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The Russian-Ukrainian war: An explanatory essay through the theoretical lens

of international relations.

Research · June 2022

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18975.64169/1

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 Variis Studiis: Vakadidike no. 6

The Russian-Ukrainian war

An explanatory essay through the theoretical lens of
international relations.

Rokoua Mataiciwa

Date & Time Competed: 22/06/22 @ 9.50am

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 has galvanized the world as many to their dismay,
witnessed the Russian leader Vladimir Putin openly ordering military actions against Ukraine, its
leadership and its citizens. This essay will seek to make sense of this event from the theoretical
perspective of international relations and by doing so, it will employ the main theories of
realism, liberalism and constructivism respectively. The first part will explain Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine, using the realism and constructivism theories while the second part, which focuses
on explaining the response made by western countries, uses the liberalism and realism theories
respectively.

In explaining Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there are two international relations theories that can
be used. The first of these two schools of thought is known as realism. According to Antunes and
Camisao (2018), realism entails that the main actor is the state. It views the world as anarchic
with no international authority to which all countries come under and as a result, nations are left
to defend and attend to their own interests, using the material power they have in the forms of
their military or economy as the means of action. Given this constant clash over the protection
and advancement of respective national interests, realists also view that the occurrence of
military conflicts between states is inevitable and as such, it is seen as the primary method to
which political change takes place (Wivel, 2018). Moreover, a factor that contributes to this is
the egotistical character of those governing the state, otherwise known to proponents of this
theory as human nature realism. Past wars have shown that leaders who were aggressive and
power hungry, tend to exploit economic, religious, ethnic and political factors as a means to
wage war, and that such factors could have occurred in that moment or was a historical event that
left unresolved tensions (Howarth, 1916; Jackson and Morelli, 2009; Oldemeinen, 2010). When
considering these elements, it can be said that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was bound to
happen, given that both states were once part of the Soviet Union and that developments from
the past contributed to the current crisis. In June of 1954, then leader of the Soviet Union Nikita
Khrushchev, decreed that Crimea, which has a majority ethnic Russian population, be transferred
from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
(Simonsen, 2000). This territorial transfer saw more Russians added to an already existing
community in Ukraine, which went on to grow even further. From 1959 to 1989, the ethnic
Russian population grew annually by 9.1 percent, going on to make up 22% of Ukraine’s
population and by 2001, ethnic Russians numbered at about 3 million people (Rapawy, 1997;

1
Shkolnikov, 2012; UCIPR, 2017). While it seemed insignificant during the Soviet era, it
nonetheless laid the foundations for what would happen up years later. In the aftermath of the
Soviet Union’s dissolution, the two constituent entities of Russia and Ukraine became sovereign
states and questions were raised on the subject of Crimea’s status and the position of the ethnic
Russian community in Ukraine (Bebler, 2015). This began to escalate in 2014 when Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych and his pro-Russian administration were overthrown through a
popular uprising. In the subsequent unrest that followed, ethnic Russians began to revolt and
form separatists movements, resulting in Crimea’s unilateral detachment from Ukraine while the
eastern territories of Luhansk and Donetsk in the Donbas region, armed conflicts erupted
between pro-Russian rebel groups and Ukrainian forces, leading to the armed groups taking
control of the territory and also declaring independence from Ukraine (Zafar, 2015; Fischer,
2019; Mirovalev, 2022). The Russian government supported these separatist movements, even to
the point of sending its forces there, under the reasoning of protecting the security and rights of
ethnic Russians. Many speculate that Putin’s motive to increase his influence could be a driving
factor for their gradual involvement into the Ukrainian crisis (Young, 2022). When taking into
account everything mentioned in this section, Russia’s war with Ukraine was inevitable. The
agitation of the ethnic Russian community provided the racial and political factor which
Vladimir Putin was able to exploit for his own political ambition of an expansionist Russia that
asserts influence over Ukraine. Under the pretence of defending ethnic Russians, Putin sent his
troops to Crimea and the Donbas, setting the stage for the eventual invasion of Ukraine with the
plausible aim of installing a pro-Russian regime to which he can have political influence over, a
clear display of human nature realism.

Staying on the quest to explain the Russian invasion from a realist perspective, one other angle is
the concern by the Russians over the threat to their security. This can be understood from the
defensive realist position, which is one variation of the realism theory. Specifically, defensive
realist notes that a state will take action because of their discontent with the international
political status quo and would do so to maintain a balance of power between them and other
states (Feng and Ruizhuang, 2006). In relating this to Russia’s actions, it can be said that the
Russian leadership resented the international system, particularly with the recent advancements
made by the military alliance known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO. Since
the end of the cold war, NATO had expanded eastwards, recruiting fourteen countries to become

2
members and in recent times there was a flirtation over the idea of Ukraine also joining (Kirby,
2022). For Russia, they find it essential to maintain a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet era,
where they would maintain close economic and political ties to their former communist
constituents, however NATO’s expansion has lessened the likelihood of that coming to fruition.
Given that much of the former eastern bloc states have already joined the alliance, Russia finds
itself less capable of asserting any influence over them and they see Ukraine as the red line to
which NATO should not cross as that would be treated as a direct threat to them (Sauvage, 2022;
Saranya, 2022). As such, NATO’s expansion in the eyes of the Russian leadership would make
them not only more vulnerable, but also less powerful and in order to stop that, they saw a need
to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO and war was the best way to ensure this. The move has
somewhat worked as since the invasion, NATO has become apprehensive about Ukrainian
membership with the President of that country Volodymyr Zelensky even admitting that Ukraine
will no longer seek membership into the organization (Wong and Jakes, 2022; Koshiw, 2022).
This is because if Ukraine is allowed to join while the conflict is ongoing, then by virtue of its
membership, NATO would have to defend Ukraine and upon doing so, come into direct conflict
with Russia, which something they don’t want. Thus for Russia, taking this chance to invade
Ukraine was their best path to stall NATO’s expansion and maintain the balance of power, which
is a reflection of defensive realism.

The third viewpoint relevant to explaining Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is from constructivism.
This concept is different from the previous two in terms of its origins. Stemming from the
aftermath of the cold war, constructivism is a social theory that was pulled into the field of
international relations and it describes the world as socially constructed, meaning it is never
fixed but rather it is constantly changing based on an actor’s beliefs and views, things that
ultimately reflects on how the state to which they lead, interacts with other states (Theys, 2018).
When applying this to the crisis, it can be said that Russian President Vladimir Putin does have
some constructed views about his country and Ukraine. In particular, he views that the Ukrainian
people are one in the same as the Russians in terms of ethnic relation, cultural history and
language (Globe, 2015; Mankoff, 2022). This argument he makes goes as far as to denouncing
the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. Putin adds that Ukraine is not a real country and that it only
came into existence after the fall of the Soviet Union, meaning that before that it was always part
of Russia (Yekelchyk, 2022). The picture Putin is painting pertains to the idea that both countries

3
are one and for Ukraine to exist on its own away from the Russian state is an injustice that
should be corrected. Consequently this was also a motivating factor that led to the invasion as it
was built as an mission to bring Ukraine back to its rightful place as part of the Russian
Federation.

The response by western countries such as the United States and other European states to the
Russian invasion of Ukraine has been relatively strong. When relating this to international
relations, there are two schools of thought that can be used to understand their actions and the
first is liberalism. This theory in essence takes an optimistic view of the world, discarding the
thought that war is inevitable, enshrining the idea that an individual’s personal rights and
freedoms should be respected and protected, democracy should be the central element of society
and that international institutions and frameworks will enhance multinational co-operation
(Jumarang, 2011; Meiser, 2018). There is one aspect of this concept that is relevant and that is
the interdependent nature of states with regards to economic activity. Different states depend on
one other for the trade of goods, services and finances, all of which take place under a
mechanism of trade agreements (Richardson, 2002). As such, this would also enable them to
engage in certain actions that may serve as an alternative to military action. One such act is
economic sanctions, which is initiated by one state or more against another and it entails the
restriction either partially or completely of financial and trade privileges, which may affect the
economy of the subjected state (Bengtsson, 2002). It is this particular approach that western
countries have employed when responding to the Russia invasion of Ukraine. The United States,
United Kingdom and many other European countries have all imposed respective sanctions
against Russian banks, businesses and politicians with regards to their financial assets,
investments and trade activities (Toh et al., 2022). Given that Russia is also involved in
international trade, western countries believe that by responding through the imposition of
sanctions, Russia would not only be isolated but eventually would also face adverse effects on
their economy which in turn, would somehow influence the Russian leadership to pull out of
Ukraine in order for such sanctions to relax, or even at a further stretch, drive its citizens to rebel
against their government because of the constraints and frustrations felt as a result of the
sanctions.

4
The second theory that can be used to explain the response of western countries to the Russian
invasion of Ukraine is once again on the theory of realism. Interestingly, the west’s response can
be understood from the view of defensive realism. As stated earlier by Feng and Ruizhuang
(2006), countries seek to compete for power due to their distaste of the international political
system and the aim of carrying out such actions would be to maintain a balance of power. Lobell
(2017) and Rendall (2006) both amplified this by respectively stating that the aggressive actions
of one state may prompt other states to engage in measures that the latter may not only feel more
protected, but also restrict the powers of the aggressor and this is relatable to the way in which
the west responded to the Ukrainian crisis. Since the invasion, seven European countries
increased their military spending and aside from that, countries such as Sweden and Finland put
forward proposals to join NATO (Mackenzie, 2022; Deni, 2022). The increase in military
spending and proposals to join NATO in the wake of the invasion are a reflection of the
sentiments held by European states over the potential threat posed to them by Russia’s
aggression and by engaging in these measures, they would be able to maintain the balance of
power.

To conclude, after studying the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent western
response that came with it from the angle of the three international relations theories, one may
assert that each of these theories have explained in their own manner the complexities of the
crisis. The usage of the defensive realist and constructivist theories to explain Russia’s invasion
shows how the crisis had been building up for years, coupled with the personal beliefs held by
Putin over the inseparable connection between Russia and Ukraine. From the perspective of the
west’s response, the liberal concept of economic interconnectedness enabled them to impose
sanctions on Russia, while from a defensive realist position, European countries have increased
their military spending and even some attempting to join NATO in order to quell Russia’s
expansionist aggression and maintain a balance of power.

Word number: 2,144 words.

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