ideal of doing philosophy by means of system building emerged relatively late, in
the seventeenth century, for which reason it is inadequate and anachronistic to apply
it to pre-seventeenth-century philosophy. This is not to assert that these early phi-
losophies, including Plotinus’, were devoid of method and order, only that they
were different.
Historians of philosophy from the nineteenth century were critical of Brucker’s
method. Hegel thus complained that Brucker’s axiomatic-deductive method was
formalistic and ahistorical, but nevertheless kept to his concept of a ‘system of phi-
losophy’ and his periodization. Despite criticism from Hegel and others, Brucker’s
concept has remained central, in some form or another, to the ensuing tradition of
general histories of philosophy, the latest examples being the introduction to
Copleston’s, first published 1946 to 1976, and Gadamer’s 1998 introduction to the
13th edition of Ueberweg’s history of philosophy.24
Until recently, this continuous influence has gone unnoticed among historians of
philosophy. Even Michael Frede, an important historian of ancient philosophy,
ignores it.25 More importantly, though, he promotes a model of explanation within
the history of philosophy that has been influential, but which does little to disentangle
22
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 15.10–18: “Ut itaque de sententia philosophorum sanum rectumque iudi-
cium ferri queat, totum ex eorum scriptis systema ita eruendum est, ut ante omnia principia genera-
lia, quae fundamenti loco toti doctrinarum aedificio subiiciuntur, eruantur, et his demum illae
superstruantur conclusiones, quae ex istis fontibus sponte sua fluunt. Quemadmodum enim hoc
praecipue philosophi officium est, ut ex positis quibusdam principiis generalibus, specialia dog-
mata iusto nexu derivet, ita eam interpretationem merito alteri praetuleris, quae cum toto systema-
tis habitu et connexione convenit apteque inter se cohaeret, etsi prima facie aliud dicere videatur.”
(Brucker’s italics. My translation.)
23
For Brucker’s exposition of Thales’ philosophy, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 457.1–478.11. For
Brucker’s exposition of Thales’ philosophy, see Catana 2008, 64–72.
24
For Brucker’s introduction of the historiographical concept of a system of philosophy, see Catana
2008, 11–34. For the influence of this Bruckerian concept, see Catana 2008, 193–282. Copleston
1985, I: 2–9, and Gadamer 1998, xviii–xxi, similarly latch on to this concept.
25
Frede does not examine the system concept as a methodological concept in Frede 1988 and 1992.
Plotinus from the methodological precepts of Brucker.26 Frede asserts that Georg
Horn (1620–1670), Thomas Stanley (1625–1678) and Brucker carried on what he
calls a doxographical tradition, which was devoid of chronological order, and which
went back to Diogenes’s Lives. This text of Laertius had been rediscovered in the
Renaissance and translated into Latin and the vernacular.27 Unfortunately, Frede’s
assertions are undocumented and misleading, as can be attested by anyone caring to
look up Brucker’s work.
In fact, Brucker did structure his account chronologically in the Historia critica
philosophiae, as indicated in its full title.28 Although Brucker praised Laertius’ Vitae
as an invaluable source to the historical circumstances of past philosophers, he criti-
cised Laertius’ work as a history of philosophy: Laertius had not paid sufficient
attention to the ideas of past philosophers, he did not possess the required power of
judgement, and he had been misled by (pagan) beliefs.29 Brucker’s forerunner
Heumann had lamented Laertius’ weak power of judgement, and Brucker praised
Heumann for his depreciation of Laertius’ Vitae.30 For much the same reason,
Brucker approved of Heumann’s castigation of another ancient biographical work,
Porphyry’s Vita Plotini; Porphyry too had lacked a solid power of judgement.31
Contrary to Frede’s postulate, Brucker and his compatriot Heumann did not see
26
For this model, see Frede 1987, ix–xxiii; Frede, 1988, 666–672; Frede, 1992, 311–325. Mann
1996, is indebted to Frede’s views, as he acknowledges on 165 n. 1, 180 n. 27, 182 n. 34, 194 n 70,
195 n. 195. Frede 1988, 666, states: “Little thought has been given to the nature of the history of
philosophy as a discipline”. He ignored existing studies on this topic, e.g. Passmore 1965 and
Braun 1973.
27
Frede 1988, 666–667 places Horn’s Historiae philosophicae libri septem (1655) and Brucker’s
Historia critica philosophiae (1742–1767) in the same doxographical tradition, ultimately going
back to Laertius. Frede 1992, 311–312, 318–322 groups Laertius and Brucker in the same doxo-
graphical tradition, and on 321 he adds Thomas Stanley to it. Horn is left out of the doxographical
tradition in Frede’s 1992 article. For the rediscovery and dissemination of Laertius’ Vitae in the
Renaissance, see Tolomio 1993. For the doxography of ancient philosophy, see Mansfeld 2008.
28
Frede 1988, 666, claims that “they [the histories of philosophy composed by Horn and Brucker]
do not even follow the chronological order”. The statement is indeed puzzling. Brucker’s work was
indeed structured by a chronological table, although he occasionally crossed the scheme in order
to connect temporally distant figures belonging to the same school. For the chronological scheme
in Brucker 1742–1767, see his chronological table in in his work, I: 43–45, which is put to use in
his account.
29
For this evaluation of Laertius, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 32.21–33. On I: 32.26–29, Brucker
subscribes to the following characterisation of Laertius and similar doxographers: “Licet enim
supinam in eo negligentiam et aliquam quoque in attendendo ad mentem veterum philosophorum
incuriam, judicii item in tanto argumento proditam paupertatem, nimiamque credulitatem culpav-
erint, viri docti.” These “learned men” (viri docti) include Heumann, to whom Brucker refers
immediately afterwards (I: 32.34 n. l).
30
Heumann 1715c, 348, praises Laertius’ Vitae for its wealth of biographical information, but
laments Laertius’ poor power of judgement. Brucker 1742–1767, I: 32.21–33, approves.
31
Heumann 1715b, 139, regards Porphyry’s Vita Plotini as an example of the genre of vitae philos-
ophorum. Like Laertius, Porphyry had a weak judgement, according to Heumann; see Heumann
1715b, 159. Brucker approves of Heumann’s criticism; see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 217.37–218.33.
For Heumann’s criticism of Porphyry, see Chap. 2 above.
themselves within the doxographical tradition of Laertius, but as an alternative to it.

As Brucker saw things, Laertius and his seventeenth-century followers—Stanley,
for instance—did not reconstruct the systems of past philosophers, and they did not
employ their power of judgement critically in order to assess the soundness of these
systems as regards internal coherence and conformity with Christian doctrine.32
Also in opposition to Frede’s claim, Brucker explicitly distanced himself from
Horn’s philosophical history, which Brucker regarded not as a history of philosophy
but as a problematic history of universal learning, where Horn, “with juvenile
haste”, had found philosophers “in heaven, in hell, in paradise, and who knows
where else?”33 Brucker insisted that he himself was not writing a ‘philosophical his-
tory’, like Horn, but a ‘critical history of philosophy’.34 In other words, Frede’s
doxographical category—comprising authors as heterogeneous as Laertius, Horn,
Stanley and Brucker—fits badly with the textual evidence, which suggests very dif-
ferent categorisations. Lastly, Frede ignores that Brucker developed a new method-
ology that distinguished his history of philosophy from those of his predecessors,
namely the one centred on the system concept, which had been absent from Laertius’
Vitae in its methodological sense.35
Let me return to Brucker, the main source of the system-concept. He held that
those past thinkers who deserve to be included in the history of philosophy—and
not in the history of literature or religion, for instance—produced systems of phi-
losophy. He claimed that Plotinus did possess a system of philosophy, though one
that was almost metaphysical in itself, and certainly one that was too obscure and
confused to make any sense.36 Although Brucker did not elaborate a distinct account
of Plotinus’ system, he did rely heavily on Plotinus’ Enneads when accounting for
the system of philosophy developed by ancient Neoplatonism (or the “eclectic sect”,
as he calls it) as a whole. As I have argued elsewhere, Brucker interpreted ancient
Neoplatonism as one single, multi-authored system of philosophy, and to this end he
made use of Plotinus’ Ennead V.1 to account for the metaphysical parts of this
Neoplatonic system. Brucker separates this Neoplatonic system from that of genu-
ine Platonism, that is, the system of the Middle Platonists.37
32
For the importance of reconstructing systems of philosophy, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 10.13–
11.33. For the role of critical judgement to the historian of philosophy, see I: 12.5–10, and 15.10–
18. For conformity with Protestantism, see Catana 2008, 147–191. For Stanley as a follower of
Laertius, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 36.24–28.
33
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 6.17–24. I: 6.23–24 reads: “hic [Horn] juvenili praecipitantia lapsus in
caelo et inferno, in paradiso, et ubi non?”
34
For seventeenth-century ‘philosophical history’, see Malusa 1993.
35
Laertius uses the term systêma occasionally (e.g. II.87.9, VII.45.5, VII.138.4–5), but not in a
methodological sense. For further discussion of Frede’s opposition between “doxographical” and
“philosophical” methods in the history of philosophy, see Catana 2016. See also Catana 2013a.
36
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 223.19–27.
37
Brucker 1742–1767 separated his accounts of Middle Platonism (II: 162–188) and Neoplatonism
(II: 189–462). For this theme, see Chap. 3 in the present book.
Accordingly, Brucker made no serious effort to delineate the assumed principles

in Plotinus’ system.38 Instead, he scorned Plotinus as a psychologically unstable
thinker, whose early acquaintance with the Egyptians had infected his mind with the
“fanatic disease of superstition”,39 and whose excessive melancholy had corrupted
his power of judgement. Such grave psychological defects could only have a nega-
tive impact upon the clarity and coherence of his system of philosophy.40 Therefore,
what we find in Plotinus’ writings is nothing but incoherence.41 In the eyes of
Brucker, Ficino’s commentary (i.e. his argumenta) to Plotinus’ Enneads was of lit-
tle help, since it was marked by the “vices” of the commentary tradition and there-
fore dismissed by Brucker without further ado.42
Brucker was not the first to attribute a system to Plotinus—other philosophers
from the beginning of the eighteenth century had done so too. The German philoso-
pher and theologian Michael Gottlieb Hansch (1683–1749), for instance, may have
done so indirectly already in 1716, as I explain in the Sect. 4.5 below. However, the
central hermeneutic position of Brucker’s historiographical concept ‘system of phi-
losophy’ institutionalised a heroic search among subsequent historians of philoso-
phy for the proper principles in past philosophies, including that of Plotinus, for
which reason Brucker’s intervention remains crucial. It was not clear from the out-
set how these principles should be understood in the case of Plotinus’ system—it
took some time before eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historians of philosophy
settled for a scheme with three principles, that is, three general theories (about the
One, Intellect and Soul) and defined their nature. I shall return to this development
in Sect. 4.5. There is no doubt that the notions of the One, Intellect and Soul are real
and important in Plotinus’ philosophy; my doubt concerns the adequacy of an all-
encompassing scheme within which they, and their philosophical corollaries, are
interpreted, namely the scheme of a system.
38
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 217.26–233.26.
39
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 219.1–5. For this unfortunate effect of the Egyptians, see II:
220.10–35.
40
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 227.12–20. For Plotinus’ weak judgement and its unfortunate effect on
his philosophy see also II: 229.18–21.
41
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 222.16–33.
42
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 223.12–15. Ficino’s adherence to the tradition of ancient theology,
according to which Moses and other Christian figures were perceived within the Platonic tradition,
was unacceptable to Brucker, and it may have added to Brucker’s negative view of him; see IV:
59.38–60.4. Zedler 1741, 867, similarly denigrates Ficino’s commentary. Zedler 1741, 728, in his
entry on Platonic philosophy, refers approvingly to Brucker’s early work on the history of philoso-
phy. Compare with Bayle 1697, II: 856, who had praised Ficino’s commentary to Plotinus for its
philological and philosophical depth. For Ficino’s translation and commentary on Plotinus’
Enneads, see O’Meara 1992, 58–60, 68–73; Saffrey 1996.
4.3 Plotinus’ Use of the Term ‘System’
Let me move on to my second claim, that Plotinus did not develop a system or phi-
losophy, nor intended to do so. Contrary to some historians of philosophy, I shall not
turn this into a matter of reproach. What does Plotinus himself say about his alleged
system and its principles? And what does he say, if anything, about the method of
his philosophy?
Plotinus did not use the Greek noun ‘system’ (systêma) at all.43 This is hardly
surprising, given the fact that Plato, one of Plotinus’ key sources, used the noun
neither to describe philosophy in general nor his own philosophy. In his dialogues
and letters, Plato used the term about mathematical relations;44 harmonies in music;45
and the organization of a government.46 These three senses fall within standard
usage in ancient Greek. None of them refer to a science, or a philosophy, and its
methodology. On a crude philological level, we can thus observe a terminological
discrepancy between, on the one hand, a Brucker’s way of characterizing Plotinus’
philosophy as a system, and, on the other hand, Plotinus’ own terminology, from
which this term is absent.
Plotinus may, of course, have expressed the idea of philosophy as a system by
means of terms other than systêma itself. The noun systêma is derived from the verb
synistêmi (I bring together), composed of the prefix syn, ‘together’, and the verb
histêmi, ‘I set up’. This Greek verb is used in a number of phrases in ancient Greek
philosophy. Therefore, when suggesting words which Plotinus might have used
instead of systêma, one could look out for terms in which this verb features.
One such candidate is systasis, also related to histêmi. Systasis means ‘combina-
tion’ or ‘coherence’, i.e. the result of a process in which parts have been ‘placed’ in
an internally ordered fashion.47 The two Greek words systêma and systasis are often
used synonymously in ancient Greek philosophy.48 The noun systolê, meaning ‘con-
traction’ or the act of giving something some kind of order (and the related verb,
systellō, meaning ‘I contract’ or ‘I concentrate’) is a second related term denoting a
synthesising process and its outcome. Did Plotinus use these terms in a manner that
43
For Plotinus’ text I rely on the editio minor of his Opera, edited by Henry and Schwyzer (Oxford,
1964–1982). For Plotinus’ use of various terms I rely on Sleeman and Pollet 1980 (Lexicon
Plotinianum), which is keyed to Henry and Schwyzer’s Greek text; the relevant information is to
be found on cols 979–980.
44
Plato, in the spurious Epinomis 991e.
45
Plato, Philebus 17d.
46
Plato, Leges 686b. Here I rely on the entry ‘σύστημα, τό’, in Ast 1835–1836, III: 344. For the
works of Plato covered by Ast, see, Ast 1835–1836I: iv–v: Six pseudo-Platonic works are covered
in this work: Axiochus, De virtute, Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias and Definitiones. A search for
the term and its cognates on Thesaurus Linguae Graecae does not alter this typology of meanings
in Plato’s works.
47
For its meanings in ancient Greek, see the entry for this term in Liddell and Scott 1996, (eds),
1734–1735.
48
Hager 1988, col. 824.
4.3 Plotinus’ Use of the Term ‘System’ 105
resembles the methodological ideal implicit in Brucker’s hermeneutic precepts for

writing the history of philosophy?
Plotinus frequently used the noun systasis, though not in a methodological sense.
Instead, he used it as an ontological term: either on the level of an individual living
being—the composition of its body, or its relation to its individual soul; or on a
universal level—the structure of the ensouled universe; or to denote the unification
of the good and levels of being.49 Before Plotinus, the term systasis had been used
in various senses, among which we find the ontological one featuring in philosophi-
cal theories of individuation, either on a particular or a universal level. Here, systa-
sis connoted the genesis, structure or constitution of the universe, of a person, or of
a thing. Early Greek thinkers like Thales, Pythagoras and Democritus had thus used
the term in its ontological sense to describe the genesis and structure of the uni-
verse.50 Plato had used the term in Timaeus 32c and 36d, though in a slightly differ-
ent linguistic form,51 when describing the formation of the universe out of its
primordial chaos and the construction of Universal Soul. Similarly, he had used the
term when describing the physiological structure of an animal, also in Timaeus, 75b.
He had also used the term for political institutions,52 but Plotinus did not pick up on
this sense.53 Given this long and complex tradition, it is difficult to identify one
privileged source for Plotinus’ ontological usage of the term. This problem need not
detain us, however, since it is clear that Plotinus did not use the term systasis in a
methodological, but in an ontological sense.
Let me turn to the second term, the noun systolê. Plotinus used this noun to
denote reduction in number;54 physiological contraction;55 or the individual soul’s
inward concentration.56 Again, he did not use the term in the methodological sense
of construing an ordered whole of philosophical doctrines; it remained keyed to
ontological, physiological and noetic themes. He also used the verb to which ‘con-
traction’ is etymologically related, namely systellein, ‘to contract’ or ‘to
concentrate’.57 In the Enneads, this verb functions as an ontological term denoting
a series of causal dependencies, and as a noetic term, denoting the individual soul’s
noetic ascent towards the One. This usage was central to Plotinus’ metaphysics and
49
For systasis in the Enneads, see I.8.8.4; I.8.15.17; II.1.2.22; II.1.2.25; II.1.3.25; II.1.4.23;
II.1.5.11; II.1.6.28; II.1.6.55; II.1.7.10; II.3.14.27; II.4.11.1; II.4.11.12; II.9.5.19; II.9.6.5; II.9.6.45;
II.9.7.25; II.9.7.27; III.2.1.2; III.2.16.33; III.2.16.51; III.3.4.27; III.3.6.24; III.5.5.18; III.6.3.11;
III.6.11.15; III.6.11.16; III.6.19.11; III.6.19.12;; IV.4.28.35; IV.4.29.34–35; IV.7.1.17; IV.7.3.33;
V.9.11.3; VI.2.2.10; VI.2.4.10; VI.2.14.4; VI.3.25.10; VI.3.25.23; VI 7.11.55; VI.7.35.37.
50
Diels 1952, III: 415.
51
See ξύστασις, also derived from histêmi.
52
E.g. Plato, Res publica 546a, Leges 702d.
53
These references in Plato I owe to the Greek-English Lexicon (Liddell and Scott 1996); ‘systa-
sis’. For a more complete list of references to ‘systasis’ in Plato’s works, see Ast 1835–1836, III:
343–344.
54
Plotinus, Enneads VI.3.12.10.
55
Plotinus, Enneads IV.4.29.23–24, IV.5.7.28.
56
Plotinus, Enneads IV.4.20.14.
57
Plotinus, Enneads II.9.9.35; III.7.3.13; II.4.11.21; II.4.11.35; VI.4.16.46.
reflected in the works of later thinkers susceptible to Plotinus’ thought, e.g. Proclus,
Marsilio Ficino and Giordano Bruno (1548–1600).58 This is interesting in itself, but
again, irrelevant to our enquiry, since Plotinus does not use the term
methodologically.
To sum up, these philological examinations do not point in the direction of the
seventeenth-century methodological ideal of a deductive model ex principiis. The
possibility still remains that Plotinus used other terms, etymologically unrelated to
systêma, to articulate his method—the terms methodos,59 or hodos,60 and method-
euein61 being among such alternative terms.
Plotinus gives a clear idea about his philosophical method in III.7.1, where eter-
nity and time are considered. Here he articulates a method consisting of three steps.
He starts by reflecting upon and clarifying his own experience of a question or a
subject matter. In a second step he seeks clarification and analysis among ancient
philosophers who had treated the same subject. If one or more ancient thinkers pro-
vide a satisfying answer, the method comes to a halt after this second step. If the
philosopher thinks it possible to attain a more complete understanding of the matter
at hand, Plotinus recommends a third step. Here the philosopher leaves tradition
behind and works out his own view.62 This method of Plotinus does not conform to
Brucker’s methodological precepts about a philosophical system derived from pre-
established principles
In Ennead I.3 On dialectics, Plotinus also mentions the eternal as a subject mat-
ter for the dialectician.63 In this context Plotinus uses the word methodos in I.3.1.1
for the practice of noetic ascent towards the good.64 He is careful to distinguish
dialectics from logic; logical activity is concerned with propositions and syllogisms,
whereas dialectics is concerned with the Forms and their internal relationship and
not subordinated to logic.65 Plotinus’ explanation of methodos in I.3.1 fits badly
with Brucker’s idea of the philosopher moving from principles, articulated as prop-
ositions, to doctrines deduced logically from these principles. It is not the ultimate
aim for the Plotinian philosopher to exercise this logical power of judgement,
employed in a procedure determining the internal coherence of propositions in a
given system.
58
See Catana 2005, 29–49, 103–152.
59
For methodos, see Sleeman and Pollet 1980, col. 630: Plotinus, Enneads I.3.1.1, I.3.4.23.
60
For hodos (journey, way, method), see Sleeman and Pollet 1980, col. 722: Plotinus, Enneads
I.3.5.12; I.4.7.32; III.2.5.19; III.5.1.52; III.6.8.9; IV.2.1.10; V.8.13.24; V.9.3.3; VI.7.19.21;
IV.4.8.24; IV.8.1.13; VI.3.22.4; VI.9.4.15.
61
For methodeuein (to treat methodically), see Sleeman and Pollet 1980, col. 630: Plotinus,
Enneads III.1.6.23.
62
For Plotinus on philosophical methodology, see Strange 1994, 23–31, who argues that Plotinus’
methodology, as presented in III.7, is mainly inspired by Aristotle.
63
E.g. Plotinus, Enneads I.3.4.6–9.
64
For the noetic ascent, see Plotinus, Enneads I.3.1–4.
65
Plotinus, Enneads I.3.4.9–23.
4.3 Plotinus’ Use of the Term ‘System’ 107
Even worse: Ennead I.3[20] On dialectics is placed immediately after I.2[19] On

virtues, reflecting their chronological order. I.3 examines the soul’s noetic ascent
towards the good, using Plato’s determination of the philosopher, the lover and the
musician in Phaedrus 284d as its starting point. According to Plotinus, the philoso-
pher (philosophos) is the one who ascends upwards “by nature” (tên physin).66 In
this Ennead we get the impression that Plotinus’ method in philosophy is reflected
in his metaphysics, and vice versa. I.3.3 states that the dialectician (dialektikos), that
is, the philosopher, should be morally virtuous. Hence, the method mentioned in I.3,
pertinent to the genuine philosopher, is related to the practice of virtue, especially
the higher virtues and their purification, dealt with in the preceeding Ennead I.2.67
The ethical dimension, emphasising the purification of the soul’s virtues, is clearly
an integral part of Plotinus’ method for the philosopher. Plotinus’ ideas about the
human soul being part of the divine, and his idea about the higher virtues transcend-
ing the civic virtues, were not only foreign to Brucker and his separation of philoso-
phy and theology, which owed much to his Lutheranism, but a serious theological
challenge.68
Let me return to Plotinus’ method. One might object that my line of inquiry has
only focused on Plotinus’ comments regarding the philosopher’s method for discov-
ering truth, not for explaining or transmitting discovered truths. Plotinus did not
articulate such a distinction, but I will turn to his “editor”, Porphyry, for clarifica-
tion. Porphyry, in his Vita Plotini, neither employed the term systêma nor the idea it
signifies.69 Porphyry offered two orderings of Plotinus’ Enneads, one thematic,
which is used in his edition and which is not structured by Bruckerian principles,
and one chronological, which also sidestepped Brucker’s system concept. In other
words, it is very hard to discern the system concept even as a pedagogical device in
Porphyry’s orderings.
66
Plotinus, Enneads I.3.11–10.
67
Trouillard 1953 regards this feature—noetic and ethical purification—as essential to Plotinus’
methodology.
68
These Plotinian ideas offered a theory of eudaimonia, in this life and in the afterlife, which was
independent of the moral instructions of Revelation, which Brucker held to be a supreme authority
in ethical matters (Brucker 1742–1767, I: 7.27–34; see Catana 2008, 147–191). Brucker’s aversion
to such a theory was far from isolated. In 1699, the Lutheran theologian Friedrich Christian Bücher
had published his Plato mysticus in pietista redivivus. Pietism was a theological position that did
not fit into the standard Protestant confessions such as Lutheranism and Calvinism. Bücher com-
pared this new seventeenth-century Pietism to ancient Platonism (including Plotinus) and warned
against the Platonic theory of furor on theological grounds; the theory was not warranted by the
Bible or by Luther, and its theory of a personal, unificatory experience with the One, facilitated by
the higher virtues, bypassed Christology (e.g. Bücher 1699, 30–37). The rejection of Plotinian
virtue ethics was typical of the anti-Platonic campaign that went on in Northern Europe from the
last decade of the seventeenth century and well into the eighteenth century. Brucker’s “systemati-
sation” of Plotinus, and of Neoplatonism in general, was one way of separating the theological
from the philosophical content.
69
Porphyry, Vita Plotini. Nor does the Greek term systêma occur in Brisson’s Greek edition of
Porphyry Vita Plotini from 1992 (Porphyry, La vie de Plotin).
If we turn to Porphyry’s report of Plotinus’ method during his seminars, we find

no information that corroborates the idea of Plotinus’ philosophy as a system. In the
Vita Plotini 3.10–21, Porphyry informs us that Plotinus found great inspiration in
Ammonius’ seminars. Plotinus stayed with Ammonius for eleven years and was
trained in his philosophical school. After Plotinus had gone to Rome and established
his school, he lectured for ten years without committing his ideas to writing. In this
period Plotinus’ seminars were less ordered, according to Porphyry, partly because
they were based on questions posed by the students (3.32–38). These seminars were
probably inclusive and spontaneous in their form, but the form was hardly adequate
for a philosopher intent on conveying a system. Moreover, Porphyry’s analogy
between the spirit (nous) of Ammonius’ seminars and those of Plotinus—stated in
relation to Plotinus’ use of philosophical commentaries—also conveys the impres-
sion that Plotinus favoured a method in which commentaries were used only as a
starting point for a free and personal reflection on the matter under discussion
(14.14–16).70 This free use of philosophical commentaries does not seem to conflict
with Plotinus’ own methodological precepts in III.7.1. What is of interest to us,
however, is that Porphyry’s Vita Plotini hardly supports the notion of Plotinus as a
system builder.
If neither the term ‘system’ and its synonyms, nor the concept referred to by the
term ‘system’, can be found in Plotinus’ Enneads, and if Plotinus’ own statements
in I.3 about the genuine philosopher’s method point in another direction, then one is
led to ask: When did the idea of a system enter Plotinus scholarship? And what were
its hermeneutic consequences?
4.4 The Term ‘System of Philosophy’ Entering Eighteenth-

and Nineteenth-Century Plotinus Scholarship
The appendix to this chapter contains a chronological list of works from the fif-
teenth to the nineteenth century. In these works we find various statements about
Plotinus’ philosophy. In the left-hand column of the appendix, I have indicated
whether these works attribute a system to Plotinus or not. This list suggests that
something important took place in the first decades of the eighteenth century: From
the fifteenth to the end of the seventeenth century, Plotinus is not attributed a system
of philosophy; after Brucker’s history of philosophy from the 1740s, Plotinus is
typically attributed such a system. What happened?
In Ficino’s Latin translation and commentary of 1492, the term, and the concept,
‘system of philosophy’, was completely absent. Ficino’s commentary runs from I.1
to IV.3. He only makes annotations (brief introductions) to each tractate from IV.4
to VI.9. Neither commentary nor annotation has recourse to the system concept.71
70
Here I follow Gatti 1996, 16: Porphyry’s reference to the nous of Ammonius denotes the style of
Plotinus’ treatment of commentaries and other sources.
71
Ficino 2008. The same applies to Plotinus 1580.
4.4 The Term ‘System of Philosophy’ Entering Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century… 109
One might object that Ficino would have employed the term, or at least the concept
of a system, if he had commented on V.1. However, the term and the concept is also
absent in complete commentaries on other works in the Platonic tradition, e.g. his
commentary on Plato’s Symposium.72 If we turn to an independent work of Ficino
that develops Plotinian ideas, namely his Theologia platonica (1469–1474), we
shall also search in vain.73 It was not a historiographical concept used by Ficino.
Philosophers commenting on Plotinus’ Enneads in the period between Ficino’s
Latin translation and Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae (1742–1767) also
refrained from using the term ‘system’ about Plotinus’ philosophy. As is evident
from the appendix, this also applies to publications by Benito Pereira (1576),
Giordano Bruno (1582–1591), Johann Heinrich Alsted (1630), Paganino Gaudenzio
(1643), Hugo Grotius (1648), Georg Horn (1655), Gerhard Johann Vossius (1658),
Johann Joensius (1659), Henry More (1668), Leonardo Cozzando (1684), Pierre
Bayle (1697, 1722), Johann Albert Fabricius (1711), Johann Lorenz von Mosheim
(1725), Johann Georg Walch (1726 and 1740), Friedrich Gentzken (1731), Johann
Franz Budde (1731) and Johann Heinrich Zedler (1741). Although this is not a com-
plete list of works from this period commenting on Plotinus philosophy, it strongly
suggests that the historiographical term ‘system’ had not yet become part of the
vocabulary used to describe philosophy of the past. We have to wait until the first
half of the eighteenth century before it emerges. This pattern fits into the wider pic-
ture: the history of philosophy was established as a philosophical discipline in the
first half of the eighteenth century, and here the Bruckerian notion of system begins
to play a controlling role.
In the case of Plotinus, we begin to see his philosophy measured against the sys-
tem concept with people like Heumann (1715) and Brucker (1742–1767), as can be
seen in the appendix. Like several others in this group, Heumann and Brucker were
active in the first half of the eighteenth century, they lived and published in Germany,
and they were practising Lutherans.74 They rejected Laertius’ biographical model
for writing the history of philosophy, largely focusing on the philosopher’s persona
(that is, his life or character), and championed a new model in which the philoso-
pher’s systema was at the centre of attention. It is from these eighteenth-century
authors that we have inherited the ideal of a genuine philosopher as one who devel-
ops a system of philosophy. They laid down the premise for many subsequent dis-
cussions about the legitimacy of Plotinus and other philosophers in the history of
philosophy. Rather than trying to justify Plotinus’ role on this premise, I think it is
time to question the legitimacy of the premise itself.
In the period after Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae, we typically see Plotinus’
philosophy assigned a system. This applies to a series of publications by historians of
philosophy, mainly working in Germany: Anton Friedrich Büsching (1774), Johann
72
Ficino 2002.
73
Ficino 2001–2006.
74
For Brucker’s confessional stance, see Alt 1926, 80; François 1998. For Heumann’s stance, see
Freudenberg 2001. For the role of confessional identity in Germany between the sixteenth and the
eighteenth centuries, see Hsia 1989.
Georg Walch (1775), Christoph Meiners (1782), Dietrich Tiedemann (1795), Johann
Gottlieb Buhle (1799), Marie Degérando (1804), Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (1807),
Hegel (1830s) and, finally, Eduard Zeller (late nineteenth and early twentieth century).
There were exceptions to this trend in Plotinus scholarship. One example is the
English Platonist Thomas Taylor, who belongs to the end of this transitory period, and
who was not moulded in the educational culture in which the transition took place. In
his first publications on Plotinus, from 1792 and 1794, Taylor did not speak of a sys-
tem in Plotinus, but he did so in his publication of 1817. Likewise, the Frenchman
Jean Henri Samuel Formey (1760) and the German Georg Gustav Fülleborn (1793)
described Plotinus’ philosophy without employing the term ‘system’. Despite such
exceptions, the introduction of the term caught on in the first half of the eighteenth
century and became standard in subsequent accounts of Plotinus’ philosophy.
In the nineteenth century, the idea spread from the history of philosophy to phi-
lology. In this context, the German philologist Georg Friedrich Creuzer is of inter-
est. His edition of Plotinus’ Enneads from 1835 was probably the most important
edition after Ficino’s 1492 edition. In the front matter to the edition, Creuzer quoted
Fabricius’ entry on Plotinus at length. Fabricius had not attributed a system to
Plotinus in either edition of his erudite Bibliotheca graeca. Creuzer, however,
inserted a new passage into Fabricius’ quoted text, written by Creuzer himself and
marked in sharp brackets in order to signal his interpolation. In this new passage,
Creuzer lamented that Ficino had not explained the system in Plotinus’ thought,
adding that he intended to remedy this omission. He then assigned a system to
Plotinus, as had become standard over the last seventy years before Creuzer, and
explained the outlines of Plotinus’ system of philosophy by means of its princi-
ples—the One, Intellect and Soul.75 In the front matter to this 1835 edition of
Plotinus, Creuzer referred explicitly to several historians of philosophy, among
them Tennemann, who had identified the same three principles in Plotinus’ philoso-
phy in 1807.76 In this way Brucker’s historiographical system concept entered the
scientific community of philologists working on Plotinus. This time Creuzer used
the famous Fabricius as a Trojan horse.77
It is a matter of straightforward historical analysis to determine the terminus post
quem of the use of the term ‘system’ in Plotinus scholarship. It is insufficient, how-
ever, only to observe the absence of the phrase ‘system of philosophy’ in eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century accounts of Plotinus’ philosophy, since this absence may be
motivated in various ways that are significant to a deeper understanding of the inter-
75
For the new passage written by Creuzer, see Creuzer 1835, xxvi–xxx. The three principles are
explained on xxvi–xxviii. On xxix–xxx, this scheme is related to Plotinus’ doctrines on ethics and
beauty, the latter reflecting the order of the One, Intellect and Soul. Creuzer had published an edi-
tion of Plotinus’ tractate on beauty (I.6) in 1814.
76
Creuzer 1835, xxii–xxiii, mentions Tiedemann, Tennemann and Fichte by name. On xxii,
Creuzer mentions Tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 6, where we find these three
principles in Plotinus’ system.
77
Neither Fabricius 1708–1728 (IV.2, 147–164) nor Fabricius 1790–1812 (V: 694–696) has a sec-
tion corresponding to Creuzer 1835, xxvi–xxx; the passage is clearly by Creuzer. This also explains
the inclusion of intermediary figures in Creuzer’s text, e.g. Tennemann 1798–1819.
4.4 The Term ‘System of Philosophy’ Entering Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century… 111
pretation at hand. We have to ask if the author of the account was unfamiliar with
the phrase and therefore refrained from using it, or, if he was familiar with it, found
Plotinus’ philosophy unworthy of it. Ficino, for instance, was unlikely to have
known the phrase in its methodological and historiographical senses, whereas
Heumann was indeed familiar with it in these two senses, but consciously denied
Plotinus the honour of having produced a philosophical system.78
Heumann, in his 1715 article on Porphyry’s Vita Plotini, was thus silent about
Plotinus’ system and its principles.79 On the very first page, Heumann points out to
the reader that his intention was not to pass judgement on Plotinus’ philosophy, only
to examine his personality and Porphyry’s report of it.80 As is soon clear to the
reader, Heumann had a very low opinion of Plotinus: Plotinus was suffering from a
state of melancholy that severely weakened his power of judgement, he was preju-
diced, he was blinded by religious superstitions imbibed in Alexandria, his philoso-
phy ruined the Christian doctrine of Trinity, and he had no regard for Christianity
whatsoever.81 As regards Porphyry’s Vita Plotini, it was fraudulent, it made com-
parisons between Plotinus and Christ that were offensive to Heumann’s religious
sentiments, and it was clearly written in the detestable tradition of Laertius’ Vitae.
Heuman was very conscious about the essentiality of the system concept to any
genuine philosopher of the past, as is clear from several other passages in his Einleitung
zur historia philosophica (1715), and of which his article on Porphyry’s Vita Plotini is
part.82 The fact was that Heumann did not acknowledge Plotinus as a genuine philoso-
pher, but scorned him for his psychological and intellectual incapacity to produce a
system. As this case also suggests, Heumann did not attribute a system to a past philoso-
phy solely on the basis of the logical coherence of its doctrines; effective conformity
with true religion, that is, Christianity, was also required. Heumann’s Lutheranism thus
played a considerable role in his evaluation of past philosophers and their systems.
Having observed the difficulty relating to the mere use of the term ‘system’, my
next task is to determine the hermeneutic consequences of the introduction of this
concept in the case of Plotinus’ philosophy in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.
Many aspects could be addressed in this context, such as the following: How did those
historians of philosophy determine the number and identity of the principles in
Plotinus’ philosophy? How did they adduce two other historiographical categories
that were strictly related to the system concept, namely ‘syncretism’ and ‘eclecti-
cism’, in relation to Plotinus’ texts? How did the system concept contribute to the
formation of the dichotomy between ‘Middle Platonism’ and ‘Neoplatonism’? How
did they handle those philosophical theories and arguments of Plotinus that were not
deductively connected with the principles identified in his system, e.g. ethical theories
on virtue in I.2.1–4, or theories about sense perception and memory in IV.6.1–3? And
78
In the index to Plotinus, Opera, ed. Ficino (1580), 811, the Latin term systema is not listed.
79
Heumann 1715b, 138–159, does not refer to principles or system in Plotinus.
80
Heumann 1715b, 139.
81
Heumann 1715b, 144–150, 159.
82
For the centrality of the system concept in the history of philosophy, see Heumann 1715a, A3r–
A4r. See also Catana 2008, 150–151.
how did these historians of philosophy—mostly Protestants from Northern Europe—

relate the alleged system of Plotinus to their religious, cultural and social background
and its historical self-consciousness? An examination of these and other aspects
clearly surpasses the limits of this book. In the remaining part I shall confine myself
to one aspect, namely the first, a brief survey of how some eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century historians came to determine the number and identity of the so-called princi-
ples in Plotinus’ system of philosophy.
4.5 Early Determinations of the Architecture of Plotinus’

System: Its Principles
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it was customary to claim that Plotinus’
system was derived from Plato’s, without further clarification. This claim may be
rooted in V.1.8, where Plotinus declares himself an exegete of Plato, though this state-
ment may have been misunderstood, as argued by Strange and Brisson. This explana-
tion, however, called for a new explanation not always given by these eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century historians of philosophy, namely, which were the principles in
Plato’s system? Brucker’s identification of Plato’s doctrine of ideas as the unique
principle in Plato’s system proved influential, also in regard to subsequent determina-
tions of Plotinus’ system, even though Plotinus himself did not claim in V.1.8 that he
carried on Plato’s system, only that he took note of Plato’s hierarchy of being.83
It appears that the earliest effort to claim the existence of a system among
Platonists, and hence in that of Plotinus, dates from 1716. As stated in the appendix,
the German philosopher, mathematician and theologian Michael Gottlieb Hansch
spoke of the “system” of “Platonists”. Hansch included Plotinus among these
Platonists.84 (The term “Neoplatonism” was introduced in the second half of the
nineteenth century—until then it was commonplace to use the term “Platonists” for
philosophers now labelled “Neoplatonists”.85) Elsewhere in the text Hansch identi-
fied two principles, or “hypotheses”, as he also called them. Hansch did not claim
that these hypostases were to be understood as principles in a system, and we should
be cautious not to read historiographical ideas into Hansch’s text that only appeared
with Heumann and Brucker; when Hansch spoke of a system in relation to the
Platonists, he may simply have transferred the term from seventeenth-century meth-
odology of science and thus used the term independently of the conceptual
innovation brought about by Heumann and Brucker in the field of history of phi-
losophy later on.86 According to Hansch, these two “hypotheses” were: (1) that the
83
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 695.30–37. For Brucker’s reconstruction of Plato’s system, see Catana
2008, 73–94.
84
Hansch 1716, 8, for instance, includes Plotinus among the “Platonists”.
85
See Hager 1983.
86
Hansch 1716, ‘Praefatio autoris’, [1], 49, 68, uses the term systema. However, he does not con-
nect the term systema with these two hypotheses in the Platonic theory of enthusiasm, as explained
on 44–71.
4.5 Early Determinations of the Architecture of Plotinus’ System: Its Principles 113
universe does not originate ex nihilo, and (2) that evil (i.e. matter) furnishes some-
thing positive in the universe.87 The ultimate source of Hansch’s account was Plato’s
Timaeus 32c-34b, where pre-existing and formless matter counted as one of the two
principles of the universe (‘principles’ in the ontological sense of the word); the
other principle being the Demiurge.88 The first hypothesis was an error, Hansch
asserted, since it is contrary to Christian doctrine about God creating ex nihilo. The
second hypothesis was similarly contrary to Christian doctrine. For this reason he
rejected the notion of Platonic enthusiasm with all its ontological, soteriological,
ethical and theological implications.
Brucker, as mentioned already, contended in the Historia critica philosophiae
that Plotinus possessed a system, though an incoherent one, but he did not identify
any principles in Plotinus’ system. As far as I know, we have to wait until the 1790s
before we find efforts to identify the principles in Plotinus’ own system: Between
1793 and 1807, Tiedemann, Buhle and Tennemann, among others, offered sugges-
tions. All of a sudden it had become urgent to sort out this issue.
Of these, Dietrich Tiedemann was the first. In his Geist der speculativen
Philosophie, he offered a lengthy account of Plotinus’ philosophy in the third vol-
ume (1793).89 Introducing Plotinus’ system, he called upon the authority of Proclus
and Augustine to corroborate his claim that Plotinus was the mastermind behind a
philosophical system whose material could also be found among other Alexandrian
philosophers. Plotinus deserved praise for constructing the system singlehandedly,
Tiedemann insisted. It is worth observing, however, that although Proclus and
Augustine did praise Plotinus as an outstanding and original thinker, neither had
attributed a system to Plotinus in the cited passages.90 The warm climate in Egypt,
Tiedemann continued, stimulated a method among Alexandrian philosophers char-
acterised by intellectual perversion and self-deception. Unfortunately, this method
blocked the only source to knowledge, namely a priori knowledge derived from
“the most universal concepts, explanations, or definitions, and the most basic
principles of all thinking”. This a priori knowledge is achieved independently of
sense experience, including that kind of experience produced by ecstasy and its
non-verbal and emotional state of mind. Plotinus managed to overcome this obsta-
cle and formulated a system based on such an a priori truth.91
87
Hansch 1716, 44: “Duos autem enthusiami Platonici hypotheses fundamentales agnoscimus, a
quibus reliquae omnes suo modo dependent. Prima: mundum non esse productum ex nihilo:
secundo vero: Malum esse positivum adstruit.” The first hypothesis is explained on 44–51, the
second on 51–71. On 51, Hansch explains that matter, together with God, is considered one of the
two beginnings (principia) of the universe among the Platonists.
88
This idea was also reported in Alcinous, Didaskalikos, 29–31.
89
Tiedemann 1791–1797, gives an account of Plotinus’ philosophy in III: 263–433. The third vol-
ume was published in 1793. He identifies these principles in III: 283–294.
90
Tiedemann 1791–1797, III: 265. Here Tiedemann refers to Proclus (The Elements of Theology,
ed. Dodds, prop. 1; Proclus, De theologia platonica I.10, Greek and Latin text [1608], 21–23) and
Augustine (Contra academicos iii.18; De civitate dei ix.10). For a critical discussion of the claim
that Proclus presented a system, see Beierwaltes 1987 and 1989.
91
Tiedemann 1791–1797, III: 279–282.
As explained in Sect. 4.3, Plotinus himself had proposed a quite different method
for the philosopher, or the dialectician, in which propositional operations were
extrinsic. Tiedemann’s reading clearly accommodates Plotinus’ Enneads to a pre-
conceived scheme of a system, in which universal propositions are required as a
starting point for a logical deduction. Brucker had provided this scheme by means
of his system concept, and he had also prepared Tiedemann’s oscillation between an
ontological and a logical interpretation of the principle of the system, deriving from
the two distinct meanings of the Latin term for principle, principium. On some
occasions Tiedemann determined the principle ontologically, identifying God as the
first cause in Plotinus’ hierarchy of being.92 On other occasions, however, he deter-
mined the principle logically, referring to “logical emanation” (“logische
Emanation”): Here ecstasy does not denote a negation of rationality, by which the
most fundamental principle is comprehended, but a completion of rationality.93
Given the lack of clear and ordered exposition of this logical principle in the
Enneads, Tiedemann went on to determine it himself, pointing out eternal and
unchangeable being (“Sein”).94 Tiedemann’s explanation is somewhat unsatisfying,
since this principle was an ontological one, and since he did not care to explain to
his readers how this principle was transferred into a logical, propositional principle,
an a priori proposition, from which other doctrines in Plotinus’ system were
deduced. Nevertheless, Tiedemann’s adoption of the system concept in the Enneads
meant that Plotinus’ hierarchy of being became synonymous with his system of
philosophy. I argue below that we do find the former in Plotinus, but not the latter,
and that we should distinguish between the two.
In 1799, Johann Gottlieb Buhle followed Tiedemann in his Lehrbuch der
Geschichte der Philosophie, praising Plotinus for having the intellectual power to
free himself of the dogmatic philosophy of his time, and for developing philosophi-
cal reasons (“Vernunftsprincipien”) in his own system.95 Also like Tiedemann,
Buhle determined being (“Sein”) as the one and only principle in Plotinus’ system:
Everything else is derived from this principle, and Plotinus’ philosophy is rendered
into a unitary whole by means of this principle.96 Buhle’s interpretation marked the
completion of an important shift in the interpretation of ‘principle’ in the Platonic
tradition: With Buhle, it is quite clear that ‘principle’ (principium) is not only con-
sidered an ontological term (the origin of the universe) as in Alcinous, who had
identified pre-existing and formless matter as an archê in Plato’s Timaeus; with
Buhle it was mainly a logical term. In Hansch’s interpretation of 1716, ‘principle’
still denoted the Platonic idea of matter as the origin of the universe; in Buhle’s
interpretation of 1799, on the other hand, ‘principle’ is first of all a logical term from
which a propositional content can be deduced.
92
Tiedemann 1791–1797, III: 282–287.
93
Tiedemann 1791–1797, III: 283.
94
Tiedemann 1791–1797, III: 283–284, 286–287.
95
Buhle 1796–1804, IV: 310. Here Buhle cites the above-mentioned work of Tiedemann. This
fourth volume was published in 1799.
96
Buhle 1796–1804, IV: 313.
Tennemann made it clear in the first pages in his Geschichte der Philosophie
(1798–1819) that his intention was not to write a history of philosophers (as
Laertius), nor a history of placita (“Philosophemen”; probably an allusion to
Brucker), but to write a history of philosophy as a science (“Wissenschaft”).97 Such
revolutionary statements may have led people like Frede to assume that Tennemann
completely abandoned Brucker’s methodology, but a cautious reading reveals that
this is not the case. Certainly, Tennemann abandoned Brucker’s use of placita as an
expository device, and he favoured Fülleborn’s emphasis on philosophical
problems,98 but he nevertheless affirmed that an exposition of past philosophers’
systems was a key element in this new endeavour of his.99 In his fervour to stage his
method as novel, he overlooked the fact that Brucker—together with Heumann—
was the source of this historiographical element.
Tennemann’s interpretation of Plotinus’ philosophy, presented in the volume
published in 1807, conformed to these precepts.100 Having declared, much like
Tiedemann and Buhle, that the Alexandrians had projected their undisciplined
imagination into nature,101 Tennemann praised Plotinus as the first to establish a
system of philosophy governed by one single principle, though he pointed out
another principle than the one identified by Tiedemann and Buhle, i.e., being.102
Plotinus’ system, Tennemann explained, was grounded in the doctrine of ideas.103
Here Tennemann relied on Ennead V.1.8, where Plotinus had explained that he was
only interpreting Plato (though without, of course, saying that Plato had a system).
Brucker had introduced the idea that Plato’s doctrine of ideas was the main principle
in his system, and Tennemann built on this interpretation.
What was the principle in Plotinus’ system? To begin with, Tennemann was
reluctant to answer this question, complaining about the system’s circularity: the
principles are derived from the doctrines of the system, and these are derived from
97
Tennemann 1798–1819, I: 3v. In I: lxxiv, Tennemann rejects Laertius’ work as a mere compila-
tion. In I: iv, Tennemann distances himself from Brucker’s works, characterising them as compila-
tions without plan, and in I: lxxvi, Tennemann similarly criticises Brucker’s work.
98
Tennemann 1798–1819, I: iv, vi.
99
Tennemann 1798–1819, I: 3v–4r, [6r], viii–ix, xiv, xix, xxviii, xxxii, xxxv, lxvii–lxix. On I: xlvii,
Tennemann explicitly subscribes to the idea of systems comprising principles from which doc-
trines are deduced. Compare with Frede 1988, 667, and his 1992, 322–323, where he claims that
the breakthrough of a novel tradition came with Meiners’ Grundriss der Geschichte der
Weltweisheit (1786), which was soon followed by Tiedemann’s Geist der speculativen Philosophie
(1791–97), Buhle’s Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie (1796–1804), and Tennemann’s
Geschichte der Philosophie (1798–1819). Frede only gives the title and publication year of
Meiners’ work, not the titles of the other three authors (Tiedemann, Buhle and Tennemann). I have
suggested the intended titles for these three authors.
100
Tennemann 1798–1819, VI: 19–186, presents Plotinus’ philosophy. This sixth volume was pub-
lished in 1807.
101
Tennemann 1798–1819, VI: iv
102
Tennemann 1798–1819, VI: 18.
103
Tennemann 1798–1819, VI: 44. On VI: 52, Tennemann affirms that Plotinus took over Plato’s
system.
the principles.104 As far as I can see, Tennemann did not identify any principle in
Plotinus’ writings from which its doctrines were deduced logically. He silently gave
up on such an endeavour. Instead, he identified three hypostases—the One, Intellect
and Soul—as three ‘principles’, but these are clearly principles in an ontological
sense, and Tennemann does not connect these three hypostases to the logical aspect
of the system concept.105 Nevertheless, Tennemann based his final judgement of
Plotinus’ system on the truth of its so-called principles (without discerning between
different meanings of ‘principle’) and the validity of logical deductions made from
these principles. As one can imagine, Tennemann’s verdict was unfavourable:
Plotinus’ system was nothing but imagination (“Einbildung”).106
As is now clear, Tennemann’s interpretation of Plotinus’ system belongs—just
like those of Buhle and Tiedemann—to the historiographical tradition going back to
Brucker. Contrary to Frede’s contention, these historians were not providing
problem- based accounts, shaped by their respective “philosophical positions”.
Instead, they emulated the tradition of eighteenth-century general histories of
philosophy.
It is noteworthy that Tennemann did not speak of the One, Intellect and Soul as
“hypostases”, but as “principles” in Plotinus’ system. Thereby he led the reader to
assume that these three concepts—important as they are in Plotinus’ hierarchy of
being—make up the foundation of Plotinus’ system.107 In this way, Plotinus’ system
became synonymous with his hierarchy of being, as conveyed in V.1.108 This is mis-
leading and unfortunate, if some or all of the four characteristics assigned to the
system concept by Brucker (see Sect. 4.2 above) are transferred to his hierarchy of
being and its three hypostases understood as the principles in such a system.
It is also of interest that Tennemann used his identification of these three princi-
ples—the so-called theoretical part of Plotinus’ system—as a basis for his account
of Plotinus’ theory of free will and ethics, the so-called practical part.109 Hereby
Tennemann emulated the method employed by Brucker when expounding past
philosophers’ systems, which had very little to do with logical deduction from logi-
cal principles. Instead, Brucker’s method was about summarising (or construing) a
few vague propositions within the past thinker’s metaphysics, subsequently using
these propositions as “background” to other propositions in the field of ethics or
104
Tennemann 1798–1819, VI: 53.
105
For the One (“Das Eine”) as the first principle, see Tennemann 1798–1819, VI: 68–92, espe-
cially 74; for Intellect (“Das Intellegenz”) as a second principle, see VI: 92–105, 108, especially
105 and 108; for Soul (“Seele”) as the third principle, see VI: 105–108. Tennemann does not bring
the system concept to the fore on the pages where these three hypostases are treated (IV: 68–141).
On VI: 105 n. 113, he brings V.1 as documentation for his account of these three principles.
106
Tennemann 1798–1819, VI: 172, 174.
107
Tennemann 1798–1819, VI: 53.
108
Tennemann 1798–1819, VI: 105 n. 113, Tennemann brings V.1 as documentation for his account
of these three principles, the One, Intellect and Soul.
109
For the distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy in Plotinus’ system, see
Tennemann 1798–1819, VI: 68.
political philosophy.110 Although Brucker’s precepts put emphasis on logical deduc-

tion, his practice did not reflect such a rigorous use of logic, amounting only to this:
the attribution of great explanatory power to principles within theoretical philoso-
phy, serving to explain doctrines within practical philosophy. Tennemann adheres to
this method and establishes a pedagogical scheme in which Plotinus’ three hyposta-
ses, or principles, serve as a basis for doctrines within Plotinus’ ethics. Thereby
Tennemann sidestepped the thematic order in Porphyry’s edition of the Enneads. By
implication Tennemann also adhered to another tenet in Brucker’s methodology and
method, namely to regard a past philosophy as a unitary, inward-looking and self-
contained unity, the principles in theoretical philosophy placed at the centre.
Hegel lectured on the history of philosophy during the first decades of the nine-
teenth century. In 1833–1836, Karl Ludvig Michelet, a student of Hegel, edited and
published these lectures. In several respects Hegel’s reading of Plotinus was origi-
nal, congenial (at least seen from Hegel’s perspective), and more sensitive to
Plotinus’s texts than had been the case over the preceding century.111 He had a much
better sense of the dialectical method in Plotinus’ Enneads, and he rejected the
widespread idea, outlined above, that Plotinus’ ideas can be explained as logical
deductions. Instead, Plotinus’ philosophy was a “metaphysics of the spirit” (“Geistes
Metaphysik”) aiming at the unification of the individual soul with the One.112 Hegel
was also keenly aware of the importance of intellectual virtues in this process of
deification.113 His reading of Plotinus clearly stood out from those of Tiedemann,
Buhle and Tennemann, which accused Plotinus of “enthusiasm” (“Schwärmerey”);
Plotinus’ idea of ecstasy cannot be reduced to physiological states or a self-inflicted
seduction by mental images, Hegel argued.114
Although Hegel claimed that we do find a “systematic development” in Plotinus’
thought, based on one single idea, as if in a system,115 he was reluctant to use the
phrase ‘system’ about Plotinus’ philosophy.116 There is no doubt for Hegel that the
Alexandrian philosophers, and Plotinus in particular, had been treated unfairly
when historians of philosophy like Brucker had called them ‘eclectics’ or ‘syncre-
tists’, thereby signalling inconsistent and contradictory samplings of past systems
110
For Brucker’s method in his accounts of Plato’s and Aristotle’s systems, see Catana 2008,
73–113.
111
We find an account of Plotinus’ philosophy in Hegel 1959, XIX: 37–69. In XIX: 37 n. and 69 n.,
Hegel (or Michelet?) refers to Tiedemann (1791–97) and Buhle (1796–1804), the only two histo-
rians of philosophy discussed in XIX: 37–69. For Brucker’s influence on Hegel, see Catana 2008,
212–227.
112
Hegel 1959, XIX: 39–40.
113
Hegel 1959, XIX: 41.
114
Hegel 1959, XIX: 42–47, rejects the characterisation of Plotinus as an “enthusiast”
(“Schwärmer”).
115
Hegel 1959, XIX: 39.
116
Hegel does not use the term “system” in his section on Plotinus (Hegel 1959, XIX: 37–69). In
these lectures, Hegel did not give up Brucker’s system concept, despite his criticism of Brucker for
being ahistorical and formalistic, and despite his novel concept of system in development (“System
in der Entwickelung”). For Brucker’s influence on Hegel, see Catana 2008, 212–227.
of philosophy.117 Hegel rejected Brucker’s interpretation of Alexandrian philoso-

phers, including Plotinus, as ‘eclectic’, in order to defend Plotinus as someone with
a system with internal coherence, which the simple-minded Brucker had been
unable to comprehend. The reason for this inability, he thought, was that Brucker
had lacked the notion of ‘system in development’ (“System in der Entwicklung”)
and was therefore unable to grasp its manifestation in Plotinus, who actually made
a synthesis of several past systems in his own.118 The principles in these earlier sys-
tems were “aufgehoben” in Plotinus’ system.
It did not cross Hegel’s mind—so it seems—that the historiographical desire to
find a system in a past thinker was indebted to Brucker. Hegel, when explaining the
“main elements” (“Haupt-Momenten”) in Plotinus’ philosophy, took recourse to the
scheme of interpretation prepared by Brucker’s system concept and applied to
Plotinus’ writings by Tennemann; Hegel thus identified the One, Intellect and Soul
as the three principles (“Prinzipien”) in Plotinus’ philosophy.119 Although Hegel did
not latch on to the term ‘system’ in this account of Plotinus, the outcome of his
reconstruction resembled that of Tennemann, since he too structured his narrative
on the three levels of being in Ennead V.1.
When we reach the second half of the nineteenth century, the assumption that
Plotinus had a system, comprising one or more principles, was effectively imple-
mented as a reading technique among historians of philosophy. One conspicuous
example of this is Zeller’s Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen
Entwicklung, which first appeared 1844–1852, and which came out in several edi-
tions, the sixth edition of 1919–1923 being the latest edition bearing the mark of
Zeller himself. This sixth edition has been reprinted several times, e.g. 1963 and
1990, and still enjoys a considerable authority.
On a general methodological level, Zeller subscribed to Hegel’s criticism of
Brucker’s logical-deductive aspirations as ahistorical, but he was equally critical of
117
See Hegel 1959, XIX: 33–34, where he defends Alexandrian philosophy from the charge of
eclecticism, which Brucker had employed. For Brucker on eclecticism and syncretism, see Catana
2008, 13–21.
118
Hegel 1959, XIX: 34–35.
119
Hegel 1959, XIX: 47–69, especially 56: “Die drei Principien sind das Eins, der nous und die
Seele.” Compare with Varani 2008, 23–28 and 405–475, who regards Hegel’s interpretation of
Plotinus as a decisive improvement of the interpretations presented by Tiedemann and Tennemann,
which she, in turn, perceives as innovative compared to preceding interpretations from the fifteenth
to the eighteenth century. Contrary to her reading, I see Hegel’s interpretation, together with those
of Tiedemann and Tennemann, as indebted to Heumann’s rejection of the biographical tradition, to
his methodological precepts for a new system-based history of philosophy, and to Brucker’s use of
Heumann’s precepts and his actual account of late ancient Platonism in his Historia critica phi-
losophiae. Since I remain sceptical about the legitimacy of Heumann and Brucker’s key method-
ological concepts (‘eclecticism’, ‘syncretism’ and ‘system of philosophy’) in regard to
pre-seventeenth-century philosophy, I disagree with her evaluation of the Plotinus interpretation
proposed by Hegel, Tiedemann and Tennemann: Varani evaluates their contribution as novel and
as a genuine contribution to our understanding of late ancient Platonism, whereas I see their con-
tributions as indebted to Brucker and hence as a distortion of our understanding of late ancient
Platonism, in particular that of Plotinus.
Hegel’s notion of a ‘system in development’. Instead, Zeller endorsed an alternative

method in which past systems of philosophy were reconstructed “from below”, not
“from above”; not from grand, preconceived schemes of historical development, but
on the basis of historical evidence.120 Zeller thus rejected Hegel’s interpretation of
Plotinus’ system as one in which earlier Greek philosophical systems were
“aufgehoben”.121 Zeller did not abandon the historiographical concept ‘system of
philosophy’, either in his precepts or in his practice, but his reconstruction of prin-
ciples in past systems was based on comprehensive and first-hand knowledge of the
sources, and it accommodated internal historical development within each sys-
tem.122 This also applies to his account of the philosophical systems in Neoplatonism,
including that of Plotinus.123
Despite Zeller’s methodological revision, his account of Plotinus’ philosophy con-
formed in some respects to the interpretative scheme laid down around 1800. Zeller
argued that Plotinus’ system relied on that of Plato,124 and he identified three princi-
ples in Plotinus’ system as the One, Intellect and Soul.125 The exposition of these three
principles in his system—also called a “system of emanation” (“Emanationssystem”)
by Zeller,126 though not a “logical emanation”, as in Tiedemann—provided a survey
of the imperceptible world (“Die übersinnlichen Welt”) and its distinct ontological
realms. Here Zeller transferred one tenet of the Bruckerian, logical-deductive system
concept to his account of ontological levels in Plotinus; he transferred the distinctive-
ness of propositions in a logical deduction to an ontological distinctiveness, i.e. an
ontological stratification, inhabited by the One, Intellect and Soul.
There is no doubt that Plotinus claims a series of causal dependencies between
the One, Intellect, Soul and matter,127 but there is reason to doubt whether he con-
ceives of these realities as ontologically distinct. Although one should be careful not
to read Plotinus’ spatial images too literally, it is worth mentioning that several of
his statements about the ontological relationship between these realities point in
another direction: the body of the individual is in its soul, not vice versa.128 The
hypostasis Soul is in Intellect: “Soul is not in the universe, but the universe in it: for
body is not the soul’s place, but Soul is in Intellect and body in Soul”.129 Intellect is
120
Zeller 1888, 8–9.
121
Zeller 1919–1923, III.2: 472–475.
122
For Zeller’s methodology, see Zeller 1888, 1–10, where the system concept remains important.
123
For Zeller’s account of Plotinus’ philosophy, see Zeller 1919–1923, III.2: 468–735; for
Neoplatonism in general, see 468–500. For ‘systems’ in these two accounts, please see the
Appendix.
124
Zeller 1919–1923, III.2: 474–475.
125
For these three principles, see Zeller 1919–1923, III.2: 529–598. For Zeller’s account of
Neoplatonism, see also Horn 2010. Compare with Beierwaltes 1987 and 1989.
126
E.g. Zeller 1919–1923, III.2: 561.
127
E.g. Plotinus, Enneads V.1, especially V.1.6.38–50.
128
Plotinus, Enneads IV.3.20–23, especially IV.3.20.14–15. See also IV.8.2.42–53 and IV.8.7–8.
129
Plotinus, Enneads V.5.9.30–32 (trans. Armstrong). For the relationship between Soul and
Intellect, see also II.9.1.13–63; III.2.16.15–17; V.3.9.15–17; V.6.4.14–25; V.9.3–4;
VI.7.20.12–13.
an image of the One.130 The soul of the individual is compared to a centre in a circle,
approaching the centre of another circle, namely the One.131 This sphere-centred
ontological scheme is in contrast to the post-Bruckerian pyramid-like scheme.
Finally, Plotinus’ ontological notion of systasis, treated above, suggests that these
realities exist in an enfolded rather than in a distinct mode.
Although Plotinus’ metaphysics is a vast and complex area that I cannot hope to
explain in this book, I do hope that my observations allow us to ask whether the
ontological stratification into distinct realities is less central to Plotinus’ philosophi-
cal concerns than to the familiar nineteenth-century scheme of interpretation. I also
hope that my analysis renders pre-Bruckerian interpretations of the Platonic tradi-
tion less alien and more intelligible to the modern reader. Thinkers like Nicholas of
Cusa (1401–1464) and Giordano Bruno were certainly aware of a hierarchy of
being in the Platonic tradition (including Plotinus’ contribution, in the case of
Bruno), but their critical and innovative attention was not directed against a strati-
fied system, but against the concept denoting the relationship between the One,
Intellect, Soul and matter, namely the Latin noun contractio, translated from the
Greek noun systasis, denoting an enfolded relationship between these realities.132
Bruno conveyed this non-stratified interpretation of Plotinus’ ontology when
explaining that “the body exists in soul, the soul exists in Intellect, and Intellect
either is God or is in God, as Plotinus said.”133 Similarly, Ficino and Bruno fre-
quently used the image of the ontological relationship between the One, Intellect
and Soul that is now marginalized by the system concept; the image of man’s soul
as the centre of a circle approaching the centre of another circle, that of Intellect.134
Zeller’s account of the intelligible world served as a background for his exposi-
tion of the so-called sense world (“Die Erscheinungswelt”) and the human soul,
including its will and moral virtues.135 In this way Plotinus’ “theoretical” philoso-
phy was endowed with a decisive explanatory superiority to his “practical”
philosophy.136 Hereby Zeller emphasised the metaphysics of V.1, paraphrasing it
into a cognitive and propositional content that provided the key components in
Plotinus’ system. In 1807, Tennemann had also relied on V.1 in his outline of
Plotinus’ system, and so did several other nineteenth-century historians.
130
Plotinus, Enneads V.1.7.1–4. See also V.3.15.22–26; VI.7.25–30; III.8.8–11; V.1.8; V.2.1.7–13;
V.3.11; V.4.2.
131
Plotinus, Enneads VI.9.8–11. See also I.7.1.24; III.8.8.32–48; IV.2.1.24–29; IV.3.17.13–22;
IV.4.16.20–31; V.1.7 and 11; VI.2.12; VI.5.5; VI.8.18.8–24.
132
Nicholas of Cusa 1932, 79.19–28; For the concept of contraction in Bruno’s thought, see Catana
2005, 29–49.
133
Bruno 1999, 139: “Il corpo dumque è ne l’anima, l’anima nella mente, la mente o è Dio, o è in
Dio, come disse Plotino”.
134
Ficino 2008 (In Plotinum) VI.9.11, 769.48–51. This is a comment on Plotinus, Enneads
VI.9.10.13–17. For Bruno’s use of the image, see Catana 2005, 12.
135
For the sensory world, see Zeller 1919–1923, III.2: 598–649.
136
For the primacy of Plotinus’ so-called theoretical philosophy to an understanding of human
nature, see Zeller 1919–1923, III: 2, 483.
4.6 Hermeneutic Problems Caused by the System-Concept 121
This practice of Zeller is in contrast to Plotinus’ methodological precepts in

I.3.1, where primacy is given to the philosopher’s dialectical skills and moral virtue,
and where these issues are reflected in his metaphysics. It is also in contrast to
Porphyry’s edition of Plotinus’ Enneads, where metaphysics is not placed first, but
where we first find ethics (I), then natural philosophy (II-III), the human soul (IV)
and, finally, the three hypostases (V-VI). One can even glimpse a circular composi-
tion in Porphyry’s chosen order, since Ennead I deals with ethics, related to the ethi-
cal purification of the human soul, a theme to which the final Ennead (VI.9.10–11)
returns. This link is also prominent in Ennead V.1.1, on the three hypostases, open-
ing with an exhortation to the reader to return to the soul’s ultimate origin, the One.
As mentioned above, in 1949 Mariën complimented Zeller’s exposition as “the first
complete and satisfying account of the fundamental ideas in Plotinus”.137 One could
equally well point out that Zeller in certain respects finalised a historiographical tradi-
tion that had emerged over the preceding hundred and twenty years or so, ultimately
inspired by Brucker. It would certainly be wide of the mark to think that Zeller’s inter-
pretative scheme remains unchallenged among Plotinus scholars.138 However, Zeller’s
history of philosophy is still widely circulated and its interpretative scheme has featured
in prominent twentieth-century expositions of Plotinus’ philosophy, for which reason it
would also be untrue to claim that its most fundamental hermeneutic tool, the system
concept, has lost its currency today.139 Brucker’s magical spell, the ‘system’, still plays
its tricks on modern scholars, though its efficaciousness may be diminishing.
4.6 Hermeneutic Problems Caused by the System-Concept
As I have argued above, the system-concept was applied to the Enneads in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth century, serving as a regulative ideal for reconstructing
Plotinus’ philosophy. I think this innovation obscures more than it reveals and I sug-
gest that we give it up entirely.
The model of explanation implies that Plotinus’ idea of the One, the first princi-
ple, is met, at least in its early Bruckerian form, with the expectation of a proposition
from which deductions can be made. However, the One is ineffable, non-discursive
and therefore non-propositional, for which reason it cannot serve as such a model.
If paraphrased and used in propositional form, Plotinus’ theory about the One as a
first principle appears as a highly questionable postulate. Clearly, the system model
implies that the system is as vulnerable as its first principle. This is fatal in the case
of Plotinus’ philosophy, since it would turn it into a matter of belief. Tennemann
drew this conclusion and characterised Plotinus’ system as nothing but “imagina-
137
Mariën 1947–1949, 458. My translation.
138
O’Meara 1993, and Dillon and Gerson 2004, do not use an exposition of The One, Intellect and
Soul as a starting point in their accounts of Plotinus’ philosophy.
139
For earlier studies using the three hypostases as a starting point for their accounts of Plotinus’
philosophy, see, for instance, Armstrong 1940 and Wallis 1995.
tion” (“Einbildung”). Even if the One is not interpreted as a logical principle but
interpreted as an ontological principle in Plotinus’ system, and used as such in a
reconstruction of Plotinus’ system, as Zeller did, its outcome is problematic, as I
shall argue in the remainder of this chapter.
The pedagogical outcome of this historiography is one in which Plotinus’ theory of
the three hypostases is presented first, i.e. Plotinus’ system is introduced via V.1. This
means, in turn, that the credibility of Plotinus’ philosophy is judged on the cogency of
his theory of the One. Given that the One is beyond rational comprehension and only
articulated by means of metaphors and images, Plotinus’ entire philosophy appears to
the novice as an untenable postulate. If the system concept is abandoned, it is easier to
dispose of this pedagogical strategy and introduce the Enneads via other treatises.
The system concept introduces the idea of philosophical originality based on the
past philosopher’s choice of principles. This conception is manifest in Brucker’s
precepts for the historian of philosophy, as explained above, and it surfaces even in
recent literature on Plotinus’ originality. In 1996, Gatti thus stated: “the essence of
his [i.e. Plotinus’] system is contained in its comprehensive meaning, and cannot be
reduced to a mosaic; his true originality stands in its [i.e. the system’s] overarching
design, not in the parts out of which it is made”.140 These words are premised on an
anachronism, namely that the system concept was available to Plotinus as a meth-
odological ideal, and that Plotinus intended to construe a new system. This is not
said in order to deny Plotinus originality, only to point out that is unwise to justify
such a claim on his endeavour as a system-builder. Indeed, many of his original
philosophical analyses and arguments are presented independently of the principles
traditionally identified in his so-called system.
Another problem derived from this Zellerian system construction is that it intro-
duces misconstructions of Neoplatonism. According to Zeller, philosophical ‘isms’,
such as Neoplatonism, are best accounted for through an exposition of the main
principles in the system of the founder of the movement; Plotinus’ system of phi-
losophy was foundational to Neoplatonism.141 Apart from the fact that Plotinus’
system is an anachronistic reconstruction, this usage turns philosophical movements
like Neoplatonism into a more inward-looking and unitary movement than was
actually the case, and it becomes hard for the historian to accommodate historical
development, conceptual innovation, discussion and openings towards new scien-
tific areas inside and outside that movement.142
The concept of a ‘system of philosophy’ implies the idea that something is consti-
tutional and internal in a past philosophy, namely the system’s principles, and other
things are external to this. The past thinker is no longer seen as being in a continuous
dialogue with his or her philosophical, theological and scientific communities, but as
a solitary figure, who, heroically, erects complexes of doctrines based on a few prin-
ciples. Apart from being an anachronistic construction on the part of the historians,
140
Gatti 1996, 14. Compare with Catana 2008, 283–299, where the unfortunate consequences of
the anachronistic system concept are presented.
141
E.g. Zeller 1919–1923, III.2: 498–499. For the division between Middle Platonism and
Neoplatonism, see Chap. 3 above.
142
Compare with Kristeller 1956, 279–283.
4.6 Hermeneutic Problems Caused by the System-Concept 123
this also hinders one from identifying links to such communities and disciplines. To
abandon the system concept is to open up Plotinus’ Enneads to a more interdisciplin-
ary examination. This problem is acute to the period from the fifteenth to the seven-
teenth century, where the system concept was unavailable as a methodological term,
and where Plotinus’ writings were interpreted and discussed in the Platonic tradition
according to different concerns that crossed the idea of a closed system.
I now turn to a different group of problems related to the Platonic tradition. As
pointed out in the Introduction above, the system concept suggests a divide between
modern interpretations of Plotinus, to a considerable extent based on the system
concept, and those “pre-systematic” interpretations advanced between the fifteenth
and eighteenth centuries.
Ficino’s commentary on the Enneads is one case in point. Ficino carries out an
extensive and original discussion of Ennead I.1–IV.3, i.e. Plotinus’ ethics and natu-
ral philosophy, and he does so without making the Bruckerian mistake, that is, with-
out reducing Plotinus’ ethical theories to his so-called principles. In this respect,
Ficino offers a much fuller account of Plotinus’ ethics than is typically the case in
nineteenth- and twentieth-century general accounts of Plotinus’ philosophy, where
ethics is typically treated as an appendix to the system. As the Sect. 4.3 above indi-
cated, the cognitive and ethical purification of the philosopher’s individual soul is an
integral part of Plotinus’s conception of a genuine philosopher, and it is closely
related to his metaphysical hierarchy. Ethics is reflected in metaphysics, and vice
versa. Ficino’s commentary is subject to a variety of criticisms, but at least he did
not derail the ethical impulse in the Enneads. In another Renaissance philosopher,
Giordano Bruno, we also find Plotinus’ ethics interwoven with his metaphysics.
Brucker and Zedler looked down on such poor spirits as Ficino and Bruno, who
seemed to be unable to master the system concept, and the two historians regard
Ficino’s commentary as insignificant and exclude it from their interpretations.
Tennemann goes one step further and institutionalises a lasting dismissal of pre-
Enlightenment interpretations of Plotinus, labelling them “allegorical”.143 From
then onwards, “pre-systematic” expositions of Plotinus’ philosophy are labelled as
allegorical, clearly excluding them from serious attention. Consequently, Tennemann
does not care to consult Ficino’s commentary on Plotinus. Although Ficino was
sensitive to potentially allegorical issues in Plotinus’ text (just as Plotinus was
sensitive to such things in Plato’s dialogues), this is not all we find in his commen-
tary: We certainly also find something else, namely an analysis of philosophical
concepts, theories and arguments. It is precisely this “something else” that has been
written off, quite unfairly.
The historiographical concept of a ‘system of philosophy’ has not only laid down
anachronistic criteria for the inclusion of past thinkers in the philosophical canon, it
has also unnecessarily restricted our hermeneutic strategies when interpreting those
figures once in the canon. This restriction is a result of a historical accident, and it
may be abandoned without harming the historical evidence examined through it. I
think it is time to give it up, and to let in what the concept left out.
143
Tennemann 1798–1819, I: lxxv.
Appendix
124
Is Plotinus’ Philosophy Characterised by the Term ‘System’ or ‘System of Philosophy’?
If I cite a multi-volume work published over several years, I indicate the year in which the relevant volume appeared.
Plotinus, Enneads: No See chapter 4, Sect. 4.3 above.

Porphyry, Vita Plotini: No See last pages in Sect. 4.3.
Ficino [1492]: No In Plotinum (1580 edition): Ficino uses neither the Latin term systema in his commentary
nor in his marginal notes.
Pereira 1576: No Where Pereira mentions Plotinus or Porphyry, he does not assign a system of philosophy
to either of them (127, 130).
Bruno [1582–1591]: No In his Latin and Italian works published 1582–1591, Bruno does not attribute a system
of philosophy to Plotinus (Bruno 1998).
Alsted 1630: No Alsted occasionally uses the term systema in his short history of philosophy
(systema used in II: 2013b, 2017b; the adverb systematice is used 2013b). He mentions
Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus in his history of logic without using the term systema
for their philosophies (II: 2020b).
Gaudenzio 1643: No Gaudenzio does not use the term systema at all in his account of the philosophies of Plotinus,
Aemilius and Porphyry (423–424, 425, 428–429).
Grotius 1648: No Grotius accounts for Plotinus’ philosophy without using the word systema (74–88).
Horn 1655: No Although Horn does employ the term systema in regard to past philosophers, e.g. Aristotle,
he does not use it for Plotinus’ philosophy (193–194, 269–274).
Vossius 1658: No Vossius does not characterise Plotinus’ philosophy as a systema (II: 72, 78).
Jonsius 1659: No Jonsius does not characterise Plotinus’ philosophy as a systema (264–265, 281–282, 293).
More 1668: No Even though Platonic philosophy is important to More, he never attributes a system
to Plotinus in this work (e.g. 7, 26, 165).
4 Changing Interpretations of Plotinus: The Eighteenth-Century Introduction…
Cozzando 1684: No Cozzando describes Plotinus’ philosophy without using the term systema (76–86).
Bayle 1697: No Bayle uses the term ‘system’ only twice in his entry on Plotinus: Once in relation to Spinoza,
Appendix
who reduced his philosophy to a ‘system’ according to the geometric method;

Plotinus too was accused of Spinozism (855); and once in relation to the Platonists and their
doctrine of occasional causation (857).
Heumann 1715b: (No) Heumann does not use the term ‘system’ in his commentary on Porphyry’s Vita Plotini,
but he says that Plotinus was superstitious, deprived of the power of judgement
and subject to prejudices (138–159); all this is essential to system building, and Heumann is among
the first to regard the system as a criterion of philosophy in regard to past philosophy
(Heumann 1715a, A3r-A4r).
Hansch 1716: (Yes) Hansch does not explicitly attribute a system of philosophy to Plotinus, only implicitly:
All Platonists—Plotinus included, we must
assume—developed systems of philosophy (‘Praefatio autoris’ [1], and 49, 68).
Bayle 1722: No Apart from orthographic changes, the 1722 article on Plotinus is identical with the 1697 version.
Fabricius 1708–1728: No Fabricius does not attribute to Plotinus a systema (IV, 147–156).
Mosheim 1725: No Mosheim does not attribute a systema to Plotinus, Porphyry or Iamblichus.
Walch 1726a: No Walch does not attribute a system to Plotinus in his entries ‘Dreyfaltigkeit’ (cols 557–566),
‘Genius’ (col. 1173), ‘Seelen-Beschaffenheit’
(col. 2267), ‘Seelen Unsterblichkeit’ (col. 2315).
Deslandes [1730]: (Yes) Deslandes does not attribute a system to Plotinus directly (Deslandes 1737, III: 133–138).
The same applies to Porphyry and Iamblichus
(III: 138–143). However, he claims that all three revived Plato’s system of philosophy (III: 121–122).
Gentzken 1731: No Gentzken does not attribute a systema to Plotinus, Porphyry or Iamblichus (121–124).
Budde 1731: No No mention of ‘system’, no effort to reconstruct a system in Plotinus (155–156).
(continued)
125
126
Walch 1740: No Walch does not attribute a system to Plotinus in his entries ‘Dreyfaltigkeit’ (cols 566–567),
‘Geist’ (col. 1135), ‘Genius’ (cols 1179–1180),
‘Seelen-Beschaffenheit’ (col. 2276), ‘Seelen Unsterblichkeit’ (col. 2324).
Zedler 1741: No The term systema is not used in the entry on Plotinus.
Brucker 1742–1767: Yes See chapter 4, Sect. 4.2 above, especially the last page.
Formey 1760: No Plotinus produced obscure writings to which no system is assigned (165–166).
Büsching 1774: (Yes) Eclectic philosophers from Alexandria had a system. Plotinus was part of this movement
and therefore had one indirectly (II: 472–481).
Walch 1775: Yes Hennings’ abbreviated account of Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae, appended
to this 1775 edition of Walch’s Lexicon, is in II: 1745–1804. Here (Alexandrian) eclectic philosophers,
among whom we find Plotinus, are said to develop a system of philosophy, though an imperfect one,
derived from Plato (II: 1780). Compare with Walch 1726 and 1740.
Meiners 1782: Yes Plotinus and other Neoplatonists are attributed a system, though an imperfect one
(13–14, 16, 48, 52, 60, 94, 102).
Taylor 1792: No Taylor does not use the term ‘system’ in his explanation of Ennead I.6 (xiii-xxii), nor does
he have recourse to this term in his notes to I.6.
Fülleborn 1793: No Fülleborn does not claim that the Alexandrian philosophers (Ammonius, Plotinus, Porphyry,
Iamblichus) had a system.
Taylor 1794: No Taylor does not use the term nor the concept system of philosophy (i-lxvii).
Tiedemann 1795: Yes ‘System’ is profusely used in the account of Plotinus’ philosophy (Tiedemann 1791–1797,
III [1795]: 263–433, e.g. 265, 270). Since Plotinus expresses his system so badly, it is necessary
for the historian of philosophy to reconstruct it (III: 283–284).
Fabricius 1796: No Plotinus is not attributed a system of philosophy in this second edition (Fabricius 1790–1812,
V [1796]: 694–696).
Buhle 1799: Yes Alexandrian Neoplatonists had syncretistic systems (Buhle 1796–1804, IV [1799]: 282, 283).
Plotinus too had a system (IV: 300–326, 420–422).
4 Changing Interpretations of Plotinus: The Eighteenth-Century Introduction…
Degérando 1804: Yes Neoplatonists are attributed a system, which is said to derive from that of Plato (I: 182–197).
Occasionally, Plotinus is attributed a system (e.g. I: 217).
Appendix
Tennemann 1807: Yes Plotinus’ system is based on one single principle (Tennemann 1798–1819, VI [1807]: 18).
The term ‘system’, as well as the concept system, is used frequently (VI: passim). Plotinus’
system is presented in an “unsystematic” way (VI: 50–51). Plotinus did not develop his own
system, but that of Plato (VI: 52).
Taylor 1817: Yes Plotinus developed a system of philosophy, which was first presented by Plato (lxxviii-lxxix).
Compare with Taylor 1792 and 1794.
Hegel [1833–36]: (Yes) Plotinus’ Enneads reveals a systematic development, based on one single idea (Hegel 1959, XIX: 39).
The three “main elements” in Plotinus’ philosophy are the three principles the One, Intellect,
and Soul (XIX: 56). The Alexandrian philosophers, however, were able to synthesise past systems
into one single and comprehensive system (XIX: 34–35).
Creuzer 1835: Yes Creuzer’s front matter to his edition of Plotinus, Opera, 3 vols (1835) quotes Fabricius’ entry
on Plotinus in I: xix-xli. He entitles this long quote ‘Prolegomena literaria’. It is cited from the
second edition of Fabricius’ Biblioteca graeca, V [1796]: 691–701. Creuzer inserts a text of his own,
marked with sharp brackets, into Fabricius’ cited text, namely section Vb, which explains Plotinus’
system (Plotinus, Opera, ed. Creuzer, I: xix, xxvi–xxx). (Compare with the first and second edition
of Fabricius’ Biblioteca graeca, which did not attribute a system to Plotinus.) Creuzer observes
that Ficino had not explained this system in his commentary (I: xxvi), and determines three
principles in Plotinus’ system (I: xxvi–xxx).
Zeller 1919–1923: Yes The system concept is fundamental to Zeller’s account of Neoplatonism
(III.2: 470, 476, 478, 480, 482, 484, 497, 498–499) and of Plotinus (III.2: 470, 471, 473,
484, 485, 486, 495, 512, 516, 519, 520, 521, 527, 528, 559, 560, 564, 578, 582, 602, 621,
634, 640, 644, 649, 658, 664, 673, 675, 695, 700).
127
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Schiavone, Michele. 1952b. Plotino nell’interpretazione dello Hegel. Rivista di filosofia neo-
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Klassifikation in Wissenschaft und Dokumentation, ed. A. Diemer, 1–13. Meisenheim am Glan.
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Washington D.C.
Taylor, Thomas. 1792. Introduction. In Plotinus, An Essay on the Beautiful, iii–xx. London.
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Taylor, Thomas. 1817. Introduction. In T. Taylor, Select Works of Plotinus, v–lxxxiii. London.
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Chapter 5
Thomas Taylor’s Dissent from Some
Eighteenth-Century Views on Platonic
Philosophy: The Ethical and Theological
Context
5.1 Introduction
The English Platonist and translator Thomas Taylor (1758–1835) published The
works of Plato in 1804, comprising his own and Floyer Sydenham’s (1710–1787)
English translations of Plato’s dialogues and letters, as well as both men’s introduc-
tions and notes to these texts.1 In his ‘General introduction’, Taylor sought to justify
this novel translation and explained the order of Plato’s works, as any translator is
expected to do. He also advanced a remarkable interpretation of Plato’s philosophy,
its nature and aim. In Taylor’s eyes, Plato was not just any ancient philosopher who
happened not to be fully translated into English; his philosophy could serve as a
remedy of what Taylor perceived as modern materialism and its evils.2
So, what kind of philosophy did Taylor find in Plato’s writings? On the opening
page of his ‘General introduction’, Taylor cites the Neoplatonist Hierocles (fl. ca. 430),
author of a commentary on Pythagoras’ Golden Verses, in answer to this question:
Philosophy is the purification and perfection of human life. It is the purification, indeed,
from material irrationality, and the mortal body; but the perfection, in consequence of being
the resumption of our proper felicity, and a reascent to the divine likeness. To effect these
two is the province of Virtue and Truth; the former exterminating the immoderation of the
passions; and the latter introducing the divine form to those who are naturally adapted to its
reception.3 (Taylor’s italics.)
1
This 1804 publication has been reprinted by the Prometheus Trust, 1995–1996. In this recent
publication we find orthographic changes, corrections of grammatical errors and spelling, and
some re-arrangement of the notes. Below I refer to the original 1804 publication and to this reprint;
I refer to the latter in square brackets. This applies to the texts of Plato and to the texts of Taylor in
these two publications. For Taylor’s life and work, see Raine 1969. For his influence upon the
English romantic movement, see Raine 1968.
2
Taylor 1804, lxxxiv [Taylor 1995, 59].
3
Taylor 1804, iii [Taylor 1995, 1]. The quotation is from Hierocles, In aureum carmen. It may be
Taylor’s own English translation from the Greek-Latin 1709 edition by Needham; Taylor owned a

134 5 Thomas Taylor’s Dissent from Some Eighteenth-Century Views on Platonic…
This ethical and metaphysical agenda is reflected in Taylor’s selection of interpret-

ers of Plato, primarily ancient Neoplatonists. Before entering the agenda set forth in
this quotation, it is worth observing the terminology with which Taylor discussed
ancient Platonism, including what we now call Neoplatonism, that is, late ancient
Platonism from ca. 200 CE to ca. 550 CE.
Although German historians of philosophy had coined the terms ‘Neoplatonism’
and ‘Neoplatonist’ in the 1770s and 1780s, Taylor did not use these terms in his
1804 publication, but spoke indiscriminately of ‘Platonism’ and ‘Platonists’, even
when referring to philosophers whom these German historians of philosophy had
called Neoplatonists, and whom we still call Neoplatonists by convention. Taylor
may not have known the neologism, or, more likely, he may have decided not to use
it because of its negative connotations.4 Similarly, Taylor consciously abstained
from using the term ‘Alexandrian philosophy’, which had been used as a pejorative
throughout the eighteenth century, denoting the philosophical movement to be
labelled ‘Neoplatonism’ from the 1770s onwards. When Taylor’s 1804 publication
was reviewed in 1809, his critic spoke precisely about the ‘Alexandrains’, clearly
using the term in a condemnatory sense.5
In his 1804 publication, Taylor also omitted the widely used labels ‘eclecticism’
and ‘syncretism’, which had been part of the conceptual scheme used to character-
ise, among other things, what we now refer to as Neoplatonism, and which had also
been used as pejoratives. Again, Taylor’s 1809 critic used precisely these two terms
in a depreciatory manner.6 In Rigg’s biographical entry on Taylor, dating from 1898,
he emulated this disdainful use of the term ‘syncretism’, accusing Taylor of adher-
ing to the “forced and fanciful syncretism of the ancient commentators [on Plato
and Aristotle]”, i.e. the Neoplatonists.7 The historiographical terms ‘Alexandrian
philosophy’, ‘Neoplatonism’, ‘eclecticism’ and ‘syncretism’ had been developed in
the eighteenth century and applied to late ancient Platonism in a fairly condemna-
tory manner.8 Taylor’s unwillingness to employ these historiographical terms was
hardly a sign of incompetence or ignorance on his part, or of any strong debt to the
copy of this edition in his private library: See Catalogue 1836, 8 n. 172. I am grateful to Tim Addey
for providing this auction catalogue and for his helpful comments.
4
Taylor 1804 [Taylor 1995] does not use the term ‘Neoplatonism’ / ‘Neoplatonist’ at all. For the
emergence of the term ‘Neoplatonism’ in the 1770s and 1780s, see Chap. 3 above.
5
Taylor 1804 [Taylor 1995] avoids the terms “Alexandrian philosophy” and “Alexandrians” for
Neoplatonic philosophy and Neoplatonists; when he uses the term “Alexandrian” to refer to
Neoplatonism, he does so in order to point out an interpretation of Neoplatonism that was unfa-
vourable and unfair in his eyes, as in the case of Warburton: E.g. Taylor 1804, xci [Taylor 1995,
63]. As we have seen, Taylor’s critic refers frequently to the “Alexandrians”; see [Mill] 1809,
191–200, 211 [[Mill] 2001, 152–166, 179].
6
Taylor 1804 does not use these two terms at all. They are used in [Mill] 1809, 195, 196 [Mill]
2001, 158, 160].
7
Rigg 1898, 469.
8
For this development in the eighteenth century, see Chaps. 3 and 4 above.
5.1 Introduction 135
Renaissance Platonism of Marsilio Ficino; rather, it indicated Taylor’s philosophi-

cal position bound up with these terms in the course of the eighteenth century.
Having clarified Taylor’s terminology, let me return to the agenda presented in
the quotation above. On a general level, Taylor held that Plotinus (204/5–70),
Porphyry (ca. 233–309), Iamblichus (ca. 242–327), Syrianus (d. 437), Hierocles,
Damascius (462–540) and Proclus (ca. 411–485), had been able to recognise this
fundamental conception of philosophy in Plato’s writings. Taylor clearly favoured
their interpretations over those of the Platonists from the Old Academy, such as
Crantor (276/75 BCE), and Middle Platonists such as Atticus (fl. ca. 175 CE),
Albinus (fl. ca. 150 CE), Galen (129–210 CE) and Plutarch (ca. 46–120 CE).
Although these Middle Platonists had been closer in time to Plato than the
Neoplatonists, “they appear”, Taylor said, “not to have developed the profundity of
Plato’s conceptions”.9 The Neoplatonists did, due to their gifted natures:
This task was reserved for men who were born indeed in a baser age, but who being allotted
a nature similar to their leader, were the true interpreters of his mystic speculations. The
most conspicuous of these are, the great Plotinus, the most learned Porphyry, the divine
Jamblichus, the most acute Syrianus, Proclus the consummation of philosophic excellence,
the magnificent Hierocles, the concisely elegant Sallust, and the most inquisitive
Damascius.10
The authority of this series of Neoplatonists was also supported by external circum-
stances: Their native language was Greek; they had access to Platonic literature; and
they dedicated their lives to Platonism. To them, Platonism was not merely an
abstract complex of theories and arguments, but a way of life.11
Taylor’s conception of Platonic philosophy, and his use of Neoplatonists as
guides to Plato’s philosophy, clearly stood out from Plato scholarship typical of the
eighteenth century in Northern Europe. The nineteenth-century reduction of Taylor
to a “nobody” in classical scholarship was largely due to his dissent from some
assumptions in eighteenth-century Protestant philosophy and hermeneutics, which
had shaped contemporary Plato scholarship, and which was effectively reflected in
the devastating 1804 and 1809 reviews. These assumptions, however, may be unten-
able or dubious upon closer examination, but they have not all been articulated and
discussed.
Over the last 60 years we have become familiar with Taylor’s significance to
nineteenth-century English and American romantic literature, but we still know
very little about the eighteenth-century background against which Taylor reacted.12
9
Taylor 1804, lxxxvii [Taylor 1995, 61].
10
Taylor 1804, lxxxvii [Taylor 1995, 61]. The Sallust mentioned here is not the historian but the
philosopher. In 1793, Taylor had published an English translation of a work by Sallust, namely On
the Gods and the World.
11
Taylor 1804, xci-xcii [Taylor 1995, 63–64].
12
For Taylor’s influence upon the Platonism of the poet Shelley, see Notopoulos 1936. Evans 1940,
1070–1072, ignores Brucker’s historiography of Plato as a background to Taylor and the 1804 and
1809 reviews. Evans 1943, 107, points out Taylor’s significance for literary romanticism, but with-
out comparing his Plato interpretation with those of the eighteenth century. Raine’s two texts from
1968 and 1969 offer good introductions to Taylor and his significance to nineteenth-century
This means that we are left with the image of Taylor as a man who had no critical
faculty, who succumbed to Neoplatonic (mis)interpretation of Plato’s works; a man
who made his mark upon the romantic literary imagination, but who did not contrib-
ute to Plato scholarship or philosophy.13 The intended force of my argument is not
that we should go back to Taylor’s Plato interpretation and accept it uncritically, but
that it is time to take an informed and critical approach to our inherited disdain of
Taylor’s interpretative outlook.
5.2 Platonic Ethics: Divine Likeness
In the citation above, we find Hierocles’ exhortation to “reascent to the divine like-
ness”. This telos of philosophy (in Greek, homoiōsis theōi) was an important theme
in the ancient Platonic tradition, and it features prominently in Plato’s Theaetetus
176a-b, in the Middle Platonist Alcinous’ Didaskalikos 28, and in Plotinus’ Ennead
I.2.1 and IV.7.10, to mention just a few examples. Neoplatonists like Plotinus and
Hierocles thus continued this tradition from the earlier Platonic tradition. The exis-
tence of such a continuity does not exclude, of course, that some ancient Platonists
did not accept this as an important and continuous tenet in Platonism; nor does it
exclude that there were other topics about which ancient Platonists disagreed. Such
differentiation, however, we do not find in Taylor’s reading. Although this tradition
of Platonic ethics has been marginalised in nineteenth- and twentieth-century ethi-
cal discourse, which has followed different conceptualisations of ethics and typi-
cally emphasised agency rather than the individual’s noetic and metaphysical
constitution, it has recently been rediscovered by some scholars working on the
Platonic tradition.14
How does Taylor interpret this ethical telos? He does not rely on Hierocles for
clarification. Apparently, he returns to Plato himself: “In short, the soul, according
to Plato, can only be restored while on earth to the divine likeness, which she
English romantic authors like Blake, Coleridge, Shelley and Wordsworth, but have little to say
about his eighteenth-century context. Tigerstedt 1974 only offers brief comments on Taylor’s Plato
interpretation (48, 62–63). Tigerstedt 1977 ignores Taylor’s Plato interpretation completely.
Glucker 1987 provides a good survey of nineteenth-century Plato interpretations in England,
including that of Taylor (160–165), though without commenting on Taylor’s context in eighteenth-
century Plato scholarship. Glucker 1996, 394–396, briefly identifies two eighteenth-century fig-
ures as central to the Plato reading against which Taylor reacted; Mosheim and Brucker. I examine
these figures below. Burnyeat’s three articles dating from 1998 and 2001 do not examine the eigh-
teenth-century assumptions informing these 1804 and 1809 reviews.
13
Rigg 1898, 468, thus stated about Taylor: “Critical faculty he had none.” Such ridicule is absent
in the most recent biographical entry on Taylor; see Louth 2004. There are exceptions to the nega-
tive view of Taylor expressed by Rigg and others: See Saffrey and Westerink 1968, xcv, paying
tribute to Taylor’s competence in Platonic texts (especially Proclus’ Platonic Theology) and to his
textual conjectures; Allen 1982, 41 (“that eccentric but brilliant scholar-Platonist, Thomas Taylor”).
14
For this reading of Plato, see Annas 1999, 52–71; Sedley 1999; Beierwaltes 2002, 132–142;
Karamanolis, 2004.
5.2 Platonic Ethics: Divine Likeness 137
a bandoned by her descent, and be able after death to reascend to the intelligible
world, by the exercise of the cathartic and theoretic virtues; the former purifying her
from the defilements of a mortal nature, and the latter elevating her to the vision of
true being”.15 In a note to these words, Taylor claims (without further references)
that Plato discusses the cathartic virtues in the Phaedo, and the theoretic virtues in
the Theaetetus. Although it is true that Plato discussed purification (katharsis) in
Phaedo 67d-70a, where we find his argument about the purification of the philoso-
pher’s soul, he did not there develop a technical term for ‘cathartic virtues’, and
certainly not one that was distinguishable from the other term, ‘theoretic virtues’.
Nor can one claim that Plato developed the term ‘theoretic virtues’ in the Theaetetus,
or indeed that he developed it in explicit opposition to ‘cathartic virtues’ in that
work. So where does this terminological scheme come from? In his commentary on
Phaedo 69c, Taylor explains:
Above these [i.e. the political virtues, as explained in the Republic] are the cathartic virtues,
which pertain to reason alone, withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the
instruments of sense as vain … Prior to these, however, are the theoretic virtues, which
pertain to the soul, introducing itself to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as
some one may be induced to think from the name but also orectically: for it hastens to
become, as it were, intellect instead of soul; and intellect, as we have before observed, pos-
sesses both desire and knowledge.16
To these three classes of virtue (political, cathartic and theoretic), Taylor adds a
fourth, namely paradigmatic virtues, which he refers to Plotinus, probably Ennead
I.2.7.17 Taylor does find that Plotinus’ virtue theory is an adequate account of Plato’s
ethics, and in this respect one can say that Taylor was indebted to Neoplatonism. He
refers continuously to these four ethical virtues in his commentary on Plato’s dia-
logues and letters, suggesting that Taylor’s exhortation to virtue on the first page of
his ‘General introduction’ is more than a rhetorical gesture; he actually means it,
and he often brings in Platonic and Neoplatonic virtue terminology in his
commentaries.18
Again, Taylor quotes Plato’s Theaetetus 176b in his ‘General introduction’ in
order to explain this telos of divine likeness. The quotation reads, in Taylor’s trans-
lation: “‘It is necessary’, says he [Plato], ‘to fly from hence thither: but the flight is
15
Taylor 1804, lxv [Taylor 1995, 45].
16
Taylor’s comment to Plato’s Phaedo in Plato 1804, IV: 273 n. 1 [Taylor’s comment to Plato’s
Phaedo in Plato 1995–1996, IV: 246 n. 12].
17
Taylor affirms the centrality of wisdom and virtue in Plato’s Phaedo in his introduction to that
dialogue; see Plato 1804, IV: 250 [Plato 1995–1996, IV: 232]. Moreover, Sydenham and Taylor
refer approvingly to Plotinus elsewhere in the context of the soul’s noetic ascent and the intelligible
realm, as is clear in the introductions to, and commentary to, Plato’s Phaedrus 246e (Plato 1804,
III: 595 [Plato 1995–1996, III: 409]), Gorgias 525a (Plato 1804, IV: 455 [Plato 1995–1996, IV:
429]) and Meno (Plato 1804, V: 33 n. 1 [Plato 1995–1996, V: 30 n.]). For Plotinus’ virtue theory,
see Dillon 1996, Smith 1999, Schniewind 2003 and 2005, McGroarty 2006, Remes 2006, Stern-
Gillet 2009.
18
One example of this is found in Taylor’s introduction to the Phaedo, commenting on Phaedo 69c
(Plato 1804, IV: 273 n. 1 [Taylor 1995–1996, IV: 309–311]).
a similitude to divinity, as far as is possible to man; and this similitude consists in

becoming just and holy in conjunction with intellectual prudence.’”19 Plotinus had
quoted these words in his Ennead I.2.1.1–5, adding that if we reach this desired
similitude, then we shall be “in virtue” (en aretê). Again, Taylor finds himself in line
with Neoplatonists like Plotinus when interpreting Platonic ethics.
Plotinus had used this quote from Plato as a starting point for his own virtue
theory, as developed in the remaining part of I.2 On virtues, and in I.4 On well-
being. The articulation of virtues transcending the political virtues, the so-called
higher virtues, provided a conceptual framework through which it became possible
to account for the individual soul’s communication with the divine realm, and for its
self-transformation, its “becoming divine”; the aim of philosophising. Plotinus
explained the centrality of virtue to anyone approaching the good: “For wisdom and
true virtue are divine things, and could not occur in some trivial mortal being, but
something of such a kind [as to possess them] must be divine, since it has a share in
divine things through its kinship and consubstantiality.”20 As is well known, Plotinus
developed a complex theory about lower and higher virtues in I.2.3–7, which was
further elaborated and systematised by Porphyry in his Sententiae 32.21 Marinus of
Neapolis’ biography of Proclus, Proclus, or On Happiness, can similarly be under-
stood within the tradition of Platonic and Neoplatonic virtue ethics, since it rephrased
several of these higher virtues as conductive to the philosopher’s telos.22
Taylor’s English translation of Marinus’ biography was published in 1788
together with his translations of Proclus’ mathematical and philosophical works; his
translation of Plotinus’ Ennead I.4 was published in his Five Books of Plotinus in
1794; his translation of Ennead I.2 was included in his Select Works of Plotinus,
published 1817; and his translation of Porphyry’s Sententiae was published in 1823.
In short, Taylor was familiar with the basic features of Neoplatonic eudaimonism
and virtue theory already before 1804. He drew on this knowledge in his Plato com-
mentary of 1804, and he continued to take an interest in Neoplatonic virtue theory
after 1804. Hence, Taylor’s Plato interpretation of 1804 was not a random compila-
tion of Neoplatonic ideas, as has been suggested — it was fairly consistent with his
emphasis on homoiōsis theōi, with his selection of cited Neoplatonists, and with
several of his other works on the Platonic tradition. Evidently, he focused on Platonic
virtue ethics, to which the selected Neoplatonists had made a substantial
19
Taylor 1804, lxvi [Taylor 1995, 45].
20
Plotinus, Enneads IV.7.10. Armstrong’s translation.
21
For Porphyry’s virtue theory in his Sententiae 32, see Porphyry, Sentences, I: 334–344, and the
notes by Brisson and Flamand to that passage in Porphyry, Sentences, II: 628–642. For Porphyry
on virtue theory, see also Smith 1974, 25–26, 48, 50, 59–61, 76–77, 104–105, 128, 134–135,
147–148, 153.
22
To some extent Marinus structures his biography according to a scheme of virtues, where we first
find the physical, ethical and political virtues (3–17), then the higher virtues, that is, the purifica-
tory, contemplative and theurgic virtues (18–35). For Neoplatonist biographies, see Edwards 2000.
5.2 Platonic Ethics: Divine Likeness 139
c ontribution.23 One might claim that Taylor is thereby guilty by association, but that
is another issue.
What did this mean to Taylor’s conception of philosophy and its relationship to
theology? Among the above-mentioned Neoplatonists, Taylor makes use of Proclus
as a “guide”, in at least two senses. First, on several occasions he cites approvingly
Proclus’ commentaries to Plato’s individual dialogues.24 Second, he draws on
Proclus’ idea that Plato’s philosophy is not only a philosophy, but also a theology:
The ineffable One is the cause of all, and from it everything receives its being and
form. The human soul is amphibious and has a privileged middle position in a hier-
archy of being stretching from the One, the summit, to the lowest being, and it is
given freedom to approach that divinity. He regards noetic ascent (or “reascent”, as
he sometimes calls it) towards the summit as a religious phenomenon described as
an act of piety.25 Platonic ethics, stressing the approach to divinity through the exer-
cise of higher virtues, can be seen as a corollary of such a conception of theology.
In 1816, 12 years after his volumes of Plato appeared, Taylor published an English
translation of Proclus’ Platonic Theology, and several of the views propounded in
his ‘Introduction’ were consistent with his views stated in 1804.
In his ‘General introduction’, Taylor underlines the radical difference between,
on the one hand, God in the genuine Platonic tradition, and, on the other, the
Christian God. He makes it clear that the Platonic God, as understood by Proclus,
cannot be understood within the Christian dogma of the Trinity:
Lastly, from all that has been said, it must, I think, be immediately obvious to every one
whose mental eye is not entirely blinded, that there can be no such thing as a trinity in the
theology of Plato, in any respect analogous to the Christian Trinity. For the highest God,
according to Plato, as we have largely shown from irresistible evidence, is so far from being
a part of a consubsistent triad, that he is not to be connumerated with any thing.26
This represents a firm rejection of the Patristic tradition, in which Neoplatonic

metaphysics to some extent had been accommodated to Christian dogma.27 He
23
Compare with Evans 1940, 1071: “It is quite true that Taylor made no distinction between the
thoughts of Plato and the neo-Platonists; his notes and introductions are little more than compila-
tions from the most heterogeneous neo-Platonic sources.” Evans 1940, 1071, cites approvingly
[Mill] 1809, 191–192 [[Mill] 2001, 153–154], which reads: “Mr Taylor has scarcely done any
thing, or indeed professed to do any thing, but to fasten upon Plato the reveries of Proclus, and of
the other philosophers of the Alexandrian school.” Burnyeat 2001a, 106, tends to follow this line
of interpretation: “Mill’s account of Proclus and other NeoPlatonists is grossly unfair. But I admit
that I would not want to read Plato solely through their eyes. They miss so much that Cicero appre-
ciates. Like Taylor, they completely lack his (and Mill’s) esteem for the Socratic spirit of question-
ing. And they are much too solemn.”
24
Taylor 1804, xxxv [Taylor 1995, 24]. Taylor similarly praises Proclus, among others, see Taylor
1804, xxxii, xlii, xlix, lxvii, lxxxvii, xc [Taylor 1995, 22, 28, 33, 67, 61, 62]. Taylor 1804, xlii-xlix
[Taylor 1995, 28–33] cites Proclus’ interpretation of Plato’s “theological dogmas”. Finally, Taylor
reports Proclus’ commentary to several of Plato’s dialogues in that 1804 publication.
25
Taylor 1804, xxxii-xxxiv [Taylor 1995, 22–23].
26
Taylor 1804, xxxv [Taylor 1995, 24].
27
E.g. Augustine, De civitate dei X.23, 29. For this subject, see Glawe 1912, which discusses Plato
and the Trinity (and anti-Trinitarianism) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
regards Emperor Justinian’s closure of the Academy of Athens in 529 as a disastrous

event in the history of Platonism, which ruined Platonic theology.28 Consistent with
this view, Taylor only cites those Neoplatonists who were working prior to, or
escaping from, the reign of Justinian (527–565), e.g. Damascius and Simplicius (fl.
sixth century CE); or those who were openly critical of Christianity, e.g. Porphyry.
He does not praise Neoplatonists accommodating Platonism to Christianity — he
bypasses thinkers like Marius Victorinus (fl. fourth century CE), Augustine (354–
430), Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 335–394) and pseudo-Dionysius (fl. ca. 500).29 He
similarly rejects Renaissance interpretations of Plato advanced by Giovanni Pico
della Mirandola (1463–1494) and Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), as well as the inter-
pretation set forth by the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614–1687): “[I]n order
to combine Christianity with the doctrines of Plato”, Taylor explains, they “rejected
some of his most important tenets, and perverted others, and thus corrupted one of
these systems, and afforded no real benefit to the other.”30 Therefore Taylor speaks
of his own interpretation of Plato in rather evangelical terms; the path he seeks has
not been trodden since Justinian closed the Academy.31
5.3 Some Eighteenth-Century Critics of Neoplatonism:

Warburton and Brucker
To Taylor, this is all well and good, but it was not so to Taylor’s contemporaries or
near-contemporaries. The “labors” of those Neoplatonists, Taylor reports, “have
been ungratefully received.”32 Why? He wonders:
Was it because that mitered sophist, Warburton, thought fit to talk of the polluted streams of
the Alexandrian school, without knowing any thing of the source whence those streams are
derived? Or was it because some heavy German critic, who knew nothing beyond a verb in
μι, presumed to grunt at these venerable heroes [i.e. these select Neoplatonists]? Whatever
was its source, and whenever it originated, for I have not been able to discover either, this
however is certain, that it owes its being to the most profound Ignorance, or the most artful
Sophistry, and that its origin is no less contemptible than obscure.33
28
Taylor 1804, lxxix [Taylor 1995, 55].
29
Taylor thus accuses pseudo-Dionysius for having “stolen” and Christianised the original Platonic
concept of prayer developed by the Neoplatonists Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus and Hierocles;
see Taylor’s ‘Introduction to the Second Alcibiades’ in Plato 1804, IV: 574 [Plato 1995–1996, IV:
541].
30
Taylor 1804, xc [Taylor 1995, 63].
31
Taylor 1804, iv, lxxix [Taylor 1995, 2, 55].
32
Taylor 1804, lxxxviii [Taylor 1995, 61].
33
Taylor 1804, xci [Taylor 1995, 63]. For further discussion of these recent critics, see Taylor 1804,
lxxxix n. 1 [Taylor 1995, 81–82]. In his introduction to Plato’s Cratylus, Taylor similarly defends
Proclus as a respectable interpreter of Plato, and rejects, once again, those “modern theologists”
who claim that Proclus perverted Plato’s theology; see Taylor’s ‘Introduction’ to Plato’s Cratylus
in Plato 1804, V: 488 [Plato 1995–1996, V: 460].
5.3 Some Eighteenth-Century Critics of Neoplatonism: Warburton and Brucker 141
Who are these figures? To which writings does Taylor allude, if any? According to
Myles Burnyeat, the first is Bishop William Warburton (1698–1779), “a learned
divine who engaged in violent polemics on theological, philosophical and other
topics.”34 He was the author of numerous writings and sermons. In Taylor’s com-
mentary on Phaedrus 250c, discussing the nature of the ancient mysteries, he refers
to Warburton’s best-known work, the Divine Legation of Moses, Demonstrated on
the Principles of a Religious Deist (2 vols, 1737–1741).35 In that work, Warburton
had defended Christianity against various forms of modern atheism, allegedly to be
found in the writings of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), Benedict Spinoza (1632–
1677) and Pierre Bayle (1647–1706); he had been opposed to ancient polytheism
and its fusion of philosophy and theology; and he had blustered against “Platonic
fanaticism”, a typical invective used against Neoplatonists among eighteenth-
century German historians of philosophy. However, Warburton had said nothing in
his Divine Legation about Plotinus and Proclus, the founders of Neoplatonism, and
he had only said very little about other Neoplatonists such as Porphyry, Iamblichus,
and Hierocles. Although Warburton had a critical view of Platonism and
Neoplatonism, he had not addressed these philosophical traditions in a serious man-
ner in that work.36
Who, then, is the other person mentioned in the quotation above, the “heavy
German critic”, who possessed little knowledge about Greek, or who knew nothing
more than Greek grammar, and had no philosophical sophistication? Taylor does
not disclose such information in this 1804 publication.37 If we look at the auction
catalogue produced when his library was sold after his death in 1835, we only find
manuscripts and books written in the two classical languages and English.38 This
suggests that Taylor did not know German and is likely to have known this German
critic through Latin or English texts, if Taylor spoke from first hand knowledge at
all.39 Taylor admits that he did not know French, so we can also exclude German
critics translated into French.40 The majority of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
German critics of Neoplatonism had written in Latin, and some of these appeared in
the 1836 catalogue: Jonsius’ De scriptoribus historiae philosophicae (1659), and
34
Burnyeat’s note to [Mill] 2001, 156 n. 3.
35
Taylor’s note to the Phaedrus, in Plato 1804, III: 328 n. 2 [Plato 1995–1996, III: 414 n. 18].
36
For Porphyry, see, for instance, Warburton 1755–1758 I.1: 109; I.2: 216; II.1: 110, 111 n. c, 195.
For Iamblichus, see, for instance, I.1: 122 n.; I.2: 323; II.1: 195–196. For Hierocles, see, for
instance, I.2: 216 n. v, 228.
37
In this 1804 publication (i.e. The Works of Plato) Taylor does not refer explicitly to any of the
important eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German critics of Neoplatonism, e.g. Heumann,
Hansch, Mosheim, Budde, Brucker, Buhle, Büsching, Meiners, Tennemann, Tiedemann, Walch or
Zedler. For criticism of Platonism — Plotinus in particular — in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, see Matton 1992, 647–653, 700–704; Neschke 1992; and Chap. 2, 3 and 4 above.
38
Catalogue 1836.
39
Glucker 1987, 170, observes that it was common in early nineteenth-century English scholarship
to ignore German contributions; George Grote (1794–1871) was the first to take notice of their
work in a serious way.
40
Taylor 1804, cvii [Taylor 1995, 75].
the erudite Fabricius’ Bibliotheca Latina (1697) and Bibliotheca Graeca (1708–
1728).41 However, Jonsius’ work had little to say about Plotinus, and he hardly
qualified as the “heavy German critic” in question.42 Fabricius edited and published
Porphyry’s Vita Plotini and wrote entries on several Neoplatonists. Fabricius’ com-
ments on Neoplatonists reported the standard accusations — e.g. that Plotinus was
a quasi-Spinozist, due to his ontological monism, and adversion to Christianity —
but one can hardly accuse him of being incompetent in Greek, and it would be unfair
to characterise even Fabricius’ sceptical but sophisticated comments on Neoplatonists
as “grunts”.
The best known of the remaining German critics is Johann Jacob Brucker (1696–
1770), a historian and Lutheran minister who published his Historia critica philoso-
phiae in 1742–1767. This work was abbreviated and translated into English by
William Enfield (1741–1797) and published in London in 1791 — implying that it
was circulating in England during Taylor’s formative years. We do not find Brucker’s
Historia critica philosophiae or Enfield’s translation in the catalogue of Taylor’s
auctioned library, which may not come as a surprise, given Taylor’s reservations.
Still, Brucker is probably the “heavy German critic” in question. Brucker had been
strongly opposed to Platonic philosophy, especially Neoplatonic philosophy, and
his orthodox, emotional and linguistic flamboyance may well be rendered as
“grunts” by anyone happening to disagree with him. Brucker himself stated in 1767
that he sided with Warburton in central philosophical and theological matters.43 It
was no coincidence that Taylor linked the two. Moreover, Brucker’s expositions had
often suffered from his desire to reduce past philosophers’ ideas into preconceived
and anachronistic schemes, as Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) objected in
1804.44 The two reviews of Taylor’s 1804 publication support the assumption that
Brucker was Taylor’s target. To these reviews I now turn.
41
Jonsius’ work is mentioned in Catalogue 1836, 21 n. 569. Fabricius’ Bibliotheca Latina (2 vols,
1712) is listed in 7 nn. 138–140 (see also Taylor’s reference to this work of Fabricius, on 5 n. 75).
Fabricius’ Bibliotheca graeca (14 vols, Hamburg 1708) is listed on 11 n. 282 (see also Taylor’s
note reference to this work on 13 n. 314; 26 n. 696).
42
For Plotinus, see Jonsius 1659, 264–265, 281–282, 293.
43
Brucker 1742–1767, VI: 202.21–205.18, agrees with Warburton (relying on a Latin translation of
his Divine Legation of Moses) against emanative and pantheistic systems of philosophy, and sees
Warburton as siding with Mosheim.
44
Schleiermacher 1804, 7–9, objects to the systematization of Plato found in Brucker and his
followers.
5.4 James Mill. Taylor’s Anonymous Critic of 1804 and 1809, Emulating Brucker 143
5.4 James Mill. Taylor’s Anonymous Critic of 1804 and 1809,

Emulating Brucker
Taylor’s Works of Plato was reviewed in 1804 in The Literary Journal, and in
1809 in The Edinburgh Review. The two reviews commented upon the same three
issues in the same order: Taylor’s hermeneutic outlook, his philological work sup-
porting his English translation, and his translation itself. The first issue occupied
most of the space and was an onslaught on Taylor as an interpreter of Plato. The
reviewer accused Taylor’s hermeneutic approach to Plato of being indebted to
Neoplatonism, and Proclus in particular.45 Taylor was guilty by association. In this
attack, the reviewer repeated several assumptions from eighteenth-century histories
of philosophy. The second issue was dealt with briefly, given Taylor’s lack of inter-
est. The third issue was drawn out over several pages, making it painfully clear that
Taylor was largely a self-taught classical scholar, who never attained the proficiency
that a university education in classics might have brought him.46
The 1804 review was signed by ‘M’, the 1809 review was completely anony-
mous, but has traditionally been attributed to James Mill (1773–1836). Today Mill
is chiefly known for his systematization of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, and as
the father of the philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), who formulated empiri-
cist and liberal traditions with considerable influence in the nineteenth century.
Recently, John Glucker and Myles Burnyeat have argued convincingly that James
Mill was the author of both reviews. They point out that James Mill was the found-
ing figure of The Literary Journal, in which the 1804 review appeared; “M” stands
for the founder and editor of the journal, [James] M[ill]. The crucial difference
between the two reviews is, according to Glucker, that the above-mentioned Brucker
is cited extensively in the 1809 review, whereas he is not cited in the 1804 review.47
This identification can be supported by internal evidence. Both reviews followed
the same composition, as mentioned above, and they both turned Cicero’s interpre-
tation of Plato as a sceptic against Taylor’s reading, as I shall explain in a moment.48
In the following, I refer to James Mill as the author of these two reviews. The impor-
tant point, however, is the fact that the reviewer’s opinions were put into circulation
and had a damaging effect upon Taylor’s reputation as an interpreter of Plato, and
that Brucker’s views were explicitly praised as authoritative.
The 1809 review cites Taylor’s words about Warburton and about the “grunt” of
some “heavy German critic” (cited above). It identifies Jacob Brucker as the latter.49
45
See [Mill], 1809, 191–192 [[Mill] 2001, 153–154].
46
Raine 1969, 19–20.
47
It is stated in the bibliography to Raine 1969, 535, that the 1809 review “is usually attributed to
James Mill”. Glucker 1996, 395–397, argues that James Mill is the author of both reviews.
Burnyeat (2001b, 65 n. 41; 2001a) reaches the same conclusion.
48
For identical references to Cicero’s Academica and its sceptical interpretation of Plato; see [Mill]
1804/2001, 115–116 (referring to the Academica I.15–16, I.46), and [Mill] 1809, 192 [[Mill] 2001,
154].
49
[Mill] 1809, 193–194 [[Mill] 2001, 156].
Whereas Taylor had regarded Brucker’s denigration of the Neoplatonist interpreta-

tion of Plato as an effect of his ignorance and sophistry, the reviewer values Brucker
highly as a historian of philosophy and turns with irony against Taylor’s rejection of
Brucker. Mill praises Brucker for his critical faculty — something which Taylor
lacks, according to Mill — and introduces Brucker in the following manner:
There is one of these German critics, who, though not endowed with the spirit of philosophy
to that eminent degree which, for his arduous and important task, was to have been wished,
has yet, by his industry, by his erudition, and the general soundness of his judgement, per-
formed a service of the highest value to philosophy, — we mean Brucker, the author of the
celebrated and most useful Historia critica philosophiae; some of whose swinish notes
respecting these Alexandrian worthies, it may not be improper for Mr Taylor to hear.50
In Brucker’s terminology, the “Alexandrian worthies” was a pejorative reference to

ancient Neoplatonists. Mill cites three “grunts”, in the form of citations from
Brucker’s Latin opus, criticising — or, to put it more plainly, unfairly vilifying —
the interpretation of Plato advanced by Proclus and other Neoplatonists.51 In addi-
tion to these “grunts”, Mill cites a series of “squeaks”, in the form of citations from
Brucker’s work, all targeting the morality of the Neoplatonists favoured by Taylor:
Plotinus, Porphyry, Apollonius, Proclus, and Hierocles.52 Together, these “grunts”
and “squeaks” make up a substantial part of Mill’s criticism of Taylor’s interpreta-
tion of Plato. Brucker’s outlook was thus at the core of the Taylor-Mill controversy
1804–1809.
Brucker had considered Neoplatonic interpretations of Plato unreliable and cor-
rupt. Neoplatonists were infected by Egyptian culture and religion, whose polythe-
ism and pluralistic religiosity had turned Alexandrian philosophers into timid minds
inclined towards religious syncretism, since they were too fearful to abandon inher-
ited religious traditions. This mindset shaped their philosophy — they were con-
stantly in want of the most incoherent synthesis of philosophical systems, and they
never exercised the intellectual courage required to abandon inherited philosophical
traditions. Moreover they suffered from the illusion that furor — the alleged aim of
Platonic philosophising — could bring about the blessed life of their souls. This was
contrary to Christian doctrine and therefore wrong. Finally, they suffered from a
medical condition in which an excess of melancholic humours generated mental
images in their disturbed brains, which they, unfortunately, mistook for real con-
cepts and divinities.53 Instead of relying on Neoplatonic interpreters of Plato,
Brucker had turned to Cicero (Academica I.5ff.), Apuleius (De Platone et eius dog-
mate) and Alcinous (Didaskalikos) for guidance, since they had not been infected
with the Neoplatonic disease.54 To what extent Brucker actually followed the
50
[Mill] 1809, 194 [[Mill] 2001, 156–157].
51
[Mill] 1809, 194–195 [[Mill] 2001, 157–158].
52
[Mill] 1809), 195–198 [[Mill] 2001, 158–163].
53
Brucker separated Middle Platonism from what we have come to call ‘Neoplatonism’. Brucker
himself labelled the Neoplatonic movement ‘secta eclectica’, the ‘eclectic sect’. For his account of
Neoplatonism, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 189–462, and Chap. 3 above.
54
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 669.13–23.
5.4 James Mill. Taylor’s Anonymous Critic of 1804 and 1809, Emulating Brucker 145
g uidance of these Middle Platonists in his own reconstruction of Plato is quite

another question, with which I shall not deal here.
In his 1804 and 1809 reviews, Mill returned to Cicero for much the same reason
as Brucker, in order to avoid the infected, Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato, and
he even returned to the same work of Cicero, the Academica. Hence, it is unlikely
that Mill was “on his own”, as has been suggested recently.55 Admittedly, Brucker
and Mill used Cicero in different ways — Brucker used Cicero’s account, together
with those of Apuleius and Alcinous, to present Plato as a system builder, whereas
Mill used Cicero to present Plato as an undogmatic sceptic.56 Taylor did not see
Plato through the eyes of the sceptic Cicero, as Mill made abundantly clear in his
two reviews. Taylor, however, did not turn his back on Cicero as a competent reader
of Plato, but he primarily acknowledged him as an orator with a keen sense of sty-
listic devices in Plato’s texts.57
Before examining Mill’s quotations from Brucker — the “grunts” and
“squeaks” — let me cite Mill’s own words about the Neoplatonists informing
Taylor’s interpretation of Plato:
Those men were in fact the charlatans of antient [i.e. ancient] philosophy; and we have
nothing in modern times to compare either with the phrenzy of their writings, or the infamy
of their lives. A gross mixture of the allegorical genius of Oriental theology, with the quib-
bling genius of the worst kind of Grecian metaphysics, and an audacious spirit of mystical,
irrational and unintelligible fancy-hunting, respecting the invisible powers of nature, and
the economy of the universe, constitutes the essence or the animating principle of that
absurd and disgusting jargon which they exhibit to us under the profaned name of philoso-
phy. Add to this, that they were, almost without exception, impostors and mountebanks,
THAUMATURGI par metier, that is, lying professors of miracle-working, of conversing
with the gods, of revelations from heaven, and other cheats by which they could purloin the
admiration of an ignorant and abused [1809: absurd] multitude.” (Reviewer’s italics and
upper case letters.)58
These hateful words convey a political accusation against Neoplatonists. They

claimed the existence of non-existent metaphysical entities about which they did
not, and could not, have any real knowledge. Hence, they had to postulate such non-
existent entities and a cognitive content about such realities (their “fancy-hunting”);
and they had to make others believe in these entities by means of “that absurd and
55
Compare with Burnyeat 2001a, 105: “Because he [James Mill] was on his own, he had the luck
to fall in love with a Plato unencumbered by the NeoPlatonic interpretation which had prevailed
since Ficino and the Renaissance. He read Plato and he read Cicero, and found the second an
attractive guide to the first. Later he read Taylor, a mere epigonous of Ficino.” Brucker is ignored
as a possible source of inspiration. Burnyeat’s further suggestion, that Taylor simply succumbed to
Ficino’s influence, fits badly with Taylor’s own rejection of Ficino’s Platonism (Taylor 1804, xc
[Taylor 1995, 63]), and it is at loggerheads with the fact that Ficino’s interpretation of Plato had not
been dominant since the first half of the eighteenth century, as explained in Tigerstedt 1974 and
1977. For further discussion of the differences between the respective forms of Platonism upheld
by Ficino and Taylor, see Catana 2011.
56
For Brucker’s reconstruction, see Catana 2008, 73–94.
57
Taylor 1804, lxxxv, ci [Taylor 1995, 59, 70].
58
[Mill] 1809, 193 [[Mill] 2001, 155].
disgusting jargon”. Given that their ontological and cognitive categories were noth-
ing but hypostatizations — or worse, fraud and mendacity — the outcome of the
Neoplatonists’ performances was poor: They were “lying professors of miracle-
working”, that is, “charlatans”.
Most importantly, the Neoplatonists carried out these “cheats” in order to manip-
ulate the “ignorant and absurd multitude”.59 The philosophical term ‘multitude’ had
already a long history around 1800, typically denoting the ignorant and physically
violent masses. In seventeenth-century political philosophy, however, it had become
opposed to another term, the ‘people’. Thomas Hobbes’ De cive of 1642 played a
key role in this development. In his terminology, the term multitudo was used for
groups of men (homines) living in a state of nature in pre-civilised societies. He
opposed ‘multitude’ (multitudo) to ‘people’ (populus), living in more civilised soci-
eties where men are regarded as political subjects and organised under politically
legitimate leadership (VII.5).60 Given this pre-history, Mill’s use of the term ‘multi-
tude’ brings out an accusation: the ancient Neoplatonists belonged to a less devel-
oped political culture, in which charlatans could manipulate the ignorant masses
with their lies and tricks. The Neoplatonists, pseudo-philosophers and charlatans as
they were, took advantage of this.
The philosophical reservations articulated in Mill’s “grunts” and “squeaks” go
deeper, however, since they also concern Neoplatonic ideas of philosophy, theology
and ethical virtue, as well as historiographical categorisations of Neoplatonism. In
the remaining part of his 1809 review, Mill elaborates these reservations, mainly
through numerous citations from Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae, discredit-
ing some Neoplatonic philosophers, Proclus in particular. In order to explain this
element in Mill’s review of Taylor, we have to understand Brucker’s denigration of
the ancient biographical model, which underpins his scornful words about Marinus’
biography of Proclus.
5.5 Brucker’s Rejection of the Biographical Model
Diogenes’s Lives had been rediscovered in the fifteenth century and it served as a
model for the biographical genre up till Brucker.61 Brucker acknowledged Laertius’
work as an important source for parts of ancient philosophy that had otherwise been
lost (Epicurus, for instance), but he rejected it as a model for accounts of past
59
Here I follow the 1809 edition ([Mill] 1809, 193), which reads “absurd multitude”, not “abused
multitude”, as transcribed by Burnyeat in [Mill] 2001, 193. [Mill] 1809, 195 [[Mill] 2001, 159],
also refers to the “admiration of a deluded multitude”. For Neoplatonists and their respective rela-
tions to society, see Smith 2005.
60
Hobbes 1983, 152–153.
61
For the writing of philosophy’s past up till Brucker, see Blackwell and Weller 1993; Piaia and
Santinello 2011. For the origin of the biographical genre in late ancient philosophy, see Edwards
and Swain 1997; Edwards 2000. We are less well informed about the eighteenth-century crisis and
marginalization of the biographical genre.
5.5 Brucker’s Rejection of the Biographical Model 147
p hilosophers, partly because it did not exhibit the systems of past philosophers, and
partly because Laertius and other biographers did not employ their critical power of
judgement in these accounts.62 Brucker, in his history of philosophy, did not discard
biographical and historical information about the past philosopher completely, but
he subordinated it to an even more important account of the past philosopher’s sys-
tem of philosophy; biographical circumstances were reported as far as they had
influenced the philosopher’s system. Nevertheless, the persona of the philosopher
ceased to be of prime importance to Brucker.63 Similarly, the subtle and often
oblique rhetorical strategies employed in ancient biographies, were abandoned in
Brucker’s accounts.
In Brucker’s programmatic statements, the philosopher’s personality is valuable
only as far as it is intellectually emancipated from traditions and their inherited
prejudices, enabling the philosopher to choose freely and independently the princi-
ples of his system; the noetic and metaphysical constitution of the philosopher’s
soul, on the other hand, did not qualify his system, which stood on its own as a
propositional complex of doctrines.64 In practice, however, Brucker was not shy of
citing whatever biographical source he could find, if it could be used to discredit a
past thinker whom he happened to dislike. One example is his uncritical and unfair
citations of biographical statements about Neoplatonists.
Brucker’s compatriot, the Lutheran theologian Christoph August Heumann
(1681–1764), had dethroned the biographical genre as an adequate model for narra-
tives of past philosophers already in 1715, using Porphyry’s Vita Plotini as an exam-
ple of the weaknesses in this model. Here Heumann had turned ancient Neoplatonists’
fondness of biographies of Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophers into a matter of
reproach: the admiration with which these biographies were read by subsequent
Neoplatonists proves that they were not independent and autonomous minds, as
genuine philosophers should be, but adhered to ancient authorities. In fact, Heumann
reasons, in these ancient biographies, Neoplatonists were presented as pagan saints,
as if they were equal to Christ in spiritual stature. In order to achieve this impressive
depiction, biographers had dressed up and portrayed Neoplatonic philosophers with
lies, frauds and mendacities, as Heumann seeks to demonstrate through a critical
62
For this evaluation of Laertius, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 32.21–33.
63
Perhaps one should not write off the interest in the philosopher’s persona among eighteenth-
century philosophers. It may be more to the point to interpret Brucker’s move as a desire to replace
the prestigious persona of the Renaissance philosopher — the contemplative Platonist who some-
times found himself in conflict with Christian orthodoxy and university institutions (e.g. Pico and
Bruno) — with a new persona conforming to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century harmonisation
in Northern Europe of Protestant church and national state (including its universities). For this
harmonisation and its implications for the philosopher’s persona, see Condren, Gaukroger and
Hunter 2006. For a theoretical clarification of the concept of persona as a hermeneutic tool in the
history of early modern philosophy, see Hunter 2007.
64
Hadot 1995, 107–108, suggests that medieval scholasticism distinguished philosophy’s spiritual
content from its theoretical content; the former was transformed into theology, the latter into phi-
losophy. My analysis opens up another perspective: Brucker’s introduction of the historiographical
concept system of philosophy implies that post-Bruckerian historians of philosophy have been
inadequately equipped to identify this “spiritual” dimension in past philosophy.
examination of Porphyry’s Vita Plotini.65 Brucker fully subscribed to Heumann’s

severe verdict in the case of Porphyry’s Vita Plotini and other Neoplatonic biogra-
phies, and he, also following Heumann, regarded this biographical genre as a failed
model in need of replacement. His Historia critica philosophiae was intended to
supplant the biographical model for the history of philosophy.
Taylor sticks to the pre-Bruckerian idea, strong in Neoplatonism, that the noetic
and metaphysical constitution of the agent’s soul, manifested in his or her lower and
especially higher virtues, is essential not only to the quality of his or her philoso-
phising, but also to the very aim of philosophising; to reascend to “the divine like-
ness” through a purification of the virtues. Marinus’ biography of Proclus is an
example of this tradition in Neoplatonism. Contrary to Brucker and those who
agreed with him, Taylor is, as we have seen, positively inclined towards Porphyry’s
and Marinus’ biographies, and his position clearly stands out compared with
Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae and other prominent histories of philosophy
at the forefront in the last decades of the eighteenth century.
Mill, on the other hand, follows Brucker’s criticism, and he turns the Bruckerian
accusation against Taylor; he, too, lacked originality and critical power of judg-
ment.66 Mill, in his 1809 review, is caught up between the old and the new paradigm
as regards biographical information. On the one hand, he follows Brucker and his
relatively novel historiography, focusing on the systems of the Neoplatonists. On
the other hand, he also clings to the old biographical model by his extensive use of
ad hominem arguments (the “squeaks”) intended to discredit the modes of philoso-
phising of the Neoplatonists. Proclus, regarded by Taylor as “the consummation of
philosophic excellence”, is targeted by Mill in this manner. Seen from a logical
viewpoint, Mill’s ad hominem arguments are fallacies, because they suggest invalid
inferences from the personality of the thinker to the validity of that thinker’s ideas
and arguments. Nevertheless, these ad hominem arguments perform well as rhetori-
cally effective devices, demolishing the credibility of the philosophies produced by
Proclus.67
5.6 Christian Revelation and its Significance to Brucker’s

Historiography
As explained in the Introduction and Sect. 5.2 in this chapter, Taylor maintained a
Neoplatonic virtue theory and used it forcefully in his interpretation of Plato’s phi-
losophy. Mill, on the other hand, scorned Neoplatonic doctrines on ethical virtue in
65
Heumann 1715b, 144–146, 148. We find the same characterisation of Neoplatonic biographies in
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 319.3–13, 328.6–14 (Marinus’ biography on Proclus), 378.23–379.40
(Neoplatonist biographies and histories in general).
66
[Mill] 1809, 191–192 [[Mill] 2001, 153–154].
67
For these “squeaks” targeting the personalities of some Neoplatonists, see [Mill] 1809, 195–197
[[Mill] 2001, 159–163].
5.6 Christian Revelation and its Significance to Brucker’s Historiography 149
his 1809 review.68 To be more precise, Mill attacked one key concept in Neoplatonic
ethics, namely that of noetic ascent through furor, or enthusiasm, which is concep-
tually connected to Neoplatonic virtue theory, and which is an essential component
in Neoplatonist biographies, as exemplified in Marinus’ biography of Proclus.69
What was the ultimate background of Brucker and other eighteenth-century German
historians of philosophy?70 Three things, I shall argue: Protestant theology and its
emphasis on Christian revelation in moral matters (Sect. 5.6); the overt anti-Platonic
ethics among the same eighteenth-century thinkers (Sect. 5.7); and the medical
criticism of furor, also current among Protestant thinkers (also Sect. 5.7).
Let me examine the theological background first. It is a huge and complex field,
and I shall restrict my analysis to its ramifications in eighteenth-century histories of
philosophy. German Protestant thinkers from the eighteenth century reacted with
great force — rhetorically and scholarly — against earlier and contemporary think-
ers whom they perceived as threats to their confessional position. The establishment
of the history of philosophy, undertaken by some of these German thinkers, was
partly motivated by the desire to set the record straight: that is, to re-organise his-
torical self-awareness in the field of philosophy according to the outlook determined
by their confessional stance, Protestantism, and to expurgate Christianity more
broadly from various “errors” (Protestantism being the corrective), especially those
originating from Neoplatonic authors and absorbed into the Christian tradition
through the Church Fathers.
The purpose of Brucker’s history of philosophy was thus apologetic and is best
seen as an extension of Protestant church history, inspired by Johann Lorenz
Mosheim (1693–1755).71 The history of philosophy, thus conceived, was not only a
record of philosophy’s past with intrinsic value, it was also a useful and expedient
tool when confronting contemporary philosophers referring back to “erroneous”
philosophical doctrines. One conspicuous example of such a triumphant error was
68
[Mill] 1809, 194 [[Mill] 2001, 157], cites Brucker’s disparaging account of Proclus’ personality
and virtues. Mill does not discuss Neoplatonic virtue theory per se.
69
For Mill’s denigrating words about Platonic furor and enthusiamus, see for instance [Mill] 1809,
196–197 [[Mill] 2001, 161–162], citing Brucker 1742–1767, II: 231.5–14 (Oriental theology
introduced into Neoplaotonism superstition and enthusiasm).
70
Unfortunately, eighteenth-century German Protestant polemics against Platonic and Neoplatonic
virtue ethics has not yet been studied thoroughly in discussions of eighteenth-century Platonism;
see Knox 1957, Tigerstedt 1974 and 1977, Neschke 1992, Israel 2001, Franz 2003, Israel 2006,
Varani 2008, Vassányi 2011 and Hanegraaff 2012. As Glucker 1996, 395 n. 27, observes,
Tigerstedt’s two books are “too brief ... The proper and extensive history of the modern study of
Plato is yet to be written.” Matton 1992, Heyd 1995 and Varani 2008 have carried out important
work in this direction, although much still needs to be done, in particular when it comes to the
metaphysical, psychological and ethical aspects of Platonic and Neoplatonic virtue ethics in sev-
enteenth- and eighteenth-century Protestant thought.
71
For the apologetic nature of the history of philosophy proposed by Heumann and Brucker, see
Catana 2008, 147–191; Catana 2013b, 623–624. For Brucker’s apologetic agenda, see Brucker
1742–1767, I: 21.10–23.25, especially 21.17–32, where it is said that the history of philosophy
leads not only to the recognition of truths and felicity, but also to the expulsion of errors dangerous
to Christianity, e.g. those of Platonists.
to be found in Platonic philosophy, where the idea of amor and furor had led the
platonici to believe, quite falsely, that the human soul could re-ascend to the divin-
ity, due to the divine nature of the human soul, and due to the universal procession
and return of which the human soul is an integral part. This erroneous Platonic
doctrine had been integrated into Christianity via the Fathers and it lived on through
more recent Platonists, Brucker explains; he may be referring to Renaissance
Neoplatonists like Ficino and Pico, but he may also be referring to the Lutheran
Ehregott Daniel Colberg (1659–1698) and his Platonisch-Hermetisches
Christenthum of 1690–1691, where Platonic philosophy, especially Neoplatonic
philosophy, was seen as a virus which had entered Christianity its early phase and
which still influenced contemporary, non-confessional religious movements in
Germany, posing a threat to orthodox Lutheranism72; or Brucker may refer to the
Lutheran Friedrich Christian Bücher (1651–1714) and his Plato mysticus in pietista
redivivus (1699), which accused contemporary Pietism of using ancient Platonists,
including Plotinus and Porphyry, in its theological foundation. It is an explicitly
stated aim of the Bruckerian history of philosophy to expurgate this error from the
Christian church.73
In this context it is worth recalling Brucker’s orthodox Lutheran distinction
between philosophy and revelation, presented in the ‘Dissertatio praeliminaris’ to
his Historia critica philosophiae, and used in his subsequent categorisations and
evaluations of the philosophers treated in that work. Brucker explains:
In fact, there is a double source to the understanding of the truth, which leads to the posses-
sion of the real good, and hence to the possession of felicity. One [source] consists in the
rules of the inborn light or human reason, the other [source] consists in divine revelation.
For since the human intellect is circumscribed by narrow limitations to such a degree that it
is unable to measure the vast areas of the complete truth, and even less to comprehend all
that is required for the sake of human happiness, it was necessary that divine revelation was
brought to the aid of man, and that it taught him about the matters which are befitting for
the enhancement of his happiness.74
72
I have not had access to the 1690–1691 first edition. Instead I rely on the 1710 edition of that
work. In Colberg 1710, 4–16, it is claimed that Plotinus’ metaphysics and psychology were instru-
mental to Platonic philosophy and its notion of noetic ascent by means of higher ethical virtues. On
103–107, this Plotinian metaphysics is regarded as central to the Platonic philosophy that has
contaminated contemporary non-confessional religious movements. For Colberg’s attack on
Platonism, see Varani 2008, 192–205.
73
For the dangerous error of Platonic philosophy, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 22.20–23.25. For
Ficino and Pico as deplorable examples of such a revival, see IV: 59.38–60.4.
74
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 7.27–34: “Duplex vero veritatis ad veri boni possessionem, et exoriun-
dam inde felicitatem ducentis cognitionis fons est, unus congenitae lucis sive rationis humanae
regulae, alter divina revelatio. Cum enim adeo angustis limitibus humanus intellectus circumscrip-
tus sit, ut patentissimos veritatis universae campos emetiri, immo nec ea. omnia cognoscere valeat,
quae tamen felicitatis humanae ratio cognosci et sciri postulat, necesse erat, ut divina revelatio
suppetias homini ferret, et de iis eum instrueret, quae felicitatem eius summo loco ponere apta
sunt.” For the doctrine on double truth in Lutheran theology, see Bianchi, 2008, 25–32.
5.6 Christian Revelation and its Significance to Brucker’s Historiography 151
By ‘revelation’ Brucker refers to the Protestant Bible, given his adherence to the
Lutheran Augsburg confession and his role as a Lutheran minister.75 Revelation thus
conveys truths about “vast areas of the complete truth”, that is, we may assume,
theoretical knowledge about the universe. First of all, however, the Bible conveys
truths about moral issues essential for human happiness — truths which cannot be
obtained by human reason alone. We may assume that Brucker alludes to Christian
doctrines on original sin resulting from the fall of man, the afterlife of man’s soul,
the Eucharist, the Trinity, and so on.76 These truths are disclosed, or at least hinted
at, through the Bible, not through sense and reason, and these revealed truths are
elucidated by Christian theology, not by philosophy, which is confined to the narrow
borders of human sense and reason.
Brucker employs the Bible and Christian doctrines as a corrective in his judge-
ments about the normative conformity of past systems of philosophy — one of the
two issues to be assessed in his “critical history of philosophy”; the other issue
being the logical, internal coherence of the doctrines within the system itself.77
Having accounted for the circumstances of a past philosopher and the coherence of
his system, Brucker typically ends his narrative by an assessment of such normative
character. In particular, he asks whether the past philosopher was an atheist or vio-
lated Christian transcendentalism by some sort of Spinozistic monism. For instance,
he asks whether the concept of the divinity in Plato’s Timaeus was in conflict with
the Christian notion of the divinity.78 Another example is Brucker’s condemnation
of Aristotle as an atheist. Aristotle’s doctrine of the eternity of the universe was in
conflict with the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo; his notion of the first mover
as eternally absorbed in self-contemplation and indifferent to his creation violated
the Christian doctrine of divine providence. These and other “errors” (errores) in
Aristotle’s philosophy are judged by Brucker on the basis of their conformity with
Protestant doctrine.79 Likewise, Porphyry is condemned in the most colourful
phrases as the enemy of Christianity, because of his criticism of Christ’s divinity, as
reported by Augustine.80 Arabic philosophers are condemned too, again on confes-
sional grounds; they accepted Muhammad as a prophet.81 Neoplatonists are rou-
tinely condemned as “superstitious” syncretists, produced by the syncretistic
75
For Brucker’s confessional identity, see also François 1998, especially 107.
76
See, for instance, Brucker 1742–1767, I: 26.26–30, where Brucker speaks of the mystery of
salvation (mysterium salutis), referring to the redemption of the Christian’s soul.
77
For the assessment of the system’s internal coherence, see Brucker 1742–1767, I: 15.10–18.
78
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 682.5–29, Brucker discusses whether Plato was guilty of Spinozism by
claiming in the Timaeus that the universe is a fusion of the divinity and matter.
79
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 832.14–835.6. Compare with Israel 2006, 409–512, especially 479; Israel
contends that Brucker was undogmatic and a keen defender of freedom of thought from theologi-
cal and political authority.
80
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 257 n. d, referring to Augustine, De civitate dei XIX.23. For Porphyry as
an “enemy” (hostis) of Christianity, see Brucker 1742–1767, II: 251.14–257.17. For the general
opposition between Neoplatonism and Christianity, see, for instance, II: 372.12–376.13.
81
For Brucker on Arabic philosophy, see Flasch 1998, 187–197.
religious culture of Alexandria.82 Similarly, the Neoplatonic theory of virtue is non-

Christian and cannot in any way lead to the true vita beata; the very idea of a divine
human soul able to communicate directly with the divinity through a hierarchy of
being – thus bypassing the priesthood, church and Bible – is regarded non-Christian
and rejected.83 All this is in line with the premise of Brucker’s history of philosophy,84
but it is one that has often been ignored when subsequent authors have cited
Brucker’s individual accounts, Mill’s 1809 review included.
Brucker’s practice seems to fit badly with his own recommendations to the histo-
rian of philosophy, to pass his judgements on past systems without prejudices.85 To
Brucker, however, there is no contradiction involved here, since the assumption
about the Bible’s divine origin and infallibility is not categorised as a prejudice, but
as a truth transcending human reason, which must therefore be accepted by faith.
Heumann, an important source for Brucker’s conception of the history of philoso-
phy, shared this view: According to Heumann, philosophy should be guided by
Christian revelation, and a philosophy only based on human authority (“bloß men-
schliche Auctorität”), is false, as in the case of the Epicureans.86 In the thought of
Heumann and Brucker, reason is not divorced from religion — on the contrary, the
express intention, to unite the two. Their harmonisation conflicts with the interpreta-
tion of the Enlightenment as a period in which these two were kept apart.87
Given these assumptions in Brucker’s thought, it hardly comes as a surprise that
he is openly hostile towards Platonism, especially late ancient Platonists, who had
the chance to follow Christ, but chose not to do so, and who, in some cases, even
rejected Christianity as a form of re-mythicising that belittles man’s noetic faculties.
It becomes more understandable that anyone sensitive to the tenor of Brucker’s writ-
ings — like Mill in 1809 — comes to regard non-Christian, Hellenic philosophers
like the Neoplatonists as “charlatans of ancient philosophy”, who succumb to
82
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 191.1–23 (characteristic of Alexandrian Neoplatonism, the secta eclec-
tica, to fuse popular religious superstition with philosophical eclecticism), 318.1–7 (Proclus’
“insania superstitio”), 321.13–17 (superstition in Alexandria). For the alleged superstition among
Alexandrian Neoplatonists, see for instance II: 325.8–20, 330.15–18, 358.18–33, 370.23–371.30.
Brucker also finds it in the so-called theology of Iamblichus; see II: 431.20–435.20. On I: 22.20–
23, Brucker claims that superstition is inherent in Platonism as such. For a modern discussion of
Iamblichus’ theology, see Bussanich, 2002.
83
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 318.16–319.33. See also Brucker’s general account of the virtues in the
Neoplatonic system, which are similarly rejected as non-Christian; II: 459.29–462.22.
84
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 7.27–34.
85
For the ideal historian of philosophy judging past systems without prejudices, see Brucker 1742–
1767, I: 12.18–13.3. Genuine philosophers, i.e. eclectics, reflect without prejudices; see V:
3.22–4.11.
86
Heumann 1715–1716, 183.11–13. Heumann condemns Epicureans and similar thinkers on the
same grounds; 235.20–236.16. For Brucker on the authority of revelation, see Brucker 1742–1767,
I: 7.27–34.
87
Compare with Israel 2001, 327, 474, 547, 645, and Israel 2006, 409–512, especially 477–479.
For some links between university culture and the search for confessional identity in seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century Germany, see Hsia 1989.
5.7 Brucker and the Eighteenth-Century Campaign against Platonic Virtue Ethics 153
“superstition”.88 Mill’s first “grunt”, cited from Brucker’s Historia critica philoso-
phiae, brings out this hostility eloquently. Here Brucker is cited for his attack on
Proclus, whose Platonic theology is characterised, without qualification, as “old-
womanish superstition” and “inane religiosity”.89 Likewise, in one of Mill’s
“squeaks” from Brucker’s opus, Plotinus’ philosophy is branded as one “entirely
composed of superstition, enthusiasms, tricks and countless arts of deceiving
people”.90 Mill’s own words, cited above, emulate this disdain of religion among
Hellenic philosophers. Though Mill does not articulate this explicitly, he perpetu-
ates Brucker’s implicit distinction between revelation and philosophy, when he cites
Brucker’s claims about Neoplatonists being superstitious.
If we read in this implicit claim, Taylor’s error is not reducible to the rather
superficial circumstance that he refers to Hellenic gods, mentioned by Neoplatonists,
and that Brucker did not accept these gods because they were not mentioned in the
Bible. Taylor’s real error was one that he shared with ancient Neoplatonists, namely
his affirmation of a Platonic theology in the guise of Proclus. Hereby Taylor tacitly
elided the Lutheran distinction between revelation and philosophy, which had been
affirmed in Brucker’s determination of the two sources of truth. This distinction had
been deployed forcefully in Brucker’s assessment of the religious correctness of
past philosophers’ theologies, and it had been instrumental to the way in which his-
tory of philosophy was written and taught in the nineteenth century.91
When Mill in his 1809 review repeats Brucker’s accusation that ancient
Neoplatonists (and Proclus in particular) were “superstitious”, he implicitly sub-
scribes to this distinction, though he may not have liked the distinction itself if he
had thought carefully about it. Similarly, if we accept Christian revelation (in what-
ever version of the text) as a criterion of truth, and if we accept Brucker’s Lutheran
view of the relationship between revelation and philosophy, it follows that Proclus’
Platonic theology, affirmed by Taylor, must be condemned as “superstitious”, as
done by Brucker, and later on by Mill. But should we accept this criterion in Mill’s
criticism of Taylor? And should we accept it as a valid criterion in writing the his-
tory of philosophy?
5.7 Brucker and the Eighteenth-Century Campaign

against Platonic Virtue Ethics
The German reaction against Platonic virtue theory targeted the theories of Plotinus,
Porphyry and Macrobius, and their Renaissance revival in Ficino’s commentary on
Plotinus’ Enneads. As explained above, Brucker’s express intention with his history
88
For Mill on the superstition of the Neoplatonists, see for instance [Mill] 1809, 196–197 [[Mill]
2001, 161–162], citing Brucker 1742–1767, II: 231.5–14.
89
[Mill] 1809, 194 [[Mill] 2001, 157], citing Brucker 1742–1767, II: 333.12–23.
90
[Mill] 1809, 196 [[Mill] 2001, 161], citing Brucker 1742–1767, II: 231.5–14.
91
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 7.27–34.
of philosophy was to expurgate Christianity from the errors caused by Platonic phi-
losophy and its notion of amor.92 Given this intention, Neoplatonic virtue ethics was
a very important target. It should be observed, however, that this strain of ancient
virtue ethics also spread outside Neoplatonism through the accounts of Porphyry
and Macrobius — for instance, to medieval scholastic philosophers like Bonaventura
(1217–1274) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274).93 Brucker and his supporters may
well have been aware of the influence of Neoplatonic virtue ethics among late medi-
eval thinkers — “Catholics” as they were from a confessional viewpoint — and this
knowledge may have fuelled their criticism of this version of ancient virtue ethics.
However, the German theological reaction against Platonic ethics was decisively
provoked by the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614–1687) and his Enchiridion
ethicum (London, 1666), where the notion of the soul’s “boniform faculty” re-
introduced the Platonic idea of the human soul’s divinity and noetic ascent towards
the good.94
A few words about More, before I proceed to his German critics. More defines
virtue as a “power of the soul” (vis animae) able to ignore sense impressions and
bodily impulses and to seek the good for itself. Contrary to Aristotle (Nicomachean
Ethics II.1), More holds that virtue is not a habit (Lat. habitus), partly because ‘vir-
tue’ means ‘power’, partly because virtue as a power of the soul can exist in a
human being independently of habits. More calls virtue, understood in this manner,
“right reason”.95 According to him, man possesses innate ideas about good and evil,
on the basis of which he makes judgements.96 Man has innate knowledge of the
good by means of the “boniform faculty of the soul”, which is intuitive and not the
result of logical deduction from principles.97 This boniform faculty prepares for his
Platonism in the field of ethics. He thus refers to Plotinus’ ethical and ontological
determination of the contemplative man approaching the good.98 He also picks up
on aspects of Aristotle’s ethics concordant with this Platonic view, namely Aristotle’s
notion of the intellectual virtues and their contribution to man’s well-being, as pre-
sented in the Nicomachean Ethics X.7.99
More integrates into all this Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines on the purifica-
tion of the human soul, though without clinging slavishly to the subtle scheme of
lower and higher virtues developed by Plotinus and Porphyry.100 Moreover, More
holds that the divinity’s illumination is a prerequisite for the soul’s ascent, though it
is unclear whether he conceives of this illumination as natural or actively caused by
92
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 22.20–23.25.
93
Hochschild 2002.
94
For More’s use of Plotinus and Ficino, see Hutton 2007.
95
More 1690, 11.
96
More 1690, 81–82.
97
More 1690, 16.
98
More 1690, 8–9, 29–30, 192.
99
More 1690, 14.
100
More 1690, 220–221.
5.7 Brucker and the Eighteenth-Century Campaign against Platonic Virtue Ethics 155
the divinity.101 These and other modifications of Platonic and Neoplatonic ideas,
laying the foundation for a synthesis of Platonism and Christianity, may account for
Taylor’s rejection of More’s interpretation of Platonism.102 To German Protestant
thinkers, on the other hand, More’s modifications were too Platonic, as we shall see,
and they typically condemned More’s Enchiridion with its idea of the boniform
faculty.
These German thinkers from the first half of the eighteenth century regarded
More as a near-contemporary Platonist posing a threat to their theology.103 In 1743,
Brucker articulated this acute sense of confessional and national hostility by describ-
ing More as one who “has flung against German theology” the philosophies of the
Platonists Plotinus, Ficino and Hermes Trismegistus.104 Brucker’s counter-attack
was informed by a series of anti-Platonic texts written in the first half of the eigh-
teenth century by Protestant theologians, to whom I now turn.
In 1690–1691 the above-mentioned Colberg published his Platonisch-
Hermetisches Christenthum, attacking a variety of contemporary religious move-
ments outside Lutheranism for relying on Platonic philosophy. Although he gives a
very long list of movements contaminated by Platonic or Neoplatonic philosophy,
Pietism is not among them; it was left to Bücher to adapt Colberg’s anti-Platonism
to Pietism.
In 1699, the above-mentioned Bücher (1651–1714) published his Plato mysticus
in pietista redivivus, in which he accused Jakob Spener (1635–1705), the founder of
contemporary Pietism, of using Plotinus, Porphyry and other Platonists in support
of his unorthodox theology.105
In 1711, the Leipzig professor Gottfried Olearius (1672–1715), theologian and
philologist, published a Latin translation of Thomas Stanley’s History of Philosophy
(1655–1662) supplied with several supplements, where Olearius severs the connec-
tion between Platonism and Neoplatonism and turns against the religious aspects of
Platonic furor.106 In 1716, the philosopher, theologian and mathematician, Michael
Gottlieb Hansch (1683–1749) published his Diatriba de enthusiasmo platonico,
which was an attack on Platonic furor, or enthusiasmus. Generally speaking, he
regarded a synthesis of Platonism (Neoplatonism in particular) and Christianity as
self-contradictory and impossible, due to very different doctrines on the origin and
101
More 1690, 205.
102
Taylor 1804, iv, lxxix [Taylor 1995, 2, 55].
103
More is presented as a near-contemporary exponent of Platonism in Hansch 1716, 134; Walch
1775, II: col. 1205.
104
Brucker 1742–1767, IV: 439.1–440.4. See also the account of More on IV: 439–443.
105
Bücher 1699, A2r-A4v, B4r, C1v. For Bücher’s criticism of ancient Platonism, see Glawe 1912,
103–105; Lehmann-Brauns 2004, 187–222. Bücher’s anti-Platonism is not studied in Tigerstedt’s
two works of 1974 and 1977. Remarkably, Bücher is given an entry neither in the Allgemeine
deutsche Biographie (1875–1912) nor in the Neue deutsche Biographie (1952-).
106
[Olearius] 1711, 1205–1222. Olearius is not mentioned as the translator and author to the sup-
plements. However, several eighteenth-century authors identify him as the author; see Chap. 3,
Sect. 3.3 above.
nature of the universe upheld in these two traditions.107 Hanch was familiar with the
Neoplatonic theory of the lower and higher virtues, and the role of the latter in the
theory of noetic ascent, and his account of ancient and Renaissance Neoplatonic
virtue ethics is, despite its polemical agenda, the most extensive in the eighteenth
century that I know of. Section VII, Chaps. 3, 4, 5 and 6, is thus dedicated to the
Neoplatonic theory of the physical, political and purificatory virtues.108 The Platonic
enthusiasmus, to which the exercise of these virtues should lead, still according to
the Neoplatonists, is hardly to be found in the Bible, Hansch observes, for which
reason this road to felicity is suspect.109
In 1725, Mosheim published De turbata per recentiores Platonicos ecclesia,
which was partly integrated into his 1731 Latin translation of, and commentary on,
The True Intellectual System of the Universe, written by the Cambridge Platonist
Ralph Cudworth (1617–1689). Mosheim carried on the campaign against Platonic
ethics manifest in Hansch’s work of 1716, asserting that Neoplatonism was the vil-
lain of the history of Christian doctrine. Brucker, in his Historia critica philoso-
phiae of 1742–1767, cited Olearius and Mosheim frequently in his section on
Neoplatonism, the “secta eclectica”, largely subscribing to their theological reserva-
tions against Neoplatonic ethics.110 We have to wait until around 1800 before we
find a rejection of the theological orthodoxy of Mosheim and his peers. Before then,
however, Brucker and other eighteenth-century historians of philosophy had firmly
established the historiographical concepts ‘system’, ‘eclecticism’, ‘syncretism’, and
reduced Neoplatonic ethics to an insignificant (and in this case erroneous) appendix
to a metaphysical system of philosophy.
Other figures popularised this Protestant anti-Platonic campaign. In 1726, Johann
George Walch (1693–1775), professor of theology in Jena, published his very popu-
lar Philosophisches Lexicon, which came out in three subsequent editions, in 1733,
1740 and 1775. Entries like ‘Moral’, ‘Sitten’, ‘Tugend’, ‘Seele’ and ‘Freiheit zu
gedencken’ are permeated by Protestant doctrines on the human soul and its virtues,
divine grace, soteriology, Christian revelation, Trinity, and the limits of human rea-
son. Again we see Henry More singled out as the enemy.111
Brucker quoted Walch approvingly in his work of 1742–1767.112 In return, in
Walch’s 1775 edition, Brucker was given credit for circulating his views on Platonic
ethics.113 The 1775 edition also paid tribute to Brucker by appending an outline of
the history of philosophy drawn up in the Historia critica philosophiae. Moreover,
Walch and Brucker were privately connected — they both frequented the house of
Brucker’s university teacher Johann Franz Budde (1667–1729), whose daughter
107
Hansch 1716, 55–57.
108
Hansch 1716, 88–92.
109
Hansch 1716, 71. For Hansch’s attack on Platonic enthusiasm, see Varani 2008, 179–191.
110
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 190 n. c and several other places in the section on Neoplatonism (II:
189–462).
111
Walch 1775, I: 1205.
112
Brucker 1742–1767, I: 38 n. e; V: 545.29–31, refers approvingly to Walch.
113
Walch 1775, II: col. 1226.
5.8 Taylor’s Legacy 157
Walch married.114 Although Walch’s Lexicon is mediocre and unoriginal from a

philosophical perspective, its popularity helps us to explain how the negative view
of Neoplatonism, which we saw in Bücher, Hansch, Mosheim and Brucker, came to
dominate eighteenth-century histories of philosophy in Northern Europe.
The third and final motive for attacking Neoplatonism in the eighteenth century
was medical. Brucker reduced the cognitive content of Platonic furor or enthusias-
mus to a medical condition; an excess of melancholy generating a host of simulacra
and images in the sufferer’s disturbed imagination.115 On this score Brucker was
probably influenced by Meric Casaubon’s (1599–1671) medical critique of enthusi-
asm in his Treatise concerning Enthusiasm (1656).116
It was this fusion of (Protestant, or Lutheran) confessional identity, university
culture, and historical outlook, outlined on the previous pages, which alienated
Taylor from the scholarly establishment, as is clear in the quotation from Taylor
above.117
5.8 Taylor’s Legacy
Taylor made no distinction between Platonism and Neoplatonism, as had been para-
mount in eighteenth-century Plato scholarship. Mill did. To him Neoplatonism pre-
sented a distorted and unreliable interpretation of Plato. If one doubts the legitimacy
of the distinction, then a vital premise for Mill’s attack dissolves and Taylor’s Plato
interpretation emerges in a new light. If one can legitimately elide the distinction, it
does not necessarily entail, of course, that Taylor’s interpretation is true — only that
we may approach it differently than has typically been done.
The marginalization of Taylor’s ethical and metaphysical reading of Plato was
confirmed by institutional and methodological circumstances of the history of phi-
losophy in the nineteenth century. The history of philosophy was institutionalised
114
For Brucker’s regular visits to Budde’s house and for his friendship with Budde’s son, Carl
Friedrich Budde, see Alt 1926, 42–43. For Walch’s connection to Budde’s daughter, see Alt 1926,
40; Schmitt 1998, col. 183.
115
Brucker 1742–1767, II: 366.25–367.3.
116
For this medical criticism of Meric Casaubon, see Heyd 1995, 44–92.
117
Taylor 1804, xci [Taylor 1995, 63]. Compare with Raine 1969, 3–4, who claims that Taylor lived
in an age with two cultures, that of the “scholastic theologians” and that of the “romantic poets”.
Taylor may have influenced these romantic poets through his works on the Platonic tradition, but
his attention in those works is not directed at the romantics, but at the Platonic tradition itself, as
his 1804 publication of Plato indicates. Hence I find it slightly misleading to present Taylor as
belonging to the camp of romantic poets, standing in opposition to the camp of scholastic theolo-
gians; Taylor is first of all placed in a philosophical tradition. Raine 1969, 4, explains: “The diver-
gence between those ‘two’ [cultures] whose frontiers may be variously drawn goes back to Greece;
and the ultimate distinction lies in what is thought to be the nature of the primary reality.” Though
I agree that Taylor took a very critical stance towards the culture of Protestant academics, including
theologians, I also find that there is a danger in this sweeping picture; we risk losing sight of
Taylor’s immediate background, eighteenth-century philosophy and its histories of philosophy.
when courses in the subject became mandatory in philosophy departments in the

nineteenth and twentieth centuries.118 Brucker’s view of the history of philosophy,
including historiographical concepts like ‘system of philosophy’, ‘eclecticism’ and
‘syncretism’, was affirmed and adopted by most eighteenth-, nineteenth- and in
some cases even twentieth-century historians of philosophy writing general histo-
ries of philosophy.119 Admittedly, there were critical voices and rhetorical declama-
tions stating radical dissent, as in the case of Hegel, but despite criticism his
conception of the discipline remained fundamental; Hegel too carried on Brucker’s
system concept in his lectures on the history of philosophy.120 Even Zeller, still an
authority in the history of ancient philosophy, carried on the Bruckerian concepts
‘system of philosophy’ and ‘eclecticism’, though in a modified form, and he used
them effectively to characterise Neoplatonism.121
When Mill wrote his reviews of The works of Plato, he could not have known
how successful Bruckerian history of philosophy was to become in the nineteenth
century, but Brucker’s eighteenth-century followers had already increased in num-
bers over the last decades of the eighteenth century, and they were probably suffi-
cient in number and academic status to make Mill confident that Taylor was a
solitary and easy target, working against the current.122 Taylor was clearly aware of
this trend in the academic world, as his ‘General introduction’ testifies. However, he
did not receive a university education when he was young, and as an adult he was
not part of academic university culture, with which he did not identify at all.
Taylor’s reading of Plato and his emphasis upon the idea of divine likeness were
not opposed by Mill’s two reviews alone. The damaging effect of these reviews was
reinforced by the advent of Kant’s deontology and Bentham’s utilitarianism in
nineteenth-century ethics, which marginalised virtue ethics — not just Neoplatonic
virtue ethics, but other forms of ancient virtue ethics as well. Utilitarianism, perhaps
the most influential position, was propagated through the very same Mill and his
systematization of Bentham’s works, where ancient Platonic ethics was considered
nonsense, and where human happiness was severed from the metaphysics of the
human soul and its ethical virtues.123 Instead, emphasis was placed on moral agency.
Though often anti-clerical, utilitarianism carried on this tenet inherited from
eighteenth-century Protestant ethics, and Mill is an interesting transitional figure in
this respect.
Taylor’s philosophical legacy, then, was unfortunate, to say the least. He was not
only working against the current of the eighteenth century, shaping the intellectual
118
Schneider 1993.
119
For a late follower of Brucker’s idea of the history of philosophy as the history of philosophical
systems, see Copleston 1985, I: 2–9.
120
For Brucker’s influence, see Catana 2008, 193–282.
121
For Zeller’s use of the historiographical concept eclecticism in regard to Neoplatonism, see
Zeller 1919–1923, III.1: 547–564.
122
Mill was in line with public ridicule of Taylor in the years leading up to his 1804 publication;
see Evans 1940, 1068–1070.
123
Glucker 1987, 165.
References 159
identity of the majority of his contemporaries — he also had the misfortune to be

followed by further movements which buried virtue ethics altogether. Although
ancient virtue ethics have been recovered over the last decades through the works of
Anscombe, MacIntyre and others, it is mainly the Aristotelian version that has been
revived, not the Platonic or Neoplatonic one. Taylor’s reading of Plato reminds us
that such a reading is not only possible in the field of Platonic ethics, but also worthy
of being taken seriously and discussed critically, just like any other interpretation
presented by a serious scholar of Plato.
References

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Chapter 6
Afterword. Schleiermacher and Modern
Plato Scholarship
As this book makes clear, late ancient Platonism was subjected to two interrelated
developments in the eighteenth-century: The rejection of the biographical model,
and the reconstruction of late ancient Platonism according to a system concept that
followed the methodological precepts proposed by Heumann and Brucker. Over the
last decades, the second of these two developments has been discussed in several
publications, for instance in Santinello’s works. However, little attention has been
paid to the first development, the abandonment or transformation of the biographi-
cal model. One may thus ask if and how the biographical model should be re-
integrated into future accounts of past philosophy. This is an interesting discussion
which transcends the limits of this book, though I hope that this book may support
such a discussion.
This book focuses on late ancient Platonism and the way in which it was under-
stood and evaluated according to eighteenth-century methodological precepts.
However, these precepts were not only applied to late ancient Platonism in that
century, but to all past philosophy. For this reason, this book sheds light on a more
general development within the methodology of history of philosophy, which points
forward to history of philosophy as it has been written in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries. One case in point is Plato scholarship in Germany after the eighteenth
century, for instance the work of the German philologist and theologian Friedrich
Schleiermacher (1768–1834).
Schleiermacher published his German translations of Plato’s dialogues
between 1804 and 1828. These translations were pre-fixed by a general introduc-
tion (‘Einleitung’) and introductions to each of the dialogues. In his ‘Einleitung’,
he reports the tradition within Plato scholarship according to which Diogenes’s
Plato biography had been pre-fixed to editions of Plato’s works since the fifteenth

166 6 Afterword. Schleiermacher and Modern Plato Scholarship
century.1 Schleiermacher laments that this practice was carried out “without
judgement” (“ohne Urtheil”), for which reason he abandons it. Although
Schleiermacher does not explicitly refer to Heumann’ reviews of Diogenes’s
Lives and of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus, both published in 1715, they may well
be the point of reference. Schleiermacher does not explicitly refer to Heumann for
this criticism of Diogenes (nor does he refer to Heumann elsewhere in his intro-
ductions to Plato’s dialogues), but to Tennemann’s System der platonischen
Philosophie (1792–1795).2
In this work, Tennemann had followed Heumann’s and Brucker’s precepts and
identified the system and its principles in Plato’s philosophy, referring explicitly to
the method adopted in Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae and its reconstruc-
tion of Plato’s system, complaining that Brucker’s actual reconstruction of Plato’s
system was unsatisfying.3 Tennemann had reported the interpretation of Plato’s doc-
trines in late ancient Platonism (“neue platonische Philosophie”), which was, in
fact, not Platonic at all, but simply a “perversion” (“Ausartung”) of it.4 Moreover, he
had agreed that it was necessary to purge a proper Plato interpretation from these
distortions, probably referring to at least some of those eighteenth-century authors
dealt with in this book.5 Just like Brucker, Tennemann had given priority to the
reconstruction of Plato’s system of philosophy, and, also like Brucker, he did not
abandon biography altogether: Tennemann did provide critical, historical and bio-
graphical information about the past philosopher portrayed, in this case Plato.
However, Tennemann also repeated Heumann’s criticism of this tradition, e.g. by
referring to Diogenes’ Life of Plato as an “eulogy” (“Lobrede”).6 Tennemann said
that the criticism raised by a “reviewer” (“Kritiker”) of this author (i.e. of Diogenes)
is applicable to Diogenes’ account of Plato too: Diogenes’s Plato biography was an
1
Schleiermacher 1804, 3: “Die griechischen Ausgabe der Werke des Platon pflegen denselben
seine Lebensbeschreibung aus der bekannten Sammlung des Diogenes voranzuse[t]zen. Allein nur
die unverständigste Anhänglichkeit an einen alten Gebrauch könnte ein so rohes, ohne alles Urtheil
zusammengeschriebenes Produkt der Uebertragung würdigen.”
2
Schleiermacher 1804, 3. On 26–27, praises Tennemann’s System der platonischen Philosophie,
especially its chronological account of Plato’s works.
3
Tennemann 1792–1795, I: iii-vi. On I: x, he admits that he has not been able to locate a single
work in which Plato’s system of philosophy is exposed. On I: x-xii, he refers to Brucker’s Historia
critica philosophiae for an unsatisfying reconstruction of Plato’s system of philosophy.
Nevertheless, he lists Brucker’s work as one of the most significant on I: xxviii, and he clearly fol-
lows the drift of the methodology recommended by Brucker, to reconstruct the past philosopher’s
system of philosophy. Compare with Lamm 2005, 93: “Both Tennemann and Schlegel were com-
mitted to approaching Plato via the new historicism.”
4
Tennemann 1792–1795, I: viii.
5
Tennemann 1792–1795, I: ix n. 1, he thus refers to Hansch 1716. This work is also listed in
Tennemann 1792–1795, I: xxxii.
6
For criticism of Diogenes, see Tennemann 1792–1795, I: xvi–xviii, at xviii. For Tennemann’s
own biographical account of Plato, see I: 1–80.
6 Afterword. Schleiermacher and Modern Plato Scholarship 167
uncritical compilation of facts composed without order and critical judgements.7

Although Tennemann had not mentioned Heumann by name on this occasion, it is
not difficult to discern Heumann’s criticism of the biographical tradition in this
assessment and to identify Heumann with this “reviewer”. Schleiermacher, in his
‘Einleitung’ to Plato’s works, affirmed explicitly Tennemann’s criticism of
Diogenes’s Life of Plato and referred, instead, to Tennemann’s alternative Plato
biography.8 Moreover, Schleiermacher, despite his criticism of Tennemann, carried
on the Bruckerian historiographical concept ‘system of philosophy’ when interpret-
ing Plato’s texts.9
In the case of Schleiermacher, we thus see that he, through Tennemann, picked
up on some tenets that were peculiar to German eighteenth-century history of phi-
losophy dedicated to the Platonic tradition, namely the denigration of the biographi-
cal tradition, Diogenes in particular, and the endeavour to reconstruct past
philosophical systems. This eighteenth-century background has not always been
acknowledged in the literature on Schleiermacher as a Plato interpreter, where he is
often characterized as the first modern Plato scholar.10 Even though he arguably did
7
Tennemann 1792–1795, I: xx: “Das Urtheil, welches die Kritiker über den Werth dieses
Schriftstellers gefällen haben, bestätiget sich vollkommen in Ansehung dieses Theiles. Er hat blos
ansgeschrieben und zusammengetragen; die Fakta ohne Auswahl und Ordnung hingeworfen; die
Quellen nicht allezeit angegeben, und den Leser über ihren Werth und Glaubwürdigkeit ganz in
Ungewissheit gelassen. Wenn abweichenede Berichte vorkommen, so werden sie ohne alle Kritik
vorgetragen. Auch als blosse Kompilation betrachtet, hat seine Arbeit nicht einmal einen Werth
von Seiten der Vollständigkeit. Es ehlet auch nicht an zweckwidrigen Abkürzungen und
Werstümmelungen der Berichte, und an Widersprüchen. Bei allen diesen Fehlern ist es doch ein
ganz unetbehrliches Buch, wegen der vielen Materialien, die wir sonst gar nicht finden würden.”
Compare with Heumann’s criticism of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus, in chapter 2 above.
8
Schleiermacher 1804, 3.
9
Schleiermacher 1804, 35, thus refers to the Platonic system of philosophy (“platonischen
System”). For Schleiermacher’s criticism of, and his use of, the historiographical concept system
of philosophy, see Catana 2008, 205–209.
10
Lamm 2005, 91, is sceptical about the characterization of Schleiermacher as a romantic inter-
preter of Plato and writes: “Finally, the modifier ‘romantic’ [when used about Schleiermacher’s
Plato interpretation] eclipses the very important fact that Schleiermacher’s interpretation of Plato
is thoroughly ‘modern’—if not exactly the first modern interpretation, surely the most authorita-
tive. It is its modern quality, inseparable from its romantic elements, that marked it as a watershed
in the history of Plato interpretation.” See also Lamm 2005, 92: “His [Schleiermacher’s] interpre-
tation of Plato’s dialogues, as explicated in his ‘Introductions’, changed the entire course of Plato
studies and continues to reverberate even now, two centuries later.” Lamm does not mention
Heumann and Brucker in this article. Likewise, Forster 2012 does not mention Heumann as part of
the background to German, nineteenth-century history of philosophy, although he was instrumen-
tal to the marginalization of the ancient biographical tradition, which is typical of histories of
philosophy in the nineteenth century. Forster mentions Brucker twice (866, 868), pointing out that
Brucker and Tiedemann “prepared” histories of philosophy in the nineteenth century, but without
explaining which features from Brucker’s historiography entered nineteenth-century history of
philosophy. Schleiermacher’s direct references to Tennemann in his ‘Einleitung’, and thereby his
indirect references to Heumann and Brucker, are not dealt with (878–882). Laks 2019 and Szlezák
2019 similarly ignore the eighteenth-century German background to Schleiermacher’s Plato
interpretation.
168 6 Afterword. Schleiermacher and Modern Plato Scholarship
make novel and distinct contributions to Plato scholarship—his hermeneutic theory

and its application to Plato’s dialogues being one of them—it is too often ignored
that he carried on fundamental methodological assumptions from the eighteenth
century: scepticism in regard to the biographical tradition being one of them, the
endeavour to reconstruct the systems of past philosophers, being another. These two
assumptions have been ingrained at such a deep level in the discipline history of
philosophy, and they have had such a tremendous impact that they have appeared as
natural and self-given to posterity, even though they are the outcome of contingent,
theological struggles in the eighteenth century. This lack of historical awareness has
made it far too easy uncritically to believe in, and repeat, the rhetorical declarations
about the uniqueness of Schleiermacher’s work as a Plato interpreter that were made
by himself and by his contemporaries.11
Schleiermacher did not engage in a direct discussion with the eighteenth-century
authors dealt with in this book—they belonged to a fairly distant past that was far
removed from contemporary romantics, who played a much more significant role to
Schleiermacher, e.g. Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829); as far as these eighteenth-
century historians of philosophy were known to Schleiermacher, they were largely
mediated through Tennemann’s works, that is, his System der platonischen
Philosophie. Tennemann was no unimportant mediator, and his understanding and
evaluation of Plato’s works was manifestly important to Schleiermacher when
translating and commenting Plato’s dialogues, even though Schleiermacher was
also critical about Tennemann’s interpretation. Moreover, Tennemann’s understand-
ing and evaluation of late ancient Platonism, also touched upon in this work, may
well have played a role in Schleiermacher’s assessment of the authorship of indi-
vidual Plato dialogues.
One case in point is the Alcibiades I, which was attributed to Plato in the ancient
and early modern period, until Schleiermacher questioned this attribution in his
introduction to his translation of it. He did so partly for internal reasons, apparent
inconsistencies between doctrines found in this dialogue and other Plato dialogues,
and partly for external reasons, namely that it had been favoured among the “older
commentators” (“ältere Commentatoren”).12 Hereby Schleiermacher may refer to
late ancient commentaries to this dialogue, produced by Proclus or Olympiodorus.
Or, perhaps more to the point, he may refer to the anonymous Prolegomena, prob-
ably written by a late ancient Platonist and dating from the sixth century CE; here
Plato’s Alcibiades had been recommended as a starting point for Platonic studies.13
11
One example is Böckh and his praise of Schleiermacher’s Plato translation immediately after its
publication; see Lamm 2005, 92.
12
Schleiermacher 1828, 291: “Bekanntlich haben ältere Commentatoren des Platon dieses
Gespräch vorzüglich gerühmt als den besten Eingang in die Weisheit des Mannes, und den
Anfängern empfohlen mit diesem am liebsten das Studium der Schriften des Platon zu beginnen.
Auch ist nicht zu läugnen, dass darin vielerlei berührt wird und angeregt, worüber andere Schriften
des Platon nähere Auskunft geben, und dass dennoch nichts darin zu schwer ist oder zu tief und
dunkel auch für den am wenigsten vorbereiteten Neuling.”
13
[Anonymous], Prolegomena, §26, recommends the Alcibiades as the first Plato dialogue to be
studied as an introduction to Plato’s philosophy.
References 169
Schleiermacher’s assessment remained authoritative at least until 2001, when

Nicholas Denyer re-opened the discussion about the authorship of the Alcibiades I,
arguing, against Schleiermacher, that it was written by Plato himself.14 Now this
book is not the proper place to enter this discussion: all I want to point out here is
that neither Denyer nor other modern contributors to this discussion have paid atten-
tion to the background for this discussion, namely Schleiermacher and his adher-
ence to certain tenets of German, eighteenth-century Plato scholarship. I hope this
book will help its readers to understand and discuss the nature and role of this
background to this and perhaps other discussions in modern Plato scholarship.
References
[Anonymous.] 1990. Prolegomena, in L. G. Westerink, J. Trouillard and A. Segonds (eds),
Prolégomènes a la philosophie de Platon. Paris.
Denyer, Nicholas. 2001. Introduction. In Plato, Alcibiades, intro., Greek text and comm. N. Denyer,
1–29. Cambridge.
Diogenes Laertius. 1925. Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 2 vols. Greek text with English trans-
lation, trans. R. D. Hicks. Cambridge, Mass., and London.
Forster, Michael N. 2012. The History of Philosophy. In The Cambridge History of Philosophy in
the Nineteenth Century (1790–1870), eds A. W. Wood and S. S. Hahn, 866–904. Cambridge.
Laks, André. 2019. Schleiermacher on Plato: From Form (Introduction to Plato’s Works) to
Content (Outlines of a Critique of Previous Ethical Theory). In The Companion to German
Platonism, ed. A. Kim, 146–164. Leiden.
Lamm, Julia A. 2005. The Art of Interpreting Plato. In The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich
Schleiermacher, ed. J. Mariña, 91–108. Cambridge.
Santinello, Giovanni (ed.). 1979–2004. Storia delle storie generali della filosofia, editor-in-chief
G. Santinello, 5 vols in 7 parts. Brescia, 1979–1981; Rome and Padova, 1988–2004.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 1804. Einleitung. In Plato, Werke, 3 vols in 6 parts, intro. and trans.
F. Schleiermacher, I.1 (1804): 1–52. Berlin, 1804–1828.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 1828. Einleitung [Alcibiades I]. In Plato, Werke, 3 vols in 6 parts, intro.
and trans. F. Schleiermacher, III.2: 291–299. Berlin, 1804–1828.
Szlezák, Thomas Alexander. 2019. Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Theory of the Platonic Dialogue
and Its Legacy. In The Companion to German Platonism, ed. A. Kim, 165–191. Leiden.
Smith, Nicholas D. 2004. Did Plato write the Alcibiades I? Apeiron 37: 93–108.
Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb. 1792–1795. System der Platonischen Philosophie, 4 parts in 2 vol-
umes. Leipzig.
Denyer 2001, 14–26, challenges Schleiermacher’s claim that the Alcibiades I is not written by
14
Plato; it is, Denyer argues. Smith 2004 argues that the dialogue was not written by Plato. Smith
2004, 94 n. 6, gives a survey of some recent contributions to the discussion.
Index
A Beierwaltes, W., 78, 84, 113, 119, 136

Africanus, S., 52 Bentham, J., 16, 143, 158
Ahnert, T., 2, 9 Bernal, M., 87
Albrecht, M., 28, 69, 70 Berschin, W., 29, 30, 46
Alcinous, 15, 81, 85, 88–89, 113, 114, 136, Bianchi, L., 150
144, 145 Blackwell, C., 87, 146
Alexander the Great, 51 Blake, W., 136
Allen, M.J.B., 136 Blumenthal, H.J., 96
Almeloveen, T.J., 47 Bödeker, H.E., 2
Alsted, J.H., 66, 109, 124 Bonaventura, 154
Alt, K., 10, 109, 157 Bonetti, A., 16, 96
Amelius, 39, 42–44, 52, 56–58 Boys-Stones, G., v, 90
Annas, J., 85, 88, 136 Braun, L., 24, 96, 101
Anscombe, G.E.M., 159 Bréhier, E., 97
Apollo, 38, 51–53 Brisson, L., 48, 51, 56, 57, 107, 112, 138
Apollonius of Tyana, 50 Brucker, J.J., 4, 23, 65, 96, 135, 165
Apuleius, 15, 88–89, 144, 145 Bruno, G., 11, 28, 76, 77, 106, 109, 120, 123,
Aquinas, T., 154 124, 147
Ariew, R., 28 Bücher, F.C., 22–24, 34, 42, 45, 107, 150, 155
Aristotle, 11, 27, 54, 68, 78, 99, 106, 117, 124, Budde, J.F., 10, 109, 125, 141, 156, 157
134, 151, 154 Buhle, J.G., 82, 83, 110, 113–117, 126, 141
Armstrong, A.H., 97, 98, 119, 121, 138 Burnyeat, M.F., 89, 136, 139, 141, 143, 145,
Ast, F., 104, 105 146
Augustine, 46, 80, 113, 139, 140, 151 Büsching, A.F., 82, 83, 109, 126, 141
Augustus, Emperor, 52 Bussanich, J., 152
B C
Bagchi, D., 9 Calvin, J., 8
Baker, P., v, 33, 49 Carneades, 66
Barnes, T.D., 72 Casaubon, M., 47, 60, 76, 77, 157
Bayle, P., 29, 35, 41, 47, 55, 66, 80, 96, 103, Casini, P., 10, 69, 70, 73
109, 125, 141 Cassirer, E., 1–4
Beaujeu, J., 88 Cassius, G.A., 9, 57

d’histoire des idées 227, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20511-9
172 Index
Castricius, 44, 58 Erasmus of Rotterdam, 8

Catana, L., 5, 9, 11–13, 23, 24, 28, 59, 67–70, Erdozain, D., 4
75–77, 87–89, 99, 100, 102, 106, 107, Erennius, 56
111, 112, 117, 120, 122, 145, 149, Ermolao, B., 49
158, 167 Eusebius, 35, 47
Celenza, C., 32 Eustochius, 37, 44, 51, 58
Cellarius, S., 51 Evans, F.B., 135, 139, 158
Celsus, A.C., 47 Exner, C., 22
Chiaradonna, R., 85
Christ, 23, 33, 50, 111, 147, 152
Cicero, 39, 53, 88–89, 139, F
143–145 Fabricius, J.A., 29, 35, 45, 47, 59, 109, 110,
Clement of Alexandria, 72, 73 125, 126, 142
Colberg, E.D., 150, 155 Ficino, M., 7, 14, 15, 23, 29, 47–49, 51, 54,
Coleridge, S.T., 136 76, 77, 86, 95, 103, 106, 108–111, 120,
Condren, C., 32, 147 123, 124, 127, 135, 140, 145, 150,
Copleston, F., 87, 100, 158 153–155
Corrigan, K., 96 Fistioc, M., 89
Cottingham, J., 28 Flasch, K., 151
Cousin, V., 28 Formey, J.H.S., 110, 126
Cozzando, L., 109, 125 Forster, M.N., 167
Creuzer, G.F., 31, 110, 127 François, E., 9, 10, 109, 151
Cudworth, R., 156 Franz, M., 66, 69, 70, 72, 75, 89, 149
Frazier, A.K., 33
Frede, M., 96, 100–102, 115, 116
D Freudenberg, M., 24, 109
Damascius, 30, 47, 71, 135, 140 Fulgentius, 99
Darnton, R., 2 Fülleborn, G.G., 82, 83, 110, 115, 126
Davidson, J., 97 Fyfe, W.H., 57
Degérando, J.M., 110, 127
Democritus, 105
Denyer, N., 169 G
Descartes, R., 5, 28, 69, 75 Gadamer, H-G., 100
Deslandes, A.F., 125 Gaetano, M., 95
d’Hérodote, 73 Gallienus, Emperor, 44, 58
Diderot, D., 1, 10, 69, 70, 72, 73, 80 Garber, D., 28
Diels, H., 105 Gatti, M., 97, 108, 122
Dillon, J., 68, 90, 98, 121, 137 Gaudenzio, P., 109, 124
Dodds, E.R., 97, 113 Gaukroger, S., 32, 147
Donini, P., 66, 68, 75, 84 Gay, P., 1–4
Dreitzel, H., 66 Gellius, A., 26, 38, 52
Dufour, R., 96 Gerson, L.P., 10, 90, 98, 121
Gigante, M., 24
Glawe, W., 22, 50, 139, 155
E Glucker, J., 136, 141, 143, 149, 158
Ebeling, F., 22 Gordian, Emperor, 41, 55
Eberhard, J.A., 82 Görgemanns, H., 29, 30, 46
Edwards, M., 50, 138, 146 Goulet, R., 53
Elizabeth, 8 Gregory of Nyssa, 140
Emilsson, E., 10, 89 Grmek, M.D., 59
Enfield, W., 5, 142 Grote, G., 141
Engberg-Petersen, T., 65 Grotius, H., 109, 124
Epicurus, 32, 146 Grundling, N.H., 6
Index 173
H L
Haakonssen, K., 28 Laertius, D., 4, 5, 7, 11, 24–30, 32, 35, 46, 47,
Hadot, I., 65 52, 65–67, 71–73, 75, 84, 101, 102,
Hadot, P., 32, 68, 147 109, 111, 115, 146, 147
Hager, F.-P., 66, 72, 81, 82, 84, 104, 112 Laks, A., 167
Halfwassen, J., 31 Lamm, J., 17, 166–168
Hanegraaff, W.J., 149 Lehmann-Brauns, S., 22, 23, 155
Hansch, M.G., 23, 50, 53, 84, 103, 112–114, Leibniz, G.W., 69, 74, 75
125, 141, 155–157, 166 Leopardi, G., 31
Hatzimichali, M., 65, 69 Liddell, H.G., 104, 105
Hegel, G.W.F., 7, 31, 83, 100, 110, 117, 118, Long, H.S., 30
127, 158 Longinus, 57
Henry VIII, 8 Longo, M., 24, 96
Heraclides Ponticus, 52 Louth, A., 136
Heraclitus, 85 Luther, M., 8, 22, 23, 107
Heumann, C.A., 4, 21, 72, 96, 147, 165
Heyd, M., 6, 50, 60, 76, 82, 149, 157
Hierocles, 133, 135, 136, 140, 141, 144 M
Hobbes, T., 146 MacIntyre, A., 159
Hochschild, J.P., 154 Macrobius, 78, 153
Holzhey, H., 66 Mahlev, H.A., 6
Horn, C., 84, 102, 119 Malusa, L., 67, 102
Horn, G., 25, 66, 101, 102, 109, 124 Mansfeld, J., 101
Hsia, R.Po-chia., 9, 22, 109, 152 Marcellus, 44, 58
Hunter, I., 32, 147 Mariën, B., 97, 121
Hutton, S., 154 Marinus, 30, 47, 138, 146, 148, 149
Hypatia, 71 Maternus, J.F., 45, 59
Matton, S., 6, 65, 96, 141, 149
Maurer, K., vi
I McGroarty, K., 137
Iamblichus, 15, 22, 50, 51, 76, 80, 124, 125, McMahon, D.M., 4
135, 140, 141, 152 Meiners, C., 82, 83, 85, 110, 115, 126, 141
Israel, J., 3–6, 149, 151, 152 Meinhardt, H., 46, 66, 72, 81, 82
Mejrup, K., 22
Michelet, K.L., 31, 117
J Mill, J., 16, 32, 83, 134, 139, 141, 143–146,
Jensen, F.G., vi 148, 149, 152, 153, 157, 158
Jonsius, J., 25, 66, 124, 141, 142 Mollowitz, G., 89
Justinian, Emperor, 83, 140 More, H., 109, 124, 140, 154–156
Justin, M.J., 52 Morhof, D.G., 6
Mosheim, J.L. von, 23, 50, 71, 83, 84, 96, 109,
125, 136, 141, 142, 149, 156, 157
K Muhammad, 151
Kahle, M., 24, 43 Mühlpfordt, G., 21
Kant, I., 89, 158 Mulsow, M., vi, 6, 23, 50
Karamanolis, G., 22, 65, 86, 88, 136
Killy, W., 8, 10
Knox, R.A., 149 N
Köpke, B., 23 Nelson, J.C., 77
Kors, A.C., 4 Neschke, A., 58, 141, 149
Kristeller, P.O., 122 Nicholas of Cusa, 120
Krumwiede, H-W., 9 Nieke, W., 66, 68
174 Index
Nikolaidis, A.G., 33 R
Notopoulos, J.A., 135 Raine, K., 133, 135, 143, 157
Numenius, 57 Rasmussen, A.L.S., vi
Remes, P., 90, 137
Ricklin, T., 33
O Rigg, J.M., 134, 136
O’Brien, D., 25, 29, 31, 47 Ritschl, O., 68, 99
O’Cleirigh, P., 96 Roberts, W.R., 57
Olearius, G., 65, 66, 71, 72, 75, 84, 155, 156 Rogatianus, 44, 58
Olympias, 38, 51 Runia, D.T., 65
Olympius, 40, 54, 56
O’Meara, D.J., 58, 85, 96, 98, 103, 121
Opsomer, J., 90 S
Origen, 56 Sabinillus, 44, 58
Ossa-Richardson, A., vi, 53 Saccas, A., 55, 73
Saffrey, H.D., 103, 136
Sallust, 135
P Santinello, G., 96, 146, 165
Pade, M., vi Schiavone, M., 16, 96
Pallesen, C., v Schlegel, F., 166, 168
Parmenides, 85 Schleiermacher, F., 17, 84, 142, 165
Passmore, J., 95, 101 Schmidt-Biggemann, W., 23
Paulinus, 44, 58 Schmitt, C., 157
Pereira, B., 109, 124 Schneider, U.J., 23, 66, 69, 70, 158
Peschke, E., 22 Schniewind, A., 22, 137
Peter, Disciple, 50 Schwyzer, H.-R., 48, 96, 97, 104
Petersen, E., 47 Scott, R., 104, 105
Philostratus, F., 50 Sedley, D., 85, 136
Piaia, G., 146 Serapion, 58
Pico della Mirandola, G., 23, 26, 49, 68, 140 Serck-Hanssen, C., v, 89
Pietro Pomponazzi, 141 Shelley, P.B., 135
Plato, 6, 22, 74, 104, 133, 165 Simon Magus, 22, 23, 37, 49, 50
Plautus, T.M., 48 Slaveva-Griffin, S., 90
Plotina, P., 36, 48 Sleeman, J.H., 104, 106
Plotinus, 6, 21, 66, 95, 135 Smith, N.D., 169
Plotus, 36, 48 Snyder, J., 95
Plutarch, 48, 52, 135 Socrates, 46, 49
Pocock, J.G.A., 2, 3 Sorabji, R., 86
Polemon, 54 Souverain, J., 6
Pollet, G., 104, 106 Sparn, W., 9
Polybius, 99 Spener, P.J., 22, 23, 155
Porphyry, 6, 21, 65, 135, 166 Speusippus, 66, 89
Potamo of Alexandria, 65, 66, 71, 72 Spinoza, B., 3, 4, 80, 125, 141
Proclus, 30, 47, 68, 71, 76, 78, 81, 86, 106, Stamatellos, G., vi, 65, 85, 95
113, 135, 136, 138–141, 143, 144, 146, Stanley, T., 25, 67, 71, 88, 101, 102, 155
148, 149, 152, 153, 168 Steinmetz, D.C., 9
Proust, J., 10 Stern-Gillet, S., 137
Pseudo-Dionysius, 140 Steinmetz, D.C., 9
Pyrrho of Elis, 47 Strange, S.K., 112
Pythagoras, 38, 50, 52, 53, 105, 133 Suetonius, 52
Index 175
Swain, S., 146 Vassányi, M., 149

Sydenham, F., 16, 133, 137 Victorinus, M., 140
Szlezák, T.A., 167 Vierhaus, R., 8, 10
Søvsø, T., vi, 65 von der Stein, A., 99
Vossius, G.J., 25, 26, 66, 109, 124
T
Tarrant, H., 86 W
Taylor, T., 13, 16, 17, 31, 32, 83, 110, 126, Walch, J.G., 27, 50, 51, 54, 66, 72,
127, 133–159 75, 109, 110, 125, 126, 141,
Tennemann, W.G., 7, 86, 89, 110, 113, 155, 156
115–118, 120, 121, 123, 127, 141, Walker, D.P., 87
166–168 Wallis, R.T., 121
Thales, 68, 75, 87, 100, 105 Warburton, W., 134, 140–143
Thomasius, C., 6, 9, 21, 50–52 Weller, P., 146
Tiedemann, D., 7, 110, 113–119, 126, 141, Westerink, L.G., 136
167 Wilberding, J., 85
Tigerstedt, E.N., 22, 23, 89, 96, 136, 145, 149, Woltereck, C., 51
155 Wordsworth, W., 136
Tolomio, I., 11, 101
Trabattoni, F., 85
Trajan, 48 X
Trismegistus, H., 155 Xanthippe, 46
Trouillard, J., 107 Xenocrates, 89
U Z
Una Juárez, A., 97 Zambelli, P., vi, 51
Zedler, J.H., 103, 109, 126, 141
Zeller, E., 16, 66, 84, 97, 110, 118–122,
V 127, 158
van Dale, A., 53 Zethus, 44, 58
van Hoof, L., 33 Zosimus, 53
van Ruler, H., 4 Zoticus, 44, 58
Varani, G., 6, 7, 118, 149, 150, 156 Zwingli, U., 8

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International Archives of the History of Ideas 227

Archives internationales d'histoire des idées

ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D’HISTOIRE DES IDÉES

EVIDENCE IN THE AGE OF THE NEW

Late Ancient Platonism

ISSN 0066-6610 ISSN 2215-0307 (electronic)

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Copenhagen, Denmark Leo Catana

1 The German Enlightenment: Modern Interpretations������������������������ 1

3.4 Brucker’s Reconstruction of the System

1.1 Eighteenth-Century Germany Intellectual Life

Cassirer 1932, xi.

E.g. Cassirer 1932, 301–302.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 1

I am not in a position to judge Israel’s synthesis of the European Enlightenment,

In other words, among historians of philosophy we do find the opposition between

One last publication should be mentioned in this survey of approaches to the

to contemporary or near-contemporary religious movements within Protestantism,

1.2 Lutheranism and Eighteenth-Century German,

­ eetings to counter the reformation in Europe, but unsuccessfully: In sixteenth-

Brucker was born in Augsburg in 1696. In the period 1715–1720, he studied

1.3 Platonism in Eighteenth-Century Thought

i­ mplications of Heumann’s and Brucker’s confessional stance, that of Lutheranism:

i­ncluding late ancient Platonism.43 According to Brucker, Neoplatonism was char-

1.4 The Thesis of the Book. Survey of Its Chapters

absent in interpretations produced between the fifteenth and eighteenth century.

t­heological premises going back to the historiography of philosophy developed by

E.g. Lamm 2005, 92.

2.1 Heumann’s Cultural Context: Lutheran anti-Platonism

Christoph August Heumann (1681–1764) was a German Lutheran theologian, phi-

For Heumann’s debt to Thomasius, see Mühlpfordt 1989.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 21

2.2 Heumann’s Negative and Positive Program for Writing

states. By contrast, “philosophical history” should be a discipline that requires phil-

2.3 Heumann’s Argumentative Strategy in his Commentary

Heumann’s 1715 review of Porphyry’s Plotinus biography was provoked, he claims,

accounts together make up a history of philosophy. Another difference is that the

2.4 Heumann’s Influence upon Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-­

VI. Das Leben Plotini vom Porphyrio beschrieben.

I. [Was hier unser Vorhaben sey]

I I. [Urtheil von der Lateinischen Ubersetzung dieser

III. [Anmerckung von dem Nahmen Plotinus]

IV. [zu welcher Zeit Porphyrius diese Lebens-Beschreibung gemacht habe]

(e) Pædagog. cap. IX.

Heumann’s text; or ”Kaysers” see 146.8, 156.24.

V. [Entdeckung der Absicht/ so Porphyrius bey dieser Schrifft gehabt]

VI. [Urtheil von des Plotini spiritu familiari]

diesem/ er wolte ihm seinen spiritum familiarem in sichtbarlicher Gestalt zeigen. Zu

VIII. [Plotini würkliche Vereinigung mit GOtt]

Ferner erzehlet(n)59 Porphyrius, es habe Plotinus in der Platonischen Philosophie es

I X. [Was von dem Zeugniß zu halten/ so das oraculum dem Plotino

X. [Plotini Allwissenheit und göttliche Macht]

A spot of ink makes the reading of “r” slightly uncertain.

XI. [Warum Plotinus sein Vaterland und seine Eltern verläugnet]

XII. [Plotini Leben biß auf sein 40tes Jahr]

XIII. [Wenn und wie viel Bücher der Plotinus geschrieben]

eines gleichfalls Platonischen Philosophi. Er setzet zwar hinzu/ es habe Plotinum

XV. [Bekräfftigung derselben]

XVI. [Hochachtung des Plotini zu Rom bey seinen Leb-Zeiten]

XVII. [Seine Discipel, wie auch seine Lehr-Art]

XVIII. [Seine Lebens-Art]

XIX. [Sein Tod]

XX. [Wahres Contrefait des Plotini und Porphyrii]

Copenhagen, Denmark Leo Catana

1 The German Enlightenment: Modern Interpretations�� 1

3.4 Brucker’s Reconstruction of the System

1.1 Eighteenth-Century Germany Intellectual Life

1.2 Lutheranism and Eighteenth-Century German,

eetings to counter the reformation in Europe, but unsuccessfully: In sixteenth-

1.3 Platonism in Eighteenth-Century Thought

i mplications of Heumann’s and Brucker’s confessional stance, that of Lutheranism:

including late ancient Platonism.43 According to Brucker, Neoplatonism was char-

1.4 The Thesis of the Book. Survey of Its Chapters

theological premises going back to the historiography of philosophy developed by

2.1 Heumann’s Cultural Context: Lutheran anti-Platonism

2.2 Heumann’s Negative and Positive Program for Writing

2.3 Heumann’s Argumentative Strategy in his Commentary

2.4 Heumann’s Influence upon Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-

VI. Das Leben Plotini vom Porphyrio beschrieben.

I. [Was hier unser Vorhaben sey]

I I. [Urtheil von der Lateinischen Ubersetzung dieser

III. [Anmerckung von dem Nahmen Plotinus]

IV. [zu welcher Zeit Porphyrius diese Lebens-Beschreibung gemacht habe]

V. [Entdeckung der Absicht/ so Porphyrius bey dieser Schrifft gehabt]

VI. [Urtheil von des Plotini spiritu familiari]

VIII. [Plotini würkliche Vereinigung mit GOtt]

I X. [Was von dem Zeugniß zu halten/ so das oraculum dem Plotino

X. [Plotini Allwissenheit und göttliche Macht]

XI. [Warum Plotinus sein Vaterland und seine Eltern verläugnet]

XII. [Plotini Leben biß auf sein 40tes Jahr]

XIII. [Wenn und wie viel Bücher der Plotinus geschrieben]

XV. [Bekräfftigung derselben]

XVI. [Hochachtung des Plotini zu Rom bey seinen Leb-Zeiten]

XVII. [Seine Discipel, wie auch seine Lehr-Art]

XVIII. [Seine Lebens-Art]

XIX. [Sein Tod]

XX. [Wahres Contrefait des Plotini und Porphyrii]

VI. The Life of Plotinus Described by Porphyry91

I. [Our present purpose]

II. [Assessment of the Latin translation of this biography]

III. [Some remarks regarding the name ‘Plotinus’]

IV. [When Porphyry composed this biography]

V. [Determination of Porphyry’s intention when writing this text]

VI. [Assessment of Plotinus’ familiar spirit]

VIII. [Plotinus’ actual unification with God]

I X. [What is to be made of the testimony about Plotinus

X. [Plotinus’ omniscience and divine power]

XI. [Why Plotinus disavowed his country and his parents]

XII. [Plotinus’ life up to the age of forty]

XIII. [How many books Plotinus wrote and when]

IV. [A few judgments of Plotinus made by the ancients, to the effect that

XV. [Corroboration of these judgments]

XVI. [Admiration for Plotinus in Rome during his lifetime]

XVII. [His disciples and his teaching style]

XVIII. [His lifestyle]

XIX. [His death]

XX. [A true depiction of Plotinus and Porphyry]

3.2 Brucker’s Historiographical Categories: ‘System’,

3.3 Historiographical Assumptions in Brucker’s

3.4 Brucker’s Reconstruction of the System of the Secta

3.5 The Secta Eclectica: Brucker’s Legacy in General

3.6 Problems in Brucker’s Reconstruction of the Secta

3.7 Brucker’s Alternative Guides to Plato: Cicero, Alcinous

4.2 Brucker’s Use of the Historiographical Term ‘System

4.3 Plotinus’ Use of the Term ‘System’

4.4 The Term ‘System of Philosophy’ Entering Eighteenth-

4.5 Early Determinations of the Architecture of Plotinus’

4.6 Hermeneutic Problems Caused by the System-Concept

Is Plotinus’ Philosophy Characterised by the Term ‘System’ or ‘System of Philosophy’?