Workshop: Eudaimonia socratica e cura dell‟altro

Sezione: Dialettica e protrettica

Amathia as an obstacle to eudaimonia

(Laws 731d-732a)1
Guido Cusinato

1. Excessive self-love as the worst of all evils .............................................................. 1

1.1. "Self-love" or "excessive self-love"? ............................................................................1
1.2 The true confutation of Callicles‟ selfishness as cancer of the soul ..............................3
1.3 Further developments of the argument ..........................................................................4
1.4. Excessive self-love and amathia ..................................................................................5

1. Excessive self-love as the worst of all evils

1.1. "Self-love" or "excessive self-love"?

The aim of my contribution is to draw the attention of Plato‟s scholars to the

extraordinary relevance of a passage of the Laws that has so far been little considered. The
passage in question is the following.

Πάνηφν δὲ μέγιζηον κακῶν ἀνθρώποις ηοῖς πολλοῖς ἔμθσηον ἐν ηαῖς υσταῖς ἐζηιν, [...]. ηοῦηο
δ‟ ἔζηιν ὃ λέγοσζιν ὡς θίλος αὑηῷ πᾶς ἄνθρφπος θύζει ηέ ἐζηιν καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔτει ηὸ δεῖν εἶναι
ηοιοῦηον. ηὸ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ γε πάνηφν ἁμαρηημάηφν διὰ ηὴν ζθόδρα ἑασηοῦ θιλίαν αἴηιον
ἑκάζηῳ γίγνεηαι ἑκάζηοηε.

There is an evil [kakon], great above all others, which most men have, implanted in their souls, […].
[731e] It is the evil indicated in the saying that every man is by nature a lover of self, and that it is
right that he should be such. But the truth is that the cause of each and every fault [hamartematon] lies
in the person‟s excessive love of self [heautou philian]. (Laws, V, 731d-e)2

This passage implies four theses: 1) in most humans the origin of the greatest of all evils
lies not in the body but in the soul; 2) in every human there is a natural and legitimate
tendency to love oneself; 3) in fact this tendency, although positive in itself, often degenerates
into an excessive and violent form of the self-love; 4) the origin of all sins/faults for every
human being can always be traced back to this excessive and violent self-love.

1
Here I take up some theses I developed and deepened in G. Cusinato, Trascendenza dal sé ed espressività.
Costituzione dell’identità personale ed esemplarità, in: «Acta Philosophica», 21 (2012), 259-284; Id.,
Periagoge. Teoria della singolarità e filosofia come esercizio di trasformazione (2014), QuiEdit, Verona, 2017.
2
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 10 & 11 translated by R.G. Bury. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1967 & 1968. I would like to thank Linda Napolitano, Fulvia De Luise,
Livio Rossetti and Alessandro Stavru for the constructive dialogue and numerous suggestions.
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 It is not indifferent for a philosopher to establish what is the greatest of all evils and the
cause of all sins/faults, as this has direct consequences on the way he conceives the meaning
and purpose of his philosophy. With regard to this question, some relevant novelties emerge
in this passage: Plato no longer affirms that the origin of the worst of all evils and the cause of
all faults can be attributed to the influence of the body (as in the Phaedon) or to the
prevalence of negative emotions (as in the Republic), nor that “the only real evil is ignorance”
(as in various dialogues).3 There is also something new with respect to the thesis that good
cannot leave aside self-control (enkrateia), which he had previously understood as the
foundation of virtue (Memo, I, 5, 4).
The interpretations of Plato‟s concept of evil thus far have mainly focused on the
Phaedon‟s passage according to which the worst of all evils comes from the influence of the
sensations of pleasure and pain on the soul, which in fact nails the soul to the body, making it
believe that «the things are true which the body says are true» (Phaedon 83d). In this
perspective the problem of evil does not directly concern the soul, which in itself is not the
origin of evil, but rather the influence of the body and the passions linked to it.
Plato overcomes the dualistic conception of the Phaedon with the theory of the
tripartition of the soul presented in the Republic and Phaedrus, recognizing the origin of evil
in the non-rational parts of the soul. Here in Laws 731e an important further step is taken: the
novelty of this step consists in discovering that there is an implicitly positive natural passion
in the soul, the philautia, which for some reason often degenerates to become violent,
excessive, and dangerously out of control if it is not cultivated well. Consequently, the
concept of philosophy described in the Phaedon changes: the philosophical exercise will no
longer aim at a katharsis from the body and the passions linked to it, but will be carried out
by a katharsis from a specific passion of the soul: excessive and violent self-love.4
Of course Plato had criticized selfishness as well before this passage of the Laws, for
example, in Gorgias and the Republic as he delivers Socrates‟ response to Callicles and
Thrasymachus. However, it was rather a minor criticism and referred only to individuals
characterized by violent passions such as tyrants. In this passage of the Laws, on the contrary,
the argument against excessive selfishness acquires depth and involves an evil present in all
humans, so that it assumes an anthropological value.
Thus it is quite surprising not only that up to now few scholars have dwelt on this
passage, but also that the few who have analyzed it have not grasped its innovative contents,
so much so as to often confuse criticism of “excessive self-love” with that of “self-love”. Here
I would simply quote Julia Annas: «Plato sees as the root of most evils in human life,
philautia or love of self» (Virtue &Law in Plato & Beyond, p. 68). The only time Annas uses
the whole expression “excessive love of self” is when she literally translates the passage 731e
from the Greek hē sphodra heautou philia, however, even in this case, in the next line she
returns to the expression “loving ourselves” (id. p. 112-113).
The dominant interpretation is that only Aristotle would grasp the importance of
philautia, while this concept would have a substantially negative meaning for Plato. Horn
claims on this point:

The love for oneself (philautia), which in Aristotle became the basis of all love relationships
with others (EN 1168a28-1169b2), plays only a subordinate role in Plato‟s work and is explicitly
criticized as "excessive self-love" (to sphodra philein hauton) (Leg. V 731d-732b).5

3
Euthyd. 281c-e; Hipp. ma. 296a; Protag. 345e, Gorg. 509e; Tim. 86e.
4
Cfr. G. Cusinato, Katharsis, ESI, Napoli 1999.
5
«Die Liebe zu sich selbst (philautia), die bei Aristoteles zur Grundlage aller Liebesbeziehungen zu anderen
wird (EN 1168a28–1169b2), spielt bei Platon nur eine untergeordnete Rolle und wird als «übergroße
Selbstliebe» (to sphodra philein hauton) explizit kritisiert (Leg. V 731d–732b) (Horst).
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 One can see that there is only one subject in the whole sentence, namely “the love for
oneself (philautia)”, so that according to Horn philautia “is explicitly criticized” by Plato “as
„excessive self-love‟”. In this way "self-love" and “excessive self-love” are placed on the
same level as if they were equivalent.
Once Plato‟s criticism of “excessive self-love” is mistaken for criticism of “self-love”,
there are no more obstacles to interpret Plato as a precursor of Augustine‟s criticism of amor
sui as opposed to amor Dei. This is indeed what happens for example in the interpretation of
Rist. In Plato, however, this Augustinian opposition does not exist. There is not even a
criticism of self-love in itself, rather Plato disputes a solipsistic conception of self-love, such
as that with which the tyrant attempts to achieve happiness for himself at the expense of his
fellow citizens. He does not criticize legitimate self-love, egoistic eudaimonism, insofar as it
converges with the happiness of others and the good of the polis.
However, the eudaimonia of the individual and the good of the polis do not necessarily
fit with the perspective of the dominant opinion. In this Plato remains a follower of Socrates
and maintains a critical attitude towards the dominant axiology, i.e. the one that identifies the
pursuit of happiness with that of wealth and fame.
Here the way is opened to a hitherto little investigated theme such as that of the “care of
desire” in Plato. The concept of the “care of desire” has so far been excluded from most
contemporary discourse because it is confused either with an exaltation of immediate desire
or, on the contrary, with a repression of desire. The error consists in believing that to be
happy it is enough to follow the immediate desire. Instead, the question at the heart of
happiness is precisely this: not to simply follow desire, but rather to cultivate it and make it
grow. It is also a matter of interpreting the term “care” not in the sense of a repressive
upbringing, but in the sense of cultivation.

1.2 The true confutation of Callicles’ selfishness as cancer of the soul

As mentioned above, Plato had already criticized selfishness and certain forms of
excess, for example in Gorgias, as he tells Socrates‟ response to Callicles. It is difficult,
however, to keep away the feeling that such a response actually turns out to be a moralistic
exhortation that falls on deaf ears. As Fulvia de Luise has well highlighted, while reporting
Socrates‟ replies to Callicles, Plato seems to distance himself from them:

“The negative outcome of the comparison and, above all, the high level of internal
coherence of the selfish models of happiness & virtue that Socrates‟ antagonists defended
lead one to think that Plato considers the Socratic strategy of moralization of individuals to be
substantially weak on a psychological and political level.” (Fulvia de Luise).

However, Plato has not yet touched the heart of the matter at this point. What is the
backbone of Callicles‟ argument that Socrates cannot refute? What Callicles says can be
summed up in two points: 1) selfishness and the right of the stronger are facts of natural law,
while laws are an imposition of the weak; 2) the tyrant‟s action is the true model of happiness,
since happiness consists in being able to do everything one wants and to have everything one
desires.
It is only by reversing these two theses that the standpoint of Callicles and
Thrasymachus can really be refuted. This step does not take place in Gorgias, where Socrates
replies that virtue and happiness do not consist in satisfying every desire, nor in the Republic,
where Plato thinks to accompany the virtuous effort within the normative framework of the
state, but only in the Laws, i.e. precisely with the passage 731c-732c.

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 Compared to Socrates‟ criticism of both Callicles‟ and Thrasymachus‟ theses in the
previous dialogues, the argumentative structure of the passages from 731c to 732c in the Laws
is much more solid and convincing. The discourse is in fact not confined to a moralistic
exhortation which begins with the famous thesis that «every wrongdoer is a wrongdoer
involuntarily» (731c), but adds that the vicious man is the «victim of some misfortune»
which requires him to «make […] effort[s] to avoid» (731d). Finally, he reveals that this
misfortune to be avoided is an excessive self-love (731e). It is presupposed that there is a
cancer, a deadly pathology of the soul which expresses itself in an excessive and restless self-
love.
Here the moralistic exhortation, which still echoed in Gorgias, is replaced by a warning
against what is identified as the worst of all possible evils: the excessive and restless self-
love. It is no longer the exhortation of a rhetorician, but the diagnosis of a doctor of the soul.
What was previously passed off by Callicles as a model of happiness and a right of nature of
the strongest now turns out to be a defect of the common man, indeed a misfortune to be
prevented and cured, because it makes us blind.
In the proem of Laws 5 it is stated that even the wicked reaches the intersubjective level,
though in the sense of self-referential closure: those who are evil surround themselves with
wicked people and this will be their punishment (728b) – a kind of cura sui in reverse.
Therefore, to take care of and honour the soul means to devote oneself to the better things and
to perfect the others if possible: there is nothing more suitable than the soul to escape evil and
to put oneself on the trail towards the supreme good. It is only at the third place that the body
and richneses must be honoured. These, then, are not to be refused. The evil arises when they
are put before the care of the soul, when we put all our energies into enrichment and pursue
glory while neglecting the care of the soul. In doing this the elders must not make speeches,
but set an example (729c). A happy life should not lead to losing friends like those who are
faithless or ignorant (730c).
The conclusion of the argument with the passage 731e reorganizes and gives new vigor
to a whole series of ideas that were already present in the Republic. The tyrant‟s life proves to
be a model of unhappiness because his life would be devoid of fellowship (koinonia) and
friendship (philia). And in the pursuit of pleasures and honours, the image of the sea god
Glaucus inevitably returns to mind, who is overlaid by the incrustations of the afflictions that
prevent him from giving a true physiognomy to his own singular existence. That of Callicles
and Thrasymachus is not a model of happiness but of unhappiness, nor is it a law of nature
from which one cannot escape, because one can live differently, focusing one‟s energies on
taking care of the soul.
So, to summarize, if excessive selfishness is the worst of all evils, then Callicles and
Thrasymachus themselves suffer because: 1) they dissipate their existence by taking care of
little things instead of what is really important, in other words, they give shape to an existence
covered with incrustations like that of the sea god Glaucus; 2) they close themselves into a
solipsistic perspective and erect a wall ever higher between themselves and the rest of the
world.

1.3 Further developments of the argument

In the passage 731e Plato recognizes in the excessive self-love a specific pathology of
the human soul: a real cancer that leads to a serious form of alienation. This excessive self-
love gives rise to three different consequences which are listed in the following lines:

1) It causes the blindness not only in the epistemological but also in the axiological
sense, which results in the inability to distinguish exactly the right [ηὰ δίκαια], the good [ηὰ
ἀγαθὰ] and the beautiful [ηὰ καλὰ] (731e);
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 2) It leads to amathia, namely to the mistaking for knowing one‟s own «ignorance
[ἀμαθίαν]», «whence it comes about that though we know practically nothing, we fancy that
we know everything; and since we will not entrust to others the doing of things we do not
understand, we necessarily go wrong in doing them ourselves» (732a-b);

3) After the diagnosis of the worst of the evils and its two main symptoms, Plato finally
points out the remedy that consists in using the force of exemplariness, as already mentioned
in the passage on amathia: «every man must shun excessive self-love [πάνηα ἄνθρφπον τρὴ
θεύγειν ηὸ ζθόδρα θιλεῖν αὑηόν], and ever follow after [the example of] him that is better
than himself [ηὸν δ᾽ ἑασηοῦ βεληίφ διώκειν ἀεί], allowing no shame [αἰζτύνην] to prevent
him from so doing» (732b).

For reasons of space, hereafter I will only consider the second point related to the
amathia.

1.4. Excessive self-love and amathia

At first glance one might think that Plato‟s thesis that the greatest of all evils is
excessive self-love is opposed to that of Socrates that the origin of all evils is ignorance. Still,
the situation is more complex. The thesis according to which evil is done out of ignorance
must be read first and foremost bearing in mind that Socrates in the Apology shows not only
that true wisdom is not knowing, but also that the human being, unlike the gods, is not wise,
but at most a lover of wisdom. Consequently, the evil for Socrates is not done because of
ignorance, understood as not knowing, but due to a much more radical kind of ignorance.
The solution becomes clear as soon as we realize that Plato sharply distinguishes
between two types of ignorance, that is, between amathia (the not knowing that has the
presumption of knowing) and agnoia (the not knowing that has the awareness of not
knowing). Besides the epistemological limit present also in agnoia, there is an axiological
limit in amathia, the ethical root of which lies precisely in an excessive self-love. Therefore I
commit evil acts not because I have no knowledge, that is, because I lack information to
understand a given situation or my information is wrong, but because amathia has blinded
me.
Once this difference has been made explicit, it reveals that in passage 731c Plato does
not contest Socrates‟ thesis, which brings the cause of all evils back to ignorance (amathia),
but rather makes it more radical. For Plato the worst of all evils is an excessive and
immoderate self-love that generates amathia and prevents agnoia; therefore Socrates rightly
points out that the cause of evil is ignorance. This ignorance, however, must be understood as
amathia, which derives its limits not only from an epistemological deficiency, but primarily
from a form of infatuation or axiological blindness caused by excessive self-love, or
“egotism”. In 731e Plato goes one step further and discovers that behind the amathia there is
excessive self-love and that this is the ultimate cause of all evil.
The distinction between amathia and agnoia allows to question also the thesis of
Socratic intellectualism that arose following the Aristotelian reading of Protagoras according
to which all one needs to be virtuous is knowledge: if the previous premise is true, then what
is necessary to be virtuous is more than just a learning process that helps overcome ignorance.
It is a healing process that drives away from amathia and egotism – a process made possible

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by what, taking up a current term today, could be indicated as the strength of the
exemplariness of others, which Plato also mentions in 732b.6

6
On the concept of exemplariness see my essay G. Cusinato, Sull’esemplarità aurorale, saggio
introduttivo a: M. Scheler, Modelli e capi, FrancoAngeli, Milano 2011.
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