Final Respondent Memorial

SHRI.
NITYANAND JHA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022

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IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF RASHTRAKUTA
(WRIT JURISDICTION)
MR. MOHAN SINGH & ORS. ……..PETITIONER(S)
Versus
STATE OF RASHTRAKUTA …….RESPONDENT
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASKHTRAKUTA)
MEMORIAL FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 1

SHRI. NITYANAND JHA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. List of Abbreviations …………………………………………………3
2. Index of Authorities…………………………………………………...4
3. Statement of Jurisdiction………………………………………………7
4. Statement of Facts……………………………………………………...8
5. Statement of Issues…………………………………………………….9
6. Summary of Arguments……………………………………………….10
7. Arguments Advanced………………………………………………….13
8. The Prayer……………………………………………………………...25

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
v. versus
SCR Supreme Court Reports
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Lt. Lieutenant
Ors. Others
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
SC Supreme Court
JT
CompCas. Company cases
W.P Writ Petition
App. Appeal
& and
Co. Company
U.P Uttar Pradesh
Assn. Association
r/w Read with
MP Member of Parliament
u/s Under section
Hon’ble Honourable
M/s Minister of State

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
• P N Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1988 SCR (1) 732, 1987 SCC (4) 609.
• Lt. Commander Pascale Fernandes v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., 1968 AIR
594, 1968 SCR (1) 695.
• Satish Chandra & Anr. v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies, 1994 81 CompCas 482
SC, JT 1994 (3) SC 620, 1994 (2) SCALE 829, (1994) 4 SCC 332, 1994 3 SCR 618,
1994 (2) UJ 280 SC.
• Rakhaldas Mukherjee v. S.P Ghose, AIR 1952 Cal 171.
• Babu Ram Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad Muzaffar Nagar,
1969 AIR 556, 1969 SCR (1) 518.
• Babu Ram Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad Muzaffar Nagar,
1969 AIR 556, 1969 SCR (1) 518.
• Lowry v. Inman, 37 How. Pr. 153 (1869).
• Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, 1978 AIR 851, 1978
SCR (3) 272.
• Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab State Electricity Board & Ors. , 2010 (4)
RCR(Civil) 859 : 2010 (11) Scale 69 : 2010 (13) SCC 216 : 2010 (7) Supreme 499 :
2010 AIOL 706 : AIR 2010 SCW 7020 : 2011 (4) All.M.R. 479 : 2010 (11) JT 615.
• Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1990 AIR 851, 1990 SCR (1) 588
• Namit sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745).
• Prafulla Kumar Das & Ors., v. State of Orissa & Ors., (1992) : W.P. (civil) 611,
(1993) : App. (civil) 791.
• S.G Vombatkere v. Union of India, 2021 : W.P 682.
• T.R Kothandaraman v. T.N Water Supply and Drainage Board, 1994 SCC (6) 282.
• Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association & Ors. v. Union of India, [(1993) 4
SCC 441]
• State of AP v. McDowell & Co., AIR 1996 SC 1628.
• ML Kamra v New India Assurance, 1992 AIR 1072.
• Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538
• Chiranjeet Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.

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• Harkchand ratanchand Bantia v Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 14453.

• Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, 1960 SCR (2) 671.
• Kedarnath Singh v. the State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.
• State of Bombay v. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318: 1951 SCR 682.
• Quraishi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 : 1959 SCR 629.
• Jalan Trading Co. v. D.M Aney, AIR 1979 SC 233 : (1979) 3 SCC 220.
• Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873 : (1981) 2 SCC 600.
• Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113.
• Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295, 1301, 1305.
• Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494.
• Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545: AIR 1986 SC 180,
194.
• A.K Gopalan v. the State of Madaras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
• Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248: AIR 1978 SC 597.
• Common cause v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 1665.
• Bilal Ahmed Kaloo vs. State of Andra Pradesh, (1997)7 SCC 431.
• Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Assn. v. Central Valuation Board and Ors, AIR
2007 SC 2276.
• Grand Kakatiya Sheraton Hotel and Towers Employees and Workers Union v.
Srinivasa Resorts Limited and Ors, AIR 2009 SC 2337.
STATUTES
• Indian Penal Code, 1860.
BOOKS AND ARTICLES
• M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, LexisNexis, Gurgaon, 7th Edition 2016.

• V N Shukla, The Constitution of India, EBC, Lucknow, 8th Edition 2001.
• Dr. J. N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, Central Law Agency.
• H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Law and Justice Publishing Co, Delhi, 4th
Edition 2021.
LEGAL DATABASES

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• Manupatra
• SCC Online
• Indian Kanoon

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The petitioners have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Rashtrakuta under Article 32
of the Constitution of Rashtrakuta. The matter is to be heard by this Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Article 32 r/w Article 13 (2) of the Constitution of Rashtrakuta is read as hereunder:
Article 32: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the natura of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and
(2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court
under clause (2)
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution
Article 13 (2) in the Constitution of Rashtrakuta is read as hereunder:
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by
this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of the
contravention be void

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of brevity and convenience of the Hon’ble Court the facts of the present case are
summarised as follows:
BACKGROUND:
1. The present case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Rashtrakuta under Article 32
of the Constitution of Rashtrakuta, challenging the constitutional validity of the
arbitrary Section 124A of the Rashtrakuta Penal Code.
2. The petitioners in the present case are Mr. Mohan Singh, a retired cricketer-turned-
politican from the Prajapita Party, who was also an ex-MP from the constituency of
Sharwad, and, Mr. Rangraj, a news reporter for B News Channel, who also conducted
the interview of Mr. Mohan Singh.
3. Mr. Arun Singh of the Jana-Hita Party, won the Assembly Elections of 2020 from
Sharwad constituency.
4. Team Rashtrakuta had qualified for the finals in RCC Champions Trophy.
5. Subsequently, during the second semi-finals of the RCC Champions Trophy (Team
Sakistan v. Team Taustralia), Mr. Mohan Singh cheered for Team Sakistan in the
following manner, “Come on boys you can beat them, you are not less than anyone”
6. Mr. Mohan Singh was charged with sedition, as defined u/s 124A of the RPC.
7. Hon’ble High Court of Dhanera provided for bail grant to Mr. Mohan Singh.
8. Post bail grant and release, Mr. Mohan Singh was questioned in an interview on B
News Channel by Mr. Rangraj, “Sir, don’t you think that the criminal case filed
against you was politically motivated only to demoralise you, since you are a
celebrated political leader from a different political party from that of the present
government?”, to which Mr. Mohan Singh replied, “it is definitely a politically
motivated act to suppress my voice for which I am not afraid of and I am having full
faith in our judicial system. Which is the reason, I have challenged the
constitutionality of Section 124A of RPC before the Hon’ble Apex Court”.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
A. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF ALTERNATE REMEDY WILL

APPLY?
B. WHETHER THERE WAS IN FACT A VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS?
C. LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF THE PARLIAMENT
2. WHETHER THE PROVISION OF SECTION 124A OF THE RPC IS

CONSTITUTIONAL?
A. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OR ARTICLE 14 OF THE

CONSTITUTION?
B. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE

CONSTITUTION?
C. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE

CONSTITUTION?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Article 32 can only be invoked in case there is a violation of Fundamental Rights

which is unreasonable in nature. Moreover, the Doctrine of Alternate Remedy plays a
major role in declaring this petition unmaintainable. It is humbly submitted that the
present petition is therefore unmaintainable in the Hon’ble Apex Court of
Rashtrakuta.
A. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF ALTERNATE REMEDY WILL

APPLY?
The Doctrine of Alternate Remedy is essential to be considered in this

particular petition. It is humbly submitted that this petition could have been
instanced at the High Court, or any other court of law, with an assurance of the
receival of justice.
B. WHETHER THERE WAS IN FACT A VIOLATION OF

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the claim for
the petitioners, that there Fundamental Right is violated, has a huge lacuna in
it. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that this issue does not
unreasonably restrict or withhold any Fundamental Right available with
anyone.
C. LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF THE PARLIAMENT
The Parliament is the primary law-making authority of the country involved in

the making, amending and repealing of laws that are inconsistent with the

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needs of the society. It is humbly submitted that the legislature, therefore, is

more than capable of handling the law of sedition.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
The concept of “Judicial Review” as provided by Article 13 (2) of the

Constitution of Rashtrakuta gives the judiciary a purpose of determining the
constitutional validity of enactment and if there is a violation of Fundamental
Rights in the procedural implementation of such enactment. Therefore, it is
humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the particular legislation
is constitutional and does not violate the provisions of Article 14, 19 or 21.
A. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE

CONSTITUTION?
Any enacted legislature cannot unreasonably go astray from the principles of

equality provided in article 14 of the Constitution of Rashtrakuta. However,
absolute equality isn’t granted by the constitution, and reasonable classification
is permitted by the constitution based on the nexus between intelligible
differentia and the object that the legislation aims to achieve. Therefore, it is
humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the particular
legislation is constitutional and does not violate the provisions of article 14.

CONSTITUTION?
Absolute or unregulated liberty which is utterly free from any fetters has the
potential to push a democracy into anarchy. Therefore reasonable restrictions
are constitutionally imposed even on fundamental rights if they clash with the
sovereignty and integrity of the nation. In concurrence to this, it is humbly
submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the particular legislation is
constitutional and does not violate the provisions of article 19(1).

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CONSTITUTION?
Right against compelled speech which comes under the domain of the right of
free speech and expression is subject to reasonable restriction as enshrined
under article 19(2). The above-said legislation rightfully coheres with
elements of reasonable restriction. Therefore it is humbly submitted before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court that the particular legislation is constitutional that
does not constitute any violation of compelled speech since the Right to
Freedom to Speech and Expression is not categorical and is subjected to the
exceptions prescribed by A.19(2) of the constitution

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
A. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF ALTERNATE REMEDY WILL APPLY?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that due to the availability of
alternative remedies, this petition shall be directed to a lower court, such as the
High Court in particular, whose scope of jurisdiction is much wider and better
suited for the grave nature of the petition. Directly approaching the Apex Court
dilutes the efficacy of the remedy. The Supreme Court in the case of PN Kumar v.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi1 directed the petitioner to approach the High
Court for the writ petition due to the vast amount of powers available with the
High Court to deal with cases.
It is a well known principle that whatever provision of law is capable of being
scrutinized and opined upon by the High Court, it does, by custom, be heard in a
High Court at the first instance. The judgement of the High Court can then be
called into questioning and challenged in the Supreme Court, as was given in the
case of Louise Fernandes v. State of Maharashtra2. Moreover, the Court also
held, in the case of Satish Chandra v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies3 that the
High Court is the alternative remedy when it comes to dealing with a petition filed
directly in the Supreme Court, before consequently dismissing the petition filed
before it. The Court, talking about alternate remedy in the case of Rakhaldas
Mukherjee v. S P Ghose4, held that the alternate remedy shall only be considered
such if it is equally effective or adequate. This is to be determined on a case-to-
case basis. The alternate remedy is held to be ineffective if it involves too much
cost of litigation, or if it exhausts crucial time of the petitioner, thereby nullifying
the very essence behind filing the petition. It is humbly submitted that in the
1
P N Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1988 SCR (1) 732, 1987 SCC (4) 609.
2
Lt. Commander Pascale Fernandes v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., 1968 AIR 594, 1968 SCR (1) 695.
3
Satish Chandra & Anr. v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies, 1994 81 CompCas 482 SC, JT 1994 (3) SC 620,
1994 (2) SCALE 829, (1994) 4 SCC 332, 1994 3 SCR 618, 1994 (2) UJ 280 SC.
4
Rakhaldas Mukherjee v. S.P Ghose, AIR 1952 Cal 171.

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present scenario, neither does approaching the High Court involve the petitioners
in a series of burdening costs, nor does it consume time beyond a reasonable
amount.
Furthermore, in the case of M/s Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v.
Antarim Zila Parishad5, the Supreme Court had stated two cases wherein the
doctrine of alternate remedy shall not apply:
a) When the authority acting under the provision of law is ultra vires
b) When the principles of natural justice are violated
The first of these points is not applicable in the present scenario. The principles of
natural justice originate from the tenets and descendance of Roman Law. It is
closely linked to the standard of morality displayed in common law, and its
derivation is not codified in any statute or book of law. To put it in simplistic
terms, natural justice involves making decisions that are just, reasonable and fair.
The three pillars of natural justice are:
1) Audi Alteram Partem6: This particular concept relates to how it is in the

interest of justice to hear both the parties appearing for a matter, and how
arbitrary it would be to completely ignore one of the parties’ stances in
that matter. No man shall be condemned unheard.7 It is humbly submitted
that the principle of audi alteram partem was not violated in the present
scenario. There has been no documented arbitrariness shown which barred
the petitioners from filing petitions or utilising their legal remedies.
2) Nemo Judex In Causa Sua8: This Latin phrase literally translates to “no
one should be a judge in their own cause”. If anyone has an interest, which
may be in the form of a potentially favoured decision, it is expected of the
judicial authority in question to recuse itself from giving a decision. It is
humbly submitted that this principle has not been violated in the present
scenario as well, as there are no documented links between any of the
judges involved in giving any of the decisions related to the case.
5
Babu Ram Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad Muzaffar Nagar, 1969 AIR 556, 1969 SCR
(1) 518.
6
MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/audi%20alteram%20partem (last
visited Oct. 1 2022).
7
Lowry v. Inman, 37 How. Pr. 153 (1869).
8
ICLR, https://www.iclr.co.uk/knowledge/glossary/nemo-iudex-in-causa-sua/ (last visited Oct. 1 2022).

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3) Reasoned Decision: Every party has the right to be made aware the
grounds or the arguments on which a decision is made final. It can be
defined as statements that are offered as a justification or an explanation.9
It upholds the principle of fairness that must be prevalent in every action,
whether it be judicial, or quasi-judicial or administrative, as mentioned in
the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner10. It is
humbly submitted that during the course of the events, it has never
happened that the petitioners were arbitrarily, without any rational
justification be arrested or detained.
Having put the principles of natural justice based on the relevant facts of this case11, it
is humbly submitted that they have not been violated during any of the judicial or
non-judicial events pertaining to this case. Therefore, the doctrine of alternate remedy
shall apply to this present case.
B. WHETHER THERE WAS IN FACT A VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS?
The Supreme Court case of Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti v. Union of India12 clearly
laid down that the violation of a Fundamental Right is sine qua non when it comes
to seeking an enforcement in the form of a writ from the Supreme Court.
Therefore, Article 32 cannot simply be invoked to adjudicate the validity of any
legislation unless it adversely affects any of the Fundamental Rights of the
petitioner. Courts can only exercise the power of judicial review as indirectly
enshrined in the Constitution beyond legislative competence only under certain
well-specified limitations13 .
9
MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reason (last visited Oct. 1 2022).
10
Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. Chief Election Commissioner, 1978 AIR 851, 1978 SCR (3) 272.
11
Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab State Electricity Board & Ors. , 2010 (4) RCR(Civil) 859 : 2010
(11) Scale 69 : 2010 (13) SCC 216 : 2010 (7) Supreme 499 : 2010 AIOL 706 : AIR 2010 SCW 7020 : 2011 (4)
All.M.R. 479 : 2010 (11) JT 615.
12
Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1990 AIR 851, 1990 SCR (1) 588.
13
Namit sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745).

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It has been previously held by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Kedar Nath
v. State of Bihar14 that Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code is a valid provision. It
further held that though the section imposes restrictions on the fundamental freedom
of speech and expression, the restrictions are in the interest of public order and are
within the ambit of permissible legislative interference with the Fundamental Right.
In light of the abovementioned facts and those that shall be argued in the contentions
given ahead, it is humbly submitted that there has been no violation of Fundamental
Rights which isn’t reasonably expected, rendering the writ petition in this Hon’ble
court non-maintainable. A law may create hardships for some, but on those sole
grounds, it shall never be declared unconstitutional. Mere hardship is no ground to
strike down valid legislation15.

CONSTITUTION?
It is humbly submitted that a law which violates the Fundamental Rights of a

person is void. In case such a violation takes place, it the imperative duty of the
Supreme Court to weigh the factors that are most crucial in determining the
fundamentality of the statute in question. One of these criteria is the competence
of the legislature to make law.
Even though Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s arguments in favour of identifying

“seditious” language as an exception to freedom of speech and expression was not
received well among the others during the Constituent Assemble Debates16, it is
humbly submitted that the proposition itself, irrespective of its actual
materialisation, is a testament to the fact that sentiment regarding a complex
legislation solidifying the crime of sedition was prevalent even in the mind of a
Freedom Fighter, many of whom were jailed and given sentences for the same
exact crime. The Parliament derives its power to uphold and further legislate, if
need be, about the law of sedition from this particular aspect itself. The Solicitor
14
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 : 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769.
15
Prafulla Kumar Das & Ors., v. State of Orissa & Ors., (1992) : W.P. (civil) 611, (1993) : App. (civil) 791.
16
INDIAN KANOON, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1389880/ (last visited Oct. 1 2022).

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General of India had remarked that instances of abuse of provision would never be
a justification to reconsider a binding judgement of the constitutional bench.
It is most humbly submitted that the Parliament of India has shown great vigour in
identifying and quashing several outdated and archaic laws17. It has the capacity
and the capability of amending, severing provisions, or completely annexing a
particular aspect of law if need be. Moreover, the Union Government, in the case
of S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India18, has explicitly shown their earnestness in
re-examining the provision of sedition as defined under Section 124A of the IPC,
and stated how the Hon’ble Supreme Court may not invest its precious time in
examining the validity of Section 124A, as it is perfectly capable of doing so.
It is therefore contended, that this petition is non-maintainable as the Parliament of

Rashtrakuta is the appropriate authority to examine the validity and prevalence of
Section 124A of the Rashtrakuta Penal Code.

CONSTITUTIONAL?
The concept of the Indian constitution’s golden triangle was first observed and
argued in the case of T.R Kothandaraman v. T.N Water Supply and Drainage
Board19. Articles 14(1), 19(2), and 21(3) constitute this triangle for the protection
of the public’s liberty. Every provision or legislation should be tested in coherence
with these three sections to validate its constitutionality. It has been explained in
Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association & Ors. v. Union of India20 that
the will of the constitution which also amounts to the will of the people in a
democracy should prevail if the spirit of any legislation condenses an individual’s
right as conferred in the III part of the Indian Constitution.
To test the constitutional validity of any past or future legislation, the power of
judicial review has been granted in article 13 of the Constitution of Rashtrakuta.
17
ECONOMIC TIMES, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/parliament-approves-
bill-to-scrap-58-archaic-laws/articleshow/70499286.cms?from=mdr (last visited Oct. 1 2022).
18
S.G Vombatkere v. Union of India, 2021 : W.P 682.
19
T.R Kothandaraman v. T.N Water Supply and Drainage Board, 1994 SCC (6) 282.
20
Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association & Ors. v. Union of India, [(1993) 4 SCC 441].

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The article states that: “The State shall not make any law which takes away or
abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of
this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void 21.
DOCTRINE OF PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY: There is a general

premise that the legislature of democracy has an optimum understanding of the
needs of the people and any provision enacted by the legislature is the
manifestation of its experience with problems of the general public and the
legislature would not deliberately flout a constitutional safeguard or right.22
Supreme court in the case of ML Kamra v New India Assurance 23said that “The
court ought not to interpret the statutory provisions, unless compelled by their
language, in such a manner as would involve its unconstitutionality, since the
legislature of the rule-making authority is presumed to enact a law which does not
contravene or violate the constitutional provisions.” Therefore the statute enacted
is always presumed to be constitutionally valid and it is for the challenger to prove
the contrary. 24
A. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OR ARTICLE 14 OF THE

CONSTITUTION?
Equality is one of the major central pillars of the democracy of Rashtrakuta.

The principle of equality puts a bar on inequalities, unfairness, and
arbitrariness. Neither the parliament nor any state legislature can transgress
the doctrine of equality. Its definition as stated in article 14 is also inspired by
Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948: “all are equal
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection
of the law”.
There are two concepts in this principle as given in article 14 namely,
“equality before the law” and “equal protection of laws”. The former is
concerned with the absence of any special dispensation available to any
individual while the latter talks about subjection to equality in the same
21
INDIA CONST. art. 13
22
State of AP v. McDowell & Co., AIR 1996 SC 1628.
23
ML Kamra v New India Assurance, 1992 AIR 1072.
24
Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.

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situation i.e. the equals shouldn’t be treated unlike and unlikes shouldn’t be
treated alike. Equality varies immensely when it comes to the nature, ability,
and circumstances of every individual and therefore absolute equality is not a
feasible argument and is not what article 14 enshrines. Granting a guarantee
of equality can’t be drawn in parallel with the rules whose applicability will
be the same for everyone regardless of the difference in circumstances as
decided in Chiranjeet Lal v. Union of India25.
The impugned legislation is not in violation of the right to equality as per
article 14 because there is no discrimination among individuals charged under
the said provision and its consequences are the same for all. It’s the
responsibility of the courts to identify the scope of arbitrariness and
unreasonableness in a piece of legislation compelling enough to strike it
down.
The presence of a nexus between the intelligible differentia and the object
being sought after by the legislation which gives rise to the restrictions arising
out of reasonable classification constitutes the test for arbitrariness. The
restrictions imposed by the said legislation on an individual’s liberty are there
in the interest of national security and maintenance of public order which
gives way to a very strong link between the enacted restrictions and their
reasonableness. Therefore section 124(a) of the Rashtrakuta Penal Code, 1860
does not stand in violation of article 14 of the Constitution of Rashtrakuta.

CONSTITUTION?
Article 19(1) of the Constitution of Rashtrakuta grants six freedoms to the

citizens of Rashtrakuta namely, freedom of speech and expression, freedom to
assemble peacefully without arms, freedom to form associations and unions,
freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India, freedom to reside
and settle in any part of the territory in India, freedom to practice any
profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business.
25
Chiranjeet Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.

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Absolute or unregulated liberty which is utterly free from any fetters cannot be
granted because it has the potential to lead a democracy into a state of anarchy
and public disorder. In concurrence with this, various clauses in article 19 of
the constitution impose certain restrictions on the freedoms provided in 19(1).
These reasonable restrictions have been put in place so that the rights in the
above-said article do not clash with public welfare and national morality.
Article 19(2) inflicts some reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech
and expression in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of Rashtrakuta,
the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offense. The test for reasonableness should be based on “the
nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of
the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be
remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing
conditions at the time”26
DOCTRINE OF TRUE CHARACTER AND NATURE: Developed in the case of

Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India27 this doctrine takes into consideration the
subject matter of the impugned legislation, the area in which it operates, and its
purport and intent behind the enactment. The pith and substance of any legislation are
what this principle talks about. When this concept is broken down to a molecular
meaning, Pith means the true essence of something, and the word substance signifies
the most cardinal aspect of anything. When a question arises against the
constitutionality of a provision it’s important to examine that piece of legislation
using the lens of this doctrine.
The charges in section 124 (a) of the Rashtrakuta Penal Code 1860 have provided a
definite safeguard against anti-national, terrorist, and secessionist factors. The Hon'ble
Supreme court in the case of Kedarnath Singh v. the State of Bihar provided its
conformity towards the validity of the provisions related to sedition. The apex court
stated that the speech falling under the ambit of sedition will pose a direct threat to the
26
Harkchand ratanchand Bantia v Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 14453.
27
Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, 1960 SCR (2) 671.

NJ17R
sovereignty of the country and therefore it’s the responsibility of the government to
restrict such expression to prevent anarchic circumstances in the nation.
The main function of the above-said section is to protect the rightfully elected
government of the country from being disrupted or potentially overthrown with the
help of unlawful forces. Criticism of the government via the right of expression and
speech is a key essential of democracy but a lawfully elected government is the soul
of a democratic country and its exposure to threats of subversion points toward the
fundamental failure of the constitution of such a nation. The restrictions arising out of
section 124(a) of RPC are in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of
Rashtrakuta and therefore fit perfectly under the canopy of reasonable restriction.
a) VIOLATION OF RIGHT AGAINST COMPELLED SPEECH:

Violation as to Right against Compelled Speech bifurcates itself as violations of
the rights of- Right to Dissent and Right to Remain Silent. S.124A of RPC does
not constitute any violation as to compelled speech since the Right to Freedom as
to Speech and Expression is not categorical and is subjected to the exceptions
prescribed by A.19(2) of the Constitution. It has been numerously litigated
otherwise however Supreme Court judgments have always been in favor of the
validity of the S.124A, Rashtrakuta identifies itself as responsible to maintain the
security of the state as well as public order, irrelevant of the Section being adopted
by the imperial legislature, the Indian judiciary has made sure to reduce the scope
of the Section such that security of the state is maintained and public order is not
threatened without hampering the promotion of a free society. In Kedarnath v. the
State of Bihar, the constitutional validity of the Section was upheld, the judgment
provided a procedure via which the right to speech can be curtailed of which
corresponding substance is “intention or tendency” to create public disorder. The
utterance will only assume a penal connotation whence the trial of a person
adjudicates that such wordings were pernicious or intentional as to the creation of
public disorder. The criminality of utterance does not prevail under S.124A as
soon as the charge is filed, the coherence to charges is a fair court trial, only the
court and its intelligence determine the constitutionality of criminality, and each
case as to sedition is heard by Court to determine guilt, any attack on S.124A is
hence an attack on judicial competency. The Directive Principles of the State
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Policy Part IV of the Constitution are to be taken into account in the determination
of reasonable restrictions28293031, guilt based on sedition is constituted whence an
utterance threatens “security and peace” latter thereof forms a part of DPSP.

CONSTITUTION?
Article 21 states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to a procedure established by law. The right to life which is
the most fundamental of all is also the most difficult to define.
The term ‘life’ was explained in Munn v. Illinois32: “the term ‘life’ is more
than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to
all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally
prohibits the mutilation of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg,
putting out of an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body
through which the soul communicates with the outer world.”
The above statement has been quoted by the Supreme Court of India in many
instances333435
In the case of A.K Gopalan v. the State of Madaras36, the Supreme court
outrightly rejected the view that the word ‘law’ as written in article 21 only
talks about jus and lex and it was established that it rather means the
principles of natural justice flowing on the analogy of ‘due process of law’ in
correspondence with the interpretation of the American Supreme court.
It was adequately settled in the Maneka Gandhi case 37 that article 21 does
not exclude articles 19 and 14. The procedure prescribed in article 21 which
28
State of Bombay v. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318: 1951 SCR 682.
29
Quraishi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 : 1959 SCR 629.
30
Jalan Trading Co. v. D.M Aney, AIR 1979 SC 233 : (1979) 3 SCC 220.
31
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873 : (1981) 2 SCC 600.
32
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113.
33
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295, 1301, 1305.
34
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494.
35
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545: AIR 1986 SC 180, 194.
36
A.K Gopalan v. the State of Madaras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
37
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248: AIR 1978 SC 597.

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deprives a person of ‘personal liberty should meet the requirements of all the
above-stated three articles of the constitution of Rashtrakuta.
A prerequisite of the reasonableness of law providing for denial of life or

liberty has been instated by the establishment of a relationship between
articles 14, 19, and 21.
Penal laws like section 124-a of the RPC and section 292 of the RPC have
been subjected to tests of satisfying reasonableness under article 19 because
freedom of speech and expression is protected by the above-said article.
Therefore it is concluded that the test of reasonableness against article 19 is
not an application of whether or not the law is penal rather it is whether the
law penalizes an activity protected under article 19.
Validity test for reasonableness under article 19 can also be tested under
article 21 in cases where procedures of penal sanctions are under the radar of
being questioned for their validity.
The conviction rate of sedition cases has gone down to less than 3% as per the
latest reports of the National Crime Records Bureau. Therefore the right to
life and liberty is curtailed for only those people who have been properly
prosecuted and convicted as per the procedures followed by the courts of
Rashtrakuta. The Supreme court of India has advised the courts to be very
diligent in dealing with cases of sedition because of their sensitive nature.3839
In the cases of Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Assn. v. Central Valuation

Board and Ors40; and Grand Kakatiya Sheraton Hotel and Towers
Employees and Workers Union v. Srinivasa Resorts Limited and Ors41 the
court held that total unreasonable can be the ground for declaring an enacted
38
Common cause v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 1665.
39
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo vs. State of Andra Pradesh, (1997)7 SCC 431.
40
Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Assn. v. Central Valuation Board and Ors, AIR 2007 SC 2276.
41
Grand Kakatiya Sheraton Hotel and Towers Employees and Workers Union v. Srinivasa Resorts Limited and
Ors, AIR 2009 SC 2337.

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law ultra vires. Substantive unreasonableness needs to be satisfied by the

court for a such declaration concerning any piece of legislation.
SECTION 124-A IS NOT AN ARBITRARILY ENACTED PIECE OF

LEGISLATION: The restriction imposed on the right provided by articles
14, 19, and 21 are in coherence with the grounds of reasonable and balances
precisely with the protection of sovereignty and integrity of the nation of
Rashtrakuta. It is, therefore, necessary to have certain legislative provisions in
favor of the general public interest by protecting the will of the state i.e. the
government elected by the people of that state by maintaining the lucidity of
principles of reasonable restrictions.

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THE PRAYER
In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may this Hon’ble Court
be pleased to:
Quash the writ petitions filed by the petitioners, thereby upholding the constitutional validity of
Section 124A of the Rashtrakuta Penal Code.
AND/OR
Pass any other order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
And for this, the respondent as duty bound, shall humbly pray.

NJ17R
Sd/-
COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

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SHRI.

NITYANAND JHA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF RASHTRAKUTA

MR. MOHAN SINGH & ORS. ……..PETITIONER(S)

STATE OF RASHTRAKUTA …….RESPONDENT

(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF RASKHTRAKUTA)

MEMORIAL FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 1

1. List of Abbreviations …………………………………………………3

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 2

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 3

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 4

• Harkchand ratanchand Bantia v Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 14453.

• Indian Penal Code, 1860.

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

• M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, LexisNexis, Gurgaon, 7th Edition 2016.

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 5

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 6

Article 32: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.

Article 13 (2) in the Constitution of Rashtrakuta is read as hereunder:

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 7

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 8

1. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

A. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF ALTERNATE REMEDY WILL

B. WHETHER THERE WAS IN FACT A VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL

C. LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF THE PARLIAMENT

2. WHETHER THE PROVISION OF SECTION 124A OF THE RPC IS

A. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OR ARTICLE 14 OF THE

B. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE

C. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 9

1. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

Article 32 can only be invoked in case there is a violation of Fundamental Rights

A. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF ALTERNATE REMEDY WILL

The Doctrine of Alternate Remedy is essential to be considered in this

B. WHETHER THERE WAS IN FACT A VIOLATION OF

C. LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF THE PARLIAMENT

The Parliament is the primary law-making authority of the country involved in

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 10

needs of the society. It is humbly submitted that the legislature, therefore, is

2. WHETHER THE PROVISION OF SECTION 124A OF THE RPC IS

The concept of “Judicial Review” as provided by Article 13 (2) of the

A. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE

Any enacted legislature cannot unreasonably go astray from the principles of

B. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 11

C. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 12

1. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

A. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF ALTERNATE REMEDY WILL APPLY?

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 13

The three pillars of natural justice are:

1) Audi Alteram Partem6: This particular concept relates to how it is in the

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 14

B. WHETHER THERE WAS IN FACT A VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 15

C. WHETHER IT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE

It is humbly submitted that a law which violates the Fundamental Rights of a

Even though Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s arguments in favour of identifying

MEMORIALS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 16

It is therefore contended, that this petition is non-maintainable as the Parliament of

2. WHETHER THE PROVISION OF SECTION 124A OF THE RPC IS