SEER, Vol. LV, No. 3, July 1977.

The Balkans as a Factor in

German Foreign Policy,
I9I2_ I9I
R. J. CRAMPTON

To have to accept a simple explanation for a problem previously

regarded as impenetrablycomplex was the most audacious and exact-
ing of the adjustmentsdemanded by ProfessorFischer's re-interpre-
tation of the origins of the First World War. No longer was the
historian required painstakingly to reveal the process by which
Europe's international order collapsed under the weight of its inner
contradictions, he could merely delineate Germany's deliberate
subversion of that order. The quintessence of this change was in
Fischer's designation of the War Council of 8 December I912 as the
point at which Germany's rulers decided to induce the war they
regarded as inevitable.' No longer was it relevant to consider Kaiser
Wilhelm at Doorn mixing prophecy and wistful reminiscence by
declaring, 'It will all run away from him [Hitler] as it ran away
from me',2 for events were now explained by Wilhelm's calculated
decision to fight before the balance of power shifted even more to
the advantage of Germany's opponents.
Since ProfessorFischer's findings were first published additional
documentary evidence for his views has come to light and, though
his case is not yet proved to the satisfaction of all, there would be
few who would disagree that 'The interpretation of these newly
discovereddocumentson the "war council" of December I912 is now
central to the entire controversy on the origins of the War'.3 Along
with the study of new documentation on the motivation for German
policy must go a reconsideration of the implementation of that
R. J. Crampton is a Lecturer in History at the University of Kent.
1 For Fischer's discussion of the War Council of 8 December i9I2, see Fritz Fischer,
KriegderIllusionen: Die deutschePolitikvonI9 Ibis 1914, Dusseldorf,1969, pp. 232-41; see
also J. C. G. Rohl, 'Admiral von Muller and the Approach of War, 19I I-l 914' (The
Historicaljournal, xii, 4, London, I969, pp. 651-73, see pp. 660-4, 672).
2 James Joll, I914, the UnspokenAssumptions,Stevenson Inaugural Lecture, London,
I969; also printed in H. W. Koch, ed., The Originsof theFirst World War; Great Power
Rivalryand GermanWar Aims, London, 1972, pp. 307-28, quoted on p. 308.
3 J. C. G. Rohl, ed., 19r4: Delusionor Design? London, 1973, p. 30. In his introduction
to this work Dr Rohi provides a masterly summary of the recent evidence in support of
Professor Fischer's thesis. The main body of the book reproduces newly discovered docu-
ments by Prince Lichnowsky, German ambassador in London, 1912-1914, and cor-
respondence between a former German ambassador in Vienna, Prince zu Eulenbuirg-
Hertfeld, and Professor Kurt Breysig.

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 BALKANS IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 37I

policy; it is the intention of this article to re-examine, in the new

light recent research has thrown on the motives of German foreign
policy in the period 19I2 to 1914, German policy in the Balkans
and the significanceof this policy with regard to Germany'srelations
with Britain and Austria-Hungary.
ProfessorFischer ascribesto Germany'sBalkan policy a particular
strategic purpose. After 8 December the German Chancellor, von
Bethmann Hollweg, had, Professor Fischer argues, accepted the
necessity of war but only if Britain were to remain neutral:
Principally,however,-and this, as before, was the most important
axiom in Bethmann Hollweg's foreign policy-the Chancellorwas
anxiousto convincethe Emperorthat Germanycouldwagecontinental
war only if Britainremainedneutraland, despitewhat Greyand Hal-
dane had said, this neutrality could be achieved if Germany and
Britainwere to co-operatesincerelyin the ambassadors'conferencein
London.4
In the Londonambassadorialreunions,therefore,'... the German
government was following a clear-cut policy; co-operation with
Britain was another attempt to prove Germany's love of peace to
the power which she hoped to prize away from the Triple Entente'.5
The ground was already well-prepared. Since the failure of the
Haldane mission both London and Berlin, for differing reasons, had
been increasingly anxious to find points upon which they could
agree and be seen to agree.6 The Portuguese colonies provided one
possibility but despite 'rapid progress'7in the spring of I9I2 agree-
ment here could be reached only slowly and the consequenceswould
hardly be dramatic. The Balkan crisis of I 9I 2 was a different matter.
Here greater issues were at stake, for if Britain and Germany failed
4 Fischer, Krieg, p. 236: 'In erster Linie jedoch-und das war nach wie vor der wich-
tigste Grundsatz der Bethmann Hollwegschen Aussenpolitik-war der Kanzler bemuht,
den Kaiser davon zu uberzeugen, dass der kontinentale Krieg von Deutschland nur
gefuhrt werden konne, wenn England neutral bliebe, und dass trotz der Eroffnungen
Haldanes und Greys diese Neutralitiit zu erreichen sein wiirde, wenn Deutschland und
England auf der Londoner Botschafterkonferenz vertrauensvoll zusammenarbeiten
wurden.' Both Grey and Haldane had made recent references to the fact that Britain
would come to the aid of France if she was in danger of being defeated by Germany for
such a defeat would affect the balance of power too much to the disadvantage of Britain.
5 ibid., p. 250: '. . . die deutsche Regierung auf der Londoner Konferenz eine ziel-
bewusste Politik getrieben hat: Das Zusammenspiel mit England war ein neuer Versuch,
die deutsche Friedensliebe jener Macht zu demonstrieren, die man aus der Triple-
Entente herauszulosen hoffte.'
6 M. L. Dockrill, 'The Formulation of a Continental Foreign Policy by Great Britain,
I908-I9I2' (Ph.D. thesis, London University, I969, p. 393). For backbench pressure on
Grey, see j. A. Murray, 'Foreign Policy debated; Sir Edward Grey and his Critics, I9I I-
1912', in L. P. Wallace and W. C. Askew, eds, Power, Public Opinionand Diplomacy:
Essays in Honourof Eber MalcolmCarroll,Durham N.C., 1959.
7 P. H. S. Hatton, 'Britain and Germany in 1914. The July Crisis and War Aims' (Past
and Present,no. 36, Oxford, April I967, p. I43). For a more exhaustive account of the
discussions on the Portuguese colonies see R. T. B. Langhorne, 'Anglo-German Nego-
tiations concerning the Future of the Portuguese Colonies, 19II-I9I4' (The Historical
journal, XVi, 2, 1973, pp. 36i-87).

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 372 R. J. CRAMPTON
to agree to restrain their friends and allies this could easily be the
prelude to a European war in which Berlin could scarcely hope for
British neutrality even in the critical initial stages of that war;"
on the other hand, co-operation between the two powers could be
the deusex machinawhich saved Europe from, at the very least, an
Austro-Russian clash. What better way could there be of proving
to London the value of Germany rather than the Franco-Russian
alliance as a co-guarantorof European stability? And so it was that
despite the collapse of Turkish power in Europe and in spite of
partial mobilization by Austria and Russia, Britain and Germany
co-operated successfullyto bring about the ambassadors'conference
in London as the medium through which the powers would settle
those of the questions raised by the Turkish collapse which the
powers considered to be of European rather than purely Balkan
significance.9
The improvement in the atmosphere in which Anglo-German
relations were conducted was immediate and startling. By November
the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was working so
closely with the Germans on the Balkan problem that he would not
make any step without it first being approved in Berlin10and in a
private letter he admitted: 'The Germansseem to me to desire peace
and not to be making mischief';11 when Prince Lichnowsky,the new
German ambassador in London, arrived to take up his duties he
was pleasantly surprised by the warmth of his reception and by
Grey's 'straightforwardand frank character'.'2Even more surprising
was that the press in both countries was uncharacteristically re-
strained in its comments upon the other nation. In October the
British embassy in Berlin had discerned a distinctly more favourable
attitude towards Britainin the Germanpress,'3whilst in the following
month the German embassy in London reported with satisfaction
that British newspapers, unlike those in France, were not gloating
over Turkey's military reverses and interpreting them as defeats for
8 For the argument that it was chiefly for neutrality in the initial stages of the war that
Bethmann was aiming, see WolfgangJ. Mommsen, 'Domestic Factors in German Foreign
Policy before I914' (CentralEuropeanHistoryVI, i, Atlanta, Georgia, 1973, pp. 3-43).
9 For the diplomatic history of the Balkan wars see E. C. Helmreich, 7he Diplomacy
of the Balkan Wars, i92-I1913, Cambridge, Mass., 1938. For further details on the origins
of the ambassadorial conference and for British and German co-operation in producing
it, see the present author's 'The Diplomatic Relations between Great Britain and Ger-
many in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean from the Crisis of Agadir to the Murder
at Sarajevo'(Ph.D. thesis,LondonUniversity, I971, pp. 92-153).
10 G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, British Documentson the Origins of the War,
1898-I914, London, 1926-38, vol. IX, part ii, no. 297 (hereafter called BD).
11 London, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers 800/63, Grey MSS (hereafter
called FO Grey): Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen, British ambassador in Berlin,
private, 7 November 1912.
12 Rbhl, 1914, p- 43.
13 FO 371/1501, no. 443: Granville, British charge d'affaires in Berlin, to Grey, 14
October i912.

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 BALKANS IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 373
German munitions.14At the end of the year the German military
attache in London compared Anglo-German relations at the end of
I9II and I9I2: 'Today things are completely different. Diplomatic
co-operation between the [two] powers to bring about peace ... has
already borne fruit and perhaps will yield yet more ...'.15 There
was a widespread and understandable optimism in the Wilhelm-
strasseand, with Grey unwilling to do anything in the Balkanswith-
out first securing Berlin's approval, the German Secretary of State,
von Kiderlen-Wachter, believed he had the British 'eating out of his
hand'.'6 Kiderlen died at the end of December I9I2 but this did not
impair the detente, for in London his successor, von Jagow, was
well thought of"7 and in Berlin it still seemed that Grey would not
relinquish his close co-operation with Lichnowsky-indeed, Admiral
von Muller, the chief of the Imperial German Naval Cabinet, had
the impression that Grey 'does nothing without first speaking to him
[Lichnowsky]'.18
How, then, did Berlin use this exceptionally favourable opportun-
ity to prove to Britain the value of co-operation with Germany? In
fact, despite the supposed decisions of 8 December and Bethmann's
reaction to them with regard to British neutrality, by March 19I3
Germany was clearly less willing than in December I9I2 to co-
operate with Britain in Balkan affairs and within the London am-
bassadors' conference. The first significant act of the German
government in the conference was to demand of a reluctant Lich-
nowsky that he support his Austrian colleague, Count Mensdorf, in
the ambassadorial meetings.'9 Lichnowsky's hands were not, how-
ever, completely tied and he was still able both to work quietly with

14 Public Record Office and Foreign Office Library, German Foreign Office Micro-
film, GFM (hereafter called GFM) IO/44I, no. Io67, I8 November 19I2 and no. I079,
20 November I912: von Kiihlmann, counsellor at the German embassy in London, to
Bethmann.
15 GFM io/ 96: Report by Major Ostertag, 3I December, 1912: 'Ganz anders heute.
Das diplomatisches Zusammengehen der Machte zur Herbeifuhrung des Friedens hat
bereits ... Fruchte gezeigt und wird vielleicht bessere Fruchte tragen....'
16 Ernst Jackh, Kiderlen- Wachterder Staatsmannund Mensch,2 vols., Berlin and Leipzig,
1925, ii, p. I62. '[Jetzt sind die Englander so zahm], dass sie mir aus der Hand fressen.'
17 Grey told the British ambassador in Rome, wherejagow was then serving as German
ambassador: 'Everything I have heard from you makes me welcome this appointment'.
FO Grey, 800/64, Grey to Rodd, private, 6 January, 1913. A week later Grey noted: 'If
only we could have ten years of a man like Jagow to deal with, really controlling the
policy of Germany, we would be on intimate terms with her at the end of the time, and
on increasingly good terms all through it.' BD, X, ii, no. 455.
18 See Rohl, 'Admiral von Muller' p. 666. Admiral von Muller spoke of Grey 'der
nichts tue ohne ihn [Lichnowsky] vorher zu sprechen'.
19 See Johannes Lespius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme,
eds, Die GrossePolitik der europaischenKabinette, i871-I914, Sammlung der diplomatischen
Aktendes AuswartigenAmtes,40 vols., Berlin, 192 I-7, vol. XXXIV, part i, no. 12526 (here-
after called GP). See also Rohl, I914, p. 88 and for Lichnowsky's strained relations with
the Wilhelmstrasse, see Edward F. Willis, PrinceLichnowsky,Ambasssador of Peace,Berkeley,
California, 1942, pp. 81-I77.

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374 R. J. CRAMPTON
Grey20and to press upon his own political masters the necessity of
urging Austria to make concessionsover the Albanian frontier. This
case the ambassadorhad pleaded in his first despatch from London21
and in the beginning of I9I3 Lichnowsky held to this standpoint.
He was not without success. Serious discussion on the Albanian
border could not begin until the ambassadorialreunion of 22 January,
for until then there was no sign of any hope that such discussions
could be fruitful and Grey, as chairman of the meetings, would not
permit discussions that were pointless.22 Russia's admission that
Montenegro need not have Scutari had, however, opened the way
to negotiations, though St Petersburgwould naturally be expecting
compensating concessions from Austria; before the meeting, there-
fore, Grey approached Lichnowsky and requested that Berlin exer-
cise a moderating influence in Vienna.23Such influence was exerted.
Bethmann Hollweg told the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in
Berlin, Count Szogyenyi, that though he did not take seriously
Russia's claim that Serbia should be given Ipek, Prisrend and
Djakova, he was also sure that Austria would not follow a Prestige-
politik and 'would be satisfied with her successes on the Adriatic
coast and in the question of Albanian autonomy'.24The following
day, 2I January, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold,
announced that Austria would allow Serbia possessionof Ipek and
its environs, including the Orthodox monastery of Visoki Decani,
even though the latter was in an entirely Albanian area.25
These concessionswere encouraging, but Austria remained adam-
ant on the question of Scutari and the surrounding lake and plain.
Russia had already conceded that the town should not be given to
the Montenegrins, even if their present siege of it were successfully
concluded, yet St Petersburg was demanding that the plain and
lake, which the Austrians had suggested should be drained, pass
into Slav occupation. By the end of January both Jagow and the
Kaiser had urged Austria to give way on these points,26but in vain.
The Germans now pressed for smaller concessions. Lichnowsky
having reported that agreement on the Albanian frontiers was un-
likely, Szogyenyi was told that perhaps the situation could be eased
20
GP, XXXIV, i, 12738, 12748, I2763; FO 37I/1758. Grey to Buchanan, no. 45,
27 January, I 913.
21 Rohl, 1914, p. 43-
22 BD, IX, ii, no. 426.
23 ibid., no. 520.
24 Ludwig
Bittner, A. F. Pribram, Heinrich Srbik, and Hans Uebersberger, eds,
Oesterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitikvon der bosnischenKrise 1909 bis zum Kriegsausbruch
I94, 9
vols., Vienna and Leipzig, 1930 (hereafter called OeU), vol. V, no. 5454: '. . . sich mit
dem Erfolg in der Adria und in der albanesischen Autonomiefrage zufrieden stellen
werden.'
25 ibid., no. 5472.
26 ibid., nos. 5540 and 5604.

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 BALKANS IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 375
if more concessions were made by Austria. Berchtold ruled out the
cession of Djakova to Serbia but did allow that the Hoti, Gruda and
Benusi tribes be included in Montenegro but, he added, these
concessions were the last that Austria was prepared to make and
were being made 'solely through especial considerationof Germany's
wishes'.27Berchtold was clearly annoyed and on 7 February he
informed Austria's ambassadors abroad that the latest agreement
was a compromise and not a concession which could be indefinitely
extended; if the other powers did not now accept Austria'sdemands
over Albania, she would revoke the compromise and revert to her
original demands.28
This is an important development. The Germans had been told
expressly by Berchtold that the Austrians, despite the best of in-
tentions, would not be in a position to go any further along the road
of compromise.29Had Berchtold's words been taken literally in
Berlin the policy of co-operating with Britain to impose restraint on
Russia and Austria would have disappeared and with it any real
chance of seducing Britain from her relationship with Russia and
France. This Bethmann and Jagow would not allow. Zimmermann,
the under-secretaryof state at the foreign office in Berlin, was soon
pressingfor yet another small concessionfrom Austria.30A week later
Jagow and Bethmann buttressed a similar request with a more
general argument; Grey had recently once again expressed his
satisfaction at the results Anglo-German co-operation had yielded
but if Austria could not now cede to the Slavs the insignificant town
of Dibra Grey would be deeply disappointed and Vienna's intransi-
gence would only have
made it difficultfor him [Grey] to carry out his policy of mediation
which has been so satisfactoryfor the interestsof the Triple Alliance.
Thus it would be very welcomeif CountBerchtoldcould commithim-
self in this exceptionalcase to the cessionof Dibra to Serbia.3'
Four days later Berchtold made the requested concession.32It was,
said a contented Wilhelmstrasse,all that could be reasonably asked
or expected of Austria.33
From this point real German pressure on Austria ceased. Berlin
27 ibid., nos. 5640 and 5664: ... . allein aus besonderer Rucksichtsnahme auf den
Wunsch Deutschlands....'
28 ibid., no. 5712.
29 ibid., no. 5664.
30 ibid., no. 5792.
31 ibid., no. 5841, GP,
XXXIV, i, I2862: '... ihm die Durchfuhrung seiner im Interesse
des Dreibundes erfreulichen Vermittlungspolitik erschweren. Sehr zu begrussen ware es
daher, wenn Graf Berchtold sich ausserstenfallszur Teilung Dibras an Serbien entschliessen
konnte.'
32 OeU, V, no. 5841-
33 ibid., nos. 5898 and 5899.

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 376 R. J. CRAMPTON

continued to pass on schemes and plans hatched in London for a

solution to the question of the Albanian borders and by the end of
March agreement had been reached, Russia making an unequivocal
and public declaration that Montenegro would never have Scutari,
even if the siege were carried, and Austria finally relinquishing
Djakova to the Serbs.34 But the Ballhausplatz did not concede
Djakova under duress or pressure from Germany-as had been the
case with Dibra-for Berlin had merely relayed views and pointed
to the political advantages of a settlement, and the tone of the
German notes to Vienna had none of the urgency of those before
the cession of Dibra.35 Nor did the Wilhelmstrasse keep from Britain
the fact that it was no longer bringing pressure to bear on Vienna.
It had been known in London that Bethmann had never enjoyed
'the job of talking to Austria'36 and Grey accepted with silent
resignation Jagow's declaration that '. . . he [Jagow] had gone as far
with Austria as he possibly could ... [and] that, anxious as he was
for a settlement, he could not undertake to advise Austria to give
way any further. All he could do was to communicate your views
to the Austrian government'.37 Privately London was informed that
Jagow was 'very firm about not giving any advice at Vienna. His
position was, he told me, that it took him all he knew to extract
Dibra ... another turn of the screw might be resented'.38
That Germany had simply ceased to operate her part of the
original co-operative contract was not yet realized either in London
or in Berlin, and the Djakova settlement at the end of March main-
tained the illusion that Anglo-German collaboration was continuing
unimpaired. Grey's tireless efforts to guide the ambassadors towards
a peaceful solution of the Balkan crisis were praised by all, even
Nicolson,39 and when responding to kind words from Bethmann
34 Grey recaptures picturesquely the excitement and relief with which the news of the
cession of Djakova was relayed and received: 'One morning a message was brought to
me, at my house in London, that the Austrian Ambassador wanted to see me on an
urgent matter; I sent back a message asking him to come to my house at once. In a few
minutes Mensdorff arrived. The room in the house that I occupied then was small; on a
table in the middle stood daffodils and other spring flowers sent to me from Fallodon and
placed in tall glasses of water. Mensdorff entered briskly, even a little breathless with
haste, delighted with the good news he brought and exclaiming, 'We give up Djakova!'
As he bustled quickly into the room, his full-skirted frock-coat, swaying as it passed the
flower-table, brushed the heads of some daffodils; the resentful daffodils tilted their glass and
emptied the water down the skirtsof Mensdorff's coat. Some perturbation ensued; I fetched
a towel and swathed the coat as best I could. Then we fraternized over Djakova.' Viscount
Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Fiverears, i892-i9i6, 2 vols., London, 1925, 1, pp. 268-9.
35 OeU, V, nos. 5874, 6024, 6I95 and 62I2.
36 FO Grey, 8oo/62, Goschen to Grey, private, i 8 January I 913.
37 BD, IX, ii, no. 648, Goschen to Grey, Tel. 40, 22 February 1913. See also ibid.,
nos. 65o and 65s.
38 Public Record Office, Carnock MSS, FO 800/363 (hereafter called FO Carnock):
Goschen to Sir Arthur Nicolson, permanent under-secretary of state at the Foreign
Office,private, I March I913.
39 FO Carnock 800/362, Nicolson to Sir Charles Hardinge, viceroy and governor-
general of India, 9 January 1913: Nicolson noted of Grey, 'He is carrying on these

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 BALKANS IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 377
Grey remarked that: 'It was a great encouragement that the
Chancellor appreciates [my] efforts for European agreement and
co-operates Bethmann, too, did not see that by April
so cordially'.40
German co-operation was on a less stable base and he did not realize
therefore that the long term objectives which such co-operation was
to achieve were thereby endangered; in January he had declared
that Anglo-German co-operation in the Balkans 'had been most
useful and advantageous, and as a starting point for future good
relations between the two countries it was worth more than any
Naval Agreement or political understanding'.4'His views remained
remarkably and unjustifiably constant. In February, he explained
to Berchtold that the Balkanswere all important as they could bring
about a change in British policy for, he believed, the Triple Entente
had reached a high point and henceforth Britain would experience
the law of diminishing returns in her relations with France and
Russia unless the threat of war drove the three powers together
again ;42 and when, at the end of March, he prepared a brief for
use in the Reichstag Budget Commission his objectives were clearly
unchanged; he noted:
I would like just once more to establish that the improvementin
Anglo-Germanrelations,to which I can testify,is for the momentstill
not beingreflectedin tangibleresults.It is a questionof the firstbegin-
ningsof a developmentwhich,if it is not to be stifled,will need careful
tending.43
This draft statement could certainly be interpreted as a vague
confirmation-and the Reichstag Budget Commission would be
given nothing more than vague hints on such a matter-of Germany's
intent to co-operate with Britain in the Balkansand so to detach her
Ambassadorial meetings very skilfully and firmly, and has shown gifts which I confess I
did not think he possessed'. In I9I5 Lichnowsky recalled that in the search for a com-
promise over the Albanian borders 'the decisive factor was Sir E. Grey's attitude'. Cited in
Rohi, I9I4, p. 89. Bethmann was sometimes more grudging in his praise: 'Grey is full of
the best intentions, but so entangled in Entente policy that we ought to be glad if at least
he restrains Russia and France. And that he does'. Quoted in Konrad H. Jarausch, The
EnigmaticChancellor:BethmannHollweg and the Hubrisof ImperialGermany,New Haven and
London, I973, p. 341.
40 For Bethmann's public praise see BD, IX, ii, no. 813. For Grey's response, see FO
Grey 80o/62: Grey to Goschen, private telegram, 8 April I9I3. (Italics my own.)
41 BD,% IX, ii, no. 5oo.
42 GP, XXXIV, i, no. I28I8.
43 GFM I o/ I 96, draft declaration for the Reichstag Budget Commission, i 9 March I 913.
'Ich mochte nur noch einmal feststellen, dass die Besserung in den deutsch-englischen
Beziehungen, die ich feststellen konnte, einstweilen noch nicht in konkreten Tatsachen
zum Ausdruck kommt. Es handelt sich um die ersten Anfange einer Entwicklung, die der
sorgfaltigen Pflege bedarf, soll sie nicht gehemmt werden.' Jagow, too, talked of the
possibility of a change in the alignment of the powers and in explaining his policies to von
Tschirschky, the German ambassador in Vienna, noted that the London talks had been
an opportunity of showing Britain the danger presented to Europe by Russian ambitions
and the pressure of the Slavs, and, Jagow added: 'Diese Frucht wird jedenfalls noch
reifen und ein weiteres-schon latentes-Abrucken Englands von Russland zufolge
haben.' GP, XXXIV, i, no. I2982.

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 378 R. J. CRAMPTON
from France and Russia. Yet if that had been Bethmann's intention
he had been extraordinarilyself-deceivingin his failure to recognize
the significance of Germany's refusal in late February to put further
pressure on Vienna. Further doubt is cast upon this interpretation
of Bethmann's Balkan policy if we examine how carefully he did
tend this important development.
There were certainly indications of continuing co-operation be-
tween Germany and Britain in Balkan affairs. Both powers were
determined to resist the claim by the Balkan allies for an indemnity
from Turkey,44and they were willing to co-ordinate what demands
they would present as compensation for the loss of the Capitulations
in former Ottoman territory.45But these were minor matters and
were unlikely to influence Britain's relations with her Entente
partners. The Scutari crisis of April-May I9I3 was far from a minor
matter, for the 'conquest'46of Scutari by the Montenegrinsand their
subsequent refusal to evacuate the city produced the most intense
moment of European tension during the Balkan crisis of I912-I3.47
Yet in the peaceful solution of this crisis the Anglo-German con-
nection was of little significance. Before the Montenegrin entry into
the city the powers had decided to send an international fleet to the
Adriatic coast to forestall and hopefully to obviate independent
action by Austria and this the Kaiser had welcomed for, as Lich-
nowsky was to intimate to Grey, the imperial belief was that 'the
European conference has to decide, not Vienna alone' ;48 Britain,
Wilhelm minuted on another despatch, would not 'be pushed away
from us again'.49The Kaiser's fantasies were further excited after
the fall of Scutari; his solution to the problem was an Austro-Italian
expedition under British leadership and, though the cabinet in
London ruled this out,50 Wilhelm was encouraged by a statement
from Grey warning King Nikolas he would be left to his fate if
Montenegro did not return Scutari to the powers.51Wilhelm assumed
44 For the financial issues involved in the Balkan settlement see Helmreich, op. cit.,
pp. 443-52. For British and German attitudes on the claim of the Balkan allies, see FO
371/1758: Grey to Goschen, 57, 10 February 1913. See also Frank G. Weber, Eagles on
the Crescent;Germany,Austria and the Diplomacyof the TurkishAlliance, I914-i918, Ithaca
and London, 1970, pp. 17-58, passim.
45 FO Grey 800/62: Grey to Goschen, private, 25 Dec. I9I2, and Goschen to Grey,
private,4 Jan. 1913.
46 There is evidence that the city was sold by its defending commander, Essad Pasha.
See R. J. Crampton, 'The Decline of the Concert of Europe in the Balkans, 1913-1914'
(The Slavonicand East EuropeanReview,LII, I28, London, July I974, p. 395 and especially
n. 12).
47 The British ambassador in St Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, notes in his memoirs,
'Here was a moment when I thought war inevitable': My Mission to Russia and other
DiplomaticMemories,2 vols., London, 1923, I, p. 132.
48 GP, XXXIV, ii, no. I3097: 'Europ. Conferenz hat zu entscheiden. NichtWien allein.'
49 ibid., no. 13104: 'wieder von uns abgedruckt....'
50 Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers, CAB. 41/34, paper 15, 23 April 1913
(hereafter called CAB).
51 BD, IX, ii, no. 896.

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 BALKANS IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 379
that Britain had moved sufficiently far from its Entente connections
to allow the Triple Alliance to impose its will in Albania and he
regarded this as an important victory for German diplomacy.52He
was mistaken. Grey, on the contrary, was returning to the Entente
fold as the danger increased, and he warned Sir George Buchanan
of the dual dangers of 'acting against the wishes of Russia and of
separating ourselves from France at a momentwhenit seemsmostneces-
sarythatwe shouldkeepin closediplomatic
touchwithherandwithRussia'.53
When it became clear that Montenegro would be bought out rather
than forced out of Scutari54 Wilhelm was bitterly disappointed,
denouncing Grey with the observation that 'one cannot do business
with such a man'.55
52 GP, XXXIV, ii, no. I3232.
53 Taken from FO 37I/177I, Grey to Buchanan, Tel. 377, I May 19I3. This document
appears as BD, IX, ii, no. 920, but the italicized passage was excluded from the final draft
and was not printed by Gooch and Temperley.
54 There are many references in the published collections of diplomatic documents to
the possibility of Montenegro being given a large loan to sweeten the pill of losing Scutari.
See, for example, GP, XXXIV, i, no. I2798 and XXXIV, ii, no. 13I02; OeU, V, nos. 5703
and 5764; BD, IX, ii, no. 86I. Russia was reported to be willing to offer King Nikolas of
Montenegro twenty million francs to leave Scutari, see Pourtales, German ambassador in
St Petersburg, to Bethmann, i i o, I o April 1913, GFM I 0/446, though from Berlin came the
rumour that King Nikolas wanted only ten million, 'eight million for Montenegro and
two million for himself': Goschen to Grey, private, 5 April 1913, FO Grey 800/62. It is
clear from the British archives that at the height of the Scutari crisis one factor accounting
for the calm which prevailed in Whitehall was that a very clear possibility existed for
using such a financial escape hatch. On 30 April, when discussions on finding territorial
compensation were beginning, the Foreign Office received from Boulton Bros., Old
Broad St., E.C., the following letter:
For your private information we have been approached by M. Popovitch, the
Montenegrin delegate in London, regarding the question of a Treasury Bill transaction
of two million Francs.
The money is required over a period for internal obligations contracted during the
recent fighting.
We have intimated to M. Popovitch that we should not be willing to put this trans-
action through until we are satisfied there will be a peaceful settlement of the Scutari
question. M. Popovitch is coming to see us again tomorrow morning.
During the interview he gave us certain interesting information, and we would like
to ascertain from you the value of such information, if possible. Could Mr. Boulton
have an interview regarding this matter this afternoon?
We naturally do not wish to put through financial business with Montenegro without
your full approval.
The Foreign Secretary gave instructions to reply verbally:
No money whatever should be given to Montenegro while she continues to resist the
decision of the Powers about Scutari. On the other hand should she submit to the will
of the Powers and evacuate Scutari there would be no political objection whatever to
supplying her with funds if financiers wish to do so. Till then there is the strongest
objection.
Later in the day Mr. R. P. Maxwell, a senior clerk in the Foreign Office added:
I informed Mr. Boulton verbally in the sense of the above. He told me that at an
interview which he had with M. Popovitch he derived the impression that Montenegro
would give up Scutari for a small rectification of the frontier (giving them some terri-
tory on the left bank of Boyana) and a pecuniary indemnity-but he thinks they will
continue to bluff for a time.
The correspondence is in FO 37I/I806.
55 GP, XXXIV, ii, no. 13252: 'Mit solchem Mann ist keine Politik zu machen.'

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 380 R. J. CRAMPTON
The Scutaricrisishad shownthat Britainhad not yet been drawn
away fromthe Ententeand if Germanywas usingthe Balkancrisis
and the Londonambassadors' conferenceto prizeBritainawayfrom
France and Russia there was clearly more to be done. Jagow
certainlymade no secretof his apparentreadinessto co-operate.In
the summer he wrote to Sir Rennell Rodd, his former ambassadorial
colleaguein Rome:
Many cloudsin the Anglo-Germansky have dispersedand I thinknow
as formerlythat the sun of friendshipmustshine eventually.Anyhow
much mutual distrusthas vanished.Throughoutall the phasesof the
last few months Sir EdwardGrey has shown himselfloyal and con-
ciliatory.As far as I am concerned,you know sufficientlywell that I
shall do everythingto co-operatein improvingrelations.56
It was true that Britishand Germanpoliciesdid not clashover the
second Balkan war and that Germanydid press successfullyin
Viennafor the acceptanceof Grey'sproposalfor the settingup of a
commissionto delimitAlbania'ssouthernborder,57 but in the latter
case Berlinsecretlyurged acceptanceof the commissionbecauseit
would avoid the powerstakingstrongstepsagainstGreece58whose
friendshipGermanywas anxiousto secure and who had recently
expressedinterestin the notion of closerrelationswith the Triple
Alliance.59The rarityof Anglo-Germanco-operationin the Balkans
fromthe Scutaricrisisto the endingof the ambassadors' conference
in Augustis all the moredifficultto explainin that the occasionsfor
it were plentiful.Of all the questionsraisedby recentcrisesin the
Near Eastthe singleone in whichBritainhad a realinterestwasthat
of the Aegeanislands.60 Kiderlenhad seen this and urgedthat Ger-
manyshouldwait uponBritain'swishesin thisquestion61butJagow,
mindfulof the need not to angerTurkeyor Italy and in the teeth of
Lichnowsky'sadvice,62reversed that policy so thoroughly that
Germanyundertookto lead the Alliancepowersin debateson the
56 FO Grey 800/64: Rodd to Grey, private, 8 July 1913, enclosing a translated extract
from Jagow's letter.
57 GP, XXXV, no. 13650.
58 GFM 10/93.: Jagow to Tschirschky, 26I, 23 June 19I3.
59 ibid.: note by Jagow, marked 'ganz geheim', i8 June I9I3,
60 The question was a complicated one. During the Italo-Turkish war the Italians
had occupied the southern Sporades and the Greeks had taken over most of the islands
in the northern Aegean during the Balkan wars. For the British it remained essential that
no great Power establish herself in the eastern Mediterranean whence it might be able
to threaten the Levant trade and British interests in Egypt, etc. See BD, IX, i, no. 430 for
the Admiralty's assessment of the importance of ensuring an Italian evacuation of the
Aegean; see also Richard Bosworth, 'Britain and Italy's Acquisition of the Dodecanese,
19I 2-I 915' (The Historicaljournal, XIII, 4, 1970, pp. 683-705); W. C. Askew, Europe- and
Italy's Acquisitionof Libya, 1911-I912, Washington D.C., 1939, pp. 207ff, and Arthur J.
Marder,FromDreadnought
toScapaFlow,vol. I: TheRoadto War,1904-1914, Oxford,I96I,
pp. 299-30I. For Greek naval action and the occupation of the islands in the northern
Aegean, see documents in FO 371/1502, 1505, 152 I and 1759.
61 GP, XXXIV, i, no. 12529.
62 ibid., no. I2640.

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 BALKANS IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 38I
islands.63 Albania, too, offered many opportunities for Anglo-
German co-operation. As anarchy within the newly created state
increased Grey was desperate to establish a provisional government
to keep some sort of order; he appealed to Germany for assistance;64
but although the Wilhelmstrassealso thought a provisional govern-
ment necessary, it would exercise no pressurein Vienna as 'Count
Berchtold did not respond to it'.65 Even when agreement had been
reached on the setting up of a provisional government in the form
of an international control commission the Austrians continued to
frustratethe implementation of the agreement; they were the last to
appoint a delegate to the commission,66they objected to the com-
mission meeting in Scutari which most people thought its natural
venue,67and they requested that all decisions of the commission be
unanimous before they were binding,68 a condition which, if ac-
cepted, would have paralysed the provisional government. These
were issues which were ideally suited to effective Anglo-German
collaboration,yet Grey did not turn to Berlinfor help. And only once
did the Germans offer their assistance.In August the Wilhelmstrasse
suggested an extension of the authority of the Admiral who had
taken charge of Scutari after the Montenegrin evacuation;;69 Grey
showed little enthusiasm for the idea. Wisely so for within three
days the Germans had changed their minds; having expressed a
willingness to put pressureon Vienna to agree to an extension of the
Admiral's authority Berlin was now pleading Habsburg suscepti-
bilities as its reason for supporting rather than opposing Austria on
this issue.70In October, when Grey resisted the Austrians' demand
for the withdrawal of the Admiral from Scutari, Jagow was 'in
entire agreement' with the British Foreign Secretary but would not
say so openly for fear of offending Vienna.7"
The apparent weakness of Germany's position vis-a'-visAustria in
such minor matters as these is difficult to reconcile with the idea that
Berlin's Balkan policy was being conducted with grand strategic
aims in view. Even more difficult to fit into this pattern is the fact
that although Germany ruled out Austrian action against Serbia in
the summer of I913, and thereby averted a very serious crisis in the
Balkans,72she made no attempt to capitalize diplomatically on this
action.
63 ibid., XXXV, no. I 3621.
64 FO 37I/I806, Grey to Granville, 226, 7 July 19I3.
65 BD, IX, ii, no. I io6.
66 GP, XXXVI, i, footnote*, pp. 263-4.
67 ibid., nos. 14027-30, I4032, 14038, 14039.
68 BD, X, i, no. 35.
69 FO 37I/I825: Goschen to Grey, Tel. I40, 23 August I913.
70 ibid., Goschen to Grey, Tel. i ,26 August 19I3.
71 ibid., Granville to Grey, Tel. I72, 6 October 19I3.
72 For this incident see infra, pp. 385-6.

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382 R. J. CRAMPTON

The end of the ambassadors'conference in August indicated that

the Balkan crisis had passed its peak. There remained, however,
many unresolved issues on which Britain and Germany could co-
operate. Lichnowskyclearly did not regard the end of the conference
as introducing any change in German policy; in 19I5 he wrote:
The Anglo-Germanco-operationduring these conferencesprovided
the basis for the understanding we sought, and I worked to consolidate
it fromthen on. Throughour commonactivitythe BritishGovernment
gained confidencein our desirefor peace, and so the anxietyover our
intentionsgraduallyabatedand a readinesswasshownto accommodate
our wishes in other areas also.73
Some successes were achieved in other areas, notably the Baghdad
railway, but in the Balkans, the fons et origoof the Anglo-German
detente, there was a gradual return to the pre-igi 2 state of suspicion
and disagreement. In October I 9I3 the German foreign office
stressedto Lichnowskythat 'just as before we place great importance
on close co-operation with Britain in the Albanian and Balkan
questions'.74The Wilhelmstrassedid indeed request British help in
persuading the Serbs to evacuate areas assigned to Albania,75but
before Whitehall could react Austria had presented an ultimatum
in Belgrade and Germany clearly had knowledge of the impending
diplomatic action by Austria.76 Similarly Berlin proposed that Ger-
many and Britain should exercisejoint diplomatic pressurein Athens
to secure the withdrawal from southern Albania of Greek irregular
bands but once again Britain was denied the chance to respond, this
time by an Austro-Italian demarche in the Greek capital.77 Anglo-
German co-operation did produce some results early in I914; Berlin
secured from Rome a declaration that Greece should be allowed to
retain those islands she had occupied during the Balkan wars-
hardly a major concession;78 Germany's refusal to accept Austro-
Italian schemes to secure for themselves a monopoly in the Albanian
bank79 was warmly received in London even if the refusal, like
Berlin's absolute rejection of Austrian pretensions to colonial terri-
tory in Asia Minor,80was hardly disinterested: the powers' acceDt-
73 Quoted in Rohl, I9I4, p. 98.
74 GP, XXXVI, i, no. 14052: '. . . wir aufenges Zusammengehen mit England in albani-
schen und Balkanfragen nach wie vor grossten Wert legen'.
75 ibid., no. I4164 and BD, X, i, no. 38.
76 Hugo Hantsch, LeopoldGraf Berchtold,2 vols., Graz, 1963, II, p. 501.
7 See Crampton, op. cit., p. 402.
78 BD, X, i, nos. 182, 187, i 88; FO Grey 800/62: Goschen to Grey, private, 3 I December
I913; other sections of this letter appear in BD, X, i, no. 455 and GP, XXXVI, ii, nos. 14236
and 14237.
79 GFM I4/3, Nadolny, German delegate to the Albanian control commission, to
Auswartiges Amt, Tel. 12, 12 January 1914; FO 371/1885: Goschen to Grey, 25, i6
January I914, Tel. 8, 21 January 1914 and 65, 14 February 1914; see also GP, XXXVI, i,
footnote **, pp. 598-9.
80 For these claims see F. R. Bridge, 'Tarde venientibus ossa: Austro-Hungarian colonial
aspirationsin Asia Minor, I 9I3-I4' (MiddleEastern Studies,vi, London,1970, pp. 319-30).

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 BALKANS IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 383
ance of Wilhelm zu Wied as Prince of Albania and his arrival in his
new principality was marginally helped by collaboration between
Berlin and London,8' although the two powers could not reverse
Wied's disastrous decision to make his capital in Durazzo, a town
dominated by the notorious Essad Pasha;82 and when the danger of
a Turco-Greek conflict threatened to close the Straits in June 1914
Grey did turn to Berlinfor help.83Clearlysome faith in the potentiali-
ties of Anglo-German co-operation survived, for on 24 June 19I4
Grey wrote to Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin:
Herrvon BethmannHollweghad instructedPrinceLichnowskyto tell
me that he hopedthat if new developmentsor emergenciesarosein the
Balkansthey would be discussedas franklybetween Germanyand
ourselvesas the difficultiesthat aroseduringthe last Balkancrisis,and
that we shouldbe able to keepin close touch.84
A close examination of the evidence would suggest that unless he
was subtly trying to revive a dying phenomenon the chancellor was
allowing original successes to outshine the dull realities of recent
failures. Since the decision of February I9I3 not to press Austria to
make further concessions, German co-operation had been of little
help to Britain in the Balkans and the Near East. Since October
19I3 German policy had positively alienated Britain. The disparity
between Germany's declarations and her actions in Albania sowed
suspicions which Sir Eyre Crowe, AssistantUnder-Secretaryof State
at the Foreign Office, was predictably the first to articulate; even be-
fore the Austrian ultimatum to Belgrade in October he minuted:
I am not altogetherconvinced that the Germansare playing quite
straightin this Albanianquestion.They constantlyassureus that they
do not approvewhat Austriadoes but in fact they have at everystage
supportedher vigorously.85
Even more damaging, in Britain's eyes, was the fact that Germany
allowed Austria and Italy to disrupt the Concert of Europe before it
had reached any decision on the one issue in which Britain had a
direct interest-the Aegean islands.86Grey had attempted to link
81 Germany agreed, at Grey's suggestion, to act as the spokesman for the other powers
when Wied was approached: BD, X, i, nos. 82, 83, 85, 86, 96.
82 For the conditions within Albania and the disruption caused by Essad Pasha, see
J. Swire, Albania, the Rise of a Kingdom,London, 1929, reprinted New York, I97I, pp.
I 73-232; Constantin Chekrezi, Albania Past and Present,New York, I9I9, reprinted New
York, I971, pp. 105-52 (Chekrezi was secretary to the Control Commission) and Ekrem
Bey Valora, Lebenserinnerungen, 2 vols., Munich, I973, II, pp. 3-90.
83 BD, X, i, nos. 282 and 284. Berlin agreed as to the necessity of protecting trade but
was not willing to make any proposals: GP, XXXVI, ii, no. I4620.
84 FO 3 7 I/I99I: Grey to Goschen, 197, 24 June 19I 4.
85 FO 37I/I825: minute by Sir Eyre Crowe on Goschen to Grey, Tel. I77, I4 October
I9I3.
86For the disruption of the concert of Europe by the powers of the Triple Alliance,
see Crampton, op. cit.

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 384 R. J. CRAMPTON

thisquestionto thatof southernAlbania;but Austriaand Italy,with

supportfromBerlin,had acceptedthe Albaniansolutiontheydesired
and subsequentlydeniedcategorically,thoughjustifiably,the inter-
dependenceof the two questions.Worsestill, Germanyappearedto
be takingcreditin Constantinople for preventingthe cessionof the
islandsto Greece,a clearcontraventionof Grey'soriginalprinciple
that no one power should gain any advantage from the Balkan and
Near Easternsettlement.Crowevoicedmostbitterlythe sentiments
felt in London:
I am afraid that the attitude adopted by the Germangovernment,
coupledwith the care that has been takento take creditfor it in antici-
pation at Constantinoplemeans the end of the policy of co-operation
between Englandand Germany,and the relapseon Germany'spart
into the cynical policy of promotingdiscordamong other powersfor
the purpose of acquiring a position of advantage for herself.87

LaterCrowewas to note:
At every stage in the question of the Albanian frontier, the evacuation,
and the Greek Islands, the three governments of the Triple Alliance
have acted jointly and collectively, on several notorious instances even
to the total exclusion of the three other powers.88

Britain'snaturalresponsewas to returnto a closerrelationshipin

near eastern affairswith the other Entente powers.89By 19I4 almost
nothingwasleftof the Anglo-German detenteof 19 12-13; Germany,
it seemed in London, was incapable of imposing her will upon
Austria; the assumption was, as Sir Fairfax Cartwright, the British
ambassador in Vienna, wrote in September I 9 I 3, that '. . . in formu-
lating the foreign policy to be pursued by the Triple Alliance in the
Near East, it is an understood thing that the wishes of Austria-
Hungary shall prevail over those of Germany'.90
Had Sir Fairfax Cartwright's analysis been correct it would
explain away Germany's failure to make Anglo-German co-
operation in the Balkans a longer and more fruitful venture. The
analysis is, however, demonstrably false.
After February I9I3 it was indeed true that Germany was at
times remarkably compliant towards Austria, so much so that three
years later Lichnowsky's memories were that
In reality there were two Austrian representatives in London on that
occasion [the ambassadors' conference], Count Mensdorff and myself.
87 BD, X, i, no. 223-
88 FO 371/1893: minute by Sir Eyre Crowe, Goschen to Grey, Tel. 42, i I April 19I4.
89 See Crampton,op. cit., pp. 416-19.
90 FO Carnock800/370. Cartwrightto Nicolson,private,27 September19I3.

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 BALKANS IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 385
. . . It is a fact that at this conferenceAustria,not Germany,was the
leadingpowerin the Triple Alliance.9'
During the conference itself, and even before the fall of Scutari to
the Montenegrins, the Kaiser spoke of having 'done so much for
Austria' that he would now press for Austria submitting to his will
in one aspect of the Balkan crisis.92Yet after the conference there
was no sign, at least in Germany's relations with Britain, that
German control had been reasserted,for German support for Austria
and Italy in the Albanian and Aegean debates was, if unenthusiastic,
absolutely reliable.
Germany's decision in February 19I 3 to defer to the wishes of her
allies in most important Balkan and Near Eastern questions was her
own; it was not forced upon her by Austria or Italy. This is easily
proved both by the important instances in which Germany did, for
various reasons, impose her will upon her alliance partners, and by
the fact that the prevailing impressionin Vienna was of a Germany
dominant not submissive-Austria's interests, it was believed, had
been impaired by a lack of co-operation from Berlin. In the early
stages of the crisis the Ballhausplatz was resentful of constant
German advice to do nothing93and in Vienna the suspicion was
felt that Austrian interests were actually being sacrificed so that the
Anglo-German detente would not be endangered, for 'In Germany
they have no comprehensionof the interests of our Empire or its ten
million Germans. All they can think about [in Berlin] is Dread-
noughts'.94This suspicion was never fully dissipated; the famous
Matscheko memorandum, drawn up by the Ballhausplatz immedi-
ately before the Sarajevo tragedy and mapping a future diplomatic
strategy for the Alliance in the Balkans, resulted from Berchtold's
belated determination '... to take the initiative and call the way-
ward German allies to order'.95
The Matscheko memorandum repeated more forcefully argu-
ments first put forward by Vienna in the summer of I913. At that
time Germany was brutally disproving the contention that Austria
91 Quoted in Rohl, 1914, p. 98.
92 Von Treutler, representative of the German
Foreign Office in the Imperial en-
tourage, to Auswartiges Amt, Tel. I4, 5 April 1913, GFM io/446. The issue on which
Wilhelm had decided to assert his will was that of the future Balkan strategy of the
Triple Alliance, see infra, pp. 386-7.
93 Hantsch, op. cit., I, p. 388.
94 Fritz Fellner, ed., Das politische TagebuchJosef Redlichs, Kommission fur neuere
Geschichte Osterreichs, no. 39, 2 vols., Vienna, 1953, I, p. 179: 'In Deutschland sei kein
Verstandnis fur unsere hiesigen Reichsinteressen und fur die Interessen der IO Millionen
Deutschen. Sie haben dort nur die Dreadnoughts im Kopfe.'
95 F. R. Bridge, FromSadowato Sarajevo:theForeignPolicyof Austria-Hungary 1866-1914,
London, 1972, pp. 367-8. For the Matscheko memorandum see ibid., pp. 367-9 and pp.
443-8 for the text. See also Hantsch, op. cit., II, pp. 545-51, and M. B. A. Peterson,
'Das osterreichisch-ungarische Memorandum an Deutschland vom 5 July I9I4' (Scandia,
vol. 30, Stockholm, I 964, pp. 138-90) .

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 386 R. J. CRAMPTON

ruled the Alliance'sBalkanroost. In the earlystagesof the second

Balkanwar, beforeRumaniahad mobilised,Berchtoldinformedthe
Wilhelmstrassethat under certain conditionsAustriaintended to
intervenein the war in orderto preventSerbiaexpandingtoo much
at Bulgaria'sexpense. Berlin vetoed the idea and was equally
adamantin opposinga secondapproachfromVienna,insistingthat
GermanywouldonlysupportAustriaif the attackcamefromSerbia.
Berchtold'sbiographercomments:'For the Monarchythis was a
severeblow, for Berchtoldit was a portentousdefeatwhichseverely
strainedthe Alliance'.96It was at this point that Germanywas
indeed 'with both handsholdingback the Austriansby their coat-
tails';97 and yet she failed to make Britainawareof this important
serviceto the causeof Europeanpeace.
For Austriathis was merelythe preludeto an even more bitter
blow.A sharpdifferenceof opinionbetweenViennaand Berlinover
the futureBalkanstrategyof the Alliancehad been emergingsince
the springof I9I3.98 Germanyhad forsakenher previousbeliefthat
Bulgariashould be the kernelof a new Balkanleague favourably
disposedtowardsthe centralpowers,and was now pressingthat to
the alreadysecureRumaniashouldbe addedGreeceand,if possible,
Serbia.Germanconcentrationon Greecehad some dynasticmoti-
vationbut was given greatermilitaryglamourby Greeksuccessesin
the second Balkanwar, and if Serbiaand Turkeycould be brought
into the new groupingthe Triplicewould completelydominatethe
Balkans.In Austriaa more realisticmood prevailed;Serbiacould
not be reconciledpoliticallyto the Austro-Hungarian empire;Greek
claimson Albaniacouldnot be admittedby eitherAustriaor Italy;
and Greeceand Turkeywerestillfarfromagreementon the Aegean
islands.The Germanschemewas thereforea chimeraand the Trip-
lice shouldconcentrateon Bulgariaand the retentionof Rumania.
The debatewas conductedagainsta backgroundof growingtension
betweenthe states of the Balkanleague, and Vienna was already
surreptitiously encouraging the Bulgarians to attack the Serbs.99
But GermanydestroyedAustria'sschemesto commit the Triplice
defacto to Bulgaria.Berlin ruled out the sensiblesuggestionthat
96 Hantsch, op. cit., II, pp.
441-2: 'Das war ein schwerer Schlag fur die Monarchie, eine
folgenschwere Niederlage Berchtolds, die das Bundnisverhaltnis ausserordentlich belastete.'
97 The remark was made famous by the Italian Foreign Minister, the Marquis di San
Giuliano: see Bridge, op. cit., p. 356.
98 For a discussion of this question see 0. H. Wedel, Austro-German DiplomaticRelations,
i908-i914, Stanford, I932; E. C. Helmreich, 'The Conflict between Germany and
Austria over Balkan Policy, 1913-1914', in D. C. McKay, Essays in the Historyof Modern
Europepresentedto William L. Langer, New York and London, 1936; Bridge, op. cit.,
344-79 passim, and Crampton, op. cit., pp. 235-44.
99 Dorte Loding, 'Deutschlands und Osterreich-Ungarns Balkanpolitik von I912-
1914 unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung ihrer Wirtschaftsinteressen' (Ph.D. thesis,
Hamburg University, I967, published I969, p. 8i).

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 BALKANS IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 387
Bulgaria receive Salonika as compensation for concessions to
Rumania which would keep the latter out of the coming fratricidal
war; Salonika was the town in which the pro-German Greek king
ascended the throne and Berlin was not prepared to alienate Greece
for the sake of Vienna's plans for Rumania and Bulgaria. The second
Balkan war, the total defeat of Bulgaria and the subsequent treaty
of Bucharest were disastrousfor Austria; the Austrophile cabinet in
Sofia had nothing to show for Austrian patronage and worse still
was the fact that Rumania and Serbia now had a common cause in
preservingtheir recent gains and, perhaps, would soon find a second
in conspiring to redeem their respective irredentewithin the Dual
Monarchy. The Ballhausplatz therefore determined upon a speedy
revision of the treaty of Bucharest, but once again Berlin would not
accept Austrian views; the Kaiser ostentatiously decorated and
congratulated the King of Rumania-yet another Hohenzollern-
upon the conclusion of peace in his capital. Austria could not contest
her ally's public endorsement of the Bucharesttreaty and her defeat
was total. To Count Hoyos, a senior official in the Ballhausplatz, it
was 'Austria'sdiplomatic Olmiitz'.100And it was also a uselesssacri-
fice. Germany never did win Greek support and Berlin joined with
Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne, in resisting
Berchtold's continuing pressurefor an alliance with Bulgaria0l1lest
this disturb the links between Rumania and the Triple Alliance,
links which, by November I9I3, were patently dissolved.102
Germany's domination over Austria was exercised equally force-
fully in the commercial and economic sphere. Berchtold had at one
point played with the notion of trying to sweeten Serbia politically
with trading concessions but this, once again, was firmly overruled
by Berlin.103Germany, too, was amongst the powers who frustrated
Austrian attempts to create new railway companies to replace the
Oriental Railway Company in areas conquered by Greece and
Serbia.104Indeed economic competition between Germany and
Austria in the Balkanswas severe; German economic interests in the
area had grown rapidly since the signing of the Dual Alliance,105and
100 Fellner, op. cit., I, pp. 206-7.
101 Hantsch, op. cit., II, pp. 509-10. Germany refused to help find money for loans to
Bulgaria until 1914, see Bridge, op. cit., p. 362. For the history of European finance in
Bulgaria and its diplomatic significance, see Tsevetana Todorova, Diplomaticheska istoriyana
vdnshnitezaemi na Bdlgaria, I888-I912 (Diplomatic History of foreign loans for Bulgaria
i 888-I g I 2), Sofia, I 97 I . It is to be regretted that this brilliant study ends in I 9 1 2.
102 See C. A. Macartney, The HabsburgEmpire, i79o-19i8, New York and London,
I969, p. 789.
103 Loding, op. cit., p. 48.
104 ibid., pp. 48-59-
105 For the growth of German economic interests in the Balkans, see Fritz Fischer,
'Weltpolitik, Weltmachtstreben, und deutsche Kriegsziele' (HistorischeZeitschrift,CXCIX,
2, Munich, 1964, pp. 265-346). An English translation is available in H. W. Koch, ed.,
Op. Cit., pp. 79-144.

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388 R. J. CRAMPTON

the diplomatic considerations which underlay the latter were not

always compatible with the political demands created by the
former.106When such contradictions did appear, particularly if they
were caused by an attempt on Austria's part to increase its economic
position, German wishes invariably prevailed.'07
That Germany exercised political and economic dominance over
Austria was natural. As the more powerful partner in the Dual
Alliance Germany could be expected to have a decisive voice in all
major debates, should she so desire. This was certainly the case in
the July crisis in I914 when a German objection could have pre-
vented Austrian action against Serbia.108 Yet the July crisis itself is
of relatively little importance to this essay, for in that crisis both
Germany and Austria were agreed upon the course that had to be
followed. What is of significance for the present argument is an
examination of the instances when the two powers did not agree
and the reasons why Germany did or did not assert the dominance
she indubitably possessed.
On the few occasions when Berlin did give in to Austrian or Austro-
Italian wishes it rationalized its action by referring to the health of
the Triple Alliance. In January I913 Bethmann had expressed the
hope that Anglo-German co-operation would be able to find a
solution to the Scutari crisis but he did also insist that this would
have to be done without 'impairing the solidarity of our relations
with Austria' ;109Jagow, too, spoke of Germany's principal objective
being 'so to regulate the settlement that Albania does not become a
bone of contention between Vienna and Rome' and in the same
despatch to von Tschirschky, the German ambassador in Vienna,
he continued, 'in this question we have only one interest: that our
allies shall be agreed upon the solution and that our opponents are
not given the impression of differences within the Triple Alliance."'10
For such reasons had Berlin accepted, without serious resistance,
Berchtold's demand that no more pressure be placed on Austria as
Dibra was her final concession. But was the Triple Alliance, renewed
in December I 9 1 2, that delicate ? Could Vienna have seriously
contested further German pressure to make concessions in the
106 'In der Haltung des deutschen AuswairtigenAmts gegenuber der Donaumonarchie
offenbarte sich ein Widerspruch zwischen traditioneller Bundnispolitik und imperialisti-
scher Wirtschaftspolitik': L6ding, op. cit., p. 244.
107 ibid.
108 Lichnowsky wrote in 1915: 'People say to me: "Had Sir E. Gray so wished,
Russia would not have moved." I reply: "Had we so wished, Austria would not have
moved .. .".' Rohl, 1914, p. 102.
109 GP, XXXIV, i, no. i2763: ... . die FestigkeitunseresVerhaltnisseszu Osterreich
untergraben wird'.
1O ibid., no. 12724: '. .. die Regelung so zu gestalten, dass Albanien auch fur die
Zukunft kein Zankapfel zwischen Wien und Rom wird... . Wir haben in dieser Frage
nur das eine Interesse, dass sich unsere Verbundeten uiber deren L6sung einigen -und
unsere Gegner nicht den Eindruck von Unstimmigkeit im Dreibund gewinnen.'

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 BALKANS IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 389
Balkans had Germany been prepared to press for them? If the
ultimate stake involved in Germany'sBalkan policy was the neutrali-
zation of Britain then Berlin'swas a remarkablypusillanimousstance,
especially as a few months later Germanywas preparedso to bludgeon
Austria that a Viennese newspaper could talk of the imminence of
'a second Koniggritz',"'1and this for the sake not of a sustained and
subtle attempt to secure Britishneutrality but for the retention of the
already questionable loyalty of Rumania and for the improbable
friendship of Greece.
German support for the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia in October
I913 is partly explicable as an effort to reconcile a bruised ally.112
The Wilhelmstrasse'ssupportfor her allies in Albania and the Aegean
islands, in the face of Britain's need for German help, was again
explained by the need to preserve the strength and health of the
Triplice. Here Austria and Italy were, in the beginning at least, in
unusual and welcome agreement and Germany was especially
anxious to be sure of Italian good faith, both because of current
attempts to strengthen the military cohesion and co-ordination of the
alliancell3 and because discussionsbetween Paris, Ro-meand London
on a possible Mediterranean agreement were in progress."14 In fact
German policy failed in this respect, for in the spring and summer of
I914 Austro-Italian disagreements over Albania and a possible
merger between Serbia and Montenegro, by which the formerwould
gain that access to the Adriatic which Austria had fought so strenu-
ously to prevent, had become so serious that Tschirschkywas talking
of an internal crisis in the Triplice and Zimmermann was urging
high level discussions to eradicate these tensions.115If Germany's
Balkan policy had been designed to secure British neutrality and
Britain had been estrangedbecauseof a vain effortto keep Austriaand
Italy togetherthen we must assumethat Berlinplaced less value on the
possible gain of British neutrality than on maintaining the strained
Austro-Italian link of the Triple Alliance. The converse may also be
assumed; if British neutrality were the more important objective
Austro-Italian interests would be subordinate to it. The point has
more than theoretical significance. In the latter half of the July crisis,
11I The Reichspost.See H. Kanner, KaiserlicheKatastrophenpolitik, Leipzig, 1922, p. 174.
112 Hantsch, op. cit., II, p. 501. It was also of course the case that in demanding the
withdrawal of Serbian troops from Albania the Ballhausplatz was merely insisting that a
decision of the powers be respected.
113 Fischer, Krieg derIllusionen,pp. 570-7.
114 ibid., pp. 586-8 and BD, X, ii, pp. 620-54, and for information on the German side,
GFM I6/I02, frames 627-8i.
115 GP, XXXVI, ii, footnote *, p. 689; and ibid., nos. 14520 and I4526. For discussions
on the question of Serbian-Montenegrin union see H. Heilbronner, 'The Merger Attempts
of Serbia and Montenegro, 19I3-1914' (Journal of CentralEuropeanAffairs,xvlii, Boulder,
Colorado, 1958-9, pp. 281-91); GFM 10/93, frames 227-32 and GP, XXXIX, pp. 371-
409.

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390 R. J. CRAMPTON

wheneveryefforthad to be madeto preventthe alienationof Britain

Germanydid in fact overrulean Austriansuggestionwhich could
have strengthenedconsiderablyItaly'scommitmentto the Triplice.
The suggestion,relayed to Jagow on i8 July, was that Italy be
allowedsovereigntyover the Dodecaneseas compensationfor any
conqueststhe Austriansmight makein the Balkans.Jagow rejected
the idea on the grounds that even to propose it would offend
Britain.116
It is clearthat Germanyhad the powerto imposeits will uponits
allies in Balkan affairs. It is clear that she frequently exercised this
power.It is alsoclearthatin a severeinternationalcrisisshe exercised
thispowerspecificallyto preservethe possibilityof Britishneutrality.
It is equallyclearthat in moretranquiltimesshe chosenot to exer-
cise this poweron a numberof occasionswhen to do so wouldhave
broughther diplomaticallycloser to Britain.From these 'lost op-
portunities'it may be concludedthat Germany'sBalkanpolicy in
I913 and I914 was not ultimatelydeterminedby the desireto draw
Britain away from the Triple Entente. BethmannHollweg and
Jagow may indeedhave hopedthat co-operationwith Britainwould
have this result,but they wereremarkablylackingin persistencein
their effortsto reachthis diplomaticcrockof gold.
This is not to deny that Germany had decided long before July
I9I4 that war-defensive, preventive or localized-was necessary
and should be fought sooner rather than later; nor is it to deny that
the War Council of 8 December I9I2 marked the beginning of a
more conscious and systematizedeffort to gear Germany to meeting
that war. The attractively simple explanation for German policy in
the Balkans which ProfessorFischer has offered, however, must be
questioned.
116 Stolberg, counsellor to the German embassy in Vienna, to Jagow, private, I8 July
I914, and Jagow to Tschirschky: Tel. I26, 2o July 1914, GFM I0/102.

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