Chapter-2 Hazard Identification Techniques

2
 TSCR
Pellet Plant
Merchant Mill

Long Products
Fines
Sinter Plant
New Bar Mill
Iron Ore

CUSTOMER
Hot
Wire Rod Mill
Metal

Fluxes Coke Blast Hot Strip Mill

Flat Products
Furnaces

Coke Plant
Coal Steel Making
Converter
Cold Rolling Mill

Raw Materials Raw Materials Iron Making Steel Rolling

Processing Making

3
3
Some Details of 6 MT Integrated Steel Plant
Main Raw Materials: Piping and Instrumentation diagram (P&ID):
A piping and instrumentation diagram is a
Iron ore detailed diagram in the process industry which
shows the piping and process equipment
Coke together with the instrumentation and control
Sinter devices

Pallets Man Power:

Fluxes Around 15,000 people
It may cost Rs 50,000 Cr
Area- 5000 Acres

Prof. O B Krishna, Center of Excellence in Safety Engineering

4
and Analytics(CoE-SEA)
5
Introduction
• Hazards are induced in a system during its design and operations
• Design life cycle of a system is required to be analyzed for detailed hazard identification
• There are seven stages in design life cycle
Table 1 Important Hazard Identification Techniques

The hazard identification techniques have been divided into

four categories depending on the area in which they are
predominantly applied:
(i) Process hazards identification
(ii) Hardware hazards identification
(iii) Control hazards identification, and
(iv) Human hazards identification.
Figure 2 Project Life cycle and applicability of hazard Identification Techniques
Preliminary Hazard List (PHL)
INTRODUCTION
i. The preliminary hazard list (PHL) is an analysis technique for identifying and listing potential
hazards and mishaps that may exist in a system.
ii. The PHL is performed during conceptual or preliminary design and is the starting point for
all subsequent hazard analyses.
iii. Once a hazard is identified in the PHL, the hazard will be used to launch in-depth hazard
analyses and evaluations, as more system design details become available.
iv. The PHL is a means for management to focus on hazardous areas that may require more
resources to eliminate the hazard or control risk to an acceptable level. Every hazard
identified on the PHL will be analyzed with more detailed analysis techniques.
PHL Overview

The technique was established very early in the history of the system safety discipline. It was formally
instituted and promulgated by the developers of MIL-STD-882.
PHL Methodology
PHL Methodology
PHL Methodology
PHL Worksheet
Hazard Checklist: Hazardous Energy Sources

Source: PRA, Kumamoto & Henley, Wiley, 1996

Hazard Checklist: Hazardous Processes and Events

Source: PRA, Kumamoto & Henley, Wiley, 1996

Case: Ace Missile System

Missile head
WCS – Weapon Control System
Ace Missile System Conceptual Information
PHL for Ace Missile
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
INTRODUCTION
i. The preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) technique is a safety analysis tool for identifying
hazards, their associated causal factors, effects, level of risk, and mitigating design
measures when detailed design information is not available.
ii. The PHA provides a methodology for identifying and collating hazards in the system and
establishing the initial system safety requirements (SSRs) for design from preliminary
and limited design information.
iii. The intent of the PHA is to affect the design for safety as early as possible in the
development program. The PHA normally does not continue beyond the subsystem
hazard analysis (SSHA)
PHA Overview

TLM- top Level Mishaps

SCF- Safety Critical Factors
SSR- System Safety Requirements
PHA Process
PHA Process
PHA Worksheet

IMRI-Initial Mishap Risk Index

FMRI- Final Mishap Risk Index
Initial Mishap Risk Index
Hazard Control Hierarchy
Case: Ace Missile System Missile Structure
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
i. A HAZOP study is a formal systematic procedure used to review the design and
operation of a potentially hazardous process facility. It is used to identify deviations
from normal safe operation, which could lead, to hazards or operability problems, and to
define any actions necessary to deal with these
ii. The HAZOP technique was initially developed in the 1960s to analyze major chemical
process systems but has since been extended to other areas, including mining operations
and other types of process systems and other complex systems such as nuclear power
plant operation and software development.
iii. HAZOP provides qualitative estimates to understand risk exposure to people, Assets and
environment. Recommendations of QRA are based on the mitigating system to reduce the
consequence/ Likelihood and overall risk.
iv. Hazard and Operability studies popularized by the pioneering work at institute of Chemical
Industries (ICI ), UK by Trevor Kletz and Ellis Knowlton in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Terms Definition
STUDY NODES - The locations at which the process parameters are investigated for deviations.

INTENTION - The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of
deviations at the study nodes.

DEVIATIONS - These are departures from the intention which are discovered by systematically
applying the guide words (e.g., "more pressure").

CAUSES - These are the reasons why deviations might occur. Once a deviation has been shown to
have a credible cause, it can be treated as a meaningful deviation. These causes can be equipment
failures, human errors, an unanticipated process state (e.g., change of composition), external
disruptions (e.g., loss of power), etc.

CONSEQUENCES - These are the results of the deviations should they occur (e.g., release of toxic
materials). Trivial consequences, relative to the study objective, are dropped.
HAZOP Process Parameters (Characteristic to particular process)

• Flow
• Volume
• Pressure
• Composition
• Temperature
• Viscosity
• Time
• Agitation
• Level
• Reaction
• Concentration • Component
• Phase

• Power
Guide Words and Meanings (Characteristic to particular parameter)

Guide Words Meaning

No Negation of the Design Intent
Less/low Quantitative Decrease
More/high Quantitative Increase
Part Of Qualitative Decrease
As Well As Qualitative Increase
Reverse Logical Opposite of the Intent
Other Than Complete Substitution
Too long Quantitative Increase (Time)
Too short Quantitative Decrease (Time)
Guide Words and Examples

Guide word Parameter Deviation

NO FLOW NO FLOW

MORE PRESSURE HIGH PRESSURE

AS WELL AS ONE PHASE TWO PHASE

OTHER THAN OPERATION MAINTENANCE

HAZOP Matrix

▪ Along the top of the matrix are process parameters such as flow, pressure, and
temperature

▪ Down the left-hand column are deviation guidewords such as High, Reverse,
and Wrong type of

▪ Some of the cells may be omitted if they are inappropriate to a particular node

▪ For example, the process keyword “flow” is not used when analyzing a vessel
Node number:

S. No. Guidewords Flow Pressure Temperature Time

1 High

Too much

More

Too long

2 Low

Too little

Less

Too short

3 Backwards

Reverse

4 None / off

5 Wrong type of

Action missed

6 As well as

Other than

Part of

Wrong time

7 Miscellaneous
HAZOP FLOW DIAGRAM
DIVIDE SYSTEM INTO
STUDY NODES

SELECT A NODE

RECORD THE APPLY ALL SPECIALIZED GUIDE

CONSEQUENCES AND YES NO
WORDS IN TURN, TURN
CAUSES AND SUGGEST HAZARDS / OPERATION
REMEDIES PROBLEMS?

NOT SURE

NEED MORE
INFORMATION
HAZOP Procedure
1. Divide process flow into sections, i.e. reactor, storage.

2. Choose a study node, i.e. line, vessel, pump.

3. Describe its design intent.

4. Select a guide word / process parameter.

5. Apply a guide word / process parameter.

6. Determine cause(s).
HAZOP Procedure

7. Evaluate consequences/problems.

8. Recommend action: what? who? when?

9. Record the results

10. Repeat 5 to 9 for a new guide word / process parameter.

11. Repeat 4 to 10 for a new process parameter / guide word.

12. Repeat 2 to 11 for a new study node.

13. Repeat 1 to 12 for a new section.

Continuous Process Example-HAZOP
DAP (Diammonium phosphate) is a concentrated phosphate-based fertilizer. Phosphorus is an
essential nutrient along with Nitrogen and plays a vital role in the development of new plant tissues and
the regulation of protein synthesis in crops.
The typical formulation is 18-46-0 (18% N, 46% P2O5, 0% K2O).
A

PHOSPHORIC ACID
STUDY
B NODE 1

STUDY STUDY
AMMONIA NODE 2 NODE 3
C

DIAMMONOUM
PHOSPHATE (DAP)
 Continuous Process Example for HAZOP
• In this process, the phosphoric acid and ammonia are mixed, and a
NP fertilizer, diammonium phosphate (DAP) results, if the reaction of
ammonia is complete.

• If too little phosphoric acid is added, the reaction is incomplete, and

excess ammonia results.

• Too little ammonia available to the reactor results in a safe but

undesirable product (mono-ammonium phosphate).
o Loss of material (phosphoric acid)
o Corrode downstream units

• The HAZOP team is assigned to investigate "Personnel Hazards

from the Reaction".
 For Study Node 1

Parameter :Flow
Guide word: NO
Deviation: NO & FLOW (no flow at study node 1)
Causes:
• Valve A falls closed
• Phosphoric acid supply exhausted
• Plug in pipe, pipe ruptures
Consequences: Excess ammonia in reactor and release to work area
(excess pressure – pressure relief valve rupture, ammonia with
down stream products leading to a death, sub-consciousness)
Suggested Action: Automatic closure of valve B on loss of flow
from phosphoric acid supply.
 For Study Node 1

Guide word: LESS

Deviation: LESS & FLOW (reduced flow at study node 1 )
Causes:
• Valve A partially closed
• Partial plug or leak in pipe
• Cavitation
Consequences: Excess ammonia in reactor and release to work area.
Amount released is related to quantitative reduction in supply. Team
member assigned to calculate toxicity level versus flow reduction.
Suggested Action: Automatic closure of valve B based on reduced
flow in pipe from phosphoric acid supply. Set point dependent on
toxicity versus reduced flow calculations.
 For Study Node 1

Guide word: MORE

Deviation: MORE & FLOW (increased flow at study node 1)
Causes: Flow meter gives inferior results, pump performance
enhanced due to high electric voltage.
Consequences: Excess phosphoric acid degrades product but
presents less hazard to workplace.
 For Study Node 1

Guide word: PART OF

Deviation: PART OF & FLOW (decreased concentration at study
node 1)
Causes:
• Vendor delivers wrong material or concentration
• Error in charging phosphoric acid supply tank
Consequences: Excess ammonia in reactor and release to work area.
Amount released is related to quantitative reduction in supply.
Team member assigned to calculate toxicity level versus flow
reduction
Suggested Action: Check phosphoric acid concentration during
charging. If it is low, add appropriate concentrated phosphoric acid.
 For Study Node 1

Guide word: AS WELL AS

Deviation: AS WELL AS & FLOW (Increase concentration of
phosphoric acid)
(Not a realistic consideration since highest available concentration
used to charge supply)

Guide word: REVERSE

Deviation: REVERSE & FLOW (Reverse flow at study node 1)
Causes: No reasonable mechanism for reverse flow
For Study Node 1
Guide word: OTHER THAN
Deviation: OTHER THAN & FLOW (material other than
phosphoric acid in line A)
Causes:
• wrong delivery from vendor
• wrong material chosen from plant warehouse
Consequences: Depends on substitution; team member assigned to
test potential substitutions based on availability of other materials
at site.
Recommended Action: Check on material chosen before charging
phosphoric acid supply tank.
For Study Node 1

i. Repeat the same process for the other parameters, characteristic to the process such as
Temperature, Pressure, etc.
ii. Total deviations ,causes , gaps recommendations for the node -1 is done
Similarly…

• By choosing other study nodes for flow sheet sections.

• Different process parameters and combining them with the guide

words.

Continue this process…

HAZOP Study Report

• Each action and the person responsible for completing the action
is recorded on the record sheet.

• Report should include

• introduction
• brief process description
• keyword combinations used
• results and analysis of main findings
• conclusions and recommendations
• references, and
• appendices.
 HAZOP Study Review

• Review meetings monitor the completion of actions recorded on the

record sheets and are classified as follows:
• action is complete
• action is in progress, and
• action is incomplete awaiting further information.

• Record all action follow-up requirements to demonstrate reasoning and

also record hazards not requiring action including the reasons why no
action was necessary.
CASE STUDY: Hazop work sheet propane storage & propane dilution system-Tata Steel (K)

SL NO NODE-NO SYSTEM PAGE NO

1 301 ROAD TANKER TO PROPANE STORAGES 4
2 302 SUPPLY OF PROPANE TO CONSUMER 9
3 303 PROPANE DILUTION SYSTEM 14
Figure xx Propane distribution system installation for 3MT slab caster

Figure 1 P&ID of propane storage and distribution 54

Simple P&ID of Propane Distribution System

Figure 1 P&ID of propane storage and distribution 55

 Node: 301 Propane Storage System P&ID No. G/P&I/6654/2013
Design Intent Tanker to Storage
Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Remark/Action
Compressor C- 01/02/03 Low filling rate in storage tank Standby Compressor Provided
Malfunction T1/T2/T3 C- 01/02/03

Compressor Trip at 21Kg/cm2

No filling in Storage tank Pressure Safety valve
No/ Less Flow Tanker designed for 21kg/cm2
testing should be
ROV-1 Stuck Close T1/T2/T3
Pressure gauge &, Pressure incorporated in
Increase in Pressure in Tanker safety Valve has been provided maintenance schedule
on tanker

During operation of propane

liquid filling from Road Tanker
to Storage Tank, due to More or
high flow, Stating Charge is
generated. To avoid the hazard Resistance is to be
from static Charge in pipeline checked for all
More pressure difference in Tanker
More Flow Static Charge possible Line ,Tanker and Tank is Earthed and Propane storage tank, earthling Strip and
and Tank Earth pit and a record
Jumper made of Copper,
is to be maintained..
Aluminum or G.I. strip for
electrical continuity is to be
provided in all flanges

R-1
 Node: 301 Propane Storage System P&ID No. G/P&I/6654/2013
Design Intent Tanker to Storage
Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Remark/Action
Lower Pressure Covered in Less flow
Higher Temperature External fire Fire and Explosion Hazard PRV-01 and PG-01,12,13,14 Provided

High pressure Gas detector provided GLD 1, 2, 3 Provided.

Water Sprinkler provided for the Storage tanks

and Tanker unloading station

PSV provided.
Lower Temperature No Issue
Higher Level Transfer not stopped at Tank Pressurization LT-11/21/31 ,PT11,21,31 are provided in the
high level tank same will close respective ROV-11/21/31
(Storage Tank T-1,2,3)
Lower Level No Issue
Concentration NA
Impurity NA
Utility Failure Power No Transfer of Propane All ROV and SV will Close DG should be provided for
from Tanker to Storage backup power for the
Tank. operation of Propane
storage system
Compressor C-01, C-02 &
C-03 will stop. R-2
 Start-up
Proper SOP is to be made for attending
Start Up & Shutdown of Propane system
Shut-down

Proper Isolation,

N2-purging &
Maintenance
Permit System

Should be included SOP

Excess flow of liquid and Excess Flow Check

temperature fall at Tankers
Leakage Corrosion of line
 Node: 302 Propane Storage System P&ID No. G/P&I/6654/2013 R1
Design Intent To Supply Propane to Consumer
Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Remark/Action

Standby System Provided

No/ Less Flow ROV stuck close No supply to Customer
Flow meter No-91A/B/C provided

Fall In temperature
EFV-16/26/36 provided
Excess flow Pipe line
Leakage
More Flow
More consumption from
EFV-16/26/36 provided
Customer side

Reverse Flow Not possible NRV-41/51/61 provided

Covered in higher
Higher Pressure
Temperature below

Covered in Low
Lower Pressure
flow
 Node: 302 Propane Storage System P&ID No. G/P&I/6654/2013 R1
Design Intent To Supply Propane to Consumer
Remark/Acti
Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation
on

Higher Level
WLI-41/51/61
Water in vaporizer SV-42/52/62 stuck open No Issue
indicates
V-1/2/3

Lower
NA
Concentration

Impurity NA

DG should be provided for

Power failure No vaporization and hence no supply None backup power (R-2)
Utility Failure
Instrument Air Failure Control valves failure None Provide N2 Line as a standby
for Air(R-3)
Node: 302 Propane Storage System P&ID No. G/P&I/6654/2013 R1

Design
To Supply Propane to Consumer
Intent
Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Remark/Action
Maintenance To be considered later i. Proper Isolation,

ii. N2-purging &

iii. Permit System Should be included

iv. S OP

Leakage Corrosion of line Excess flow of Excess Flow Check

liquid and Valves-16/26/36
temperature fall provided
 Node: 303 Propane Dilution System
P&ID No.
Design Intent To Dilute Propane
Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Remark/Action

DG should be provided for

backup power (Mentioned
None in R-2)
Diluted propane not available
Power Failure Mr .Arindam Panigrahi
PGs-PG2,PG9 inlet and Bypass line with isolating
No Flow
outlet valve to be provided for the Line Drain and filter
Filter choke-TIF1
No/ Less Flow filter/ Standby Filter (R-4)
Less Pressure replacement process to
PI-103
(Propane) be incorporated in SOP
Provide Low pressure
Alarm. (R-5)
No/Less Flow

(Air)

As Propane Dilution System

Lack of supply of Air(tank empty) Diluted propane not available Standby Tank Provided will be away from Propane
storage one more DG should Mr .Arindam Panigrahi
Power Failure Diluted propane not available None be provided for backup
power in Dilution area.-R-6
 Node: 303 Propane Dilution System P&ID No.
Design Intent To Dilute Propane

Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguard Recommendation Remark/Action

Higher Pressure Covered in more flow

Lower Pressure Covered in No/Less Flow

Higher Temperature External Fire Fire/Explosion Fire Fighting System

(Propane)
Hot Supply from Vaporizer Interlocks in Vaporizer V1,2,3
provided
Lower Temperature (Propane) Considered in leakage(below)

Higher Level NA

Lower Level NA

Impurity/ Contaminant Dust Improper mixture Filter Provided-TIF-1 Bypass line to be Provided for the Filter

(R-4)
 Other
NA
material
Calorimeter will not Battery backup may be provided for
Utility Failure Power failure (Covered Above) No
work Dilution system (R-7).
Sampling NA
Proper Isolation, N2-purging &
Maintenance To be considered later Permit System Should be
included , S OP
During any leakage in the field, in the
Propane Dilution area for taking
Fire/Explosion immediate action , One/ or two CCTV
Leak detector and
Propane Pipe line failure/ Flange or Gasket camera may be provided in the field, so
Loss of Firefighting System
Fall in temperature Proper SOP to be made to attend
containment/ Failure that any leakage in the system is
Provided
in Pipeline immediately noticed by the Control leakage/ Emergency Handling
Leakage Methyl Mercaptan pipe line failure.
Gas masks and Analyzer Room official and proper action can be
Toxic release
taken without delay.

(R-8)
Methyl Mercaptan atmospheric
HSE/
Gas masks and Portable concentration meter may be provided
ergonomic Methyl Mercaptan Toxic release
Analyzer near working area for continuous
issues
monitoring..(R-9)
Regulatory
None
issues
Proper SOP is to be made for
Start-up To be considered later attending Start Up & Shutdown
of Propane system
When I was working with hazardous integrated Iron & steel plant, very often used to hear about HAZOP studies,
to study the hazards and reduce the risks of a process. People used to feel a sigh of relief in this process. We used to
work with ineffective techniques for hazard analysis and risk reduction in other important areas like construction,
maintenance etc. The result is so many incidents resulting into injuries, property loss and more importantly delays
in the goals.
Having understood this HAZOP methodology, always used to ask ‘why not we use HAZOP methodology to these
disciplines’. Nobody used to support or appreciate, this idea ,brushing away with the comments like not possible,
very expensive, no skills , no body tried etc. It gave me great consolation ,when Dave Macdonald supported this
idea in his book titled ‘Practical Hazop’s ,Trips and Alarms’.
Now IIT could develop ‘Hazop for all Disciplines’ and help the industries.
Learning : Do not leave any idea to solve important problems even discouraged by the experts or practitioners as
they have fixed minds, till achieve the goal

65
Hazops, we have seen are operated on a very simple set of principles:

▪ Structure the plant or system into component operations.

▪ Explain each operation and test it for its tolerance to all possible deviations.
▪ Recommend safeguards and corrective actions, where needed.
These principles supported by guideword prompts for deviations make it possible to construct Hazop methods
for a wide range of plant and processes. These Hazop methods can be extended to many other areas to
understand the deviations using their suitable element and guidewords, such as

▪ Maintenance Hazard Operability studies.

▪ Cultural Hazard Operability Studies.
▪ Mechanical parts and machines Hazard Operability studies.
▪ Electrical systems Hazards operability studies.
▪ Material handling Hazards operability studies

▪ Electronic control systems Hazards operability studies

▪ Computer –based control system Hazards operability studies

▪ Alarm systems Hazards operability studies

Guide words:

Hardware Software Control systems

▪ Device error
▪ Bad measurement
-Loss of signal(zero read)
-Loss of signal (full scale read)
-Signal erratic
-I/O failure
-Control card failure
-Processor rack failure’
-Abnormal temperature
• Program corruption
• Memory management error
• Addressing error, Data failure
• Timing overload
• Timeout failure
• Endless loops
• Message failure
• Failure of counters
• Sequence interpretation error
• Data validation problems
• Operation override
• Power failure
• Power surges
• Field 24V failure
• Rack 9V supply failure
• Static electricity
• Physical contamination
• Abnormal environment
• Redundancy in system architecture
• Error diagnosis adequacy
• Operator training
• Code security
• System crash recovery
Incident Critical Elements (ICE’s) or Parameters

If we look at the operations of the industries, from construction to decommissioning, some elements or activities
contribute, most for the incidents and these elements are called Incident Critical Elements (ICE’s). Maintenance is
one of the important activities to retain the integrity of the equipment or process. Some of the ICE’s for the
maintenance activities are mentioned below.

i. Energy Isolation ix. Access

xiv. Moving Equipment
ii. Material handling (cranes failure, Rigging defects) x. PPE’s
xv. Lifting tools
iii. Explosion xi. Handling Facilities
xvi. Hand tools
iv. Work at height xii. Procedures
xvii. Permit to work (PTW)
v. Welding xiii. Ergonomics
xviii.Mechanical Integrity
vi. Gas cutting xiv. Communication
xix. Supervision
vii. Confined space requirements xv. Skills and Training
viii. Slip, trip, fall

69
Table 1 Comparison between Hazop and Maintenance operability study (MOP)

Hazop Maintenance operability study(Mop)

Used to manage hazards of processes Used to manage the hazards during maintenance activities

The whole system divided into sub

Nodes Nodes Imp maintenance Equipment
systems or nodes.

Energy isolation, Material Handling, Confined space, Work

Parameter Temp ,flow, pressure etc. ICP’s
at height, Quality of the spare part etc.

Fully Implemented (FI),Not Implemented(NI), Partially

Guide word Less, no, more Guide word Implemented (PI)
Quality of the spare: As per standard specification,

Deviation Less flow, no flow, over flow Deviation Implemented in electrical, Not implemented in gas lines

70
Maintenance Operability Study Guide Words
1. To find out the adequacy requirement and availability of each of ICE , the following guide words may be
used for most of the parameters by the Mop team.
(a) Is the requirement fully complied?
(b) Is the requirement partially complied?
(c) Is the requirement not complied?

For a ICE like Quality of the spare part, guide word could be Standard specification followed, standard supplier
etc may be used
1. From this , one can understand what is available, causes for inadequacy.
2. Estimate their consequences.
3. Then, necessary interventions could be designed and implemented so that maintenance
activities are carried out safely.

71
Case study-1 on Maintenance Operability Study (Mop)

In the steel plant operations, the slabs are cast to a weight of 28 tons (based on the downstream coil sizes and
the yield requirements).Each cast from the slab caster will have a run of around 25000 tons. It means, this
25000 tons slab continuously coming out of slab caster has to cut into approximately 893 slabs at hot
condition. Propane continuous gas cutting machine is used for this purpose. The propane is a hazardous gas
and comes from the propane underground tanks. These in turn filled by the road tankers. The P&ID of the
propane gas plant is attached. The storage bullet has worked for five years and hence requires preventive
maintenance activity to be done.

72
Figure 1 P&ID of propane storage and distribution 73
Maintenance activities can be divided as follows
1. Cleaning the tank, manually.

2. Inspection of all joints by die penetration test ,inside and outside of the joints.

3. Change the two valves.

4. Paint the external surface of the tank.

74
Activity (Node) Detail of Activity System Page number

101 Cleaning the tank, manually. Propane gas storage

Inspection of all joints by die

102 penetration test ,inside and Propane gas storage
outside of the joints.

Propane gas unloading and

103 Change the two valves.
filling

Paint the external surface of the

104 Propane gas storage
tank.

75
 Parameters or Incident Critical
Maintenance Operability Study (Mop) of Propane Tank Elements(ICE’s)

1. Energy isolation
Maintenance activities can be divided as follows 2. Material handling(Cranes failure, Rigging
defects)
1. Cleaning the tank, manually. 3. Explosion
4. Work at height
2. Inspection of joints by die penetration test, inside and outside of the joints. 5. Welding
6. Gas cutting
3. Change the two valves. 7. Confined space requirements
8. Slip, trip, fall
4. Paint the external surface of the tank 9. Access
10. PPE’s
11. Handling Facilities
List of Nodes/ Activities used in the Mop of Propane tank 12. Procedures
13. Ergonomics
14. Communication
15. Skills and Training
Activity Detail of Activity System Page 16. Moving Equipment
(Node) number 17. Lifting tools
18. Hand tools
101 Cleaning the tank, manually. Propane gas storage
19. Permit to work(PTW)
102 Inspection of joints by die penetration Propane gas storage 20. Mechanical Integrity
test, inside and outside of the joints. 21. Supervision
103 Change the two valves. Propane gas
Guide words applied
unloading and filling i. Partially done/ Not done
104 Paint the external surface of the tank. Propane gas storage ii. Partially suitable/ Not suitable
iii. Partially adequate/ Not adequate

Parameter or Incident Critical Element + Guide word = Deviation 76

TSK, Propane Station
Node-101
Parameter/ ICE Deviation
Electrical energy partial or
no isolation
Propane energy Partial or no Gas flow not stopped
Energy Isolation Isolation positively
Nitrogen Energy Partial or
no Isolation
Ventilation assurance Not felt the
Partial or no implementation requirement.
Availability of low voltage
(24V) lighting. Partial or no
Confined space implementation.
Rescue mechanism Partial
or no implementation
Non provision of ladders for
Work at height going up and into the tank.
Welding machine, process
Welding and welding operator,
Partial or not suitable
Mop WORK SHEET PROPANE STORAGE & PROPANE DILUTION SYSTEM
Cleaning of propane storage tank of Propane storage system P&ID- G/P&I/6855/2013, Storage Tank
Cause Root Cause Consequence Safeguard Available Recommendation
Implement Energy source
Energy Source People may get
Lack of knowledge Full Energy Isolation Verbal agreement Identification and Energy
properly not identified electrocuted
Isolation fully.
People while working in
Valves are not blanked. Only Implement blanking of valves
Inlet valves not blanked the tank may be exposed Valves isolation
closed Numbers-
to gas
After purging the tank,
Nitrogen valve not Nitrogen valves
Nitrogen valve not Asphyxiation in the tank Nitrogen valves are closed. Blank the Nitrogen Valves
blanked blanking.
isolated positively
Air circulation systems Arrangement of air
Asphyxiation in the tank Available -----
arrangement. compressor lines
Non availability of Not knowing the Availability of 24V
Shock to the people Available -----
24V supply importance. supply
Poor consequence
Rescue mechanism and
management. Fatal
Non availability Not planning earlier trained people, within Available -----
implication, in case of
the team
emergency.
No provision into the Trip and fall. Could be Availability of proper
design.
No planning earlier
any consequence. ladders
Wooden ladders available Suggest to use metallic ladders.
Not suitable welding Availability of right
machine, non- welding machine, Only transformer type welding Use dc controlled welding
Not known. Not available Shock and electrocution.
availability of correct cables, procedure and machine, non-qualified welder machine.
process and operator. operator.
77
 Parameter/ ICE Deviation
Mobile cranes, chain blocks,
Handling facilities trolleys for material transfer.
Partial or not suitable
Maintenance critical and non-
Procedures critical procedures. Partial or
not suitable
Written, audio and video
communication at the work
Communication and around the work. Partial
or not suitable
Powered hand tools. Partial
Hand tools or not suitable
Workers skills in the trades
Skills and like welding and gas cutting,
training work at height. Partial or not
suitable.
Cause
Not suitable/ fit mobile
cranes, chain blocks and
trolleys.
Live maintenance critical
procedures for important
maintenance activities
not available.
Communication to
workers on maintenance
and safety cortical things.
Powered good condition
hand tools like nut
runners, torque
wrenches, hand grinding
machines, cutters etc.
Lack of competencies in
important maintenance
activities.
Root Cause
System not existing to check
these parameters.
System of developing and
maintaining maintenance
critical procedures (MCP) not
existing.
System inadequate and not
matured
Double insulated powered
hand tools in good condition
to be ensured.
No system of checking the
competencies of welders,
riggers and fitters.
Consequence
Fall of people, materials
resulting in serious an
Incident.
May result into catastrophe
while execution and after
execution.
May result into catastrophe
while execution and after
execution.
May result into electric
shock and injury.
May result in to injuries to
people, bad product quality
resulting in less integrity.
Safeguard
Assurance of fit and
suitable cranes, chain
blocks trolleys etc.
Standard Operating
procedures (SOP’s) should
be developed and
available.
Well documented standard
and aggressive
implementation.
Well documented
requirements including
brands and suppliers for
hand tools.
Competencies of the
workforce to be ensured
before the start of the job.
Available
Tested and fit mobile
equipment and chain
blocks not available
Only few general
procedures available. No
maintenance procedures
available.
No documented clear
communication procedures
Lot of furious hand tools in
use.
No evidence to know the
workforce competencies.
Recommendation
Make a process that tested
and fit mobile equipment
only available for work.
Develop MCP’s and train
people and make these
procedures available.
Good use of written, audio
and video communication
to be developed and
implemented.
Ensure system that right
hand tools are used by
company as well as
contractor employees
Ensure full proof system of
ensuring competencies of
the workforce of own and
contractors.
78
Parameter/ ICE Deviation Cause Root Cause Consequence Safeguard Available Recommendation

Lack of systems to
Systems, equipment Good systems in
ensure access to fire Systems should be Fire systems and fire
and use of fire May result into place for fire Ensure access to
tenders, fire hydrant available to keep fighting standards
Fire fighting fighting equipment. property and human fighting, but access emergency equipment’s
systems fitness and dynamic fire fighting and implementation
Partially adequate or loss to fire tenders not like fire tenders.
fire fighting and fire hydrants. at the site.
not adequate clear.
knowledge
Good PTW
People allowed to
Loose procedures People may get into procedures and
work place without
and lenient hazards and training to the
Permit to making work area No PTW procedures PTW given without Implement with zero
implementation. consequence may be concerned should be
work(PTW) safe to work. followed physical verification. tolerance.
Work force do not fatal to them and to there with audit,
Partially adequate or
see value in PTW the machines. observation and
not adequate
consequence.
Supervisors should
Supervisors given
have competencies
There is no method The whole group competency
on work and Supervisors do not Competent
Supervision of evaluation of the will be at risk due to certificate after -----
standards. Partially have competencies. supervisors available
supervisors. weak supervision. training and
adequate or not
verification
adequate

79
References

• Ericson, C. A. (2015). Hazard analysis techniques for system safety. John Wiley & Sons.
• Henley, E. J., & Kumamoto, H. (1996). Probabilistic risk assessment and management for
engineers and scientists. IEEE Press (2nd Edition).
• J. Maiti, Industrial Safety Engineering. Web-based course on National program on Technology
Enhanced Learning, IIT Kharagpur,2018. Available at
https://nptel.ac.in/courses/110/105/110105094/.

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