FELIXBERTO C. STA. MARIA v. SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, et al.

(G.R. No. L-30773, February 18, 1970)

Facts: Felixberto Sta. Maria is a professor of English and Comparative Literature was elected
Dean of the College of Education on May 5, 1967 by the Board of Regents, on nomination of the
UP President. His appointment as such Dean was for a five-year term, “effective May 16, 1967
until May 17, 1972, unless sooner terminated, with all the rights and privileges as well as the
duties and obligations attached to the position in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the University and the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines. As far back as
February 11, 1969, the graduate and undergraduate students of the UP College of Education
presented to President Salvador P. Lopez a number of demands having a bearing on the
general academic program and the physical plant and services with a cluster of special
demands. In response, President Lopez created a committee composed of eight graduate
students in which they met 9 times with Dean Sta. Maria in February and March 1969 and
March 17, 1969. Dean Sta. Maria gave President Lopez a written summary of the dialogues he
had with the committee and enumerated in connection with the demands, the steps taken, the
steps being taken and the steps to be taken. He also provided recommendations which are
responsive to the needs and necessities of the students. However, the students were not
appeased as according to them, Dean Sta. Maria did not act on some of their demands. On July
16, 1969, Adelaida E. Masuhud, President of the UP Graduate Education Student Organization,
led a group who visited President Lopez and submitted to him a progress report on the students’
demands taken up with Sta. Maria since March 26, 1969. She acknowledged that the dean had
granted ten demands but deplored that further action on the demands that have far reaching
implications for the students, faculty and the College as a whole were not taken. Then, the
Education Graduate Student Organization boycotted their classes and it was supported by other
colleges. In fact, the UP Student Council voted to support the students’ education strike. In the
morning of July 23, at 10:00 o’clock, the UP President called a meeting of the faculty of the
College of Education. Those present gave him a vote of confidence to resolve the issue on hand
as he sees fit, hence, on the same day, July 23, 1969, President Lopez issued the transfer order
herein challenged, Administrative Order 77 as demanded by the prevailing crisis. He also
simultaneously appointed ad interim Professor Nemesio R. Ceralde as "acting Dean of the
College of Education, without additional compensation.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner’s transfer from the College of Education to the Office of the
President, as special assistant with the rank of dean without reduction in salary constitutes
removal.
Decision: The transfer constitutes removal. Sta. Maria was relieved as Dean of the U.P.
College of Education and was assigned to the Office of the President as a Special Assistant
“with the rank of Dean.” Also, the issuance of an ad interim- appointment to the respondent
Nemesio Ceralde as Acting Dean of the U.P. College of Education underscores the fact that the
petitioner had ceased to be the dean of the college. It meant, simply, that the respondent
Ceralde was appointed dean vice the petitioner. For unless the position of Dean of the College
of Education was vacant there could be no appointment to it. And finally, that the petitioner was
appointed to a new position and not merely detailed thereto was confirmed by the respondent
Lopez’s own counsel who, at the hearing on July 29, 1969 before the Board of Regents of the
University, admitted that the transfer order constituted an ad interim appointment of the
petitioner as Special Assistant to the U.P. President.
 JORGE B. VARGAS v. EMILIO RILLORAZA, et al.
(G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948)
Facts: A motion dated August 28, 1947, assails the constitutionality of section 14 of the
People's Court Act (Commonwealth Act No. 682) was filed because of the following grounds,
among others are; a.) It rovides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court, other than
those provided in section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution; b.) It authorizes the
appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the qualifications set forth
in section 6, Article VIII, of the Philippine Constitution; c.) It amends the Constitution by a
procedure not sanctioned by Article XV, of the Philippine Constitution; and d.) It destroys the
independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the 'packing' of the Supreme Court in certain
cases, either by Congress or by the President."
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the prosecution, opposes the motion and submitted his
propositions, which stated, inter alia, that Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not
and is not intended to provide an additional qualification for members of the Supreme Court,
much less does it amend section 6, Article VIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines and it does
not destroy the independence of the judiciary or curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Issues: Whether or not section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, creating the People's Court,
is constitutional.
Decision: Yes. Sec. 14 of CA No. 682 is constitutional. To discover whether the above quoted
section 14 of the People's Court Act is repugnant to the constitution, one of the best tests would
be to compare the operation of the pertinent constitutional provisions without said section, with
their operation with the same section if the latter were to be allowed to produce its effects. It is
self-evident that before the enactment of said section of the People's Court Act, it was not only
the power but the bounden duty of all the members of the Supreme Court to sit in judgment in
all treason cases duly brought or appealed to the court. That power and that duty arise from
Article VIII of the Constitution, particularly section 4, providing how the court shall be composed
and how it may sit, section 9, ordaining that they shall hold office during good behavior in their
term of office. Further, the advisability or inadvisability, as well as the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of a law is for the legislative and not for the judicial body to determine, unless
the unreasonableness constitutes a violation of the constitutional limitations. Courts should
construe and apply the law, but cannot legislate or encroach upon the legislative power of the
government. As Chief Justice Marshall said in the celebrated case of McCulloch vs. Maryland:
"When the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to
the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass
the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground." (20
Law. ed., p. 309.) It is a maxim that a law must be upheld unless its unconstitutionality is so
clear as to have no reasonable doubt on the subject. Hence, petition to have section 14 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682 declared unconstitutional is denied.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. JULIO POMAR
(G.R. No. L-22008, November 3, 1924)
Facts: From the record that on the 26th day of October, 1923, the prosecuting attorney of the
City of Manila presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance, accusing the defendant of a
violation of section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine
Legislature. The complaint alleged:
"That on or about the 27th day of August, 1923, and sometime prior thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, being the manager and person in charge of La Flor
de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a
corporation duly authorized to transact business in said city, and having,, during the year 1923,
in his employ and service as cigar-maker in said factory, a woman by the name of Macaria
Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave which began on the 16th day of July, 1923, by reason
of her pregnancy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously fail and refuse to pay to
said woman the sum of eighty pesos (P80), Philippine currency, to which she was entitled as
her regular wages corresponding to thirty days before and thirty days after her delivery and
confinement which took place on the 12th day of August, 1923, despite and over the demands
made by her, the said Macaria Fajardo, upon said accused, to do so."
To said complaint, the defendant demurred, alleging that the facts therein contained did not
constitute an offense. The demurrer was overruled, whereupon the defendant answered and
admitted at the, trial all of the allegations contained in the complaint, and contended that the
provisions of said Act No. 3071, upon which the complaint was based, were illegal,
unconstitutional and void.
Issues: Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 had been adopted
within the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.
Decision: The provisions of said sections had not been adopted within the reasonable and
lawful exercise of the police power of the state, and were therefore unconstitutional and illegal.
In determining whether a particular law promulgated under the police power of the state is, in
fact, within said power, it becomes necessary, first, to determine what that power is, its limits
and scope. The police power of the state cannot be exercised in contravention of the inhibitions
of the constitution. Hence, the legality of the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No. 3071 is
attacked upon the ground that they authorize an unconstitutional interference with the freedom
of contract and that the freedom and right to enter into legal contracts constitutes one of the
liberties of the people of the state; that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the
liberty of the individual protected by the constitution.

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 JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., et al. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, at al.
(G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
Facts: The Philippine Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 10175 or known as the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 which seeks to protect individuals from crimes or unlawful acts that can
be committed through the internet. While it is admitted that these of internet or cyberspace gives
access to research, advertisements, business, inquiries and connection with a greater number
of audience, it is also an instrument to commit crimes which the law itself is trying to prevent and
regulate. Petitioners in these consolidated cases, contended that this law violated certain
constitutional rights thus praying that it be declared void and unconstitutional. The Petitioners
argued that even though the Act is the government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace
activities, 21 separate sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights, particularly the right
to freedom of expression and access to information. In February 2013, the Supreme Court
extended the duration of a temporary restraining order against the government to halt
enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the issues.

Issues: Whether or not several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 violated
freedom of expression and privacy.
Decision: The Court ruled that several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
violated freedom of expression and privacy. The Court held that Sections 4(c) (3), 12, and 19 of
the Act were unconstitutional. It found that Section 4(c) (3) restricted freedom of expression by
prohibiting the unsolicited transmission of commercial communications, such as spam. Section
12 was declared in violation of the right to privacy because it lacked sufficient specificity and
definiteness in collecting real-time computer data. Section 19 was found to violate the rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures, which gave the government the authority to
restrict or block access to computer data without a judicial warrant. True, the State has a
legitimate interest in the preservation of order. For that purpose, it also has the power, exercised
through the legislature, to criminalize acts and provide penalties therefor. Hence, it can validly
regulate harmful conduct under Section 4 (c) (3). Section 6, however, is a different matter. The
State cannot override a clear Constitutional command that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech.

PHILAWSOPHIA: CHAPTER II CASE READINGS | Case Digest

 CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS v. ST. SCHOLASTIC’S COLLEGE WESTGROVE
(G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015)
Facts: SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001,
SSCW hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW’s Director of the Lay Apostolate and
Community Outreach Directorate.
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When
SSCW learned of the petitioner’s pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCW’s
Directress, advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the
petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from her employment just because
she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage.
On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she
should not be dismissed for engaging in premarital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a
result thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee
of a Catholic school. In a letter7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her
pregnancy out of wedlock does not amount to serious misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an
employee. She averred that she is unaware of any school policy stating that being pregnant out
of wedlock is considered as a serious misconduct and, thus, a ground for dismissal. Further, the
petitioner requested a copy of SSCW’s policy and guidelines so that she may better respond to
the charge against her.
Issues: Whether or not whether the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a
disgraceful and immoral conduct, thus tantamount to a valid ground to terminate her
employment.
Decision: The petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock is not a disgraceful or immoral conduct,
hence the petitioner’s dismissal is not a valid exercise of SSCW’s management prerogative. The
fact of the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to characterize the
petitioner’s conduct as disgraceful or immoral. In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner was
illegally dismissed as there was no just cause for the termination of her employment. SSCW
failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish that the petitioner’s conduct, i.e., engaging in
premarital sexual relations and conceiving a child out of wedlock, assessed in light of the
prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial
evidence to establish that premarital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of
wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral. The totality of the circumstances
surrounding the conduct alleged to be disgraceful or immoral must be assessed against the
prevailing norms of conduct. Public and secular morality should determine the prevailing norms
of conduct, not religious morality.

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PHILAWSOPHIA: CHAPTER II CASE READINGS | Case Digest
 FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA v. JUDICIAL BAR AND COUNCIL
(G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)
Facts: On September 18, 2012, Ferdinand R. Villanueva was appointed as the Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the
vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31,
Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur. On December
2013, JBC’s Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed him that he was not
included in the list of candidates for the said stations to which he responded seeking for
reconsideration and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature
examination. The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter dated
February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC En Banc.
However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the
JBC’s long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to,
among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years,
and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the
list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to the Court and argued, among others, that the
he JBC’s five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution.

Issues: Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.
Decision: Yes. The adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the
petitioner’s case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the
JBC. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the
JBC’s principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary
for appointment by the President. The assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should
have been published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes,
including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain
binding force and effect. JBC’s ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up
judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. The
Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as
it is based on reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the
applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid and constitutional

PHILAWSOPHIA: CHAPTER II CASE READINGS | Case Digest

 JUSTA G. GUIDO v. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, c/o FAUSTINO AGUILAR
(G.R. No. L-2089, October 31, 1949)
Facts: The petitioner, Justa G. Guido, filed a petition for prohibition to prevent the Eural
Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of First Instance of Rizal from
proceeding with the expropriation of his land, two adjoining lots, part commercial, with a
combined area of 22,655 square meters, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the
north Manila boundary, on the main street running from this city to the north. Four grounds are
adduced in support of the petition, among others, that the land sought to be expropriated is
commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539 which states
that the President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any interest therein,
through purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for
resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants
or occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are qualified
to acquire and own lands in the Philippines.
Issues: Whether the expropriation of Justa G. Guido’s land is in conformity to the principle of
Social Justice.
Decision: No. It does not conform to the social justice. It has been truly said that the assertion
of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to
another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is
claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with every just principle and fundamental
maxim of a free government. The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does
not supply paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress
Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion
division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are
equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between
values given and received, and equitable sharing of the social and material goods on the basis
of efforts exerted in their production. In the case at bar, it is understood that contracts, for the
sale by lots of the land sought to be expropriated to the present tenants of this herein petitioner,
have been executed. There is, therefore, not the slightest reason for the intervention of the
government in the premises.

PHILAWSOPHIA: CHAPTER II CASE READINGS | Case Digest

 PRYCE CORPORATION v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
(G.R. No. 172302, February 18, 2014)
Facts: A petition for corporate rehabilitation filed by petitioner Pryce Corporation on July 9, 2004
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138. The rehabilitation court found the petition
sufficient in form and substance and issued a stay order on July 13, 2004 appointing Gener T.
Mendoza as rehabilitation receiver. On September 13, 2004, the rehabilitation court gave due
course to the petition and directed the rehabilitation receiver to evaluate and give
recommendations on petitioner Pryce Corporation’s proposed rehabilitation plan attached to its
petition. The rehabilitation receiver did not approve this plan and submitted instead an amended
rehabilitation plan, which the rehabilitation court approved by order dated January 17, 2005. In
its disposition, the court found petitioner Pryce Corporation “eligible to be placed in a state of
corporate rehabilitation.” The disposition likewise identified the assets to be held and disposed
of by petitioner Pryce Corporation and the manner by which its liabilities shall be paid and
liquidated. The respondent China Banking Corporation elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals and contended that the rehabilitation plan’s approval impaired the obligations of
contracts.
Issues: Whether or not the rehabilitation plan is in violation of the constitutional proscription
against impairment of contractual obligations.
Decision: The rehabilitation plan did not violate the constitutional proscription against
impairment of contractual obligations. The non-impairment clause was designed to promote
commercial stability. At its core is “a prohibition of state interference with debtor-creditor
relationships.” Corporate rehabilitation is one of many statutorily provided remedies for
businesses that experience a downturn. Rather than leave the various creditors unprotected,
legislation now provides for an orderly procedure of equitably and fairly addressing their
concerns. Corporate rehabilitation allows a court-supervised process to rejuvenate a
corporation. Its twin, insolvency, provides for a system of liquidation and a procedure of
equitably settling various debts owed by an individual or a business. It provides a corporation’s
owners a sound chance to re-engage the market, hopefully with more vigor and enlightened
services, having learned from a painful experience. Rather than let struggling corporations slip
and vanish, the better option is to allow commercial courts to come in and apply the process for
corporate rehabilitation.

PHILAWSOPHIA: CHAPTER II CASE READINGS | Case Digest

 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. INTERPORT RESOURCES
CORPORATION, et al.
(G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008)
Facts: On August 6, 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of
Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). Under the Memorandum of Agreement, IRC
acquired 100% or the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI), which would
own and operate a 102 megawatt (MW) gas turbine power-generating barge. The agreement
also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with National
Power Corporation. On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine
Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI). PRCI owns 25.724 hectares of real estate property in Makati. Under
the Agreement, GHB, a member of the Westmont Group of Companies in Malaysia, shall
extend or arrange a loan required to pay for the proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI. - It is
alleged herein that a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent to the
Philippine Stock Exchange through facsimile and the SEC, but the facsimile machine of the
SEC could not receive it. However, the SEC received reports that the IRC failed to make timely
public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, heavily traded IRC
shares utilizing this material insider information. For this reason, the SEC required the directors
to appear before the SEC to explain the alleged failure to disclose material information as
required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. The SEC also found that the directors of
IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of the Revised Securities Act.
Respondents also contended that their right to due process was violated when the SEC
required them to appear before the SEC to show the cause why sanctions should not be
imposed upon them since such requirement shifted the burden of proof to respondents. The
case reached the CA and said court ruled in favor of the respondents and effectively enjoined
the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or administrative cases against respondents. In its
resolution, the CA stated that since there are no rules and regulations implementing the rules
regarding DISCLOSURE, INSIDERTRADING OR ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
REVISED SECURITIES ACT, and the SEC has no statutory authority to file any suit against
respondents.
Issues: Whether or not the SEC has authority to file suit against respondents for violations of
the RSA.
Decision: The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of
law where a reasonable construction that will support the law may be given. It is well
established that administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules and regulations to
confirm to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into
effect its general policies. The insider's misuse of nonpublic and undisclosed information is the
gravamen of illegal conduct. The intent of the law is the protection of investors against fraud,
committed when an insider, using secret information, takes advantage of an uninformed
investor. Insiders are obligated to disclose material information to the other party or abstain from
trading the shares of his corporation. When someone trades in the market with unfair advantage
in the form of highly valuable secret inside information, all other participants are defrauded. All
of the mechanisms become worthless. 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted to
promote full disclosure in the securities market and prevent unscrupulous individuals, who by
their positions obtain non-public information, from taking advantage of an uninformed public.

PHILAWSOPHIA: CHAPTER II CASE READINGS | Case Digest

 ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. No. 151258, December 1, 2014)
Facts: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
They were Caesar “Bogs” Asuncion, Samuel “Sam” Belleza, Bienvenido “Bien” Marquez III,
Roberto Francis “Bert” Navera, Geronimo “Randy” Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo “Lenny”
Villa (neophytes). On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members
of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to
Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also
an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter
were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their
initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their “briefing,” they were brought to
the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation. Even before
the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans
and as soon as reaching the compound, they receivedd physical blows. The neophytes were
then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan “initiation rites.” On the morning of their second
day—9 February 1991—the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play rough
basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles.
Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them
physically and psychologically. After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The
head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of
Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including
Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to “paddling” and to additional rounds of
physical pain. After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering
and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold,
some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a
sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the
hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Issues: Whether or not accused Dizon is guilty of homicide.
Decision: No. The Court cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill.
Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt of such intent. Instead, the Court adopts and reinstates the finding of the trial court in part,
insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill. Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice,
from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an

PHILAWSOPHIA: CHAPTER II CASE READINGS | Case Digest

inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. Here, the
threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.

PHILAWSOPHIA: CHAPTER II CASE READINGS | Case Digest