pan Air L!nes Co., Ltd.

Mclhnnell-Douglas DC-8-62F,
8054, Aachorage, Alaska, January 13, 1977

Washington, D.C. 20594

Aircraft Accident Report

January 13, 1977
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Washington, D. C . 20594
r TABLE OF CONTENTS

Synopsis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .',.. . . . . . . . . . .
'1
1. Investigation ............ .......... .:,

. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ........... .. .. .. .. .. ..
1.1 History of the Flight
1.2 Injuries to Persons
1.3 Damage to Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~~. .
1.4 Other Damage........................
1.5 Personnel Information ...................
1.6 Aircraft Information ....................
1.7 Meteorological Information .................
1.8 Aids to Navigation............... ......
1.9 Communications.......................
1.10 Aerodrome Information ...................
1.11 Flight Recorders ......................
1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. ..
1.13
1.14
Medical and Pathological Information
Fire......................
. . . . . .......
1.15 Survival Aspects ................ ......
1.16 Tests and Research.....................
1.16.1 Performance ................ ......
1.16.2
1.17 . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Computer Simulations
Additional Information
Stall Warning System . . . . . . . . . . . ........
1.18 New Investigation Techniques ................
2. YI Analysis.................... ......
3. Conclusions ........................
3.1 Findings.................... . . . . . .
3.2 Probable Cause.......................
4. Recommendations .......................
5. Appendixes................... ......
Appendix A - Investigation ..............
Appendix B - Crew Information
Appendix C - Aircraft Information
. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
-
Appendix D Taxi Route JA 8054 . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Appendix E - Wreckage Distribution Chart
Appendix P - Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcr:ipt
Appendix G - Cockpit Voice Recorder/Flight
....
 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Page ...
.

Adopted: January 16, 1979

. 1
. 2
, 2 JAPAN AIR LINES GO., LTD.
, 4 MCDONNEL-DOUGLAS DC-8-62F, J A 8054
4 ANCHORAGE, ALASKA
4 JANUARY 1 3 , 1977
4 ' A
4 W SYNOPSIS
5 V I '
q:A
w
5 A t 0635:39 A.stt. on January 13, 19F7, Japan Air Lines Co.,
5 Ltd., J A 8054 c r a s h e d s h o r t l y a f t e r t a k e o f f from runway 24L a t Anchorage
5 International A i r p o r t , Anchorage, Alaska. The cargo c o n s i s t e d of l i v e
6 ~eefcattle f a ? d e l i v e r y t o Japan. The three crewnembers and t h e two
6 cargohandlers aboard t h e aircraft d i e d i n t h e c r a s h and t h e a i r c r a f t was
9 deatroyed.
10 .-
10 \\The N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board determines t h a t t h e
10 j

:z 1
10 !

14
6"
p obable c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t was a s t a l l t h a t r e s u l t e d from t h e p i l o t ' s
o n t r o l i n p u t s aggravated by a i r f r a m e i c i n g while t h e p i l o t was under t h e
f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l . C o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e cause of t h i s a c c i d e n t was t h e
f a i l u r e of the o t h e r f l i g h t c r e w members t o p r e v e n t t h e c a p t a i n from a t t e m p t i n g
the f l i g h t .&
14 1 __
14 .#
L8
18
19
.9
!I
:1
2.
3
5
7
9

'1
 i

. 1. INVESTIGATION

1.1 History of t h e F l i g h t

On January 13, 1977, a Japan A i r Line (JAL) McDonnell-Douglas

DC-8-62F. J A 8054, operated a s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l charter cargo f l i g h t
6 from Moses Lake, Washington, U.S.A., t o Tokyo, Japan. An en route stop
and crew change were scheduled a t Anchorage, A M . The a i r c r a f t
a r r i v e d a t Anchorage a t 0503. 1/ T h h m i n g ' flightcrew reported tfiat
t h e only weather they encounterzd en route was a l a y e r of fog on t h e
f i n a l approach a t 800 f e e t - 2 / , and t h a t they did not encounter any
p r e c i p i t a t i o n o r icing. ,. .

The a i r c r a f t was serviced and a walk-around inspection was

performed by JAL maintenance personnel and contract mechanics. The two
c o n t r a c t mechanics s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e was i c e on t h e i n l e t euide vanes.
~~
I . ~ -,~ ~~~~

t h e engine cowlings, and t h e engine b u l l e t noses, but no i c e was reported

on the a i r f o i l surfaces. The JAL personnel s t a t e d t h a t they did not s e e
any i c e on t h e a i r c r a f t . One contract mechanic advised the JAL represen-
t a t i v e t h a t t h e engine anti- icing system should be used by t h e next. crew
t o c 1 e a r . t h e i c e i n t h e engine i n l e t s . Na maintenance was performed on
the a i r c r a f t .
-
\
,/
The outbound flightcrew was wakened about 0330, l e f t t h e h o t e l
by t a x i about 0430, and a r r i v e d a t t h e JAL dispatch office.abouC 0500.
d r i v e r who brought t h e outbound crew t o t h e ~ a i r p o r ts t a t e d
The
t h a t he b came concerned by t h e c a p t a i n ' s a c t i o n s in t h e t a x i and c a l l e d
h i s dispatcher t o r e p o r t h i s impressions.
,
H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e c a p t a i n ' s movements were uncoordinated;
that h i s f a c e was flushed and h i s eyes were glazed; t h a t h i s conversation
was garbled and incoherent; t h a t h i s movements were jerky and unstablek
t h a t he had trouble g e t t i n g o u t of t h e cab and had t o steady himself
on t h e c a r door.

* About 0450 t h e t a x i dispatcher called t h e operations agent fo;

t h e contract maintenance company and reported t h a t one of her d r i v e r s
had taken an "intoxicated" JAL captain t o t h e airport;, The operations
agent s t a t e d t h a t ".~.-it~~seemed l o g i c a l t h a t J A L would d e t e c t any-thing
unusual iiiTXEEiE.cordingly."~.
- \
He f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t a t 06'20, -he
~ - -n.o t i f i e d
/ IiKs l i n e manager of t h e conversation with t h e t a x i diseatcher and t h a t __~~
w e l t t h a t i f t h e c a p t a i n w a s - i n t o x M . . I A L BE...or%-'-first
t h e f l i g h t immediately." The JAL dispatch
JAL .~
1~
crew s < a m m - F h e y noted nothing unvsual
The dispatch b r i e f i n g proceeded smoothly and
asked by t h e outbound crew.

- A l l times are:Alaskan standard based on t h e 24-hour clock.

'1/
-2 / A l l a l t i t u d e s a r e mean sea l e v e l unless otherwise noted.
 - 3 -

The outbound crew consisted of an American captain and a

panese.:first officer and €light engineer. They went to the aircraft
out 05f5 and boarded the aircraft with the two cattle handlers. The
ver of the crew car, a friend of the captain, stated that "...he was
good condition as far as way's I've seen him sometimes and I made
las at statement before I ever heard any rumors that he was supposedly
runk or had been partying or whatever."
top
A review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) indicated that
that about 0603 the captain and first officer were checking the inputs to the
inertial navigation system. They also checked the Automatic Terminal
Information Service (ATIS) for local visibility, received their clearance,
and began their prestart checklists about 0609. The weather on the ATIS
ort was in part: "...sky partially obscured, visibility one-quarter
...."
le, fog The checklists were completed and the takeoff data reviewed.
wo out 0615 the engines were started and the stickshaker (stall warning
, stem) was tested. The after-start checklist was completed and the
rted rcraft was cleared to taxi to runway 24L. During the taxi, the flight
see ineer requested and received permission from the captain to turn the
3en- gine anti-ice system on because of the ice on the inlet guide vanes.
:ew e flight controls and spoilers were checked while taxiing and the
In aps were extended to 23'. The taxi checklist was completed and the
akeoff data, the flap settings, and the trim settings were again
eviewed. The captain, in response to the challenge "anti-ice, de-ice,
el nd rain removal," said, "Ok, we will use engine anti-ice.'' The de-ice
ystem was reported "off" by the flight engineer. d
zd

'i
.on Th,e captain taxied the aircraft southeast on the ramp, past

5-
terminal toward runway 04L. k : stepped ULL i i r - ramp after being
If instructed to hold short of runway 24R. After several communications
with the controller, the aircraft taxied onto runway 24R, and reported
"..;ready for takeoff.." The tower advised the captain that he was on
C ay 24R which the captain contradicted. The controller then issued taxi
instructions to get the aircraft to runway 24L. The caitain made a 180'
on runway 24R before he finally taxied to the taxiway which leads to
lhe approach end.of runway 24L. The crew again reported that they were ready
.ed for takeoff at 0633:37.

Takeoff was initiated and,at 0634:32 the captain called "maxi- 8

mim parer." At 0634:50 the captain announced, "I have" and at 0634:52,
1 %@',&nots),was called by the copilot. At 0635:10, "Vee one" was
called by the copilot and at 0635:16 rotation was called and acknowledged
by the captain. At 0635:19.5 the cautain called "Ten denrees" and at
Ob35:21.4-the first officer called Vi. At b635:26.2 a sound similar to
 air et was recorded. This sound became more frequent and
c w o u n d a of impact. At 0635:32 the first'officer
called "Gear up" and at 063>:J3 the flight engineer said "Too much speed
(steep)." 21 At 0635:38 the engineer called "stall" simultaneously the direction. Th
~

stickshaker sounded and continued until 0635:39.3, when impact was recorded.'

A witness near the departure end of the runway saw t h e m f t

climb to acestimated altitude of ,about 100 feet above the ground. veer
to a e left, and then slide
~
"...
out of the air.,'' .
.~

The accident occurred at night at latitude 61' 10' N and accident was:
longitude 150° 2' W. The elevation at initial impact was 124 feet.

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Injuries -
Crew Passengers Others

Fatal 3 0 2 cattle handle

Serious 0 0 0
MinorINone 0 0 0

Damage to Aircraft

The aircraft was destroyed

-
' Other Damage

dne

1.5 Personnel Information

The flightcrew had been trained and certificated in accordance

with the current Japanese and ICAO regulations and standards. (See
Appendix B.)

jy, Aircraft Information

The aircraft was certificated, equipped, and,maintained in
accordance with Japanese regulations and ICAO recommended practices.
The crew that flew JA 8054 to Anchorage reported the No. 2 DME as inoper-
ative. No maintenance was performed on the DME because there were no
parts available. There was no evidence of any other preexisting aircraft
problems or maintenance difficulties. (See Appendix C . )

The weight and balance were calculated to have been within the
established limits. The aircraft fuel load at takeoff was estimated to
have been about 117,200 pounds of Jet-AI.

-
31 The exact word could not be determined.
 The a i r c r a f t was equipped t o haul l i v e c a t t l e i n pens i n s t a l l e d
io the cabin*area. The pens a r e designed t o d i v i d e t h e c a t t l e i n t o
small groups so that t h e i r movement was r e s t r i c t e d i n any h o r i z o n t a l
direction. . T h e c a t t l e were not p o s i t i v e l y r e s t r a i n e d and were.able t o
d. move w i t h i n -t h e limits of t h e pens; t h e space f o r movement depended on
the number of cattle i n each pen. There were no v e r t i c a l r e s t r a i n t s .

Meteorological Information
$J The National Weather Service observation taken j u s t after t h e
accident was:

0639, Local - - partial obscuration, v & s i b i l i t y - - % @le,

fog; temperature--2O0F; dewpoint--18 F; wind--340 3 kns;
altimeter setting--29.59 in.Hg; runway 06 r i g h t v i s u a l
range--1,800 f t v a r i a b l e t o 5,000 f t , 6/10 of t h e sky
obscured by fog; ( a i r c r a f t mishap).
er
The wind speed record from an anemometer located near t h e
center of t h e a i r p o r t showed 2 kns between 0630 and 0640. The freezing
level was a t t h e surface. A t 0634 t h e fog a t t h e a i r p o r t was reported
by an inbound p i l o t t o be l o c a l i z e d over t h e a i r p o r t and t h e nearby
lake.

The inbound crew of J A 8054 s t a t e d t h a t they entered t h e fog

a t an a l t i t u d e of about 800 f t during t h e i r approach t o Anchorage and
broke out a t 250 t o 300 f t .
d
The accident occurred i n darkness with t h e v i s i b i l i t y r e s t r i c t e d
by fog.

1.8 Aids t o Navigation

Not involved.

Communications
1.9 f+
There were no.reported mechanical problems with a i r c r a f t t o
ground communications. However, some transmissions to t h e f l i g h t had t o
be repeated by t h e c o n t r o l l e r . / CkG.3 > rKb+
1
1.lo Aerodrome Information

Anchorage I n t e r n a t i o n a l Airport was equipped with t h r e e runways;

24L106R. 24R/06L, and 31/13. Runway 24L is 10,897 f t long and 150 f t
wide with a 0.3 percent upslope. The e l e v a t i o n of t h e departure end of
.. the runway is 124 f t . There are U.S. Standard ALSF-2 approach l i g h t s
1 .
installed a t t h e departure end of t h e runway and t h e runway is equipped
‘with high i n t e n s i t y runway l i g h t i n g and runway c e n t e r l i n e l i g h t i n g .

I
 - 6 -

The l i g h t s were operating without reported problems dur:ing t h e take!Off.

(See Appendix D.)

I n order t o t a x i t o runway 24L, t h e crew had t o t a x i southeast

on t h e parking ramp, northeast on a taxiway p a r a l l e l t o runway 24R,
c r o s s 24R. and t a x i down a diagonal taxiway connecting t h e runways t o
t h e a r r i v a l end of runway 24L.

The t e r r a i n from t h e departure end of t h e runway t o t h e a i r p o r t

perimeter road about 750 f t p a s t t h e end of t h e runway was r e l a t i v e l y
l e v e l . About 225 f t l e f t of t h e threshold l i g h t s , t h e t e r r a i n slopes
up t o a c r e s t of 148 f t about 1,000 f t p a s t t h e departure end of runway
24L. There is another c r e s t 153 f t high about 1,800 f t past t h e departure
end of t h e runway and 360 f t l e f t of t h e extended runway c e n t e r l i n e .
The a i r c r a f t s t r u c k both of these c r e s t s a f t e r i n i t i a l impact. (See
Appendix E.)

1.11 F l i g h t Recorders

The a i r c r a f t was equipped with a Sundstrand FA542 f l i g h t data

recorder (FDR) serial No. 3611, and a Collins cockpit voice recorder
(CVR) s e r i a l No. 1610. The recorders were both mounted i n t h e a f t
s e c t i o n of t h e fuselage. They were recovered s l i g h t l y sooted but with
no s i g n i f i c a n t damage.

A l l FDR parameters had been recorded c l e a r l y and a c t i v e l y with

no e v i d e n p of recorder malfunction o r abnormality. The l a s t 1:36.3
minutes were read out and t h e a l t i t u d e data were corrected to a barometric
pressure of 29.59 in.Hg t o convert t h e recorded pressure a l t i t u d e t o
mean sea level. No other corrections were made.

The CVR tape was transcribed i n i t s e n t i r e t y and comments i n

Japanese were t r a n s l a t e d by members of t h e CVR group. (See Appendix F.)

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

The a i r c r a f t first s t r u c k t h e ground about 1,031 f t p a s t t h e

departure threshold of runway 24L and about 179 f t l e f t of t h e extended
runway c e n t e r l i n e a t an elevation of 1 2 4 , f t . After i n i t i a l impact, t h e
a i r c r a f t continued t o t r a v e l on a southwesterly heading which diverged
t o t h e l e f t of t h e extended runway c e n t e r l i n e . The a i r c r a f t crossed t h e
a i r p o r t access road without marking i t and s t r u c k r i s i n g t e r r a i n a t an
e l e v a t i o n of about 140 f t . The a i r c r a f t broke up a t t h a t point.

The i n i t i a l impact mark was V shaped which widened to about 1 2

f t before i t l o s t d e f i n i t i o n . A short d i s t a n c e past t h a t point a ground
s c a r had been made by t h e No. 4 engine. A mark made by t h e No. 3 engine
appeared, followed successively by marks from t h e No. 1 engine, No. 2
engine and t h e l e f t wingtip. The magnetic bearing of t h e c e n t e r l i n e
 - 7 -

of the ground marks was about 230O. The wreckage a r e a was about 1,670
f t long $nd 390 f t wide. No a i r c r a f t components o r wreckage were found
outside t h i s area.
st
* The fuselage and wings broke i n t o s e v e r a l major sections; the

engines separated from the wings; and t h e landing gears sepa6ated from
the attaching s t r u c t u r e s . The f l a p s were extended 21' t o 23 ; t h e leading
edge s l o t s were open; t h e s p o i l e r panels were locked down; &he s t a b i l i z e r
or t was s e t 4.44' a i r c r a f t noseup; t h e rudder was displaced 7.5 t o t h e r i g h t ;
and t h e landing gears were r e t r a c t e d .

V The cockpit s e c t i o n was damaged by impact but t h e r e was no

ture f i r e damage. The cockpit f l o o r was displaced upward and the e n t i r e
occupiable area was disrupted. The cockpit s e a t s were damaged and i
de'tached from t h e i r attachments. Some occupants were still held i n the
seats by the r e s t r a i n t systems.

The main fuselage was broken i n t o t h r e e major s e c t i o n s t h a t

'were damaged and burned. The c a t t l e pens and c a t t l e were s c a t t e r e d
I throughout t h e fuselage wreckage.

The t a i l s e c t i o n separated from t h e fuselage and remained-.

intact. It had been damaged by impact but had l i t t l e f i r e damage. The
t a i l cone was bent up with compression buckles on t h e top surface. The
measurement'between fuselage s t a t i o n s 1730 and 1791 was 51.25 ins.
h rather than t h e nominal 6 1 ins. The t a i l cone was bent up 7'. The
horizontal s b i l i z e r jackscrews measured 6.75 ins. between the bottom
ric P
of the j a c k crew upper stop s e r r a t i o n s t o t h e top of t h e stop s e r r a t i o n s
on the sprocket. There was a s t r i k e mark on top of t h e t a i l cone 9 ins.
right of t h e t a i l cone c e n t e r l i n e . The t a i l cone was displaced t o t h e
l e f t and t h e end of the l e f t elevator inboard closure r i b had h i t t h e
t a i l cone and had made a crease, t h e crease correspanded t o an elevator
1 t r a i l i n g edge "up" position.

A l l f l i g h t control surfaces, wing f l a p s , and s p o i l e r panels

were found. The measurements of f l a p a c t u a t o r s ranged from 4 3/8 i n s .
t o 9% i n s . , equivalent t o f l a p extension of 21' t o 23'. The i n t e g r i t y
of the f l i g h t c o n t r o l system could not b e established but a l l t h e cables
examined displayed evidence of t e n s i l e f a i l u r e .

! The c a t t l e r e s t r a i n t web and holding pens were examined and

the web was found i n s t a l l e d and i n t a c t . The eight pens were t o r n f r e e
of the f l o o r attachment f i t t i n g s and were found i n t h e v i c i n i t y of the
fuselage wreckage. The s i d e s of the pen on t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e fuselage
were damaged only s l i g h t l y . However, t h e s i d e s of the pens from the
right s i d e of the fuselage were heavily damaged and some were fragmented.
The end panels, o r g a t e s , of t h e pens were i n t a c t . None of the gates
showed any severe bends. The damage p a t t e r n was consistent with f o r c e f u l
vement of the c a t t l e forward and to t h e r i g h t .

I
 - 8 -

,. .
I

The engines were examined and t h e damage sustained was consis-

t e n t w i t h high engine r o t a t i o n a t impact. Ten of t h e 1 2 i n s t a l l e d
engine a n t i - i c e valves were open. The o t h e r two were damaged and t h e
p o s i t i o n a t impact was not determined.

Samples of f u e l and o i l were taken from each engine .and analyzed.

A l l samples t e s t e d were normal except t h e o i l sample from No. 4 engine,
which had a s l i g h t l y h i g h chrome content. Examination of t h e recovered
system components gave no i n d i c a t i o n of p r e e x i s t i n g system f a i l u r e o r
malfunction.

The p i t o t heads were recovered and t h e i n l e t s were f r e e of

f o r e i g n material. The s t a t i c p o r t s were not recovered. The c a p t a i n ' s
static s e l e c t o r was i n t h e "normal" p o s i t i o n . The rudder power c o n t r o l
mechanism and t h e yaw channel computer were t e s t e d ; they both operated
satisfactorily.

Three "bugs" on t h e c a p t a i n ' s airspeed i n d i c a t o r were set a t 134,

148. and 160 kns and t h e speed comanand set at 170 kns. Three "bugs" on I

t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r s airspeed i n d i c a t o r were set a t 130, 158, and 160 kns.

and t h e speed command was set a t 170 kns. The c a l c u l a t e d r e f e r e n c e
speeds f o r t h i s f l i g h t with 23' f l a p s were V1--137 kns; VR--152 kns;
V2--161 kns. . .

The engine pressure r a t i o (EPR) instrument "bugs" wera-set a t

1.87, 1 . 8 p t o 1.87, 1.88 and 1.88 kor engine Nos. 1 through 4 , re-
s p e c t i v e l y . Takeoff EPR was 1.86 and climb EPR was 1.84. The
f u e l flow instruments a l l i n d i c a t e d a flow between 624 and 669 l b / h r .

The p i t c h trim compensator was "normal." The p i t c h t r i m in-

d i c a t o r was disconnected and t h e s t a b i l i z e r trim handle was i n a nose-
down position. The a u t o p i l o t f u n c t i o n s e l e c t o r was..aet a t " v e r t i c a l
speed" and t h e p i t c h knob i n d i c a t e d a descent of 500 fpm. The rudder
trim i n d i c a t o r was f u l l l e f t and t h e a i l e r o n trim i n d i c a t o r
was set a t "3R."
. I , , ' f ,
The windshield heat was " off," t h e c a p t a i n ' s . a n t i - i c e h e a t e r
was set a t "capt p i t o t , " a l l t h e engine a n t i - i c e switches were 'ion,"
and t h e scoop a n t i - i c e was "on."

The instrument l i g h t switches were on and a mixture of red and

white l i g h t i n g had been s e l e c t e d . The f u e l q u a n t i t y gauges i n d i c a t e d a
l a t e r a l l y balanced f u e l load. The a i r f o i l a n t i - i c e s e l e c t o r was " off"
and t h e t a i l de-ice switch was i n t h e "normal" p o s i t i o n .

The a i l e r o n and rudder hydraulic power shutoff l e v e r s were i n

o r near t h e "on" d e t e n t . A l l t h e engine a n t i - i c e c i r c u i t breakers were
closed.
 There was no evidence of preimpact f i r e , explosion, o r s t r u c t u r a l
- nalfunction.

-
The s t a l l warning system computer was recovered and checked;
it operated'within l i m i t s .

zed. 1.131 Medical and Pathological Inforrhation

Y
't
,**(' Autopsies i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e f i v e persons aboard t h e a i r c r a f t
died of multiple impact i n j u r i e s . There >was no evidence of any pre-
existing disease t h a t could have contributed t o t h e accident.

Toxicological s t u d i e s conducted on t h e f i v e persons were

negative f o r drugs. The carbon monoxide concentrations were 7 . 3 percent
saturation or less. No e t h y l alcohol was found except i n specimens
taken from the c a p t a i n ' s body.

The i n i t i a l blood alcohol l e v e l of t h e c a p t a i n was 298& 3,UsAfl&,9

&+
.34, percent
\
and- a v i t r e o u s alcohol l e v e l of 310 mgs p e r c e n t ~ ~ r e c
i n5 d
7
tests conducted w i t h i n 1 2 hours a f t e r t h e accident by t h e Alaska Medical ;
Laboratory. Additional t e s t s were conductec! on specimens from t h e
captains's body by t h e C i v i l Aeromedical I n s t i t u t e and they found a
blood alcohol l e v e l of 210 mgs percent and a v i t r e o u s l e v e l of 281 mgs 1 '
percent.

A blood alcohol l e v e l of 100 mgs percent i s considered t o be \>

legally i n t o x i c p t i n g f o r d r i v e r s i n t h e S t a t e of Alaska. Thp National \.--4-

u
A number of persons who were i n contact with t h e c a p t a i n during t h e 1
20 hours he was i n Anchorage were interviewed. The witnesses' statements ;
conflicted when they were asked if t h e c a p t a i n had been drinking o r
showed evidence of drinking.
i
Of t h e 13 persons interviewed regarding t h e c a p t a i n ' s a c t i v i t i e s
before r e p o r t i n g t o t h e a i r p o r t , 5 c l o s e acquaintances s a i d t h a t he c
showed no s i g n s of drinking o r t h a t he had not had a drink i n t h e i r
presence. S i x persons who were not c l o s e l y acquainted with t h e c a p t a i n
1
stated t h a t he had been drinking o r showed s i g n s of being under t h e
influence of alcohol w i t h i n t h e 1 2 hours before t h e scheduled f l i g h t .

i
 - 10 -
The all
1.14 5 -
Fire
midpoints of
Although some witnesses stated that the aircraft was on fire altitude tra
before impact, no evidence was found during the wreckage examination to
support their statements. Scattered ground fires erupted between the
point of initial impact and the access road. There was also a major !

ground fire in the primary wreckage area.

The airport fire department dispatcher was notified of'the

crash about 0636. There was a delay in finding the wreckage because of
the fog and because the controller did not specify the end of the runway
where the crash was located. Response time was estimated to be about 5
minutes.
In addition to three firetrucks from the 'airport fire department,
the city fire department and the Alaskan Air National Guard responded.
An Alaska State Police helicopter was also called. Wqter was transported
to the fire area by two tanker trucks and about 9,000 gallons of extinguishi
agent and 250 gallons of light water were expend'ed by the airport fire
department. Ambulances, heavy equipment, and lighting vehicles were
also used in the firefighting and rescue operations.
..
1.15 Survival Aspects
This accident was not survivable for the five aircraft occupants '
because the cockpit area was too severely deformed.
e
1.16
J
Tests and Research

1.16.1 Performance Evaluation

. .

The performance group attempted to define the aircraft's

takeoff performance and to compare that performance to other DC-8's in
similar conditions to determine whether JA 8054's performance was
standard. In addition, the group examined the possibility of an accretion
of airframe ice on JA 8054 and the effects of ice accretion on the
aircraft's performance.

The flight recorder readouts of load factor, heading, and

altitude were plotted in engineering units and the equivalent airspeed
was estimated. The calculated equivalent airspeed was derived by correcting
a fairing of the recorded indicated airspeed for alternate static system
uosition error and for takeoff rotation effects. The point @f liftoff
'from the runway was selected to coincide with the min&um altitude
recorded in the typical dip on the altitude trace.
 - 11 -
The-altitude p r o f i l e was prepared by f a i r i n g a l i n e through
the midpoints of an envelope, which enclosed t h e datum p o i n t s read from
a l t i t u d e t r a c e . This was c o r r e c t e d f o r a l t e r n a t e s t a t i c system
position e r r o r and f o r ground e f f e c t . The e f f e c t s of t r a n s i e n t v a r i a t i o n s
in s t a t i c pressure sens'ed i n t h e s t a l l made i t d i f f i c u l t t o use t h e
poststall a l t i t u d e d a t a f o r any purpose o t h e r than trend a n a l y s i s .

The v e r t i c a l a c c e l e r a t i o n p r o f i l e was e s t a b l i s h e d by connecting

the datum points by s t r a i g h t l i n e s . I n t e g r a t i o n of t h e v e r t i c a l a c c e l e r a t i o n
resulted i n s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t a l t i t u d e curves, a l l of which showed
considerable d e v i a t i o n from t h e a l t i t u d e s recorded by t h e FDR--even when
corrected f o r r o l l and p i t c h angles. The i n t e g r a t i o n results a r e s e n s i t i v e
t o the assumed rate of climb a t t h e p o i n t where t h e i n t e g r a t i o n was
begun. I n addition, a d e v i a t i o n of i-0.05 G was recorded throughout t h e
, takeoff r o l l and had t o be accounted f o r . V e r t i c a l a c c e l e r a t i o n i s
recorded every 0.1 second and a l t i t u d e i s recorded every 1 . 0 second.
Therefore, t h e performance group decided that short-term d e v i a t i o n s of 1
li 2 seconds i n t h e rate of climb might be apparent on t h e v e r t i c a l
acceleration t r a c e but not apparent on t h e a l t i t u d e t r a c e . As a r e s u l t
of these s t u d i e s , however, t h e performance group concluded t h a t only
trends i n a l t i t u d e changes could be e s t a b l i s h e d by use of t h e s e data.

A l l t h e t r a c e s deviated s i g n i f i c a n t l y during t h e last few

aeconds of t h e recording, and t h e spacing between d a t a p o i n t s on a l l
traces indicated that t h e f o i l d i d n o t move c o n s t a n t l y .

The C w r a n s c r i p t was reviewed and p e r t i n e n t comments and

aounds were e x t r a c t e d and timed. The timing of t h e c a l l o u t s a t 80 kns,
VI, V l , and V 2 were compared t o a CVR t a p e of another JAL DC-8 which
took off under s i m i l a r conditions. Frequency spectrum diagrams of t h e
went times were made from t h e CVR t a p e s of both aircraft. Eighty
knots, VI, and VR occurred i n both c a s e s near t h e same elapsed times.
But the time between t h e c a l l f0.r r o t a t i o n and V was about 1 . 5 seconds
longer i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e t a p e from JA 8052. when compared t o t h e
other DC-8 takeoff tape.

Sounds recorded i n t h e cockpit of J A 8054 have been i d e n t i f i e d

18 a i r c r a f t b u f f e t a s s o c i a t e d with an approach t o a s t a l l . These sounds
were first recorded s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e c a l l of V 2 and increased i n frequency
dnd i n t e n s i t y u n t i l masked by t h e louder sounds of t h e s t a l l warning
8ystem and impact. The stall warning system f i r s t sounded about 1 . 2
aeconds before t h e sounds of impact and t h e s e l a t t e r sounds l a s t e d about
0.2 seconds before e l e c t r i c a l power was removed from t h e CVR.

The CVR and FDR d a t a were c o r r e l a t e d t o provide a timed event

profile of t h e accident from t h e beginning of t h e takeoff r o l l t o t h e
final impact and a p r o f i l e of t h e f l i g h t a f t e r l i f t o f f . (See Appendix
,C.) The c o r r e l a t i o n was corrected by a f a c t o r of 3 percent f o r a
 - 12 -

d i f f e r e n c e i n elapsed times between events on t h e FDR tape and t h e CVR

tape.,. I n i t i a l impact, a s recorded on t h e FDR t r a c e , was assumed t o have
been 0.6 second a f t e r t h e last r e l i a b l e d a t a p o i n t s on t h e a i r s p e e d ,
a l t i t u d e s , and heading t r a c e s and w i t h i n 1.0 second before t h e i n i t i a l
recorded sounds of a i r c r a f t breakup. The Safety Board concluded t h a t
i n i t i a l contact of t h e t a i l cone with t h e ground may have been masked by
t h e sound of t h e s t a l l warning system and t h a t t h e subsequent impact of
t h e r i g h t wing and engines was t h e f i r s t recorded sound of impact.

T h i s c o r r e l a t i o n indicated t h a t V I , VR, and V2 were c a l l e d

when those a i r s p e e d s should' have been displayed on t h e airspeed i n d i c a t o r
i n t h e cockpit. A i r c r a f t r o t a t i o n appeared t o have been w i t h i n 1
second of t h e c a l l , and t h e a i r c r a f t l i f t e d o f f , as defined by t h e d i p
i n t h e a l i t i t u d e t r a c e , within 3 seconds a f t e r r o t a t i o n began. (See
Appendix G.)

The i n i t i a l r a t e of climb after l i f t o f f appeared t o be higher

than t h a t normally achieved by o t h e r DC-8's i n s i m i l a r conditions.

JA 8054 reached a maximum recorded airspeed of about 164 kns;

t h e airspeed began t o decrease when t h e sound of b u f f e t was recorded on i
t h e CVR. A maximum a l t i t u d e of 284 f t (160 f t above t h e runway) was
reached and, as t h e sound of b u f f e t increased, t h e heading t r a c e i n d i c a t
a t u r n t o t h e l e f t ; t h e v e r t i c a l a c c e l e r a t i o n t r a c e i n d i c a t e d B decrease
i n v e r t i c a l loading; and t h e airspeed continued t o decrease.' The a i r -
speed t r a c e became e r r a t i c a s though t h e r e was a disturbance i n t h e
a i r f l o w d e n s e d by t h e a l t e r n a t e p i t o t s t a t i c system. During t h e 3 t o 4
seconds b e f o r e impact, b u f f e t sound increased, t h e v e r t i c a l load
f a c t o r increased r a p i d l y , and t h e r a t e of descent decreased suddenly.

The recorded airspeed was converted t o groundspeed and t h e

groundspeed and heading were used t o c a l c u l a t e a ground t r a c k from
l i f t o f f t o impact. Estimated s i d e s l i p angles.provlded by t h e manufactur
f o r p r e s t a l l and p o s t s t a l l f l i g h t were incorporated i n t o t h e ground
t r a c k c a l c u l a t i o n s . The derived impact p o i n t compared favorably with
t h e a c t u a l impact p o i n t , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e corrected FDR d a t a were
substantially correct. ., I

, ..
1.16.2 Computer Simulations
. .
The Safety Board reviewed computer simulations conducted by ''

t h e manufacturer and t h e o p e r a t o r , and although t h e assumptions used

were d i f f e r e n t , t h e conclusions were s i m i l a r . Both s t u d i e s indicated
t h a t a i r c r a f t a c c e l e r a t i o n t o near V was normal but t h a t a c c e l e r a t i o n
from V t o V2 was less than normal. RBoth s t u d i e s indicated t h a t t h e
aircra!t must have been t o t a t e d t o an excessive p i t c h angle
 - 13 -
just before it reached V in order to have produced the FDR recorded
data. FinalEy, both stdies concluded that the aircraft stalled just
after V2 was called and that the stall continued and deepened to an angle
of attack of at least 18' until impact.
The group noted that by using a normal coefficient of lift to
&yze the flightpath of the aircraft, the aircraft reached a higher
peak altitude than that recorded by the FDR. Various assumptions regarding
vertical acceleration, engine thrust levels, angle of attack, and control
manipulations were applied to computer-generated flightpaths. Calculations
showed that, in order to approximate the recorded flightpath, the maximum
coefficient of lift had to be reduced about 15 percent and thatfhe
.
aircraft stalled at an angle of attack^ abouf,~
/
'2 1638s than normal?
In view of the normal performance of the aircraft at Moses
Lake and in view of the meterological conditions at Anchorage, the
possibility of airframe icing was examined.

Conditions were favorable for the accretion of rime icing from

the time the aircraft approached Anchorage until the crash. While glaze
ice waS also possible, rime ice would likely have predominated where
airflow impinged on the structure, mainly around the stagnation point of
airflow on the leading edge of the airfoils.

The temperature of the fuel remaining in the wing tanks after

landin was calculated to be about -8.3'F and the temperature of the
fuel atded at Anchorage was'about 32 F. Calculations show that tlie
temperature of ttd fuel in the wing tanks after refueling ranged from 20
to 25.5'F. Because of the fog at 20°F and the below-freezfng
temperature of the skin above the fuel tanks, the supe-water
e f x c o u l d have accumulated on the wing and f o r m Z & % m e
- d suclircnr@as-~as-fed~ Liy- E i T h e r ' 8 F r Z G z ~

d& crewman, there was sufficient time between the preflight check
r@d the takeoff for enough h e to form to degrade the takeoff performance
of JA 8034. However, the exact amount of icing could not be determined.
Typically, roughness on the upper wing surface, such as rime
ice, which begins at the leading edge and extends toward the trailing
edge, will reduce the maximum lift coefficient and consequently the
angle of attack at which stall occurs. Roughness also will increase
poststall drag. These effects will become more severe as the surface
roughness extends farther -chordwise and may'be accompanied by an increase
in both the angle of attack for zero lift and the wing parasite drag.
Deflection of trailing edge flaps tends to increase these effects.

Roughness elements of about 1/10,000 of the wing chord can

adversely affect the maximum lift coefficient. Scaling the data to the
DC-8-62 indicates that if roughness elements of 1/32 in. are closely
 - 14 7

L i s t r i l p t e d along t h e leading edge of t h e wing and some p o r t i o n of i t s

r s u r f a c e , t h e maximum l i f t c o e f f i c i e n t would be reduced by a s muc
e r c e n t . A s u r f a c e roughness element of about 1 / 7 2 i n . d i s t r i b u
on t h e upper s u r f a c e of t h e f u l l span of t h e DC-8-62 wing would degrad
t h e m a x + n u m lift c o e f f i c i e n t by a s much a s 1 5 percent.

1.17 Ahditional Information

1.17.1 S t a l l Warning System

The s t a l l warning system induces v i b r a t i o n s i n t o t h e c o n t r o l

columns i f t h e a i r p l a n e approaches a s t a l l condition during f l i g h t and
provides a p o s i t i v e s t a l l warning which cannot be confused with o t h e r
warning systems i n t h e cockpit. The system c o n s i s t s of a l i f t transducer,
~~

l i f t computer, c o n t r o l col& shaker, t e s t r e l a y , and test switch.

The l i f t transducer i s t h e sensing mechanism f o r t h e s t a l l

warnlng system and i s l o c a t e d i n t h e r i g h t wing leading edge. The
transducer i s e l e c t r i c a l l y heated f o r i c i n g p r o t e c t i o n whenever t h e
" anti- icing meter" s e l e c t i o n switch i s i n any p o s i t i o n o t h e r than "off."
The vane of t h e l i f t transducer protrudes through she lower s u r f a c e of
t h e wing leading edge so t h a t when t h e a i r p l a n e is i n f l i g h t , aero-
dynamic f o r c e s on t h e vane a c t i v a t e an e l e c t r i c a l s i g n a l which i s
transmitted t o t h e l i f t computer. The computer p r o c e s s e s , t h e s i g n a l
from t h e transducer and, when a p p r o p r i a t e , completes a c i r c u i t t o t h e
s t i c k s h a k e r on t h e c a p t a i n ' s c o n t r o l column. The s t i c k s h a k e r warns t h e
crew of a p a l l when it shakes and knocks t h e c o n t r o l column; t h e warning
can be f e l t and heard on both c o n t r o l columns. The system is disengaged
when t h e a i r c r a f t is on t h e ground and t h e nose gear oleo s t r u t is
compressed.

Although t h e test switch .is used t o check t h e c o n t i n u i t y of

t h e e l e c t r i c a l c i r c u i t s , including t h e s t i c k s h a k e r , i t does not t e s t
transducer o p e r a t i o n .

I n f l i g h t , t h e transducer w i l l normally i n i t i a t e a s t a l l warning

a t an airspeed about 3 t o 6 percent above s t a l l speed. In t h i s c a s e t h e
s t a l l speed was about 140 kns, and t h e s t i c k s h a k e r would have been
expected t o o p e r a t e a t an airspeed between 144 t o 146 kns.

1.18 New I n v e s t i g a t i o n Techniques

None

8 2. ANALYSIS

The crewmembers were c e r t i f i c a t e d , t r a i n e d , and q u a l i f i e d f o r

t h e f l i g h t i n accordance with Japanese and ICAO r e g u l a t i o n s and standards.
 - 15 -
..
All f l i g h t crewmembers had adequate rest periods before r e p o r t i n g f o r

The a i r c r a f t was c e r t i f i c a t e d , maintained, and equipped i n

accordance with Japanese and ICAO r e g u l a t i o n s and standards. There was
- M evidence of i n - f l i g h t f i r e , s t r u c t u r a l f a i l u r e , o r f l i g h t c o n t r o l or
powerplant malfunctions.

The Derformance s t u d i e s i n d i c a t e d t h a t normallv t h e stall ~~ 7v s,, :'.

f
- I

warning system should have a c t i v i a t e d when th'e a i r c r a t t s t a l l e d a t . o r *

j%t a f t e r reaching, V 7 i n s t e a d of about 1 second before impact. Although .',,
.I
all t h e system components were not recovered. and, therefore; could not

I
be examined, t h e CVR i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e system was checked during t h e ,:
pretakeoff checks and t h e crew was apparently s a t i s f i e d with t h e test. ',,d'
.There were s e v e r a l reasons why t h e system may not have functioned,
including changes i n performance caused by a i r f o i l i c e , i c e on t h e
.transducer, o r improper c a l i b r a t i o n . The Safety Board w a s unable t o
~~

determine why t h e s t a l l warning system did mt a r t i v a t e P a r 1 i . w

accident sequence.

The s e t t i n g s of t h e s t a b i l i z e r trim, landing f l a p s , and slats

,were appropriate f o r t h e t a k e o f f .

$ Rotation was probably i n i t i a t e d when t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r c a l l e d

R. Based on t h e performance evaluation and t h e computer simulations.
ed
- 16 -
 - 17 -
t It &a extremely difficult for c r e A e r s to challenge a
ptain even when the captain offers a threat to the safety of the
, . ~ ,
ght. The concept of command authority and its inviolate nature, v,*...*,.?p,,

ept in the,caseof incapacitation, has become a pratice without

As a result, second-in-command pilots react indifferently in
where they should be more assertive. Rather than submitting
econd-in-command pilots should be encouraged
e - Y i - - n
dvice-~could.+esultin the pilot-in-command's
,
L 1 ,
~ ,
s actions. p , .: < . , , f , ,
..-.-~--..-,.,.,I,,,
j, .is-. ~. i
.' I

41
The Safety Board has previously stated - , and continues to
ieve, that the second-in-command is an integral part of the operationa
trol of a flight, is a fail-safe factor, and has a share of the duty
responsibility to assure that the flight is operated safely. Therefor
second-in-command should not passiv'ely condone any operation of the
He should affirmatively

W Q
-- -_
advise
~.
,,'\
ety-offlight..~is i n ,jeqprar_dy,
X
the flight . is
,.... ~
Safety Board could not determine what transpired between
remembers before they boarded the aircraft, but there is little or
!
~i' ,
that the second-in-command or the flight engineer expressed 1
ht. In addition, there is no i
ent the flight from proceeding I
1

The Safdy Board has on two previous occasions addressed re-

ations regarding need to emphasize the dangers of unprofessional
rmance by flightcrew members. On August 28, 1972, the Board recommended
t the Air Line Pilots Association and Allied Pilots Association
lement a program to provide means for peer group monitoring and
ciplining any air carrier pilot who may display any unprofessional
No response has been received to these recommendations.
On October 8, 1974: the Safety Board recommended to the Federal
iation Administration (FAA) that they develop an air carrier pilot
gram, similar to the General Aviation Accident Prevention Program,
twould emphasize the dangers of unprofessional performance in all
88s of flight. The FAA agreed with the recommendation and reported
tmany airlines have established accident prevention programs and
uiodically conduct seminars on this subject. The FAA participates in
hese seminars and will continue to do s o . The FAA also reported
 - 21 -
5. APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

INVESTIGATION

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the

lccident a t about 1400 e.s.t., January 13, 1977. Investigators were
lispatched immediately to Anchorage, Alaska. Working gKOUpS were
letablished for operations, weather, structures, powerplants, systems,

.
~unanfactors, f l i g h t data recorder, cockpit voice recorder, and
leintenance records.

Parties t o the investigation who Cssisted the Board included:

lapan Air Lines; Federal Aviation Administration; &Donuell-Douglas
Lircraft Co.; P r a t t and Whitney Aircraft Division, United Aircraft Corp.,
m u d International Federation of A i r L i n e P i l o t s .

This investigation w a s conducted i n accordance with ICAO Annex

13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The Japanese
hvernment furnished an accredited representative who participated
b the investigation.
 I
:.,/

.
u 6''2--
- 22 -

APPENDIX B

CREW INFORMATION

Captain Hugh L . Marsh

Captain Marsh, 53, was employed by Japan Air Lines June 24, 1969.
He was r a t e d as a DC-8 c a p t a i n February 9, 1970. He held a JCAB a i r l i n e
t r a n s p o r t r a t i n g No. 001168, issued October 30, 1969, and a second
c l a s s navigator r a t i n g No. 000563, issued September 10, 1970.
Captain Marsh was type- rated i n the DC-8 October 30, 1969. H i s JCAB
f i r s t - c l a s s medical c e r t i f i c a t e was issued September 18, 1976, and
would have expired March 17, 1977. (A r e s t r i c t i o n on h i s medical c e r t i f i c a t e
required him t o wear c o r r e c t i v e g l a s s e s f o r near v i s i o n while e x e r c i s i n g
t h e p r i v i l e g e s of h i s c e r t i f i c a t e . ) Captain Marsh had logged 23,252
hours f l y i n g time, including 4,040-hours i n DC- 8's. He had a l s o logged
1,186 hours n i g h t time and 187 hours instrument time. H i s l a s t l i n e
check and r o u t e check were completed J u l y &., 1976 and h i s last proficiency
check on September 4, 1976. H e had logged 153 hours including 83 hours
n i g h t time and 1 0 hours instrument time i n t h e preceding 90 days. He had
been on duty.5.5 hours in the 24jhours before r e p o r t i n g f o r duty on
January 13. 1977. H i s duty time on the d a t e o f , t h e accident was 1 . 5 hours.

Copilot Kunihika Akitani

Copilot Akitani, 31, was employed by JAL May 6, 1970. He was

r a t e d as a pC-8 second o f f i c e r December 26, 1972, and as a DC-8'cepilot
August 1, 1976. He held JCAB commercial l i c e n s e No. 004100, dated
January 25, 1972; f l i g h t engineers c e r t i f i c a t e No. 000947, dated December 16,
1970; and instrument c e r t i f i c a t e No. 002297, dated May 10, 1972. He also

1976, and h i s l a s t simulator check on November 15, 1976. He had been on dut
2.8 hours in t h e 24-hour period before r e p o r t i n g f o r t h i s f l i g h t . He
had flown 38 hours instrument time i n t h e preceding 90 days.

F l i g h t Engineer Nobumasa Yokokawa

F l i g h t Engineer Yokokawa. 35, was employed by JAL A p r i l 1. 1960.

H e was r a t e d as a f l i g h t engineer i n DC- 8's on November 20, 1960. He
a l s o held f l i g h t engineer r a t i n g s in CV-880 and B-747. His f l i g h t
engineer c e r t i f i c a t e No. 000306, was issued August 5, 1966. He had logged
a t o t a l of 4,920 hours as a f l i g h t engineer, including 2,757 hours in the
DC-8. His medical c e r t i f i c a t e was issued January 1, 1975, and would have
expired January 25, 1977. H i s l a s t r o u t e check was completed February 11, 1
He had been on duty 5 hours during t h e 24 hours before r e p o r t i n g f o r t h i s
f l i g h t . He logged 89 hours i n t h e 90 days preceding t h e accident.
 - 23 -
....
.
APPENDIX C

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The a i r c r a f t was a McDonnell-Douglas DC-8-62F. JA 8054, s e r i a l

nufactured December 2 , 1971. The a i r c r a f t had accumulated
s flying time on the date of the acc'ident, including 8,708
urs since the last major inspektion and 45 hours since the l a s t check,

The a i r c r a f t was equipped w i t h 4 JT3D-3BDL P r a t t and Whitney

S e r i a l No. Total Time Time Since Heavy Maintenance

669362 26,057 8,574

669385 23,415 6,242
669766 19,801 5,935
669413 21,513 727

The maintenance records were reviewed for the period of

anuary 14, 1976, through January 13, 1977. No discrepancies were
iscovered t h a t 'could be associated with the accident mechanism.
 -a:
Roger Eight Z

0#6rr TIVII: *an Air Eighty F

+ w:Roger Eight Z
*S JAW Ugh. Ground E
1 lWR: &pan Air Eighty I

. . Zv- e JAUOB4: Roger hold shm

K TIII: Qkay Japan Air Ei
of runway two fot
* 11111: Japan Air Eighty I

4@ TWR: Japan Air Eighty 1

J, y u 6 4 : Ah Eight Zero
i m:Okay you can begi
-: Roger Eight 2
-54: Okay. Now ut
m:Roger
 n Air Eight Zero Five Four as Ten Forty F
lHeavy taxi runway two four left.
Roger Eight Zero Five Four, two four left. ,,

Air Eighty Fifty FOULHold short of runwq two four left 1629:45 TWR:, Japan Air Eight Zero Five Four did you
1h nRoger Eight Zero Five. ... 162950 JAL-: Eh--eh---EightZero Five Four say a
. ,
Ugh. Ground Eight Zero Five Four say againjease @) 162952 TWR:i .y a one ai hty on the runway or str;
%&uency a n i taxi back..
n Air Eighty Five Four hold short of runwa$ix left
la 163007 J A L W Eh-Japan Air Eight Zero Five Foul
Roger hold short six I& Eight Zero Five Fqr
@ 163011 TWR:': Japn Air Eight Zero Five F a r a one eit
sy Japan Air Eighty Fifty Four you're going$ r u n w y two four l e f t hold short right turn off the runway and taxi bad
runway two four right. dbby in your taxi.

an Air Eighty Fifty Four. You are in front of he terminal now is that cwreet
@ 1mo:z 'JAW.
E i h t Zero Five Four moving.
1.631:38 J A W : Eighty Five Four what can we expec
sn Air Eighty Fifty Four are you holding uh +t south of the terminal
Ah Eight Zero Five Four holding now. @ 1631:42 TWR:iOK Eight Zero Five Four strai
y you can begin taxi t o runway two four lefand hold short of runway two four right.
Y?
you're on runway two four rig t turn
--
a h u t a hundred and twenty (legaet'
rid;
ahead

Roger Eight Zero Five Four clear taxi two fdr len hold short two four right. r l e f t and you've been on

Okay. Now uh we're moving Japan Air. : Okay thank you.

?r w are welcome
Ugh Tower Japan Air Eight Zero Five Four M y for takeoff. : We're turning right to two four left.
iight Zero Five Four hold short ofthe runwq traffic landing six right. Japan Air Eight Zero Five Four righ
lold short roger.
lapan Air-hold short-we're on the runway 1
1 m . 1 7 TWR: Jmpp Ai! Eight Zero Five Four taxi into I
ou ngMng past the uh hold point on run
h we are going past now Eight Zera
I you're on two four right.
Jgh we're two four left Zero Five Four ready for takeo
rh-Tower, Japan Air Eight Zero ...
dimb on COUCSBwe*bound cleared I
 T'

D:45 TWR: Japan Air Eight Zero Five Four did you copy
2950 JAL80M: Eh--eb--Eight Zero Five Four say again.
W:52 TWR:. Okay a one ei hty on the runway or straight ahead down to the next intersection a right turn off this
frequency a d taxi back.
$0:07 JAL8064: Eh-Japan Air Eight Zero Five Four say again please
30:ll TWR: Japan Air Eight Zero Five F a r a one ei hty on the runway or strai ht ahead to the next intersection
a rlpht turn off the runway and tax1 b a d down to the approash en8 of runway two four left and no
&lay in your taxi.
10:25 JAL8QM: Eight Zero Five Four moving.
31:38 J A L W : Ewhty Five Four what can we expect

a
31:42 TWR: OK Eight Zero Five Four strai ht ahead and you're approaching an intersection for your information
you'm.on runwa two four rig t turn right the intersection yau're just appmachin it'll be uh -..about
--
ja about a hunlred and twenty degreeturn back to your ri$t and then up to ant! hold short of
' ~ n w a two
y four left and you've been on runway two four nght, and uh should be able to get you off
in just a second.
~

3208 JAL+: Okay thank you.

3210 TWR: I You are welcome
3 2 4 4 JAW&: We're turning right to two four left.
3247 TWR: /Okay Japan Air Eight Zero Five Four right turn back to runwny two four left.

Lou
33:17 TWR: k p A i l Eight Zero Five Four @xi into position and hold runway two four left and advise when
re going part the uh hold pomt on runway two four left.
Ugh we are going past now Eight Zero Five Four.
Eight Zero Five Four ready for takeoff two four left.
t Zero Five Four uh-you are approaching runway four left at this time.
Affirmativdight Zero Five Four.
y climb on c o u m westbound cleared for takeoff.
E@t Zero Five Four clear for takeoff.

I 1 I
I
. . NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOAR1
WASHINGTON, D.C.

i TAXIIWG ROUTE OF JAL 8054

ANCHORAGE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
i JANUARY 13,1977
1
 . ~

/'

' . i'l
__II
 VIEWOF INITIAL IMPACT

Ti4 ENGINE NACELLI mc*r U M K l

IP STRIKE M A W

--

.
SPILLAGE AREA
SPOTTY GROUND FIRE

L7

. I
 ..

E ASSY. F S l W lP/N 5773257.261 R.M PIECEOFPYLONPANEL

R LATCH MECHANISM
ADES (L VANES
LH AFT (PIN 6757519.501)
ENG. SIN sBBo131 IJAL SIN 0301
L IP/N 6618510d141
IP/N 57575155011 IS/N 1 4 6 JAL)
ON DUCT (PIN 5757513.WI) IWN m S ]
R.21 PIECE OF ENGINE COWL
R.22 14 FOOT SECTION OF WING
R-23 ENGINE COWL
R-24 ENGINE NOSE BULLET
R.25 ENGINE NOSE COWL IPiN 57575155031 IJAL SIN 008)
R.26 WHEEL (L TIRE ASSY. OUTBOARD STK 158 IJAL S/N
R.27 HYDRAULIC ACTUATOR (PIN571561OaSo1G)
R.28 LEFT WING (FOLDED)
R-23 INTAKE COWL
RJO m s . l t 4 ENGINE PYLON
R 3 1 REVERSER ASSAY. WN 056 OR 0 5 8 )
R 3 2 CLAMSHELL ASSY.
R 3 J COWL W O R
R.34 FUSELAGE AIR CONDITIONING PACK
R.35 ENGINE COWL DOOR
R.% ws.tl4 ENGINE IS/N f f i e m )
R.37 TAIL SECTION
R-38 SECTION OF RIGHT WING
R.39 ENGlNEPYLONUALSIN015 W S . # I )
Rd0 FQS.tll ENGINE IS/NB69362)
R d 1 RIGHTMAIN LANDINGGEAR ISIN R%51
R 4 2 COCKPIT SECTION
R 4 3 18 FOOT SECTION OF RIGHT WING ROOT WITH 18 FOOT P '
FUSELAGE (LTE FLAPS
R . U LEFT MAIN LANOING GEAR ISIN L 9 U I
Rd5 POS.#3 ENGINE IS/Nffi97ffi)
R 4 ENGINE PYLON ms.431
R47 FWD. AUX TANk, LEFTSIDE PALLET FLOOR 125 FOOT:
R d 8 UPPER FUSELAGESHELL(LPIECESOF FLAPS
849 14 FOOT PIECES OF RIGHT WING TIP
R-50 SECTION OF OUTBOARD RIGHT WING WITH SLOTS. NP FL

1 w o ' LIT6 UII IF- TWIIESWLD)

F-- - - - ~ - - + - - - 4 - - - - t - - - - ~ -
iINE NACELLE 8 T R t K I Y U K ,

DINE NACELLE STRIKE UR)

S TM M11K m,
FUSELAGE TAIL-
FIRST MARK 4N PAW. 1IH t#
k . 1 4 START OF HILL RISE (€LEV. IZSMSL)
,

STRIKE MAmK \
\
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY @A((
WASHINGTON, D.C.
WRECKAGE DISTRIBUTION CHP RT
I JAPAN AIRLINES COMPANY, LTD
It Dc8-62F, 1118054
" 6 E INTERNATH)NN AIRPW
ANCHORAGE, ALASKA
! Jmuaty 13, 1977
: ~* ~ ... V
~~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~~~ ~~ ~~~~
 - 29 -
APPENDIX F

T&bNSCRIPT OF A COLLINS COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER, S/N 1610,

W O V E D FROM THE JAPAN AIRLINES DOUGLAS DC-8
AT ANCHORAGE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
ANCHOIORAGE. ALASKA, JANUARY 13, 1977

-
LEGEND
CAM Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source
RDO Radio transmission from accident aircraft
-1 Voice identified as Captain
-2 Voice identified as First Officer
-3 Voice identified as Flight Engineer
-1 Voice unidentified
ANC OCANC Anchorage Oceanic
ANC TWR Anchorage Tower
IC Intercom
ANC GND Anchorage Ground
ST- 1 Sand Truck 1
/'
c-47u Miscellaneous aircraft
NU-6 Miscellaneous aircraft
ALRlO2 Miscellaneous aircraft
PU-4 Miscellaneous a'ircraft
N655MA Miscellaneous aircraft
ATIS Airport Terminal Information Service
T: Translation from Japanese
* Unintelligible word
Y Nonpertinent word
x Break in continuity
0 Questionable text
(( 1) Editorial insertion
___ Pause
Note: Times are expressed in Grenwich Mean Time. t
 AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME & TIME &

SOURCE CONTENT
‘z
1606:34
CAM- 2 Okay f i v e n i n e f o u r zero zero

CAM- 1 Five nine, check

CAM- 2 One seven zero, okay

CAM- 1 0 kay

CAM- 2 Number, okay?

1 CAM-1 Okay --- number two Bethel i s n o r t h

s i x zero, ah, ---
f o u r seven one

CAM- 2 Check

CAM- 1 West one s i x one, f o u r n i n e three

CAM-2 Check

CAM- 1 Spot n o r t h s i x one, one zero s i x

CAM-2 Check

CAM-1 West, one f o u r nine, f i v e n i n e one

/

CAM-2 Check
 tm.
.A
SOURCE CONTENT a-
MINT GND T: May I *?
CAM- 2 North f i v e zero, zero zero zero F/ E T: Eh- w a i t a moment, stand by please 1
M I N T GNO T: Hai roger
1603: 39
CAM-2 Check, east one s i x zero, zero zero z e h ,
check, number seven, north four four, zero
zero zero, check east one f i v e zero, zero
zero zero, check, number eight, north four
zero, one f i v e zero, check east one four
five, zero zero zero
CAM- ? *
I
w
CAM- 2 Check, number nine, north three seven, four w
e i g h t zero, check east one f o u r two, zero 1
zero zero, check
CAM- 1 Number nine
CAM-2 Okay
CAM- 1 Okay *, north three seven four e i g h t zero,
east one f o u r two zero zero zero
CAM-2 Check
CAM- 1 (*) north four zero one f i v e zero, one
f o u r f i v e zero zero zero
CAM-2 Check
CAM- 1 Number seven north four four north, one
f i v e zero east *
CAM-2 Check
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS
TIME h TIME h I. 6
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT e..,. cd

CAM ((Sound o f cough)) L

3
E
CAM-1 Six, north f i v e zero, east one s i x zero
CAM-2 Check
! 1606: 06
CAM- 1 NO problem --- number --- f i v e north
f i v e four
CAM-2 Check
CAM- 1 East one seven two
I CAM-2 Check
I
W
N
I
CAM- 1 * north f i v e seven zero zero
~

CAM-2 Check
CAM- 1 East one eighty
CAM-2 Check
CAM- 1 (*) keep em happy, north f i v e zero
four zero zero
CAM- 1 West

Captain, f i v e zero? Five nine

Okay f i v e nine
 1607:lO
ANC TWR Speedbird n i n e eighty.sevenq:..ro$w,
disregard %
CAM- 1 Okay *...
CAM- 2 **
CAM- 1 Yes please
CAM- 2 T: We've g o t " before f i v e minutes?"

CAM- 3 T: Eh?
I
CAM-2 T: "Before f i v e minutes", please W
W

CAM- 3 T: Hai I

CAM ((Sound o f c l i c k s l i k e using a r a t c h e t ) )

1607: 35
CAM-2 S t a r t i n g engine
CAM- 1 Yes

CAM- 1 Ah --- l e t ' s have the l o c a l v i s i b i l i t y

CAM-2 Captain

CAM-2 Ah --- according ATIS's quarter ---

q u a r t e r m i l e fog %
+d
1607:50 m
RDO-2 Anchorage Oceanic, Japan Air e i g h t ;
3
zero f i v e four, good morning
-I
APPENDIX F
.
I
L
a
0
I-
L
s
W
8
Q W
V
WCT
-0
I-v)
 1608:38
RM)-2 Roger, e i g h t zero f i v e f o u r 1
Clear t o Tokyo v i a J e t f i v e oh one Bethel
'...
* ((simultaneous w i t h above transmission))

Three one z(?ro

Three one d o

Okay remaining items

T: L e t ' s s t a r t " c h e c k l i s t "

I
w
T: Checklist, please v1
I
T : yes --- yes
((Sound o f pneumatic s t a r t e r ) )
1609 :00
ANC TWR Air France two seven three, go ahead
P i l o t p r e f l t g h t c h e c k l i s t , INS
M I N T GND Cockpit, t h i s i s ground, a l l engine
ground c l e a r
Checked and load

ROO-3 Hai, roger

 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COmUNICATIONS
TIME & %
-SOURCE CONTENT
TIME &
SOURCE CONTENT ..
Cd

3E
cAK2 Landing gear handle
RDO ((Other ATC conversation)) r
CAM- 1 Down and t h r e e green
‘x
CAM-2 Hydro, a i r brake pressure
CAM-1 Checked and normal
UW-2 Air brake hand1.e
CAM-1 Safetied
CAM-2 Parking brake RDO ((Other ATC conversation))
I

CAM-1 Set W
OI
I
cAK2 Window, windshield heat
UW-1 L e t thea warm up
cAK2 Radios
GW-1 Checked

CAM-2 Weather radar, transponder

CAM-1 Stand by
CAM-2 Gyro compass c o n t r o l l e r
CAM-1.
. .,
CONTENT SOURCE
CAM- 1 on ..

CAM-2 Seatbelt. no smoking ...

CAM- 1 Both on *
CAM-2 Emergency l i g h t s
CAM- 1 Armed

CAM-2 Overspeed warning

1609: 50
CAM-1 Stand by I
W
U
w 2 Overspeed warning and barber pole I
seaector
CAM-? Tested ((following "and" above))
CAM-1 * okay, charlie, c h a r l i e
CAM-2 Char1i e mode '
CAM-2 S t a t i c selector, p i t o t cutoff
CAM-1 Okay normal
CAM-2 Anti-skid
8
CAM-1
CAM-2
Off
Kifis
iw!
h!
CAM- 1 Tested
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COmUNICATIONS

TIME h TIME h
CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

“t
Wound and set, you have the time
now, --- ten minutes

Eh-, radio INS switch

Ah-, radio *
F l i g h t instruments
I
Check (and) set w
m
I
Flight director compass
1610:30
I have now almost north
Autopilot servo cutoff switch

Instrunent warning

Retracted, lights o f f
Autopilot controller
 . ,.,. .. .

..
CAM-1 Tested
UIM-2 Rain renmval handles ".
.
CAM-1 Off
1610:47
CAM-2 Checklist completed ((simultaneously
w i t h sound zaaa))
CAM-3 'T: Go ahead
CAM-2 T: Hai
1610:51
CAM-2 Before s t a r t i n g checklist
CAM- 2 Ship pouch, passport
CAM- 3 Checked
CAM- 1 I have
CAM-2 Log book
CAM- 3 Checked
CAM-1 Checked ((simultaneous w i t h above
transmission))
CAM- 2 P r e f l i g h t check
CAM- 3 Completed

CAM-2 Oxygen system, mask and interphone

I
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMJNICATIONS
TIME &
-
SOURCE CONTENT
TIME
- &
SOURCE CONTENT
CAM-3 Checked my side
CAM-(.?) Check nly *
CAM-2 Circuit breakers and fuses
CAM-3 Checked and on
CAM-2 Radio rack blower switch
CAM-3 T:-Radio rack is n o m 1
CAM-2 Electrical panel
I
CAM-3 Set
0
CAM-2 Recirculation fans I

CAM-3 Off
CAM-2 Air-conditioning, pressurization
CAM-3 Auto and set +at three one zero, ah-
three t+ .zero T: sorry
CAM-1 Okay
CAM-2 Pneumatic switches
CAM-3 Low positiop
1611:24
CAM-2 Cabin compressors
CAn-3 Off
 1
cruc3 off ..

w 2 Smoke detector
..
un-3 T: smoke detector i s n o m 1
cAK2 T: Hai
w 2 F i r e warning
"

wc3 Tested

w 2 Oil system
CAM-3 Checked I
*
c
wc2 Ground cooling, blowaway j e t
I

CAM-3 Ot and l i g h t on
u

CAM-2 Fuel quantity

CAM-3 Orderted) one one nine, actual one
one nine, freezing point minus f o r t y
four
CAM- 1 Forty four, okay that checks
CAM-3 Yeah
CAM- 2 Fuel system
"-3 Checked and set
CAM-2 Hydro selector
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME &
CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT I.
r
.

CAM-3 Number two general z

x
cl
Rudder, a i l e r o n power controls

Off

Eh-, engine hydro. pumps

On

Engine instruments

Checked my side
I
Reverser standby pump
f.
N
Checked and o f f I

INS mode - nav

Okay stand by

A19 warning l i g h t s

Now nav

Yes
Check
 .. . 1
Hah?

..
Gear p i n
Gear pin, removed and --- on
--- board

Stand by seven items

Okay ground already c l e a r t o s# t a r t

Roger, s t a r t i n g engines

Clear three now

Okay T: Hai, go ahead

1612:31
ROO- 2 Anchorage Oceanic, Japan Air e i g h t
zero f i v e four, s t a r t i n g engine now

1612:36
ANC OCANC Japan Air e i g h t zero f i v e four, roger,
contact ground have a good f l i g h t

1612:39
ROO-2 Roger
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND C W N I C A T I O N S
I. .
TIME h TIME h
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT 8m
CAM-1 Okay, three, four, two, one 3
4-!
CAM-2 Weight and balance, takeoff data hl

CAM-2 T: checked t a k e o f f data

CAM-3 0kay
ROO-3 Ah three, four, two, one

M I N T GND Roger, ah, a l l engine ground c l e a r

ROO-3 T: Hai, roger thanks

CAM-2 Door warning l i g h t s
CAM-3 Eh-, out, o f f I
c.
CAM- 1 c.
Okay one three seven, one f i v e one I

1613:04
CAM-2 F1 i g h t recorder
CAM-3 Set and on
CAM-2 Anti- collision l i g h t

CAM- 1 On
1613:06
CAM- 2 Pneumatic pressure
 .n-*-
~ I
. ~ ,.
Galley power
1
I.

CAM- 3 Off

CAM-2 Main boost pump

CAM-3 On

1613:12
CAM- 2 Checklist a l l completed

cAM.3 Roger

CAM-? Okay
I

1613:15 f.
VI
CAM- 1 Takeoff data review please I
1613:17
CAM- 2 Eh? ST-1 Sand t r u c k one %
CAM-1 Takeoff datz

CAM-2 Takeoff data, three three n i n e f l a p ST-1 Sand t r u c k one

two three, f o u r p o i n t seven, p o i n t
e i g h t seven, two eight, one three ANC GND Sand t r u c k one proceed runway three one
nine, one f i v e one, one s i x one and hold s h o r t of runway s i x r i g h t ,
remain c l e a r of t h e diagonal
CAM- 1 One three nine, one *
ST- 1 Ten f o u r
CAM-2 One t h r e e seven, one f i v e one, one s i x
b
PU-4 Anchorage ground, p i c k up four w
8
z
hY
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME €i TIME & %

I.
,.
. w
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT ,
M

Rotation ANC GNO Okay, there wl be a Japan Air

i 8st
z +4
li pressure r i s e
O
ST-1 Ten four
N one r o t a t i o n
1614:32
Fifteen ANC GND --- four one heavy t a x i north ramp
Light up
((Sounds of c l i c k s ) )
Starter valve close ATIS Two zero, wind zero two zero a t four,
altimeter two nine f i v e niner, ILS I
Two runway s i x r i g h t approach i n use,
landing runway s i x r i g h t , departing p.
Q,

Rotation runway two four l e f t , advise you have I

whiskey
lipressure r i s e
O
N one r o t a t i o n
Fuel in, --- f u e l flow *
Light up ATIS Anchorage International information
whiskey, one f i v e f i v e s i x greenwich
By --- weather, sky p a r t i a l obscured,
v i s i b i l i t y one quarter mile, fog,
Fuel flow s t a b i l i z e temperature two zero, wind zero two
zero a t four, altimeter two niner
Thank you f i v e niner, ILS runway s i x r i g h t
approach i n use, landing runway s i x
Hai, bypass check okay r i g h t departing runway two four l e f t ,
advise you have whiskey
 --I \\INU aoove statements simultaneous))

161;1:4U
CAM-(Z) S t a r t i n g engine c
\

CAM ((Three above transmissions simultaneous))

CAM- 3 Roger
RDO-3 T: number t h r e e

MRINT GND T: Go ahead

ANC GND Pick up four, ground

CAW-1 Rotation
I
PU-4 I ' m on t h e n o r t h X c.
CAM- 3 O
lipressure r i s e .
I

1613:53 I
CAM- 3 N one r o t a t i o n ANC GND Pick up four roger t h a t ' s approved

PU-4 Thank you

1613:59
CAM- 1 Twenty percent
ANC GND Sand t r u c k one wl
i you be working X
CAM- 1 Rotation
1614:12
CAM- 3 (**) go ahead ((simultaneous w i t h PU-4 A f f i r m a t i v e -ah- when Imake my X
CAM- 1 above) )

CAM- 1 L i g h t up

CAM- 3 S t a r t e r valve closed

I.
CAM- 1 Number f o u r
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS . *.
I.
~
.

TIME & TIME &

i, SOURCE CONTENT
SOURCE CONTENT

CAM- 3 S t a r t e r valve close

CAM- 1 A
i i e r o n power
CAM- 3 Roger, rudder, a i l e r o n power on
1615:13
CAM- 1 Number one r o t a t i o n

CAM- 3 O
li pressure r i s e
CAM- 3 N one r o t a t i o n
CAM- 1 Fuel I
.P
a,
CAM- 1 Normal I

CAM- 1 L i g h t up
CAM- 1 Switch o f f

CAM- 3 S t a r t e r valve closed

CAM- 3 Disconnect

CAM ((Sound of c l i c k ) ) ((switching sound of 1615:38

external power t o engine generator RDO-3 Ah- disconnect a l l ground equipment
power) 1 and interphone, thank Y O U very much
CAM-?

((T: sound o f beee, beee)) ". 1

((Sounds l i k e a u t o p i l o t warning))

Okay

T: probably changed t o two f o u r

T: Is t h a t r i g h t ?
Right
I
((Sound o f s t i c k shaker)) P
\D
I
T : two f o u r minimum i s
MAINT GND Cockpit t h i s i s ground, a l l set,
please s t a r t turbo compressor
RDO-3 T: Eh- say again please
MAINT GND T: Eh- you may s t a r t - turbo
compressor

CAM- 1 After ah
CAM-2 Yes s i r , a f t e r s t a r t i n g
%
'd
CAM-1 Yeah
8
CAM-3 Roger R
+d
 Rudder and a i l e r o n power contro1s"qn
CAM-3 Gust lock
CAM-2 Off

CAM-3 PTC
CAM-1 Override
CAM-3 Hydraulic system checked
CAM- 1 Check pressure quantity
CAM-3 Check hai pressure quantity check
okay ((simultaneous with CAM-1 above))
CAM- 3 P i t o t , heater

I CAM-1
CAM-3
Captains
Ground e q u i p n t
CAM-1 Stand by
CAM-3 Stand by ground equipment
1.617:Ol
CAM ( ( S t a b i l i z e r i n motion, sound
seven times))
CAM- 1 One three seven
 1
ST-1 Sand t r u c k one, holding s h o r t o f ' t h e
diagonal on three one

1617:28
ANC GND Truck one you can hold - you can cross %

ST-1 I see him - thank you

Okay t a x i

Roger

Ik 1617:33
-1.. . A f t e r s t a r t c h e c k l i s t complete?

Ah - ground equipment okay? I

I"

Stand by

Stand by ground equipment

1617:40
RDO-2 Anchorage ground, Japan Air e i g h t
zero f i v e f o u r request t a x i i n f o r m a t i o n
whiskey cargo area

1617:47
ANC GND Japan Air e i g h t zero f i v e f o u r o r i s
i t ten f o r t y f i v e heavy t a x i runway
two f o u r l e f t
Two f o u r l e f t
1617:53 %
+d
RDO-2 Roger, e i g h t zero f i v e . f o u r two m
four l e f t 3
Brake pressure check G
Lo
Roger check
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COmUNICATIONS

TIME & TIME & b(. ', g

SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT
z i
"-2 T: Ground i s okay, r i g h t ? 5
rrl
CAM- 1 Okay c l e a r t o t a x i

CAM-2 Taxi c l e a r

1618:05
CAM-3 Hai - checklist completed

CAM-2 Ground signal okay?

1618:07
CAM- 1 Ground signal okay

CAM ((Sound o f engine power increase and

decrease f o r 13 seconds))

CAM-3 Captain, engine a n t i - i c e on

CAM- 3 Because i n l e t guide vane some i c e

CAM ((Sound o f c l i c k s ) ) ' '

1618:34 : . ..
CAM-1 Okay, engine a n t i - i c e on

CAM-3 Yah. okay now

CAM ((Sound o f engine power increase

and decrease f o r 4 seconds))

w-2 Right side c l e a r

r~ . :. .
TIME 6
-
' "&
SWRCE
W E
SOURCE CONTENT
1618:47
CAM-1 I think ah - no ((sound of laughter)) L-

CAM-2 Ah - ATIS said ah - quarter mile

CAM- 1 Better we'don't ask 'em
1619:OO
CAM-2 Okay ((Sound o f laughter))
CAM-1 Two - four left
CAM- 2 Two - four left
I
1619:20 cn
w
CAM-1 East-west taxi
1619:29
N655M4 Anchorage ground DeHavilland six five
five %
ANC GND DeHavilland five mike alfa %
CAM-2 Right side clear
1619:H
CAM-1 Controls please check
CAM-2 Aileron - right
CAM-3 Hai, pressure - cycling
CAM- 2 Left

I Pressure - cycling
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME &
TIME &
SOURCE
C A M - 7 Elevator
CONTENT -
SOURCE CONTENT

CAM- 2

CAM-2
UP
Down 't
;' 'q
I
CAM ((T: Boo. b1 0 0 , n i n e times, sound of
t a k e o f f war,ning)) ( (simultaneous w i t h
above C A M 4: I )

CAM-2 One more time

CAM-1 Okay

CAM-3 Hai pressure c y c l i n g

CAM-? Ha i

CAE( ((Sound o f engine acceleration

f o r 4 seconds))

CAM ((Sound o f engine

. . deceleration))

CAM-2 F1aps

CAM- 1 Okay l e f t rudder

CAM- 1 Right rudder

CAM- 3 How about the f l a p ?

CAM- 1 S p o i l e r s and f l a p s two- five

CAM-2 Flap two - f i v e okay

ST-1 Sand t r u c k one %
-
INTRA-COCKPIT
TIME & TIME &
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

CAM- 2 Two three f l a p s ST-1 Sand t r u c k one, X

-
-_._ ^.
 TIME & TIME &
SOURCE CONTENT SWRCE CONTENT

CAM-2 Two three flaps ST-1 Sand truck one, %

CAM-1 Okay ..
e:
.

CAM- 1 Spoilers please

..

CAM- 2 Spoi 1 ers

CAM-3 Pressure cycling
CAM-2 Lights on
CAM- 1 Okay again left rudder
I
CAM- 3 Pressure cycl ing (( simul taneous with ln
above transmission)) n
l
I
CAM-3 Okay
CAM-1 Right. rudder
CAM-3 Pressure cycling T: Hai
CAM-1 Okay
CAM- 1 Taxi before takeoff
CAM-2 Checklist?
CAM-1 Ha i
CAM-3 c-47u Anchorage ground, Cessna % ’d
Hai roger
1620:52
8
x”
CAM-3 Brakes w
 -

INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME EL
TIME EL
-
SWRCE CONTENT -
SOURCE CONTENT

1620: 54
CAM- 1 Checked
't
CAM- 3 F l i g h t instrument and a l t i m e t e r s

1620: 58
CAM- 1 Okay checked and s e t

ROO ((Other ATC conversation))

CAM- 2 Two n i n e r f i v e niner, s e t and
cross checked

CAM- 3 INS

CAM- 2 Check and on

CAM- 3 Auto - ah a l l warning l i g h t s

CAM-2 Check my s i d e

CAM-3 Check my side

CAM-1 Check a n t i - s k i d remaining ((simul taneOUS

w i t h above statement) )
~I

CAM- 3 Okay

CAM- 3 Takeoff data sod EPR bug

1621:16
CAM- 1 Review please

CAM-2 -
Eh three three nine, f l a p two
three, stab four point ( s i x )
-
p
~

INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COHMUNICATIONS

TIME & TIME 6

SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

1621:21
PI" nfn nnninn
I I C n ~ ~ ~ r r r e l p r a t i o n f o r four
 AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS
TIME & TIME &
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT
1621:21
CAM
..-. .

CAM-2 One p o i n t e i g h t seven, one three n i n e

' k

CAM-1 One three n i n e

CAM-2 One f i v e one
CAM ((Sound of engine deceleration))
CAM-1 F i v e one
CAM-2 I
One s i x one
VI
U
CAM-1 S i x one I

CAM-2 Flap up one nine one

1621:34
CAM- 1 Okay (checked)
w-2 EPR one point e i g h t f i v e checked
and s e t

CAM-3 S t a b i l i z e r s e t t i n g and trim tabs

CAM-2 Four p o i n t seven zero
T: we c a n ' t see, eh eh
CAM-3 T: f u r t h e r , please
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS
%
CONTENT
TIME &
SOURCE
1621:56
CONTENT - w
m
z
t5
H
x
ANC GND Cessna f o u r seven UnifOrM % cl
T: thank you, I ' v e g o t it ..
Zero zero s e t
Check
F l i g h t c o n t r o l s ((simultaneous w i t h
above transmission))

Free
Power on
RDO ((Other ATC conversation))
I
Lights o f f
VI
co
Anti- ice, de- ice and r a i n removal I

Okay we wl
i use engine a n t i - i c i n g
Engine a n t i - i c e scoop okay on
((overlapped w i t h c a p t a i n ' s "engine"))

Okay

De-ice o f f
1622:05
Yaw damper ANC GND Japan Air e i g h t y f i f t y four, h o l d
s h o r t o f runway two f o u r l e f t

1622:09
RDO-2 Roger e i g h t zero f i v e
Off
Yaw damper off?

TIME &
CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

1622:16 - - ~ ..-:a?-.-.. o/
 ,ATRA-COCKPIT AIK-liKUUNU LUI*PIUNILflIlURJ

TIME & TIME &

SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

:AM-3 Okay
1622:16 ..'.. .
ANC GNO Cessna f o u r seven uniform %
:AM- 1 Clear t o cross?
ANC GND Okay wi
l you %
1622: 25
ROO-2 Ah - ground, e i g h t zero f i v e four, say
again please

1622: 31
ANC GND Japan Air e i g h t y f i v e four, h o l d s h o r t
o f runway s i x l e f t I
A
: M-1 Holding ln
W
1622:35
I
RDO-2 Roger hold s h o r t s i x l e f t , e i g h t zero
m-1 Holding s h o r t f i v e four

1622:41
ANC GND Okay, Japan Air e i g h t y f i f t y four, y o u ' r e
going t o runway two f o u r l e f t , h o l d s h o r t
o f runway two f o u r r i g h t
:AM- 3 Briefing for'takeoff

"1 Standard procedure

:AM-2 Yes s i r
1622:57
:AM- 1 Make sure I acknowledge a l l ANC GND Japan Air e i g h t y f i f t y four, you are
transmissions, any questions i n f r o n t o f t h e terminal now, i s t h a t w
speak up okay? correct?
3
x"
:AM- 2 Pardon
21
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COrrmNICATIONS
TINE &
TIME &
SOURCE CONTENT -
SOURCE CONTENT
I CAM-1 Any question, any problems, please
speak. okay w
:. .
CAM- 2 Yes, s i r ((simultaneous with above
statement)) z
CAM- 1 Okay, I want you t o c a l l eighty knots
V - ah

CAM- 2 V-one
CAM- 1 V-one, V-R, r o t a t i o n

CAM-2 Okay
I
CAM- 1 Anything before V-one, w e ’ l l abort the 01
takeoff, I have maximum brakes, t h r u s t ANC GND Northwest r e p o r t % 0
I
reverse, you have s p o i l e r a f t e r V, V-one
1623:28
ANC GNO Japan Air eighty f i f t y four, are
-
you holding ah j u s t south of
the terminal?
CAM-2 Ah, a f f i r m a t i v e
CAM- 1 Our c a l l sign i s
1623:37
ROO-2 Ah- e i g h t zero f i v e four, holding
now
1623:40
ANC GND Okay you can begin t a x i t o runway
two four l e f t and hold short o f
runway two four r i g h t
1623:46
RDO-2 Roger, e i g h t zero f i v e four, clear
t a x i two four l e f t hold short two
, four r i g h t

INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COWJNICATIONS

1IME i3
~~ ~ ~ TIME & ~

SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

ANC GND Cessna f o u r % - cleared f o r takeoff

 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

lIHE & TIME &

SOURCE CONTENT soURCE CONTENT

ANC GND Cessna f o u r P - cleared.for tgkeoff

CAM- 2 Clear t a x i two f o u r

CAM- 1 Is t h a t a i r c r a f t ? z
CAM- 1 What i s t h a t ?
ANC GNO That's runway s i x

1624:16
RW- 1 Okay now ah - we are - moving Japan
Air
1624:21
ANC GND Roger
1624: 24
CAM (ISound o f engine acceleration and
then deceleration f o r s i x seconds))
CAM- 2 Right side c l e a r

1624: 32
CAM-1 Anything, a f t e r V-one, we w i
l abort
t h e takeoff; you have wings l e v e l
CAM- Okay
CAM- Spoiler - -
and maybe ah s l i p p e r y
runway, so I d o n ' t t h i n k we are going
t o a b o r t t h e t a k e o f f r o l l okay?
CAM- So my - may decision r i g h t ?
 INT~CMKPIT AIR-GROW(O COrrmNICATIONS

TIME & TIME &

SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT , .. ii
1624: 55
W 3 Captain, yaw damper o f f now okay?
Usually on yaw damper

Wl No
CAM-3 No. okay roger
ANC GNO Cessna f o u r seven i
Wl Not oh
cAK3 Yes s i r

CAU-1 Okay on I
QI
1625: 05 N

CAM-3 Uh- on, okay

1625: 06
w 3 F/E panel, e l e c t r i c a l system checked,
cabin and freon canpressor tested and
**
CAM- I ' v e been f l y i n g e i g h t zero one
e i g h t so l o n g
((Sound o f -laughter))

((Above two transmissions simultaneous))

CAM- Galley okay, stand by remaining i t e m

Roger
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COmUNICATIONS

TIME & TIME &

SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

1625:19
CAM- 1 Cleared f o r t a k e o f f ..
CAM-1 Okay remaining items
1625: 27
CAM-3 Remaininge
t
mi ~. , '' "
,:,. , , .

CAM-1 T: Hai, go ahead

CAM-3 Roger
1625: 32 I
CAM-3 Flap and s l a t s m
w
I
CAM-2 Two f i v e s e t
1625: 37
CAU-1 Two f i v e , l i g h t check ( o r r i g h t
check)

"-3 Reverser staqd by pmp

CAM-2/3 On ([simuTtaneously))
CAM-3 I g n i t i o n override

W 2 / 3 A
ll engines ((simultaneous w i t h CAM-1))
CAM-3 ATC transponder
CAM-1 Check i t ' p l e a s e
hi
CAM-2 On
 INTRA-COCKFIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME & TIME il

SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE
1 6 2 m
CAM- 3 Anti- skid
CAM- 2 Stand by
CAM- 3 T: Hai b l ow-away j e t , push
CAM-2 On
1625: 56
CAM- 3 Okay stand by ah
Check1is t completed
CAM-2 Switch t o tower
CAM ((Sound o f c l i c k ) )
1626: 05
CAM-1 Sometimes we j u s t stay ground c o n t r o l
-
b u t okay make sure we have contact
CAM ((Sound o f engine a c c e l e r a t i o n f o r
approximately 15 seconds))
1626:12
RDO-2 Ah- tower, Japan Air e i g h t zero f i v e
four, ready f o r t akeoff

1626:16
ANC TWR Ah- e i g h t zero f i v e f o u r h o l d s h o r t
o f runway t r a f f i c landing s i x r i g h t
CAM- 1 Okay hold s h o r t
1626:21
RDO-2 Hold short, roger
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COrrmNlCATIOHS
TIME 6 T.IM 6
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

NW-6 Uh- i s Northwest s i x %

I.

ANC TWR Northwest s i x i s cleared %

CAM ((Sound of engine a c c e l e r a t i o n and then,
deceleration f o r approximately f o u r
seconds))
NU-6 Roger
1627: 06 . .
CAM-1 Checklist --- complete
CAM- 3 Ah- completed
1627:13
ALR102 Anchorage tower, aeronautical one
oh two %
1627:20
ANC TWR Aeronautical one oh two %

ALR102 Okay and t h a t ' s %

CAM-2 Runway s i x r i g h t approach outer marker
CAM-2 Tower said, ah h o l d s h o r t
two four l e f t
- h o l d short,

CAM-1 Light, small a i r p l a n e

CAM-2 I t ' s okay?
CAM-1 Yes s i r
1627:43
ROO- 1 Japan Air - holding short -
CAM- 2 ah we a r e on t h e runway
T: we a r e already i n the runway
CAM-3 T: Eh?
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME & TIME &

SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT
CAM-2 T: we are already i n the runway yes ..
we a r e
'X
CAM-3 T: what d i d you say?
CAM- 2 T: we a r e i n the runway, "Hold
short: s a i d the tower

CAM-3 T: Oh yes, we are i n the runway, t h i s

i s runway, two four, i s n ' t it?

CAM-2 Two f o u r
1627: 55
ANC TWR Okay y o u ' r e on two f o u r r i g h t

1627:58
ROO-1 Ah- we a r e two f o u r l e f t
CAM-3 T: heading i s two four, i s n ' t it?

CAM-2 T: two four, s u r e l y

1628:lO
ROO-2 Ah- tower, Japan Air e i g h t zero
CAM- 1 T: j u s t a seeond
NW-6 Uh- Northwest ah s i x has landed

ANC TWR Northwest s i x , t u r n l e f t %

1628: 25
NW-6 Roger

1628: 31
ANC GND Five f i v e mike alpha, ground

INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COmUNICATIONS

-
TIME h TIME &
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

CAM-2 T: even ifi t ' s small airplane, i t ' s

i problem
ANC GND Okay runway s i x r i g h t %
 TIME & TIME &
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

CAM- 2 T: even i f i t ' s small airplane, i t ' s

problem ..
ANC GND Okay runway s i x r i g h t ' %
CAM-3 T: s i x r i g h t i s i n use so much, before
' k
CAM-? T: t h a t ' s t r u e
CAM- T: i t ' s problem!
ChM- I t ' s okay
NW-6 Uh-Northwest ah- s i x i s now c l e a r

ANC TWR Northwest s i x roger, cross runway %

I

NW-6 Thank you % o\

U

I
CAM-2 Ah-, captain, t a k e o f f minimums
ALRlO2 Tower, Alaska aeronautical %
CAM-1 Takeoff minimums okay

CAM-2 Ah-, t a k e o f f minimum w

to f o u r ALRlO2 Tower, Alaska aeronautical one
l e f t i s ah oh two's a t t h e marker
ANC TWR Alaska aeronautical one zero two
continue %

ALR102 t o and ah %
One oh w
CAM-1 What?
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COmUNICATIONS

TIME 6 TIME 6
CONTENT
I.

SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE

z
ALR102 J u s t f o r your i n f o r m a t i o n s i r %
CAM-2 Ah, two f o u r l e f t minimum i s onle s i x -
s i x t e e n hundred f e e t RVR, so i t s ah ANC TWR Roger
quarter v i s i - v i s i b i l i t y fog

1629:45 1629:45
CAM- 1 So we have it, thank you ANC TWR Japan Air e i g h t zero f i v e four, did
you copy?
CAM-2 Go ahead
162950
RDO-1 Eh- eh- e i g h t zero f i v e four say again

d<: *' (A
'.. -
~

1629: 52
ANC TWR Okay a one e i g h t y on t h e runway o r
I
o\
s t r a i g h t ahead down t o t h e next i n t e r - co
s e c t i o n a r i g h t t u r n o f f t h i s frequency I
and t a x i back
CAM-2 One e i g h t y and s t r a i g h t down
. ~ I

.-4XR-1-~,
., What's our c a l l sign?
1630: 07
RDO-2 Eh, Japan Air e i g h t zero f i v e f o u r say
again please

1630: 11
ANC TWR Japan Air e i g h t zero f i v e f o u r a one
e i g h t y on t h e runway o r s t r a i g h t ahead
t o next intersection a r i g h t turn o f f
t h e runway and t a x i back down t o t h e
approach end o f runway two f o u r l e f t
and no delay i n your t a x i
 Okay?
..
CAM- 1 Moving
1630:25
CAM RDO-2 Ah- e i g h t zero f i v e f o u r moving
((Sound o f engine power increase
twice f o r f i v e seconds each))
CAM-2 One e i g h t y and s t r a i g h t down to
t h e r i g h t runway o f f
1630: 36
CAM- 3 T: going t o two f o u r r i g h t , eh- and I
then t o l e f t , again? cn
W
I
CAM ((Sound of goso goso undeterminable
i n background))
1630: 56
CAM-2 My s i d e c l e a r
CAM ((Sound of engine power increase w to
times f o r f i v e seconds each))
1631:38
RDO-1 Eighty f i v e four, what can we
expect?
 INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS
%
TIME €i TIME €i
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE
cl
1631 :42
'
k.
ANC TWR Okay, e i g h t zero f i v e f o u r s t r a i g h t ahead
and you're approaching an i n t e r s e c t i o n
f o r your infdrmation y o u ' r e on runway two
f o u r r i g h t , t u r n r i g h t the i n t e r s e c t i o n
y o u ' r e j u s t approaching, it'll be a uh
about a - about a hundred and twenty
degree t u r n back t o your r i g h t and then
up t o and h o l d s h o r t o f two f o u r l e f t ,
you've been on runway two f o u r r i g h t ,
and uh, should be able t o g e t you o f f
i n j u s t a second
I
1632:08 U
RDO- 1 Okay thank you 0
I
1632:lO
ANC TWR You a r e welcome

ALR102 Air one oh two's on t h e ground %

ANC TWR One oh two roger t u r n l e f t %

ALR102 One.oh two

We're cleared t o two f o u r r i g h t ?

Left? 1 .. '
. ,
, ,
1632:44
RDO-1 We're turning r i g h t t o w
t o four l e f t

1632:47
ANC TUR Okay Japan Air eight zero f i v e f o u r
right turn back t o runway two f o u r
lP/+

1 INiRA-COCKPIT AIR-'GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME &
CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

ANC TWR Aeronautical one zero two r e p o r t

-
-
-
INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-'GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME &
CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

ANC TWR Aeronautical one zero two report;:

when %
'k 1632:59
This side two f o u r l e f t ALR102 Aero one oh two's c l e a r
((Sound o f engine power increase
f o r approximately f i v e seconds))

((Sound s i m i l a r t o a i r c r a f t running ANC TWR One oh two roger, cross runway %

over i c e r u t s w i t h nose gear, noise
undistinguishable)) ALR102 One oh two

T: we were just a t t h e middle o f

two f o u r r i g h t

T: yah, we were there

T: made a t u r n frm there

1633:17
-ANC TUR Japan Air e i g h t zero f i v e f o u r t a x i
i n t o p o s i t i o n and h o l d runway two f o u r
l e f t and advise when y o u ' r e going past
the uh h o l d p o i n t on runway two f o u r
1e f t
-
Okay we a r e going past now, the
hold point %
+d
1633:28
RW- 2 Eh, we a r e going past now e i g h t zero
five four
8
F4
w
 AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

TIME &
CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

Ready f o r takeoff

Right
Eight zero f i v e four ready for takeoff
two four l e f t
1633:41
ANC TWR Eight zero f i v e four - uh - you're
approaching runway two four l e f t a t
t h i s time
I
((Sound o f engine power increase))
U
N
Affirm, a f f i r m a t i v e I
1633:46
RDO-2 Affirmative e i g h t zero f i v e four
1633:51
ANC TWR Okay climb on course westbound cleared
f o r takeoff
Cleared f o r takeoff
1633:55
ROO-2 Eight zero f i v e four clear f o r takeoff

Okay, remaining items again, again

Roger, okay, - f l a p s and s l o t s
Two f i v e checked
Reverser standby punp
On
 - AIR-GROUND C O ~ N I C A T I O N S

TIME h TIME ll
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

CAM-3 I g n i t i o n override
I. .
CAM-2 Al engine
"-3 All engine
1634:07
CAM-3 ATC transponder

CAK- 2 On
ALR102 Tower one oh w
to
CAM-3 ' Anti- skid

CAM-2 Arlll I
u
W
CAM-1 Arlll I

CAM-3 Blow-away j e t push

1634:15
C
AM-
' Checklist completed
ANC TWR One oh two, go

1634:19
CAB-2 Last time a t ah -w
to four right ALRlO2 Yeah t h a t fog doesn't s t a r t 'till
middle p o s i t i o n about e i g h t hundred f e e t down uh the
approach end o f s i x r i g h t , everything
e l s e i s b e a u t i f u l frm there a l l t h e
way o u t t o the o u t e r marker
1634:23.3 %
CAM- 1 Cleared f o r t a k e o f f
 -~

AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS INTRA-COCKPIT

TIME & TIME &

-
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

ANC TWR Thank you ..

CAM ((Sound o f engine power increase))
1634:31
1634:31.4 ANC TWR How extensive uh does i t appear
CAM- 3 Stabilize t o be l a y i n g around t o us t o the
uh northeast
1634:32.8
CAM-1 Maximum
1634: 36
1634:36.9 ALRlO2 Eh a c t u a l l y i t ' s ah j u s t r i g h t
CAM-3 Number f o u r overboost over t h e lakes and uh t h e a i r p o r t
and everything e l s e i s b e a u t i f u l
1634:39
CAM-2/3 Two f o u r overboost
1634:43
1634:43.8 ANC TWR Nice place t o b u i l d an a i r p o r t
CAM-2 Power s e t
1634: 45
1634:45.6 ALR102 Oh yeah they thought i t o u t r e a l
CAM- 1 Thank you we1 1

1634:50.4
w-
1 I have
1634: 51.1
CAM-2 You have
1634:52.5
CAM-2 Eighty

((Background sound be i n s t o get

CAM'
3
q u i e t e r s t a r t i n g here )
I 1635:09.6
- ~ ~~

INTRA-COCKPIT
TIME &
SOURCE CONTENT

i n background))
 - .~
~

AIR-GROUND COWUNICATIONS INTRA-COCKPIT

TIME & TIME II
SOURCE CONTENT SOURCE CONTENT

1635:13
CAM ((Two bang bang heard i n background))
1 .
163k15.6
CAM-2 Rotation ,..
-.
1635:16.8
CAM- 1 Rotation
CAM ((The background noise i s changing t o the
airborne))
1635:19.5 I
CAM- 1 Ten degrees U
VI
1635:21.4 I
CAM-2 Vee two
1635: 26.2
CAM ((Sound s i m i l a r t o a i r c r a f t buffeting))
((This sound grows more frequent and
ends a t the crash))
1635:31.8
CAM-2 Gear up
CAM-? ( * *)
1635:33.0
CAM-3 Too much (speed) %
a
((The word "speed" could be "steep"))
H
1635: 34.2 x
CAM- 2 Eh!
1635:37.9
CAM ((Sound o f s t i c k shaker))
APPENDIX F - 16 -
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A
F
.f
-0
L
0
8L
c
VI
m
L
V
i
m
- 77 -

UU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE8 1979-281'568/87