No. L-16749.  January 31, 1963.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court of domicile
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C.
AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of
the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
Private International Law; Determination of
citizenship; U.S. citizenship not lost by stay in
Philippines before independence.—The
citizenship that the deceased acquired in California
when he resided there from 1904 to 1913 was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a
territory of the United States until 1946, and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to
have intended to abandon his California citizenship
by acquiring another.
Same; Validity of testamentary provisions;
Meaning of “national law” in Article 16, Civil
Code; Conflict of law rules in California to be
applied in case at bar.—The “national law”
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot
possibly apply to any general American Law, because
there is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each
state of the union having its own private law
applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
the state. It can therefore refer to no other than the
private law of the state of which the decedent was a
citizen. In the case at bar, the State of California
prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens, an internal
law for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of
law rules for its citizens domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Hence, reason demands that the
California conflict of law rules should be applied in
this jurisdiction in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Domicile; Factors considered in
determining aliens’ domicile in the Philippines.
—An American citizen who was born in New York,
migrated to California, resided there for nine years,
came to the Philippines in 1913, and very rarely re-
turned to California and only for short visits, and who
appears to have never owned or acquired a home or
properties in that state, shall be considered to have
his domicile in the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Rule of resorting to the law
of the domicile in determining matters with
foreign element involved.—The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should govern
in most matters or rights which follow the person of
the owner.
bound to apply its own law as directed in the
conflict of law rule of decedents state;
Application of the renvoi doctrine.—The conflict
of law rule in California, Article 946 Civil Code, refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines
in the case at bar. The court of domicile can not and
should not refer the case back to California, as such
action would leave the issue incapable of
determination, because the case will then be tossed
back and forth between the two states. If the
question has to be decided, the Philippine court must
apply its own law as the Philippines was the domicile
of the decedent, as directed in the conflict of law rule
of the state of the decedent, California, and
especially because the internal law of California
provides no legitime for natural children, while the
Philippine law (Articles 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of
the Philippines makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;
Philippine law to be applied in case at bar.—As
the domicile of the deceased, who was a citizen of
California, was the Philippines, the validity of the
provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child of the latter’s legacy, should be
governed by the Philippine law, pursuant to Article
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Intsance
of Davao, Cusi, Jr., J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for
oppositor-appellant.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said
court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing
the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen
Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring
Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in
case of death without issue, one-half of said residue
to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains
the following provisions:
“3.  I declare x x x that I have but ONE (1)
child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now
residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.
 “4.  I further declare that I now have no
living ascendants, and no descendants except my
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY.
x  x  x  x  x
“7.  I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA
HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo
Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has
she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from
all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the
said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch
of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at
the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as well
as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..
x  x  x  x  x
“12.  I hereby give, devise and bequeath,
unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the
income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: x x x”
It is in accordance with the above-quoted
provisions that the executor in his final account and
project of partition ratified the payment of only
P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed
that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of
partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia,
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as
an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward
E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are
(a) that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural
children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In
amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that
the law that should govern the estate of the
deceased Christensen should not be the internal law
of California alone, but the entire law thereof
because several foreign elements are involved, that
the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
decided in California, Section 946 of the California
Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the
decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was
also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having
been declared an acknowledged natural child of the
decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate
from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E.
Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death, the
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has
the right to dispose of his property in the way he
desires, because the right of absolute dominion over
his property is sacred and inviolable and In re
Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page
179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions
for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence,
this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as
follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL
CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST
SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING
AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION
OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY
THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E.
Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death. But
there is also no question that at the time of his death
he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
following facts admitted by the executor himself in
appellee’s brief:
100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aznar vs. Garcia
“In the proceedings for admission of the will
to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.;
his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed
school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the
U.S. Army Transport “Sheridan” with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the
State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the
Philippines until 1904.
“In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen
returned to the United States and stayed there for
the following nine years until 1913, during which
time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
“Mr. Christensen’s next arrival in the
Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in
1928, he again departed the Philippines for the
United States and came back here the following year,
1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again
returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
“Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen
was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in
April 1945, he left for the United States but returned
to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits “6”, CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits “AA”, “BB” and “CC-Daney”; Exhs. “MM”,
“MM-l”, “MM-2-Daney” and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
1953.)
“In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen
returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in
question herein) which he executed at his lawyers’
offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St.
Luke’s Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953.” (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile
of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded
by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated
to California and resided there for nine years, and
since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned
to California very rarely and only for short visits
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he
appears never to have owned or acquired a home or
properties in that state, which would indicate that he
would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make
home in the State of California.
“Sec.  16.  Residence is a term used with
many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally,
however, it is used to denote something more than
mere physical presence.” (Goodrich on Conflict of
Laws, p. 2).
As to his citizenship, however, We find that
the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913,
was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the
latter was a territory of the United States (not a
state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the
fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that
he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. This
conclusion is in accordance with the following
principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
“The terms ‘residence’ and ‘domicile’ might
well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown,
has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be
domiciled in a place where he has never been. And
he may reside in a place where he has no domicile.
The man with two homes, between which he divides
his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in
it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with
the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however,
that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only
for the particular business in hand, not giving up his
former ‘home,’ he could not be a domiciled New
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires
the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
‘Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one’s domicile.’ Residence, however, is a
term used with many shades of meaning, from the
merest temporary presence to the most permanent
abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et
the only proper one.” (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his
testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows: 
“ART.  16.  Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
“However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may
be found.”
The application of this article in the case at
bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term “national law” is used therein.

There is no single American law governing
the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The “national law” indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in
California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains
the contention of the executor-appellee that under
the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose
of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of
California, which is as follows:
“If there is no law to the contrary, in the
place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
governed by the law of his domicile.”
The existence of this provision is alleged in
appellant’s opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited
in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only
the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued
on executor’s behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California,
the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
abovecited case, should govern the determination of
the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the
State of California of which Christensen was a citizen.
Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question
of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been
defined by various authors, thus:
“The problem has been stated in this way:
‘When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a
jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the
reference to the purely internal rules of law of the
foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law
minus its Conflict of Laws rules?’
“On logic, the solution is not an easy one.
The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that
is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which
referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once
having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the
reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the
‘endless chain of references’ which has so often been
criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law
of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference
back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason
why the original reference should be the internal law
rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that
such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round,
but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law.
Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the
rule of reference.
“Strangely enough, both the advocates for
and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their
respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this
choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two
states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be
accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine,
the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of
the forum. In the case stated above, had the
Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would
have been against the woman; if the suit had been
brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected
the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The
same result would happen, though the courts would
switch with respect to which would hold liability, if
both courts accepted the renvoi.
“The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory
in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of
divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of
Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of
the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the
forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person’s title to land,
recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every
court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the
parties, will be valid everywhere.” (Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
“X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate,
domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question
arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X’s next of kin.
“Assume (1) that this question arises in a
Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of
laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for
an application of the law of the deceased’s last
domicile. Since by hypothesis X’s last domicile was
France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court
to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in
French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show
that if a French court were called upon to determine
how this property should be distributed, it would
refer the distribution to the national law of the
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course
of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of
distributions, on the assumption that this is what a
French court would do. If it accepts the so-called
renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus
applying its own law.
“This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is
presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule
of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the
law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower
sense. The German term for this judicial process is
‘Ruckverweisung.’” (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31,
pp. 523-571.)
“After a decision has been arrived at that a
foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are
the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such
foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question
which, while it has been considered by the courts in
but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated
by them as the ‘Renvoyer’ to send back, or the
‘Ruchversweisung’, or the ‘Weiterverweisung’, since
an affirmative answer to the question postulated and
the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in
toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the
forum. x x x (16 C.J.S. 872.)
“Another theory, known as the “doctrine of
renvoi”, has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in
determining the question before it, must take into
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but
also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply
the law to the actual question which the rules of the
other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of
the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally
been repudiated by the American authorities.” (2
Am. Jur. 296)  law of the domicile in the determination of matters
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also
been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in
the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-
531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted
herein below:
“The recognition of the renvoi theory implies
that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or
internal law of the foreign state or country, but its
rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this
theory ‘the law of a country’ means the whole of its
law.
x  x  x  x  x  x  x
“Von Bar presented his views at the meeting
of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in
1900, in the form of the following theses:
“(1)  Every court shall observe the law of its
country as regards the application of foreign laws.
“(2)  Provided that no express provision to
the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
“(a)  The provisions of a foreign law which
disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as
regards their personal statute, and desires that said
personal statute shall be determined by the law of
the domicile, or even by the law of the place where
the act in question occurred.
“(b)  The decision of two or more foreign
systems of law, provided it be certain that one of
them is necessarily competent, which agree in
attributing the determination of a question to the
same system of law.
x  x  x  x  x  x  x
“If, for example, the English law directs its
judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in
accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first
inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute
personal property upon death in accordance with the
law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law
would make the distribution in accordance with the
law of nationality — that is the English law — he
must accept this reference back to his own law.”
We note that Article 946 of the California
Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If
the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own
intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited
In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its
citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the
with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary
law should govern in most matters or rights which
follow the person of the owner.
“When a man dies leaving personal property
in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the
manner of distribution of the property, the law of the
state where he was domiciled at the time of his
death will be looked to in deciding legal questions
about the will, almost as completely as the law of
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of
land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules
control devolution of the personal estate in case of
intestate succession, the same rules should
determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that
the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws
rules at the situs property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is
the general convenience of the doctrine. The New
York court has said on the point: ‘The general
principle that a dispostiton of a personal property,
valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere,
is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first
fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating property
take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than
ever.’” (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp.
442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the
national law is the internal law of California. But as
above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in
other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should
enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of
laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we
are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our
Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California
in accordance with the express mandate thereof and
as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for
those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees’ behalf that the
clause “if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
should govern. This contention can not be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above
the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California
Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the
testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines
in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not
and should not refer the case back to California; such
action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent
was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent,
if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides
no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of
the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson,
39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton
vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to
support the decision can not possibly apply in the
case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the
subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen
of a state in the United States but with domicile in
the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case
that there exists in the state of which the subject is a
citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of
the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the
deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as
the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment
reversed, with costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
Decision reversed and case returned to lower
court with instructions that partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession applies.
Notes.—The words “amount of successional
rights” used in Article 16 of the Civil Code refer to
the extent or amount of property that each heir is
legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for
distribution (Collector v. Fisher, et al., L-11622 and
L-11668, Jan, 23, 1960).
The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country and
is domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case
where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and was
domiciled therein at the time of his death. (Bellis vs.
Bellis, et al., L-23678, June 6, 1967, 20 SCRA 358).

No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET
AL., heirs-appellees.
Wills; Succession; Conflict of laws; Renvoi
doctrine.—The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country and
is domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case
where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and was
domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that,
even assuming that Texas has a conflicts rule
providing that the domiciliary law should govern
successional rights, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it would
still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which
calls for the application of the law of the place where
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
where the properties involved are found in the
Philippines.
Same; Foreign laws.—In the absence of proof as to
the conflicts rule of Texas, it would be presumed to
be the same as our local conflicts rule.
Same; Applicability of national law to
succession; Capacity to succeed—The decedent's
national law governs the order of succession, the
amount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will and capacity to succeed.
Same; Third paragraph of article 17 of New
Civil Code does not modify article 16.—The third
paragraph of article 17 of the New Civil Code is not
an exception to the second paragraph of article 16.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article," when it incorporated article 11 of
the old Civil Code as article 17, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of
article 10 of the old Civil Code, as article 16. The
legislative intent must have been to make the second
paragraph of article 176 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As a further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under article
1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is
governed by the decedent's national law,
Same; Legitimes; Statutes; Special and general
provisions.—Whatever public policy and good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congres has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. It has specifically
chosen the decedent's national law to govern, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Same; Testamentary provision that
successional right to decedent's estate would
be governed by law other than his national law
is void.—A provision in a foreigner's will that his
properties should be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not in accordance with his national
law is void, being contrary to article 16 of the New
Civil Code.
Same; System of legitimes does not apply to
estate of a citizen of Texas.—Where the decedent
was a citizen of Texas and under Texas laws there
are no forced heirs, the system of legitimes in
Philippine law cannot be applied to the succession to
the decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the decedent's will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined
under Texas law.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for
oppositorsappellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for heirs-
appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis,
et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust
Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON. J.P., J,:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question
purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964. approving
the project of partition f iled by the executor in 'Civil
Case No. 37089 therein.
The. facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen
of the State of Texas and of the United States." By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he
had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George
Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by
his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him,
he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis.
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed
a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid f or, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by
his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis,
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and
Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G.
Bellis died, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as
executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of
shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three
(3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00,
which it released from time to time accordingly as
the lower court approved and allowed the various
motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing
its administration, the executor submitted and filed
its "Executor's Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of
stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a
total of ?120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor—pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
testator's Last Will and Testament—divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the
benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by
his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground
that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs
of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition
despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April
27, 1964 by the executor.1 After the parties filed
their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued
an order overruling the oppositions and approving
the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon
Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law
of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration
having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositorsappellants appealed to this Court to
raise the issue of which law must apply—Texas law
or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the
case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia,
L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time
of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a
conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting
the situs theory (lex where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different
from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not
rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they
never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the
Civil Code.
________________
1 He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be
included in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to
file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of
partition; to submit his brief after paying his proportionate
share in the expenses incurred in the printing of the record
on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his
sisters—but this Court resolved to deny the motion.
2 San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil
Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions,
with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights;
(c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will;
and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that—

"ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated. "However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may
be found."
"ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed
by the law of the nation of the decedent."
16—of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos
G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas
law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied
to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is
hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.

Appellants would however counter that Art. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala,
17. paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that— Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their Judgment affirmed.

acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of
the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of
the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code,
while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as
Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose
to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate
and intestate succes-sions. As further indication of
this legislative intent. Congress added a new
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.
Notes.—In Philippine Trust Company vs.
Bohanan, 60 O.G. 4615, it was held that the validity
of the provisions of the will of a citizen of Nevada
should be governed by his national law, the law of
Nevada. Since the Nevada law allows a citizen of
Nevada to dispose of all his property according to his
will, the testamentary provisions therein, depriving
his wife and children of what should be their
legitimes under Philippine law should be respected
and the project of partition made in accordance with.
his will should be approved,
In Aznar vs. Christensen Garcia, 61 O.G.
7302, it was held that, where the deceased citizen of
California was domiciled in the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will should be
governed by Philippine law, pursuant to article 946 of
the California Civil Code, and not by the internal law
of California.

It is therefore evident that whatever public

policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave,
inter. alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones,

Appellants would also point out that the

decedent executed two wills—one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate—
arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void. for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10—now Article