PARDELL V.

BARTOLOME digested by:

GATCHALIAN V. COLLECTOR digested by: Victor Villaseran

DIVERSIFIED CREDIT V. ROSADO digested by: Juan Miguel Villaseran

SIARI VALLEY ESTATES V. LUCASAN digested by:

PUNZALAN V. BOON LIAT digested by: Panfilo Gevera

G.R. No. L-18009 January 10, 1923

EMILIO PUNSALAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
C. BOOT LIAT, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS:
The twenty-two (22) men discovered a giant fish with a large amount of ambergris off the coast of
Cawit-Cawit in the Province of Zamboanga. They put the fish in three sacks and brought it to
Mahajara Butu's home, where they left it in Ahamad's care. The two full sacks' contents were then put
into three trunks. These twenty-two people established a pact that they would be the only owners of
the ambergris and that nobody could sell it without the approval of the others. In
regards to the half-sack of amber, they decided that some of them should sell it in Zamboanga in
order to find out the going rate for ambergris so they could dispose of the rest in accordance.
The remaining amber in the two bags that had been left in the Maharaja Butu's home for storage was
then offered for sale to the Chinese men Cheong Tong and Lim Chiat for P12,000.
It seems that there were other individuals in Zamboanga who were aware of the presence of these
ambergris in Maharaja Butu's home. Mr. Henry E. Teck suggested going to Cawit-Cawit to seize
some purportedly illegal opium to the captain of the revenue cutter Mindoro. He, the master of the
Mindoro, quickly sailed to Cawit-Cawit after relaying this information to the Collector of Customs. The
master searched the three trunks when he got there and took them. Then Ahamad and other Moros
requested permission from the master to travel with him to Zamboanga, and the master granted their
request. The master was certain that the items in the three trunks were not opium once he was on
board and throughout the trip. Mr. Teck offered to buy the amber in the three trunks throughout the
cruise. Ahamad agreed to sell the amber for P7,500 in exchange for a guarantee of safety, and after
signing a bill of sale with Maharaja Butu and three additional Moros, he also received P2,500 as
partial payment. Later, the remaining amount of this cost was paid. The amber that Cheong Tong, Lim
Chiat, and the Moros had acquired from Tamsi and his associates was missing when they arrived at
the Maharaja Butu's home. The plaintiffs, who include twenty-one of the twenty-two Moros who had
caught the whale, filed a complaint, and Ahamad is one of the defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for recovery may be filed by a co-owner against a coowner with respect to
the thing they held in common.

HELD:
YES. The action for recovery which each co-owner has, derived from the right of ownership inherent
in the co-ownership, may be exercised not only against strangers but against the coowners
themselves, when the latter perform, with respect to the thing held in common, acts for their exclusive
benefit, or of exclusive ownership, or which are prejudicial to, and in violation of, the right of the
community. Wherefore, it is the judgment and order of the court that the defendants deliver to the
plaintiffs twenty-twenty-first (20/21) of the amber in question, or, in default thereof, the value of the
amber which is the subject-matter of this action shall be P60,000, without special finding as to the
costs of this instance. So ordered.

RESUENA V. CA digested by: Paula Barroga

G.R. No. 128338 March 28, 2005

TINING RESUENA, ALEJANDRA GARAY, LORNA RESUENA, ELEUTERIO RESUENA,

EUTIQUIA ROSARIO and UNISIMA RESUENA, Petitioner,
vs.
th
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, 11 DIVISION and JUANITO BORROMEO, SR., Respondents.

07 Resuena v. CA TOPIC
GR NO. 128338 DATE March 28, 2005 Each co-owner may
bring an action in
ejectment ;
Art 487
PONENTE: TINGA, J
FACTS

• Private respondent, the late Juanito Borromeo, Sr. is the co-owner and overseer of certain parcels of
land located in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu designated as Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 of the Talisay Manglanilla
Estate.
• Borromeo Sr. (respondent) owns six-eighths (6/8) of Lot No. 2587 while the late spouses
• Inocencio Bascon and Basilisa Maneja (Spouses Bascon) own two-eights (2/8).
• On the other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned in common by respondent and the heirs of one Nicolas
Maneja. However, the proportion of their undivided shares was not determined.
• Prior to the institution of the present action, petitioners Tining Resuena, Alejandra Garay, Lorna
Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena (5 petitioners) resided in the upper portion of Lot No.
2587.
• Respondent claims that all petitioners have occupied portions of the subject property by virtue of his
own liberality.
• Respondent would want to expand and extend the facilities of the resort that he established on the
subject properties, so he then demanded that petitioners vacate the property.
• Petitioners, however, refused to vacate their homes.
• This prompted respondent to file a complaint for ejectment with the MTC against the petitioners.

MTC RULING: Complaint was dismissed.

Respondent did not have a preferential right of possession over the portions occupied by petitioners,
since Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 were not yet partitioned nor the disputed portions assigned to respondent
as his determinate share.

RTC RULING: Reversed the Decision of the MTC.

It held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which allows any one of the co-owners to bring an action in
ejectment, may successfully be invoked by the respondent because, in a sense, a co-owner is the owner
and possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all
co-owners.
CA RULING: Affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE/S:
WON Borromeo Sr. has the right to eject the 6 petitioners (Eutiquia Rosario & Resuena et al) from Lot No.
2587. (YES)
PETITIONER (Resuena et al) RESPONDENT (Court of Appeals)
ground their petition on respondent’s testimony in Borromeo Sr. has the right to eject petitioner
Civil Case No. R-14600 that he had agreed with co- Eutiquia Rosario from Lot No. 2592.
owner, Basilisa Maneja, on the portions they each With regard to the other five (5) petitioners, the
were to occupy in Lot No. 2587 prior to the partition Court notes that their first three assignments of
of the property. errors are interrelated and built on each other.

RULING
Respondent has a right to eject the petitioners from Lot. No. 2587.
Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that “[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action
in ejectment,” is a categorical and an unqualified authority in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from
the portions of Lot. No. 2587. This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an
action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. Thus, a co-owner may bring an action to
exercise and protect the rights of all. When the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a
favorable decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights. Respondent’s
action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the
property since petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.
Petitioners’ lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with respondent’s right under Article 487,
clearly settles respondent’s prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587.

DISPOSITIVE
Petition is DENIED.

ADDITIONAL NOTES
Article 546 of the Civil Code applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the
belief that he is the owner thereof; Persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its
owners are not possessors in good faith

ACABAL V. ACABAL digested by: Jayson Dimarucut

LAVADIA V. COSME digested by: Clyde Aquino

G.R. No. L-47996 May 9, 1941

ENGRACIA LAVADIA Y OTROS, demandantes y apelados,

vs.
ROSARIO COSME DE MENDOZA Y OTROS, demandados y apelantes.

FACTS:

The case starts from the jewels consist of a gold crown with diamonds, necklace w/ diamonds, belt w/
diamonds, gold bracelet, gilded silver plate, and other pieces for clothing decoration for the Our Lady
of Guadalupe. These jewels were made around 1880 at the expense of six resident ladies from
Pasanjan, Laguna, namely Paula ,Pia,Martina, Matea, Isabel,Engracia all surnamed Lavadia. These
jewels were made for the adornment of the Our Ladey of Guadalupe. After the jewels were made, the
ladies decided that it will stay on Pia Lavadia. When the other 5 ladies died, except for Engracia
Lavadia,the jewels were passed to Rosario Cosme de Mendoza, a direct decendant of Paula Lavadia.
Then of February 9,1938, Rosario Cosme de Mendoza notified all persons interested that she will
deliver the jewels to the Bishop de Lina, informing them that they would witness the delivery. Engracia
Lavadia and the heirs of Isabel, Matea, and Martina all surnamed Lavadia were not pleased with the
delivery of the jewels to the church so they wanted to return the jewels back into their custody.
Rosario Mendoza contented that she had a better right over the jewels because she had been
faithfully carrying out her duty as depository to the jewels. The Court of Origin ruled in favor of
Engracia Lavadia and the heirs since they owned 4/6 on the joint ownership and Rosario Cosme
Mendoza only owned 2/6.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the contract of Rosario Cosme Mendoza to the original owners of the jewels were of
a contract of deposit?

2. Whether or not the jewels in question should fall in the custody of Engracia Lavadia?

RULING:
1. No. The Supreme Court held that the contract in of a joint ownership because Rosario Cosme
Mendoza, even acting as a depository, is a decendant of one of the original owners of the jewels,
therefore, she has a right to the ownership on the jewels.

2. Yes. The Superme Court held that the the jewels should be in Engracia Lavadia and in the heirs
custody because here in the case, it does clearly state how each contribution of the six ladies were
made in the making of the jewels, therefore the court presumed that the contributions were made
equally by the ladies under Article 393 of the Old Civil Code. That is why the Supreme Court also
upheld the decision of the Court of Origin that Engracia Lavadia et.al. has 4/6 ownership over Rosario
Cosme Mendoza.

MELENCIO V. DY TIAO LAY digested by: Keziah Salvador-Seggay

G.R. No. L-32047 November 1, 1930

MANUEL MELENCIO, MARIANO MELENCIO, PURA MELENCIO, and CARIDAD

MELENCIO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
DY TIAO LAY, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

The petitioners in this case, the co-owners of the subject land located in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija
brought the present case of recovery of the said land against the defendant, Dy Tiao Lay. The subject
land is part of Ramon’s inheritance which he shared with his siblings and a nephew. It was leased to a
Yap Kui Chin for a 20-year term (with an option to extend by up to 40 years), but the contract of lease
was without the signature of Ramon and his nephew. The siblings then made an extrajudicial partition
of their inheritance, and the subject land fell to the share of Ramon Melencio, then to his children, the
plaintiffs. By that time, Yap’s right to lease the land was assigned to Dy Tiao Lay, the defendant.

When Ramon died, his widow, the mother of the plaintiffs and the administratrix of his property,
continued to collect a P20.20 per month rent from Dy Tiao Lay. She demanded that the rent be raised
to P300 per month but Dy Tiao Lay refused since the rent is a stipulation of the written lease contract.
The petitioners insisted that they did not know of the lease contract, and that it was executed
without their consent and was void. If there was a contract, it is still void because the contract: had
alterations to the property so it needed to be signed by all the co-owners; was for a term of over 6
years, which is null and void under Art 1548 (now 1647, but no mention of 6 years). Furthermore, the
duration is unreasonably long thus against public policy. The court a quo ruled in favor of the validity
of the lease contract, hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the contract of lease is void

RULING:

The Court ruled that the contract of lease is null and void. Dy Tiao Lay is ordered to deliver the
possession of the property to the administratrix of the estate of Ramon Melencio, and to pay monthly
rent of P50 from May 1926 up until the land is delivered.

The Court cited Art. 397 (now 491) of the Civil Code which provides that "none of the owners shall,
without the consent of the others, make any alterations in the common property even though such
alterations might be advantageous to all." The Court, however, found that the alterations to the land
are not of sufficient importance to nullify the lease since none of the co-owners subjected to such
alterations until over 20 years after the execution of the contract of the lease.
TUASON V. TUASON digested by: Albretch Khan Anam

G.R. No. L-3404 April 2, 1951

ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Angela Tuason, Antonio Tuason Jr. and Gegorio Araneta, Inc., co-owners of a parcel of land, agreed
to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later
divided among them. This agreement is embodied in a document (Exh. 6) entitled "Memorandum of
Agreement". The terms of such contract briefly stated as follows: that the three co-owners agreed to
improve the property by filling it and constructing roads and curbs on the same and then subdivide it
into small lots for sale.

Araneta Inc. was to finance the whole development and subdivision; to prepare a schedule of prices
and conditions of sale subject to the approval of the other two co-owners, to sell the subdivided lots
and execute the corresponding contracts with buyers, and to receive 50 per cent of the gross selling
price of the lots and the rents that may be collected from the property while in the process of sale, the
remaining 50 per cent to be divided in equal portions among the three co-owners.

Angela filed a complaint in the Court of First instance of Manila praying that the contracts should be
declared null and void because said terms violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code. COFI
dismissed such complaint without pronouncement to such cost. The plaintiff appealed from that
decision, and because the property is valued at more than P50,000, the appeal came directly to this
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the terms of the contract violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code?

RULING:

"ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at
any time, demand the partition of the thing held in common.

"Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not exceeding
ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement."

We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The
contract (Exh. 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain
a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership
and of the community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale
among the co-owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all
the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-ownership. By
virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and substantially entered into a contract
of partnership as the best and most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the
life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have been attained.

The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. There is no pronouncement as to costs

VERDAD V. CA digested by: Jiana Quitlong

G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996

ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON
ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES AND VIRGINIA
ROSALES, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent, Socorro Codero Vda. De Rosales, is seeking to exercise a right of legal
redemption over the subject property which the petitioner, Zosima Verdad is a purchaser. The said
property is a 248-square meter residential lot (identied to be Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan
Cadastre, located along Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan City).

The property was first owned by Macaria Atega who had two marriages; first with Angel Burdeos and
the second with Cañuto Rosales. After her death, she was survived by her son, Ramon Burdeos, and
her grandchild (Felicidad Burdeos) from her first marriage; and by her children, David Rosales, Justo
Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales, from her second marriage.

The private respondent, Socorro Rosales, is the widow of David Rosales, Macaria’s son. He died after
Macaria’s death intestate.

In an instrument, dated June 1982, the widow and childfren of Ramon Burdeos sold the lot to the
petitioner, Zosima Verdad. Socorro discovered the said sale on March 1987 and a day after, she
sought for the redemption of the said property. She first tendered a sum of 23,000 pesos, which was
the amount the petitioner paid for the lot, however, Zosima Verdad refused.

No settlement was reached thus, Socorro Rosales filed an action for "Legal Redemption with
Preliminary Injunction" before the Regional Trial Court.

RTC RULING: The trial court ruled in favour of the Zosima Verdad, holding that the private
respondents’ right to redeem the property had already lapsed.

CA RULING: The appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC and said that Socorro Rosales
had the right to redeem the said property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Soccoro Rosales had legal right of redemption over the disputed lot.

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court held Socorro Rosales had legal right of redemption over the disputed lot.
While it is true that Socorro, as a daughter-in-law, is not an intestate heir of Macaria, however, she is
a legal heir of David Rosales, Macaria’s son and her husband. Macaria’s property passed on to her
children after her death, thus, David Rosales, along with Macaria’s other children, became co-owners
of the said property

When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest over the
property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law
on succession, Articles 995 and 1001.

Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon became
co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria.

According to Article 1620,

"ARTICLE 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of
the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one."
In addition, it was held that the right of redemption was timely exercised by Sorcorro Rosales. No
written notice of the sale was given to them by the Burdeos heirs which was required under Article
1623 of the Civil Code. Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private
respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she
discovered the sale from the Oce of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated,
on 16 October 1987, before the trial court.

DISPOSITIVE:

All given, we find no error in the appellate court's finding that private respondentsare entitled to the
redemption of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

RAMIREZ V. RAMIREZ digested by:

AGUILAR V. CA digested by: John Mark Haban

VDA. DE APE V. CA digested by:

HALILI V. CA digested by: Daryoush Madadi

G.R. No. 113539 March 12, 1998

CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO
CATANIAG, respondents.

FACTS:

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real

properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow private respondent Helen
Meyers Guzman, and his son, private respondent David Rey Guzman, both of whom
are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim,
assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in
and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.
Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation Guzman then sold the
parcel of land to Catanaig, who is one of respondents in this case. Petitioners, who are
owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances —
between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano
Cataniag — and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption
under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA
denied the appeal of the Halilis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale of the land is null and void.

RULING:

No, because the prohibition in the constitution has already been served. Article
XII, Section 7 provides that Non- Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or
to lands of the public domain, In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private
lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. While it
is true that the transfer of Helen of his right to her son who is an American citizen
contradicts the prohibition set forth in the Constitution, the Supreme Court upheld the
subsequent sale of the land to Catanig, a Filipino citizen. Jurisprudence is consistent
that “if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid.”
The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus
“[I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as
construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation’s lands for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization. “

FRANCISCO V. BOISER digested by:

CARVAJAL V. CA digested by: Jefferson Roma

G.R. No. L-44426 February 25, 1982

SULPICIO CARVAJAL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and EUTIQUIANO CAMARILLO and LIBERATA
CACABELOS, respondents.
FACTS:

The subject lot was originally owned by Hermogenes Espique and his wife and after their death, the
lot was succeeded by their children, Maria, Evaristo, Faustino, Estefanio and Tropinio. Petitioner then
averred that he purchased the 2/5 of the lot from Estefanio and respondents purchased 1/5 of the lot
from Evaristo. The part of the land in controversy was the 1/5 portion. This prompted the private
respondents to file a case of ejectment and recovery of possession, where in fact there has been no
partition yet on the subject lot. Both the lower court and the appellate court ruled in favor of the
respondents. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the co-owners may sell a specific part of the co-owned property without partition.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in negative and reversed the decision of the lower court.

The fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. Espique in favor of respondents and the sale executed
by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were made before the partition of the property among the
co-heirs does not annul or invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are valid. However, the
interests thereby acquired by petitioner and respondents are limited only to the parts that may be
7
ultimately assigned to Estefanio and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the estate subject to
provisions on subrogation of the other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger-purchaser provided in
Article 1088 of the Civil Code.

Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the
inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties of by judicial proceeding, a co-
heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the
whole estate such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner
of the whole estate left with respect to the part of portion which might be adjudicated to him, a
community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it
remains undivided

PAMPLONA V. MORETO digested by: Faiza Ukkoh

FACTS:

Spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega (died intestate on May 6, 1946 in Calamba, Laguna)
acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in
Calamba, Laguna.

They have six (6) children, namely, (1) Ursulo (died intestate on May 24, 1959 with heirs Vivencio,
Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio), (2) Marta (died also intestate on April 30, 1938
with heir Victoria Tuiza), (3) La Paz (died intestate on July 17, 1954 with heirs Pablo, Severina,
Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza), (4) Alipio (died intestate on June 30, 1943 with heir
Josefina Moreto), (5) Pablo (died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his
brother plaintiff Leandro), and (6) Leandro.

On July 30, 1952, Flaviano, without the consent of the heirs, and before any liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed
of absolute sale (Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00.

Spouses Pamplona constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano, at the time of
the sale, pointed to. Their son (Rafael) also built his house within lot 1496 about one meter from its
boundary with the adjoining lot. Both without knowledge that the subject matter of their sale
transaction was No. 1495 and not the alleged lot No. 1496.

From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Pamplona enlarged their house and constructed a piggery corral at
Lot 1496. On 1956, Flaviano died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to
vacate the lot on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot as the same belongs to
the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already dead when the
sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused.

The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid as the lot sold is
registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers believing in good faith that the
vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.

After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it was found out that
there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in the execution of the deed of
sale because while the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the
parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject
matter of their sale transaction.

Lower Court: Transfer Certificate of Title No. (Lot No. 1495) and registered in the name of spouses
Pamplona is cancelled.

Deed of absolute sale of the eastern portion of Lot 1496 (781 sq m) is null and void, with the plaintiff
hereby declared as the rightful owners and entitled to its possession.

The remaining portion of Lot 1496 (390.5 sq m) defendants are declared lawful owners and entitled to
its possession and shall be entitled to a certificate of title covering said portion and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 9843

The RTC decision was affirmed by the CA; hence, this petition was instituted appealing the decision
of the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in litigation, or only ½ of
the same?

RULING:
Yes, they are entitled to the full ownership of the property in litigation. The Court ruled that at the time
of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was already dissolved six years before and therefore, the
estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano, and the heirs of his deceased wife.

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involve. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

There was partial partition, the co-owner (Flaviano) as vendor pointed out its location and even
indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erected without objection. Despite the fact
that at the time of sale, there was no partition of the subject property between the co-owners and
Flaviano, as vendor, had ownership of an undetermined portion of the hereditary estate which he had
a perfect and legal right to dispose of to the Spouse Pamplona. And during the period, both parties
lived as neighbors, yet the heirs lifted no finger to question the occupation, possession and ownership
of the land purchased by the Pamplonas. The private respondents are in estoppel by laches to claim
half of the property, in dispute as null and void.

According to Art. 776, the inheritance which private respondents may receive from their deceased
parents includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by
their parent’s death. In addition, under Art. 1311 of the NCC, the contract of sale executed by
Flaviano took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs which includes the private
respondents; therefore, they must comply with said obligation. The petition is affirmed with
modification with respect to the fact that the sale executed in favor of Spouses Pamplona is legal and
valid in its entirety.

CASTRO V. ATIENZA digested by:

ESTOQUE V. PAJIMULA digested by: Jiana Quitlong

G.R. No. L-24419 July 15, 1968

LEONORA ESTOQUE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ELENA M. PAJIMULA, assisted by her husband CIRIACO PAJIMULA, defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Lot No. 802 was originally owned by the spouses, Rosendo Perez and Fortunata Bernal, who were
survived by their children, namely, Crispina Perez, Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo Perez. Ricardo Perez
is now also dead.

On October 28, 1951, Crispina P. Vda. de Aquitania sold her right and participation in Lot No. 802
consisting of 1/3 portion with an area of 640 square meters to Leonora Estoque, the plaintiff. On
October 29, 1951, a deed of extrajudicial settlement was entered into wherein Lorenzo Perez, Emilia
P. Posadas and her minor children assigned all their right, interest and participation in Lot No. 802 to
Crispina Perez. On December 30, 1959, Crispina Perez and her children Rosita Aquitania Belmonte,
Remedios Aquitania Misa, Manuel Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and Aurora Aquitania sold to Elena
Pajimula,the defendant, the remaining 2/3 western portion of Lot No. 802 with an area of 958 square
meters.

Leonora Estoque based her complaint for legal redemption on the claim that she is a co-owner of Lot
No. 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof.

On the other hand, Elena Pajimula claimed that the Estoque bought the 1/3 southeastern portion,
which is definitely identified and segregated, hence there existed no co-ownership at the time and
after Estoque bought the aforesaid portion, upon which right of legal redemption can be exercised or
taken advantage of.
ESTOQUE’s CONTENTION:

- That the deed in her favor was inoperative to convey the southeastern third of Lot 802 of the
Rosario Cadastre notwithstanding the description in the deed itself, for the reason that the
vendor, being a mere co-owner, had no right to sell any definite portion of the land held in
common but could only transmit her undivided share, since the specific portion corresponding
to the selling co-owner is not known until partition takes place.
- That the sale in her favor, although describing a definite area, should be construed as having
conveyed only the undivided 1/3 interest in Lot 802 owned at the time by the vendor, Crispina
Perez Vda. de Aquitania.
- That when the next day said vendor acquired the 2/3 interest of her two other co-owners, Lot
802 became the common property of appellant and Crispina Perez.
- Therefore, when Crispina sold the rest of the property to appellee Pajimula spouses, the
former was selling an undivided 2/3 that appellant, as co-owner, was entitled to redeem,
pursuant to Article 1620 of the New Civil Code:

ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the
price of the alienation is grossly excessive the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in
common.

CFI RULING: The lower court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed the complaint, holding that the
deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by Estoque was different from that of the Pajimula; hence
they never became co-owners, and the alleged right of legal redemption was not proper.

Estoque appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right of redemption can be exercised by Estoque?

HELD:

NO. It was ruled that Estoque cannot exercise the right of redemption.

Estoque became the actual owner of the southeastern third of lot 802 on October 29, 1951. She never
acquired an undivided interest in lot 802. And when eight years later Crispina Perez sold to the
Pajimula the western two-thirds of the same lot, Estoque did not acquire a right to redeem the
property thus sold, since their respective portions were distinct and separate.

(1) The deed of sale to Estoque (Annex A of the complaint) clearly specifies the object sold as
the southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area of 840 square meters,
more or less. Granting that the seller, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania could not have sold this
particular portion of the lot owned in common by her and her two brothers, Lorenzo and Ricardo
Perez, by no means does it follow that she intended to sell to appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided
interest in the lot forementioned. There is nothing in the deed of sale to justify such inference. That
the seller could have validly sold her onethird undivided interest to appellant is no proof that she did
choose to sell the same. .

(2) While on the date of the sale to Estoque (Annex A) said contract may have been
ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed, the
transaction was validated and became fully effective when the next day (October 29, 1951) the
vendor, Crispina Perez, acquired the entire interest of her remaining co-owners (Annex B) and
thereby became the sole owner of Lot No. 802 of the Rosario Cadastral survey (Llacer vs. Muñoz, 12
Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly prescribes that — .
 When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the
seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or
grantee."

DISPOSITIVE:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal is armed. Cost against appellant
Estoque.

DIVERSIFIED CREDIT V. ROSADO digested by:

PNB v. CA digested by:

SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM V. JUDGE CAMPOS digested by:

LIM V. MOLDEX LAND digested by:

CAPITLE V. DE GABAN digested by: Paula Barroga

G.R. No. 146890 June 8, 2004

LILIAN CAPITLE, SOFRONIO CORREJADO, ARTEMIO CORREJADO, VICENTE CORREJADO,

CECILIA CORREJADO, GLORIA VDA. DE BEDUNA, ROGELIA CORREJADO, MANUEL
CORREJADO, RODOLFO CORREJADO, TERESITA C. AMARANTE, JUANITA CORREJADO
AND JULIETA C. PEREGRINO, petitioners,
vs.
JULIETA VDA. DE GABAN, JULIA CORREJADO AND HERMINIGILDO CORREJADO,
respondents.

27 Capitle vs. Vda. de Gaban TOPIC

GR NO. 146890 DATE June 8, 2004 Extinguishment of co-
ownership
PONENTE: CARPIO-MORALES, J
FACTS

• Fabian Correjado (Fabian) inherited from his father Santos Correjado two parcels of land subject of the
case at bar.
• Fabian died intestate in 1919. He was survived by four children,namely: Julian, Zacarias, Francisco and
Manuel, all surnamed Correjado.
• After Fabian’s death in 1919, his son Julian occupied and cultivated the two subject parcels of land (the
property) until his death in 1950. He was survived by three children, namely, herein respondents Julieta
vda. de Gaban (Julieta), Julia Correjado (Julia)and Hermegildo Correjado.
• Julian’s brother Francisco died in 1960. He was survived by herein petitioners Manuel Correjado,
Teresita C. Amarante, Juanita Correjado, Rodolfo Correjado, and Jileta Peregrino.
• Julian’s brother Zacarias died in 1984. He was survived by the other petitioners herein, Aurora P. vda.
de Correjado, Lilia Capitle,Artemio Correjado, Cecilia Correjado, Rogelia Correjado (Rogelia),Sofronio
Correjado, Vicente Correjado and Gloria vda. de Beduna.
• On November 26, 1986, petitioners filed a complaint for partition of the property and damages before
the (RTC) against respondents.
RTC RULING: Dismissed the complaint upon the grounds of prescription and laches.
CA RULING: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving that Francisco and Zacarias were illegitimate.
Petitioners also failed to prove that Zacarias and Francisco were legitimate.
Upon the disputable presumption, however, that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered a lawful contract of marriage, it is presumed that Fabian and Maria were lawfully
married, hence, their children Zacarias and Francisco (as well as Manuel)-predecessors-in-interest of
petitioners were legitimate children and, therefore, they co-owned with Julian the property.
Acquisitive prescription in favor of appellees had already set in. Appellees had performed unequivocal
acts of repudiation.
ISSUE/S:
WON the petitioners action has prescribed. (YES)
PETITIONER (Lilian Capitle, Sofronio Correjado,
Artemio Correjado, Vicente Correjado, Cecilia
Correjado, Gloria Vda. De Beduna, Rogelia
Correjado, Manuel Correjado, Rodolfo Correjado,
Teresita C. Amarante, Juanita Correjado And
Julieta C. Peregrino)
-Alleging that Fabian contracted two marriages, the
first with Brigida Salenda who was the mother of
Julian, and the subsequent one with Maria Catahay
(Maria) who was the mother of Zacarias, Manuel
and Francisco; that the property remained
undivided even after the death of Julian in 1950, his
children-herein respondents having appropriated
unto themselves the use and enjoyment of the
property, to the exclusion of petitioners; and that
respondents refused to deliver petitioners’ share in
the property despite demands therefor and for
partition.
RESPONDENT (Julieta Vda. De Gaban, Julia
Correjado and Herminigildo Correjado)
-In the intestate estate of their great grand father
Santos Correjado, petitioners were not adjudicated
any share in the property, for Maria, the mother of
petitioners’ respective fathers
Francisco and Zacarias, was just a mistress of
Fabian, hence, Francisco and Zacarias (as well as
Manuel) were illegitimate who were not entitled to
inherit under the old Civil Code (Spanish Civil Code
of 1889).

RULING: Assuming arguendo that petitioners’ respective fathers Francisco and Zacarias were
legitimate and, therefore, were co-owners of the property: From the moment co-owner Julian occupied
in 1919 and claimed to be the absolute and exclusive owner of the property and denied his brothers
any share therein up to the time of his death in 1950, the question involved is no longer one of
partition but of ownership in which case imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be
invoked.
The adverse possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest—herein respondents as
exclusive owner of the property having entailed a period of about 67 years at the time of the
filing of the case at bar in 1986, ownership by prescription had vested in them.

DISPOSITIVE
Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
ADDITIONAL NOTES
SANTOS CORREJADO > 2 PARCELS OF LAND
FABIAN CORREJADO (1919)
1. JULIAN C (1950) - MOTHER BRIGIDA SALENDA
A. JULIETA C
B. JULIA C
C. HERMEGILDO C
2. ZACARIAS C (1984) - MOTHER CATAHAY (MARIA)
A. AURORA P. VDA DE C
B. LILIA CAPITLE
C. ARTEMIO C
D. CECILIA C
E. ROGELIA C/
F. SOFRONIO C
G. VICENTE C
H. GLORIA VDA. DE BEDUNA
3. FRANCISCO C (1960) - MOTHER CATAHAY (MARIA)
A. MANUEL C.
B. TERESITA C. AMARANTE
C. JUANITA C.
D. JULIETA P.
4. MANUEL C - MOTHER CATAHAY (MARIA)

Art. 2263, New Civil Code

ART. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with orwithout a will, before the effectivity of
this Code, shall be governed by theCivil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court.
xxx

ART. 807, Spanish Civil Code of 1889

ART. 807. The following are forced heirs:
Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
The widower or widow, natural children legally acknowledged, and the father or the mother of the latter, in
the manner and to the extent established by Articles 834, 835, 836, 837, 840, 841, 842, and 846.

ART. 939, Spanish Civil Code of 1889

ART. 939. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, the natural children legally
acknowledged and those legitimated by royal concession shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased.

Art. 1134, New Civil Code

ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years.
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.