§Definition – Exempting circumstances

(non-imputability) are those grounds for

exemption from punishment because
there is wanting in the agent of the crime
any of the conditions which make the act
voluntary or negligent. (REYES, The Revised Penal
Code, Book One, 19th ed., 2017, [hereinafter, REYES, Book
One], p. 221)
§ These are circumstances by virtue of which,
although the act is criminal, the law exempts the
actor from liability. A crime is committed, but
circumstances pertaining to the offender calls
for his exemption from criminal liability.
§ Since there is a crime, although there is no
criminal liability, THERE IS CIVIL LIABILITY
except in accident and insuperable cause which
strictly are not criminal. (BOADO, Notes and Case on the
Revised Penal Code, 2012, [hereinafter, BOADO], p.99)
§Basis – The exemption from punishment is
based on complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent,
or on the absence of negligence on the
part of the accused. (REYES, supra at 221)
§Burden of proof – Any of the
circumstances mentioned in Art. 12 is a
matter of defense and the same must be
proved by the defendant to the
satisfaction of the court. (REYES, supra at 223)
Art. 12. – Circumstances which exempt
from criminal liability. – The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless
the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has
committed an act which the law defines as a
felony (delito), the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he
shall not be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same court.
Art. 12. – Circumstances which exempt from
criminal liability. – The following are exempt
from criminal liability:
2. A person under nine years of age.*
3. A person over nine years of age and under
fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which
case, such minor shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of Article 80 of this
Code**
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally
irresponsible, the court, in conformity with the
provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall
commit him to the care and custody of his family who
shall be charged with his surveillance and education;
otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some
institution or person mentioned in said Article 80.
Art. 12. – Circumstances which exempt from
criminal liability. – The following are exempt
from criminal liability:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act
with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of
an irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act
required by law, when prevented by some lawful or
insuperable cause.
Imbecility distinguished from insanity
§ While the imbecile is exempt in all cases from
criminal liability, the insane is not so exempt if it
can be shown that he acted during a lucid interval.
§ During a lucid interval, the insane acts with
intelligence.
§ An imbecile is one who, while advanced in age, has a
mental development comparable to that of children
between two to seven years of age. (REYES, supra at 223)
To constitute insanity, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence or that there be a
total deprivation of the freedom of the will
§ In order that the exempting circumstance of
insanity may be taken into account, it is necessary
that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence while committing the act, that is, that
the accused be deprived of reason; that he acts
without the least discernment; or that there be a
total deprivation of freedom of the will. (People v.
Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 661)
To constitute insanity, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence or that there be a
total deprivation of the freedom of the will
§ Thus, mere abnormality of mental faculties is
not enough, especially if the offender has not lost
consciousness of his acts. At most, it is only a
mitigating circumstance. (Art. 13, par. 9)
Basis of paragraph 1

§ The exempting circumstance of insanity or

imbecility is based on the complete absence of
intelligence, an element of voluntariness.
(REYES, supra at 232)
Procedure when the imbecile or the insane
committed a felony

§ The court shall order his confinement in one of

the hospitals or asylums established for persons
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of
the court. (REYES, supra at 224)
The Defense must prove that the accused was
insane at the time of the commission of the
crime, because the presumption is always in
favor of sanity
§ Sanity being the normal condition of the human
mind, the prosecution may proceed upon the
presumption that the accused was sane and
responsible when the act was committed. The
presumption is always in favor of sanity and
the burden of proof of insanity is on the
defense. (People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 87084, June 17, 1990)
How is insanity manifested?
§ Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted
condition of the mental facilities which is manifested
in language and conduct. An insane person has no full
or clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his acts.
§ Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding
circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject,
such as evidence of the alleged deranged person’s
general conduct and appearance, his acts and
conduct consistent with his previous character and
habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, etc. (BOADO,
supra at 100)
How much evidence is necessary to
overthrow the presumption of sanity?
§ In order to ascertain a person’s mental condition at
the time of the act, it is permissible to receive
evidence of the condition of his mind during a
reasonable period both BEFORE and AFTER that time.
§ Direct testimony is not required, nor are specific acts
of derangement essential to establish insanity as a
defense. Mind can be known only by outward acts.
Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and
emotions of a person and come to determine whether
his acts conform to the practice of people with sound
mind. To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial
evidence, if clear and convincing, will suffice. (People
v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 93)
Insanity at the time of the commission of the
felony v. insanity at the time of the trial
§ When a person was insane at the time of the
commission of the felony, he is exempt from
criminal liability.
§ When he was sane at the time of the commission of
the crime, but he becomes insane at the time of the
trial, he is liable criminally.
§ The trial, however, will be suspended until the
mental capacity of the accused be restored to
afford him a fair trial. (REYES, supra at 225-226)
Evidence of insanity
§ The evidence of insanity must refer to the time
preceding the act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution. If the evidence points to
insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime,
the accused cannot be acquitted. He is presumed to
be sane when he committed it. (U.S. v Guevara, 27 Phil.
574, 550)
§ An inquiry into the mental state of the accused
should relate to the period immediately before or at
the precise moment of doing the acts which is the
subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after
that crucial period or during trial is immaterial.
(BOADO, supra at 102)
Evidence of insanity
§ If the insanity is only occasional or intermittent in
its nature, the presumption of its continuance does
not arise.Where it is shown that the defendant had
lucid intervals, it will be presumed that the offense
was committed in one of them. (People v. Bonoan, 64
Phil. 87)
§ But a person who has been adjudged insane, or
who has been committed to a hospital or to an
asylum for the insane, is presumed to continue to
be insane. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
Illustrations when defense of insanity not
credible:
1. The accused knew that his wife was dead
because he was informed of her death. He said
that his wife quarreled with him. She was
irritable. He remembered that a week before the
incident he got wet while plowing. He fell asleep
without changing his clothes. During his
confinement in jail, he mopped the floor and
cooked food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes,
he worked in the town plaza or was sent
unescorted to buy food in the market. He is not
insane. (People v. Ambal, No. L-52688, October 17, 1980)
Illustrations when defense of insanity not
credible:
2. Government psychiatric doctors who had closely
observed the accused for a month and a half found
him in good contact with his environment and that
he did not manifest any off behavior for in fact he
could relate the circumstances that led to his
confinement. He exhibited remorse for killing the
victim, his wife and he voluntarily surrendered to
the police headquarters. He was coherent and
intelligent. The presumption of sanity has not been
overcome. (People v. Magallano, No. L-32978, October 30,
1980)
Illustrations when defense of insanity not
credible:
3. The mental illness of the accused was described
as “organic mental disorder with psychosis” but
the doctor said that a person suffering from
insanity may know that what he is doing is
wrong. He also observed that the mental illness
of the accused came on and off. When
interviewed upon his admission to the mental
institution, he recalled having taken 120 cc of
cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks of
marijuana before the commission of the crime.
(People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 87084, June 27, 1990)
Dementia praecox is covered by the term
insanity
§ A person suffering from a form of psychosis, a
type of dementia praecox, homicidal attack is
common because of delusions that he is being
interfered with sexually, or that his property is
being taken. During the period of excitement,
such person has no control whatever of his acts.
(People v. Bonoan, supra)
§ In the Bonoan case, an irresistible homicidal
impulse was considered embraced in the term
“insanity”.
Schizophrenia, formerly called dementia
praecox
§ Medical books describe schizophrenia as a
chronic mental disorder characterized by inability
to distinguish between fantasy and reality and
often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is
the most common form of psychosis. (People v.
Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
Schizophrenia, formerly called dementia
praecox
§ Defense of insanity not credible in:

§ The accused was afflicted with “schizophrenic

reaction” but knew what he was doing; he had
psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego; in spite of
his “schizophrenic reaction”, his symptoms were not
“socially incapacitating”, and he could adjust to his
environment. He could distinguish between right
and wrong. He was not legally insane when he
killed the hapless and helpless victim. (People v.
Puno, No. L-33211, June 29,1981)
Epilepsy may be covered by the terms
“insanity”
§ Epilepsy is a chronic nervous disease
characterized by fits, occurring at intervals,
attended by convulsive motions of the muscles
and loss of consciousness. Where the accused
claimed that he was an epileptic but it was not
shown that he was under the influence of an
epileptic fit when he committed the offense, he is
not exempt from criminal liability. (People v. Mancao
and Aguilar, 49 Phil 887)
Feeblemindedness is not imbecility

§ In the case of People v. Formigones, supra, it was

held that feeblemindedness is not exempting,
because the offender could distinguish right from
wrong. An imbecile or an insane cannot
distinguish right from wrong.
Pedophilia is not insanity

§ Pedophilia is a mental disorder not synonymous

with insanity. It is a sexual disorder wherein the
subject has strong, recurrent and uncontrollable
sexual and physical fantasies about children
which he tries to fulfill, especially when there are
no people around. Despite this affliction,
pedophiles could distinguish between right from
wrong. (People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 130210, December 8, 1999)
Amnesia is not proof of mental condition of
the accused
§ Amnesia, in and of itself, is no defense to a
criminal charge unless it is shown by competent
proof that the accused did not know the nature
and quality of his action and that it was wrong.
Failure to remember is in itself no proof of the
mental condition of the accused when the crime
was performed. (People v. Tabugoca, G.R. No. 125334,
January 25, 1998)
Age of absolute irresponsibility raised to
fifteen years of age
§ R.A. No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006 raised the age of absolute irresponsibility
from nine to fifteen years of age.
§ Under Sec. 6, a child 15 years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subject to an intervention program.
(REYES, supra at 232)
Basis of paragraph 2

§ The exempting circumstance of minority is based

also on the complete absence of intelligence.
(REYES, supra at 232)
Par. 3, Art. 12 of the RPC impliedly repealed by
R.A. No. 9344
§ A child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to
an intervention program, unless he/she has acted
with discernment, in which case such child shall be
subject to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
Par. 3, Art. 12 of the RPC impliedly repealed
by R.A. No. 9344
§The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.
Basis of paragraph 3

§ The exempting circumstance in paragraph 3 of

Art. 12 is based also on the complete absence of
intelligence. (REYES, supra at 237)
Children above 15 but below 18 years of age
who acted without discernment exempt
from criminal liability

§ A minor under 18 but above 15 must have acted

with discernment to incur criminal liability. The
minor is presumed to have acted without
discernment since the phrase “unless he/she
acted with discernment” indicates an exception to
the general rule that a minor under 18 but above
15 has acted without discernment.
Children above 15 but below 18 years of age
who acted without discernment exempt
from criminal liability

§ Thus, it is incumbent upon the Prosecution to prove

that a minor who is over 15 but under 18 years of
age has acted with discernment, in order for the
minor not to be entitled to this exempting
circumstance. (REYES, supra at 233)
Period of criminal responsibility
§ Under the Code as amended by R.A. No. 9344, the
life of a human being is divided into four periods:
1. The age of absolute irresponsibility – 15 years and
below (infancy)
2. The age of conditional responsibility – 15 years and 1
days to 18 years
3. The age of full responsibility – 18 years or over
(adolescence) to 70 (maturity)
4. The age of mitigated responsibility – 15 years and 1
day to 18 years, the offender acting with
discernment; over 70 years of age
Child in Conflict with the Law (CICL)

§ A child in conflict with the law (CICL) is a person

who at the time of the commission of the
offense is below 18 years old but not less than 15
years and one day old. (Sec. 1, A.M. No. 01-1-18 SC,
Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law)
Meaning of “discernment”
§ Discernment means the capacity of the child at
the time of the commission of the offense to
understand the differences between right and
wrong and the consequences of the wrongful act.
§ The discernment that constitutes an exception to
the exemption from criminal liability of a minor 15
years of age and below, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and
wrong. (People v. Doquena, 68 Phil 580, 583)
Determination of discernment
§ The determination of discernment shall take into
account the ability of the child to understand the
moral and psychological components of criminal
responsibility and the consequences of the
wrongful act; and whether a child can be held
responsible for essentially antisocial behavior.
(Sec. 10, A.M. No. 01-1-18 SC, Revised Rule on Children in
Conflict with the Law)
Discernment and Intent distinguished
§ The terms “intent” and “discernment” convey two
distinct thoughts. While both are products of the
mental processes within a person, “intent” refers
to the desired act of the person while
“discernment” relates to the moral significance that
a person ascribes to the said act.
§ Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another
but may be aware of the consequences of his
negligent act which may cause injury to the same
person in negligently handling an air rifle. (Guevara
v. Almodovar)
Discernment may be shown by (1) the
manner the crime was committed, or (2) the
conduct of the offender after its commission
1. Manner of committing the crime
§ When the minor committed the crime during
nighttime to avoid detection or took the loot to
another town to avoid discovery, he manifested
discernment. (People v. Magsino, G.R. No. 40176, May 3,
1934)
Discernment may be shown by (1) the
manner the crime was committed, or (2) the
conduct of the offender after its commission
2. Conduct of the offender
§ Rodel, who was 16 years old, punched the body and
the head of the victim with a brass knuckle wrapped
around his right fist. Raymund then tied a
handkerchief around the victim’s neck, fastened a
dog chain to the end of the said handkerchief and,
with the aid of Raymund and Rodel, hoisted the
victim’s body to and hanged it from a nearby tree.
Rodel, together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio…
Discernment may be shown by (1) the
manner the crime was committed, or (2) the
conduct of the offender after its commission
2. Conduct of the offender
§ … not to reveal their hideous act to anyone;
otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel knew,
therefore, that killing the victim was a
condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy.
He fully appreciated the consequences of his
unlawful act. (Madali v. People, G.R. No. 180380, August 4,
2009)
Presumption of Minority
§ The child in conflict with the law (CICL) shall
enjoy the presumption of minority and shall enjoy
all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until
proven to be 18 years old or older at the time of
the commission of the offense. (Sec. 5, A.M. No. 01-1-
18-SC, Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law)
§ In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall
be resolved in his/her favor. (Sec.7, R.A. No. 9344)
§ Penal laws should be liberally construed in favor of
the offender.
Determination of Age
The age of the child shall be determined according
to the following rules:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of a child is
an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth;
2. In the absence of a birth certificate, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal
certificates and school records or any pertinent
document that shows the date of birth of the
child; (REYES, supra at 236)
Determination of Age
3. In the absence of the documents under par. 1 and 2
of this section due to loss, destruction or
unavailability, the testimony of the child, the
testimony of a member of the family related to the
child by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such was
exact age or date of birth of the child pursuant to
Sec. 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, the
testimonies of the other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence shall suffice. (Sec. 5, A.M. No. 01-1-18-SC, Revised
Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law)
Burden of Proof of Age
§ Any person alleging the age of the child in conflict
with the law has the burden of proving the age of
such child.
§ If the age of the child is contested prior to the
filing of the information in court, a case for
determination of age under summary proceeding
may be filed before the Family Court which shall
render its decision within 24 hours from receipt of
the appropriate pleadings of all the parties. (Sec. 5,
A.M. No. 01-1-18-SC, Revised Rule on Children in Conflict
with the Law)
The allegation of “with intent to kill” in the
information is sufficient allegation of
discernment
§ Where the information for homicide filed in the court
of first instance alleges “that said accused, with the
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and
feloniously push one Lolita Padilla xxx into a deep
place, and a consequence thereof Lolita drowned”, it is
held that the requirement that there should be an
allegation that she acted with discernment should be
deemed amply met with the allegation in the
information that the accused acted “with intent to
kill”. (People v. Nieto, 103 Phil. 1133)
ELEMENTS:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere
accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
Basis of paragraph 4

§ The exempting circumstance in paragraph 4 of

Art. 12 is based on lack of negligence and
intent. Under this circumstance, a person does not
commit either an intentional felony or a culpable
felony. (REYES, supra at 242)
The person must be performing a lawful act

§ While defending himself against the unjustified

assault upon his person made by his assailant[,
appellant Galacgac fired his revolver at random,
wounding two innocent persons.
§ HELD: The discharge of a firearm in such a thickly
populated place being prohibited and penalized
under Art. 155 of the RPC, appellant Galacgac
was not performing a lawful act when he
accidentally hit and wounded Marina Ramos and
Alfonso Ramos. Hence, he cannot invoke par. 4,
Art. 12. (PP v. Galacgac, 54 O.G. 1027)
The person performing a lawful act must do
so with due care, without fault or negligence
§ Appellant claims exemption from criminal liability
under Art. 12, par. 4. But this exempting
circumstance cannot be applied to the appellant
because its application presupposes that there
is no fault or negligence on the part of the
person performing the lawful act with due
care, whereas, in this case, the prosecution had
duly established that the appellant was guilty of
negligence. (People v. San Juan, C.A., 65 O.G. 11264)
Accident

§ An accident is something that happens outside the

sway of our will, and although it comes about
through some act of our will, lies beyond the
bounds of humanly forseeable consequences. It
connotes the absence of criminal intent. (BOADO,
supra at 138)
§ If the consequences are plainly forseeable, it will be
a case of negligence.
Accident presupposes lack of intention to
commit the wrong done
§ Art. 12 (4) of the RPC, the legal provision pertinent
to accident, contemplates a situation where a
person is in fact in the act of doing something
legal, exercising due care, diligence and
prudence, but in the process produces harm or
injury to someone or to something not in the least
in the mind of the actor - an accidental result
flowing out of a legal act. (Talampas v. People, G.R. No.
180219, November 23, 2011)
Examples of an accident

§ FACTS: The accused, while hunting, saw wild

chickens and fired a shot. The slug, after hitting a
wild chicken, recoiled and struck the tenant who
was a relative of the accused. The man who was
injured died.
§ HELD: If life is taken by misfortune or accident
while the actor is in the performance of a lawful
act executed with due care and without intention
of doing harm, there is no criminal liability. (U.S. v.
Tanedo, 15 Phil. 196)
Examples of an accident

§ In the aforementioned case, there is no question

that the accused was engaged in the performance
of a lawful act when the accident occurred. He was
not negligent or at fault, because the deceased
was not in the direction at which the accused fired
his gun. It was not forseeable that the slug would
recoil after hitting the wild chicken. (U.S. v. Tanedo, 15
Phil. 196)
Examples of an accident

§ A chauffeur, while driving his automobile on the

proper side of the road at a moderate speed and
while due diligence, suddenly and unexpectedly saw
a man in front of his vehicle coming from the sidewalk
and crossing the street without any warning that he
would do so.
§ Because it was not physically possible to avoid hitting
him, the said chauffeur ran over the man with his car.
It was held that he was not criminally liable, it being a
mere accident. (U.S. v. Tayongtong, 21 Phil. 476)
Examples of an accident

§ Just as the truck then being driven by the accused

was passing the slow-moving road roller, a boy
about 10 or 12 years of age jumped from the step
of the sideboard of the road roller directly in front
of the truck, and was knocked down, ran over and
instantly killed. The accused was acquitted of all
criminal liability arising out of the unfortunate
incident which resulted in the death of the boy.
(U.S. v. Knight, 26 Phil. 216)
Case of negligence, not accident
§ FACTS: As two persons fighting paid him no attention,
the defendant drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice
in the air. The bout continued, however, so he fired
another shot at the ground, but unfortunately the
bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Francisco, an
innocent bystander.
§ HELD: The mishap should be classed as homicide
through reckless imprudence. The defendant wilfully
discharged his gun without taking precaution as the
district was populated, and the likelihood that his
bullet would glance over the hard pavement. (People v.
Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018)
Negligence
§ Negligence is the omission to do something which
a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
(Raynera v. Hiceta, G.R. No. 120027, April 21, 1999)
§ It is the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand without which such other person
suffers injury. (People v. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March
4, 2004)
Accident v. Negligence

§ Accident and negligence are intrinsically

contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.
(People v. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March 4, 2004)
Accident v. Self-defense

§ Accident and self-defense are two incompatible

defenses. Accident presupposes the lack of
intention, while self-defense assumes voluntariness,
but induced only by necessity. (People v. Lao-as, G.R. No.
126396, June 29 2001).
§ When an accused claims that the crime was the
result of an accident, the burden of proving self-
defense will not come into play.
When claim of accident not appreciated

1. Repeated blows negate claim of wounding by

mere accident. (People v. Taylaran, No. L-49149, October
23, 1981)
2. Accidental shooting is negated by threatening
words preceding it and still aiming the gun at
the prostrate body of the victim, instead of
immediately helping him. (People v. Reyes, No. L-
33154, February 27, 1976)
ELEMENTS:
1. That the compulsion is by means of physical
force;
2. That the physical force is irresistible;
3. That the physical force must come from a third
person.
§ This exempting circumstance presupposes that a
person is compelled by means of force or
violence to commit a crime.
Basis of paragraph 5

§ The exempting circumstance in paragraph 5 of

Art. 12 is based on the complete absence of
freedom, an element of voluntariness. (REYES,
supra at 244)
Irresistible force
§ Before a force can be considered to be an irresistible
one, it must produce such an effect upon the
individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces
him to a mere instrument and, as such, incapable of
committing a crime.
§ It must be such that, in spite of the resistance of the
person on whom it operates, it compels his members
to act and his mind to obey. Such a force can never
consist in anything which springs primarily from the
man himself; it must be a force which acts upon him
from the outside and by a third person. (U.S. v. Elicanal,
35 Phil. 209)
No compulsion of irresistible force
§ The pretension of an accused that he was
threatened with a gun by his friend, the
mastermind, is not credible where he himself was
armed with a rifle. (People v. Sarip, Nos. L-31483,
February 28, 1979)
Passion and obfuscation cannot be irresistible
§ The irresistible force can never consist in an
impulse or passion, or obfuscation. It must consist
of an extraneous force coming from a third person.
(December of Sup. Ct. of Spain, March 15, 1876)
Nature of force required
§ The force must be irresistible to reduce the actor to a
mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending and of
such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act is not done.
§ A threat of future injury is not enough. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense
in equal combat. (People v. Loreno, No. L-54414, July 9
1984)
ELEMENTS:
1. That the threat which causes the fear is of an evil
greater than or at least equal to, that which he is
required to commit;
2. That it promises an evil of such gravity and
imminence that the ordinary man would have
succumbed to it. (U.S. v. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209, 212, 213)
§ This exempting circumstance also presupposes
that a person is compelled to commit a crime by
another, but the compulsion is by means of
intimidation or threat, not force or violence.
Basis of paragraph 6

§ The exempting circumstance in paragraph 6 of

Art. 12 is also based on the complete absence of
freedom, an element of voluntariness. (REYES,
supra at 244)
§ “Actus me invito factus non est meus actus.” (An
act done by me against my will is not may act.)
Nature of duress as a valid defense

§ Duress as a valid defense should be based on real,

imminent, or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb
and should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote
fear. (People v. Borja, No. L-22947, July 12, 1979)
The accused must not have opportunity for
escape or self-defense
§ A threat of future injury is not enough. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or
self-defense.
§ Duress is unavailing where the accused had every
opportunity to run away if he had wanted to or to
resist any possible aggression because he was
also armed. (People v. Palencia, No. L-38957, April 30,
1976)
No compulsion of uncontrollable fear
§ If A had threatened to burn the house to B should
the latter not kill his (B’s) father, and B killed his
father for fear that A might burn his (B’s) house, B
is not exempt from criminal liability for the reason
that the evil with which he was threatened was
much less than that of killing his father. (REYES,
supra at 245)
§ Death is much greater injury than damage to
property.
ELEMENTS:
1. That an act is required by law to be done;
2. That a person fails to perform such act;
3. That his failure to perform such act was due to
some lawful or insuperable cause.
Basis of paragraph 7

§ The circumstance in paragraph 7 of Art. 12

exempts the accused from criminal liability,
because he acts without intent, the third
condition of voluntariness in intentional felony.
(REYES, supra at 250)
When prevented by some lawful cause

Example:
A confessed to a Filipino priest that he and
several other persons were in conspiracy against
the government. If the priest did not disclose and
make known the same to the proper authority, he is
exempt from criminal liability, because under the
law, the priest cannot be compelled to reveal any
information which he came to know by reason of
the confession made to him in his professional
capacity. (Vide, Sec. 24[d], Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Insuperable cause

§ It is an exempting circumstance which applies to

felonies by omission. The law imposes a duty on
the offender to perform an act, but his failure to do
so is due to a lawful or insuperable cause. There is
no civil liability because his acts are lawful. (BOADO,
supra at 142)
When prevented by some insuperable cause

Example:
Art. 125 provides for the number of hours
when a person arrested must be delivered to the
judicial authorities. If the peace officer failed to do
so because of circumstances beyond their control
such as long holidays when judicial offices are not
open, that is an insuperable cause. (BOADO, supra at
142)
When prevented by some insuperable cause

Example:
A mother who at the time of childbirth was
overcome by severe dizziness and extreme
debility, and left the child in a thicket where said
child died, is not liable for infanticide, because it
was physically impossible for her to take home the
child. (People v. Bandian, 63 Phil. 530, 534-535)
The severe dizziness and extreme debility of the
woman constitutes an insuperable cause.
IN ALL THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES,
INTENT IS WANTING IN THE AGENT OF THE
CRIME
§ Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom
and the use of intelligence. Hence, in par. 1,2,
and 3 of Art. 12, the imbecile, insane, or minor, not
having intelligence, does not act with intent.
§ The person acting under any of the circumstances
mentioned in par. 5 & 6, not having freedom of
action, does not act with intent.
§ In par. 4, it is specifically stated that the actor
causes an injury by mere accident without
intention of causing it. (REYES, supra at 250)
DISTINGUISH JUSTIFYING FROM EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCES
JUSTIFYING EXEMPTING
The act is legal, within the The act is criminal.
bounds of law.
There is no crime, hence, no There is a crime and a criminal.
criminal.
Since there is no crime, there is Since there is a crime, there is a
no criminal and no civil criminal (but exempted from
liability. criminal liability), and there is
civil liability.
The emphasis of the law is on The emphasis of the law is on
the act. the actor.
DISTINGUISH JUSTIFYING FROM EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCES
§ A person who acts by virtue of a justifying
circumstance does not transgress the law, that is,
he does not commit any crime in the eyes of the
law, because there is nothing unlawful in the act as
well as in the intention of the actor. The act of
such person is in itself both just and lawful.
§ There is neither a crime nor a criminal. NO CIVIL
LIABILITY, except in paragraph 4, Art. 11 (causing
damage to another in a state of necessity). (REYES,
supra at 251)
DISTINGUISH JUSTIFYING FROM EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCES
§ In exempting circumstances, there is a crime
but no criminal liability. The act is not justified, but
the actor is not criminally liable.
§ THERE IS CIVIL LIABILITY, except in par. 4
(causing an injury by mere accident) and 7 (failure
to perform an act required by law when prevented
by some lawful or insuperable cause) of Art. 12.
(REYES, supra at 251)
Absolutory causes

§ Absolutory causes are those where the act

committed is a crime, but for reasons of public
policy and sentiment, there is no penalty imposed.
(REYES, supra 251)
Other absolutory causes
In addition to the justifying circumstances (Art. 11)
and the exempting circumstances (Art. 12), there
are other absolutory causes in the following
articles:
§ Art. 6. – The spontaneous desistance of the person who
commenced the commission of a felony before he could
perform all the acts of execution.
§ Art. 20. – Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability.
– The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be
imposed upon those who are such with respect to their
spouses, ascendants, descendant, legitimate, natural, and…
Other absolutory causes
§ … adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within
the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories
falling with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.
§ The provision of par. 1 of Art. 19 read: “by profiting themselves
or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.”
§ Art. 124, last paragraph. – The commission of a crime, or
violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the
compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be
considered legal grounds for the detention of any person.
Other absolutory causes
§ Art. 247, pars. 1 & 2. – Death or physical injuries inflicted
under exceptional circumstances. – Any legally married
person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill
any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other
kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
Other absolutory causes
§ Art. 280, par. 3. – The provisions of this article (on trespass to
dwelling) shall not be applicable to any person who shall
enter another’s dwelling for the purpose of preventing some
serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a
third person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who
shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some
service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter
cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses, while the same
are open.
Other absolutory causes
§ Art. 332. – Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No
criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by the following
persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants, descendants, or relatives by
affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property
which belonged to the deceased spouse before the
same shall have passed into the possession of another;
and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in
law, if living together.
Other absolutory causes
§ Art. 344, par. 4. – In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with
the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or
remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions
of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-
principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the
above-mentioned crimes.
Instigation v. Entrapment
§ There is a wide difference between entrapment
and instigation, for while in the latter case the
instigator practically induces the would-be-
accused into the commission of the offense and
himself becomes a co-principal, in entrapment,
ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the
execution of his criminal plan.
§ Entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and
conviction of the lawbreaker. In instigation, the
accused must be acquitted. (People v.Yutuc, G.R. No.
82590, July 26, 1990)
Instigation v. Entrapment
§ In instigation, a public officer or a private
detective induces an innocent person to commit a
crime and would arrest him upon or after the
commission of the crime by the latter. It is an
absolutory cause.
§ In entrapment, a person has planned, or is about
to commit a crime, and ways and means are
resorted to by a public officer to trap and catch
the criminal. Entrapment is not a defense. (REYES,
supra at 256)
Instigation is an absolutory cause
BASIS OF EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY:

A sound public policy requires that the courts

shall condemn this practice (instigation) by
directing the acquittal of the accused. (REYES, supra at
253)
Example of Instigation
§ FACTS: An internal revenue agent, representing
himself as a private individual engaged in gambling,
approached the accused and induced the latter to
look for an opium den where he said he could smoke
opium. The agent went to the accused three times to
convince the latter. Because of the insistence of the
agent, the accused made efforts to look for an opium
den and eventually he found one. The agent and the
accused went to the place, and there the agent
received an opium pipe. After a while, he left and
returned later to arrest the accused for allegedly
smoking opium.
Example of Instigation
§ HELD:

The accused was not criminally liable. He was

instigated to commit the crime of smoking opium.
(U.S. v. Phelps, 16 Phil. 440)
Example of Entrapment
§ FACTS: A detective representing to be a private
individual, jobless, and in need of money,
befriended a well-known thief. The thief told him
that there was easy money around if he would take
a chance. The detective asked the thief what it was
and the latter told him that he was going to break
into the house of a rich man to steal some jewels
and money. The detective pretended to have
agreed with him and the two went to the house,
entered it and stole items. Then and there, the
detective arrested the thief.
Example of Entrapment
§ HELD:

The thief is criminally liable for the robbery

committed. There was entrapment. The fact that
an agent of the law acted as a supposed
confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter,
provided that the original design was formed by
the thief independently of such agent. (REYES, supra at
255)