Vietnam: Harnessing The Court Of International Public Opinion and the Strength of

International Law in South China Sea (SCS)1

By: Catherine S. Panaguiton

“Nobody’s going to fix the world for us, but working together, making use of technological
innovations and human communities alike, we might just be able to fix it ourselves.” ---Jamais
Cascio2
I. Introduction
Is the South China Sea needing to have a “fix”? The South China Sea has been a source

of conflicts and tensions for the past years until the present. There indeed is a need to put an end

to the disputes and for countries to live harmoniously in the region. The South China Sea

arbitration case filed by the Philippines was meant to be a peaceful means to clear up points of

contention in the South China Sea, but is it enough? Should Vietnam also follow suit to protect

its own interests? And what is the role of other countries should Vietnam file suit?

These are the questions that this paper seeks to address. This paper first tries to provide a

summary of the Vietnam’s arguments in its position in the South China Sea. Vietnam upholds

the South China Sea arbitration case by the Philippines, so the author will touch upon that vis-à-

vis the support it has from other countries. Then it will launch into an investigation of the current

support by US to Vietnam in SCS arbitration and give comprehensive suggestions for the future

support of US to Vietnam. This paper likewise wishes to investigate the Vietnamese and

Singapore cooperation in the SCS. It also wishes to explore Vietnam-ASEAN relations in the

SCS. Europe’s Security policy in the South China Sea and how it can make a difference for

1
Dutton, Peter. “Vietnam Threatens China With Litigation Over the South China Sea” [online] available
from <https://www.lawfareblog.com/vietnam-threatens-china-litigation-over-south-china-sea>,Accessed
August 25, 2021.
2
Ntaskmanager website [online] available from <https://www.ntaskmanager.com/blog/best-teamwork-
quotes/>,Accessed August 25, 2021.
Vietnam in its position in the SCS disputes, EU- ASEAN relations will also be discussed. Japan,

New Zealand and Australia and Vietnam relations will then be discussed. The main objective of

this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of countries over the world and their stand with

Vietnam regarding the South China Sea debacle, to predict whether the countries would echo

their support of a Vietnamese arbitration in the same manner as the Philippines’ arbitration case.

The South China Sea is an ongoing dispute that needs to be resolved before it escalates.

As to Vietnam’s role in the determination of such resolution, it would remain to be determined in

years to come. The Philippines’ arbitration case had an impact to the world because of the

support that it had gotten from different countries. For a Vietnamese arbitration to have the same

impact, the international community must have a united front in upholding international law and

the UNCLOS. This paper examines the likelihood for that to happen and provides an estimation

of countries that are likely to back a Vietnamese arbitration.

II. Summary of the Vietnam’s arguments in its position in the South China Sea

On May 2, 2014, relations between Vietnam and China have seriously deteriorated

because of China’s unilateral drilling in the northeastern area of the South China Sea or the Gulf

of Tonkin. This incident added a new issue to the list of disputes in the South China Sea between

Vietnam and China.3

3
Vu Hai Dang.“Disputes between Vietnam and China in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis”, p. 35
online] available from < https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/140930_Hiebert_PerspectivesSouthChinaSea_Web.pdf>, Accessed
December 8, 2020.
 Specifically, China parked the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC)4 oil

drilling platform Haiyang Shiyou 981 at a location west of Triton islet and approximately 50

miles within Vietnam’s EEZ. The drilling platform was initially accompanied by an armada of

ships including the China coast guard, fishery enforcement, transport and supply ships, fishing

boats (some armed) and PLA navy warships (Jianghu II- class frigate, fast attack Missile Craft

753). By May 7, the number of Chinese ships and vessels had increased to 73, including 7 PLA

warships.5

The size of the fleet suggests that China anticipated potential resistance from Vietnam

and had plans to defend the rig against any attacks, including military attacks. The operation was

clearly planned carefully, indicating, China’s ability to conduct coordinated operations involving

PLA navy, China coast guard and state-owned enterprise assets. China’s actions produced

responses from Vietnamese coast guard and a series of events involving the use of water cannons

and ramming of vessels.

During the period from May 2 to its departure on July 15, Vietnam’s coast guard and

VNFSF vessels attempted to confront the Chinese and force them to leave Vietnam’s EEZ.

China responded by declaring an expanding exclusion zone around the drilling platform, and

enforcing it by directing high water cannons at the bridges of Vietnamese coast guard and

VFSNF vessels. Chinese ships, on average two to four times heavier than their counterparts,

have also engaged in ramming Vietnamese vessels.

4
Ibid.
5
Carlyle A. Thayer. “Vietnam’s Maritime Forces”, pp. 147-148 [online] available from < https://csis-
website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/140930_Hiebert_PerspectivesSouthChinaSea_Web.pdf>, Accessed
December 8, 2020.
 China also employed other methods of intimidation such as unsheathing deck cannons

and other weapons and aiming them at Vietnamese vessels, flying military and civilian aircraft

ahead and directing the high-powered water cannons at the communication masts and antennae

of Vietnamese vessels. On May 26, a Chinese enforcement ship No. 11209 rammed and capsized

a Vietnamese fishing boat DNA 90152, endangering its crew. Chinese law enforcement officials

also boarded Vietnamese fishing craft outside of China’s exclusion zone and seized their catch,

navigation equipment and other items of value. Vietnamese fishermen report being intimidated,

and in some cases, beaten by metal bar wielding Chinese officials.6 By June 5, Vietnamese

officials reported that 24 Vietnam coast guard and VNFSF vessels have been damaged. On July

5, 2014, Vietnamese authorities reported that up to 115 Chinese ships, including 5 PLA navy

warships, were deployed at the site where the rig was located.7

In addition to the foregoing, there is also the matter of suspension of potential oil drilling

activities in the South China Sea that could result to a lot of income inuring to the benefit of

Vietnam to go down the drain. Particular to this issue is Block 118, whereby Exxon in 2009

acquired the rights to explore more than 13 million acres off the coast of Vietnam, all within an

area Vietnam considers its exclusive economic zone under a United Nations maritime

convention. Some of that acreage, however, is contested by China.8

6
Ibid at 13.
7
Ibid.
8
Brian Spegle and Chester Dawson. “China Flexes Might with Energy Giants.” [online] available from
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-tells-oil-companies-to-choose-sides-in-territorial-dispute-
1405529382>, accessed May 19, 2021.
 Map depicting position of Block 118 which is within Vietnam’s EEZ, item 4.9

The below shows some details and the controversy regarding this project in Block 118:

“ While the sea tensions unfold, US energy giant ExxonMobil find itself
increasingly intertwined in the geopolitical row, amid rising speculation Chinese
pressure may drive it from a $10 billion natural gas project in Vietnam-claimed
waters.

9
Ibid.
 xxx
In January, the company said on its website that it had awarded a contract for
front-end engineering and design, and was seeking permits, filing planning
applications and conducting other preparatory work for the proposed
development. An ExxonMobil promotional video of the project says the project
“could power the Vietnamese economy for decades.”
Blue Whale is Vietnam’s largest gas venture and is scheduled to come online in
2022 as the rapidly growing nation confronts an energy crunch.
The off-shore site is located in deep-water Block 118, about 88 kilometers off the
Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea, and is estimated to hold some 150
million cubic meters on reserves, according to energy industry reports.
Until recently, most regional industry analysts believed that the ExxonMobil
project would be out of China’s crosshairs, beyond the reach of its notorious nine-
deash line map that encompasses nearly 90% of the contested sea.
Rumors have thus spread fast and furious on Vietnamese social media that
ExxonMobil could indeed cave pressure from Beijing to cease its involvement in
the Blue Whale project.”10

In 2020, such rumors appear not to be absolutely unfounded and it has been declared that

there is an anticipated departure by ExxonMobil from the Blue Whale Project.11

Now fast forward. Well within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, Vanguard Bank is a

significant source of resources for Vietnam. However, in July of 2019, the area also became the

site of the worst stand-off between Vietnam and China in five years. Angered by Vietnam’s

drilling operations at Vanguard Bank, China sailed in its Haiyang Dizhi 8 survey ship, escorted

by coast guard vessels, and a several months stand-off ensued. China’s decision to send an

intimidating flotilla of coast guard vessels is becoming increasingly commonplace as China

10
Tim Daiss. “All the Reasons ExxonMobil May Leave Vietnam” [online] available from
<https://asiatimes.com/2019/09/all-the-reasons-exxonmobil-may-leave-vietnam>, Accessed May 19,
2021.
11
Nguyen Qang Dy. “Trump-Trong Summit Remains in Limbo” [online] available from
<https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/trump-trong-summit-remains-limbo>. Accessed May 19, 2021.
presses its expansive nine-dashed line claim and seeks to prevent Southeast Asian claimant

nations from developing resources or possessing maritime features within the line’s limits. Yet

despite China’s great power advantage in the region and a history of claimant states’ withdrawal,

Vietnam did not back down in the incident, some forty-five years after losing control of the

Paracels in a deadly standoff with China.12

(A) Actions within Vietnam’s EEZ

One significant ruling in the Award was when China’s nine-dashed line was formally

declared to be invalid.13 Further, the case stated that once a state becomes a party to the

UNCLOS, historic rights contrary to the UNCLOS are abandoned automatically.14 China’s

aggressive actions well within Vietnam’s EEZ are based on its nine dashed line claim. Without

this foothold, its aggressive actions have no legal basis. Following UNCLOS, Vietnam enjoys all

the rights entitled to it under said treaty for actions done within the EEZ, such as Block 118.

As thus, in the Haiyang Shiyou incident and the Vanguard Bank incidents, whereby

Chinese ships violated rights of Vietnam within its EEZ, Vietnam can assert that China violated

international law in the following as Vu Hai Dang15 iterates:

• In a state’s EEZ and continental shelf, only this state has the sovereign rights for the

purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources and jurisdiction to establish and use

artificial islands, installations and structures16 and third states shall have due regard to the

rights and duties of the former,17

12
Ibid at 12.
13
See Award, para. 238 (d) p. 100.
14
See Award, paras. 238 (d), 260 and 261.
15
Ibid at 20 p. 42.
16
UNCLOS, Arts. 56, 77, 81.
17
Ibid, Art. 58.
 • All states enjoy the freedom of navigation in the EEZ,18

• Artificial islands, installations and structures outside the territorial seas can only have a

safety zone that shall not exceed a distance of 500-meter radius,19

• States shall take necessary measures for ships flying their flags to ensure safety of

navigation with regard to, inter alia, the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of

ships and the prevention of collisions, and in taking such measures, states are required to

conform to generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices,20

• States shall not endanger the safety of navigation or create any hazard for vessels in the

exercise of their powers of enforcement against vessels,21

• Rules relating to the conduct of vessels under the International Regulations for the

Prevention of Collision at Sea 1972 of the International Maritime Organization,22 and

• The prohibition of the use force or threaten to use force in international relations.23

Substantive questions: (b) Paracel Islands and Spratlys Islands

Another big issue was the arbitral tribunal declarations on the status of maritime features.

Pundits claim that it could also be argued that, technically, the tribunal ruling on the legal status

of the Spratly features applies only to the Spratlys—not the Paracels.24

18
Ibid.
19
Ibid. Article 60; UN Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, Art. 5.
20
Ibid, Art. 94.
21
UNCLOS, Art. 255.
22
International Maritime Organization, International Regulations For the Prevention of Collision At Sea,
October 20, 1972, Part B, [online] available from
<https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/COLREG.aspx>,Accessed December 10, 2020.
23
UN Charter, Article 2 (4).
24
Ibid at 30.
 However, in the Award, the arbitral tribunal relied on similar cases with features having

the same dimensions to rule on maritime features (i.e. dimensions in Quitasueño in the

Nicaragua vs. Colombia25 case that were considered as “rock” were made a basis for declaration

of “rocks” of maritime features in the SCS case between Philippines and China.)

Finding validity in this practice is instructive for Vietnam.26 This could very well be a

practice that can be employed in ruling on the status of maritime features in the Paracel islands.

Substantive questions: (c) environmental degradation proscribed under Article 192 of

UNCLOS

The result of the island-building and presence en masse of the PAFMM has not

just been a matter of maritime control. It has also seen the devastating destruction of

coral reefs on the seabed through dredging for island construction and the maritime

militia’s reported engagement in illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing,

decimating the South China Sea’s marine biodiversity. 27 By some estimations, China

already represents half the world’s fishing activity, with between 200,000 and 800,000

fishing boats. 28 China’s distant water fishing fleet, the world’s largest, is thought t o

25
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua vs. Colombia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 624.
26
Ibid at 31 p. 18.
27
Veerle Nowens. “ Above the Law: Holding China To Account in the South China Sea” [online]
available from <https://www.orfonline.org/research/above-the-law-holding-china-to-account-in-the-
south-china-sea/>, Accessed May 18, 2021 Citing Rachael Bale, “One of the World’s Biggest
Fisheries is on the Verge of Collapse,” National Geographic, 29 August 2016; Matthew
Southerland, China’s Island Building in the South China Sea: Damage to the Marine
Environment, Implications, and International Law, US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, 12 April 2016.
28
Ibid citing Ian Urbina, “How China’s Expanding Fishing Fleet Is Depleting the World’s
Oceans,” Yale Environment 360, 17 August 2020.
comprise between 1,600 and 3,400 vessels, though the Overseas Development Institute

estimates the number is closer to 17,000. 29

The impact of Chinese fishing is global, but it is acute in the South China Sea. Total

fish stocks in the South China Sea have been depleted by 70 percent to 95 percent since

the 1950s, while catch rates have declined by 66 percent to 75 percent over the last 20

years. 30 Island building and giant clam harvesting, with crude and destructive extraction

methods, were estimated in 2017 to have severely damaged or destroyed 160 square

kilometers of coral reefs. 31 Giant clam harvesting, after a brief hiatus, has reportedly

resumed. 32 The secondary effects of such practices are deeply problematic. The South

China Sea accounted for 12 percent of global fish catch in 2015, with over half of the

world’s fishing vessels operating in the region. 33 According to various studies, fish

accounts for around 19 percent of animal-sourced protein in Asia, rising to 75 percent in

Cambodia, and fisheries are the main or supplementary source of employment and

livelihood for more than 47 million people in the region (including China). 34 Failing to

29
Ibid citing Miren Gutiérrez et al., “China’s Distant-Water Fishing Fleet: Scale, Impact and
Governance,” Overseas Development Institute, June 2020.
30
Ibid citing South China Sea Expert Working Group, A Blueprint for Fisheries Management and
Environmental Cooperation in the South China Sea, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2017.
31
Ibid citing “A Blueprint for Fisheries Management and Environmental Cooperation in the South
China Sea”.
32
Ibid citing “China’s Most Destructive Boats Return to the South China Sea, ” Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, 20 May 2019; Dona Z. Pazzibugan, Jhesset O. Enano, Juie M. Aurelio,
“PH Protests China’s Harvest of Giant Clams,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17 April 2019.
33
Ibid citing Gregory B. Poling, “Illuminating the South China Sea’s Dark Fishing Fleets,” The
Stephenson Ocean Security Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 January
2019.
34
Ibid citing CGIAR Research Program on Fish, “Asia,” CGIAR.
look after the marine environment is in contravention of Article 192 of UNCLOS. 35 These

considerations can be strong arguments against China that Vietnam can elucidate in its

case.

III. The Republic of the Philippines vs. People’s Republic of China (South China Sea
Arbitration Case) and support of countries worldwide

Over the last few years, many countries have clarified their positions on the July 2016

South China Sea arbitration ruling and the validity of China’s maritime claims. Based on these

developments, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) has updated its tracker of official

public stances on the arbitration. As a result, we have identified 8 governments that have

publicly called for the ruling to be respected, 34 that have issued generally positive statements

noting the verdict but have stopped short of calling for the parties to abide by it, and 8 that have

publicly rejected it.36

What this exercise shows is that shifts have been relatively minor since the tracker’s last

major update five years ago. Only two countries, Germany and the United Kingdom, evolved

from positively acknowledging the ruling to explicitly calling for it to be respected. Two others,

Russia and Syria, moved from neutral statements to rejecting it. And one country, Indonesia,

shifted from neutral to vaguely positive. Everyone else remains exactly where they were a month

after the ruling was issued. And for most countries, that means studiously silent.37

35
United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea Part XII Protection and Preservation of the
Marine Environment, UN.
36
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative website. Arbitration Support Tracker [online] available from
<https://amti.csis.org/arbitration-support-tracker/>
37
Ibid.
 How many countries recognize the decision as legally binding on both parties and call for

it to be respected will determine its ultimate value, as international pressure is the only

enforcement mechanism. AMTI has scoured publicly available, official statements to determine

the real positions taken by countries. It is useful to compare this evolving list with the public

positions of countries before the ruling.38

38
Ibid.
 Chinese officials and state media before the ruling had trumpeted the number of countries

voicing support for Beijing’s position that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction in the case and the

ruling was therefore invalid. On the eve of the ruling, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs

claimed that number had climbed to more than 60, but had not provided a list of the countries or,

in most cases, evidence for their support. AMTI identified 65 countries that appeared to be

included in China’s list of supporters before the verdict. Of those, 31 had publicly confirmed

their support. In contrast, 41 countries had said that the arbitral award would be legally binding

and had called on both China and the Philippines to respect it.39

39
Ibid.
 Support for China’s position ahead of the ruling was defined as an explicit public

statement that 1) the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction or legitimacy; 2) the right of states to

choose their own method of dispute resolution should be respected (and therefore compulsory

dispute mechanisms such as the tribunal are invalid); or 3) the right of states to exempt certain

types of disputes from compulsory settlement as provided for by article 298 of the UN

Convention on the Law of the Sea should be respected (which China claims invalidates the

arbitral proceedings because they actually touched upon boundary delimitation, from which it

has exempted itself).40

IV. Current support by US to Vietnam in SCS arbitration and give comprehensive

suggestion for the future support of US to Vietnam

“lf it turns out that China is set on a path of “incremental imperialism” on the water,
the South China Sea is likely to remain high on the American agenda in Asia”41---
Bronson Percival, Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center, Washington

As the incoming Biden administration formulates its South China Sea strategy, one

regional partner that looms large is Vietnam. Over the last few years, tensions between China

and Vietnam in the South China Sea have remained high, impacting fishing and natural resource

exploration in disputed waters. While the Biden administration is likely to continue the positive

40
Ibid.
41
Vannarith Cheang “Best Quotes from the Third South China Sea Workshop in Hanoi” [online]
available from <https://vannarithchheang.com/2011/11/12/best-quotes-from-the-third-south-china-sea-
workshop-in-hanoi/>,Accessed August 25, 2021.
momentum in bilateral ties, it is less clear what specifically Hanoi seeks from Washington to

help it effectively deter Beijing.42

Amidst the conundrum on Vietnam policy, Grossman highlights a few policy preferences

that Vietnam has with the United States based upon his experiences, to wit:

“First, Vietnam was quite pleased with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statement on
July 13 in which he announced the U.S. would not respect Beijing’s maritime claims
derived from disputed features in the Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Luconia
Shoals, and Natuna Besar. Prior to that moment, Washington’s policy of maintaining the
integrity of maritime counterclaimants’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) over China’s
expansive “nine-dash line” claims had been an open secret, but Pompeo’s announcement
for the first time confirmed it. His statement coincided with the fourth anniversary of the
Philippines’ arbitration victory over China on their disputes, and Washington reaffirmed
its support for this legal decision, which essentially invalidated Beijing’s entire approach
to sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.43
Following Pompeo’s announcement, Vietnam probably felt just a little more confident
that the U.S planned to support Hanoi in defending Spratly Island claims within its EEZ.
Significantly, Washington specifically highlighted Vanguard Bank – the scene of the last
major China-Vietnam standoff in 2019 – as indisputably part of Vietnam’s EEZ. A Biden
administration decision to reiterate this policy stance would be greatly appreciated in
Hanoi. But Vietnam certainly seeks more, particularly in the Paracel Islands where China
in 1996 declared straight baselines – i.e., internal Chinese waters between Paracel
features – and in April extended administrative control over the Paracels (and Spratlys)
from Sansha City on Woody Island, the largest island in the Paracels. If the Biden team
issued a similar statement that refused to recognize Chinese sovereignty over the waters
pertaining to the Paracel archipelago (and even better, the territory itself), then Hanoi
would likely be overjoyed.44
Second, as I have previously written in these pages, Vietnam has quietly endorsed the
U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy because it takes a hard line against China in the South China
Sea and suggests Washington’s intent to sustain a presence in the region for years to
come. Indeed, in one of my discussions with Vietnamese interlocutors, I was told in no
uncertain terms that the U.S. cannot allow a repeat of China’s 2012 takeover of
Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. Hence, if the Biden administration keeps the
Indo-Pacific strategy (which it should), then it would likely signal to Hanoi that

42
Derek Grossman. “What Does Vietnam Want From the US in the South China Sea?” [online] available
from <https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/what-does-vietnam-want-from-the-us-in-the-south-china-
sea/>,Accessed August 25, 2021.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
 Washington strives to deter Beijing from undertaking such actions, and the U.S. will
punish China for new transgressions.45
To be sure, Vietnam’s tacit support of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy comes with certain
caveats. For example, it does not want to see U.S.-China relations become so adversarial
that the dynamic forces Vietnam to choose between the two powers. Hanoi has also
generally remained mum on the rising number of U.S. freedom of navigation operations
(FONOPs) in the South China Sea. Although Vietnam supports challenging Chinese
maritime claims under the auspices of the United Nations Convention for the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) and in the interest of maintaining a rules-based order, Hanoi also does
not wish to see FONOPs against waters surrounding territory it controls. Yet the U.S.
occasionally does so. Going forward, Hanoi would rather see continued
FONOPs focused on the Paracel Islands that make China less comfortable there.46
Third, showing up for key regional fora is, as it has always been, at least half the battle in
Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, the U.S. has quite a bit of work to do in this area. Over the
last few years, the Trump administration sent insufficiently senior representation to the
ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit, angering Southeast Asian leaders.
Vietnam’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2020 was hampered by the pandemic, but Hanoi
still managed to hold events virtually. But for the second year running, the Trump
administration dispatched National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien to participate in the
event – a clear slight to ASEAN leaders in attendance, especially when no travel was
required.47
If the Biden administration would like to improve its image in Vietnam, and the broader
region for that matter, then sending high-level officials to attend these events – preferably
the president himself – will be critical. While participating, the administration would be
served well by reiterating Pompeo’s statement on the South China Sea and going further
on the Paracels, if possible. At a minimum, Hanoi expects that Washington will
reemphasize its long-standing policy to uphold a norms- and rules-based order in the
region.
Fourth, there are distinct opportunities for the U.S. to engage in security cooperation with
Vietnam. To be sure, Hanoi’s “Four No’s and One Depend” defense policy – formerly
and more commonly referred to as “Three No’s” (no military alliances, no foreign bases
on Vietnamese soil, and no working with a second against a third country) – is
constraining, but there is certainly room for less provocative forms of cooperation. For
example, the U.S. can support Vietnamese development of maritime domain awareness
capabilities to help it better understand what China is doing in the South China Sea. Non-
traditional forms of security cooperation, such as in the areas of humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief (HA/DR) or search and rescue (SAR), enable bilateral exercises that,
though not lethal, may still provide critical skill sets to the Vietnamese armed forces.

45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
 Hanoi also welcomed procurement of additional coast guard capacity from Washington
following the sale of ex-Hamilton-class coast guard cutters.48
Moreover, Vietnam’s latest defense white paper, published in November 2019, offers two
additional points. The first is another “no,” which pledges never to initiate, or threaten to
initiate, armed conflict. The “One Depend,” however, is quite relevant to the U.S. as it
reads: “depending on the circumstances and specific conditions, Vietnam will consider
developing necessary, appropriate defense and military relations with other countries.”
Hanoi is clearly leaving the door open to deepening security relations with the U.S.,
without specifically naming the U.S., if Chinese assertiveness continues to rise in the
South China Sea. Hence, the Biden administration may benefit from a Vietnam actively
seeking greater cooperation in the future.49
Finally, as the Biden administration takes the reins, it might want to consider re-engaging
with Vietnam on upgrading the U.S.-Vietnam “comprehensive partnership” to a
“strategic partnership.” Doing so would send a clear message to China that Vietnam has a
strong backer in the U.S., and probably unlock deeper security cooperation. As early as
2011, Vietnam floated the idea, but nothing has happened since then for unknown
reasons. The Biden administration, however, will have a unique opportunity to discuss
this possibility with new Vietnamese leaders following the Vietnamese Communist
Party’s 13th Party Congress, set to take place this month. Depending on who emerges
from the Party Congress, they may possess the political capital needed to make such a
decision.”50

Regardless, Vietnam is likely to increasingly look for support from the U.S. to help it push

back against China in the South China Sea. The Biden administration should look to capitalize

on these opportunities while coordinating its efforts across allies and partners – namely “like-

minded partners” such as Australia, India, and Japan – that can complement U.S. assistance.51

V. Investigate the VN and Singapore cooperation in the SCS

“The US security presence “remains vital to the Asia-Pacific region,” and China
would be unable to take over that role in Southeast Asia even with its increasing
military might”--- Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong

48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
 Singapore’s relations with China have taken a plunge in 2016. First, the Chinese were

irked by Singapore’s support for the South China Sea arbitration ruling in July and then by

Singapore’s alleged attempt to include a mention of the ruling in the final document of the Non-

Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Venezuela in September. In a very public spat,

Singapore’s ambassador, Stanley Loh, denied raising the South China Sea issue while Chinese

Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang insisted that “a certain nation” had tried to trip China

up at the summit. Then, in November, Hong Kong customs impounded nine Singapore Armed

Forces armored personnel carriers in transit from Taiwan.52

Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1990, Singapore and China have developed

strong trade, finance, and investments links. Trade and investment ties between the two countries

grew steadily over the years, and China became Singapore’s largest trading partner in 2014, with

bilateral trade in goods reaching $86 billion. In 2013, Singapore’s investment in China reached

$7.23 billion, making it China’s largest investor. Remarkably, the city-state is China’s top

investment destination in Asia as well.53

But Singapore has cultivated strong economic and security links with the United States

too. The United States is Singapore’s second most important trade partner after China. The city-

state has also attracted major investments from the United States due to open-door investment

policies and highly developed business infrastructure. More than 1,300 U.S. companies have

invested in Singapore, and over 300 have set up regional headquarters there. Meanwhile, U.S.-

52
Michael Tan. “Singapore’s China Conundrum” [online] available
<https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/singapores-china-conundrum/>,Accessed on August 25, 2021.
53
Ibid.
Singapore security ties date back to the 1960s, when Singapore actively supported America’s

war effort in Vietnam.

The island state is sandwiched between much bigger neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia,

and there were fears too of communist North Vietnam and China. The communist victories in

Indochina in 1975 and Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 reinforced Singapore’s view

that the United States should play a role in Southeast Asian security. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s

first prime minister, understood the importance of having “overwhelming power on its

side.” Because of her limited strategic space, Singapore has looked to the United States as a

security guarantor, although that is not officially acknowledged.

Following China’s reform and opening to world trade in 1978, however, few

Singaporeans still think of China as a communist threat. Since Deng Xiaoping’s visit to

Singapore in 1978, Chinese leaders have looked upon Singapore as a successful development

model. Lee was an “old friend” of the Chinese and was widely respected in China. The Chinese

sense kinship with Singaporeans, 78 percent of whom are of Chinese descent, and admire

Singapore’s blend of authoritarian state-capitalism, its low crime, and high standard of

cleanliness. Deng welcomed Lee’s counsel and the prestigious Lee Kuan Yew School of Public

Policy has since trained many cohorts of Chinese officials in the art of public administration. To

offset a notoriously low birth rate, the Singapore government has encouraged immigration from

China, and of the nation’s 5.2 million people today, one million are recent Chinese immigrants.

With keen strategic instincts, Lee Kuan Yew deftly balanced relations with the West and China.

Beijing has been sympathetic to Singapore’s security needs and accepted the rationale behind her
military ties with the United States and Taiwan; although Singaporean troops have been training

in Taiwan since 1975, Beijing made no fuss until now.54

Despite her Western-leaning position, Singapore has avoided taking sides with the United

States in a conflict with China. Things changed in the wake of President Barack Obama’s ‘Pivot

to Asia’ since 2011, which entailed moving 60 percent of U.S. naval forces to the Asia-Pacific

and the creation of a 12-nation trade pact called the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP that

excludes China. Singapore has been an enthusiastic supporter of the ‘Pivot.’ In 2012, the United

States announced that it would deploy littoral combat ships to the city-state as part of the pivot.

During his state visit to Washington in August, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong

hailed Obama as America’s first “Pacific president” and said at a White House press conference

that he hoped Congress would ratify the TPP.55

These statements riled up observers in Beijing, but things came to a head a month later

when the Singapore delegation to the Non-Alignment Movement Summit allegedly pushed to

include a reference to The Hague ruling on the South China Sea in the summit’s final document.

In July, after The Hague tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected Chinese claims

in the South China Sea, Prime Minister Lee had voiced support, declaring that the verdict

delivered a strong statement about international law in maritime disputes. Singapore reportedly

attempted to also highlight the ruling, which China has dismissed as invalid, in the NAM summit

statement. Since Singapore is not a claimant in the South China Sea disputes, the NAM episode

provoked alarm among Chinese officials who now saw Singapore going out of her way to

54
Ibid.
55
Ibid.
oppose China. The subsequent impounding of the armored vehicles in Hong Kong rattled many

Singaporeans and left them questioning their prime minister’s strategic judgment.56

Singapore’s prosperity has long been founded on her role as a free port on the Straits of

Malacca, the 900 km long waterway that links Asia with the Middle East and Europe, and carries

about 40 percent of the world’s trade. More than 50,000 merchant ships ply the route each year.

When the British first arrived to set up a trading post at the beginning of the 19th century, there

were barely a thousand people living on the island. Today it is the world’s second busiest port

after Shanghai by cargo tonnage, and has earned praise as a sophisticated financial and trading

center with one of the highest wealth and income levels in Asia.57

In much the same way, the South China Sea is critically important to China’s

development. China’s economy is heavily dependent on trade, the bulk of which passes through

the South China Sea, and freedom of navigation on those waters is crucial. Eighty percent of

China’s crude oil imports come through the Straits of Malacca, a choke point that the U.S. Navy

could easily constrict. It is not hard to see why Beijing regards the South China Sea as a core

national interest. To diversify risk, the Chinese have sought alternative routes to the Indian

Ocean. There were discussions about opening a canal on the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand to

join the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea, but talks have not borne fruit.58

Meanwhile, plans for a land route from southwest China over Myanmar to the Bay of

Bengal have been stalled by policy changes in Myanmar. But in November, there came two low-

key announcements which may have long-term impact on Singapore. First, Pakistan announced

56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
the opening of Gwadar Port, the southern terminus of a corridor of roads, railways, and pipelines

linking the city of Kashgar in China’s western Xinjiang province to the Arabian Sea. When

completed, the corridor will bypass the Straits of Malacca and cut the journey from China to

Europe from 45 to 10 days. A second announcement concerns a Sino-Malaysian venture to build

a mega port in Malacca that could supplant Singapore. The port will be connected by a new

railway across the Malay peninsula to the South China Sea, again circumventing Singapore. The

two projects are part of China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, which promises to reshape the

political and economic landscape of the region and beyond.59

Lee Hsien Loong may have underestimated the importance China places on the South

China Sea. By tilting toward the United States, he may have put his country at risk. Singapore

has been unique among ASEAN states in that it enjoyed a special relationship with Beijing, one

carefully nurtured by Lee Kuan Yew and Chinese leaders since Deng Xiaoping. Because of a

common cultural heritage, the Chinese feel greater affinity to Singapore than any other Southeast

Asian state and Chinese diplomats often look to Singapore to help convey their views within

ASEAN. That trust has been compromised, and other states such as Malaysia and the Philippines

may now be seen as better partners. Lee Hsien Loong put his reputation on the line when he

chose to support the TPP and the South China Sea ruling. The TPP is now dead in the water

without the United States, and Manila — Washington’s strongest Southeast Asian ally that

initiated the South China Sea arbitration — has turned and embraced Beijing.60

59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
 The irony is not lost on Singapore’s citizens. The city-state may yet prove able to weather

recent diplomatic reverses, but Singapore can ill afford to misread long-term geopolitical trends

in Asia.61

VI. Vietnam-ASEAN relations in the SCS

“ASEAN has interests, responsibilities, and the ability to actively engage in the issue
and contribute to the settlement of the dispute.”62

On 21st March 2021, Sino-Philippines tensions escalated as 200 Chinese militia boats

were spotted along a disputed reef in the South China Sea (SCS). For decades, similar

escalations between Southeast Asian claimants, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines,

and China have been prevalent.63

The SCS is a vital trade passage, accounting for $3.37 trillion of trade including oil and

natural gas. As protecting these essential trade passages becomes more critical as China’s

aggressiveness heightens, Freedom of Navigation (FON) missions, alongside technical and

military assistance to various Southeast Asian countries, are increasingly undertaken by the US

and its allies to counter China to uphold the “rules-based order” and safeguard critical sea lines

of communication (SLOCs). Beyond the SCS being an integral economic passage, it forms an

61
Ibid.
62
Ibid at 2.
63
“ASEAN and the South China Sea: Southeast Asian Regionalism in Peril” [online] available from
<https://kingsthinktank.com/2021/06/24/asean-and-the-south-china-sea-southeast-asian-regionalism-in-
peril/>, August 25, 2021.
avenue for the US to balance China in Asia, heightening the SCS’ strategic importance to extra-

regional actors like the US. 64

As China grows more ambitious, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a

10-member bloc to promote stability, progress and cooperation in Southeast Asia, is failing to

demonstrate tangible resolve in warding off China’s presence in their backyard. 65

A lack of consensus makes a divided ASEAN on all fronts

ASEAN’s disunity encumbers a cogent response to China’s aggression. Within ASEAN,

individual countries have conflicting claims in the SCS rooted within differing historical

interpretations of territory in the SCS, challenging ASEAN’s legitimacy in coherently brokering

a resolution with China. While the ASEAN Charter stipulates adherence to international law and

calls upon peaceful settlement of disputes, this has not been completely watertight. In August

2020, Malaysia shot dead a Vietnamese fisherman after his fishing boat entered Malaysian

waters, escalating Malaysia-Vietnam tensions. Although not directly related to the SCS dispute,

this highlighted the propensity for inter-ASEAN conflict to easily undermine ASEAN principles

of non-aggression, which is a dangerous precedent for future conflicts.66

Non-claimant ASEAN countries have occasionally hindered a concerted stance towards

China, as ASEAN’s decision-making apparatus is predicated upon consensus amongst all

members. In the 2012 ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN was left divided on responding to

64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
China, with some members accusing Cambodia of stymieing a unanimous response to a

multilateral solution by siding with China. Cambodia’s unilateral interest in preserving cordiality

with China, who frequently supports Cambodia extensively with aid, blocked ASEAN’s tradition

of producing joint communique following conflicting interests, setting the precedent for

ASEAN’s divisiveness towards China. 67

For example, while the 2016 PCA ruled in favor of the Philippines over China, Cambodia

steadfastly protected China from criticism, blocking statements mentioning the ruling against

China, deadlocking ASEAN. In 2020, China was not mentioned in the 36th annual ASEAN

Summit, dashing hopes of a harsher united stance against increased Chinese aggression. ASEAN

dissonance inhibits an unequivocal stand against China. Claimant members like the Philippines

and Vietnam, have resorted to bilateralism to resolve the issue, such as criticizing China outside

of ASEAN. These developments reveal ASEAN’s frailties in protecting the sovereignty and
68
rights of the members.

Structural and institutional frailties of ASEAN

ASEAN falls short in having a lasting leadership, compounding difficulties in pursuing

long-term strategic plans. Annually, chairmanship is rotated amongst the 10 countries, with each

country injecting their national interests into the final communiques, as illustrated in the 2012

case, where Cambodia was the chair, inhibiting a cohesive communique. Without an empowered

secretariat with proper initiative-making powers, ASEAN lacks a neutral-body capable of

67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
rallying its members together. Furthermore, as leadership changes every year, ensuring a

continuous policy towards China is arduous, impeding resolutions to the SCS question.69

These structural conundrums embolden China’s belief that the SCS issue is a bilateral,

rather than multilateral issue. With ASEAN members’ mutual wariness, they seek independent

measures against China, demonstrated by Cambodia’s accommodative stance juxtaposed

to “Vietnam’s Naval Expansion” to ward off China.70

Moving Forward: A more united ASEAN?

While bilateral diplomacy might appear as a natural alternative to an association whose

members are unprepared to resolve security concerns, especially when constrained by their

policy of non-interference, their unwillingness to take a firm stance against China has grave

implications. Not only would this skew China’s power asymmetry in the region, but it would

cripple ASEAN as an integral stabilizing force in Southeast Asia capable of defending their

regional interests. With ASEAN members balancing the economic benefits of Chinese relations

with China’s maritime expansion, along with the organization’s structural weakness as an active

player due to normative values of non-interference, Southeast Asia’s continued stability will be

bolstered by ASEAN’s clear articulation of a stance on the South China Sea. 71

ASEAN needs to build a sense of community with common interest in regional security

before substantive agreements can be made regarding the SCS. By intensifying current efforts to

69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
promote ASEAN unity – both within ASEAN leadership and its people – a shared identity and

responsibility to uphold the sovereignty of ASEAN members can be facilitated. With a concerted

ASEAN, this raises the possibility that ASEAN members will start to see the SCS issue as a

provocation on all.72

This might provide grounds for a strategic communications grassroots campaign to

counteract Chinese aggression, leading to capital flight from Southeast Asia and also, unifying

the entire ASEAN body. Moreover, ASEAN solidarity is critical to precipitate a robust Code of

Conduct (CoC) that will align the interests of all parties and stabilize the region. With a new CoC

due in 2021, ASEAN needs to first, reassess its internal stance towards the SCS. Through an

environment predicated on camaraderie, this can form a precursor to an internal CoC – a

necessary first step before it can coherently respond to China. 73

VII. Europe’s Security policy in the South China Sea and how it can make a
difference for Vietnam in its position in the SCS disputes, EU- ASEAN relations

The European Union called out China on Saturday for endangering peace in the South

China Sea and urged all parties to abide by a 2016 tribunal ruling which rejected most of China’s

claim to sovereignty in the sea, but which Beijing has rejected.74

72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
74
Yew Tian. “EU Blames China For Endangering Peace in South China Sea” [online] available from
<https://www.reuters.com/world/china/eu-blames-china-endangering-peace-south-china-sea-2021-04-
25/>,Accessed August 25, 2021.
 The EU last week released a new policy aimed at stepping up its influence in the Indo-

Pacific region to counter China’s rising power.75

The Philippines on Friday protested to China over its failure to withdraw what it called as

“threatening” boats believed to be manned by maritime militia around the disputed Whitsun

Reef, which Manila calls the Julian Felipe Reef.76

"Tensions in the South China Sea, including the recent presence of large Chinese vessels

at Whitsun Reef, endanger peace and stability in the region," a EU spokesperson said in a

statement on Saturday.77

EU reiterated its strong opposition to "unilateral actions that could undermine regional

stability and international rules-based order".78

It urged all parties to resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with international law,

and highlighted a 2016 international arbitration that had ruled in favor of the Philippines while

invalidating most of China's claims in the South China Sea.79

China rejected EU's accusation that its ships at Whitsun Reef, which China calls Niu'E

Jiao, had endangered peace and security.80

75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
 The Chinese Mission to the EU in a statement on Saturday reiterated that the reef is part

of China's Nansha Islands, or Spratly Islands, and that it was "reasonable and lawful" for Chinese

fishing boats to operate there and shelter from the wind.81

The Chinese statement also insisted that China's sovereignty, rights and interests in the

South China Sea were formed in the "long course of history and consistent with international

law" and rejected the 2016 tribunal ruling as "null and void".82

"The South China Sea should not become a tool for certain countries to contain and

suppress China, much less a wrestling ground for major-power rivalry," the Chinese statement

said.83

China is increasingly worried that Europe and other countries are heeding U.S. President

Joe Biden’s call for a “coordinated approach” towards China, which had so far materialized in

the form of sanctions over its security crackdown in Hong Kong and treatment of Uyghur

Muslims.84

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken last month said Washington “stands by its ally, the

Philippines,” in the face of China’s massing maritime militia at Whitsun Reef.85

81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.
 VIII. Japan, New Zealand, India and Australia and VN in the South China Sea

Japan has joined a growing list of countries that are challenging China’s maritime claims

in the South China Sea. Japan presented a one-page diplomatic note to the United Nations

rejecting China’s baseline claims and denouncing its efforts to limit the freedom of navigation

and overflight. Japan’s note is the latest in series of recent criticisms of China’s position, joining

submissions to the U.N. from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Malaysia, Australia,

Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and the United States.86

India has always emphasised the need to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight in

the South China Sea. Today it is taking a more vocal stand, declaring the South China Sea as a

global commons wherein all disputes should be settled in accordance with international law

and without prejudicing the legitimate interest of any third party who has a stake in the

disputed waters. The Indian Navy has deployed one of its frontline warships in the South China

Sea after the Galwan incident. Though there are speculations if this was just a part of the

routine naval deployments, which the Navy has been carrying out in the region, the message is

unmistakable. Additionally, the Indian Navy also deployed its frontline vessels along the

Malacca Straits near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the route from where the Chinese

Navy enters the Indian Ocean Region to keep a check on any Chinese naval activity. 87

There are certain challenges that India will have to face while sustaining its stance on

the SCS disputes. The principal impediment is likely to come from the ASEAN itself. India has

86
Radio Free Asia. “Japan Latest Nation to Contest Beijing’s South China Sea Claims” [online] available
<https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/japan-latest-nation-contest-beijings-south-china-sea-
claims>,August 25, 2021.
87
Orfonline. “India Calibrates Its South China Sea Approach” [online] available from
<https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-calibrates-its-south-china-sea-approach/>,August 25, 2021.
observed how Singapore, Vietnam and Myanmar appear to be more invested in India’s role as

a security provider in comparison to Malaysia or Indonesia – due to the sensitivity attached to

security in the Malacca Strait. At the same time, Laos and Cambodia enjoy closer relations

with China, whereas the Philippines, Thailand and Brunei remain undecided on India’s role as

a security provider in the region. China is a power that will continue to be an important partner

for the ASEAN and, for that matter, many others in the Indo-Pacific, especially in a post-

COVID world where countries will struggle to revive their economies. ASEAN overtook the

European Union to become China’s largest trading partner in the first quarter of 2020, and

China is the third-largest investor ($150 billion) in ASEAN. 88

To be sure, there is no unity within ASEAN regarding the competing claims with

China. For instance, the Philippines President, Rodrigo Duterte’s remarks in April 2021 have

sent out mixed signals on his country’s approach to the SCS dispute. While the Philippines will

not withdraw the navy and coast guard boats patrolling the disputed South China Sea, Duterte

said he wants “to maintain friendly ties with China, citing Manila’s ‘debt of gratitude’ for

Beijing’s help with the coronavirus vaccine.” 89

There is no doubt that there has been a palpable shift in India’s approach to the disputes

along the South China Sea. This tilt may not be a significant one, and it remains to be seen

whether it is merely symbolic or more substantial. However, a certain momentum is visible in

88
Ibid.
89
Ibid.
India’s stance, and such a shift, albeit slight, can be a facilitator for new policy initiatives and

actions on the part of India in the SCS and the broader Indo-Pacific.90

In the short term, it will not be feasible for India to have a military role and it has also

wisely chosen to stay clear of any involvement in a possible confrontationist scenario. It has

conveyed its unwillingness to participate in joint patrols or FONOPS with the US Navy in the

South China Sea. Since this is a regional issue and given the prevalent opinion that ‘ASEAN

centrality and unity’ is waning, the Southeast Asian countries will want to handle the disputes

at the ASEAN platform. However, there remain ways where India can show its Southeast

Asian neighbours that even while it is aware that it has a limited role to play in the military

domain, given their sensitivity to the idea of foreign military operating in their sovereign

waters, India can still engage in a substantial course of action to help the ASEAN littorals. This

will show India’s regard for Southeast Asia as the fulcrum connecting the Indian the Pacific

Oceans, thereby enlivening the principles underlined in its Indo-Pacific policy.91

India is fully committed to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and to ensuring a rules-based

international order. To that extent, it is fully supportive of initiatives in this regard in the entire

region. It participates in numerous bilateral and multilateral naval exercises in the region; it is

usually the first responder in any Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)

operation; and it is an active participant in various regional security forums. India can, in the

various bilateral, CORPAT exercises it undertakes with the Southeast Asian navies, introduce

the aspect of information sharing and networking among national agencies of this region

90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
towards providing HADR as well as Search and Rescue operations during natural calamities.

This has been done in the past under the aegis of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and can be re-

started, or else introduced in the Samudra Shakti and SIMBEX exercises.92

Effective maritime enforcement capacity begins with strong maritime domain

awareness (MDA), defined as the ability to gather, process, analyze, and share real-time

information about what is occurring at sea. This capacity is vital for promoting marine safety,

responding to vessels in distress, stopping illegal activity, tracking at-sea transshipments, and

protecting waters from illegal incursions by foreign vessels. Most countries must rely on

multilateral information-sharing. India’s Indian Ocean Region Information Fusion Centre

(IOR-IFC) can work with the IFC in Singapore, Indonesian Maritime Information Centre, and

Malaysia’s International Maritime Bureau to exchange and share information on illegal

incursion and movement of Chinese fishing and naval vessels in the disputed waters of the

SCS.93

India has already been engaged in capacity-building initiatives with countries like

Vietnam and the Philippines. India and Vietnam pursue naval cooperation which includes

composite training programs in the field of submarines, aviation, and dockyard training. In

2015, both countries’ coast guards signed an MOU for establishment of collaborative

relationship to combat transnational crime and for sharing best management practices and

augmenting operational-level interactions. In 2016, India and Vietnam upgraded their ties to

the level of a “comprehensive strategic partnership”. The two have signed an agreement to

92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.
exchange white shipping information. India is also exploring the possibility of selling warships

to the Vietnamese Coast Guard.

In 2017, India and the Philippines signed an MOU on defense cooperation and logistics.

In 2019, they signed another MOU on the sharing of white shipping information. Their coast

guards regularly conduct bilateral maritime exercises. Such initiatives should be undertaken

with other claimant countries like Indonesia. Moreover, Indian Coast Guard can provide

trainings to the Vietnamese, Filipino and Indonesian coast guards. Coast Guard exchange

programs can be initiated and exercises can be conducted to provide training in handling cases

of illegal fishing vessels, especially Chinese fishing boats entering the disputed waters. Given

that the Chinese fishing vessels encroaching the disputed waters have become a regular

occurrence and the coast guards are the first responders, besides naval training and exchange,

coast guard training and contributing to their capacity building also need to be considered. 94

India had been exploring international markets in Southeast Asia and elsewhere to sell

the Brahmos missile system. Among the ASEAN countries, Vietnam was the first country that

was offered these missiles. India proposed a US$ 100-million line of credit to the Philippines

for the purchase of military hardware. It has also offered the Philippines its Akash missile

systems (25 kilometers, mid-range surface-to-air missile system) that can intercept and destroy

94
Ibid.
hostile aerial platforms. India should now consider selling Brahmos missiles to countries like

the Philippines and Indonesia.95

Some claimant countries like Indonesia are keen on infrastructure development of the

islands around the disputed waters (for example, in Natuna Sea). Indonesia is seeking to invite

the US to invest in the development of Riau Islands’ Natuna regency, which is a part of

Indonesia’s outer islands in the southern part of the contested South China Sea. This is where

India and its other Quad partners can come in. India can push the US, Japan, Australia to invest

in the infrastructure development in Southeast Asia, and by extension, in the ASEAN

Masterplan on Connectivity 2025. 96

Extra-regional players like India, the US, Japan, and Australia can constantly voice the

need for upholding international law in the SCS on the part of China and for the faster

conclusion of the COC on terms which would be acceptable to China as well as the claimant

ASEAN countries. This can help create pressure on the Chinese leadership in various global

platforms.97

Besides the platform of Quad, India can work with other countries in other forums. For

instance, most of the naval activity in the South China Sea is dominated by the Asian and

Pacific powers. The recent announcements by European navies to operate in the SCS, directly

challenging China’s expansive claims and supporting freedom of navigation at sea, are causing

concern for Beijing. India can consider joining such activities. The US has plans to set up a

95
Ibid.
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid.
‘numbered fleet’— i.e., the First Fleet which could be operating in the crossroads between the

Indian and the Pacific oceans and based in Singapore. Apparently, US allies and partners such

as India, Singapore and Japan may have endorsed its utility and agreed to support it.98

The key is to start with such soft security issues in the immediate term and draw out

proposals that will be immediately acceptable to the ASEAN member states. This will help

India gain the trust of its ASEAN partners: that India truly is an advocate of ASEAN centrality

and that Southeast Asia is the cog of its Indo-Pacific policy. Even the Quad members, the

European countries like France, as well as the UK, can work alongside India and the other like-

minded countries in the Indo-Pacific on these non-conventional areas.99

New Zealand’s response (or lack thereof) to the South China Seas dispute shines light on

its foreign policy perspectives in an era of significant geopolitical change in Asia which has been

occasioned by China’s rise. There is an apparent reluctance of the New Zealand government to

take an especially strong or public stance on the tensions in the South China Sea in 2014. One of

the possible explanations for this circumscribed response can be found in the challenges facing

New Zealand in balancing its relations with and between the major powers. While New Zealand

has been enjoying closer security relations with the United States, it has still been cautious about

becoming party to what might be seen as a US-led set of positions on Asia-Pacific security. This

means that Wellington is more likely to indicate a preference for mutual restraint in the South

China Sea than to use language and formulas which can easily be depicted as criticism of

China’s actions in particular. At the same time, as a strong supporter of international law and the

98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
peaceful resolution of disputes, and as a candidate for the UNSC for 2015–2016, to be

completely quiet on this issue would have set up a disconnect with the principles that New

Zealand would want to be known for supporting. The result is that the New Zealand government

made its concerns known in some quarters, but in a far less pointed way and more general than

some of its traditional security partners. In that sense too, New Zealand’s approach has been

closer to the milder consensus positions of ASEAN than to the loud concerns of some of the

individual South China Sea claimant countries in Southeast Asia. This also means that there have

been differences in the approach taken by New Zealand and its near neighbor Australia.100

IX. Summary

Country Positively Statements that might suggest support to

Acknowledge a Vietnamese arbitration
Arbitral Tribunal
Ruling/Supporting
Arbitration

(Republic of the
Philippines vs.
People’s Republic
of China)
United States of Yes/Yes Vietnam was quite pleased with Secretary of
America State Mike Pompeo’s statement on July 13
in which he announced the U.S. would not
respect Beijing’s maritime claims derived
from disputed features in the Spratly Islands,
Scarborough Shoal, Luconia Shoals, and
Natuna Besar.

100
Robert Ayson. “ The South China Sea and New Zealand’s Foreign Policy Balancing Act.” [online]
available
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303361590_The_South_China_Sea_and_New_Zealand's_Fore
ign_Policy_Balancing_Act>,August 25, 2021.
 Washington specifically highlighted
Vanguard Bank – the scene of the last major
China-Vietnam standoff in 2019 – as
indisputably part of Vietnam’s EEZ.101
Singapore Yes/Yes Not being a claimant does not mean that
Singapore has no interest in the South China
Sea. Much to the contrary, as a small state, it
has an interest in ensuring that all claimant
states always act in accordance with
international law, including UNCLOS.
Moreover, as an island state, Singapore has
an interest in ensuring that international law
preserves freedom of navigation and
overflights and that such law is interpreted
and applied consistently. xxx

As a small country, Singapore has a

fundamental interest in the peaceful
settlement of international disputes in
accordance with international law and its
sanctioned processes rather than on the basis
that might is right.102
ASEAN Positively Indonesia: Indonesia Cites 2016 South
Acknowledging China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award at UN103
the Ruling:
Indonesia,
Singapore, Malaysia: In a letter to the United Nations,
Malaysia, Malaysia has stated that China's maritime
Myanmar, claims in the South China Sea have no legal
Vietnam; basis, potentially signaling that Kuala
Supporting the Lumpur is hardening its stance.
Ruling: Philippines
(No Comment: In a note verbale dated Wednesday, the
Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysian mission to the U.N. wrote to
Laos, Thailand) Secretary General Antonio Guterres that it
/Supporting "rejects China's claims to historic rights, or
Arbitration: other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with

101
Ibid.
102
Jane Chan. “Singapore and the South China Sea: Being an Effective Coordinator and Honest Broker”
[online] available from
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/294576615_Singapore_and_the_South_China_Sea_Being_an_
Effective_Coordinator_and_Honest_Broker>,Accessed August 25, 2021.
103
Ankit Panda, “Indonesia Cites 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award at UN Is that A Big
Deal?” [online] <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/indonesia-cites-2016-south-china-sea-arbitral-tribunal-
award-at-un-is-that-a-big-deal/>, Accessed on August 25, 2021.
 Philippines, respect to the maritime areas of the South
Vietnam, (No China Sea encompassed by the relevant part
Comment: Brunei, of the 'nine-dash line.'"
Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, Malaysia, Noting that China's claims are contrary to
Myanmar, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Singapore) or UNCLOS, it added, "The Government of
Malaysia considers that the People's
Republic of China's claim to the maritime
features in the South China Sea has no basis
under international law."104

Myanmar: Cambodia and Myanmar have

reiterated their support for a peaceful
solution to the territorial disputes involving
China and several ASEAN countries in the
South China Sea after a meeting between
Prime Minister Hun Sen and Myanmar’s
newly appointed ambassador to
Cambodia.105

Brunei: “Specific issues should be

addressed bilaterally by the countries
directly concerned through peaceful
dialogue and consultations. Brunei
Darussalam emphasizes that such
negotiations on the South China Sea should
be resolved in accordance with the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea and rules and principles of
international law.”- Brunei’s foreign
ministry. Although international law
application is congruent with Philippines’
and Vietnam’s position, Brunei's insistence
that specific issues in the maritime region

104
Ken Moriyasu and Wajahat Khan, “Malaysia says China’s maritime claims have no Legal Basis.”
[online] <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/South-China-Sea/Malaysia-says-China-s-
maritime-claims-have-no-legal-basis>,Accessed August 25, 2021.
105
Khmer Times. “Cambodia and Myanmar In Joint Stand on South China Sea Dispute” [online]
available from <https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/news/cambodia-and-myanmar-in-joint-stand-on-
south-china-sea-dispute/#!/story=post-95421>,Accessed August 25, 2021.
 should be addressed bilaterally syncs with
Beijing's position106

Cambodia: In the 2012 ASEAN Regional

Forum, ASEAN was left divided on
responding to China, with some members
accusing Cambodia of stymieing a
unanimous response to a multilateral
solution by siding with China. Cambodia’s
unilateral interest in preserving cordiality
with China, who frequently supports
Cambodia extensively with aid, blocked
ASEAN’s tradition of producing joint
communique following conflicting interests,
setting the precedent for ASEAN’s
divisiveness towards China. 107

Laos: Laotian Prime Minister Thongloun

Sisoulith said in Ulaanbaatar on July 14 that
Laos supports China’s stance on the South
China Sea arbitration case unilaterally
initiated by the former Philippine
government.108

Thailand: Thailand said it “supports

China’s efforts” to maintain maritime peace
amid a regional dispute over the South China
Sea.109

** Note: Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, are

strong traditional allies of China that have no
strategic interest in the South China Sea.110

106
Sofia Tomacruz, “Brunei, the Quiet Claimant, Breaks Its Silence on South China” [online] available
from <https://www.rappler.com/world/asia-pacific/brunei-breaks-silence-south-china-sea>,Accessed
August 25, 2021.
107
Ibid.
108
Xinhua. “Lao PM Voices Support for China’s stance on South China Sea arbitration” [online]
available from
<http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/photos/2016/07/15/content_281475394069446.htm>,Accessed
August 25, 2021.
109
Reuters. “Thailand Supports China’s efforts to Maintain Peace” [online]
<https://www.reuters.com/article/asean-summit-southchinasea-thailand-idUSL3N1BJ27A>,Accessed
August 25, 2021.
110
Adam Leong Kok Wey, “ Is the South China Sea Fracturing ASEAN?” [online] available from
<https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/08/25/is-the-south-china-sea-fracturing-asean/>, Accessed August
25, 2021
 European Union Positively The European Union called out China on
Acknowledging Saturday for endangering peace in the South
the Ruling: China Sea and urged all parties to abide by a
Austria, Belgium, 2016 tribunal ruling which rejected most of
Bulgaria, Croatia, China’s claim to sovereignty in the sea, but
Cyprus, Czech which Beijing has rejected.111
Republic,
Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France,
Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden

Supporting
Ruling: Germany

No Comment: N/A/

Supporting
Arbitration:
Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech
Republic,
Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France,
Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania,
Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia,

111
Yew Tian. “EU Blames China for endangering Peace in South China Sea” [online] available from
<https://www.reuters.com/world/china/eu-blames-china-endangering-peace-south-china-sea-2021-04-
25/>,Accessed August 25, 2021.
 Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden)

Japan Supports ruling, "Beijing's maritime claims are not valid

Supports under international law."112
Arbitration
Japan MOFA statement:

1. Today, on July 12, 2021, five years

have passed since the issuance of the
Arbitral Tribunal’s award as to the
disputes between the Republic of the
Philippines and the People’s
Republic of China regarding the
South China Sea. As the Tribunal’s
award is final and legally binding on
the parties to the dispute under the
provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), the parties to this case,
the Philippines and China, are
required to comply with the award.
The claim by China that it will not
accept the award is against the
principle of peaceful settlement of
disputes in accordance with
international law, in particular
UNCLOS, and undermines the rule
of law as a fundamental value of the
international community. Japan
strongly hopes that the parties’
compliance with the award will lead
to the peaceful settlement of disputes
in the South China Sea.
2. Japan highly appreciates the
Philippines’ renewed commitment to
the peaceful settlement of disputes in
the South China Sea in accordance
with the award as shown by the
statement by President Duterte at the
112
Ken Moriyasu and Wajahat Khan, “ Malaysia Says China’s Maritime Claims Have No Legal Basis”
[online] available from <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/South-China-
Sea/Malaysia-says-China-s-maritime-claims-have-no-legal-basis>,Accessed on August 25, 2021.
 UN General Assembly in September
2020 and the recent statement of
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin
issued in June 2021 regarding the
award.
3. Given the universality and
comprehensiveness of UNCLOS, all
maritime claims must be based on
the relevant provisions of UNCLOS.
Japan renews its objection to
maritime claims in the South China
Sea that are inconsistent with
UNCLOS and remains seriously
concerned about the current situation.
Furthermore, Japan reiterates its
strong opposition to unilateral
attempts to change the status quo by
force or coercion.
4. Japan will continue working in
coordination with ASEAN and other
countries concerned to maintain and
strengthen the maritime order based
on the rule of law, and to realize a
free and open Indo-Pacific.113

Australia Supports ruling, Australia’s statement, Minister of Foreign

Supports Affairs
Arbitration
Five years ago today, an Arbitral Tribunal
established in accordance with the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) reached a clear and unanimous
decision on the South China Sea arbitration
between the Philippines and China.

It found that China’s claim to ‘historic

rights’ or ‘maritime rights and interests’
established in the ‘long course of historical
practice’ in the South China Sea were
inconsistent with UNCLOS and, to the
extent of that inconsistency, invalid.

113
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [online] available from
<https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press3e_000209.html>,Accessed August 25, 2021.
 The Australian Government has consistently
called on the parties to the arbitration to
abide by the Tribunal’s decision, which is
final and binding on both China and the
Philippines.

Our position is guided by our principled

support for international law and UNCLOS.
UNCLOS sets out the legal framework
within which all activities in the oceans and
seas must be carried out. It contains clear
rules that apply to all countries for maritime
claims, the lawful uses of maritime spaces,
including freedom of navigation and
overflight, and the peaceful resolution of
disputes.

Adherence to international law is

fundamental to the continuing peace,
prosperity and stability of our region. It
allows all states – big and small – to resolve
disputes peacefully.

Australia will continue to support the right

of all countries to seek to resolve disputes
peacefully and in accordance with
international law, including UNCLOS.

India Positively Without taking sides on the dispute, India

acknowledges has chosen to take a stand on the principle
ruling, no comment and application of international law, issuing
on supporting a statement that said: 'As a State Party to the
arbitration United Nations Convention on the Law Of
the Sea (UNCLOS), India urges all parties to
show utmost respect for the UNCLOS,
which establishes the international legal
order of the seas and oceans.' The statement
indicates that New Delhi recognises the
ruling from the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA) and will uphold it.

The statement focuses more on the need to

respect international law; it is not a position
 on China or the Philippines, or on the South
China Sea for that matter.114
New Zealand Supports ruling, Australia and New Zealand on Friday
supports arbitration strongly urged China to refrain from stoking
tensions in the South China Sea after its
apparent deployment of surface-to-air
missiles on a disputed island.115

The main question to be answered on this part is if Vietnam decides to file an arbitration

case that is framed pursuant to the Philippine South China Sea arbitration ruling, who of the

countries is likely to support Vietnam in such an action? To determine this, the reactions by

countries to the Philippines’ South China Sea arbitration will be taken into consideration, as well

as their statements towards the South China Sea in general and Vietnam in particular.

From the data, it can be predicted that the United States of America is likely to back up a

Vietnamese arbitration. The United States of America has positively acknowledged the

Philippines’ Arbitral Tribunal Ruling and has been found to support arbitration. The United

States likewise released several statements, particularly, Secretary of State Mike

Pompeo’s statement on July 13 in which he announced the U.S. would not respect Beijing’s

maritime claims derived from disputed features in the Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal,

Luconia Shoals, and Natuna Besar. Washington specifically also highlighted Vanguard Bank –

the scene of the last major China-Vietnam standoff in 2019 – as indisputably part of Vietnam’s

EEZ- which is one of Vietnam’s main contentions.

114
Darshana Baruah. “South China Sea Ruling: India Takes A Stand.” [online] available from
<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/south-china-sea-ruling-india-takes-stand>,Accessed on
August 25, 2021.
115
Colin Packham. “Australia, New Zealand Urge China Show Restraint in South China Sea” [online]
available from <https://www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-china-idUSL3N15Y0A1>,Accessed on
August 25, 2021.
 From the data, it is likewise highly probable that Singapore will support a Vietnamese

arbitration. Singapore has positively acknowledged the Philippines’ Arbitral Tribunal Ruling and

has been found to support arbitration. Singapore likewise released the following statement:

“Not being a claimant does not mean that Singapore has no interest in the South
China Sea. Much to the contrary, as a small state, it has an interest in ensuring
that all claimant states always act in accordance with international law, including
UNCLOS. Moreover, as an island state, Singapore has an interest in ensuring that
international law preserves freedom of navigation and overflights and that such
law is interpreted and applied consistently. xxx

As a small country, Singapore has a fundamental interest in the peaceful

settlement of international disputes in accordance with international law and its
sanctioned processes rather than on the basis that might is right.”116

As for ASEAN, it becomes a more complicated matter. ASEAN countries seem to have

differing views and opinions on arbitration in the South China Sea. Indonesia has been noted to

be positively acknowledging the ruling, even citing the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal

Award at UN117.

Malaysia has positively acknowledged the Philippines’ Arbitral Tribunal Ruling and has

been found to support arbitration. In a note verbale, the Malaysian mission to the U.N. wrote to

Secretary General Antonio Guterres that it "rejects China's claims to historic rights, or other

116
Jane Chan. “Singapore and the South China Sea: Being an Effective Coordinator and Honest Broker”
[online] available from
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/294576615_Singapore_and_the_South_China_Sea_Being_an_
Effective_Coordinator_and_Honest_Broker>,Accessed August 25, 2021.
117
Ibid.
sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea

encompassed by the relevant part of the 'nine-dash line.'"

Noting that China's claims are contrary to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or

UNCLOS, it added, "The Government of Malaysia considers that the People's Republic of

China's claim to the maritime features in the South China Sea has no basis under international

law."118

Myanmar has been noted to be positively acknowledging the ruling. It has also reiterated

its support for a peaceful solution to the territorial disputes involving China and several ASEAN

countries in the South China Sea after a meeting between Prime Minister Hun Sen and

Myanmar’s newly appointed ambassador to Cambodia.119

Brunei on the other hand, has neither expressed its support of the ruling or positively

acknowledged the ruling or supported arbitration. However, on the issue of the South China Sea,

it has manifested that:

“Specific issues should be addressed bilaterally by the countries directly

concerned through peaceful dialogue and consultations. Brunei Darussalam
emphasizes that such negotiations on the South China Sea should be resolved in
accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and
rules and principles of international law.”- Brunei’s foreign ministry.”

Although international law application is congruent with Philippines’ and Vietnam’s

position, Brunei's insistence that specific issues in the maritime region should be addressed

bilaterally syncs with Beijing's position.120”

118
Ibid.
119
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
 Same as Brunei, Laos and Cambodia have neither expressed its support of the ruling or

positively acknowledged the ruling or supported arbitration. Cambodia came as far as in the

2012 ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN was left divided on responding to China, with some

members accusing Cambodia of stymieing a unanimous response to a multilateral solution by

siding with China. Cambodia’s unilateral interest in preserving cordiality with China, who

frequently supports Cambodia extensively with aid, blocked ASEAN’s tradition of producing

joint communique following conflicting interests, setting the precedent for ASEAN’s

divisiveness towards China. 121 Laotian Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith said in Ulaanbaatar

on July 14 that Laos supports China’s stance on the South China Sea arbitration case unilaterally

initiated by the former Philippine government.122

(Kindly note: Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, are strong traditional allies of China that have no

strategic interest in the South China Sea.123)

Lastly and in the same vein, Thailand have neither expressed its support of the ruling or

positively acknowledged the ruling or supported arbitration. Thailand said it “supports China’s

efforts” to maintain maritime peace amid a regional dispute over the South China Sea.124

(NOTE: Singapore is a member of the ASEAN, but has been discussed in previous section)

In sum, ASEAN seems divided on the issue of arbitration. Due to their positions

regarding the South China Sea arbitration of the Philippines, it seems doubtful that Cambodia,

121
Ibid.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.
Brunei and Laos would support a possible Vietnamese arbitration. Whilst, it can be gleaned from

their positive response and support on arbitration by the Philippines, there is a huge chance that

Malaysia and Indonesia might be amenable to an arbitration filed by Vietnam.

Almost all countries in the European Union positively acknowledged the ruling. The

countries Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,

Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,

Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden positively

acknowledged the ruling. Germany went as far as throwing its full support of the ruling. The

entire European Union has been noted to supporting arbitration. In fact, in a statement, the

European Union called out China on Saturday for endangering peace in the South China Sea and

urged all parties to abide by a 2016 tribunal ruling which rejected most of China’s claim to

sovereignty in the sea, but which Beijing has rejected.125 Due to the foregoing, it is safe to

assume that the EU would have a favorable stance as regards a Vietnam-initiated arbitration.

Japan has been firm in its stand of supporting the ruling and the arbitration. In a strong

statement, Japan has held that "Beijing's maritime claims are not valid under international

law."126 The below shows Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on the South China Sea:

1. Today, on July 12, 2021, five years have passed since the issuance of the
Arbitral Tribunal’s award as to the disputes between the Republic of the
Philippines and the People’s Republic of China regarding the South China Sea.
As the Tribunal’s award is final and legally binding on the parties to the dispute
under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), the parties to this case, the Philippines and China, are required to
comply with the award. The claim by China that it will not accept the award is

125
Ibid.
126
Ibid.
 against the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with
international law, in particular UNCLOS, and undermines the rule of law as a
fundamental value of the international community. Japan strongly hopes that the
parties’ compliance with the award will lead to the peaceful settlement of disputes
in the South China Sea.
2. Japan highly appreciates the Philippines’ renewed commitment to the
peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea in accordance with the
award as shown by the statement by President Duterte at the UN General
Assembly in September 2020 and the recent statement of Secretary of Foreign
Affairs Locsin issued in June 2021 regarding the award.
3. Given the universality and comprehensiveness of UNCLOS, all maritime
claims must be based on the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. Japan renews its
objection to maritime claims in the South China Sea that are inconsistent with
UNCLOS and remains seriously concerned about the current situation.
Furthermore, Japan reiterates its strong opposition to unilateral attempts to change
the status quo by force or coercion.
4. Japan will continue working in coordination with ASEAN and other
countries concerned to maintain and strengthen the maritime order based on the
rule of law, and to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific.127

The foregoing shows that it is safe to assume that Vietnam can count on Japanese support

in its arbitration efforts.

Australia is similar to Japan in supporting the ruling and arbitration. The actual statement

from Australia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is as follows:

“Five years ago today, an Arbitral Tribunal established in accordance with the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) reached a clear and unanimous
decision on the South China Sea arbitration between the Philippines and China.

It found that China’s claim to ‘historic rights’ or ‘maritime rights and interests’

established in the ‘long course of historical practice’ in the South China Sea were inconsistent

with UNCLOS and, to the extent of that inconsistency, invalid.

127
Ibid.
 The Australian Government has consistently called on the parties to the arbitration to

abide by the Tribunal’s decision, which is final and binding on both China and the Philippines:

“Our position is guided by our principled support for international law and
UNCLOS. UNCLOS sets out the legal framework within which all activities in
the oceans and seas must be carried out. It contains clear rules that apply to all
countries for maritime claims, the lawful uses of maritime spaces, including
freedom of navigation and overflight, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Adherence to international law is fundamental to the continuing peace, prosperity

and stability of our region. It allows all states – big and small – to resolve disputes
peacefully.

Australia will continue to support the right of all countries to seek to resolve
disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law, including
UNCLOS.”

Due to those strong statements in support of the UNCLOS and Philippines’ arbitration, it

may be gleaned that there is a huge chance of Australian support of a Vietnam-initiated

arbitration.

New Zealand, Australia’s neighbor has also been vocal about its support of the ruling in

the Philippines’ case and arbitration in general. In fact, New Zealand together with Australia,

strongly urged China to refrain from stoking tensions in the South China Sea after its apparent

deployment of surface-to-air missiles on a disputed island.128 Vietnam can probably look for

New Zealand’s support should they decide to file for arbitration.

Finally, India has shown to positively acknowledge the ruling in the Philippines’ case.

However, it has been silent on supporting the arbitration process. India has remained neutral

between the Philippines and China in its statement,

128
Ibid.
 “Without taking sides on the dispute, India has chosen to take a stand on the
principle and application of international law, issuing a statement that said: 'As a
State Party to the United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS),
India urges all parties to show utmost respect for the UNCLOS, which
establishes the international legal order of the seas and oceans.' The statement
indicates that New Delhi recognizes the ruling from the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA) and will uphold it.

The statement focuses more on the need to respect international law; it is not a position

on China or the Philippines, or on the South China Sea for that matter.129 From the foregoing, it

may only be a hint of possibility that India may support Vietnam in its filing for arbitration.

X. Conclusion

As a whole, there seems to be more support in the Republic of the Philippines and the

People’s Republic of China ruling and arbitration process in general. While not overwhelming in

support, it seems to be a significant number. There is particularly wide support in the upholding

of principles of international law and the UNCLOS and for countries that seemingly try to

remain a neutral stance on the issue, this stand on upholding international law is still prevalent.

For as long as Vietnam frames its arbitration case along these lines of upholding international

law and the UNCLOS, as the Philippines had, it may garner the same support from other

countries that the Philippines enjoyed.

Although Vietnam will be alone in its fight should it file an arbitration case, backing of

many countries is crucial in its ability to provide change in the landscape and synergy in the

South China Sea. Therefore, rallying as much support for peaceful means of settling disputes

129
Ibid.
such as arbitration, harnessing the court of international public opinion and the strength of

International Law in South China Sea must be furthered.