Chapter 10

China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia:

Beyond Merely Image Building
Aleksius Jemadu
Universitas Pelita Harapan

International relations in the 21st century are characterized by the growing

importance of public diplomacy to support the operation of government-to-
government interactions. The importance of public diplomacy today can be
explained with the following illustration. As a rising regional and global power
China wants to accomplish its foreign policy objectives in foreign countries
including Indonesia. The accomplishment of those objectives requires the
support of the public of a foreign country. Public diplomacy is outreach and
messaging by a country to citizens of other countries to enhance perceptions of
that country. In this case, public diplomacy constitutes efforts by Chinese officials
to improve how Indonesians view China and its foreign policies. China could
use various means of communications to reach out to the Indonesian public to
create a positive impression about its foreign policy objectives. Chinese leaders
realize that such positive impressions cannot be taken for granted, as there are
certain historical, social, and political contingencies that are embedded in the
entire historical evolution of the relationship between China and Indonesia.
Thus, there must be a strong intentionality on China’s part to organize and
implement its public diplomacy and address critical issues that might emerge
due to the contingent factors that have been mentioned earlier.
Since President Joko Widodo took power in 2014, there has been
significant progress in bilateral relations between China and Indonesia
as one can measure it by using a set of quantitative indicators. In his
presentation in front of Indonesian government officials, academics and
civil society groups, the Indonesian ambassador to People’s Republic of
China, Djauhari Oratmangun, highlights the fact that today China has
become Indonesia’s largest trading partner with US$37.4 billion and the
second largest source of foreign investment with US$4.8 billion in 2020.1

1. Djauhari Oratmangun, Indonesian Ambassador to People’s Republic of China,

“Hubungan Indonesia–Tiongkok Terkini” [The Current Updates on Indonesia–China
216 Southeast Asia as a Site of Imperial Contestation

The Chinese Ambassador Xiao Qian gave even more detailed information
on the progress of the bilateral cooperation between China and Indonesia.
He reported that from the year 2000 until 2019 the bilateral trade had
reached the point of US$79.4 billion, an increase of tenfold.2 On top of
that, China has pledged to make Indonesia its regional hub for healthcare
industries in Southeast Asia.3
The paradox of China’s public diplomacy in Indonesia over the last
few years is that the convergence and complementarity of policies at the
governmental level coexists with the reality of China’s relatively low level of
popularity among Indonesian respondents as indicated by a recent survey
conducted by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) based in
Singapore. According to the survey, among the Indonesian respondents
only 15.5 percent are confident and 0.8 percent very confident, when asked
how confident they are about China’s positive contribution to “global peace,
security, prosperity, and good governance.”4 If this survey can be used as
a guide to measure the success of China’s public diplomacy in Indonesia,
then it is no exaggeration to say that it has not achieved its intended goals.
There must be an honest investigation to find out what has led to China’s
low level of popularity in the eyes of the Indonesian public.
The gap between the progress of the bilateral cooperation between
the two governments and China’s social unpopularity should lead us to
the following research questions. First, what has China done in organizing
and implementing its public diplomacy in Indonesia? Second, what are
the critical issues that remain unanswered or inadequately addressed?
Third, what suggestions can be proposed to deal with those critical issues

Relations], presentation at a public seminar organized by the Indonesian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs on May 20, 2021.
2. Xiao Qian, “Work Hand-in-Hand a New Era: China–Indonesia Friendship,” The
Jakarta Post (April 14, 2020). Accessed on May 24, 2021: https://www.thejakartapost.
com/news/2020/04/14/insight-work-hand-hand-a-new-era-china-indonesia-
friendship.html.
3. Dian Septiari, “Wang Yi calls for closer China-Indonesia ties,” The Jakarta Post
( January 14, 2021). Accessed on May 26, 2021: https://www.thejakartapost.com/
paper/2021/01/13/wang-yi-calls-for-closer-china-indonesia-ties.html.
4. Sharon Sea, Hoang Thi Ha, Melinda Martinus, and Pham Thi Phuong Thao. The
State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report (Singapore: ASEAN Studies Center, ISEAS
Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021), 42. Accessed on May 20, 2021: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/
articles-commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/the-state-of-southeast-asia-2021-
survey-report/.
China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia 217

or problems? To answer those research questions, this chapter will be

structured as follows. After the introduction, the chapter describes the
growing convergence between China’s foreign policy objectives and
Indonesia’s policy priorities under President Joko Widodo especially during
the pandemic era. Such policy convergence is not only due to Indonesia’s
domestic conditions, but it is also related to the external dynamics of the
regional and global power politics between the United States and China
in which Indonesia and other countries in Southeast Asia find themselves
caught in the middle. Thus, countries like Indonesia are reacting by coming
up with policy strategies to maximize their own priorities given the interest
and policy overtures from China and the US. This subsection of the chapter
also explains why China and Indonesia have continued to strengthen their
bilateral ties from their respective standpoints. The chapter will describe
both the content and methods of China’s public diplomacy with a special
focus on the role of its embassy in Jakarta, which serves as its focal point in
ensuring the social acceptance of Beijing’s foreign policy objectives in the
eyes of the Indonesian people. Then the analysis will identify opportunities
to improve the quality of China’s public diplomacy by capitalizing on the
uniqueness of its development model and the imperative of adjusting to
the peculiarities of Indonesian social and political contexts. This study
will end with some concluding remarks to draw the attention of the two
governments as the key policy stakeholders of the success of China’s public
diplomacy in Indonesia.
The Growing Convergence of the Two Countries’ Foreign Policy
Objectives
Since President Joko Widodo came to power in 2014, there have been
at least three important moments in which the governments of China
and Indonesia expressed their determination to strengthen bilateral ties
in various fields of cooperation. First, President Xi Jinping and President
Joko Widodo started with the announcement of a “Joint Statement on
Strengthening Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the People’s
Republic of China and The Republic of Indonesia” in Beijing on March
26, 2015.5 The policy document represented an important foreign policy

5. “Joint Statement on Strengthening Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the

People’s Republic of China and The Republic of Indonesia,” March 26, 2015. Accessed
on May 26, 2021: http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyyn/zywx/t1249223.htm.
218 Southeast Asia as a Site of Imperial Contestation

venture for President Joko Widodo who needed international support

from China to actualize his domestic priorities including infrastructure
development and maritime connectivity. On China’s side, there was a
strong intentionality to strengthen its strategic cooperation with the
largest economy in Southeast Asia whose leadership in the region is
of high value for China’s wider strategy in Asia. It was clear from the
statement that Beijing and Jakarta were fully aware of the convergence and
complementarity between President Xi Jinping’s 21st century Maritime Silk
Road (the maritime leg of the BRI) and President Joko Widodo’s vision of
transforming Indonesia into a Global Maritime Fulcrum.
Second, three years later, on March 28, 2018, during his visit to
Indonesia, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and President Joko Widodo
renewed their commitment and pledged to promote the comprehensive
strategic partnership to a higher level with more substantive economic
cooperation that would benefit the two sides.6 What was interesting in the
new commitment was that China wanted to integrate its cooperation with
Indonesia into its regional and global strategies. For his part, President Joko
Widodo wanted to use this new momentum to convince the Indonesian
people that his deep and extensive engagement with China had produced
tangible outputs in terms of trade opportunities and that China’s increasing
investments in various strategic projects including the high speed railway
Jakarta–Bandung. In the lead up to the 2019 presidential election, the
concrete results of the bilateral cooperation with China were of high value
for campaign purposes as President Joko Widodo sought to secure an
electoral victory for a second term.
Third, government-to-government cooperation between China and
Indonesia has gained a new momentum during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Thus, on April 20, 2021, President Xi Jinping and President Joko Widodo
were engaged in a telephone conversation in which the two leaders exchanged
their mutual appreciation regarding the progress of their cooperation in
vaccine production and distribution.7 The two leaders reaffirmed their
determination to intensify efforts in aligning China’s BRI and Indonesia’s

6. Xinhua, “China-Indonesia joint statement,” The China Daily (May 8, 2018). Accessed on
May 26, 2021: https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/80/68/102/1525752899369.html.
7. “President Xi Jinping Speaks with Indonesian President Joko Widodo on the Phone,”
April 7, 2020. Accessed on May 26, 2021: http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/sgdt/
t1766882.htm.
China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia 219

maritime connectivity. It is quite evident China and Indonesia have

reached a new level of closeness in their strategic cooperation, at least at the
government level. Beijing’s eagerness to build strong ties with Indonesia and
institutionalize it for long-term gain may come from its strategic calculation
that the acceptability of its influence among the people of the largest
member of ASEAN can help China to consolidate its influence over the
region amid a growing competition with the US in Southeast Asia. There
are at least two reasons why Southeast Asia is of “enormous importance” to
China: “geopolitical and economic considerations.”8 Geopolitically, China
is surrounded by traditional US allies including Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan. China’s interest in Southeast Asia is multifaceted. Like the Europeans
and Japanese, China is eager to secure sources of natural resources like tin,
iron ores, agricultural goods, etc. Southeast Asia is also the main maritime
corridor for China to proceed further with its BRI investment projects and
it is the maritime connection linking China to the Middle East and Europe.
On top of that, ASEAN with its around 700 million people is a huge market
with a growing purchasing power whose economic ties with China have
been institutionalized through various regional platforms. As the largest
member of ASEAN and its informal leader, the social acceptance of China’s
foreign policy objectives in Indonesia sets the tone for the whole region of
Southeast Asia and even for the global community considering the fact that
the region is the first maritime gate for China’s BRI projects before they reach
the Indian Ocean through the Middle East and Africa, and ultimately on
to Western Europe. It is quite evident that in China’s eyes Indonesia stands
out as its strategic partner in Southeast Asia for its longer term regional and
global strategies.
Although President Joko Widodo’s government is generally described as
being mainly inward-looking,9 he is always ready to utilize foreign policy for
his pragmatic purposes. The success of Jokowi’s infrastructure development

8. “In no region is China’s influence felt more strongly than in South-East Asia,” The
Economist (February 27, 2021). Accessed on May 26, 2021: https://www.economist.
com/briefing/2021/02/27/in-no-region-is-chinas-influence-felt-more-strongly-than-in-
south-east-asia?itm_source=parsely-api.
9. Aaron Connelly, “Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo’s Foreign Policy
Challenges,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 37, no. 1 (2015): 1-28; Vibhanshu Shekhar,
Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: Rise of an Indo-Pacific
Power (London: Routledge, 2018).
220 Southeast Asia as a Site of Imperial Contestation

hinges on the way he manages Indonesia’s bilateral relations with China. As

Indonesia’s largest trading partner and the second largest source of foreign
investment, China has a strategic advantage, not only for the pragmatic
political interests of President Joko Widodo but also for Indonesia’s long-
term economic development. The largest Chinese investment in Indonesia
now is the Jakarta–Bandung high speed railway with an estimated cost of
US$5.5 billion. Although there were social and environmental problems
that seemed to hinder the implementation of the project in its initial stage,10
today, construction of the railroad is proceeding relatively smoothly towards
its completion by the end of 2022.
Instead of choosing to bandwagon with China, President Joko Widodo
prefers to proceed with his “hedging and balancing” strategy to attract
foreign investment from China for his infrastructure projects.11 The end
of his second term is scheduled for 2024, and the president undoubtedly
wants to leave his office with a legacy as a successful leader and therefore
in the remaining years of his presidency there is a real need to restore the
nation’s economic growth from the ongoing recession since 2020 caused
by the pandemic Covid-19. On top of that, the ruling party, the Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) wants the same thing as it aspires
to maintain its electoral preponderance in the legislative and presidential
elections of 2024. The indispensability of China’s support in gaining this
legitimacy will create an electoral competition in which the use of anti-
China sentiments looms large and those who oppose the government are
ready to capitalize on interethnic conflict for their own electoral advantage.
The robust growth of government-to-government cooperation with
its impressive increase in its quantitative parameters will at the same time
exacerbate the risk of failure if the two countries do not manage the societal
aspect of these bilateral ties. There are at least two important reasons why
China’s public diplomacy in Indonesia needs to be well designed and
implemented not only for the sake of its strategic interests but also for

10. Meiki W. Paendong, “The Jakarta–Bandung Railway Project: 5 Years on Still Going
Nowhere,” The Diplomat (December 3, 2020). Accessed on June 14, 2021. https://
thediplomat.com/2020/12/the-jakarta-bandung-rail-project-5-years-on-and-still-going-
nowhere/.
11. Tirta Nugraha Mursitama and Yi Ying, “Indonesia’s Perception and Strategy toward
China’s OBOR Expansion: Hedging with Balancing,” The Chinese Economy 54, no.1
(2021): 10, DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2020.1809816.
China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia 221

Indonesia itself. First, learning from Japan’s historical experience in the early
1970s where anti-Japan student demonstrations broke out in Jakarta was
an indication that the presence of foreign business interests in Indonesia
needed social acceptability if they were meant to endure for a long-term
projection.12 Such a political imperative becomes even more urgent to
avoid negative reactions from those who feel marginalized in the process
of economic regionalization and globalization. Should the same scale of
protests be mobilized against China, there would be a higher chance of
them being more destructive because tension could be exacerbated by the
additional element of deeply rooted anti-Chinese sentiments. China’s public
diplomacy also needs to consider the fact that most countries in Southeast
Asia, including Indonesia, have a strong historical tradition of nationalism.
The emergence of perceptions (and concerns) about Chinese hegemony,
whether provoked by pragmatic and irresponsible politicians or insinuated
by Western media, could ruin China’s image among Southeast Asians. This
could become further complicated if the US makes it a strategy to encourage
the nationalist sentiments of the people in Southeast Asia.13 Second, there
is a practical reason for China to manage its public diplomacy in Indonesia,
in particular, to ensure the protection and security of the operations of its
investment projects throughout the country. It is true that the Indonesian
government has the responsibility to guarantee the protection and safety
of foreign citizens and properties, but social acceptability of an investment
project should also be considered for the sake of its smooth operation.
China’s Public Diplomacy and its Activities in Indonesia
BRI can be seen as an international arrangement of demand for China’s
abundant capital. After WWII, the US and its allies created Bretton
Woods Institutions (WB and IMF) to create demand for Western capital
by developing countries.14 As China now emerges as a global economic
powerhouse, Beijing wants to do the same thing by integrating trade,

12. Calvin Kong-Lim Ho, “China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia: Problems and
Opportunities.” Master of Law thesis in Political Science, Tsinghua University, China
(2018), 57.
13. C. Raja Mohan, “Asian Nationalists Hold Key to More Effective US China Strategy in
Southeast Asia,” Foreign Policy (October 23, 2020). Accessed on May 21, 2021: https://
foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/23/u-s-china-strategy-asian-nationalism/.
14. David C. Korten, When Corporations Rule the World (New York: Kumarian Press,
2015), 242.
222 Southeast Asia as a Site of Imperial Contestation

investment, and loans for infrastructure development with China at the top.
Thus, they will have final say in determining the rules of the game either by
fiat or through the indispensability of its economic power.
Therefore, the operation of BRI with the vast network of trade and
investment it creates is subject to the workings of market principles like
efficiency, competitiveness, advanced technology, and professionalism;
BRI practices could produce a social divide in countries where its capital
seeks profitability. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to think about the
social legitimacy of the investment projects wherever capital is allocated.
China’s public diplomacy plays a very important role in ensuring the social
acceptability of their regional and global networks of trade and investment.
From the perspective of public diplomacy, there is a question whether it is
true that economic interdependence is the only valid narrative regarding
the implementation of BRI and its investment projects.
The BRI and its projects are the real presentations of what China is and
will be in the minds of the people where those projects are located and
implemented. Thus, in a sense, the BRI is China’s global attempt at public
diplomacy and the key to its contribution in shaping world civilization for
the rest of the 21st century. It is like the US Marshall Plan in Europe after
World War II. But, unlike the US and the West, China does not seem to
be interested in spreading a particular ideology. The BRI is mostly about
the pursuit of material welfare through regional and global networks of
trade and investment in which China is at the center. Once the BRI is
fully implemented, China will be its indispensable source of capital and
demand for goods and services from other countries participating in the
networks. Although there are voices questioning whether “Pax Sinica”
would replace “Pax Americana” in the foreseeable future,15 countries in
Southeast Asia including Indonesia, should anticipate a regional and global
economy where China will be at the center with all the essential economic
instruments that it has.

15. Y.Y. Kueh, Pax Sinica: Geopolitics and Economics of China’s Ascendance (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 2012), x. For arguments doubting China’s ability to provide
an international leadership as a public good like what the US has done since the end
of the World War II, see for instance, Suisheng Zhao, “Rhetoric and Reality of China’s
Global Leadership in the Context of Covid-19: Implications for the US-led World Order
and Liberal Globalization,” Journal of Contemporary China 30, no. 28 (2021): 245, DOI:
10.1080/10670564.2020.1790900.
China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia 223

As far as Indonesia is concerned, the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed

railway project sets the parameter of public assessment of China’s image
as it is the first of its kind in Southeast Asia and as such, its success will
determine the chance of the replication of similar projects in other parts of
the region. It is not surprising that China pays a great deal of attention to its
perfect completion and successful operation. There are at least four reasons
why this project has a strategic meaning for China’s success not only in
terms of its large economic scale in the region but also as an extraordinary
tool of public diplomacy by which China constructs its positive image in
the minds of the Indonesian people. First, the success of this project will
send a clear message to the rest of Southeast Asia and the world that China
is a credible and reliable partner in terms of the fulfilment of its promise
with the BRI grand design. Second, the use of state-of-the-art technology
in the field of railway transportation represents China’s ability to put itself
on the same level with the Western industrialized world and thereby lays
a solid foundation of its way towards global prominence. Technological
supremacy constitutes an imperative element of a global power status.
Third, China’s public diplomacy in Indonesia will be significantly enhanced
through this project because it has set an ideal type of cooperation between
a country with sophisticated technology and a needing country whose
technological advancement remains left behind. In a wider context and as
part of its competition with the US, China wants to change the battlefield
from an abstract contestation of political values or norms like democracy
and human rights into a struggle for a global recognition as a problem-solver
for developing countries. Over the last four decades, since Deng Xiaoping,
China has liberated hundreds of millions of its people from dire poverty
and reduced income inequality even more effectively than the US.16 Thus,
instead of being a moralizing agent who tries to impose certain values on
other countries, China chooses to be a partner offering practical solutions
to real problems with the expectation that living standards of the people
might be raised to a dignified level. Finally, the high-speed railway project is
meant to be a long-term project with all its business calculations.

16. Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won: The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy
(New York: Public Affairs, 2020), 200-1; Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World
(New York: Penguin, 2012), 185; Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 160.
224 Southeast Asia as a Site of Imperial Contestation

The Chinese ambassador to Indonesia, Xiao Qian, is probably one of

the most prolific diplomats in publishing opinion articles in Indonesian
newspapers like The Jakarta Post and Kompas.17 This chapter offers a content
analysis of his writings to understand the rationale behind China’s foreign
policy objectives in Indonesia, and I examine what the ambassador might
expect from his Indonesian readers or audience. Xiao Qian started his job
as the Chinese ambassador to Indonesia in 2018. He has been quite active
in reaching out to the Indonesian government officials from the central
down to local level, party leaders, Indonesian think tanks, and leaders of
religious mass organizations. Those who read his articles in the Indonesian
newspapers will know a great deal about China’s policy objectives in
Indonesia, and how bilateral cooperation between the two countries is
working. Therefore, one can interpret China’s public diplomacy through
the analysis of the content of his messages. On top of that, the ambassador
has used his articles to respond to criticisms against China’s global policies,
especially those that come from the US government and Western media.
China is fully aware of the fact that most Indonesian mainstream media
rely on Western news agencies as sources of information on many global
issues. Therefore, Ambassador Xiao Qian uses the same media instruments
to respond to criticisms against his government that may affect public
perception in Indonesia. One issue which has drawn much attention
from the Chinese embassy in Jakarta is the accusation made by the US
government and media that China has committed gross violations of
human rights in Xinjiang. On his visit to Jakarta at the end of October 2020,
former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made a speech in front of the
leaders of Indonesia’s largest Muslim mass organization, Nahdlatul Ulama

17. Here are examples of Xiao Qian’s opinion articles on which I make my content
analysis. Xiao Qian, “Belt and Road Benefits Indonesia, the World,” The Jakarta
Post (April 5, 2019). Accessed on May 30, 2021: https://www.thejakartapost.com/
academia/2019/04/05/belt-and-road-benefits-indonesia-the-world.html; “Work Hand-
in-Hand in a New Era: China–Indonesia Friendship,” The Jakarta Post (April 14, 2020).
Accessed on May 29, 2021: https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/04/14/
insight-work-hand-in-hand-for-a-new-era-of-china-indonesia-friendship.html;
“Understanding China Objectively and Accurately,” The Jakarta Post (February 26,
2021). Accessed on May 29, 2021: https://www.thejakartapost.com/index.php/
academia/2021/02/25/insight-understanding-china-objectively-and-accurately.html;
“Solidaritas dan Kerjasama Mengalahkan Pandemi” [Solidarity and Cooperation to
Defeat the Pandemic], Kompas (Maret 17, 2020).
China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia 225

(NU), in which he openly told his audience that the Chinese government
had committed gross violations of human rights against the Uighurs in
Xinjiang.18 On the same day, the Chinese embassy in Jakarta issued a
press release to respond to the US criticisms saying that the accusations
were “blatant lies” and that it was part of the US campaign to discredit and
delegitimize the Chinese Communist Party.19 On top of that, on October
30, 2021, The Jakarta Post published Ambassador Xiao’s opinion article
titled “China–Indonesia Ties: Surge Together with the Tide of Times” in
which he made a counterargument that his government should be credited
with improving the living standards of the Uighurs through various
development programs.20 It is interesting to note that the Ambassador’s
method of public diplomacy has turned out to be quite effective in that
both the Indonesian government and the largest Islamic mass organizations
(NU and Muhammadiyah) have been relatively soft in their reactions on
the issue of human rights of the Uyghurs, giving the impression that the
moderate groups are indifferent or silent about the atrocities.21
In responding to the US criticisms of China’s de facto military control over
the disputed islands in the South China Sea, through its public diplomacy
the Chinese embassy seems to avoid the impression that China harbors the
goal of becoming a hegemonic power in Southeast Asia. At the same time,
China has always been firm (and will continue to be so) in defending its
territorial claims in the South China Sea with its nine-dash line argument.
From China’s strategic standpoint, defending the only maritime corridor
for its BRI project is a non-negotiable imperative. The question is how can
China manage public diplomacy through which it has to combine seemingly

18. Alya Nurbaiti and Dian Septiari, “Pompeo Calls on Indonesian Muslims to Oppose
China’s Uighur Issue,” The Jakarta Post (October 30, 2020). Accessed on May 20, 2020,
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/10/30/pompeo-calls-on-indonesian-
muslims-to-oppose-chinas-uighur-issue.html .
19. The Chinese Embassy in the Republic of Indonesia, “Ambassador Xiao Qian’s
Response to Erroneous Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo,” press release
(October 29, 2020). Accessed on May 22, 2021: http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/sgdt/
t1827603.htm.
20. Xiao Qian, “China–Indonesia Ties Surge Forward with the Tide of Times,”
The Jakarta Post (October 29, 2020). Accessed on May 20, 2021: https://www.
thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/10/29/insight-china-indonesia-ties-surge-forward-
with-the-tide-of-the-times.html.
21. Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), “Explaining Indonesia’s Silence on
Uyghur Issue,” IPAC Report No. 57 ( June 20, 2019): 9.
226 Southeast Asia as a Site of Imperial Contestation

contradictory messages between a firm assertion of its territorial claims in

the South China Sea and a willingness to continue the consultations with
ASEAN members to finalize the draft of the Code of Conduct in the South
China Sea? Through the press release made by the Chinese embassy and
the opinion articles of Ambassador Xiao, one can underline the following
key points representing the main message to the Indonesian audience
and other ASEAN members.22 First, Chinese government officials have
repeated their statements that there is a complementarity between China’s
BRI and Indonesia’s vision of its foreign policy vision of “Global Maritime
Fulcrum” or GMF. This can be interpreted as China’s implicit recognition of
Indonesia’s territorial integrity and full sovereignty over its territorial waters
including what Indonesia calls Laut Natuna Utara (North Natuna Sea).
The fact that China did not continue the spat when Indonesia protested
its naval maneuvers in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the
North Natuna Sea and even reaffirmed its commitment to invest there was
an indication of how much Beijing valued the strategic importance of its
bilateral relations with Indonesia.23 Second, China has used the narrative of
regional stability in defending the status quo of its de facto control over the
South China Sea while at the same time keeping the enthusiasm of ASEAN
countries in continuing the talks and consultations on the draft of the
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Third, China wants to convince
Indonesian and other ASEAN members that the US interference in the
South China Sea is not only undesirable but destabilizing as it could lead
to an unnecessary and dangerous escalation of power politics in the region.
It is quite evident that China gives a high priority to its social acceptability
among ASEAN members for they are its direct neighbors. If they welcome
China’s rise as a global power, Beijing will be more confident in convincing
countries in other regions to do the same thing.
Another repeated topic in Ambassador Xiao Qian’s opinion essays

22. The Chinese Embassy in the Republic of Indonesia, “Chinese Ambassador Xiao
Qian’s Response to Erroneous Remarks by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo,” October
29, 2020. Accessed on August 20, 2021: http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxw/
t1827603.htm.
23. Adrian Wail Akhlas, “China Remains Committed to Investing in Indonesia despite
Natuna Spat,” The Jakarta Post ( January 9, 2020). Accessed on May 26, 2021: https://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/01/09/china-remains-committed-to-investing-in-
indonesia-despite-natuna-spat.html.
China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia 227

is China’s self-described position as a developing country.24 From the

perspective of China’s public diplomacy in Indonesia and other ASEAN
members, there are at least four reasons why such a description is of high
value in terms of China’s impression management. First, the Ambassador
wants to convince Indonesian readers that China today is different from what
it was in the mid-1960s when the Chinese Communist Party was accused
of supporting the abortive coup led by the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI). Now, China seeks to cooperate with Indonesia in accomplishing
its goals without interfering into Indonesia’s domestic politics. Second,
China is fully aware of the fact that it must avoid the idea or perception
that it is practicing hegemonic bullying in Southeast Asia. Such perception
could damage its declaration of China’s peaceful rise to global prominence,
obstructing the formation of regional and global networks of trade and
investment within the BRI framework. Thus, the narrative or discourse
of win-win cooperation is promoted to ensure its social acceptability and
the enthusiastic participation of all China’s international partners. Third,
China wants to distance itself from the Western colonial history while
boasting the fact that its rise to global prominence coexists with its equal
partnership with other countries regardless of their level of economic
development. Fourth, China admits that its rise as a global power has been
made possible by the integration of its economy into the global market.
Thus, it wants to keep this interdependence narrative alive and support the
principle of economic multilateralism as China has benefited immensely
from it. Finally, China knows very well that all ASEAN countries give high
priority to their economic development especially given the setbacks from
dealing with Covid-19. And Southeast Asian countries compete among
themselves to utilize economic opportunities created from China’s rise as
a global economic powerhouse in Asia. On top of that, for the sake of their

24. In fact, Xiao Qian is not the only Chinese diplomat who depicts China as a
developing country. In one of his regular press conferences, Zhao Lijian, Chinese
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, described China and Indonesia as two developing
countries whose cooperation was of great significance for the global community. See
News Desk “China and Indonesia are both major developing countries and important
emerging economies, and the cooperation between the two countries are of strategic
significance and have global influence,” Daily Spokesman (August 20, 2021). Accessed
on May 28, 2021: https://dailyspokesman.net/live/china-and-indonesia-are-both-
major-developing-countries-and-important-emerging-economies-and-the-cooperation-
between-the-two-countries-are-of-strategic-significance-and-has-global-influence/.
228 Southeast Asia as a Site of Imperial Contestation

performance legitimacy, ASEAN governments will seek to boost trade and

attract foreign investment to ensure high economic growth. It is within such
a context that the writings of the ambassador try to convince his Indonesian
readers that China would be a good partner to cooperate with considering
the geographical proximity and the richness of its historical and cultural
exchange with people of Southeast Asia. China’s eagerness to keep the
momentum of its cooperation with Indonesia is understandable because,
from China’s geopolitical and geostrategic considerations, compared to
other Asian regional powers like Japan, India, Australia and Vietnam,
Indonesia stands out as a partner that is relatively free from historical or
territorial hostilities with China.
There is no doubt China has used many other methods of public
communication to change popular perception to its favor in Indonesia.
Dyah Lestari Asmarini from the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
reported an extensive series of China’s public diplomacy activities in
Indonesia including scholarships for young leaders in ASEAN, conferences
on people-to-people friendship, sister cities, the establishment of Chinese
studies and language centers, the construction of mosques, and an exchange
of protected wild animals, China’s panda and Indonesia’s Komodo dragon.25
As many studies have suggested,26 China’s public diplomacy abroad,
including in Indonesia, has not really produced the observable positive
effect of improving hearts and minds as Beijing might have intended,
which has been probably due to the domination of its top-down approach
and embedded reluctance to capitalize on genuine people’s initiatives in
managing China’s public impression in foreign countries.

25. Dyah Lestari Asmarini, “Strategi Indonesia dalam Membangun P-to-P Connection
dengan Tiongkok” [Indonesia’s Strategy in Building P-to-P Connection with China], a
presentation in a seminar organized by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) on
October 3, 2020.
26. Just to mention several of them one can see in Zhao Kejin, “The Motivation Behind
China’s Public Diplomacy,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 2 (2015):
167-96; Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (2008): 257–273. Accessed on
May 20, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25098003; Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The Rise of
China’s Public Diplomacy,” Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 12 (Hague: Clingendael,
The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, July 2007); Joshua Kutzlantzick,
“China’s New Diplomacy and Its Impact on the World,” The Brown Journal of World
Affairs 14, no. 1 (2007): 221–35. Accessed on May 17, 2021: https://www.jstor.org/
stable/24590703.
China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia 229

Keeping the Momentum and Addressing the Critical Issues

It remains to be seen how much the completion of Indonesia’s strategic
national projects funded by Chinese investments, along with the public
relations outreach of the Chinese ambassador through his writings and press
releases, and China’s various forms of charity programs can help to increase
the social acceptability of its foreign policy objectives in the minds of the
Indonesian people. While some quantitative parameters of the bilateral ties
between China and Indonesia are on the rise and create a momentum that
must be kept by both sides, there are some critical issues that need to be
addressed if the two governments want to ensure the legitimacy of their
common endeavours. In some cases, the role of the Indonesian government
and political leaders also determine the balance in the equation.
It is true that the difference between China’s single party system and
Indonesia’s multi-party presidential system makes the communication with
the Indonesian public more complicated, but such structural constraints
should not necessarily prevent the two governments from doing their best
in responding to the aspirations of the Indonesian civil society groups
and people at the grassroots level. Table 1 provides a fuller description of
potential problems that China’s public diplomacy in Indonesia must deal
with if it wants to achieve its intended goals.

Table1: Problems and possible solutions for China’s public

diplomacy in Indonesia

Problems that need Public diplomacy Possible solutions

to be addressed implications
Trade deficits since A widespread More access for
the implementation impression that Indonesian exports to
of ASEAN- Indonesia has been China to reduce trade
China Free Trade used as market for deficits
Agreements in 2010 cheaper goods from
China
230 Southeast Asia as a Site of Imperial Contestation

China’s aggressive Increasing fear of Respect for

military build-up in Chinese nationalism Indonesia’s territorial
South China Sea and and hegemonic integrity and signing
illegal fishing within intentions of Code of Conduct
Indonesia’s ZEE in SCS
The pragmatism of Emboldening negative China increases
Indonesian political attitude towards China engagement with
parties and leaders and the presence of its Indonesian political
to use anti-Chinese political and economic parties and moderate
sentiments in interests in Indonesia Islamic groups to
mobilizing political counter anti-China
support in electoral sentiments in society
competition
Transnationalism of Distrust and Direct and honest
the issue of human misunderstanding explanation of China’s
rights violations of even among the policies of security
the Uyghur people moderate groups and human rights
in the province of about China’s real in the province of
Xinjiang initiated intention to mend Xinjiang and social
by Western ties with the Islamic and economic
governments and groups improvements in that
media province
The inflow of Dissatisfaction among More job
Chinese workers in Indonesian workers opportunities for
Indonesia’s strategic that their jobs are Indonesian and
investment projects taken over by foreign minimize the use of
Chinese workers Chinese workers with
stricter regulations
China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia 231

Less participation of The alienation of More participation

non-state actors or civil society groups by the Indonesian
civil society groups from government- media and civil society
in independently to-government groups in monitoring
monitoring or cooperation with and controlling the
supervising the the effect that there implementation of
implementation is no independent investment projects
of projects funded social control over
by loans from investment projects
Chinese government funded by loans from
or China-led Chinese financial
multilateral institutions
development banks
Top-down approach People at the More engagement
in the way the grassroots level can with the people at
Chinese embassy easily be mobilized the grassroots level
deals with the to spread anti-China through development
Islamic moderate sentiments through programs with
groups with strong religious houses of problem-solving
emphasis on charity worship and social orientation
programs with less media
interactions with the
grassroots
Bad treatment of Emboldening old More strict and
Indonesian workers sense of distrust and transparent law
by their Chinese prejudice enforcement
employers on by Chinese and
Chinese ships Indonesian authorities
to ensure total
compliance and
respect for the human
rights of Indonesian
citizens
232 Southeast Asia as a Site of Imperial Contestation

A gap in the payment Reigniting old feelings More training and

of wages and of distrust and capacity building for
incentives between prejudice Indonesian workers
Chinese workers and to ensure transfer
Indonesian workers of technology and
legitimate demand
for higher wages and
more incentives
Bad and Reigniting old feelings More efforts from
unsympathetic of distrust and both governments to
manner and attitude prejudice build mutual respect
of some of Chinese and understanding
tourists during their
stay in Indonesia
Reports in the Jeopardizing the Open clarification
Indonesian online credibility of Chinese by Chinese
media of allegations government in the authorities that such
that Chinese eyes of the Indonesian allegation is not
government-backed public true and China fully
hackers infiltrate respects Indonesian
the Indonesian sovereignty and
telecommunication national security
operator for
surveillance
and intelligence
purposes27

Some of the critical issues are elaborated upon here together with their
possible solutions, and I discuss how the two governments might contribute
to ensure the accomplishment of their intended outcomes. First, one of the
goals of countries in inviting foreign investment is to create jobs and thus new
sources of income for the local population. Thus, it is normal for Indonesia
to expect that Chinese investment would help bolster employment

27. Anggoro Suryo Jati, “Hacker China Jebol Operator Telekomunikasi, Indonesia
Termasuk? [Chinese Hackers Disrupt Telecommunication Operators: Is Indonesia
Included?],” DetikInet (August 4, 2021). Accessed on May 20, 2021: https://inet.
detik.com/security/d-5668629/hacker-china-jebol-operator-telekomunikasi-
indonesia-termasuk.
China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia 233

among Indonesian workers in their business operations. However, the

reality of what is happening in the field sometimes tells us different and
more complicated stories. For instance, in 2020 there was a controversy
regarding the establishment of the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Project
(IMIP), in Konawe, Central Sulawesi. The local community opposed
the project because they believed that Chinese workers took away job
opportunities from Indonesian people.28 However, Wang Liping, Minister
Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta, explained that the Chinese
workers were employed because Indonesia could not provide workers
with skills that were necessary to operate smelter machines. On top of
that, the ratio of Chinese to Indonesian workers at the project was 1:10.29
It is difficult to verify the truthfulness behind such an official explanation
because there was no independent inquiry into the reality in the field and
the project management did not seem to allow people from outside to
conduct a field survey. From the case of the Morowali project one may learn
that people have generally three concerns: the issue of job opportunities
which requires certain level of skills and professionalism, the issue of equal
treatment in terms of labour wages, and the issue of the unpreparedness of
the Indonesian workers because they are lacking in language proficiency
and professional skills.
It is a normal practice in the politics of foreign aid and investment
that donor countries and foreign investors attach certain conditions to
be met by the recipient countries before they get approval for their aid or
investment. Donor countries prioritize their interests first before they think
about the interests of the recipient countries.30 Considering the inevitable
application of the law of scarcity of foreign investment, recipient countries
are often in a weak position in the negotiations and they may be under
pressure to accept the terms of the transaction set by the donor countries
and their business entities. Thus, Indonesia does not have many choices in
dealing with Chinese investors and they find themselves in a situation in
which they must accept deals that might not be favorable enough in the eyes
of the Indonesian workers and civil society organizations. During Covid

28. Dian Septiari, “As Locals Oppose Project, China Vows to Create Jobs,” The Jakarta
Post ( June 9, 2020). Accessed on May 20, 2021: https://www.thejakartapost.com/
paper/2020/06/08/as-locals-oppose-project-china-vows-to-create-jobs.html.
29. Ibid.
30. John White, The Politics of Foreign Aid (London: Bodley Head, 1974), 128.
234 Southeast Asia as a Site of Imperial Contestation

restrictions, when the Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Maritime

Affairs and Investment, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, explained to the media
why the government had to allow hundreds of Chinese workers to enter the
country while prohibiting those who wanted to travel to spend their Idul
Fitri holiday in their hometowns with families, he argued that if Indonesia
did not fulfil the wishes of foreign investors, their money would be invested
elsewhere.31 The fact that the Indonesian public is so sensitive about the
special treatment of Chinese workers is an indication that there is a limit to
Indonesia’s tolerance towards the privileges given to Chinese investors. On
top of that, if Indonesia’s bilateral cooperation with China is mainly driven
by pragmatic calculations of those in power and less by the nation’s long-
term interests, there is always a danger that the social legitimacy of such
cooperation might be jeopardized.
The controversy related to the employment of Chinese workers in
large numbers in Indonesian projects poses a problem for Chinese public
diplomacy. However, there are some ways that it could be addressed.
First, it is imperative to address and manage realistically the issue of job
opportunities. If Chinese diplomats do not do this, public discontent can
be manipulated by Indonesian politicians to gain advantage in elections.
Thus, there is a need for transparency and the practice of good corporate
governance. One way of applying this principle of transparency is to provide
details about employment plans of foreign companies so that people
might get first-hand information about the justification behind the special
treatment of the Chinese workers. Second, the Indonesian government
should take responsibility to improve the language and technical skills
of Indonesian workers so that they can participate meaningfully and
productively in Chinese investment projects. In this case, cooperation
with the Chinese government and business entities can be explored for the
benefits of all parties.
Another sensitive issue with a tremendous impact on China’s public
diplomacy in Indonesia is the alleged mistreatment and human rights
abuses of Indonesian citizens employed on board Chinese-flagged fishing

31. Herdi Alif Al Hikam, “Kubu Luhut Ingatkan Jangan Usik TKA, Nanti Investornya
Hengkang! [Luhut’s gives warning not to disturb foreign workers, lest they flee from
Indonesia].” DetikFinance (May 12, 2021). Accessed on May 26, 2021: https://finance.
detik.com/berita-ekonomi-bisnis/d-5567396/kubu-luhut-ingatkan-jangan-usik-tka-
nanti-investornya-hengkang.
China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia 235

vessels. In one case, a dead body of an Indonesian citizen was thrown off
a fishing vessel.32 The fact that the Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno
Marsudi had summoned the Chinese Ambassador Xiao Qian to express
Indonesian concerns indicated how critical the issue was not only for the
government but also the Indonesian people. Although the issue is beyond
direct responsibility of the Chinese government because the crime is
committed by private citizens, it can be of tremendous consequence for the
promotion of people-to-people interactions between the two countries.
The failure to address social problems like this can only strengthen inter-
ethnic prejudices which will ultimately ruin the common efforts by the two
governments to promote mutual understanding and respect between the
Chinese and the Indonesian people.
Finally, China’s public diplomacy should give special attention to the
cooperation between the Chinese embassy and the two largest Muslim mass
organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah. The Chinese government is fully aware
of the importance of engaging with these two religious civil society groups not
only because they represent tens of millions of Indonesian Muslims. Support from
NU and Muhammadiyah is thus critical for both the Indonesian government
and the Chinese government if they want the relationship to continue. The
Chinese embassy has conducted outreach programs like scholarships, student
exchanges, charity, and grants. However, the elitist nature of such programs may
leave behind people at the grassroot levels in rural areas who really need to see
tangible evidence of China’s commitment to solve their social and economic
problems. Thus, there is a need to go beyond just charity and explore something
that really occupies their collective memories for a long time. Referring to the
information that is displayed on the official website of the embassy on January
21st, 2020, the Chinese Ambassador Xiao Qian made a visit to Sugajaya Village,
Sukabumi City, West Java accompanied by the Indonesian Minister of Rural
Affairs, City Mayor, and the Village Chief.33 According to the report, Deden,
the village chief, acknowledged how he had learnt from China “the advanced

32. Budi, Sutrisno, “Indonesia Reiterates Concern about Alleged Mistreatment of

Crewmen on Chinese Vessels,” The Jakarta Post ( June 12, 2021). Accessed on June
26, 2021: https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/06/12/indonesia-reiterates-
concern-about-alleged-mistreatment-of-crewmen-on-chinese-vessels.html.
33. “Ambassador Xiao Qian Visited Suga Jaya Village, Sukabumi City, West Java,”
February 1, 2020. Accessed on May 26, 2021: http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/sgdt/
t1738589.htm.
236 Southeast Asia as a Site of Imperial Contestation

production technology and rural governance experience.” As a matter of fact, the

Chinese government realizes the importance of using the Indonesian media to
popularize its problem-solving capacity in social and economic development.
One can observe this in the cooperation between Xinhua News Agency and
Kompas from Indonesia. For instance, On March 6, 2021, Kompas ran an article
sponsored by the Xinhua News Agency titled “Sepuluh Kasus Pengentasan
Kemiskinan di China [Ten Cases of Poverty Alleviation in China].”34 This is
clearly China’s way of telling its Indonesian readers that China is a successful and
attractive model with the ability to fulfil citizens’ basic needs. China is trumpeting
their ability to meet the social and economic needs of the people.
The Kompas article intends to convince the Indonesian public about
at least three key messages of China’s public diplomacy through the local
media. First, China’s political system has its own way to respect people’s
basic rights, and in this case economic rights, and it has the enormous
capacity to alleviate poverty in rural areas and meet the requirements of the
UN sustainable development goals even one decade before the target set
by that global institution. Although one can argue that the demonstration
of China’s success abroad is meant to overcome its sense of insecurity at
home,35 the real impact of China’s model in social economic development
is quite evident in countries seeking to emulate its success. Second, China
can use modern technology and government policies to increase prosperity
for the rural population. Third, China’s political and economic system can
narrow the development gap among regions in China, and between urban
and rural areas. These successes may be very attractive to Indonesians,
many of whom are still poor and residing in the countryside.
Conclusion
This chapter explores China’s public diplomacy beyond the conventional
understanding of the concept as just the public relations function of the
government aiming at building good impressions to gain trust and social
acceptance. There is growing policy convergence between China and
Indonesia under President Joko Widodo. Trade and investment between

34. Xinhua, “Sepuluh Kasus Pengentasan Kemiskinan di China [Ten Cases of Poverty
Alleviation in China,” Kompas (March 6, 2021), 3.
35. Thomas Ammeyaw-Brobbey, “The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Regime
Fragility: Explaining China’s International Efforts at Solving Domestic Insecurity,”
International Journal of Politics and Security 2, no. 4 (2020): 18.
China’s Public Diplomacy in Indonesia 237

the two countries has increased significantly and the countries’ leaders
are amenable to closer relations. However, the Indonesian public is not
yet on board. Thus, there must be a conscious effort to manage the social
acceptability of the foreign policy objectives of the two governments. As
survey results show, China is not yet popular in the minds of the Indonesian
people. There is the urgency of public diplomacy to go beyond the mere
instrumentalization of culture or other sources of soft power. There is no
doubt that culture can be a source of attraction in international relations.
However, experiential evidence is far more effective than just cognitive
reflections when it comes to building an enduring impression about the
presence or operation of the interests of a foreign country amid the people
of another society. The Chinese Ambassador’s outreach to the Indonesian
people through his writings needs to be complemented by China’s unique
strong point, which is its problem-solving capacity not only through its
investment projects in urban areas under the framework of BRI but also, and
more importantly, social economic development projects for rural areas.
Then China’s public diplomacy in Indonesia might be able to accomplish
its intended goal, namely the social acceptability of China’s foreign policy
objectives in the minds of the Indonesian people. China’s public diplomacy
in Indonesia demonstrates their increasing awareness of the need to use
soft skills to help them achieve foreign policy goals. Trade and investment
alone will not win hearts and minds. China’s success or failure at this will
have critical implications for China’s foreign policy in the rest of Southeast
Asia and perhaps the global community.