INSTITUTO POLITÉCNICO

NACIONAL
ESCUELA SUPERIOR DE INGENIERÍA
MECÁNICA Y ELÉCTRICA
“TICOMAN UNIT”

System 32, Landing Gear

SUBJECT: Aircraft Systems

PROFESSOR: Eng. Fernando Vázquez
Paniagua
GROUP: 6AV4
MEMBERS:
Gustavo Adrián Guijosa Maldonado
Abraham Jaimes Mackay
Raúl Eduardo Pérez Mendoza
Edy Fernando Roblero López
Rafael David Rubio Ramírez

JUNE 06, 2022.

LANDING GEAR CONTROL SYSTEM - LEVER ASSEMBLY

Purpose

The landing gear control lever assembly operates the landing

gear selector valve through the landing gear control cables.

Location

The landing gear control lever is on the P2 (panel 2) center forward panel

in the flight compartment.

Physical Description

The control lever assembly has these components:

* Control lever

* Position switch (4)

* Lock mechanism

* Lever lock solenoid.

Functional Description

The landing gear control lever has these three positions with detents:

* UP

* OFF

* DOWN.

You must first pull the control lever out before you can move the lever.

The lever operates a push-pull cable which moves the forward quadrant. You do not
adjust the push-pull cable. The forward quadrant is below the flight compartment
floor.

The control lever assembly has a lever lock mechanism operated by a lever lock
solenoid.

The lever lock prevents accidental movement of the landing gear lever to the up
position when the airplane is on the ground.

When the airplane takes off, the solenoid gets electrical power and retracts. This

turns the lever lock mechanism to the unlocked position. The landing gear control
lever assembly has four control lever position switches. Two down position switches
send signals when the lever moves to the down position. Two up position switches
send signals when the lever moves to the up position.

When you put the landing gear lever in the down position, the down position switches
move to the closed position. This sends signals to the landing gear position indication
and warning system.

The position indication system uses these signals to operate the red landing gear
position lights.

When you put the landing gear lever in the up position, the up position switches
move to the closed position. This sends signals to the antiskid system. The antiskid
system uses these signals to inhibit antiskid operation during gear retract braking.

Training Information Point

If the lever lock solenoid fails in the locked position, you can move the landing gear
control lever to the up position with the lever lock override trigger.

The trigger retracts the forward part of the control lever so it clears the lever lock
mechanism.
Nose Landing Gear Estructure

LANDING GEAR - DOWNLOCK PIN - NOSE LANDING GEAR

You install a downlock pin into the nose landing gear to make sure an outside force
does not unlock the nose landing gear. There is one nose landing gear downlock pin
for the nose landing gear. The nose landing gear downlock pin installs in the NLG
downlock pin hole.

AIR/GROUND SYSTEM - NOSE LANDING GEAR COMPRESSED SENSORS

Purpose

Two nose landing gear compressed sensors supply nose landing gear shock strut
compressed position signals to the air/ground system.

Physical Description

The landing gear compressed sensors are inductance type sensors. Each sensor
has a metal target and a sensor.

Location

The nose landing gear compressed sensors are on each side of the upper torsion
link where the link attaches to the outer cylinder of the nose landing gear. The targets
are on the lower area of the outer cylinder of the nose landing gear.

Functional Description

The targets are near the sensors when the nose landing gear shock strut
compresses and the airplane is on the ground. This sends signals to the air/ground
systems in the proximity switch electronics unit (PSEU) when the nose landing gear
is on the ground. The PSEU detects the change in sensor inductance and sets the
sensor status as target near. If the target is outside the sensing range, the status of
the sensor is set to target far. If the PSEU detects a failed sensor, the sensor status
is set to target far.
NOSE LANDING GEAR AND DOORS - GENERAL DESCRIPTION

• General

The nose landing gear absorbs landing forces and holds the forward part of the
airplane weight when the airplane makes a landing. The nose landing gear doors
open to permit gear operation. They close to aerodynamically seal the nose landing
gear wheel well.

• Shock Strut

The nose gear shock strut supports the nose of the airplane. The shock strut consists
of an outer and inner cylinder. The shock strut also has two centering cams, one in
the outer cylinder and one in the inner cylinder. The center cams hold the nose
wheels in a straight-line position for gear extension or retraction.

• Drag Strut

A drag strut holds the nose gear in the extended or retracted position. The drag strut
consists of an upper and lower link, hinged in the center. The drag strut folds about
the hinge during landing gear operation. The lower end of the lower drag strut
connects to the shock strut outer cylinder. The upper end of the upper drag strut
connects to the nose wheel well forward upper side wall structure.

• Lock Mechanism

A lock mechanism moves to an over-center position to lock the drag strut in the up
and the down positions. The lock mechanism also stabilizes the drag strut in the fore
and aft direction. The lock mechanism consists of two lock links, two springs, and a
lock actuator.

• Lock actuator

The lock actuator moves the lock mechanism to the locked position when the nose
landing gear is up or down.

• Nose Landing Gear Actuator

The nose landing gear actuator supplies the force to retract and extend the nose
landing gear.

• Gas and Oil Charging Valves

The shock strut uses hydraulic fluid and compressed dry air or nitrogen to control
the shock strut action. The gas charging valve lets you pressurize the shock strut.
The oil charging valve permits hydraulic servicing of the shock strut.

• Torsion Links

The torsion links prevent the inner shock strut from rotation in the outer shock strut
except when a steering force is applied. The torsion links consist of an upper and
lower link connected at the aft ends. The forward end of the upper link connects to
a steering collar on the outer shock strut. The forward end of the lower link connects
to the inner shock strut. Steering forces applied to the upper torsion link by the
steering system are transmitted to the inner cylinder by the lower link.

• Integral Axle

The main landing gear axle attaches to the bottom of the inner cylinder. You cannot
remove the axle if it gets damaged.

• Jack Pad

A jack pad on the bottom of the shock strut lets you move the inner cylinder up for
wheel and tire replacement.

• Tow Fitting

A tow fitting is between the nose landing gear tires.

• NLG Doors

Two doors aerodynamically seal the nose landing gear wheel well to decrease drag.
The doors attach to the outboard edges of the nose landing gear wheel well. The
doors connect to the shock strut and move mechanically when the nose landing gear
extends or retracts.

-LANDING GEAR CONTROL SYSTEM - GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Purpose

The landing gear control system controls the extension and retraction of the main
and nose landing gears. The landing gear control system also provides normal or
alternate hydraulic pressure to these systems:
* Main landing gear shimmy damper

* Gear retract brake system.

• Nose Wheel Steering

The pressure for nose wheel steering comes from the nose landing gear extension
pressure only. Hydraulic system A normally supplies pressure to the nose gear
steering through the landing gear control system. When you move the alternate nose
wheel steering switch to the alternate position, the landing gear transfer valve moves
to the alternate position. The landing gear transfer valve moves the pressure source
of the landing gear extension and retraction, and the nose wheel steering, from
hydraulic system A to hydraulic system B.

LANDING GEAR CONTROL SYSTEM - LEVER ASSEMBLY

Purpose

The landing gear control lever assembly operates the landing gear selector valve
through the landing gear control cables.

Location

The landing gear control lever is on the P2 center forward panel in the flight
compartment.
 Faults and accidents in system 32, of the Boeing 737

Nose Landing Gear

• Aloha Airlines Flight 243

Aloha Airlines Flight 243 was a scheduled flight
between Hilo Airport and Honolulu
International Airport, both in the Hawaiian
archipelago (United States), which upon
reaching cruising altitude on April 28, 1988,
suffered a decompression explosion that
caused part of the cabin roof to detach, forcing
the pilot to make an emergency landing at
Kahului Airport. The plane was a Boeing 737-
200 registered N73711 of the airline Aloha Airlines.
On April 28, 1988, a Boeing 737-200 registered as N73711 of Aloha Airlines, is about
to cover the route between Hilo Airport and Honolulu International Airport. At the
helm were Captain Robert Schornsteimer and co-pilot Madeleine Tompkins, one of
the few American female pilots licensed to fly commercial aircraft. The cabin crew
was made up of flight attendants: Jane Sato-Tomita, Michelle Honda and the cabin
manager, Clarabelle Lansing.
At 13:25 (HDT), the plane takes off with 95 passengers on board (90 passengers
and 5 crew members).
Upon reaching cruising altitude (24,000 ft-7,200 m), at 1:46 p.m., 20 minutes after
takeoff, the plane unexpectedly suffered an explosive decompression. The roof and
much of the side fuselage from the front to the wing section detaches leaving the
plane completely depressurized and a third of its passengers exposed to wind shear
and temperatures of -20ºC. The chief of cabin, Clarabelle Lansing, is ejected out of
the device in the act. The cockpit is only attached to the lower frames of the cargo
compartment and tilted slightly downwards, at any time it can detach due to the
strong tensions of what remains of the structure. Fortunately for the passengers, the
indication of fastened seat belts was still in force because they were in the ascent
maneuver and no passenger was ejected.
The pilot requests an emergency landing at the Kahului airport in Maui, an airport
located between mountains and where a very strong wind usually blows. The 737
maneuvers slowly, and any stress on the weakened structure can lead to
catastrophe.
Thirteen minutes after the accident, the Maui airport can be seen. Communications
are very difficult for cabin crew due to the wind, they are so far unaware of the extent
of the damage behind them. The descent is made at high speed since the plane's
controls are semi-locked.
When pulling out the nose landing gear, the pilot notices that the good working light
does not come on, the pilot fears and believes that he will have to land with the nose
to the ground, but the controller notices that the gear is fully deployed and tells you
all the landing gear is normal. At the time of landing the plane could collapse due to
the blow to the weakened structure.
The plane manages to land with all the passengers with whom it had taken off except
for the veteran stewardess Lansing, who was ejected when the roof fell off. The flight
attendant's body was never found.
Causes
An Aloha Airlines Boeing 737-200, similar to
the crashed plane.
After a lengthy investigation, it was determined
that the cause of the incident was due to metal
fatigue, similar to that which occurred on the de
Havilland Comet.
The aircraft had been in operation for 20 years,
one of the most accepted hypotheses as to the cause of the accident was that the
737 involved had a history of unusual vibrations that were generated when taking
off, with a lot of engine noise. Because in each takeoff and landing cycle the aircraft
is pressurized and depressurized respectively, the fuselage acts as a kind of metal
balloon that expands and contracts. From the factory, the plane came with a hull
useful life calculated by the manufacturer at around 75,000
pressurization/depressurization cycles, or, what is the same, 75,000 flights, since in
each flight the plane has to be pressurized and in each flight there is a
pressurization/flight/depressurization cycle: it was found that this aircraft had made
89,680 flights.
This excess of flight cycles and pressurization/depressurization has probably been
creating fractures in the upper panels of the forward section of the 737, due to a
phenomenon known as "metal fatigue" (for more information see the article Material
Fatigue) that led to the visible break. In addition, a passenger stated, in the
investigation that was carried out, that she saw, before boarding, what she believed
was a break in the plane's surface near the entrance door. Signs of corrosion were
also found in the area of the joints of the aluminum plates that make up the hull of
the aircraft, which, although they are assembled with a special adhesive in addition
to the visible rivets, the corrosion between the plates and the adhesive weakened
the union. , leaving all the work of keeping the structure together to the rivets, due to
the climate of the area where the device operated. This chain of events probably
weakened the structure in some part of the forward section causing the accident
when the cabin was pressurized.

• Southwest Airlines Flight 345

Southwest Airlines Flight 345 was a scheduled passenger

flight from Nashville International Airport in Tennessee to
LaGuardia Airport in New York City, United States. On
July 22, 2013, a Boeing 737 - 700 operating on the route
suffered a front landing gear collapse during landing at
LaGuardia Airport; there were no casualties, nine people
were injured. The plane, which at the time had an
estimated value of $15.5 million, was scrapped as a result of the accident.
The aircraft involved was a Boeing 737-7H4, make N753SW, serial number 29848,
line number 400. It first flew on October 6, 1999 and was delivered to Southwest
Airlines the same month. It was powered by 2 cfmi CFM56 - 7B22 turbofan engines.
At the time of the accident, the aircraft was nearly fourteen years old and had
accumulated 49,536 flight hours.
The commander of Flight 345 had been flying for Southwest Airlines for almost 13
years, six years as a commander. At the time of the accident, he had accumulated
a total of 12,000 flight hours, including 2,600 hours as Boeing 737 commander. The
first officer had 20 years of previous experience in the United States Air Force and
had been hired by Southwest Airlines a year and a half before the accident.
The plane landed on runway 4 nose landing gear first and main landing gear second.
The forward section of the landing gear collapsed upwards into the body of the
aircraft, causing substantial damage to the electronics housing in the fuselage. The
plane continued for 663 meters along the runway, then stopped midway after
skidding on its nose in a sea of sparks. As a result of the accident, the airport was
closed until its rescue resources were available again. Two hours later, the other
lane was reopened to traffic. The airport cleared and inspected the runway and
removed the aircraft in time for the first departures the following day. Nine occupants
were treated for minor injuries, all of them sustained during the evacuation, six of
whom were taken to local hospitals.
Causes

Metallurgy The NTSB Materials Laboratory examined

fractured pieces of the nose landing gear left axle and
three fractured pieces of the nose landing gear lower
drag brace bolt. The examination of the components
revealed the fracture surfaces were consistent with an
overstress fracture and no preexisting defects were
observed. A hardness test of the axle and of the drag
brace disclosed that all hardness values were within the limits of the material
specification. Operational Trends for Go-Arounds and Missed Approaches Accident
data suggest that pilots often fail to perform a go-around or missed approach when
stabilized approach criteria are not met. A 1998 review of NTSB-investigated
accidents by human factors researchers found that about 75% of accidents were the
result of plan continuation errors in which the crew continued an approach despite
cues that suggested it should not be continued. Additionally, line operations safety
audit data presented at the International Air Safety Summit in 2011 suggested that
97% of unstabilized approaches were continued to landing even though doing so
was in violation of companies' standard operating procedures.

Main Landing Gear

This Report is a technical document that reflects the opinion of the Aviation Accident
Investigation Commission of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, in
relation to the circumstances in which the event occurred.
The Operational Safety Recommendations, resulting from the technical process of
the investigation, they are not intended to generate presumption of guilt or
responsibility and have been carried out in compliance with the provisions of the Civil
Aeronautics Law 27261 and its Regulations.

Description

On March 28, 2017, the Boeing B-737-3M8 aircraft with registration OB-2036-P
operated by Cía. PERUVIAN AIR LINE SAC, after making contact on Runway 31 of
the "Francisco Carlé" Airport in Jauja, suffered a collapse of the right main gear, the
aircraft leaned and rested on the No. 2 engine, sliding until it left the runway , entering
a drainage ditch where the right engine became detached from its mounting and
spilled fuel that later ignited and reached the stopped aircraft.

No serious injuries were reported among the occupants of the aircraft, but there were
the total destruction of it due to fire.
The investigation established that the mechanical components of the «SHIMMY
DAMPER - SD» damping system; were outside the tolerance range, which
prevented the correct damping of the vibrations and lateral oscillations of the wheels,
generating a “SHIMMY” event, which led to the collapse and breakage of the main
landing gear of the aircraft.

Flight Background
After making a normal flight, the aircraft began the approach in good weather
conditions to Runway 31 at Jauja. That day, according to NOTAM CO510/17,
maintenance work was being carried out on the runway and only the right side was
enabled, a situation also reminded the aircraft crew by the Control Tower operator.

The landing at the Jauja airport was carried out by the First Officer, who was in the
training/qualification stage to operate in high-altitude fields; after the contact of the
main landing gear and after 2 seconds of positioning the nose gear on the runway,
almost simultaneously with the activation of reverse, the crew felt strong vibrations
and oscillations accompanied by pitching up and down, bouncing a couple more
times in an uncontrolled manner and after a loud noise, the right main landing gear
collapsed.

The crew was unable to maintain directional control of the aircraft because the
wheels of the left main landing gear and the No. 2 engine moved off the runway on
the right side.
The engine entered a drainage channel that caused it to detach from the wing
embedment and consequently the fuel spill that ignited and reached the stopped
aircraft.

The technical crew heard a loud explosion and saw smoke and fire from the right
side windows.
The pilot activated the three “Engine Fire” switches simultaneously and ordered the
evacuation of the aircraft on the left side, at the same time ordering the co-pilot to
leave the cockpit, as he entered large amount of smoke.
The crew proceeded with the emergency evacuation, using the inflatable ramps on
the left side. No injuries were recorded among the occupants of the aircraft, but its
total destruction was recorded as a result of the fire.

Aircraft Damage
During the landing run, wheel No. 4 of the Right Main Gear came off, the gearbox of
Engine No. 2 came off, Engine No. 2 came off, fuel spilled and fire, which after
approximately 45 minutes, it completely consumed the aircraft.
BACKGROUND
a) The SD is installed in the «APEX JOINT» and it is understood that it is intended
to hydraulically dampen the resonant oscillations in the MLG that could lead to
to a "SHIMMY" event. Periodic adjustments are required to compensate for normal
wear and to prevent excessive looseness in the APEX JOINT.
b) TLs fracture by ductile overload through the two largest lightening holes. In some
cases, the SD also fractures.
c) An investigation of several fractures determined that excessive play was present
in the APEX JOINT, rendering the SD ineffective. In some other cases, the
investigation determined that the "SHIMMY" event was caused by insufficient
bleeding of the SD after it or the MLG was installed, reducing its effectiveness. The
loss of damping by the SD resulted in overloads of the TL that exceeded their design,
followed by a type of ductile fracture (type of fracture that occurs after intense plastic
deformation and is characterized by a slow propagation of the initial crack). ).
d) Adequate damping can be affected by excessive wear or inadequate «APEX
WASHER», which help to transfer torsional energy to the SD axis so that it dissipates
it. If not within design tolerances, due to Free Play, energy transfer to the SD can be
inhibited, resulting in dynamic forces that can escalate to the occurrence of a
"SHIMMY" event.
e) The Rear Terminals of the UPPER and LOWER TL and their connections with the
Cylinder and Pistons, are subject to wear on the internal diameters and the faces of
the «BUSHING» flanges. Regular maintenance is required to ensure that TL joints
or connections remain within serviceable wear limits and MLG torsional free play is
within limits.
EXAM DETAILS
1) They were received for examination as indicated in figure 1 on the next page.
2) The lower TLs of each MLG fractured at similar locations, and their respective
Front terminals were missing.
3) Regarding the SUPERIOR TL of the MLG-RH:
a. Views are presented in Figures 2 and 3. The “DAMPER” portion of the assembly
SD was connected to its Front Terminal as indicated in figure 2. The «BUSHING» in
the Rear Terminals were shifted towards the interior, leaving «GAPs» between the
Tabs of the «BUSHING» and the faces of the Rear Terminals, as shown in figure 3.
b. The compensator portion of the SD of the MLG-RH was fractured from the
"DAMPER" and mostly lost. A small piece of housing compensator remained
connected to the SD housing. The piece of fractured compensator housing and
connecting bolt had rough/coarse features, consistent with Stress Fracture. c. The
«SD PISTON» was fractured, as shown in figure 4 and the piston coupling was lost.
The surface had characteristics consistent with stress fracture.
4) Regarding the LOWER TL of the MLG-RH:
a. Figure 5 shows a global view and Figure 6 shows the fractured surfaces. Was
fractured in his arms, intersecting the hole largest in triangular frame. The arms were
bent, close to the fractures as presented in figure 7 and the fractured surfaces were
on inclined planes, features consistent with overstress fracture under torsional and
bending loads.
b. The «BUSHING» in their Rear Terminals were displaced internally, leaving
«GAPs» between the Tabs of the «BUSHING» and the faces of the Rear Terminals,
as shown in figure 8. The sizes of the «GAPs» were smaller compared to those
observed in the UPPER TL of figure 3.
5) Regarding the SUPERIOR TL of the MLG-LH:
a. As shown in figure 9, the paint was lost or flaking in many of its areas. Its Front
Terminal was twisted in the direction counterclockwise in relation to its Rear
Terminal. His arms were folded and cracked. Deformation was found adjacent to the
cracked arms, consistent with over-stress fracture under torsional and bending
loads. None «GAP» was observed between the «BUSHING» Tabs and the internal
faces of the rear terminals.
b. The SD was lost, from the Front Terminal of the SUPERIOR TL. A piece of a
connecting bolt was retained within one of the holes in the TL. The internal terminal
of the bolt was fractured in the unthreaded portion of the stem and had fracture
characteristics consistent with Stress Fracture.
6) Regarding the LOWER TL of the MLG-LH:
In the upper image of figure 10 a complete view is presented and in the image Below
is a view of the fractured surfaces. this one was fractured in his arms intersecting the
largest hole in the triangular frame. The total deformation and fracture patterns were
consistent with overstress fracture under torsional and bending loads. None of the
«GAPs» were observed between the Tabs of the «BUSHING» and the internal faces
of the Terminals Later.
"SHIMMY" event
The following photograph shows the tracks left by the wheels of the two main landing
gears, right and left, on the asphalt of the Jauja airport runway, showing the
characteristics of a "SHIMMY" event. in each train, and that were not damped by the
respective SD. This undamped dynamic energy produced a torsion and bending
mechanism, initially in the MLG-RH and later in the MLG-LH, causing the TL to
break, respectively.

"SHIMMY" event
The "sensitive" mechanical components in each MLG, which affect the occurrence
of the MLG «SHIMMY» event, if they have fracture or wear, looseness and
tightening, out of tolerance, are:
1) The «APEX JOINT» made up of: the SD as a central component, and the «APEX
WASHER», «SPHERICAL SHAPED BUSHING», «APEX NUT» as complementary
mechanical components;
2) The UPPER TL and the LOWER TL that join in the «APEX JOINT»;
3) The 02 «BUSHING» of the Rear Terminals of the LOWER TL, and the 02
«BUSHING» of the Piston Terminals, where the LOWER TL is connected;
4) The 02 «BUSHING» of the Rear Terminals of the UPPER TL, and the 02
«BUSHING» of the Cylinder Terminals, where the UPPER TL is connected.
To reduce the probability of occurrence of an MLG «SHIMMY» event, “Boeing
Company” issued SL 737-SL-32-057-E “FRACTURES in LOWER TL”, which
proposes recommendations for inspection and correction of “sensitive” mechanical
parts ”.
CAUSE
Failure of the mechanical components of the «SHIMMY DAMPER - SD» damping
system in each of the main landing gear of the aircraft B737-3M8, registration OB-
2036P, being outside the tolerance range, did not allow the correct damping of the
vibrations and lateral oscillations of the wheels, generating sequential "SHIMMY"
events in both trains, which led to their collapse and breakage, while landing at the
Francisco Carlé de Jauja Airport.