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Air Defence Command: A Step in Right Direction

02 Jul 2020 By Brig. Akhelesh Bhargava (CLAWS)

1. The appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) came into being on 01

Jan 2020 after a long wait. One of the first announcements made by
CDS was about making a proposal for the creation of Air Defence
Command by 30 Jun 2020. An important question that needs to be
answered is about the structure of the Air Defence Command, should
the proposal be accepted.
2. Air Defence (AD): A Peep into History . During the Second World War,
the Union War Book made a clear distinction by listing out “coastal Air
Defence including at Ports and Anti-Aircraft (AA) Defence as Army
responsibilities. The Air Force role comprised of “Home Defence air
attack and AD intelligence scheme”.  Thus while, the Royal Indian Air
Force was engaged in regaining the command of the air; the Indian Anti
Aircraft Artillery was employed to defend all vulnerable assets from
enemy air force.
3. Post-1971 war AA Artillery expanded in a big way. Officers were directly
commissioned into the AA Artillery units and new weapon systems were
inducted, including state of the art Surface to Air Missiles (SAM). The
training of men too got separated out from Artillery. The responsibility of
ground-based AD at airfields continued with AA Artillery.
4. In 1993, the proposal for creating a separate arm in the Army to carry
out AD functions was on cards.  It was during the same time that the
Union War Book was revised, wherein the heading was changed from
“Anti-Aircraft Defence” to “Air Defence”, thus blurring the distinction. 2  Till
then the anti-aircraft defence dealt clearly with Ground-Based Air
Defence Weapon Systems (GBADWS) and AD was the action in the air
by Air Force.  The inclusion of the revised statement, “The responsibility
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of providing AD of Indian Air Space rests with the Indian Air Force”,
changed the demarcation. A joint ethos became disjointed.
5. AD Responsibility Since 1993 . Since Air Force became the prime
provider of AD in the country, it should have undertaken following tasks
under its wings and delegated/distributed the same based on a clear-cut
policy between the three services:

a. Surveillance of Air Space: Surveillance plays a prime role for

effective AD. To ensure a coordinated gap-free, multi-tiered (in range)
and layered (in height band) coverage of air space; a chain of
surveillance radars are required. The availability of surveillance
radars with the three services, their distribution/deployment,
identification of gaps and future acquisition should be planned and
executed jointly. A long-term perspective plan should have been
made for surveillance. However, all acquisitions for surveillance by
the three services are being done independently and their
deployment is based on their respective requirements and seldom
coordinated with each other even during operations. This leads to
duplication in the same geographical area as well as cause electro-
magnetic interference (EMI). Interestingly, Pakistan in 1993 was far
ahead in this field with Siemens Integrated Low-Level Air Control
System (SILLACS) which fielded a chain of radars along our western
borders.
b. AD Weapons. As the qualitative and quantitative air threat increased
and became more potent, the requirement of advanced AD weapon
systems to include self-propelled (SP) SAMs became a necessity for
the Strike Corps. The airbases earlier had three tiers of AD protection
ie, the AD aircraft, Pechora SAM (static) and the AA Artillery guns.
With time the AD tiers at the airbases increased to five by inducting
man-portable SAM (Igla 1M) and SP SAMs (Osa-AK and Spyder).
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The AD aircraft were also kitted with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Air
to Air Missiles (AAM). Due to paucity of AD resources, many Army
and Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) assets do not get even a
single tier of AD protection. The AD of a ship, in any case, is an
independent/stand-alone task and therefore not discussed.
c. Control and Reporting (C&R) System. The C&R System for AD
weapons including AD aircrafts becomes very central for an effective
AD battle as also to prevent fratricide. Being reactive in nature, AD
weapons seldom get ‘target engagement time’ of few seconds post its
reporting. It is therefore important that the complete C&R is
automated. Besides, all the passage of information should be on a
robust and secure communication network. However, various
elements of the Army C&R network quite often function on manual
mode. When the case for Integrated Air Command and Control
System (IACCS) was initiated in 2010; only Air Force requirements
were taken into consideration. Later Army AD had to initiate Project
‘Akashteer’. As on date, both are still disjointed, and Army AD C&R
network still does not get feeds from IACCS automatically. An
identification friend or foe (IFF) system for AD is essential to prevent
fratricide.
d. Communications, Frequency Management and Electronic
Warfare (EW). The ultimate aim of Air Force and Army AD is one –
the destruction of enemy aircraft. Accordingly, communication
network for AD (AFNET of Air Force and NISHAN of Army) should
have been one. It is an operational need for both services to be on
the same page. The frequency required for a large number of radio
nets (HF and VHF) for Army AD is large. Simultaneously, there are a
large number of radars being operated by both Air Force and Army
AD. Therefore, there is a need for frequency management to ensure
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electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and avoid EMI. The Air and AD

battle will be in the backdrop of heavy use of EW. The electronic
countermeasures (ECM) and electronic countermeasures (ECCM)
are practised together only during exercises. The need of the hour is
to discuss and practice together.
e. Logistics. AD weapons systems have been procured randomly from
different countries. Every AD weapon system has a comparatively
low population. Logically the spare parts, their repair and
maintenance facility should have been centrally coordinated. The
specialist trained on AD weapon would thus be on the common grid
to exchange notes and when required decide on cannibalisation
where feasible. The AD equipment maintenance by both Air Force
(Base Repair Depots [BRD]) and Army (Army Base Workshops
[ABW]) needs better management and coordination. Similarly, the AD
gun ammunition and SAMs storage depots of Air Force and Army can
be combined and war wastage rates (WWR) be optimised.
f. Human Resource and Skill Development. The manpower with Air
Force for AD is a fraction of what Army AD has. The technical skill
required for operating an AD weapon is virtually the same but training
methodology and locations are different for the three services.
Personnel is trained to handle radars, AD guns, SAMs,
communication equipment, fighter controllers and the like. The
training can be synergized at the AD training establishments of the
three services.
g. Acquisition of Weapons. Post 1993, when Air Force became overall
responsible for AD of the country, it should have automatically
become the coordination agency for procurement as well as the
development of ground-based AD weapons by Defence Research
and Development Organization (DRDO). However, the three services
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have been acquiring AD weapons independently, without reference to

other’s need. Since the AD systems, especially the SAMs and
surveillance resources (radars) are very costly there was a need to
optimize the procurement due to the availability of limited capital
budget for defence forces. An example being the procurement of SP
SAMs like Osa-AK and Spyder for protection of static airfields.
Besides, the DRDO should have been tasked jointly and minor
variation built in rather than independent orders being negotiated,
resulting in wasteful expenditure, effort and time (eg – Akash).

6. The Changed Scenario. The air threat over the years has changed.
The air targets have become faster, capable of releasing weapons from
a stand-off distance. The drones can be aircraft sized or a miniature
version (capable of attacking in swarms).  The drone attack on Aramco
oil refinery in Saudi Arabia by Houthi rebels on 14 Sep 2019[4] has
highlighted that even the civilian economic targets can be targeted by
non-state actors.  The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has
promulgated the drone policy, yet it has not earmarked any agency for
its coordination. The civil aviation and paramilitary forces under Ministry
of Home Affairs (MHA) including Coast Guard have to be taken on board
as the threat from drones under the control of rogue elements can
emanate from anywhere in the hinterland.
7. A large number of countries including China and Pakistan are having
ballistic missiles of varying range. Their numbers are ever-increasing
and are a source of the constant threat to strategic assets including
major cities. There is a need for Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) to
protect selected assets.
8. Thousands of satellites are being launched in the low earth orbit (LEO)
having remote sensing capabilities both by state and private players.
There are strategic assets which need to be shielded from the prying
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eyes of these satellites. One or many of these satellites may knowingly

eavesdrop on key installations and if this is done persistently, it needs to
be taken as a hostile act and action initiated accordingly.
9. The planning for upgrading the country’s AD is being done. The S-400
Triumf will take care of aircraft attacking with stand-off weapons as also
provide BMD. It is likely to be delivered by end of 2021. In the medium
and long term, the DRDO BMD twins of Prithvi Air Defence Missile (also
known as Pradyumna Ballistic Missile Interceptor) for high altitude and
Advance AD Interceptor for low altitude are in the pipeline and multiple
test firing have been carried out. India conducted mission ‘Shakti’ on 27
Mar 2019 in which an earmarked satellite was hit by an Anti-Satellite
Missile.
10. Along with these AD weapons, a host of phased array radars with
ranges up to 600 km are also being inducted. All the above weapons
will form part of the Strategic AD Force. The requirement of trained
manpower to operate these AD weapons will be immense. To leave all
of it to a single service may not be viable and therefore the requirement
of Air Defence Command.
11. Preparing for the Future. It is proposed that the Air Defence
Command should have direct control over the strategic AD weapons. It
should delegate control over tactical AD weapons to respective services
as hitherto fore. Simultaneously, there is an urgent need for bringing
homogeneity amongst the three services and take other stakeholders
like DGCA on board.
12. Air Force is the main stakeholder should become the prime coordinator
for a viable AD in the country. Each service has few core
competencies and they should be made responsible for that vertical
either singly or jointly but within the laid down guidelines legislated by
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Air Defence Command. The aspects which need attention on priority

are as enumerated below:

a. Automation of C&R and Tri-service Integration. The Air Force

IACCS has been fielded and operationally tested. It should be shared
with the Army and Navy albeit post sensitizing all operators to
maintain cyber hygiene. An audit of surveillance radars presently
available in the country should be carried out and a gap-free tiered
deployment should be re-planned and implemented. Steps should be
initiated to make IACCS fully automated (hands-free with minimal
human intervention).
b. Strategic AD Weapons: A tri-service organization should be created
and personnel trained for S-400, BMD and ASAT weapon systems.
Their peacetime and operational locations need to be decided and
infrastructure created.
c. Air Space Control: Since the users of air space, especially at the
low level (below 300 m) are many, there is need for a single agency
to control them so that maximum freedom of action is provided to
each.
d. Air Threat Assessment at National Level: Air threat to all assets of
the three services and JPC tasks should be reassessed and
prioritised.  Similarly, stock of all AD weapons under various
categories and those in the pipeline should be taken. Reallocation of
AD weapons should be carried out based on relative priority.
e. Training and Skill Development: The training at AD College/School
of the three services should be integrated based on respective core
competency. Training for future strategic AD weapons should
commence at the earliest. Training of paramilitary forces’ personnel
on AD aspects too, needs to be considered.
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f. Indigenous Manufacture and Procurement ex Import: A regular

interaction with DRDO, Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU),
Ordnance Factories (OF) and private industries dealing with
manufacture of AD weapons should be held. Shortcomings,
modifications and upgrades wherever required, should be timely
conveyed and feedback is taken to avoid delays. Assemblies or
equipment required to be imported should be thoroughly vetted. Strict
quality control needs to be exercised where the transfer of technology
(ToT) has been carried out for indigenous production.
g. Base Repairs and Maintenance: Due to the low population of AD
equipment, it is worthwhile to pool in resources of the three services
for base repair. Specialists need to be identified and data on their
profile be shared.

13. Conclusion. The Air Defence Command will provide a big boost to
the AD of the nation.  Optimization of AD weapons is the need of the
hour. It’s time to set right flaws and implement reforms forthwith. The Air
Defence Command will also ensure that the Armed Forces are ready to
induct strategic AD weapons and modify their plans accordingly. It will
bring about much-needed cohesiveness between AD elements of the
three services and ensure optimal functioning.

Brig Akhelesh Bhargava (Retd) is an alumnus of Defence Services

Staff College. He was an instructor at Army AD College. He
commanded an AD unit in Western Sector. As Col AD he was head of
an arm at HQ Northern Command and commanded Eastern Command
AD Brigade.