Chapter 3

Building on Civic and Citizenship

Education’s Achievements

Abstract Preparing young people for future political participation has been an
important emphasis in CCE over the past two decades, and a great deal of research
reflects this interest. Yet the nature of participation itself has been expanded during
this time ranging from engagement in the formal political system to engagement
with society at large through social media. All forms of participation are important,
but this chapter argues that given the current political environment perhaps more
attention could be paid to engagement in the formal political system. The research
studies reviewed here demonstrate the centrality of civic knowledge in building pos-
itive, participatory intentions among young people, especially where engagement in
the formal political system is an objective. Developing students’ interest in social
and political issues and building trust in democratic institutions can help in devel-
oping civic knowledge. Yet civic knowledge may not be enough if other forms of
engagement are to be encouraged. Research has shown that classrooms can assist
this process by developing environments that value openness, discussion, interaction
and exchange of ideas. Schools can help by ensuring that there are opportunities for
participation in school governance, voluntary activities, student clubs and other civic
related activities. At the same time, the ideas students formulate through interactions
with peers, parents and media mean they come to CCE with their own thoughts about
participation, and these aspirations should not be ignored. The chapter concludes by
identifying the civic enablers that will be needed to be reflected in CCE teaching and
learning in the future.

Keywords Civic engagement · Participation · Students’ interests · Open

classrooms · Social media · Student efficacy

If CCE will face challenges in the future, how confident can we be that it is capable
of doing so? This involves, in the first place, an understanding of the current impact
of CCE after which an assessment can be made of its future potential. Fortunately,
the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA)
has conducted international studies of civic education, national jurisdictions such
as Australia and the United States of America have conducted national assessments
and researchers have either tapped into this data to provide secondary analyses of the
international and national data or they have initiated local studies of their own.Thus
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 29
K. J Kennedy, Civic and Citizenship Education in Volatile Times,
Springerbriefs in citizenship education for the 21st century,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6386-3_3
30 3 Building on Civic and Citizenship Education’s Achievements

there is a considerable amount of data on which to draw to assess CCE’S potential

for the future.
The focus of this chapter, therefore, will be:
• CCE as a component of the school curriculum;
• Varieties of civic engagement—social, political and digital;
• Institutional engagement; and
• Civic enablers—supporting future civic engagement.

3.1 CCE as a Component of the School Curriculum

Educating young people to assume citizenship responsibilities is a common feature

of most education systems, but there is not a common approach. Even the name
varies so much that at times it is hard to recognize it as covering the same curricu-
lum area. In the United Kingdom, it is called Citizenship Education, in the United
States, Civic Education, and in Australia, Civics and Citizenship Education. Many
Asian countries are more likely to refer Moral Education or, as in Hong Kong, Moral
and Civic Education. In Mainland China, a recent initiative has consolidated civic
and citizenship courses at primary and secondary level within a broad curriculum
framework referred to as Morality and Rule of Law. These school ‘subjects’ have
different theoretical orientations, different political orientations and different pur-
poses, yet they share a commitment to shape the lives of young people to support
whatever regime happens to be in power. In societies such as Taiwan, when political
parties change so too do orientations to what is being called in this book CCE, yet
this does not only happen in Taiwan. Earlier, it was shown that when the Australian
government passed from Labor to Liberal in the mid-1990s, so too did orientations to
CCE. These two examples simply underline the political nature of CCE in preparing
future citizens according to preconceived notions of what a ‘good citizen’ should be.
This issue will be returned to later in this chapter.
Not only does the terminology differ when it comes to CCE, so too does the way
in which CCE is represented in the school curriculum. Reference was made above
to the different names given ‘school subjects,’ but in reality, civic education is not
always a school subject. Table 3.1 shows the diversity of forms in which CCE appears
in the school curriculum.
Using data from the IEA Civic Education Study (CivEd) (Torney-Purta, Lehmann,
Oswald, & Schulz, 2001), Fairbrother and Kennedy (2011) showed that the form
the curriculum takes—single subject, integrated, or delivered through different
subjects—only had a relatively minor impact on student learning. Students from
different countries experiencing different curriculum forms appeared to do equally
well when their levels of civic knowledge were assessed. It is more likely that the
content to which students are exposed, the pedagogies they experienced and their
out of school experiences with families and peers (including on social media) were
the significant influences on their learning than the form of the curriculum.
3.2 Varieties of Civic Engagement—Social, Political and Digital 31

Table 3.1 Approaches to organizing the citizenship curriculum

Citizenship Curriculum
Modes and Levels of Offering
Optional Compulsory
Primary/Secondary
Single subject
Taught through other subjects (e.g. History/Geography/Social
Studies)
Integrated across all subjects
Extracurricular activities

Based on Kennedy (2008, p. 489)

3.2 Varieties of Civic Engagement—Social, Political

and Digital

In an important paper, Westheimer and Kahne (2004) argued that:

Democracy is not self-winding. Students need to be taught to participate in our democracy
and different programs aim at different goals. We need to choose carefully. The choices we
make have consequences for the kind of society we ultimately help to create. (p. 246)

The focus on ‘participation’ has been the theme of a great deal of research on CCE
over the past two decades. As acknowledged by Westheimer and Kahne (2004), part of
this focus arose out of a concern for declining voter participation in the United States
but also elsewhere (Esser & de Vreese, 2007). The decline was particularly noticeable
among young people. Yet it was not only political engagement that was singled out
for attention. Putnam (1995) argued that social bonds were disappearing in the United
States with his famous ‘bowling alone’ metaphor. Even in Australia, where voting
is compulsory, the Australian Electoral Commission registered its concern about
voter registration for young people that appeared to be less frequent than for other
segments of the population (85% compared with 95%, respectively) (Print, Saha, &
Edwards, 2004). Against this background, increasing ‘participation’ almost became
a sacred quest. The purpose of much research related to CCE has been to understand
the construct of participation in a deep sense, identify ways it can be enhanced as
well as ways it can be measured.
Successive large-scale assessments of citizenship education (CivEd in 1999, ICCS
in, 2009 & 2016) have provided some insight into the participation issue, particularly
from the perspective of young people themselves. When asked to respond to questions
about political participation, there is almost universal agreement that joining political
parties or becoming a candidate for election come close to the last things 14 and
15 year olds will consider as future forms of civic engagement, although voting is
often given an average level of endorsement. These attitudes are complemented by
their attitudes to political institutions where politicians compared to the courts and the
police are ranked very poorly. Students tend not to see themselves overly engaged in
any political activities in the future although there is support for engaging in activities
32 3 Building on Civic and Citizenship Education’s Achievements

that support the environment. Peaceful protest as a form of civic engagement is often
given a moderate level of support, but illegal protest is always, on average, endorsed
negatively although more recent research using person-centered approaches identifies
groups of students who will opt for more non-conventional forms of civic engagement
(Chow & Kennedy, 2015; Kennedy, Li, & Ng, 2018). Overall, however, it can be said
that from the perspective of early adolescence, political engagement does not figure
prominently as a future civic priority.
A somewhat different picture emerges when it comes to social engagement. Vol-
unteering, working with the elderly, collecting money for a social cause are all activ-
ities which young adolescents see themselves supporting in the future. Their level of
endorsement of these kinds of activities stands in marked contrast to their endorse-
ment of political activities. Thus, it is not participation per se that young people
see themselves avoiding but particular kinds of activities that are more politically
oriented. Because of the nature of this research, which is driven by surveys, there
is little explanation as to why this is the case. Some have suggested it is the age of
the students who have little experience of politics, while others see it as reflecting
general disillusionment within society about political systems.
Taking these different categories of participation, Kennedy (2006, 2018) devel-
oped a schema that showed participation and its different dimensions. These are
shown in Table 3.2. What has been added here is a fourth dimension, ‘engage in
self-regulating activities’ that Kennedy (2007) argued elsewhere represented neolib-
eralism’s attempt to turn ‘active citizenship’ to its own individualistic purposes.
Otherwise, Table 3.2 represents ‘participation’ as it was defined in CivEd and ICCS
2009/2016 and as it has been largely understood in the literature. Yet two further
comments need to be made to fill out a somewhat broader picture of participation,
especially to reflect trends not well capture by traditional notions.
Westheimer and Kahne (2004) identified three broad notions of citizenship
engagement—personal responsibility, participation and social justice. These are
somewhat broader categories than those identified by Kennedy (2006, 2018) although
there are similarities. The category of ‘personally responsible citizen’ (p. 242) empha-
sizes moral uprightness and being ‘a good person.’ In many senses, it reflects the
character education movement that has taken hold in the United States and more
recently in England where the focus is on cultivating moral virtues. While such an
approach is meant to reflect Western, and Judeo-Christian values and world view, it
has remarkable similarities with Asian conceptions of ‘good citizenship’ where it is
often argued that ‘good people make good citizens.’ The ‘participative citizen,’ on
the other hand, will know about government and its systems and will actively partici-
pate in these for the benefit of the community. Westheimer and Kahne (2004, p. 243)
characterize the difference between the two citizen types with a simple example:
the personally responsible citizen might contribute to a food drive, while the par-
ticipatory citizen would help to organize it! They also posit a third citizen type, the
justice-oriented citizen. To continue the food drive metaphor, Westheimer and Kahne
(2004, p. 243) indicated that such citizens would be more interested in finding out
why some people remain hungry in a society and then develop strategies to address
the issue.
3.2 Varieties of Civic Engagement—Social, Political and Digital 33

Table 3.2 Dimensions of participation

1. Engage in conventional political activities This is the traditional view usually held by
a. Voting political scientists
b. Joining a political party
c. Being a candidate for political office
2. Engage in voluntary community activities This is often called the ‘civic virtues’
a. Work with community care agencies approach to citizenship
b. Collect money for a good cause
3. Engage in activities that seek to change This is often called ‘the conflict’ model of
political and social directions citizenship
a. Legal
i. Write letters to a newspaper
ii. Collect signatures on a petition
b. Illegal
i. Block traffic
ii. Write graffiti on walls
iii Occupy a building
4. Engage in self-regulating activities This is often referred to as the economic
a. Become financially self-supporting model of citizenship
b. Become a self-directed learner
c. Become a creative problem solver
d. Adopt entrepreneurial values
Based on Kennedy (2006, 2018)

What is clear from the frameworks of both Kennedy (2006, 2018) and Westheimer
(2004) is that citizen participation is defined well beyond formal participation in the
political system (Kennedy’s first category). Indeed, the focus of much CCE research
in the past two decades has been very much on broader conceptions of participation
rather than narrow conceptions. Part of this has to do with the age of students so that
in CivEd and ICCS 2009/2016, students were 14–15 years old with no experience of
or access to the formal political system so that other forms of participation were used
to gain some idea of their future participation or their ideas of how a good citizen
would participate. Yet this distinction between participation in the formal system and
broader forms of social and political participation was not new. Researchers have
discussed terms such as ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ conceptions of citizenship (Walzer, 1994)
or ‘maximal’ and minimal’ conceptions (McLaughlin, 1992). This is a trend that
privileges certain forms of citizenship participation over others (e.g. justice-oriented
citizenship over personally responsible citizenship), and this trend has continued
although perhaps in unexpected ways.
Kahne, Hodgin, and Eidman-Aadahl (2016) have recently distinguished between
‘participatory politics’ and ‘institutional politics.’ Drawing on various research
projects, they documented youth’s preference for online engagement to achieve dif-
ferent social and political purposes. This allows young people to avoid institutional
politics that are more associated with governments, political parties, NGOs and polit-
ical elites (p. 8). Participatory politics, using the full range of social media, allows
for direct communication and the prioritizing of issues relevant to youth themselves.
34 3 Building on Civic and Citizenship Education’s Achievements

This kind of participation—self-directed, personally relevant, politically oriented

and often involving peers and other community members—is seen to represent a
new direction for the ‘digital natives’ who make up the large majority of the youth
population. While there are exhortations about the need to link the outcomes of such
participation to institutional politics (e.g. where new laws are needed or where action
is required by government departments and community groups), the privileging of
participatory over institutional politics is clear. The question is whether this kind of
privileging will be strong enough to confront democratic deconsolidation. There is
not a simple question, and the issue will be addressed directly later in this chapter.

3.3 The Future of Democratic Political Systems

‘Post-truth politics’ (Keyes, 2004), while not entirely new, seems to have become
a signature aspect of the current political environment. Misinformation and ‘fake
news’ seem now to be part of the vocabulary of many politicians and a reflection of
the state of politics in general. This disrespect for truth has to be seen as part of the
agenda for the deconsolidation of democracy.
As mentioned previously, it was seen in the United Kingdom referendum on
Brexit, the election of Donald Trump in the United States and the return to power
of the One Nation Party in Australia. An important characteristic of these events is
that they occurred as part of democratic processes. Post-truth politics, as a general
process to distort truth and reality, seems now to be a central feature of democracy.
This highlights the importance of political systems and their institutions in supporting
and sustaining that democracy. Yet advocates of participatory politics often seem to
have abandoned the formal political system by privileging more informal means of
participation (Kahne et al., 2016). This trend, however, may be counterproductive
in the current context since the systems and the institutions they support are in all
likelihood the best guarantee of democracy’s survival.
The issue is not only the ideological realignments that ‘post-truth politics’ repre-
sent, an alignment that has seen the rise of right wing radicalism in many parts of the
world. The past two decades of research related to CCE have taken for granted broad
liberal democratic political principles. Thus, constructs such as ‘active citizenship,’
‘civic engagement’ and ‘participation’ have dominated the research literature. Con-
ceptually, CCE has been linked to Ancient Greek and Roman conceptions of citizens’
duties and obligations so that modern citizens have been expected to be as engaged
in civic activities as their ancient peers (or at least those privileged enough to have
been considered citizens). Yet the assumption has always been that such engagement
will be directed toward liberal ends—supporting the political system, helping others,
bringing attention to issues that need to be addressed. ‘Post-truth’ politics seeks to
undermine the political system and its institutions, questions citizen rights, retreats
to an individualism that appears to care little for others and resorts to masking the
truth when it suits its purposes. This is the environment in which participatory and
institutional politics needs to be evaluated.
3.3 The Future of Democratic Political Systems 35

While democracy has delivered political gains for antidemocratic groups in the
context of ‘post-truth politics,’ it is important to understand the contexts in which
this has happened. In the United Kingdom vote to leave the European Union, the
difference between the Leave and Remain votes was 1.3 million in favor of Leave
and this margin is often highlighted as the reason the referendum results are bind-
ing on government. Yet 13 million people did not vote in the referendum, so their
views are not factored into these figures! In the 2016, US presidential election just
over 55% of those eligible voted with 26.3% supporting President-elect Trump (and
26.5% supporting Hilary Clinton). Democratic structures and processes delivered
these results. In Australia, 4.2% of the electorate delivered four senators to the One
Nation Party that has since played an important role influencing the direction of the
Australian government. Democratic processes delivered these results. As important
as the results were, the issue is about the failure of democratic participation.
In the cases of the United Kingdom and the United States, the striking lack of
participation in the formal political system stands out. In Australia, the dysfunctional
nature of a political system that delivers such results cannot escape criticism. A US
president can be elected with a little more than 25% support from the eligible number
of voters. In the United Kingdom, a 72% turnout in the Brexit referendum is hailed
as a triumph ignoring the fact that this means 28% of the eligible population did
not register a vote. In Australia, the vagaries of a system of proportional representa-
tion, originally designed to protect the rights of the Australian states and territories,
now favor fringe political groups representing extremist political views, or frivolous
views, as in the case of the Motoring Enthusiasts Party!
The failure in all this is the failure of participation—participation in the formal
political system. It reflects a lack of appreciation of how the system works and how
it can be made to work in more democratic ways. Kahne et al. (2016) may call
this concern one of ‘institutional politics,’ McLaughlin (1992) may see it related
to ‘minimal conceptions of citizenship,’ and Walzer (1994) may characterize it as
a ‘thin conception of citizenship.’ And they could be correct. The issue, however,
is that the formal political system provides the ground rules for how any society
operates. Laws, courts, the police, and schools provide the institutional support for
a functioning democratic society, and these are all linked to the political system. If
the political system and its institutions are not legitimate, there is no guarantee that
these institutions will also act in legitimate ways.
Participation in the system may be seen as disempowering for some groups and
individuals, but without their participation, the system is weakened. Participatory
politics, as referred to earlier (Kahne et al., 2016), does not solve this problem. It
provides an alternative form of participation that may be more consistent with youth
values, but it is not a substitute for engagement with the formal system. Teaching
young people to be digital citizens does not necessarily have flow-on effects into
the formal political system—at least none that has been demonstrated. Thus, future
work on civic engagement needs to return to the importance of engagement with the
political system to support democratic legitimacy through maximum participation.
Such participation might be facilitated by online engagement, but in all likelihood,
36 3 Building on Civic and Citizenship Education’s Achievements

such engagement will not flow on to support institutional politics. This is a complex
issue that will be more fully explored in Chapter 5.
Institutional engagement is by no means a new agenda as shown by Torney-Purta
et al. (2001, p. 150) who developed a model, shown in Figure 3.1, to show the
main influences on adolescents’ intentions regarding future voting behavior. This
model, is often referred to as the ‘CivEd model’, since it emerged directly from the
IEA Civic Education Study and was one of the key contributions that study made
to understanding student civic engagement. Additional research has expanded the
CivEd model to identify a broader range of influences that support young people to
focus their attention on their future civic engagement in its different forms. Given
the current political environment in which it has been shown that large percentages
of eligible voters choose not to engage or where small numbers of voters can exert
a disproportional effect on political outcomes, this line of research is particularly
important since a great deal of thought needs to be given to the role CCE can play
to prepare young people not just for engagement and participation in general but
particularly for engagement in the formal political system. This means highlighting
research on what might be called ‘civic enablers’ that help young people to appreciate
the full range of civic engagement options open to them in the future. Starting with
the CivEd model shown in Figure 3.1, a range of research will be reviewed to indicate
the foundations on which future CCE can be built.

3.4 Civic Enablers—Supporting Future Civic Engagement

The model developed for CivEd by Torney-Purta et al. (2001) and shown in Figure 3.1
was an important attempt to identify civic enablers. It is important to understand the
range of variables used in the model. First, the variables included operate at several
levels: there are demographic variables (gender, home literacy resources), individ-
ual student characteristics (expected years of further education, participation in a
school council, evenings spent outside the home, frequency of watching TV, having
learnt about voting) and a single classroom-level variable (open classroom climate).
CivEd Path Model for Civic Knowledge and Likelihood to Vote
The model shows how these independent variables are related to the two dependent
variables, Civic Knowledge and Intention to Vote and how the dependent variables
are related to each other. The results deserve much more attention than they have
received.
Second, the demographic variables show minimal impact on intention to
vote. For gender and home literacy resources (β s = 0.03 and 0.04, respectively),
individual-level variables do show relatively much greater impact with the high-
est being having learned about voting (β = 0.19) and frequency of watching TV
(β = 0.13). When it comes to civic knowledge, the results are somewhat more
positive with expected years of further education exerting the strongest effect (β
= 0.26) with home literacy resources also exerting a relatively strong effect (β =
3.4 Civic Enablers—Supporting Future Civic Engagement 37

Figure 3.1 Included with permission of the International Association for the Evaluation of Edu-
cational Achievement (IEA)

0.19). The next strongest was the classroom variable, open classroom climate (β =
0.13). Yet perhaps the most significant relationship is that between civic knowledge
and intention to vote (β = 0.21) suggesting that the more students know about
and appreciate civic life and the more positive their civic values, the greater the
likelihood that they will see the importance of voting in the future.
Third, this interpretation of the model is a generous one and for several reasons.
The variance accounted for by the models (i.e. extent to which the model can explain
the variability in the data) ranged from 18 to 20% indicating that some 80% of the
variance remains to be explained. Thus, the search for civic enablers must go on.
While it is possible to identify variables at different levels (classroom, individual),
it is not possible to differentiate the contribution of each to the overall results. More
sophisticated models are needed to estimate the variance that can be attributed to
38 3 Building on Civic and Citizenship Education’s Achievements

classroom-level variables and that which can be attributed to individuals. Neverthe-

less, important potential civic enablers have been identified in the CivEd model, and
subsequent work has been able to build on it.
ICCS 2009 did not test the CivEd model with the new data set, at least as part of
the International Report. Schulz and Fraillon (2012) and Schulz, Ainley, and Frail-
lon (2013), however, did undertake follow up secondary analyses of the ICCS 2009
data extending the original CivEd model. The model developed by Schulz and Frail-
lon (2012) added some additional predictor variables to the CivEd model (parental
interest and discussion with parents), two mediating variables (citizenship self-
efficacy and valuing participation) and two outcome variables (expected electoral
participation and expected active political participation). The parental variables
had small and significant effects on civic knowledge, and therefore, their indirect
effect through civic knowledge was also small. Yet the direct effect of parents’
interest in social and political issues on future electoral participation was relatively
stronger (β = 0.14) with a smaller effect on future active political participation
(β = 0.09). Citizenship self-efficacy, “the confidence students express in their abil-
ities to participate in civic life, (Schulz & Fraillon, 2012, p. 4) exerted the strongest
effect on both future electoral participation (β = 0.25) and future active political par-
ticipation (β = 0.35) but interestingly was negatively correlated to civic knowledge
(β = −0.01) that itself had a direct effect on both forms of future civic participation
although the effects were in the opposite direction (β = 0.24 for future electoral par-
ticipation and β = −0.13 for future active political participation). These results rein-
force the central role of civic knowledge in preparing students for future civic engage-
ment and, like the CivEd model, highlighted the importance of school experiences
such as civic participation at school and pedagogies such as an open classroom climate
in developing civic knowledge. The results expanded the CivEd model by identifying
a role for parents in the civic education of their children and the importance of devel-
oping self-efficacy so that young people can feel confident about participating in var-
ious political processes. Yet the revised model also raised some intriguing questions.
First, there was the relationship between civic knowledge and citizenship self-
efficacy. While both these variables influenced future political participation posi-
tively, they influenced future active political participation in different ways. Citizen-
ship self-efficacy had a relatively strong and positive relationship with active political
participation while civic knowledge had a negative relationship. This suggests that
building stronger commitments to future electoral participation requires higher levels
of civic knowledge, whereas building commitments to future active political partici-
pation would benefit more from developing students’ citizenship self-efficacy. Since
it is also the case that citizenship self-efficacy can contribute to the development of
future electoral participation, then a great deal of thought needs to be given to where
the emphasis should be in CCE in terms of the expected outcomes—knowledge or
participation or both—and the pathways that will lead to the required outcomes.
Second, the above issue is somewhat more complicated when other parts of the
model are examined. For example, school civic participation influenced both the
development of civic knowledge (β = 0.11) and the development of citizenship
self-efficacy (β = 0.20). It was the same for students’ perceptions of an open class-
3.4 Civic Enablers—Supporting Future Civic Engagement 39

room climate (β = 0.13 and 0.10, respectively). Thus, these civic enablers worked
together. Yet the imperative for CCE is deciding what outcomes have priority and
then identifying the enablers that are most likely to achieve these outcomes.
Third, some light is shed on this issue because of the small and negative relation-
ship between civic knowledge and citizenship self-efficacy. In traditional terms, this
relationship suggests at the very least that ‘knowledge’ and ‘self-efficacy’ are two
very different constructs even though in terms of outcomes they share some common-
alties. It could be argued that civic knowledge is more likely to lead to a conventional
form of future civic engagement, while citizenship self-efficacy has a more radical
edge to it in terms of future active political engagement. This is an important issue
to consider especially in terms of the theoretical issues discussed earlier concerning
‘thin’ and ‘think’ descriptions of such engagement. It seems that civic knowledge
is more linked to ‘thin’ conceptions, while citizenship self-efficacy has a more pos-
itive role to play in supporting ‘thick’ conceptions of civic engagement. These are
important issues for future considerations in the development of CCE.
Schulz et al. (2013) used basically the same model as has been discussed
above. A significant difference was the addition of two additional outcome mea-
sures—‘expected legal protest activities’ and ‘expected illegal protest activities”.
These were important additions because they expanded the forms of civic engage-
ment that are available to young people and they provided interesting results. As
far as civic knowledge was concerned, the results were the same as in the previ-
ous study for expected electoral engagement and active political engagement (β
= 0.24 and −0.13, respectively). For expected legal protest, there was a small but
positive relationship (β = 0.09), while for expected illegal protest, there was a rela-
tively stronger and negative relationship (β = −0.19). When it came to citizenship
self-efficacy, however, there were relatively strong and positive relationships for all
outcome measures ranging from 0.14 for illegal protests to 0.40 for legal protest.
These results reinforce the view suggested earlier that CCE certainly can support
future political engagement, but it is relatively conventional engagement related to
the formal political system. In the current environment, that requires a greater com-
mitment from citizens to exercise their voting rights, this is an important finding
for those developing CCE programs. Yet civic knowledge does not seem to lead to
greater participation over all—that requires the development of self-efficacy and the
confidence that individuals can make a difference.
While the extension of the original CivEd model has been important in identifying
additional civic enablers, there has been one key issue that remains to be addressed.
Both the CivEd and ICCS 2009 data have a special characteristic. With large samples
of individual students and schools, it is quite possible that schools as units could
exert an effect on any outcome measure in addition to the effect of individual student
attributes. Statistically, it is possible to separate these school-level and individual-
level effects with a technique referred to as multilevel modeling. One such model
was developed by Kennedy, Li, and Chan (2014) and is shown in Figure 3.2.
This multilevel model was tested using ICCS 2009 data for Hong Kong students.
Individual student measures were available for each of the variables that were mostly
the same as those used in previous studies. Student responses were computed for each
40 3 Building on Civic and Citizenship Education’s Achievements

Figure 3.2 A two-level conceptual model of the mediated effects of students’ citizenship self-
efficacy and interest in political and social issues on their school civic participation and civic
knowledge scores (from Kennedy et al., 2014, p. 200)

variable and regressed on civic knowledge as the outcome measure. This analysis
provided student-level (or individual-level) estimates of the effect of the independent
variables on the dependent variable. School-level estimates measures were developed
using school averages for each variable. That is, the average of all student scores
within each school is regressed on the dependent variable. There are several points
of interest in the results.
First, the multilevel analysis revealed that 20% of the variance in students’ civic
knowledge scores could be attributed to differences between schools (based on an
intraclass correlation (ICC), a measure of association in the school-level data, of
around 0.2. In statistical terms, this is a large school effect suggesting that when it
comes to civic learning in Hong Kong, the schools that students attend can make
a difference. Second, further analysis at the school level highlighted the potential
role of schools in supporting civic learning. School averaged civic participation,
for example, showed a relatively strong effect on civic knowledge (β = 0.534)
suggesting that in schools where there were above average levels of school civic
participation, there were also higher levels of civic knowledge. This result was
similar at the individual level although the relationship was nowhere as strong
(β = 0.146). A strong influence on school civic participation itself was students’
interest in social and political issues. Schools that showed a high average level
of student interest in political and social issues exerted a strong effect on civic
knowledge (β = 0.757) an effect also seen at the individual level (β = 0.283).
Kennedy et al., (2014) theorized these results in the following way. They inter-
preted the school-level effects as meaning that school leaders have a role in organizing
their schools to enhance civic learning. They referred to this idea as ‘leading for civic
learning’ since so much of the responsibility for what happens in schools rests with
principals and their leadership teams. What seems clear is that leadership teams in
schools need to include civic learning as one of their responsibilities to support the
civic development of young people. Schools can encourage school civic participation
3.4 Civic Enablers—Supporting Future Civic Engagement 41

outside of classrooms. As shown in this study in particular, but in the earlier reviewed
studies as well, school leaders can do a great deal to facilitate these processes.1
At the same time as identifying school-level effects, a significant outcome of
the study was the identification of important student-level effects. As in the studies
reviewed previously, citizenship self-efficacy played an important role in influencing
school civic participation both directly (β = 0.158) and indirectly through internal
political efficacy for a total effect of β = 0.227. Students’ interests in social and
political issues also had a direct and positive effect on school civic participation
(β = 0.283) and a total effect mediated by internal political efficacy (β = 0.327).
These results highlighted the mediating role of internal political efficacy, ‘beliefs
that individuals have about their capacity to become politically involved’ (Schulz,
Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr & Losito 2010, p. 120). As in the previous studies reviewed
above, school civic participation influenced civic knowledge directly (β = 0.146).
The results referred to above have endorsed the important issue of student
engagement in the civic life of the school, an area that has always been important to
civic educators. Importantly, however, the result reinforces the link between school
civic engagement and the development of civic knowledge—they are not mutually
exclusive. In the two previous studies that were based on ICCS 2009 data (Schulz
& Fraillon, 2012; Schulz et al., 2013), Hong Kong data was not included. These
results, therefore, supported the previous models but with the addition of a multilevel
analytical perspective. Issues concerning the role of citizenship self-efficacy as a
school-level variable also emerged in this study and remain to be explored.
The final study to be reviewed in this section has also focused on students’ future
expected participation, but it used a different analytic approach. The results have
important implications for both pedagogy and curriculum in CCE. Using person-
centered analysis, that identified groups based on similar item responses, and the
ICCS 2009 Asian student samples, Chow and Kennedy (2015) identified groups of
students with distinctive civic profiles in each society including Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Indonesia and Thailand. ‘The benefit of a “person-centered” approach is that it
can take on a comparative perspective within a sample to explore both commonality
and difference in persons’ various characteristics simultaneously’ (Chow & Kennedy,
2015, p. 473). That is, rather than generating a single score to represent student
achievement on a particular dimension, person-centered analysis identifies groups
of students within a sample who have similar characteristics. This process tends to
highlight heterogeneity within a sample rather than homogeneity.
In the study being discussed here, four distinct groups were identified in the Asian
samples based on their ‘intentions to participate in the future’:

1 The school-level effects of citizenship self-efficacy on school civic participation are not discussed

here. The direction of its influence at the individual level differed from its direction at the school
level suggesting there may be considerable variation across schools leading to a biased estimate.
Alternatively, citizenship self-efficacy as the school-level variable may be measuring a different
construct from what is being measured at the school level. This is not an unusual phenomena in
multilevel modeling, and it deserves further study.
42 3 Building on Civic and Citizenship Education’s Achievements

• Cluster 1: ‘Active participators’ will take a very active approach to participate in

society.
• Cluster 2: ‘Conventional participators’ will emphasize voting behavior and are
likely to reject illegal protest.
• Cluster 3: ‘Radical participators’ favor illegal protests and are less inclined to vote.
• Cluster 4: ‘Minimal participators’ have the lowest intention to engage in any civic
activities (Based on Chow & Kennedy, 2015, p. 485).
These four groups were identified in each of the societies being studied although
the pattern of group membership was not consistent across groups. In Korea, for
example, the majority of students were grouped as radical participators (39.2%), but
there was also a sizable number in the minimal participators group (35.3%). In Hong
Kong, on the other hand, conventional participators predominated (34.5%) followed
by minimal participators (33.8%). Another feature that merged was the dominance
of active participators in Indonesia (43.5% and Thailand (30.2%) compared to East
Asian societies (Taiwan (11.8%), Hong Kong (8.6%) and Korea (10.6%). The general
picture, therefore, was one of heterogeneity both with and across societies.
There are a number of key points to make about these results:
1. Diversity rather than uniformity characterizes these students’ intentions to par-
ticipate’ in the future.
2. Electoral participation is only one form of civic participation available, and while
it is embraced by all groups except the ‘minimal participators,’ it is not necessarily
the preferred form of participation.
3. Even among young adolescents, radical forms of civic participation are envis-
aged.
4. Around a third of students from East Asian societies appear to have no intentions
to participate contrasting sharply with students from South East Asian societies.
Chow and Kennedy (2015) discussed the theoretical implications of these results,
but attention also needs to be given to the practical implications, especially as far
as CCE is concerned. If classrooms are characterized by students with diverse civic
attitudes, then both the curriculum and pedagogy need to take account of that. This
means one curriculum will not suit all students. If there some students in the class
already feeling they do not want to participate, while others are already thinking about
radical forms of engagement, then curriculum and pedagogy need to take account
of this. Both groups of students need to be supported and educated about forms of
engagement that might be necessary at different times in any society’s development. It
was shown in the studies reviewed earlier that establishing an open classroom climate
will encourage engagement and discussion within the classroom. Kuang, Kennedy,
and Mok (2018) have recently identified classroom strategies that can facilitate an
open classroom climate, and these can form an important part of CCE pedagogy.
It has also been shown that opportunities for school civic participation will nurture
the idea of participation as well as enhancing civic knowledge. Teachers and school
leaders need to be aware that their responsibility in CCE is not simply to find time
to schedule it in the curriculum but to develop it in such a way that it can meet the
3.4 Civic Enablers—Supporting Future Civic Engagement 43

diverse needs of students. The issue of how to do this will be a major concern of the
following chapters that will examine the characteristics and requirements for CCE in
the future as well as a possible research agenda that will support CCE as the century
progresses.

3.5 Synopsis

Participation has been an important emphasis in CCE over the past two decades
and preparing young people for future participation an important objective. The
nature of participation itself has been expanded during this time and has ranged
from engagement in the formal political system to engagement with society at large
through social media. All forms of participation are important, but this chapter has
argued that given the current political environment perhaps more attention could be
paid to engagement in the formal political system.
The research studies reviewed here have demonstrated the centrality of civic
knowledge in building positive, participatory intentions among young people, espe-
cially where engagement in the formal political system is an objective. Yet civic
knowledge may not be enough if other forms of engagement are also to be encour-
aged. Classrooms can assist this process by developing environments that value
openness, discussion, interaction and exchange of ideas. Developing students’ inter-
est in social and political issues can also help in developing civic knowledge. Schools
can help by ensuring that there are opportunities for participation in school gover-
nance, voluntary activities, student clubs and other civic related activities. Yet the
diversity of the student population should not be underestimated. The ideas students
formulate through interactions with peers, parents and media mean they come to
CCE with their own thoughts about participation. Any curriculum must cater for this
diversity so that students can think through the issues that are most relevant to them.
What has been discussed in the chapter, and particularly the research evidence
that exists to support different civic enablers, provides the foundation for the kind of
CCE programs that will be needed in the future.

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