SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
ARTICLE VII
EXECUTIVE
DEPARMTENT
SECTION 1. The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 1
EXTENT OF THE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT
As stated above, the Constitution provides
that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in
the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec.
1]. However, it does not define what is meant
by executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain
powers by the President, i.e., the power of
control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power, the powers under
the commander-in-chief clause, the power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of Congress, the power to
contract or guarantee foreign loans, the
power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the power to submit the budget
to Congress, and the power to address
Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].
It would not be accurate, however, to state
that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of
state as well as head of government and
whatever powers inherent in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution
of the laws is only one of the powers of the
President. It also grants the President other
powers that do not involve the execution of
any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that
although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope
of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers
of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power
is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated. [Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R.
No. 88211, September 15, 1989]
RESIDUAL POWERS
The Constitution declares among the guiding
principles that "[t]he prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the
people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace
and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy."
[Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the
people, the maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are
essentially ideals to guide governmental
action. But such does not mean that they are
empty words. Thus, in the exercise of
presidential functions, in drawing a plan of
government, and in directing implementing
action for these plans, or from another point
Page | 1
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

of view, in making any decision as President
of the Republic, the President has to consider
these principles, among other things, and
adhere to them.
To the President, the problem is one of
balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the
President's residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on
the duty of the President, as steward of the
people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it
is not only the power of the President but also
his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the
nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It
is a power borne by the President's duty to
preserve and defend the Constitution. It also
may be viewed as a power implicit in the
President's duty to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American
President, where the author advances the
view that an allowance of discretionary
power is unavoidable in any government and
is best lodged in the President. [Marcos vs.
Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15,
1989]
the executive authority by an act unjustifiable
under the law has no remedy, but must
submit in silence. On the contrary, it means,
simply, that the governors-general, like the
judges of the courts and the members of the
Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in
civil damages for the consequences of an act
executed in the performance
of his official duties. The judiciary has full
power to, and will, when the matter is
properly presented to it and the occasion
justly warrants it, declare an act of the
Governor-General illegal and void and place
as nearly as possible in status quo any person
who has been deprived his liberty or his
property by such act. This remedy is assured
to every person, however humble or of
whatever country, when his personal or
property rights have been invaded, even by
the highest authority of the state. The thing
which the judiciary cannot do is mulct the
Governor-General personally in damages
which result from the performance of his
official duty, any more than it can a member
of the Philippine Commission of the
Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.

Neither does this principle of non-liability

IMMUNITY OF THE PRESIDENT FROM SUIT
The doctrine of executive immunity in this
jurisdiction emerged as a case law. The
principle of non-liability, as herein enunciated,
does not mean that the judiciary has no
authority to touch the acts of the Governor-
General; that he may, under cover of his office,
do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained.
Such a construction would mean that tyranny,
under the guise of the execution of the law,
could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights
of person and of property, wholly free from
interference of courts or legislatures. This
does not mean, either that a person injured by
mean that the chief executive may not be
personally sued at all in relation to acts which
he claims to perform as such official. On the
contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that
portion which touched the liability of judges
and drew an analogy between such liability
and that of the Governor-General, that the
latter is liable when he acts in a case so
plainly outside of his power and authority
that he cannot be said to have exercised
discretion in determining whether or not he
had the right to act. What is held here is that
he will be protected from personal liability

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 2
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

for damages not only when he acts within his
authority, but also when he is without
authority, provided he actually used
discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial
faculty, in determining whether he had
authority to act or not. In other words, in
determining the question of his authority. If
he decides wrongly, he is still protected
provided the question of his authority was
one over which two men, reasonably qualified
for that position, might honestly differ; but he
is not protected if the lack of authority to act
is so plain that two such men could not
honestly differ over its determination. In such
case, he acts, not as Governor-General but as a
private individual, and as such must answer
for the consequences of his act.
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did
not contain any specific provision on
executive immunity. Then came the tumult of
the martial law years under the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973
Constitution was born. In 1981, it was
amended and one of the amendments
involved executive immunity. Section 17,
Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit
during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by
him or by others pursuant to his specific
orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply
to the incumbent President referred to in
Article XVII of this Constitution. The 1973
Constitution ceased to exist when President
Marcos was ousted from office by the People
Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987
Constitution was crafted, its framers did not
reenact the executive immunity provision of
the 1973 Constitution, (but reverted back to
the Case Law privilege prior to the 1935
Constitution.) [Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No.
146710, March 2, 2001]
EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY MAY BE WAIVED
BY THE PRESIDENT
The rationale for the grant to the President of
the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder
of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a
criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that
would prevent the President from waiving
the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President
may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court's
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise
the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person. [Soliven vs. Makasiar, G.R. No.
82585, November 14, 1988]
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
(178 SCRA 760)

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 3
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

FACTS: On October 1989, motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioners
raising the following major arguments among
others:
1. The President has no power to bar a
Filipino from his own country.
2. There is no basis for barring the return of
the family of former President Marcos.
ISSUE: W/N the President has the power to
bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that it
cannot be denied that the President, upon
whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are implied
from the grant of executive power and which
are necessary for her to comply with her
duties under the Constitution. The powers of
the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 to limit the powers of the President as a
reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr.
Marcos, for the result was a limitation of
specific powers of the President, particularly
those relating to the commander-in-chief
clause, but not a diminution of the general
grant of executive power.
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO
(G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001)
FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner
Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
was elected Vice-President. Both petitioner
and the respondent were to serve a six-year
term commencing on June 30, 1998.During
his term, the petitioner experienced a sharp
descent from power started on October 4,
2000 when Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit"
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner,
went on air and accused the petitioner, his
family and friends of receiving millions of
pesos from jueteng lords. The exposẻ
immediately ignited reactions of rage.
Numerous investigations commenced both
from the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Calls for the resignation of
the petitioner filled the air that on October 11,
Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a
pastoral letter asking the petitioner to step
down from the presidency as he had lost the
moral authority to govern.
Political tensions continued to heat up as key
economic advisers and members of the
cabinet defected. On November 13, in a
tumultuous session, the house of
representatives finally transmitted the
articles of impeachment to the senate signed
by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of
all the members of the House of
Representatives. On November 20, the Senate
formally opened the impeachment trial of the
petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took
their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding. The
political tension rose during the
impeachment trial particularly during the
December hearings when Clarissa Ocampo,
senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank
testified on the existence of the Jose Velarde
account. The impeachment trial reached its
turning point when on the fateful day of
January 16, by a vote of 11-10 the senator-
judges ruled against the opening of the
second envelope which allegedly contained

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 4
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the
name "Jose Velarde." The non-opening of the
second envelope led to the resignation of the
public and private prosecutors and the
spontaneous outburst of anger by the people
in EDSA which is now referred to as the EDSA
dos. Petitioner’s fall from power became
more apparent starting January 19 when key
officials from the armed forces, the PNP and
his other cabinet members withdrew support.
At about 12:00 noon of January 20 Chief
Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his
family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace while
leaving a press statement indicating his
strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of the proclamation of
the respondent as President and that he is
leaving the Palace as he does not wish to
“prevent the restoration of unity and order in
our civil society.”
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the case at bar is a political
question and hence, are beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court to decide
2. Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo
is an Acting President.
HELD:
1.)No the case at bar is not a political question.
Accordingly, it is within the jurisdiction of the
Court to decide. In the case of Tanada v.
Cuenco, the Court, through former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political
questions refer "to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of
judicial review of this court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable but
also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government.
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the
"thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed
against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With
the new provision, however, courts are given
a greater prerogative to determine what it
can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did
not just grant the Court power of doing
nothing.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA
People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear.
EDSA I involves the exercise of the people
power of revolution which overthrew the
whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of
people power of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which
only affected the office of the President. EDSA
I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it
cannot be the subject of judicial review, but
EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it
caused and the succession of the Vice
President as President are subject to judicial

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 5
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

review. EDSA I presented a political question; presidency as soon as the disability

EDSA II involves legal questions.
2. ) No. President Estrada is not on leave, he
resigned from office. Resignation is not a high
level legal abstraction. It is a factual question
and its elements are beyond quibble: there
must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.
The validity of a resignation is not governed
by any formal requirement as to form. It can
be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It
can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that
petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang
Palace. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined
from his act and omissions before, during and
after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, the Court holds that
petitioner resigned as President. The
petitioner’s resignation is shown in the
following instances:
a. he left Malacañang
b. he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President
of the Republic albeit with reservation about
its legality
c. he emphasized he was leaving the Palace,
the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind inability
and that he was going to re-assume the
disappears
d. he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them.
e. he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of our country. Petitioner's
reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he
has given up;
f. he called on his supporters to join him in
the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity could not be attained if he did
not give up the presidency.
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO
(G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001)
PUNO, J.:
FACTS: In the May 11, 1998 elections,
petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
Both petitioner and the respondent were to
serve a six-year term commencing on June 30,
1998.During his term, the petitioner
experienced a sharp descent from power
started on October 4, 2000 when Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime
friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends
of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng
lords. The exposẻ immediately ignited
reactions of rage.
On November 13, in a tumultuous session, the
house of representatives transmitted the
articles of impeachment to the senate. On
November 20, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. The

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 6
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

impeachment trial reached its turning point
when on the fateful day of January 16, by a
vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against
the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank
account under the name "Jose Velarde." The
non-opening of the second envelope led to the
resignation of the public and private
prosecutors and the spontaneous outburst of
anger by the people in EDSA which is now
referred to as the EDSA dos.
On January 20, 2001, petitioner sent a letter
to the Senate and the House of
Representatives claiming his inability to
perform his functions as a president.
Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo
took her oath of office as President on January
20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m. Despite receipt
of the letter, the House of Representatives as
well as the Senate issued House Resolution
Nos. 175, 176 and 178 as well as Senate
Resolution nos. 82, 83 and 84 recognizing and
confirming the assumption of the respondent
of the presidency.
After respondent has taken her oath of office,
petitioner postulated that respondent Arroyo
as Vice President has no power to adjudge the
inability of the petitioner to discharge the
powers and duties of the presidency. His
significant submittal is that "Congress has the
ultimate authority under the Constitution to
determine whether the President is incapable
of performing his functions in the manner
provided for in section 11 of article VII."This
contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's
stance that he is a President on leave and
respondent Arroyo is only an Acting
President.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner Is only
temporarily unable to Act as President
2. Whether conviction in the impeachment
proceedings is a condition precedent for the
criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada
3. Whether or not the petitioner is immune
from the charges filed against
HELD:
1. No, petitioner is not only temporarily
unable to act as president. House Resolution
Nos. 175,176, and 178, as well as Senate
Resolutions No. 82, 83 and 84 show that both
houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
2.) No. Conviction in the impeachment
proceedings is not a condition precedent for
the criminal prosecution of the petitioner.
The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada
was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his
loss of the presidency. Since, the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it
is untenable for petitioner to demand that he
should first be impeached and then convicted
before he can be prosecuted. The plea if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing
to commend itself for it will place him in a
better situation than a non-sitting President
who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a
criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates
in the Constitutional Commission make it
clear that when impeachment proceedings
have become moot due to the resignation of
the President, the proper criminal and civil
cases may already be filed against him

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 7
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

3.) No. The petitioner is not immuned from
the cases filed against him by virtue of him
being an unsitting president. The cases filed
against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of
a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite
any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity
from liability. It will be anomalous to hold
that immunity is an inoculation from liability
for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is
that unlawful acts of public officials are not
acts of the State and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the
same footing as any trespasser.
SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution,
may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the
filing of a complaint-affidavit. If she
may initiate, what are the
repercussions of such initiation to her
executive immunity?
2. Can Beltran invoke the executive
immunity of the president as a
defense?
HELD:
First Issue:
Yes. The rationale for the grant to the
President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office-
holder'stime, also demands undivided
attention.

FACTS: Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal

complaint for libel against Beltran Petitioner
Beltran argues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit".
He contends that if criminal proceedings
ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently
have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in
an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the
witness stand, she would be exposing herself
to possible contempt of court or perjury.
SECTION 2. No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day
of the election, and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding
such election.
SECTION 3. There shall be a Vice-President
who shall have the same qualifications and
term of office and be elected with and in the
same manner as the President. He may be
removed from office in the same manner as the
President.

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 8
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment
requires no confirmation.
SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-
President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people for a term of six years which shall begin
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election and shall end
at noon of the same date six years thereafter.
The President shall not be eligible for any
reelection. No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more than
four years shall be qualified for election to the
same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than
two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity
of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election for President and Vice-President shall
be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and
Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after
the day of the election, open all certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes
shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or
more shall have an equal and highest number
of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen
by the vote of a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice- President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
THE COMELEC CANNOT MAKE
“UNOFFICIAL COUNT” FOR PRESIDENTIAL
AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
The contention of the COMELEC that its
tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the
Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such
tabulation is "unofficial," is puerile and totally
unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed
from conducting an official canvass of the
votes cast for the President and Vice-
President, the COMELEC is, with more reason,
prohibited from making an "unofficial"
canvass of said votes. [Brillantes vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004]
BRILLANTES v. COMELEC
Doctrine: COMELEC is the sole body tasked
to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall and to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections. However, the
duties of the COMELEC under the
Constitution, RA 7166, and other election

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 9
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
laws must be carried out, at all times, in its
official capacity.
FACTS: On December 22, 1997, Congress
enacted RA 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to
use an automated election system (AES) for
the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing the results of the national and
local elections. The COMELEC initially
intended to implement the automation during
the 1998 presidential elections; however, the
failure of the machines to read some ballots
deferred its implementation. Later on, in
2002, the COMELEC adopted Resolution No.
02-0170, a modernization program for the
2004 elections and issued an invitation to bid
for the P2.5 Billion poll automation contract.
After a public bidding was conducted, the
COMELEC awarded the contract to Mega
Pacific Consortium and correspondingly
entered into a contract with the latter to
implement the project. On the same day,
however, the COMELEC likewise entered into
a separate contract with Philippine Multi-
Media System, Inc. (PMSI) which pertains to
the electronic transmission of results (Phaste
III) of the respondent’s modernization
program.
By reason of the case filed by the Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines
(ITFP), the contract between Mega Pacific
Consortium and the COMELEC was nullified
and Phase II of the AES shut down. Despite
this, as well as the validation scheme under
Phase I of the AES apparently having
encountered problems in its implementation,
the COMELEC nevertheless ventured to
implement Phase III of the AES through an
electronic transmission of advanced unofficial
results of the 2004 elections for national,
provincial and municipal positions, also
dubbed as an unofficial quick count.
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
In response to this, Senator Franklin Drilon
expressed his misgivings upon the
constitutionality of the proposed electronic
transmission of results. To this end, the
COMELEC resolved to deliberate upon the
points raised by Senator Drilon and met en
banc to discuss it. Nevertheless, on the
following day, the COMELEC issued its
assailed Resolution 6712 approving the
electronic transmission of results.
When apprised of the said resolution, the
National Citizens Movement for Free
Elections (NAMFREL), and the heads of the
major political parties as petitioners-in-
intervention, wrote the COMELEC detailing
their respective concerns. When it went
unheeded, they resolved to file an action
against COMELEC.
In assailing the validity of the questioned
resolution, the petitioners aver that there is
no provision under RA 8436 which authorizes
the COMELEC to engage in the
biometrics/computerized system of
validation of voters (Phase I) and a system of
electronic transmission of election results
(Phase III). Even assuming for the nonce that
all the three (3) phases are duly authorized,
they must complement each other as they are
not distinct and separate programs but mere
stages of one whole scheme. Consequently,
considering the failed implementation of
Phases I and II, there is no basis at all for the
respondent COMELEC to still push through
and pursue with Phase III.
In addition, the other petitioners-in-
intervention point to several constitutional
infractions occasioned by the assailed
resolution. They advance the view that the
assailed resolution effectively preempts the
Page | 10
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
sole and exclusive authority of Congress
under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution
to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President. Further, as there has been no
appropriation by Congress for the respondent
COMELEC to conduct an unofficial electronic
transmission of results of the May 10, 2004
elections, any expenditure for the said
purpose contravenes Article VI, Section 29
(par. 1) of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Is COMELEC Resolution 6712 void?
HELD: Yes, it is; the assailed resolution has no
constitutional or statutory basis. That
respondent COMELEC is the sole body tasked
to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall and to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections is not
questioned. However, the duties of the
COMELEC under the Constitution, RA 7166,
and other election laws are to be carried out,
at all times, in its official capacity.
There is no constitutional and statutory basis
for the respondent COMELEC to undertake a
separate and an unofficial tabulation of
results, whether manually or electronically,
for in conducting such unofficial tabulation of
the results of the election, the COMELEC
descends to the level of a private organization
and spends public funds for the purpose. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioner, the
AES process is mutually dependent upon the
other; one cannot exist if the others do not.
Since the court has already scrapped the
contract for Phase II of the AES, the COMELEC
cannot as of yet implement the Phase III of
the program.
On the matters pointed out by the petitioners-
in-intervention, the assailed resolution
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
usurps, under the guise of an unofficial
tabulation of election results based on a copy
of the election returns, the sole and exclusive
authority of Congress to canvass the votes for
the election of President and Vice-President.
The contention of the COMELEC that its
tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the
Constitution and RA 8436 because it is
‘unofficial’ is unacceptable, for if the
COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an
official canvass of the votes cast for the
President and Vice-President, all the more it
is prohibited from making an unofficial
canvass of said votes.
In addition, the assailed COMELEC resolution
contravenes the constitutional provision that
no money shall be paid out of the treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law. By its very terms, the electronic
transmission and tabulation of the election
results projected under Resolution No. 6712
is unofficial in character, meaning not
emanating from or sanctioned or
acknowledged by the government or
government body. Thus, any disbursement of
public funds to implement this project is
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution
and RA 9206, the 2003 General
Appropriations Act.
Neither can the money needed for the project
be taken from the COMELECs savings, if any,
because it would be violative of Article VI,
Section 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution for the
power to augment from savings lies dormant
until authorized by law. In this case, no law
has, thus, far been enacted authorizing the
respondent COMELEC to transfer savings
from another item in its appropriation, if
there are any, to fund the assailed resolution.
Furthermore, the assailed resolution
disregards existing laws which authorize
Page | 11
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

solely the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to
conduct the unofficial counting of votes.
Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated
in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the
accredited citizens arm (NAMFREL) is
exclusively authorized to use a copy of the
election returns in the conduct of an unofficial
counting of the votes, whether for the
national or the local elections. No other entity,
including the respondent COMELEC itself, is
authorized to use a copy of the election
returns for purposes of conducting an
unofficial count.
However, in contravention of the law, the
assailed Resolution authorizes the so-called
Reception Officers (RO), to open the second
or third copy intended for the respondent
COMELEC as basis for the encoding and
transmission of advanced unofficial precinct
results. This not only violates the exclusive
prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an
unofficial count, but also taints the integrity of
the envelopes containing the election returns,
as well as the returns themselves, by creating
a gap in its chain of custody from the Board of
Election Inspectors to the COMELEC.
have possibly complied with the thirty-day
notice requirement provided under Section
52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code. This
indubitably violates the constitutional right to
due process of the political parties and
candidates.
Lastly, as correctly observed by the petitioner,
there is a great possibility that the unofficial
results reflected in the electronic
transmission under the supervision and
control of the COMELEC would significantly
vary from the results reflected in the
COMELEC official count. The latter follows the
procedure prescribed by the Omnibus
Election Code, which is markedly different
from the procedure envisioned in the assailed
resolution. Resultantly, the official and
unofficial canvass, both to be administered by
the respondent COMELEC, would most likely
not tally and, as a consequence, would most
likely undermine the electoral process. The
only intimated utility claimed by the
COMELEC for the unofficial electronic
transmission count is to avert the so-called
‘dagdag-bawas’, but this purpose, however, as
the petitioner properly characterizes it, is a
total sham.

Moreover, Section 52(i) of the Omnibus
Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC
as the statutory basis for the assailed
resolution, does not cover the use of the latest
technological and election devices for
unofficial tabulations of votes. In fact, the
COMELEC even failed to notify the authorized
representatives of accredited political parties
and all candidates in areas affected by the use
or adoption of technological and electronic
devices not less than thirty days prior to the
effectivity of the use of such devices. Since
Resolution No. 6712 was made effective
immediately a day after its issuance on April
28, 2004, the respondent COMELEC could not
The Court cannot accept as tenable the
COMELECs profession that from the results of
the unofficial count, it would be able to
validate the credibility of the official
tabulation. To sanction this process would in
effect allow the COMELEC to preempt or
prejudge an election question or dispute
which has not been formally brought before it
for quasi-judicial cognizance and resolutions.
Even if this reason were disregarded, the
problem with ‘dagdag-bawas’ is one which
stems from human intervention.
In the prevailing set up, there is human
intervention because the results are manually

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 12
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
tallied, appreciated, and canvassed. On the
other hand, the electronic transmission of
results is not entirely devoid of human
intervention. The crucial stage of encoding
the precinct results in the computers prior to
the transmission requires human
intervention. Under the assailed resolution,
encoding is accomplished by employees of the
PMSI; thus, the problem of ‘dagdag-bawas’
could still occur at this particular stage of the
process. Nothing would have changed
regardless if Phase III were implemented.
Note:
MANUAL COUNTING PROCESS IN NATIONAL
ELECTIONS
Under the Omnibus Election Code, after the
votes are cast and the polls closed, the Board
of Election Inspectors (BEI) for each precinct
is enjoined to publicly count the votes and
record the same simultaneously on the tally
boards and on two sets of Election Returns.
Each set of the ER is prepared in eight (8)
copies. After the ERs are accomplished, they
are forwarded to the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC), which would canvass all
the ERs and proclaim the elected municipal
officials.
All the results in the ERs are transposed to
the statements of votes (SOVs) by precinct.
These SOVs are then transferred to the
certificates of canvass (COCs) which are, in
turn, brought to the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC). Subsequently, the PBC
would canvass all the COCs from various
municipalities and proclaim the elected
provincial officials, including those to the
House of Representatives.
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
The PBC would then prepare two sets of
Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOCs).
One set is forwarded to Congress for its
canvassing of the results for the President
and Vice-President. The other set is
forwarded to the COMELEC for its canvassing
of the results for Senators.
As the results are transposed from one
document to another, and as each document
undergoes the procedure of canvassing by
various Boards of Canvassers, election
returns and certificates of canvass are
objected to and at times excluded and/or
deferred and not tallied, long after the pre-
proclamation controversies are resolved by
the canvass boards and the COMELEC.
PORMENTO VS ESTRADA
FACTS: Estrada was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the May 1998
elections. He sought the presidency again in
the May 2010 elections. Pormento opposed
Estrada’s candidacy and filed a petition for
disqualification. COMELEC (Division) denied
his petition as well as his subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration (En
Banc). Pormento then filed the present
petition for certiorari before the Court. In the
meantime, Estrada was able to participate as
a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010
elections where he garnered the second
highest number of votes.
ISSUE: Is Estrada disqualified to run for
presidency in the May 2010 elections in view
of the prohibition in the Constitution which
states that: "[t]he President shall not be
eligible for any reelection?
Page | 13
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
HELD:Private respondent was not elected
President the second time he ran. Since the
issue on the proper interpretation of the
phrase any reelection will be premised on a
persons second (whether immediate or not)
election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No
live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in
this case no definite, concrete, real or
substantial controversy that touches on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. No specific relief may conclusively
be decreed upon by this Court in this case
that will benefit any of the parties herein. As
such, one of the essential requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review, the
existence of an actual case or controversy, is
sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate
actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is
not empowered to decide moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the result
as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In
other words, when a case is moot, it becomes
non-justiciable.
An action is considered moot when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence,
one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again
between the parties. There is nothing for the
court to resolve as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Assuming an actual case or controversy
existed prior to the proclamation of a
President who has been duly elected in the
May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
true today. Following the results of that
elections, private respondent was not elected
President for the second time. Thus, any
discussion of his reelection will simply be
hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no
useful or practical purpose.
SECTION 5. Before they enter on the execution
of their office, the President, the Vice-President,
or the Acting President shall take the following
oath or affirmation:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties
as President (or Vice-President or Acting
President) of the Philippines, preserve and
defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do
justice to every man, and consecrate myself to
the service of the Nation. So help me God.” (In
case of affirmation, last sentence will be
omitted.)
SECTION 6. The President shall have an official
residence. The salaries of the President and
Vice-President shall be determined by law and
shall not be decreased during their tenure. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the term of the
incumbent during which such increase was
approved. They shall not receive during their
tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source.
SECTION 7. The President-elect and the Vice-
President-elect shall assume office at the
beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-
President-elect shall act as President until the
President-elect shall have qualified.
Page | 14
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

If a President shall not have been chosen, the
Vice-President-elect shall act as President until
a President shall have been chosen and
qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President,
the President-elect shall have died or shall
have become permanently disabled, the Vice-
President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall
have been chosen or shall have qualified, or
where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall act as
President until a President or a Vice-President
shall have been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the
manner in which one who is to act as President
shall be selected until a President or a Vice-
President shall have qualified, in case of death,
permanent disability, or inability of the
officials mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph.
SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation
of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the
President and Vice-President, the President of
the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
then act as President until the President or
Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified.
President. He shall serve until the President or
the Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified, and be subject to the same
restrictions of powers and disqualifications as
the Acting President.
SECTION 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the
Office of the Vice-President during the term for
which he was elected, the President shall
nominate a Vice-President from among the
Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
SECTION 10. The Congress shall, at ten o’clock
in the morning of the third day after the
vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-
President occurs, convene in accordance with
its rules without need of a call and within seven
days enact a law calling for a special election
to elect a President and a Vice-President to be
held not earlier than forty-five days nor later
than sixty days from the time of such call. The
bill calling such special election shall be
deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section
26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall
become law upon its approval on third reading
by the Congress. Appropriations for the special
election shall be charged against any current
appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25,
Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of
the Congress cannot be suspended nor the
special election postponed. No special election
shall be called if the vacancy occurs within
eighteen months before the date of the next
presidential election.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall SECTION 11. Whenever the President transmits
serve as President in case of death, permanent to the President of the Senate and the Speaker
disability, or resignation of the Acting of the House of Representatives his written

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 15
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to
the President of the Senate and to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall
reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the
Members of the Cabinet transmit within five
days to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Congress shall decide the issue.
For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if
it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of
call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of
the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required
to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of
both Houses, voting separately, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
act as the President; otherwise, the President
shall continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office.
SECTION 12. In case of serious illness of the
President, the public shall be informed of the
state of his health. The Members of the Cabinet
in charge of national security and foreign
relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied
access to the President during such illness.
SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman,
or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen
or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries.
Section 13
DISQUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT
AND HIS OFFICIAL FAMILY
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the
second sentence provides: "They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly,

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 16
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions
imposed on the President and his official
family, which prohibitions are not similarly
imposed on other public officials or
employees such as the Members of Congress,
members of the civil service in general and
members of the armed forces, are proof of the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by
itself and to impose upon said class stricter
prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in
the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable
to all elective and appointive public officials
and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
meant to be the exception applicable only to
the President, the Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot
possible refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution. To construe said
qualifying phrase as respondents would have
us do, would render nugatory and
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose
of the framers of the Constitution to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to
holding other offices or employment in the
government during their tenure.
Respondents' interpretation that Section 13
of Article VII admits of the exceptions found
in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would
obliterate the distinction so carefully set by
the framers of the Constitution as to when the
high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch
from the President to Assistant Secretary, on
the one hand, and the generality of civil
servants from the
rank immediately below Assistant Secretary
downwards, on the other, may hold any other
office or position in the government during
their tenure. [Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896,
February 22, 1991]
THE DISQUALIFICATION ALSO APPLIES TO
APPOINTMENTS IN ACTING CAPACITY
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of
Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was
undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article
VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too
clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could
not validly hold any other office or
employment during his tenure as the Acting
Solicitor General, because the Constitution
has not otherwise so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation
was in an acting or temporary capacity. The
text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution
was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
Page | 17
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

President and the Members of his Cabinet in
so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in
government-owned or government
controlled-corporations was concerned. In
this regard, to hold an office means to possess
or to occupy the office, or to be in possession
and administration of the office, which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge
of the functions and duties of the office.
Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself,
supra, the Constitution makes no reference to
the nature of the appointment or designation.
The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be
construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or
temporary, for it is without question that the
avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to
prevent the concentration of powers in the
Executive Department officials, specifically
the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies
and assistants. To construe differently is to
“open the veritable floodgates of
circumvention of an important constitutional
disqualification of officials in the Executive
Department and of limitations on the
President’s power of appointment in the guise
of temporary designations of Cabinet
Members, undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries as officers-in-charge of
government agencies, instrumentalities, or
government-owned or controlled
corporations.” [Funa v. Agra, G.R. No.
191644, February 19, 2013]
EXCEPTION IN THE DISQUALIFICATION
The prohibition against holding dual or
multiple offices or employment under Section
13, Article VII of the Constitution must not,
however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of said
officials' office. The reason is that these posts
do no comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said
officials. To characterize these posts
otherwise would lead to absurd
consequences, among which are: The
President of the Philippines cannot chair the
National Security Council reorganized under
Executive Order No. 115 (December 24,
1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the
Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of
National Defense, Justice, Labor and
Employment and Local Government sit in this
Council, which would then have no reason to
exist for lack of a chairperson and members.
The respective undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries, would also be prohibited. [Civil
Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 83896, February 22, 1991]
DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
(177 SCRA 354)
FACTS: The special prosecutor officer filed in
the Sandiganbayan an information against
petitioner Doromal, alleging:
"That the above-named accused, a public
officer, being then Commissioner of the
Presidential Commission on Good
Government, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully have direct or indirect financial
interest in the Doromal International Trading
Corporation, an entity which transacted or
entered into a business transaction or

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 18
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

contract with the Department of Education, of which he is member, submitted to any

Culture and Sports and the National
Manpower and Youth Council, both agencies
of the government which business, contracts
or transactions he is prohibited by law and
the constitution from having any interest."
The information was initially annulled for the
reason that the “TanodBayan” has no right to
file information without the approval of the
Ombudsman. The Special Prosecutor sought
clearance from the Ombudsman to refile it.
The Ombudsman granted clearance but
advised that "some changes be made in the
information." A new information, duly
approved by the Ombudsman, was filed,
alleging that:
". . . , the above-named accused (Doromal), a
public officer, being then a Commissioner of
the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully, participate in a business through
the Doromal International Trading
Corporation, a family corporation of which he
is the President, and which company
participated in the biddings conducted by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and the National Manpower & Youth Council,
which act or participation is prohibited by
law and the constitution."
Petitioner moved to quash the information on
the ground that he, a PCGG Commissioner, has
not signed any document, bid of the family
corporation of which he is member,
submitted to DECS. Sandiganbayn denied the
motion to quash, hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the prohibition under Section 13
of Article VII of the Constitution should not
apply if an accused has not signed any
document of any bid of the family corporation
government departments.
HELD: No, the provision shall still apply
because the DITC remained a family
corporation in which Doromal has at least an
indirect interest. Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution provides that "the
President, Vice-President, the members of the
Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall
not . . . during (their) tenure, . . . directly or
indirectly . . . participate in any business." The
constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition
in the Civil Service Law that "pursuit of
private business .
. . without the permission required by Civil
Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a
ground for disciplinary action against any
officer or employee in the civil service.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
(194 SCRA 317)
FACTS: President Aquino issued EO No. 284,
which allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions. It was
assailed for it violates the Constitution.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of
EO No. 284 on the principal submission that it
adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII
other than those provided in the Constitution.
According to petitioners, by virtue of the
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely:

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 19
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
(1) The Vice- President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par.
(2), Article VII thereof; and
(2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
ISSUE: Whether or not an executive order
allowing members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices in addition to
their primary positions is valid.
HELD: Invalid. In the light of the construction
given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated
July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to
their primary position to not more than two
(2) positions in the government and
government corporations, Executive Order
No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention
of the express mandate of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them
from doing so, unless otherwise provided in
the 1987 Constitution itself.
FUNA VS AGRA
FACTS
 March 1, 2010 – Arroyo appointed
Hon. Alberto C. Agra as Acting
Secretary of Justice
 March 5, 2010 – Arroyo appointed
him as Acting Solicitor General
 April 7, 2010 – Petitioner filed a case
as a taxpayer, alleging that the
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
appointments were prohibited under
Section 13 Art VII of the 1987
Constitution (…prohibits the
President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants from holding
any other office or employment
during their tenure unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution), and
 Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution, which bans
any appointive official from holding
any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, unless otherwise
allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position.
 August 5, 2010 – During the pendency
of the suit, Benigno Simeon Aquino III
appointed Atty. Jose Cadiz as Solicitor
General and the latter commenced his
duties
 (Agra says: he was then the
Government Corporate Counsel when
President Arroyo designated him as
the Acting Solicitor General in place of
Solicitor General Devanadera who had
been appointed as the Secretary of
Justice;
 That on March 5, 2010, President
Arroyo designated him also as the
Acting Secretary of Justice vice
Secretary Devanadera who had
meanwhile tendered her resignation
in order to run for Congress
Page | 20
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

representing a district in Quezon when a successor may be chosen and

Province in the May 2010 elections;
that he then relinquished his position
as the Government Corporate
Counsel; and that pending the
appointment of his successor, Agra
continued to perform his duties as the
Acting Solicitor General.)
 Respondents contend that Agra’s
concurrent designations were only in
a temporary capacity, the only effect
of which was to confer additional
duties to him. Thus, as the Acting
Solicitor General and Acting Secretary
of Justice, Agra was not “holding” both
offices in the strict constitutional
sense (which must be regular and
permanent and not a mere
designation)
 Respondents further contend that,
even on the assumption that Agra’s
concurrent designation constituted
“holding of multiple offices,” his
continued service as the Acting
Solicitor General was akin to a hold-
over; that upon Agra’s designation as
the Acting Secretary of Justice, his
term as the Acting Solicitor General
expired in view of the constitutional
prohibition against holding of
multiple offices by the Members of the
Cabinet; that under the principle of
hold-over, Agra continued his service
as the Acting Solicitor General “until
his successor is elected and
qualified”10 to “prevent a hiatus in
the government pending the time
inducted into office;”
 And that during his continued service
as the Acting Solicitor General, he did
not receive any salaries and
emoluments from the OSG after
becoming the Acting Secretary of
Justice
 Petitioner counters that there was no
“prevailing special circumstance” that
justified the non-application to Agra
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution;
 And that Agra’s invocation of the
principle of hold-over is misplaced for
being predicated upon an erroneous
presentation of a material fact as to
the time of his designation as the
Acting Solicitor General and Acting
Secretary of Justice
ISSUES
1. Whether or not petitioner has locus
standi
2. Whether or not the case is moot and
academic by virtue of the
appointment of Cadiz as SolGen
3. Whether or not the designation of
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice,
concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, violated the
constitutional prohibition against
dual or multiple offices for the
Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies and assistants
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)
 (1) Yes:

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 21
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
o This case before Us is of
transcendental importance,
since it obviously has “far-
reaching implications,” and
there is a need to promulgate
rules that will guide the bench,
bar, and the public in future
analogous cases.
 (2) Yes, BUT:
o the Court did not desist from
resolving an issue that a
supervening event meanwhile
rendered moot and academic
if any of the following
recognized exceptions
obtained, namely: (1) there
was a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the case
involved a situation of
exceptional character and was
of paramount public interest;
(3) the constitutional issue
raised required the
formulation of controlling
principles to guide the Bench,
the Bar and the public; and (4)
the case was capable of
repetition, yet evading review.
 (3) Yes:
o The designation of Agra as
Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position
of Acting Solicitor General was
unconstitutional and void for
being in violation of the
constitutional prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
o Being designated as the Acting
Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position
of Acting Solicitor General,
therefore, Agra was
undoubtedly covered by
Section 13, Article VII, supra,
whose text and spirit were too
clear to be differently read.
Hence, Agra could not validly
hold any other office or
employment during his tenure
as the Acting Solicitor General,
because the Constitution has
not otherwise so provided.
o In this regard, to hold an office
means to possess or to occupy
the office, or to be in
possession and administration
of the office, which implies
nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and
duties of the office.
o To be sure, Agra’s concurrent
designations as Acting
Secretary of Justice and Acting
Solicitor General did not come
within the definition of an ex
officio capacity***. Had either
of his concurrent designations
been in an ex officio capacity
in relation to the other, the
Court might now be ruling in
his favor.
o The OSG are neither required
by the primary functions nor
included by the powers of the
DOJ—MEANING, one position
Page | 22
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

was not derived from the already paid for and covered by the
other. compensation attached to his principal office.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
petition for certiorari and prohibition;
ANNULS AND VOIDS the designation
of Hon. Alberto C. Agra as the Acting
Secretary of Justice in a concurrent
capacity with his position as the
Acting Solicitor General for being
unconstitutional and violative of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution; and DECLARES that l-
Ion. Alberto C. Agra was a de facto
officer during his tenure as Acting
Secretary of Justice.
In order to be clear, therefore, the
Court holds that all official actions of
Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of
Justice, assuming that was his later
designation, were presumed valid,
binding and effective as if he was the
officer legally appointed and qualified
for the office. 54 This clarification is
necessary in order to protect the
sanctity of the dealings by the public
with persons whose ostensible
authority emanates from the State.
NOTES
*** Ex officio likewise denotes an “act done in
an official character, or as a consequence of
office, and without any other appointment or
authority other than that conferred by the
office.” The ex officio position being actually
and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are
SECTION 14. Appointments extended by an
Acting President shall remain effective, unless
revoked by the elected President within ninety
days from his assumption or reassumption of
office.
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
REASON FOR PROHIBITION ON MIDNIGHT
APPOINTMENTS
Of course, nobody will assert that President
Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at noon
at December 30, 1961. But it is common sense
to believe that after the proclamation of the
election of President Macapagal, his was no
more than a "care-taker" administration. He
was duty bound to prepare of the orderly
transfer of authority to the incoming
President, and he should not do acts which he
ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct
the policies of his successor. The time for
debate had passed; the electorate had spoken.
It was not for him to use his powers as
incumbent President to continue the political
warfare that had ended or to avail himself of
presidential prerogatives to serve partisan
purposes. The filing up of vacancies in
important positions, if few, and so spaced as
to afford some assurance of deliberate action
and careful consideration of the need for the

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 23
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
appointment and the appointee's
qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted.
But the issuance of 350 appointments in one
night and the planned induction of almost all
of them a few hours before the inauguration
of the new President may, with some reason,
be regarded by the latter as an abuse of
Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken
being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill
all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and
other conditions, and thereby to deprive the
new administration of an opportunity to
make the corresponding appointments.
[Aytona vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L-19313,
January 19, 1962]
TWO APPOINTMENTS PROHIBITED BY
SECTION 15
Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is
directed against two types of appointments:
(1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first
refers to those appointments made within the
two months preceding a Presidential election
and are similar to those which are declared
election offenses in the Omnibus Election
Code.
The second type of appointments prohibited
by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-
called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v.
Castillo, it was held that after the
proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly
elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia,
who was defeated in his bid for reelection,
became no more than a "caretaker"
administrator whose duty was to "prepare for
the orderly transfer of authority to the
incoming President." [In re Appointments
dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela
and Hon. Vallarta, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC.
November 9, 1998.]
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
THE APPOINTMENT BAN DOES NOT APPLY
TO THE JUDICIARY
The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission reveal that the
framers devoted time to meticulously
drafting, styling, and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates
that the organization and arrangement of the
provisions of the Constitution were not
arbitrarily or whimsically done by the
framers, but purposely made to reflect their
intention and manifest their vision of what
the Constitution should contain.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article
VIII of the word shall – an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be
enforced – should not be disregarded.
Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the
President the imperative duty to make an
appointment of a Member of the Supreme
Court within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy. The failure by the President to
do so will be a clear disobedience to the
Constitution.
Page | 24
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1),
Article VIII for the President to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court was
undoubtedly a special provision to establish a
definite mandate for the President as the
appointing power, and cannot be defeated by
mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to
the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed
because it was “couched in stronger negative
language.” Such interpretation even turned
out to be conjectural, in light of the records of
the Constitutional Commission’s
deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
There is no question that one of the reasons
underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part
of Article VII was to eliminate midnight
appointments from being made by an
outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the
appointments dealt with in the leading case of
Aytona v. Castillo.
Given the background and rationale for the
prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have
no doubt that the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments
made in the Executive Department. The
framers did not need to extend the
prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,
because their establishment of the JBC and
their subjecting the nomination and screening
of candidates for judicial positions to the
unhurried and deliberate prior process of the
JBC ensured that there would no longer be
midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If
midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona
were made in haste and with irregularities, or
made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the
last days of his administration out of a desire
to subvert the policies of the incoming
President or for partisanship, the
appointments to the Judiciary made after the
establishment of the JBC would not be
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
suffering from such defects because of the
JBC’s prior processing of candidates. Indeed,
it is axiomatic in statutory construction that
the ascertainment of the purpose of the
enactment is a step in the process of
ascertaining the intent or meaning of the
enactment, because the reason for the
enactment must necessarily shed
considerable light on “the law of the statute,”
i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be
construed with reference to its intended
scope and purpose, and the court should seek
to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat
it.
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates
the danger that appointments to the Judiciary
can be made for the purpose of buying votes
in a coming presidential election, or of
satisfying partisan considerations. The
experience from the time of the establishment
of the JBC shows that even candidates for
judicial positions at any level backed by
people influential with the President could
not always be assured of being recommended
for the consideration of the President,
because they first had to undergo the vetting
of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the
creation of the JBC was precisely intended to
de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with
the intervention of the Commission on
Appointments. This insulating process was
absent from the Aytona midnight
appointment. [De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010]
AYTONA VS CASTILLO
January 19, 1962 4SCRA 1
FACTS: December 19, 1961, Aytona was
appointed as ad interim Governor of Central
Page | 25
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

Bank and took oath and office on the same
date. Noon of December 30, 1961 President
elect D. Macapagal assumed office and
subsequently on December 31, 1961 issued
Order No. 2, cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by the previous Chief of
State. On the 1st day of January 1962, Castillo
was appointed by the incumbent president as
Governor of Central Bank therefor replacing
the ad interim appointee Aytona, and the
former qualified immediately. Aytona
instituted a qou warranto proceeding
challenging the right of Castillo to exercise his
right to the said post.
HON. P. B. VILLARTA AS RTC JUDGES (298
SCRA 408 [NOVEMBER 9, 1998])
FACTS: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta were Branch 62, Bago City
and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively. On May 12, 1998, the Chief
Justice received from Malacanang the
appointments of two (2) Judge of the RTC
mentioned above. The appointments were
questioned on the view that they were made
during the period of the ban on appointments
imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the new president has
the power to cancel all ad interim
appointments made by the previous
president after they have all qualified?
Held: To quote “We are informed, it is
Malacañan's practice — which we find to be
logical — to submit ad interim appointments
only when the Commission on Appointments
is in session. One good reason for the practice
is that only those who have accepted the
appointment and qualified are submitted for
confirmation. Nevertheless, this time,
Malacañan submitted its appointments on the
same day they were issued; and the
Commission was not then in session;
obviously because it foresaw the possibility
that the incoming President would refuse to
submit later the appointees of his
predecessor. As a result, as already adverted
to, some persons whose names were
submitted for confirmation had not qualified
nor accepted their appointments.”
The issue was already ventilated at the
meeting of the Judicial and Bar Council on
March 9, 1998 regarding the constitutionality
of appointments of eight (8) Associate
Justices to the Court of Appeals, specifically,
in light of the forthcoming presidential
elections. Attention was drawn to Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution reading as
follows:
Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end
of his, term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
On the other hand, appointments to fill
vacancies in the Supreme Court during the
period mentioned in the provision just quoted
could be justified by Section 4(1) of Article VII
of the Constitution which states:

Sec. 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be

IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
30,1998 OF HON. M. A. VALENZUELA AND Associate Justices. ** **. Any vacancy shall be

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 26
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof. Also pertinent although not
specifically discussed is Section 9 of the same
Article VIII which provides that for the lower
courts, the President shall issue the
appointments — from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Council for every
vacancy — within ninety days from the
submission of the list.
The Court issued a Resolution which states
that ”pending the foregoing proceedings and
the deliberation by the Court on the mater,
and until further orders, no action be taken
on the appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and
Hon. Vallarta which in the meantime shall be
held in abeyance.
In compliance with the foregoing Resolution,
Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta filed before
the Court the required pleadings and other
documents. It is noted that Hon. Valenzuela
had already taken his Oath of Office a Judge
on May 14, 1998 and explained that he did so
because on May 7, 1998, he “received from
Malacanang copy of his appointment ***
which contained the following direction “By
virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon
the performance of the duties of the office.
The Court then deliberated on the pleadings
and documents above mentioned, in relation
to the facts and circumstances on record and
thereafter resolved to promulgate the
following opinion.
ISSUE: Whether, during the period of the ban
on appointments imposed by Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the
judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of
Article VIII.
Whether the President can make
appointments to the judiciary during the
period of the ban in the interest of public
service.
HELD:
NO. The Court's view is that during the period
stated in Section 15. Article VII of the
Constitution — "(t)wo months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up
to the end his term" — the President is
neither required to make appointments to the
courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections
4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the
President is required to fill vacancies in the
courts within the time frames provided
therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of
Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the
prohibition on appointments comes into
effect only once every six years.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that
that instruction that any "vacany shall be
filled within ninety days" (in the last sentence
of Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts with
the prohibition Section 15, Article VII, which
is couched in stronger negative language —
that "a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments. . ."
Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VI is
directed against two types of appointments:
(1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first
refers to those appointments made within the
two months preceding a Presidential election
and are similar to those which are declared
elections offenses in the Omnibus Election
Code. The second type of appointments
prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists
of the so-called "midnight" appointments.
Considering the respective reasons for the
time frames for filling vacancies in the courts

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 27
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

and the restriction on the President's power
of appointments, it is this Court's view that, as
a general proposition, in case of conflict, the
former should yield to the latter. Surely, the
prevention of vote-buying and similar evils
outweighs the need for avoiding delays in
filling up of court vacancies or the disposition
of some cases. Temporary vacancies can
abide the period of the ban which,
incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes
to exist only once in every six years.
Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts
can be filled temporarily by designation. But
prohibited appointments are long-lasting and
permanent in their effects. They may, as
earlier pointed out, their making is
considered an election offense. To be sure,
instances may be conceived of the imperative
need for an appointment, during the period of
the ban, not only in the executive but also in
the Supreme Court. This may be the case
should the membership of the Court be so
reduced that it will have no quorum, or
should the voting on a particularly important
question requiring expeditious resolution be
evenly divided. Such a case, however, is
covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII
nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.
Concerning Valenzuela’s oath-taking and
“reporting for duty” as Presiding Judge of RTC
Branch 62, Bago City, on May 14, 1998, it
must be noted that it is a standing practice on
the appointments to the Judiciary – from the
highest to the lowest court – to be sent by the
Office of the President to the Office of the
Chief Justice, the appointments being
addressed to the appointees. It is the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court in the Chief’s
Justice behalf, who thereafter advises the
individual appointees of their appointments
and also the date commencement of the pre-
requisite orientation seminar to be conducted
by the Philippine Judicial Academy for new
Judges. The procedure ensures the
authenticity of the appointments, enables the
Court, particularly the Office of the Court
Administrator, to enter in the appropriate
records all appointments to the Judiciary a
well as other relevant data such as the dates
of qualification, the completion by the
appointees of their pre-requisite orientation
seminars, their assumption of duty, etc. The
procedure also precludes the possibility,
however remote of Judges acting on spurious
or otherwise defective appointments.
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and
Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to
the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 998)
were unquestionably made during the period
of the ban. Consequently, they come within
the operation of the first prohibition relating
to appointments which are considered to be
for the purpose of buying votes or influencing
the election. While the filling of vacancies in
the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public
interest, there is no showing in this case of
any compelling reason to justify the making of
the appointments during the period of the
ban. On the other hand, as already discussed,
there is a strong public policy for the
prohibition against appointments made
within the period of the ban.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the
Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the
appointments signed by His Excellency the
President under date of March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court
of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively and to order
them, forthwith on being served with notice
of this decision, to forthwith CEASE AND
DESIST from discharging the office of Judge of

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 28
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

the Courts to which they were respectively Conformably with its existing practice, the
appointed on March 30, 1998. JBC “automatically considered” for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior
of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice
GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO G.R. No.
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the
191002, March 17, 2010
last two declined their nomination through
letters dated January 18, 2010 and January
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief
25, 2010, respectively.
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010
The OSG contends that the incumbent
occurs just days after the coming presidential
President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
elections on May 10, 2010.
because the prohibition under Section 15,
These cases trace their genesis to the
Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
controversy that has arisen from the
to appointments in the Supreme Court. It
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days
must be filled within 90 days from its
after the presidential election. Under Section
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article
4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme
from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at
Court appointments, they could have easily
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which
and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also
explains why the prohibition found in Article
considering that Section 15, Article VII
VII (Executive Department) was not written
(Executive Department) of the Constitution
in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that
prohibits the President or Acting President
the framers also incorporated in Article VIII
from making appointments within two
ample restrictions or limitations on the
months immediately before the next
President’s power to appoint members of the
presidential elections and up to the end of his
Supreme Court to ensure its independence
term, except temporary appointments to
from “political vicissitudes” and its
executive positions when continued vacancies
“insulation from political pressures,” such as
therein will prejudice public service or
stringent qualifications for the positions, the
endanger public safety.
establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, Supreme Court Justice.
2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief
A part of the question to be reviewed by the
Justice.
Court is whether the JBC properly initiated
the process, there being an insistence from
some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 29
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC
may resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section
4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires
the President to appoint one from the short
list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court
(be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does
not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments
to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly
in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two
months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states: Section 4. (1). The
Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may
sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that
the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are
obviously of the same character, in that they
Page | 30
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
affect the power of the President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer
only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section
15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent
with the rule that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that
the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear,
would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely
within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Section 16 The President shall nominate and,
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until
disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress.
APPOINTMENT VS. DESIGNATION
Appointment may be defined as the selection,
by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of
a given office. When completed, usually with
its confirmation, the appointment results in
security of tenure for the person chosen
unless he is replaceable at pleasure because
of the nature of his office. Designation, on the
other hand, connotes merely the imposition
by law of additional duties on an incumbent
official, as where, in the case before us, the
Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman
of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, or where, under the
Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme
Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit
in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. It is said that
appointment is essentially executive while
designation is legislative in nature. [Binamira
vs. Garucho, G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990]
APPOINTMENTS WHICH REQUIRE
CONFIRMATION BY THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS
It is readily apparent that under the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just
quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. These four
(4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer
from time to time, are:
Page | 31
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers
are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments, the President appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of
officers are the present bone of contention.
Should they be appointed by the President
with or without the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments? By
following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in
the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. But we need not rely solely on
this basic rule of constitutional construction.
We can refer to historical background as well
as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission to determine, with more
accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the
people adopting it, on whether the
appointments by the President, under the
second, third and fourth groups, require the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. [Sarmiento vs. Mison, G.R. No.
L-79974, December 17, 1987]
APPOINTMENTS THAT DO NOT NEED
CONFIRMATION REMAIN SO, EVEN IF THE
PRESIDENT VOLUNTARILY SUBMITS THE
SAME TO THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS
Since the position of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is not among
the positions mentioned in the first sentence
of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
appointments to which are to be made with
the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, it follows that the
appointment by the President of the
Chairman of the CHR is to be made without
the review or participation of the Commission
on Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the
Chairman and Members of the Commission
on Human Rights is not specifically provided
for in the Constitution itself, unlike the
Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit, whose
appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution in the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointment.
Respondent Commission vigorously contends
that, granting that petitioner's appointment
as Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights is one that, under Sec. 16, Art. VII of
the Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison
case, is solely for the President to make, yet, it
is within the president's prerogative to
voluntarily submit such appointment to the
Commission on Appointment for

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 32
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
confirmation. The mischief in this contention,
as the Court perceives it, lies in the suggestion
that the President (with Congress agreeing)
may, from time to time move power
boundaries, in the Constitution differently
from where they are placed by the
Constitution.
The Court really finds the above contention
difficult of acceptance. Constitutional Law, to
begin with, is concerned with power not
political convenience, wisdom, exigency, or
even necessity. Neither the Executive nor the
Legislative (Commission on Appointments)
can create power where the Constitution
confers none. The evident constitutional
intent is to strike a careful and delicate
balance, in the matter of appointments to
public office, between the President and
Congress (the latter acting through the
Commission on Appointments). To tilt one
side or the other of the scale is to disrupt or
alter such balance of power. In other words,
to the extent that the Constitution has
blocked off certain appointments for the
President to make with the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, so also has
the Constitution mandated that the President
can confer no power of participation in the
Commission on Appointments over other
appointments exclusively reserved for her by
the Constitution. The exercise of political
options that finds no support in the
Constitution cannot be sustained.
Under this heading, we will assume, ex gratia
argumenti, that the Executive may voluntarily
allow the Commission on Appointments to
exercise the power of review over an
appointment otherwise solely vested by the
Constitution in the President. Yet, as already
noted, when the President appointed
petitioner Bautista on 17 December 1988 to
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
the position of Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights with the advice to her that
by virtue of such appointment (not, until
confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments), she could qualify and enter
upon the performance of her duties after
taking her oath of office, the presidential act
of appointment to the subject position which,
under the Constitution, is to be made, in the
first place, without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments, was then and
there a complete and finished act, which,
upon the acceptance by Bautista, as shown by
her taking of the oath of office and actual
assumption of the duties of said office,
installed her, indubitably and unequivocally,
as the lawful Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights for a term of seven (7) years.
There was thus no vacancy in the subject
office on 14 January 1989 to which an
appointment could be validly made. In fact,
there is no vacancy in said office to this day.
To insist on such a posture is akin to deluding
oneself that day is night just because the
drapes are drawn and the lights are on. For,
aside from the substantive questions of
constitutional law raised by petitioner, the
records clearly show that petitioner came to
this Court in timely manner and has not
shown any indication of abandoning her
petition. [Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No.
86439, April 13, 1989]
THE CONGRESS CANNOT EXPAND THE LIST
OF OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE
SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and
Commissioners fall within the second
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, more specifically under the
Page | 33
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
"third groups" of appointees referred to in
Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the
Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not
among the officers mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose
appointments requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. To the extent
that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the
appointments of respondents Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence
of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by
adding thereto appointments requiring
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments on
appointments which are otherwise entrusted
only with the President. [Calderon vs. Carale,
G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992]
WHILE THE CONGRESS CAN PROVIDE THE
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE APPOINTEE, IT
CANNOT DO SO IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE
CONGRESS IDENTIFIES THE SPECIFIC
PERSON
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Appointment involves an
exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it
is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment
papers to the appointee. In other words, the
choice of the appointee is a fundamental
component of the appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President
with the power to appoint an officer, it
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
(Congress) cannot at the same time limit the
choice of the President to only one candidate.
Once the power of appointment is conferred
on the President, such conferment necessarily
carries the discretion of whom to appoint.
Even on the pretext of prescribing the
qualifications of the officer, Congress may not
abuse such power as to divest the appointing
authority, directly or indirectly, of his
discretion to pick his own choice.
Consequently, when the qualifications
prescribed by Congress can only be met by
one individual, such enactment effectively
eliminates the discretion of the appointing
power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment.
[Flores vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22,
1993]
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS APPLY ONLY
TO APPOINTMENTS THAT REQUIRE
CONFIRMATION
Nor can respondents impressively contend
that the new appointment or re-appointment
on 14 January 1989 was an ad interim
appointment, because, under the
Constitutional design, ad interim
appointments do not apply to appointments
solely for the President to make, i.e., without
the participation of the Commission on
Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by
their very nature under the 1987
Constitution, extend only to appointments
where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad
interim appointments are to remain valid
until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment
of Congress; but appointments that are for
the President solely to make, that is, without
the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, cannot be ad interim
Page | 34
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
appointments. [Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No.
86439, April 13, 1989]
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT IS
PERMANENT APPOINTMENT
An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn
by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject
to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character
by making it effective until disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains
effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer
be withdrawn or revoked by the President.
The fear that the President can withdraw or
revoke at any time and for any reason an ad
interim appointment is utterly without basis.
[Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036,
April 2, 2002]
NOTES:
IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE
ENUMERATED THE PRESIDENT HAS THE
POWER TO APPOINT THE FOLLOWING:
1. Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts
2. Regular members of the Judicial and Bar
Council
3. Chairmen and Members of the
Constitutional Commissions
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
4. The Ombudsman and his deputies
WHAT DOES THE PHRASE “THE CONGRESS
MAY, BY LAW, VEST THE APPOINTMENT
OF OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK IN
THE PRESIDENT ALONE, IN THE COURTS,
OR IN THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS,
AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS”
CONNOTE?
This means that when the authority is given
to head of a collegial body it is to the
chairman that it is given and not to the body.
He can appoint only officers “lower in rank”.
Hence a Chairman may not appoint a fellow
member of the board.
WHEN A LAW IS SILENT AS TO WHO
SHOULD APPOINT THE CORRESPONDING
OFFICER, WHO SHOULD APPOINT?
The President.
STEPS IN THE APPOINTING PROCESS:
1. Nomination by the President;
2. Confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments;
3. Issuance of the commission;
4. Acceptance by the appointee.
In Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil 740,, the
Supreme Court declared that an appointment
is deemed complete only upon its acceptance.
Pending such acceptance, which is optional to
the appointee, the appointment may still be
validly withdrawn. Appointment to a public
office cannot be forced upon any citizen
except for purposes of defense of the State
under Sec. 4, Art. II, as an exception to the
rule against involuntary servitude.
Page | 35
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
Ramon Binamira vs. Peter Garrucho
RULING/DOCTRINES:
DISTINCTION BETWEEN APPOINTMENT
AND DESIGNATION - It is not disputed that
the petitioner was not appointed by the
President of the Philippines but only
designated by the Minister of Tourism. There
is a clear distinction between appointment
and designation that the petitioner has failed
to consider.
Appointment may be defined as the selection,
by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of
a given office. 3 When completed, usually
with its confirmation, the appointment
results in security of tenure for the person
chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure
because of the nature of his office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional
duties on an incumbent official, 4 as where, in
the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority,
or where, under the Constitution, three
Justices of the Supreme Court are designated
by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral
Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. 5 It is said that appointment
is essentially executive while designation is
legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an
appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified
public office. That is the common
understanding of the term. However, where
the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall
hold the office only in a temporary capacity
and may be replaced at will by the appointing
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security
of tenure on the person named.
MAY THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT BE
EXERCISED BY ANY OFFICER OTHER THAN
THE ONE TO WHOM IT IS VESTED - Even if so
understood, that is, as an appointment, the
designation of the petitioner cannot sustain
his claim that he has been illegally removed.
The reason is that the decree clearly provides
that the appointment of the General Manager
of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be
made by the President of the Philippines, not
by any other officer. Appointment involves
the exercise of discretion, which because of
its nature cannot be delegated. Legally
speaking, it was not possible for Minister
Gonzales to assume the exercise of that
discretion as an alter ego of the President.
The appointment (or designation) of the
petitioner was not a merely mechanical or
ministerial act that could be validly
performed by a subordinate even if he
happened as in this case to be a member of
the Cabinet.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted
cannot delegate it to another, the
presumption being that he was chosen
because he was deemed fit and competent to
exercise that judgment and discretion, and
unless the power to substitute another in his
place has been given to him, he cannot
delegate his duties to another.
In those cases in which the proper execution
of the office requires, on the part of the officer,
the exercise of judgment or discretion, the
presumption is that he was chosen because
he was deemed fit and competent to exercise
that judgment and discretion, and, unless
power to substitute another in his place has
Page | 36
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
been given to him, he cannot delegate his
duties to another.
Indeed, even on the assumption that the
power conferred on the President could be
validly exercised by the Secretary, we still
cannot accept that the act of the latter, as an
extension or "projection" of the personality of
the President, made irreversible the
petitioner's title to the position in question.
The petitioner's conclusion that Minister
Gonzales's act was in effect the act of
President Aquino is based only on half the
doctrine he vigorously invokes. Justice Laurel
stated that doctrine clearly in the landmark
case of Villena v. Secretary of the Interior,
where he described the relationship of the
President of the Philippines and the members
of the Cabinet as follows:
... all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or the law to act in person
or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
The doctrine presumes the acts of the
Department Head to be the acts of the
President of the Philippines when "performed
and promulgated in the regular course of
business," which was true of the designation
made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall
be considered valid only if not 'disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive," as also
happened in the case at bar.
BINAMIRA VS. GARRUCHO
(188 SCRA 154 [1990])
FACTS: The petitioner, Binamira, was the
former General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority by virtue of the
designation of the Minister of Tourism with
the approval of President Aquino.
Subsequently, Garrucho was delegated by the
President as the new Secretary of the
Ministry. Garucho then had taken over the
position of Binamira as the General Manager
of Philippine Tourism Authority. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N a person designated to a position by a
member of the cabinet should step down to a
person newly designated by the President to
that same position.
2. Distinguished designation from
appointment
HELD:
1. YES. The designation of the petitioner
cannot sustain his claim that he has been
illegally removed. The reason is that the
decree clearly provides that the appointment
of the General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority shall be made by the
President of the Philippines, not by any other
officer. Appointment involves the exercise of
discretion, which because of its nature cannot
be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not
possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the
exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of
the President.
Page | 37
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
His designation being an unlawful
encroachment on a presidential prerogative,
he did not acquire valid title thereunder to
the position in question. Even if it be assumed
that it could be and was authorized, the
designation signified merely a temporary or
acting appointment that could be legally
withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit
for a different reason).
2. Designation may also be loosely defined as
an appointment because it likewise involves
the naming of a particular person to a
specified public office. That is the common
understanding of the term. However,= where
the person is merely designated and not
appointed, the implication is that he shall
hold the office only in a temporary capacity
and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security
of tenure on the person named.
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO VS. SALVADOR
MISON
FACTS: The petitioners, who are taxpayers,
lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and professors of Constitutional
Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador
Mison from performing the functions of the
Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and the respondent Guillermo
Carague, as Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from effecting disbursements in
payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments,
on the ground that Mison's appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
unconstitutional by reason of its not having
been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other
hand, maintain the constitutionality of
respondent Mison's appointment without the
confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
ISSUES:
1. What are the groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint?
2. W/N confirmation of the appointments of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by
the Commission on Appointments required.
RULING/DOCTRINES:
It is readily apparent that under the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just
quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. These four
(4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer
from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed
with the consent of the Commission on
Page | 38
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

Appointments. Appointments of such officers

are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments, the President appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of
officers are the present bone of contention.
Should they be appointed by the President
with or without the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments? By
following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in
the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. But we need not rely solely on
this basic rule of constitutional construction.
We can refer to historical background as well
as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission to determine, with more
accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the
people adopting it, on whether the
appointments by the President, under the
second, third and fourth groups, require the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. Again, in this task, the
following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad
Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in
mind that a constitutional provision must be
presumed to have been framed and adopted
in the light and understanding of prior and
existing laws and with reference to them.
"Courts are bound to presume that the people
adopting a constitution are familiar with the
previous and existing laws upon the subjects
to which its provisions relate, and upon which
they express their judgment and opinion in its
adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99
N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.)
NOTES:
IS THE CONFIRMATION OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
REQUIRED IN CASE OF AN APPOINTMENT
OF A SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVE?
Yes. The sectoral representative fell under the
clause “other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution.
WHAT ABOUT IN THE CASE OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS?
No, since it is not among those mentioned in
the first sentence of article vii, section 16 or
elsewhere.
WHAT ABOUT IN THE APPOINTMENT OF
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS?
No, since it is not among those mentioned in
the first sentence of article vii, section 16 or
elsewhere.
WHAT ABOUT APPOINTMENTS AND
PROMOTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE COAST
GUARD?
No, the Coast Guard is a civilian unit
IS THE PROMOTION OF SENIOR OFFICERS
OF THE PNP SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION
BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
AS REQUIRED BY PNP LAW?
No. Congress may not expand the list of those
needing CA confirmation. PNP officers are not
members of the Armed Forces but are
civilians.

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 39
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

BAUTISTA VS SALONGA (c) The Chairman and the Members of the

RULING/DOCTRINES:
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS MAY BE APPOINTED BY THE
PRESIDENT WITHOUT THE CONFIRMATION
OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS -
Since the position of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is not among
the positions mentioned in the first sentence
of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
appointments to which are to be made with
the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, it follows that the
appointment by the President of the
Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made without
the review or participation of the Commission
on Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the
Chairman and Members of the Commission
on Human Rights is not specifically provided
for in the Constitution itself, unlike the
Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit, whose
appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution in the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in
Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the
confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments because they are among the
officers of government "whom he (the
President) may be authorized by law to
appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order
No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President
to appoint the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights. It provides:
Commission on Human Rights shall be
appointed by the President for a term of
seven years without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor.
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT
CANNOT EXERCISE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS TO CONFIRM OR DENY
APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICES WHICH ARE
EXCLUDED BY THE CONSTITUTION EVEN IF
THE PRESIDENT VOLUNTARILY SUBMITS
SUCH APPOINTMENT FOR ITS
CONFIRMATION - Respondent Commission
vigorously contends that, granting that
petitioner's appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is one that,
under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as
interpreted in the Mison case, is solely for the
President to make, yet, it is within the
president's prerogative to voluntarily submit
such appointment to the Commission on
Appointment for confirmation. The mischief
in this contention, as the Court perceives it,
lies in the suggestion that the President (with
Congress agreeing) may, from time to time
move power boundaries, in the Constitution
differently from where they are placed by the
Constitution.
The Court really finds the above contention
difficult of acceptance. Constitutional Law, to
begin with, is concerned with power not
political convenience, wisdom, exigency, or
even necessity. Neither the Executive nor the
Legislative (Commission on Appointments)
can create power where the Constitution
confers none. The evident constitutional
intent is to strike a careful and delicate
balance, in the matter of appointments to
public office, between the President and
Congress (the latter acting through the
Commission on Appointments). To tilt one

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 40
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
side or the other of the scale is to disrupt or
alter such balance of power. In other words,
to the extent that the Constitution has
blocked off certain appointments for the
President to make with the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, so also has
the Constitution mandated that the President
can confer no power of participation in the
Commission on Appointments over other
appointments exclusively reserved for her by
the Constitution. The exercise of political
options that finds no support in the
Constitution cannot be sustained.
Nor can the Commission on Appointments, by
the actual exercise of its constitutionally
delimited power to review presidential
appointments, create power to confirm
appointments that the Constitution has
reserved to the President alone. Stated
differently, when the appointment is one that
the Constitution mandates is for the President
to make without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments, the executive's
voluntary act of submitting such appointment
to the Commission on Appointments and the
latter's act of confirming or rejecting the same,
are done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY
VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AN
APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER,
STILL, THERE WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH
AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14
JANUARY 1989 - Under this heading, we will
assume, ex gratia argumenti, that the
Executive may voluntarily allow the
Commission on Appointments to exercise the
power of review over an appointment
otherwise solely vested by the Constitution in
the President. Yet, as already noted, when the
President appointed petitioner Bautista on 17
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
December 1988 to the position of Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights with the
advice to her that by virtue of such
appointment (not, until confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments), she could
qualify and enter upon the performance of
her duties after taking her oath of office, the
presidential act of appointment to the subject
position which, under the Constitution, is to
be made, in the first place, without the
participation of the Commission on
Appointments, was then and there a complete
and finished act, which, upon the acceptance
by Bautista, as shown by her taking of the
oath of office and actual assumption of the
duties of said office, installed her, indubitably
and unequivocally, as the lawful Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights for a term
of seven (7) years. There was thus no vacancy
in the subject office on 14 January 1989 to
which an appointment could be validly made.
In fact, there is no vacancy in said office to
this day.
To insist on such a posture is akin to deluding
oneself that day is night just because the
drapes are drawn and the lights are on. For,
aside from the substantive questions of
constitutional law raised by petitioner, the
records clearly show that petitioner came to
this Court in timely manner and has not
shown any indication of abandoning her
petition.
THE CONCEPT OF AD INTERIM
APPOINTMENTS APPLIES ONLY TO
APPOINTMENTS SUBJECT TO THE
CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS - Nor can respondents
impressively contend that the new
appointment or re-appointment on 14
January 1989 was an ad interim appointment,
because, under the Constitutional design, ad
interim appointments do not apply to
Page | 41
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
appointments solely for the President to
make, i.e., without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments.Ad interim
appointments, by their very nature under the
1987 Constitution, extend only to
appointments where the review of the
Commission on Appointments is needed. That
is why ad interim appointments are to remain
valid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment
of Congress; but appointments that are for
the President solely to make, that is, without
the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, can not be ad interim
appointments.
TERESITA QUINTOS – DELES VS.
COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS, AND OFFICES (C.A.),
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
FACTS: Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed
by then President Corazon Aquino as a
sectoral representative for women in 1988.
Their appointment was done while Congress
was in session. They were subsequently
scheduled to take their oath of office but the
Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an
opposition against Deles et al alleging that
their appointment must have the concurrence
of the COA.
Deles then questioned the objection of the
COA. She said that her appointment does not
need the concurrence of the COA. This is in
pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the
Constitution, which does not require her
appointment to be confirmed by the COA to
qualify her to take her seat in the lower house.
RULING/DOCTRINES:
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES IN THE
HOUSE ARE TO BE APPOINTED BY THE
PRESIDENT SUBJECT TO THE
CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS - Since the seats reserved for
sectoral representatives in paragraph 2,
Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express
provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral
representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the "other officers
whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution," referred to in
the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose
appointments are subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento
v. Mison, supra).
Nevertheless, there are appointments vested
in the President in the Constitution which, by
express mandate of the Constitution, require
no confirmation such as appointments of
members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the
Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI).
No such exemption from confirmation had
been extended to appointments of sectoral
representatives in the Constitution. Petitioner
was appointed on April 6, 1988 pursuant to
Art. XVIII, Section 7 and Art. VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2 of the Constitution,
The power of the President to appoint
sectoral representatives remains directly
derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of the
Constitution which is quoted in the second
"Whereas' clause of Executive Order No. 198.
Thus, appointments by the President of
sectoral representatives require the consent
of the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with the first sentence of Section
16, Art. VII of the Constitution. More to the
point, petitioner Deles' appointment was
Page | 42
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
issued not by virtue of Executive Order No.
198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the
Constitution which require submission to the
confirmation process.
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS ARE VALID
ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVED BY THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR AFTER
THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF CONGRESS -
Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2,
Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the
appointment of petitioner is, the recognition
by the President as appointing authority that
petitioner's appointment requires
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Under paragraph 2, Section 16,
Art. VII, appointments made by the President
pursuant thereto "shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment
of the Congress." If indeed appointments of
sectoral representatives need no
confirmation, the President need not make
any reference to the constitutional provisions
above-quoted in appointing the petitioner, As
a matter of fact, the President in a letter dated
April 11, 1989 had expressly submitted
petitioner's appointment for confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.
Considering that Congress had adjourned
without respondent Commission on
Appointments having acted on petitioner's
appointment, said appointment/nomination
had become moot and academic pursuant to
Section 23 of the Rules of respondent
Commission and "unless resubmitted shall
not again be considered by the Commission."
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
PETER JOHN CALDERON VS. BARTOLOME
CARALE
FACTS: In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This
law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA
6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division
Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be
appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to
any vacancy shall come from the nominees of
the sector which nominated the predecessor.
Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et
al as the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC, the appointment
was not submitted to the CoA for its
confirmation. Calderon questioned the
appointment saying that w/o the
confirmation by the CoA, such an
appointment is in violation of RA 6715.
Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an
encroachment on the appointing power of the
executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the
Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers appointed by
the President additional to those mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of
the Constitution.
RULING/DOCTRINES:
THE CONGRESS CANNOT BY LEGISLATIVE
FIAT EXPAND THE LIST OF OFFICERS
SUBJECT TO THE CONFIRMATION OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS;
APPOINTMENTS OF THE NLRC CHAIRMAN
AND COMMISSIONERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO
CONFIRMATION BY THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS - Indubitably, the NLRC
Chairman and Commissioners fall within the
second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, more specifically under the
"third groups" of appointees referred to in
Page | 43
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the
Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not
among the officers mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose
appointments requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. To the extent
that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the
appointments of respondents Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence
of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by
adding thereto appointments requiring
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution,
by imposing the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments on
appointments which are otherwise entrusted
only with the President.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative
prerogative. Determining their
constitutionality is a judicial function. The
Court respects the laudable intention of the
legislature. Regretfully, however, the
constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715
amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar
as it requires confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments over appointments of the
Chairman and Member of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it,
beyond redemption if we are to render fealty
to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16,
Art. VII thereof.
It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII
of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not
unconsciously, intended by the framers of the
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
1987 Constitution to be a departure from the
system embodied in the 1935 Constitution
where the Commission on Appointments
exercised the power of confirmation over
almost all presidential appointments, leading
to many cases of abuse of such power of
confirmation. Subsection 3, Section 10, Art.
VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:
3. The President shall nominate and with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments,
shall appoint the heads of the executive
departments and bureaus, officers of the
Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy
and Air Forces from the rank of captain or
commander, and all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint; . . .
The deliberate limitation on the power of
confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments over presidential
appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of
the 1987 Constitution, has undoubtedly
evoked the displeasure and disapproval of
members of Congress. The solution to the
apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not
judicial or legislative but constitutional. A
future constitutional convention or Congress
sitting as a constituent (constitutional)
assembly may then consider either a return to
the 1935 Constitutional provisions or the
adoption of a hybrid system between the
1935 and 1987 constitutional provisions.
Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply
the 1987 Constitution in accordance with
what it says and not in accordance with how
the legislature or the executive would want it
interpreted.
Page | 44
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

JESUS ARMANDO TARROSA VS. GABRIEL
SINGSON
FACTS: Gabriel C. Singson was appointed
Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President
Fidel V. Ramos. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a
"taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition
questioning the appointment of Singson for
not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments (CA). Tarrosa
invoked Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7653
which provides that the Governor of the BSP
if appointed is subject to the confirmation of
the CA.
ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBEN LISTA
FACTS: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast
Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President
to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore,
Naval Captain, and they assumed office
without confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer,
filed a petition with the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of their
assumption of office, which requires
confirmation of the COA.
RULING/DOCTRINES:

In his comment, Singson claimed that the PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS OF

Congress exceeded its legislative powers in
requiring the confirmation by the CA of the
appointment of the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral. He contended that an appointment to
the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, citing
Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution.
RULING/DOCTRINES:
THE APPOINTMENT OF THE GOVERNOR OF
THE BANGKO SENTRAL IS NOT SUBJECT TO
THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS - However for the
information of all concerned, we call attention
to our decision in Calderon v. Carale, 208
SCRA 254 (1992), with Justice Isagani A. Cruz
dissenting, where we ruled that Congress
cannot by law expand the confirmation
powers of the Commission on Appointments
and require confirmation of appointment of
other government officials not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16
of Article VII of the Constitution.
RESPONDENT OFFICERS OF THE PCG, OR
ANY PCG OFFICER FROM THE RANK OF
CAPTAIN AND HIGHER FOR THAT MATTER,
DO NOT REQUIRE CONFIRMATION BY THE
CA - the PCG used to be administered and
maintained as a separate unit of the
Philippine Navy under Section 4 of RA 5173.
It was subsequently placed under the direct
supervision and control of the Secretary of
the Department of National Defense (DND)
pursuant to Section 4 of PD 601. Eventually, it
was integrated into the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) as a major subordinate unit
of the Philippine Navy under Section 54 of
Chapter 8, Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV of EO
292, as amended.
However, on March 30, 1998, after the
aforesaid changes in the charter of the PCG,
then President Fidel V. Ramos, in the exercise
of his statutory authority to reorganize the
Office of the President, issued EO 475
transferring the PCG from the DND to the
Office of the President. He later on again
transferred the PCG from the Office of the

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 45
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
President to the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no
longer part of the Philippine Navy or the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
promotions and appointments of respondent
officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from
the rank of captain and higher for that matter,
do not require confirmation by the CA.
It is clear from Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution that only appointed
officers from the rank of colonel or naval
captain in the armed forces require
confirmation by the CA. The rule is that the
plain, clear and unambiguous language of the
Constitution should be construed as such and
should not be given a construction that
changes its meaning.
The enumeration of appointments subject to
confirmation by the CA under Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
exclusive. The clause "officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain" refers to military officers alone. This
is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission on the proposed
text of said Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Since the promotions and
appointments of respondent officers are not
covered by the above-cited provision of the
Constitution, the same need not be confirmed
by the CA.
AQUILINO PIMENTEL JR. VS EDUARDO
ERMITA
FACTS: Gloria Arroyo issued appointments as
acting secretary to Arthur Yap (Agriculture),
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
Alberto Romulo (Foreign Affairs), Raul
Gonzales (Justice), Florencio Abad
(Education), Avelino Cruz Jr (National
Defence), Rene Villa (Agrarian Reform),
Joseph Durano (Tourism) and Michael
Defensor (Environment and Natural
Resources) on 23 August 2004 except Yap on
15 August 2004. The respondents took their
oaths and assumed duties. The Congress
commenced regular session on 26 July 2004
and Senators Aquilino Pimintel, Edgardo
Angara, Juan Ponce Enrile, Luisa Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada, Panfilo LAcson, Alfredo Lim,
Jamby Madrigal and Sergio Osmena III filed
petition for certiorari and prohibition against
respondents. The Senators contended that
pursuant to Section 10 (2) Book IV of EO 292
the undersecretary shall be designated as
acting secretary in case of vacancy. Also,
petitioners assert that while Congress is in
session there can be no appointments
without first obtaining consent from
Commission on Appointments. When
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004,
Gloria Arroyo issued ad interim appointments
to the same respondents.
RULING/DOCTRINES:
POWER TO APPOINT IS EXECUTIVE IN
NATURE - The power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature, and the legislature may
not interfere with the exercise of this
executive power except in those instances
when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive power
to appoint are construed strictly against the
legislature. The scope of the legislatures
interference in the executives power to
appoint is limited to the power to prescribe
the qualifications to an appointive office.
Congress cannot appoint a person to an office
in the guise of prescribing qualifications to
that office. Neither may Congress impose on
Page | 46
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office.
However, even if the Commission on
Appointments is composed of members of
Congress, the exercise of its powers is
executive and not legislative. The Commission
on Appointments does not legislate when it
exercises its power to give or withhold
consent to presidential appointments.
THE PRESIDENT HAS THE DISCRETION TO
APPOINT ANY PERSON AND THE CONGRESS
CANNOT IMPOSE UPON THE PRESIDENT TO
AUTOMATICALLY APPOINT THE
UNDERSECRETARY AS HIS/HER ALTER EGO -
The essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-
gap measure intended to fill an office for a
limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego
of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice
as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on
the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of
great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter
ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may
become vacant while Congress is in session.
Since a department secretary is the alter ego
of the President, the acting appointee to the
office must necessarily have the Presidents
confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
office of a department secretary, the
President must appoint in an acting capacity a
person of her choice even while Congress is in
session. That person may or may not be the
permanent appointee, but practical reasons
may make it expedient that the acting
appointee will also be the permanent
appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to
make such acting appointment. Section 17,
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states
that [t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of an office in
the executive branch. Thus, the President may
even appoint in an acting capacity a person
not yet in the government service, as long as
the President deems that person competent.
ROBERTO FLORES VS. FRANKLIN DRILON
FACTS: Petitioners, taxpayers and employees
of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which directs the President to appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the
SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its
operations, the mayor of Olongapo City
(Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the
chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”
RULING/DOCTRINES:
THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT INVOLVES
THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION, AND ONCE
CONFERRED, SUCH MAY NOT BE
RESTRICTED BY THE CONGRESS TO A POINT
THAT THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY LOSES
Page | 47
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
ANY DISCRETION ON WHO TO APPOINT - As
may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he
designation of a person, by the person or
persons having authority therefor, to
discharge the duties of some office or trust,"
or "[t]he selection or designation of a person,
by the person or persons having authority
therefor, to fill an office or public function and
discharge the duties of the same. In his
treatise, Philippine Political
Law, Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz
defines appointment as "the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of
a given office."
Considering that appointment calls for a
selection, the appointing power necessarily
exercises a discretion. According to
Woodbury, J., "the choice of a person to fill an
office constitutes the essence of his
appointment," and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds
that an "[a]ppointment to office is
intrinsically an executive act involving the
exercise of discretion." In Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate
Court we held:
The power to appoint is, in essence,
discretionary. The appointing power has the
right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for
himself who is best qualified among those
who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the
appointing power . . . .
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Appointment involves an
exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it
is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment
papers to the appointee. In other words, the
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
choice of the appointee is a fundamental
component of the appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President
with the power to appoint an officer, it
(Congress) cannot at the same time limit the
choice of the President to only one candidate.
Once the power of appointment is conferred
on the President, such conferment necessarily
carries the discretion of whom to appoint.
Even on the pretext of prescribing the
qualifications of the officer, Congress may not
abuse such power as to divest the appointing
authority, directly or indirectly, of his
discretion to pick his own choice.
Consequently, when the qualifications
prescribed by Congress can only be met by
one individual, such enactment effectively
eliminates the discretion of the appointing
power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment.
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that
the subject posts be filled with a presidential
appointee for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso
nevertheless limits the appointing authority
to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor
of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify
for the posts in question, the President is
precluded from exercising his discretion to
choose whom to appoint. Such supposed
power of appointment, sans the essential
element of choice, is no power at all and goes
against the very nature itself of appointment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso
merely sets the qualifications of the officer
during the first year of operations of SBMA,
i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it
is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where
only one, and no other, can qualify.
Accordingly, while the conferment of the
Page | 48
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
appointing power on the President is a
perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso
limiting his choice to one is certainly an
encroachment on his prerogative.
NOTES:
SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ON THE PRESIDENT’S APPOINTING
POWER:
1. The President may not appoint his spouse
and relatives by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth civil degree as Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, as
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including
governmentowned or -controlled
corporations [Sec. 13, Art. VII].
2. Appointments extended by an acting
President shall remain effective unless
revoked by the elected President within
ninety days from his assumption of office
[Sec. 14, Art. VII].
3. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a resident or acting President
shall not make appointments except
temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety [Sec. 15, Art. VII].
a. In De Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 131136, February 28, 2001, the
Supreme Court ruled that this
provision applies only to presidential
appointments. There is no law that
prohibits local executive officials from
making appointments during the last
days of their tenure.
b. During this period, the President is
neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
allowed to do so. Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of
Article VIII simply mean that the
President is required by law to fill up
vacancies in the courts within the
time frames provided therein, unless
prohibited by Sec. 15 of Article VII.
While the filling up of vacancies in the
judiciary is undoubtedly in the public
interest, there is no showing in this
case of any compelling reason to
justify the making of the
appointments during the period of the
ban [In Re: Mateo Valenzuela, A.M. No.
98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998].
IMPLICATION OF THE FACT THAT THE
APPOINTING POWER IS EXECUTIVE IN
NATURE
The legislature may not usurp such function
the legislature may create an office, but it may
neither specify who shall be appointed to
such office nor actually appoint him. The
appointing power is the exclusive prerogative
of the President, upon which no limitations
may be imposed by Congress, except those
resulting from the limited exercise of power
to prescribe the qualifications to a given
appointinve office. (Manalang vs Quitoriano
903 SCRA 911 [1954])
THE POWER OF REMOVAL.
As a general rule, the power of removal may
be implied from the power of appointment.
However, the President cannot remove
officials appointed by him where the
Constitution prescribes certain methods for
separation of such officers from public service,
e.g., Chairmen and Commissioners of
Constitutional Commissions who can be
removed only by impeachment, or judges
who are subject to the disciplinary authority
of the Supreme Court. In the cases where the
Page | 49
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
power of removal is lodged in the Presfdent,
the same may be exercised only for cause as
may be provided by law, and in accordance
with the prescribed administrative procedure.
POWER TO REORGANIZE
 The President’s power to reorganize the
executive branch is also an exercise of his
residual powers under Section 20, Title I,
Book II, Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of the Philippines),
which grants the President broad
organization powers to implement
reorganization measures. Further,
Presidential Decree No. 1772, which
amended P.D. 1416, grants the President
the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities, and to standardize
salaries and materials [MEWAP v. Romulo,
supra.].
 Be that as it may, the President must
exercise good faith in carrying out the
reorganization of any branch or agency of
the executive department if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. R.A, 6656
enumerates the circumstances which may
be considered as evidence of bad faith in
the removal of civil service employees as
a result of reorganization: (a) where there
is a significant increase in the number of
positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned; (b)
where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same
functions is created; (c) where
incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit; (d)
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
where there is a classification of offices in
the department or agency concerned and
the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the
original offices; and (e) where the
removal violates the order of separation
[MEWAP v. Romulo, supra.].
THE APPOINTING AUTHOTIRY OF THE
PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED
WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE
LEGISLATURE TI IMPOSE ADDITIONAL
DUTIES ON EXISTING OFFICES.
While it is the prerogative of the President to
appoint the members of the Supreme Court,
the Court upheld the authority of the
legislature to create a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal consisting of the Chief Justice and
the Justices of the Supreme Court. The said
act did not create a new office nor specify
who should hold the office but merely
imposed additional duties and powers of the
Supreme Court and consequently upon
whoever may be the incumbent Chief Justice
and Associate Justices.
THE POWER TO APPOINT INCLUDES THE
POWER TO DECIDE WHO AMONG THA
VARIOUS CHOICES IS BEST QUALIFIED
Provided that the person chosen has the
qualifications provided by law.
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG VS. ALFREDO
L. BENIPAYO
FACTS: Maria J. Angelina G. Matibag
questions the constitutionality of the
appointment by President Arroyo of Benipayo
(Chairman of the Commission on Elections),
Page | 50
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

and Bora and Tuason (COMELEC
Commissioners). She questions the legality of
appointment by Benipayo of Velma J. Cinco as
Director IV of the Comelec’s EID and
reassigning her to the Law department.
RULING/DOCTRINES:
AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT IS A Congress, but such appointments shall be
PERMANENT APPOINTMENT - An ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President
once the appointee has qualified into office.
The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress. The second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution provides as follows:
"The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory,
but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment
of the Congress." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains
effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer
be withdrawn or revoked by the President.
The fear that the President can withdraw or
revoke at any time and for any reason an ad
interim appointment is utterly without basis.
More than half a century ago, this Court had
already ruled that an ad interim appointment
is permanent in character. In Summers vs.
Ozaeta, decided on October 25, 1948, we held
that:
"x x x an ad interim appointment is one made
in pursuance of paragraph (4), Section 10,
Article VII of the Constitution, which provides
that the ‘President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the
effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.’ It is an
appointment permanent in nature, and the
circumstance that it is subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character. An ad interim
appointment is disapproved certainly for a
reason other than that its provisional period
has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment
which is merely temporary, good until
another permanent appointment is issued."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution imposes no condition on the
effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and
thus an ad interimappointment takes effect
immediately. The appointee can at once
assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer,
all the powers pertaining to the office. In
Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments, this Court elaborated on the
nature of an ad interim appointment as
follows:
"A distinction is thus made between the
exercise of such presidential prerogative
requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments when Congress is in session
and when it is in recess. In the former, the
President nominates, and only upon the
consent of the Commission on Appointments
may the person thus named assume office. It
is not so with reference to ad interim

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 51
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
appointments. It takes effect at once. The
individual chosen may thus qualify and
perform his function without loss of time. His
title to such office is complete. In the language
of the Constitution, the appointment is
effective ‘until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.’"
Petitioner cites Black’s Law Dictionary which
defines the term "ad interim" to mean "in the
meantime" or "for the time being." Hence,
petitioner argues that an ad interim
appointment is undoubtedly temporary in
character. This argument is not new and was
answered by this Court in Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, where we explained that:
"x x x From the arguments, it is easy to see
why the petitioner should experience
difficulty in understanding the situation.
Private respondent had been extended
several ‘ad interim’ appointments which
petitioner mistakenly understands as
appointments temporary in nature. Perhaps,
it is the literal translation of the word ‘ad
interim’ which creates such belief. The term is
defined by Black to mean "in the meantime"
or "for the time being". Thus, an officer ad
interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or
to discharge the duties of the office during the
absence or temporary incapacity of its regular
incumbent (Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised
Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not the
meaning nor the use intended in the context
of Philippine law. In referring to Dr. Esteban’s
appointments, the term is not descriptive of
the nature of the appointments given to him.
Rather, it is used to denote the manner in
which said appointments were made, that is,
done by the President of the Pamantasan in
the meantime, while the Board of Regents,
which is originally vested by the University
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
Charter with the power of appointment, is
unable to act. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as
used in letters of appointment signed by the
President, means a permanent appointment
made by the President in the meantime that
Congress is in recess. It does not mean a
temporary appointment that can be
withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term,
although not found in the text of the
Constitution, has acquired a definite legal
meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The
Court had again occasion to explain the
nature of an ad interim appointment in the
more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of
Appeals, where the Court stated:
"We have already mentioned that an ad
interim appointment is not descriptive of the
nature of the appointment, that is, it is not
indicative of whether the appointment is
temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it
denotes the manner in which the
appointment was made. In the instant case,
the appointment extended to private
respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr.
was issued without condition nor limitation
as to tenure. The permanent status of private
respondent’s appointment as Executive
Assistant II was recognized and attested to by
the Civil Service Commission Regional Office
No. 12. Petitioner’s submission that private
respondent’s ad interim appointment is
synonymous with a temporary appointment
which could be validly terminated at any time
is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments
are permanent but their terms are only until
the Board disapproves them." (Emphasis
supplied)
Page | 52
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
FELIMON LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed
Administrative Officer II, Office of the City
Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon
on 18 February 1983. The appointment was
described as “permanent” but the Civil
Service Commission approved it as
“temporary.” On 22 March 1984, the Civil
Service Commission found the private
respondent better qualified than the
petitioner for the contested position and
accordingly directed herein private
respondent in place of petitioner’s position.
The private respondent was so appointed on
28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor
Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now
invoking his earlier permanent appointment
as well as to question the Civil Service
Commission’s order and the private
respondent’s title.
RULING/DOCTRINES:
NATURE OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT -
The Civil Service Commission is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature
of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited
to approving or reviewing the appointment in
the light of the requirements of the Civil
Service Law. When the appointee is qualified
and authorizing the other legal requirements
are satisfied, the Commission has no choice
but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
As Justice Ramon C. Fernandez declared in an
earlier case:
It is well settled that the determination of the
kind of appointment to be extended lies in the
official vested by law with the appointing
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
power and not the Civil Service Commission.
The Commissioner of Civil Service is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature
of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer. When the appointee is
qualified, as in this case, the Commissioner of
Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. Under the Civil Service Law,
Presidential Decree No. 807, the
Commissioner is not authorized to curtail the
discretion of the appointing official on the
nature or kind of the appointment to be
extended.
Indeed, the approval is more appropriately
called an attestation, that is, of the fact that
the appointee is qualified for the position to
which he has been named. As we have
repeatedly held, such attestation is required
of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely
as a check to assure compliance with Civil
Service Laws.
Appointment is an essentially discretionary
power and must be performed by the officer
in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can
decide.
It is different where the Constitution or the
law subjects the appointment to the approval
of another officer or body, like the
Commission on Appointments under 1935
Constitution. Appointments made by the
President of the Philippines had to be
confirmed by that body and could not be
issued or were invalidated without such
Page | 53
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
confirmation. In fact, confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments was then
considered part of the appointing process,
which was held complete only after such
confirmation.
Moreover, the Commission on Appointments
could review the wisdom of the appointment
and had the power to refuse to concur with it
even if the President's choice possessed all
the qualifications prescribed by law. No
similar arrangement is provided for in the
Civil Service Decree. On the contrary, the Civil
Service Commission is limited only to the
non-discretionary authority of determining
whether or not the person appointed meets
all the required conditions laid down by the
law.
HERMOGENES POBRE VS. MARIANO
MENDIETA
FACTS: The controversy began on January 2,
1992, when the term of office of Honorable
Julio B. Francia as PRC
Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that
time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior
Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P.
Pobre was the second Associate
Commissioner of the PRC.
Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon sought
the opinion of Acting Secretary of Justice
Silvestre H. Bello, III on whether the
President's power to appoint the
Commissioner of the Professional Regulation
Commission is restricted by Section 2 of P.D.
No. 223.
Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello,
III answered that Section 2 of P.D. No. 223
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
does not limit or restrict the appointing
power of the President.
President Corazon C. Aquino appointed the
petitioner, then an Associate Commissioner,
as the PRC Commissioner/ Chairman.
Private respondent, Mariano A. Mendieta, as
the Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a
petition for declaratory relief against
Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary
Drilon, and Acting Secretary of Justice
Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they be
enjoined from appointing, or recommending
the appointment of Associate Commissioner
Pobre as Chairman of the PRC because under
Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, he (Mendieta), as
the senior Associate Commissioner, was
legally entitled to succeed Francia as
Chairman of the PRC.
RULING/DOCTRINES:
THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT CANNOT BE
RESTRICTED TO THE POINT THAT THE
OFFICER LOSES THE DISCRETION - The Court
finds unacceptable the view that every
vacancy in the Commission (except the
position of "junior" Associate Commissioner)
shall be filled by "succession" or by
"operation of law" for that would deprive the
President of his power to appoint a new PRC
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners
— "all to be appointed by the President"
under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would
be that the only occasion for the President to
exercise his appointing power would be when
the position of junior (or second) Associate
Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not
presume that when the President issued P.D.
No. 223, he deliberately clipped his
prerogative to choose and appoint the head of
the PRC and limited himself to the selection
and appointment of only the associate
Page | 54
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
commissioner occupying the lowest rung of
the ladder in that agency. Since such an
absurdity may not be presumed, the Court
should so construe the law as to avoid it.
The duty devolves on the court to ascertain
the true meaning where the language of a
statute is of doubtful meaning, or where an
adherence to the strict letter would lead to
injustice, absurdity, or contradictory
provisions, since an ambiguity calling for
construction may arise when the
consequence of a literal interpretation of the
language is an unjust, absurd, unreasonable,
or mischievous result, or one at variance with
the policy of the legislation as a whole; and
the real meaning of the statute is to be
ascertained and declared, even though it
seems to conflict with the words of the
statute. (82 CJS 589-590; Emphasis supplied.)
NOTES:
IS THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE NECESSARY FOR
THE VALIDITY OF THE PRESIDENT’S
APPOINTMENT OF A PROSECUTOR?
No. the power to appoint prosecutors is given
to the President. Hence the law must be read
simply as allowing the Secretary of Justice to
advise the President.
POWER OF CONTROL OF JUSTICE
SECRETARY OVER PROSECUTORS
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra., it was
reiterated that decisions or resolutions of
prosecutors are subject to appeal to the
Secretary of Justice who exercises the power
of direct control and supervision over
prosecutors. Review, as an act of supervision
and control by the Justice Secretary, finds
basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. This power may still
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
be availed of despite the filing of a criminal
information in Court, and in his discretion,
the Secretary may affirm, modify or reverse
the resolutions of his subordinates. The
Crespo ruling did not foreclose the Justice
Secretary’s power of review. Thus, where the
Secretary of Justice exercises his power of
review only after an information is filed, trial
courts should defer or suspend arraignment
and other proceedings until the appeal is
resolved. Such deferment, however, does not
mean that the trial court is ipso facto bound
by the resolution of the Secretary of Justice,
because jurisdiction, once acquired by the
trial court, is not lost despite the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the
information or to dismiss the case. See also
Solar Team Entertainment v. Judge How, G.R.
No. 140863, August 22, 2000; Noblejas v.
Salas, 67 SCRA 47; Villegas v. Enrile, 50 SCRA
11; David v. Villegas, 81 SCRA 842.
Section 17. The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
CONTROL VS. SUPERVISION
An officer in control lays down the rules in
the doing of an act. It they are not followed,
he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he
may even decide to do it himself. Supervision
does not cover such authority. The supervisor
or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the
rules are not observed, he may order the
Page | 55
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

work done or re-done but only to conform to
the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his
own manner for the doing of the act. He has
no judgment on this matter except to see to it
that the rules are followed. In the opinion of
the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this,
and no more nor less than this, and so
performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision. [Drilon vs. Lim, G.R. No. 112497,
August 4, 1994]
action as may be necessary for the proper
performance of official functions, including
rectification of violations, abuses and other
forms of mal-administration; (4) review and
pass upon budget proposals of such agencies
but may not increase or add to them.
[Kilusang Bayan vs. Dominguez, G.R. No.
85439, January 13, 1992]

An administrative officer has only such DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL

powers as are expressly granted to him and
those necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof. These powers should not be
extended by implication beyond what may be
necessary for their just and reasonable
execution.
Supervision and control include only the
authority to:
(a) act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; (b) direct the performance of
duty; restrain the commission of acts; (c)
review, approve, reverse or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d)
determine priorities in the execution of plans
and programs; and (e) prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically,
administrative supervision is limited to the
authority of the department or its equivalent
to: (1) generally oversee the operations of
such agencies and insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and
economically but without interference with
day-to-day activities; (2) require the
submission of reports and cause the conduct
of management audit, performance
evaluation and inspection to determine
compliance with policies, standards and
guidelines of the department; (3) take such
AGENCY
After serious reflection, we have decided to
sustain the contention of the government in
this case on the broad proposition, albeit not
suggested, that under the presidential type of
government which we have adopted and
considering the departmental organization
established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our
Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or the law to act in person
or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
[Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, G.R. No.
46570, April 21, 1939]

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 56
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

THE PRESIDENT MAY NOT BE DEPRIVED

OF HIS POWER TO REVIEW THE DECISION
OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The
President's duty to execute the law is of
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of
all executive departments. Thus it is, that
department heads are men of his confidence.
His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is
the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure.
Naturally, he controls and directs their acts.
Implicit then is his authority to go over,
confirm, modify or reverse the action taken
by his department secretaries. In this context,
it may not be said that the President cannot
rule on the correctness of a decision of a
department secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of
the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the standard practice is to allow
appeals from such decisions to the Office of
the President. This Court has recognized this
practice in several cases. In one, the decision
of the Lands Director as approved by the
Secretary was considered superseded by that
of the President's on appeal. In other cases,
failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy
of appeal was considered a fatal defect,
warranting dismissal of the case, for non-
exhaustion of all administrative remedies.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right
to appeal to the President reposes upon the
President's power of control over the
executive departments. And control simply
means "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the
latter." [Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Paño,
G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967]
POWERS VESTED TO HEADS OF
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS MAY BE
DIRECTLY EXERCISED BY THE PRESIDENT
Since it is the Director of Lands who has
direct executive control among others in the
lease, sale or any form of concession or
disposition of the land of the public domain
subject to the immediate control of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and considering that under the
Constitution the President of the Philippines
has control over all executive departments,
bureaus, and offices, etc., the President of the
Philippines has therefore the same authority
to dispose of portions of the public domain as
his subordinates, the Director of Lands, and
his alter ego the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. [City of Iligan vs. Director
of Lands, G.R. No. L-30852, February 26,
1988]
THE POWER OF CONTROL MAY BE
EXERCISED ON THE ACT, BUT NOT ON THE
ACTOR
The extent of the power of control given to
the President by the Constitution over all
officers and employees in the executive
department was interpreted by this Court in
the case of Hebron vs. Reyes 104 Phil., 175 to
mean "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the
latter", to distinguish it from the power of
general supervision over municipal
government, but the decision does not go to
the extent of including the power to remove
an officer or employee in the executive
department. The power merely applies to the
exercise of control over the acts of the

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 57
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
subordinate and not over the actor or agent
himself of the act. [Ang-Angco vs. Castillo,
G.R. No. L-17169, November 30, 1963]
PRESIDENT’S CONTROL POWER COVERS
GOCCS
We hold that the President of the Philippines'
authority to review and reverse the decision
of the NAMARCO Board of Directors
dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position in
the NAMARCO and to order his reinstatement
falls within the constitutional power of the
President over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. Under our governmental
setup, corporations owned or controlled by
the government, such as the NAMARCO,
partake of the nature of government bureaus
or offices, which are administratively
supervised by the Administrator of the Office
of Economic Coordination, "whose
compensation and rank shall be that of a head
of an Executive Department" and who "shall
be responsible to the President of the
Philippines under whose control his
functions . . . shall be exercised." (Executive
Order No. 386 of December 22, 1950;
section 1, issued under the Reorganization
Act of 1950). [National Marketing Corp. vs.
Arca, G.R. No. L-25743, September 30, 1969]
TAKE CARE POWER
The Power to Create Fact Finding
Committee is Included in the Take Care
Power of the President
While the power to create a truth commission
cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No.
1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the
creation of the PTC finds justification under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
imposing upon the President the duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
As correctly pointed out by the respondents,
the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all
powers inherent in them. The President’s
power to conduct investigations to aid him in
ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in
this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency – is inherent
in the President’s powers as the Chief
Executive. That the authority of the President
to conduct investigations and to create bodies
to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes
does not mean that he is bereft of such
authority
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in
ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
As stated above, the powers of the President
are not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed.
It should be stressed that the purpose of
allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist
is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land. And if history is to be revisited, this was
also the objective of the investigative bodies
created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE,
PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission.
There being no changes in the government
structure, the Court is not inclined to declare
Page | 58
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
such executive power as non-existent just
because the direction of the political winds
have changed. [Biraogo vs. The Philippine
Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935,
December 7, 2010]
NOTES:
The President exercises only the power of
general supervision over local governments
[Sec. 4, Art. X],
1. On the President’s power of general
supervision, however, the President can
only interfere in the affairs and activities
of a local government unit if he or she
finds that the latter had acted contrary to
law. The President or any of his alter egos,
cannot interfere in local affairs as long as
the concerned local government unit acts
within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by
the President or any of his alter egos
seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-
conforming judgment on local affairs of a
local government unit is a patent nullity,
autonomy, as well as the doctrine of
separation of powers of the executive and
the legislative departments in governing
municipal corporations [Judge Dadole v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350.
December 3, 2002].
2. Sec. 187, R.A. 7160, which authorizes the
Secretary of Justice to review the
constitutionality or legality of a tax
ordinance — and, if warranted, to revoke
it on either or both grounds — is valid,
and does not confer the power of control
over local government units in the
Secretary of Justice, as even if the latter
can set aside a tax ordinance, he cannot
substitute his own judgment for that of
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
the local government unit [Drilon v. Lim,
235 SCRA 135],
3. In Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988,
July 19, 2000, the Supreme Court held
that Sec. 4, Administrative Order No. 327,
which withholds 5% of the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local
government units, is unconstitutional,
because the President’s power over local
governments is only one of general
supervision, and not one of control. A
basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of LGU shares in the
national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution.
FRANKLIN DRILON VS ALFREDO LIM
FACTS:
The principal issue in this case is the
constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code. The Secretary of Justice
(on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794
(Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law
and public policy.
RULING/ DOCTRINES:
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of
Justice to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted,
to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.
When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to
substitute his own judgment for the judgment
of the local government that enacted the
measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the
Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace
Page | 59
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
it with his own version of what the Code
should be. He did not pronounce the
ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis
for its annulment. He did not say that in his
judgment it was a bad law. What he found
only was that it was illegal. All he did in
reviewing the said measure was determine if
the petitioners were performing their
functions in accordance with law, that is, with
the prescribed procedure for the enactment
of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to
the city government under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was an
act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in
the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or
re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the
rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to
the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his
own manner for the doing of the act. He has
no judgment on this matter except to see to it
that the rules are followed. In the opinion of
the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this,
and no more nor less than this, and so
performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision.
JOSE VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR
FACTS: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary
of Justice to review only the constitutionality
or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
warranted, to revoke it on either or both of
these grounds. When he alters or modifies or
sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment for
the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set
aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not
replace it with his own version of what the
Code should be. He did not pronounce the
ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis
for its annulment. He did not say that in his
judgment it was a bad law. What he found
only was that it was illegal. All he did in
reviewing the said measure was determine if
the petitioners were performing their
functions in accordance with law, that is, with
the prescribed procedure for the enactment
of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to
the city government under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was an
act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in
the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or
re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the
rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to
the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his
own manner for the doing of the act. He has
no judgment on this matter except to see to it
that the rules are followed. In the opinion of
the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this,
and no more nor less than this, and so
performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision.
Page | 60
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
RULING/DOCTRINE:
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL
AGENCY - After serious reflection, we have
decided to sustain the contention of the
government in this case on the board
proposition, albeit not suggested, that under
the presidential type of government which we
have adopted and considering the
departmental organization established and
continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12,
Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or the law to act in person
or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
With reference to the Executive Department
of the government, there is one purpose
which is crystal-clear and is readily visible
without the projection of judicial searchlight,
and that is, the establishment of a single, not
plural, Executive. The first section of Article
VII of the Constitution, dealing with the
Executive Department, begins with the
enunciation of the principles that "The
executive power shall be vested in a President
of the Philippines." This means that the
President of the Philippines is the Executive
of the Government of the Philippines, and no
other. The heads of the executive
departments occupy political positions and
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the
language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of
the President's bosom confidence" (7
Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language
of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-
General, 453), "are subject to the direction of
the President." Without minimizing the
importance of the heads of the various
departments, their personality is in reality
but the projection of that of the President.
Stated otherwise, and as forcibly
characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "each
head of a department is, and must be, the
President's alter ego in the matters of that
department where the President is required
by law to exercise authority" (Myers vs.
United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U.
S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of
departments, of course, exercise certain
powers under the law but the law cannot
impair or in any way affect the constitutional
power of control and direction of the
President. As a matter of executive policy,
they may be granted departmental autonomy
as to certain matters but this is by mere
concession of the executive, in the absence of
valid legislation in the particular field. If the
President, then, is the authority in the
Executive Department, he assumes the
corresponding responsibility. The head of a
department is a man of his confidence; he
controls and directs his acts; he appoints him
and can remove him at pleasure; he is the
executive, not any of his secretaries. It is
therefore logical that he, the President, should
be answerable for the acts of administration
of the entire Executive Department before his
own conscience no less than before that
undefined power of public opinion which, in
the language of Daniel Webster, is the last
repository of popular government. These are
the necessary corollaries of the American
Page | 61
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

presidential type of government, and if there
is any defect, it is attributable to the system
itself. We cannot modify the system unless we
modify the Constitution, and we cannot
modify the Constitution by any subtle process
of judicial interpretation or constitution.
LACSON – MAGALLANES CO. VS. JOSE PANO
FACTS: Jose Magallanes was permitted to use
and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao.
The said land was a forest zone which was
later declared as an agricultural zone.
Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-
Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-
owner.
Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his
claim over the same piece of land. The
Director of Lands denied Paño’s request. The
Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his
petition hence it was elevated to the Office of
the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor
of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision
of the Secretary of Agriculture is already
conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also
averred that the decision of the Executive
Secretary is an undue delegation of power.
The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not
contain any provision whereby the
presidential power of control may be
delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is
argued that it is the constitutional duty of the
President to act personally upon the matter.
incorrect. The President's duty to execute the
law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
control of all executive departments. Thus it
is, that department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to appoint them;
his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at
pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs
their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go
over, confirm, modify or reverse the action
taken by his department secretaries. In this
context, it may not be said that the President
cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of
a department secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of
the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the standard practice is to allow
appeals from such decisions to the Office of
the President.This Court has recognized this
practice in several cases. In one, the decision
of the Lands Director as approved by the
Secretary was considered superseded by that
of the President's appeal. In other cases,
failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy
of appeal was considered a fatal defect,
warranting dismissal of the case, for non-
exhaustion of all administrative remedies.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right
to appeal to the President reposes upon the
President's power of control over the
executive departments. And control simply
means "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the
latter."

RULING/DOCTRINES: This unquestionably negates the assertion

that the President cannot undo an act of his
THE PRESIDENT CAN REVOKE THE ACTS OF department secretary.
DEPARTMENT HEADS - Plaintiff's position is

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 62
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of
the Executive Secretary herein is an undue
delegation of power. The Constitution,
petitioner asserts, does not contain any
provision whereby the presidential power of
control may be delegated to the Executive
Secretary. It is argued that it is the
constitutional duty of the President to act
personally upon the matter.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers
there are which the President must exercise
in person. Not as correct, however, is it so say
that the Chief Executive may not delegate to
his Executive Secretary acts which the
Constitution does not command that he
perform in person. Reason is not wanting for
this view. The President is not expected to
perform in person all the multifarious
executive and administrative functions. The
Office of the Executive Secretary is an
auxiliary unit which assists the President. The
rule which has thus gained recognition is that
"under our constitutional setup the Executive
Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has an undisputed
jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse
any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, including the Director
of Lands, may issue.
3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the
Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the
other department heads, no higher than
anyone of them. From this, plaintiff carves the
argument that one department head, on the
pretext that he is an alter ego of the President,
cannot intrude into the zone of action
allocated to another department secretary.
This argument betrays lack of appreciation of
the fact that where, as in this case, the
Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the
President," his decision is that of the
President's. Such decision is to be given full
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
faith and credit by our courts. The assumed
authority of the Executive Secretary is to be
accepted. For, only the President may
rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is
not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the
action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive," that remains the act of
the Chief Executive, and cannot be
successfully assailed. No such disapproval or
reprobation is even intimated in the record of
this case.
CITY OF ILIGAN VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS: The President issued Proclamation
335; withdrawing certain parcels of public
land in Iligan from sale or settlement and,
reserving such for the use of NPC (Nat’l
Power Corporation). By virtue of said
proclamation, NPC constructed a fertilizer
plant named “Maria Cristina”
Later, NPC sold the fertilizer plant to “Marcelo
Tire and Rubber Corp” with all the
machineries, right of occupancy, and use of
land. Also it made a covenant to collaborate
with DANR in facilitating sale and right to
lease for at least 25 years, the lands where
plant is erected.
Proclamation 20 and 198 were issued: Proc.
20 excluded from operation of Proc. 335
certain areas occupied by “Ma. Cristina” and
Employees Housing and declaring such lands
for open disposition. Proc. 198 changed the
technical description of said areas (6 lots)
“Marcelo Steel” and “Ma. Cristina” filed a Msc.
Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands
Page | 63
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
In the notice of sale issued in Manila, Director
of Lands advised that Bureau will sell in an
auction said lands of “Marcelo Steel”.
The President then issued Proc. 469 –
excluding from the reservation made in favor
to NPC certain lands in Iligan (Lot 1, 1-a, 3,
and 4) and DONATING said lands in favor of
Iligan City.
The Mayor of Iligan wrote to Director of
Lands informing him that City is the owner of
said lands and foreshores in auction. But no
action was taken on said request for exclusion
and so City filed a complaint for injunction in
CFI against Director. An injunction
temporarily issued.
Pending the case, President Marcos issued
Proc. 94 – excluding from the donation in
Proc. 469 certain lands (Lot 1-a, 2-a, and 3)
and declaring same for open disposition. CFI
dismissed the complaint of City and dissolved
injunction. Hence, this appeal.
RULING/ DOCTRINES:
POWERS CONFERRED TO HEADS OF
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS MAY BE
EXERCISED DIRECTLY BY THE PRESIDENT -
Since it is the Director of Lands who has
direct executive control among others in the
lease, sale or any form of concession or
disposition of the land of the public domain
subject to the immediate control of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and considering that under the
Constitution the President of the Philippines
has control over all executive departments,
bureaus, and offices, etc., the President of the
Philippines has therefore the same authority
to dispose of portions of the public domain as
his subordinates, the Director of Lands, and
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
his alter ego the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
Such power of the President is recognized
under Section 69 aforecited of the Public
Land Act as it provides:
Sec. 69. Whenever any province, municipality,
or other branch or subdivision of the
Government shall need any portion of the
land of the public domain open to concession
for educational, charitable, or others similar
purposes, the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of
agriculture and Natural Resources, may
execute contracts in favor of the same, in the
form of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any
other form, under terms, and conditions to be
inserted in the contract; but land to be
granted shall in no case be encumbered or
alienated, except when the public service
requires their being leased or exchanged,
with the approval of the President, for other
lands belonging to private parties, or if the
Congress disposes otherwise.
From the foregoing provision it is clear that
the President of the Philippines may execute
contracts in favor of any province,
municipality or other branch or subdivision
of the government who shall need any
portion of the land of the public domain open
to concession for educational, charitable or
other similar purposes, in the form of
donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any other
form.
JOSE LUIS MARTIN GASCON VS. JOKER
ARROYO
Page | 64
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
FACTS: The Lopez family owned 2 television
stations. When martial law was declared, the
stations were seized. After the Marcos regime
was toppled, the Presidential Committee on
Good Governance (PCGG) sequestered said
stations. Mr Lopez requested the return of the
stations. An agreement to arbitrate was
entered into regarding this matter.
Thereupon, petitioners as taxpayers sought to
set aside the agreement to arbitrate.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
ALTER EGO DOCTRINE - Under the
Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines also known as the Freedom
Constitution), which was in force and effect
when the "Agreement to Arbitrate" was
signed by the parties thereto on 6 January
1987, the President exercised both the
legislative and executive powers of the
Government. As Chief Executive, the
President was (and even now) "assisted by a
Cabinet" composed of Ministers (now
Secretaries), who were appointed by and
accountable to the President. In other words,
the Members of the cabinet, as heads of the
various departments, are the assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or the law to act in person,
or where the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the heads of such
departments performed in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Respondent Executive Secretary had,
therefore, the power and authority to enter
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
into the "Agreement to Arbitrate" with the
ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he
acted for and in behalf of the President when
he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is
valid and binding upon the Republic of the
Philippines, as a party thereto.
KILUSANG BAYAN VS. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ
FACTS: Petitioners questopn the validity of
the order of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon.
Carlos G. Dominguez which ordered: (1) the
take-over by the Department of Agriculture of
the management of the petitioner Kilusang
Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng
Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc.
(KBMBPM) pursuant to the Department’s
regulatory and supervisory powers under
Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the
creation of a Management Committee which
shall assume the management of KBMBPM
upon receipt of the order, (3) the
disbandment of the Board of Directors, and
(4) the turn over of all assets, properties and
records of the KBMBPM the Management
Committee.
The exordium of said Order unerringly
indicates that its basis is the alleged petition
of the general membership of the KBMBPM
requesting the Department for assistance in
the removal of the members of the Board of
Directors who were not elected by the
general membership” of the cooperative and
that the ongoing financial and management
audit of the Department of Agriculture
auditors shows that the management of the
KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in
accordance with P.D. 175, LOI 23, the
Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the
provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also
Page | 65
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
professed therein that the Order was issued
by the Department “in the exercise of its
regulatory and supervisory powers under
Section 8 of P.D. 175, as amended, and Section
4 of Executive Order No. 113.
RULING/DOCTRINES:
CONTROL AND SUPERVISION - An
administrative officer has only such powers
as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
These powers should not be extended by
implication beyond what may to necessary
for their just and reasonable execution.
Supervision and control include only the
authority to: (a) act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission
of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify
acts and decisions of subordinate officials or
units; (d) determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs; and (e)
prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and
programs. Specifically, administrative
supervision is limited to the authority of the
department or its equivalent to: (1) generally
oversee the operations of such agencies and
insure that they are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but without
interference with day-to-day activities; (2)
require the submission of reports and cause
the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to
determine compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the department;
(3) take such action as may be necessary for
the proper performance of official functions,
including rectification of violations, abuses
and other forms of mal-administration; (4)
review and pass upon budget proposals of
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
such agencies but may not increase or add to
them.
NOTES:
Members of the career service of the Civil
Service who are appointed by the President
may be directly disciplined by him [Villaluz v.
Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710], provided that the
same is for cause and in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law.
Members of the Cabinet and such officers
whose continuity in office depends upon the
pleasure of the President may be replaced at
any time, but legally speaking, their
separation is effected not by removal but by
expiration of their term.
ISIDRO ANG – ANGCO VS NATALIO
CASTILLO
FACTS: February 12, 1960- Collector of
Customs Isidro Ang-Angco was “resigned
effective on the date of notice, with prejudice
to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs,
being found guilty of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service” by Executive
Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of
the President. Upon learning of the decision
through the newpapers, Ang-Angco requested
for reconsideration : calling attention to the
fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo
in removing him from office had the effect of
depriving him of his statutory right to have
his case originally decided by the
Commissioner of Civil Service, as well as his
right to appeal to the Civil service Board of
Appeals, whose decision under Republic Act
No. 2260 is final, besides the fact that such
decisions is in violation of the guaranty
Page | 66
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers or
employees in the civil service against removal
or suspension except for cause in the manner
provided by law. Secretary Castillo, on
authority of President Garcia denied the
appeal; he asserted that the President by
virtue of his power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices,
can take direct action and dispose of the
administrative case in question inasmuch as
the provisions of law that would seem to vest
final authority in subordinate officers of the
executive branch of the government over
administrative matters falling under their
jurisdiction cannot divest the President of his
power of control nor diminish the same.
After exhausting all administrative remedies
available for Ang-Angco to secure his
reinstatement to the office from which he was
removed without valid cause or in violation of
his right to due process of law, he filed before
the Supreme Court, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with a petition for
the issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunction. Citing that Secretary Castillo
violated : Sec. 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of
1959 which vests in the Commissioner of Civil
Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to decide administrative cases against officers
and employees in the classified service;
deprived him of his right to appeal under
Section 18 (b) of the same Act of the Civil
Service Board of Appeals whose decision on
the matter is final, and removed him from the
service without due process in violation of
Section 32 of the same Act, and of Section 4,
Article XII of the Constitution, which provides
“ No officer or employee in the civil service
shall be removed except for cause as provided
for by law.” Petitioner is an officer who
belongs to the classified civil service and is
not a presidential appointee, but one
appointed by the Secretary of Finance under
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
the Revised Administrative Code, he cannot
be removed from the service in utter
disregard of the provisions of the Civil Service
Act of 1959.Respondent contended that
whether the officers or employees concerned
are presidential appointees or belong to the
classified civil service, if they are officers and
employees in the executive department, they
all come under the control of the President
and therefore, his power of removal may be
exercised over them directly without
distinction. They held, as in the case of
Negado v. Castro, 55 OG., 10534, the
President may modify or set aside a decision
of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at the
instance of the office concerned, or the
employee, or may even do so motu proprio,
there would be in the final analysis no logical
difference between removing petitioner by
direct action of the President and separating
him from the service by ultimate action by the
President should an appeal be taken from the
decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals
to him, or if in his discretion he may motu
proprio consider it necessary to review the
Board’s decision.
RULING/DOCTRINES:
POWER OF CONTROL APPLIES ONLY TO THE
ACT AND NOT TO THE ACTOR – the extent of
the power of control given to the President by
the Constitution over all officers and
employees in the executive department was
interpreted by this court in the case of
Hebron vs. Reyes to mean “the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done on
the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter”, to distinguish it from the power
of general supervision over municipal
government, but the decision does not go to
the extent of including the power to remove
Page | 67
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
an officer or an employee in the executive
department. The power merely applies to the
exercise of control over the actor or agent
himself of the act.
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION VS
FRANCISCA ARCA
FACTS: Juan T. Arive held a position in
NAMARCO, which is a government owned
corporation. The president of the Philippines
then reversed the decision of the NAMARCO
Board of Directors. The president reinstated
Juan T. Arive.
RULING/DOCTRINE:
PRESIDENT’S CONTROL POWER COVERS
GOCCs - Petitioners, however, disagree, and
contend that the word "offices," interpreted
in the light of the preceding words "executive
departments," and "bureaus," refers to offices
performing governmental functions which
have no juridical personality, and, therefore,
does not include government-owned and
controlled corporations. They claim that the
above-quoted constitutional provision is not
applicable and that what should apply is
Section 13(d) of Republic Act No. 1345,
(NAMARCO Charter) which vests in the
General Manager the power and/or duty, with
the approval of the Board of Directors, to
remove, suspend or otherwise discipline for
cause any subordinate employee of the
NAMARCO. They contend that in reversing
the order of the NAMARCO Board of Directors
dismissing Juan T. Arive from the service, and
in ordering his reinstatement, the President
of the Philippines arrogated unto himself a
power not authorized either by the
Constitution or by the law, hence his
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
actuations were legally ineffective and
certainly could not be a basis for issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction.
We hold that the President of the Philippines'
authority to review and reverse the decision
of the NAMARCO Board of Directors
dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position in
the NAMARCO and to order his re-
instatement falls within the constitutional
power
of the President over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. Under our
governmental set-up, corporations owned or
controlled by the government, such as the
NAMARCO, partake of the nature of
government bureaus or offices, which are
administratively supervised by the
Administrator of the Office of Economic
Coordination, "whose compensation and rank
shall be that of a head of an Executive
Department" and who "shall be responsible to
the President of the Philippines under whose
control his functions ... shall be exercised."
(Executive Order No. 386 of December 22,
1950, section 1, issued under the
Reorganization Act of 1950).
BIRAOGO VS THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1
establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President with the primary task
to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices
Page | 68
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers
of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft
and corruption and make recommendations.
It may have subpoena powers but it has no
power to cite people in contempt, much less
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding
body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing
of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
1. E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as
it arrogates the power of the Congress to
create a public office and appropriate
funds for its operation.
2. The provision of Book III, Chapter 10,
Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power
to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the
“Truth Commission.”
3. E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the
Constitution and statutes when it vested
the “Truth Commission” with quasi-
judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under
the Administrative Code of 1987.
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
4. E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those
of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the
legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1. E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of
Congress because the President’s
executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No.
141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and
settled jurisprudence, authorize the
President to create or form such bodies.
2. E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of
Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated
by Congress.
3. The Truth Commission does not duplicate
or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4. The Truth Commission does not violate
the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.
RULING/DOCTRINES:
While the power to create a truth commission
cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No.
1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the
creation of the PTC finds justification under
Page | 69
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, President. It also grants the President other
imposing upon the President the duty to powers that do not involve the execution of
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
Section 17 reads: country's foreign relations.

Section 17. The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents,
the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all
powers inherent in them. The Presidents
power to conduct investigations to aid him in
ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this
case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency is inherent in
the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive.
That the authority of the President to conduct
investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution or in statutes does not mean that
he is bereft of such authority.[51] As
explained in the landmark case of Marcos v.
Manglapus:
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however,
brought back the presidential system of
government and restored the separation of
legislative, executive and judicial powers by
their actual distribution among three distinct
branches of government with provision for
checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state
that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of
state as well as head of government and
whatever powers inhere in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution
itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution
of the laws is only one of the powers of the
On these premises, we hold the view that
although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope
of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers
of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power
is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x
x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in
ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
As stated above, the powers of the President
are not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to
this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. Thus, in Department of Health v.
Camposano, the authority of the President to
issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating
an investigative committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against the
employees of the Department of Health for
the anomalous purchase of medicines was
upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad
hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 70
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298
as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the
fact that the investigating team and the
PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the
latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis
supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of
allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist
is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land. And if history is to be revisited, this was
also the objective of the investigative bodies
created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE,
PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission.
There being no changes in the government
structure, the Court is not inclined to declare
such executive power as non-existent just
because the direction of the political winds
have changed.
Section 18. The President shall be
Commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in a regular
or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall,
within twenty four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the
writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion.
Page | 71
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
During the suspension of the privilege
of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
a) The Commander-in–Chief Clause.
i) “The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines…” By
tradition and jurisprudence, these
commander-in-chief powers are
not encumbered by the same
degree of restriction as that which
may attach to executive privilege
or executive control. In GUDANI
vs SENGA G.R. NO, 170165, Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were
charged with violation of Articles
of War 65, on willfully disobeying
a superior officer, in relation to
Articles of War 97, on conduct
prejudicial to good order and
military discipline. Gudani and
Balutan filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, asking
that the order of PGMA preventing
petitioners from testifying be
declared unconstitutional, the
charges for violation of the
Articles of War be quashed. The
petition was dismissed by the
Supreme Court.
ia) The vitality of the tenet that
the President is the commander-
in-chief of the AFP is most crucial
to the democratic way pf life, to
civil supremacy over the military,
and to the general stability of our
representative system of
government.
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
ib) Kapunan vs De Villa: “The
Court is of the view that such is
justified by the requirements of
military discipline. It cannot be
gainsaid that certain liberalities
of persons in the military
services, including the freedom
of speech, may be circumscribed
by rules of military discipline.
Thus, to certain degree,
individual rights may be
curtailed, because the
effectiveness of the military in
fulfilling its duties under the law
depends to a large extent on the
maintenance of discipline within
its ranks. Hence, lawful orders
must be followed without
question and rules must be
faithfully complied with,
irrespective of a soldier’s
personal view on the matter.
ii) To call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.
iia) under the calling out power,
the President may summon the
armed forces to aid her in
suppressing lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.; this
involves ordinary police action.
But every act that goes beyond the
President’s calling-out power is
considered illegal or ultra vires.
iib) When the President calls out
the armed forces of to suppress
lawless violence, rebellion or
invasion he necessarily exercises
a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. The Court
cannot overrule the President’s
Page | 72
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

discretion or substitute its own. i) Grounds: Invasion or rebellion,

ONLY CRITERION: “whenever it when public safety so requires
becomes necessary”, the President
may call out the armed forces. ii) Duration: Not to exceed 60
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. days, following which it shall
Zamora, G.R. No. 141284 be lifted, UNLESS extended by
Congress
iic) The President’s authority to
declare a “state of rebellion” iii) Duty of the President to report
springs in the main from her action to Congress within 48
powers as chief executive and at hours, personally or in writing
the same time, draws strength
iv) Congress may revoke or
from her Commander-in-Chief
extend on request of the
powers. HOWEVER, a mere
President the effectivity of
declaration of a state of rebellion
proclamation by a majority
cannot diminish or violate
vote of all its members, voting
constitutionally protected rights.
jointly
iid) DISTINCTION between the
v) The Supreme Court may
President’s authority to declare a
review, in an appropriate
state of rebellion and the
proceeding filed by any citizen,
authority to proclaim a state of
the sufficiency of the factual
national emergency.
basis of the proclamation of
iii) The power to organize courts martial law or the suspension
martial for the discipline of the of the privilege of the writ or
members of the armed forces, the extension thereof, and
create military commissions for the must promulgate the decision
punishment of war criminals. thereon within 30 days from
the filing
iiia) R.A. 7055, the lawmakers
merely intended to return to the vi) The suspension of the
civilian courts jurisdiction over privilege of the writ does not
those offenses that have been impair the right to bail
traditionally within their
vii) The suspension applies only
jurisdiction, but did not divest the
to persons judicially charged
military courts jurisdiction over
for rebellion or offenses
cases mandated by the Articles of
inherent in or directly
War. Navales v. General Abaya G.R.
connected with invasion
No. 162318
viii) During the suspension of the
b) Suspension of the privilege of the
privilege of the writ, any
writ of habeas corpus
person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 73
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

charged within 3 days, vi) There is, of course, nothing in

otherwise he shall be released the Constitution which denies
the authority of the Chief
c) MARTIAL LAW. “A state of martial law Executive, invoked by the
does not suspend the operation of the Solicitor General, to order
Constitution, nor supplant the police actions to stop
functioning of the civil courts or unabated criminality, rising
legislative assemblies, nor authorize lawlessness, and alarming
the conferment of jurisdiction on communist activities. The
military courts and agencies over Constitution grants to
civilians where civil courts are able to Government the power to
function, nor automatically suspend seek and cripple subversive
the privilege of the writ.” movements which would
bring down constituted
i) The constitutional limitations
authority and substitute a
for the suspension of the
regime where individual
privilege of the writ are
liberties are suppressed as a
likewise imposed on the
matter of policy in the name of
proclamation of martial law.
security of the State. However,
ii) Section 18 all police actions are governed
iii) by the limitations of the Bill of
IV) AREAL SATURATION DRIVE Rights. The Government
IS WITHIN THE MILITARY cannot adopt the same
POWERS OF THE reprehensible methods of
PRESIDENT authoritarian systems both of
v) There can be no question that the right and of the left, the
under ordinary circumstances, enlargement of whose spheres
the police action of the nature of influence it is trying hard to
described by the petitioners suppress. Our democratic
would be illegal and institutions may still be fragile
blantantly violative of the but they are not in the least bit
express guarantees of the Bill strengthened through
of Rights. If the military and violations of the constitutional
the police must conduct protections which are their
concerted campaigns to flush distinguishing features.
out and catch criminal [Guazon vs. De Villa, G.R. No.
elements, such drives must be 80508, January 30, 1990]
consistent with the vii)
constitutional and statutory viii)
rights of all the people IX) COURT MARTIAL PERTAINS
affected by such actions. TO THE PRESIDENT IN THE
EXERCISE OF HIS MILITARY
POWERS

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 74
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

x) Courts martial are agencies of of the executive power,

executive character, and one provided by Congress for the
of the authorities "for the President as Commander in
ordering of courts martial has Chief, to aid him in properly
been held to be attached to the commanding the army and
constitutional functions of the navy and enforcing discipline
President as Commander in therein, and utilized under his
Chief, independently of orders or those of his
legislation." (Winthrop's authorized military
Military Law and Precedents, representatives.' (Winthrop's
2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike Military Law and Precedents;
courts of law, they are not a 2d Edition, p. 49.) Of equal
portion of the judiciary. "The interest Clode, 2 M. F., 361,
Supreme Court of the United says of these courts in the
States referring to the British law: "It must never be
provisions of the Constitution lost sight of that the only
authorizing Congress to legitimate object of military
provide for the government of tribunals is to aid the Crown
the army, excepting military to maintain the discipline and
offenses from the civil government of the Army."
jurisdiction, and making the [Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, G.R.
President Commander in Chief, No. L-533, August 20, 1946]
observes as follows: 'These xii)
provisions show that Congress XIII)
has the power to provide for XIV) MILITARY COURT MARTIAL
the trial and punishment of DOES NOT HAVE
military and naval offenses in JURISDICTION OVER
the manner then and now CIVILIANS
practiced by civilized nations, xv) Due process of law demands
and that the power to do so is that in all criminal
given without any connection prosecutions (where the
between it and the 3d Article accused stands to lose either
of the Constitution defining his life or his liberty), the
the judicial power of the accused shall be entitled to,
United States; indeed that the among others, a trial. The trial
two powers are entirely contemplated by the due
independent of each other.' process clause of the
Constitution, in relation to the
xi) "Not belonging to the judicial Charter as a whole, is a trial by
branch of the government, it judicial process, not by
follows that courts-martial executive or military process.
must pertain to the executive Military commissions or
department; and they are in tribunals, by whatever name
fact simply instrumentalities
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 75
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
they are called, are not courts
within the Philippine judicial
system. As explained by
Justice Teehankee in his
separate dissenting opinion —
xvi) ". . . Civilians like (the)
petitioner placed on trial for
civil offenses under general
law are entitled to trial by
judicial process, not by
executive or military process.
xvii) "Judicial power is vested by
the Constitution exclusively in
the Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as are duly
established by law. Judicial
power exists only in the courts,
which have 'exclusive power
to hear and determine those
matters which affect the life or
liberty or property of a
citizen.'
xviii) "Since we are not enemy-
occupied territory nor are we
under a military government
and even on the premise that
martial law continues in force,
the military tribunals cannot
try and exercise jurisdiction
over civilians for civil offenses
committed by them which are
properly cognizable by the
civil courts that have
remained open and have been
regularly functioning. . . .
xix) "And in Toth v. Quarles, the
U.S. Supreme Court further
stressed that 'the assertion of
military authority over
civilians cannot rest on the
President's power as
Commander-in-Chief or on
any theory of martial law.'
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
xx)
xxi) "The U.S. Supreme Court aptly
pointed out . . ., in ruling that
discharged army veterans
(estimated to number more
than 22.5 million) could not be
rendered 'helpless before
some latter-day revival of old
military charges' and
subjected to military trials for
offenses committed while they
were in the military service
prior to their discharge, that
'the presiding officer at a court
martial is not a judge whose
objectivity and independence
are protected by tenure and
undiminished salary and
nurture by the judicial
tradition, but is a military law
officer. Substantially different
rules of evidence and
procedure apply in military
trials. Apart from these
differences, the suggestion of
the possibility of influence on
the actions of the court-
martial by the officer who
convenes it, selects its
members and the counsel on
both sides and who usually
has direct command authority
over its members is a
pervasive one in military law,
despite strenuous efforts to
eliminate the danger.'
xxii) "The late Justice Black . . .
added that '(A) Court-Martial
is not yet an independent
instrument of justice but
remains to a significant degree
a specialized part of the over-
all mechanism by which
Page | 76
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

military discipline is military authorities. And as

preserved,' and that ex long as the civil courts in the
servicemen should be given land remain open and are
'the benefits of a civilian court regularly functioning, as they
trial when they are actually do so today and as they did
civilians . . . Free countries of during the period of martial
the world have tried to law in the country, military
restrict military tribunals to tribunals cannot try and
the narrowest jurisdiction exercise jurisdiction over
deemed absolutely essential civilians for offenses
to maintaining discipline committed by them and which
among troops in active are properly cognizable by the
service.' " civil courts. To have it
xxiii) otherwise would be a
xxiv) Moreover, military tribunals violation of the constitutional
pertain to the Executive right to due process of the
Department of the civilian concerned. [Olaguer
Government and are simply vs. Military Commission No.
instrumentalities of the 34, G.R. No. L-54558, May 22,
executive power, provided by 1987]
the legislature for the
President as Commander-in- xxv)
Chief to aid him in properly XXVI) COURT MARTIAL DOES NOT
commanding the army and APPLY TO THE MEMBERS OF
navy and enforcing discipline THE PNP
therein, and utilized under his xxvii) Republic Act No. 6975,
orders or those of his creating the Philippine
authorized military National Police (PNP), which
representatives. Following the took effect on 1 January 1991,
principle of separation of provides: "SEC. 46.
powers underlying the Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases.
existing constitutional — Any provision of law to the
organization of the contrary notwithstanding,
Government of the Philippines, criminal cases involving PNP
the power and the duty of members shall be within the
interpreting the laws (as when exclusive jurisdiction of the
an individual should be regular courts: Provided, That
considered to have violated the courts-martial appointed
the law) is primarily a pursuant to Presidential
function of the judiciary. It is Decree No. 1850 shall
not, and it cannot be the continue to try PC-INP
function of the Executive members who have already
Department, through the been arraigned, to include
appropriate actions thereon
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 77
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
by the reviewing authorities
pursuant to Commonwealth
Act No. 408, otherwise known
as, the Articles of War, as
amended by Executive Order
No. 178, otherwise known as
the Manual for Courts-Martial:
Provided, further, that
criminal cases against PC-INP
members who may have not
yet been arraigned upon the
effectivity of this it shall be
transferred to the proper city
or provincial prosecutor or
municipal trial court judge."
[Quiloña vs. General Court
Martial, G.R. No. 96607,
March 4, 1992]
xxviii)
xxix)
XXX) CALLING OUT POWER OF
THE PRESIDENT AND
POWER TO DECLARE A
STATE OF REBELLION
xxxi) The above provision grants
the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a "sequence" of
"graduated powers." From the
most to the least benign, these
are: the calling out power, the
power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to
declare martial law. In the
exercise of the latter two
powers, the Constitution
requires the concurrence of
two conditions, namely, an
actual invasion or rebellion,
and that public safety requires
the exercise of such power.
However, as we observed in
Integrated Bar of the
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
Philippines v. Zamora, "these
conditions are not required in
the exercise of the calling out
power. The only criterion is
that 'whenever it becomes
necessary,' the President may
call the armed forces 'to
prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or
rebellion.'"
xxxii)
xxxiii) Nevertheless, it is equally true
that Section 18, Article VII
does not expressly prohibit
the President from declaring a
state of rebellion. Note that
the Constitution vests the
President not only with
Commander-in-Chief powers
but, first and foremost, with
Executive powers.
xxxiv) Section 1, Article VII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution
states: "The executive power
shall be vested in the
President. . . ." As if by
exposition, Section 17 of the
same Article provides: "He
shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed." The
provisions trace their history
to the Constitution of the
United States.
xxxv)
xxxvi) The lesson to be learned from
the U.S. constitutional history
is that the Commander-in-
Chief powers are broad
enough as it is and become
more so when taken together
with the provision on
executive power and the
presidential oath of office.
Page | 78
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

Thus, the plenitude of the military and police officers represented by

powers of the presidency
equips the occupant with the
means to address exigencies
or threats which undermine
the very existence of
government or the integrity of
the State.
xxxvii)
xxxviii)The foregoing discussion
notwithstanding, in calling out
the armed forces, a been committed. The petitioners claim that
declaration of a state of
rebellion is an utter
superfluity. At most, it only
gives notice to the nation that
such a state exists and that the
armed forces may be called to
prevent or suppress it.
Perhaps the declaration may
wreak emotional effects upon
the perceived enemies of the
State, even on the entire
nation. But this Court's
mandate is to probe only into
the legal consequences of the
declaration. This Court finds
that such a declaration is
devoid of any legal
significance. For all legal
intents, the declaration is
deemed not written.
[SANLAKAS vs. Reyes, G.R. No.
159085, February 3, 2004]
public respondents from conducting "Areal
Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in
Metro Manila.
The petitioners complains that police and
military units without any search warrant or
warrant of arrest goes to an area of more than
one residence and sometimes whole barangay
or areas of barangay in Metro Manila to
search for evidence of offenses that may have
the saturation drives follow a common
pattern of human rights abuses. Solicitor
General argues just the contrary, that it had
been conducted with due regard to human
rights.
ISSUE: W/N the President has the power to
order saturation drives.
HELD: YES. There is, of course, nothing in the
Constitution which denies the authority of the
Chief Executive, invoked by the Solicitor
General, to order police actions to stop
unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and
alarming communist activities. The
Constitution grants to Government the power
to seek and cripple subversive movements
which would bring down constituted
authority and substitute a regime where
individual liberties are suppressed as a
matter of policy in the name of security of the
State. However, all police actions are
governed by the limitations of the Bill of
Rights.

GUAZON VS. DE VILLA

(181 SCRA 623, 1990)
RUFFY VS CHIEF OF STAFF
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to prohibit the
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 79
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
COURT MARTIAL PERTAINS TO THE
PRESIDENT IN EXERCISE OF HIS MILITARY
POWERS
FACTS: Ramon Ruffy was the provincial
commander stationed in Mindoro at the
outbreak of war on December 8, 1941. When
the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on
February 27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to
the mountains and organized and led a
guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo Combat
team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a petition
for prohibition praying that respondents be
commanded to desist from further
proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on
the ground that petitioners were not subject
to military law at the time of offense.
DOCTRINE:
 Courts martial are agencies of
exeutive character, and one of the
authorities “for the ordering of the
courts martial has been held to be
attached to the constitutional
functions of the President as
Commander-in-Chied,
independently of legislation.”
(Winthrop’s Military Law and
Precedents, 2nd Edition, p.49)
Unlike the courts of law, they are
not a portion of the judiciary.
 Not belonging to the judicial
branch of the government, it
follows that court-martial must
pertain to the executive
department; and they are in fact
simply instrumentalities of the
executive power, provided by the
Congress for the President as
Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in
properly commanding the army
and navy and enforcing discipline
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
therein, and utilized under his
orders or those of his authorized
military representatives.
 “It must never be lost sight of that
the only legitimate order of
military tribunals is to aid the
Crown to maintain the discipline
and government of the army.”
OLAGUER VS MILITARY COMMISSION NO.
34
COURT MARTIALS DO NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS
FACTS: Petitioners, as civilians, have been
charged the crime of subversion.
Consequently, the Chief-of-Staff of the AFP
created a military tribunal, named Military
Commission No. 34, to try criminal case
against petitioners. Petitioners were then
convicted and have been imposed a penalty of
death penalty. Thereafter, petitioners filed a
petition to enjoin the military tribunal from
taking further action on their case for the
tribunal should be considered null and void.
Respondents invoked that the creation of
Military Commission is constitutional as ruled
upon in a previous case – Aquino v. Military
Commission No. 2.- as decided upon by the
Supreme Court. However, petitioners contend
that such ruling must be overturned because
the ruling is now inapplicable since Martial
Law has already been lifted.
DOCTRINE:
 Due process of law demands that
in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be entitled to,
Page | 80
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
among others, a trial. The trial
contemplated by the due process
clause of the Constitution, in
relation to the Charter as a whole,
is a trial by judicial process, not by
executive or military process.
 Military commissions or tribunals,
by whatever name they are called,
are not courts within the
Philippine judicial system.
 As explained by Justice Teehankee
in a dissenting opinion: “Judicial
power is vested by the
Constitution exclusively in the
Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as are duly
established by law. Judicial power
exists only in the courts, which
have exclusive power to hear and
determine those matters which
affect the life and liberty or
property of a citizen.
Since we are not enemy-
occupied territory nor are we
under a military government and
even on the premise that martial
law continues in force, the
military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians
for civil offenses committed by
them which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts that
have remained open and have
been regularly functioning…”
 And in Toth v. Quaries, the US
Supreme court further stressed
that “the assertion of military
authority over civilians cannot
rest on the President’s power as
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
Commander-in-Chief or on any
theory of martial law.”
 Following the principle of
separation of powers underlying
the existing constitutional
organization of the Government of
the Philippines, the power and the
duty of interpreting the laws is
primarily the function of the
judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be
the function of the Executive
Department, through the military
authorities.
 As long as the civilian courts in
the land remain open and are
regularly functioning, as they do
today as they did during the
martial law in the country,
military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians
for offenses committed by them
and which are properly cognizable
by the civil courts.
QUILONA VS. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL
(206 SCRA 821, 1992)
FACTS: The petitioner is a policemen
assigned at the WPD. He was charged with
murder before the respondent general court
martial. At the scheduled arraignment on
December 15, 1990, petitioner's counsel
manifested to the General I Court Martial his
client's desire to be arraigned and to be tried
instead by a civilian court. Arraignment was
reset. At the next arraignment on December
21, 1990, petitioner filed a motion asking that
the court mal1ial inhibit itself front pursuing
the arraignment of the accused and to have
Page | 81
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
his case investigated by the civilian
prosecutor or at least tried by a civilian court.
Although set or oral argument of January 3,
1991, respondent court decided to have the
motion argued on the day it was filed. The
motion was denied, the same with the motion
for reconsideration. Petitioner refused to
enter a plea and said that he would elevate
the case to the SC. Nevertheless, a plea of not
guilty was entered upon court order. Hence,
this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court
martial acted with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: YES the respondent court martial
acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
proceeding with the arraignment of the
petitioner. Republic Act No. 6975, 10 creating
the Philippine National Police (PNP), which
took effect on 1 January 1991, provides: "SEC.
46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. Any
provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, criminal cases involving
PNP members shall be within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regular courts: x x x.
Provided, further, that criminal cases against
PC-INP members who may have not yet been
arraigned upon the effectivity of this it shall
be transferred to the proper city or provincial
prosecutor or municipal trial court judge."
Although Republic Act No. 6975 was not yet
in effect when petitioner was arraigned on 28
December 1990, nevertheless, respondent
court martial knew or should have known
that the said Act had already been signed or
approved by the President on 13 December
1990 and that the same was published in two
(2) national newspapers of general
circulation on 17 December 1990 and that it
would take effect on 1 January 1991. It is
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
precisely for this reason that respondent
court martial decided to have the petitioner's
motion to inhibit argued on 28 December
1990 and thereafter arraigned the petitioner
on the same day despite his vehement refusal
to enter a plea.
Clearly, under the circumstances obtaining in
the present case, respondent court martial
acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
proceeding with the arraignment of the
petitioner.
SANLAKAS vs REYES
CALLING OUT POWER
FACTS: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003,
some three-hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon
instigation, command and direction of known
and unknown leaders have seized the
Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they
complained of the corruption in the AFP and
declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of
the President, Secretary of Defense and the
PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by
virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared
under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations
took place and the officers went back to their
barracks in the evening of the same day. On
August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and
General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation
No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State
of Rebellion was issued.
DOCTRINE:
Page | 82
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
 The power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare
martial law.
 Constitution requires the
concurrence of TWO conditions:
(i) an actual invasion or rebellion;
(ii) and that public safety so
require the exercise of such
powers.
 CRITERION: “whenever it
becomes necessary”, the President
may call the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
vs Zamora
 Section 18, Art. VII does not
expressly prohibit the President
from declaring a state of rebellion.
Note that the Constitution vests in
the President not only with
Commander-in-Chief Powers but,
first and foremost, with Executive
powers.
 The Commander-in-Chief Powers
are broad enough as it is and
become more so when taken
together with the provision on
executive power and the
presidential oath of office. Thus,
the plenitude of the powers of the
presidency equips the occupant
with the means to address the
exigencies or threats which
undermine the very existence of
government or the integrity of the IBP
State. G.R.
FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
 A declaration of a state of
rebellion is an utter superfluity. At
most, it only gives notice to the
nation that such a state exists and
that the armed forces may be
called upon to suppress or
prevent it.
 The Court’s mandate is to probe
only into the legal consequences
of the declaration. The Court finds
that such a declaration is devoid
of any legal significance. For all
legal intents, the declaration is
deemed NOT WRITTEN.
 The mere declaration of a state of
rebellion cannot diminish or
violate constitutionally protected
rights. Indeed, if a state of martial
law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution or
automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, then it is with more
reason that a simple declaration of
a state of rebellion could not bring
about these conditions. Lacson vs
Perez
 “In quelling or suppressing the
rebellion, the authorities mat only
resort ti warrantless arrests of
persons suspected of rebellion,
provided under Sec.5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant.”
vs. Zamora
No.141284, August 15, 2000
Page | 83
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence. The President declared that
the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature
and for a reasonable period only, until such
time when the situation shall have improved.
The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines null
and void and unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual
determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed
forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP
HELD:
When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises
a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the Court may review the sufficiency of the
factual basis thereof. However, there is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action
to call out the armed forces. The distinction
places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial
law and power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers
of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the 3 powers and provided
for their revocation and review without any
qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment
of the said powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and
broadest discretion in using the power to call
out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law,
both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by the
Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the
President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the
armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s
decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The
present petition fails to discharge such heavy
burden, as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for
calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by
the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is “militarized” in
violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution.
The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The local police forces are
the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at
all times, the real authority belonging to the
PNP

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 84
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to
assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real
authority in the operations is lodged with the
head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not
with the military. Since none of the Marines
was incorporated or enlisted as members of
the PNP, there can be no appointment to
civilian position to speak of. Hence, the
deployment of the Marines in the joint
visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian
character of the PNP.
FORTUN V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
DOCTRINE: Power of Supreme Court to
inquire into the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
by the President
FACTS:November 23, 2009 heavily armed
men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan
family, gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a
highway in Maguindanao.
Following these incidents of which the facts of
such we all know very well, President Arroyo
issued the following Presidential Decrees,
herein presented sequentially:
case) - declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in that
province except for identified
areas of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front; issued
December 4, 2009.
Two days later or on December 6, 2009
President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress in accordance with Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987. Constitution which
required her, within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to
submit to that body a report in person or
in writing of her action.
In her report, PGMA said that her actions
were based on her finding lawless men
have taken up arms in Maguindanao and
risen against the government. The
President described the scope of the uprising,
the nature, quantity, and quality of the rebels’
weaponry, the movement of their heavily
armed units in strategic positions, the closure
of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol,
Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay
Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal halls,
and the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and
patrol cars with unauthorized “PNP/Police”
markings.

1. Proclamation 1946 - declaring a On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint

state of emergency in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City to prevent and
suppress similar lawless violence
in Central Mindanao; issued
November 4, 2009.
2. Presidential Proclamation 1959
(the PD mainly assailed in this
session, convened pursuant to Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
review the validity of the President’s
action.
But, two days later or on December 12, 2009
before Congress could act, the President
issued Presidential Proclamation 1963.

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 85
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

3. Presidential Proclamation 1963 in the same manner, extend such

- lifting martial law and restoring proclamation or suspension for a period to be
the privilege of the writ of habeas determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
corpus in Maguindanao; issued rebellion shall persist and public safety
December 12, 2009. requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within

ISSUES: WoN there is a need for the Court to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in this case, considering the
same were lifted within a few days of being
issued and thus Congress was not able to
affirm/maintain the same based on its own
evaluation.
PROVISION: Article 7, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution.
twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.

The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for
a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to
the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly,
by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may,
A state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in, or directly connected with,
invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall
be released.

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 86
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

having become moot and academic. The Court

HELD. No. It is evident that under the 1987
Constitution the President and the
Congress act in tandem in exercising the
power to proclaim martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
They exercise the power, not only
sequentially, but in a sense jointly since,
after the President has initiated the
proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its
own evaluation of the situation on the ground,
a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution
reserves to the Supreme Court the power
to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension in
a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court
must allow Congress to exercise its own
review powers, which is automatic rather
than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express
duty to defend the Constitution through
such review should the Supreme Court
step in as its final rampart. The Court then
can hear the petitions challenging the
President’s action, and ascertain if it has a
factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it
can annul the proclamation or the suspension.
The problem in this case is that the President
aborted the proclamation of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight
days. In a real sense, the proclamation and the
suspension never took off. The Congress itself
adjourned without touching the matter, it
does not resolve purely academic questions
to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging these are.
Additional Note: Should the 30 days given by
the Constitution prove to be inadequate, it is
important to note that the 30-day period
does not operate to divest this Court of its
jurisdiction over the case. The settled rule
is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost
until the case has been terminated.
DISPOSITION: Petitions dismissed for
being moot and academic.
Carpio Dissenting:
The President has the sole power to declare
martial law or suspend the writ. This power
of the President is subject to review
separately by Congress and the Supreme
Court. Justice Mendoza stresses, “Thus,
Congress and this Court have separate
spheres of competence. They do not act
‘jointly and sequentially’ but independently of
each other. Father Bernas points out, “Since
the powers of Congress and the Court are
independent of each other, there is nothing to
prevent the Congress and the Court from
simultaneously exercising their separate
powers.”
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment,
or as otherwise provided in the Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 87
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
the all the Members of the Congress.
a) DEFINITIONS:
i) Pardon. An act of grace of
which exempts an individual
on whom it is bestowed from
the punishment that the law
inflicts for the crime he
committed.
ii) Commutation. Reduction and
mitigation of the penalty.
iii) Reprieve. Postponement of a
sentence or stay of execution.
iv) Parole. Release from
imprisonment, but without
full restoration of liberty, as
parolee is still in the custody
of the law although not in
confinement.
v) Amnesty. Act of grace,
concurred in by the legislature,
usually extended to groups of
persons who committed
political offenses, which puts
into oblivion the offense itself.
vi) Pardoning Power - criminal
and administrative remedies
for violation of conditional
pardon are not mutually
exclusive and may be
successively availed of by the
President for the punishment
of the conditional pardon. –
recommitment/criminal
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
prosecution for violation of
conditional pardon/criminal
prosecution for new offense if
violation of the condition
constitutes a separate
criminal offense. [Culanag v.
Director of Prisons]
b) Exercise of the President:
 Discretionary
 May not be controlled by the
legislature or reversed by the
courts, unless there is a
constitutional violation.
c) Limitations on exercise:
i) Cannot be granted in cases of
impeachment
ii) Cannot be granted in cases of
violation of election laws
without the favorable
recommendation of the
Commission on Elections
iii) Can be granted only after
conviction by final judgment
iv) People v. Bacang, the Court
declared that the 1987
Constitution prohibits the
grant of pardon, whether full
or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his
appeal from the judgment of
conviction by the trial court.
Any application for a pardon
should not be acted upon, or
the process toward its grant
should not begin, unless the
appeal is withdrawn.
Page | 88
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

v) People v Catido, it was held Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S.

that while the pardon was Sumulong
void for having extended
during the pendency of the iib) Sec. 64(i), Revised
appeal, or before conviction Administrative Code,
by final judgment, and authorizes the President to
therefore a violation of Sec. 19, order the arrest and re-
Art. VII, the grant of amnesty, incarceration of such person
applied for by the accused- who, in his judgment, shall fail
appellants under to comply with the conditions
Proclamation No.347, was of the pardon. And the
valid. exercise of his Presidential
judgment is beyond judicial
vi) Cannot be granted in cases of scrutiny.
legislative contempt, as it
would violate the separation e) Amnesty
of powers, or civil contempt,
i) People v. Patriarca, it was held
as the State is without interest
that the person released
in the same.
under an amnesty
vii) Cannot absolve the convict of proclamation stands before
civil liability. the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense. Par.
viii) Cannot restore public offenses 3, Art 89, Revised Penal Code,
forfeited. provides that criminal liability
is totally extinguished by
d) Pardon Classified. amnesty; the penalty and all
its effects are thus
i) Plenary or partial
extinguished.
ii) Absolute of conditional
ii) Vera v. People of the
iia) A conditional pardon is a Philippines, it was held that to
contract between the Chief avail of the benefits of an
Executive and the convicted amnesty proclamation, one
criminal; by the pardonee’s must admit his guilt of the
consent to the terms offense covered by the
stipulated in the contract, the proclamation.
pardonee has placed himself
iii) People v. Casido
under the supervision of the
Chief Executive or his delegate
who is duty bound to see to it Amnesty is Pardon are
addressed to infarctions of
that the pardonee complies peace of the
with the conditions of the political
offenses state
pardon. In Re: Petition for

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 89
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

Amnesty regular course of administration of the

Pardon
applies to criminal law. What is involved is rather the
applies to
classes of ascertainment of whether the convict has
individuals
persons breached his undertaking that he would "not
again violate any of the penal laws of the
Amnesty Philippines" for purposes of reimposition
there is no Pardon upon him of the remitted portion of his
need for acceptance is original sentence. The consequences that we
distinct acts required or here deal with are the consequences of an
of necessary ascertained breach of the conditions of a
acceptance pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon,
like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted
Amnesty Pardon does must of course be convicted by final judgment
requires not require of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes
concurrence such with which he was charged before the
of Congress concurrence criminal penalty for such subsequent
offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again,
Amnesty is a
Pardon is a since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code
public act
private act defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the
which the
which must be parolee or convict who is regarded as having
courts may
pleaded and violated the provisions thereof must be
take judicial
proved charged, prosecuted and convicted by final
notice of
judgment before he can be made to suffer the
Pardon looks penalty prescribed in Article 159.
Amnesty
forward and
looks
relieves the
backward Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict
pardonee of
and puts into who has been conditionally pardoned and
the
oblivion the who is alleged to have breached the
consequences
offense itself conditions of his pardon, the Executive
of the offenses
Department has two options: (i) to proceed
against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to
proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes the
Section 19 penalty of prision correccional, minimum
period, upon a convict who "having been
A CONDITION THAT THE PARDONEE granted conditional pardon by the Chief
SHALL NOT VIOLATE ANY LAW DOES NOT Executive, shall violate any of the conditions
REQUIRE CONVICTION TO CONSTITUTE of such pardon." Here, the President has
VIOLATION THEREOF chosen to proceed against the petitioner
It may be emphasized that what is involved in under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
the instant case is not the prosecution of the Administrative Code. That choice is an
parolee for a subsequent offense in the exercise of the President's executive
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 90
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny. [Torres vs. Gonzales, G.R. No.
76872, July 23, 1987]
EFFECTS OF ABSOLUTE PARDON
The better considered cases regard full
pardon (at least one not based on the
offender's innocence) as relieving the party
from all the punitive consequences of his
criminal act, including the disqualifications or
disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it
relieves him from nothing more. "To say,
however, that the offender is a `new man',
and `as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense;' is to ignore the difference
between the crime and the criminal. A person
adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted
criminal, though pardoned; he may be
deserving of punishment, though left
unpunished; and the law may regard him as
more dangerous to society than one never
found guilty of crime, though it places no
restraints upon him following his conviction."
A pardon looks to the future. It is not
retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been
suffered by the offender. It does not impose
upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. "Since
the offense has been established by judicial
proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed
to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be
required." This would explain why petitioner,
though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
[Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239,
February 9, 1989]
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
THE GRANT OF PARDON DOES NOT
RESULT IN THE AUTOMATIC
WITHDRAWAL OF THE PENDING APPEAL
The reason the Constitutional Commission
adopted the "conviction by final judgment"
requirement, reviving in effect the original
provision of the 1973 Constitution on the
pardoning power, was, as expounded by
Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent the
President from exercising executive power in
derogation of the judicial power.
Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
appellate court. A becoming regard for the
doctrine of separation of powers demands
that such exclusive authority of the appellate
court be fully respected and kept unimpaired.
For truly, had not the present Constitution
adopted the "conviction by final judgment"
limitation, the President could, at any time,
and even without the knowledge of the court,
extend executive clemency to any one whom
he, in good faith or otherwise, believes to
merit presidential mercy. It cannot be denied
that under the Jones Law and the 1981
amendment to the 1973 Constitution on the
pardoning power which did not require
conviction, the President had unimpeded
power to grant pardon even before the
criminal case could be heard. And under the
1935 Constitution which required
"conviction" only, the power could be
exercised at any time after conviction and
regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In
either case, there could be the risk not only of
a failure of justice but also of a frustration of
the system of administration of justice in view
of the derogation of the jurisdiction of the
trial or appellate court. Where the President
is not so prevented by the Constitution, not
even Congress can impose any restriction to
prevent a presidential folly. Hence, nothing
Page | 91
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
but a change in the constitutional provision
consisting in the imposition of "conviction by
final judgment" requirement can change the
rule. The new Constitution did it.
Hence, before an appellant may be validly
granted pardon, he must first ask for the
withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed
conviction must first be brought to finality.
[People vs. Salle, Jr., G.R. No. 103567,
December 4, 1995]
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY MAY BE GRANTED
IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
The Constitution does not distinguish
between which cases executive clemency may
be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same
token, if executive clemency may be exercised
only in criminal cases, it would indeed be
unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
Following petitioner's proposed
interpretation, cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same
do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any
valid and convincing reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is Our considered
view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
[Llamas vs. Orbos, G.R. No. 99031, October
15, 1991]
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
THE GRANT OF PARDON ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BASED ON THE
INNOCENCE OF THE PARDONEE
OBLITERATES THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LIABILITY
Time and again this Court has unfolded the
effects of a pardon upon the individual to
whom it is granted. In Monsanto v. Factoran,
we have firmly established the general rule
that while a pardon has generally been
regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt
so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as
innocent as though he never committed the
offense, it does not operate for all purposes.
The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or
remission of guilt and not forgetfulness. It
does not erase the fact of the commission of
the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon
frees the
individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores to him all his civil
rights. Unless expressly grounded on the
person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. The pardoned offender regains his
eligibility for appointment to public office
which was forfeited by reason of the
conviction of the offense. But since pardon
does not generally result in automatic
reinstatement because the offender has to
apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to
back wages.
But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based
on the innocence of the individual, it affirms
this innocence and makes him a new man and
as innocent as if he had not been found guilty
of the offense charged. When a person is
given pardon because he did not truly commit
the offense, the pardon relieves the party
from all punitive consequences of his criminal
act, thereby restoring to him his clean name,
Page | 92
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
good reputation and unstained character
prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, petitioner was found
administratively liable for dishonesty and
consequently dismissed from the service.
However, he was later acquitted by the trial
court of the charge of qualified theft based on
the very same acts for which he was
dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the
trial court was founded not on lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that
petitioner did not commit the offense
imputed to him. Aside from finding him
innocent of the charge, the trial court
commended petitioner for his concern and
dedication as a public servant. Verily,
petitioner's innocence is the primary reason
behind the grant of executive clemency to
him, bolstered by the favorable
recommendations for his reinstatement by
the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications and the Civil Service
Commission.
The bestowal of executive clemency on
petitioner in effect completely obliterated the
adverse effects of the administrative decision
which found him guilty of dishonesty and
ordered his separation from the service. This
can be inferred from the executive clemency
itself exculpating petitioner from the
administrative charge and thereby directing
his reinstatement, which is rendered
automatic by the grant of the pardon. This
signifies that petitioner need no longer apply
to be reinstated to his former employment; he
is restored to his office ipso facto upon the
issuance of the clemency.
Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the
government service entitles him to back
wages. This is meant to afford relief to
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
petitioner who is innocent from the start and
to make reparation for what he has suffered
as a result of his unjust dismissal from the
service. To rule otherwise would defeat the
very intention of the executive clemency, i.e.,
to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the
right to back wages is afforded to those who
have been illegally dismissed and were thus
ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
acquitted of the charges against them. There
is no doubt that petitioner's case falls within
the situations aforementioned to entitle him
to back wages. [Garcia vs. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993]
TORRES VS GONZALES
A CONDITION IN THE GRANT OF PARDON
THAT THE PARDONEE SHALL NOT VIOLATE
ANY OTHER LAWS DOES NOT REQUIRE
CONVICTION BEFORE THE PARDON MAY BE
WITHDRAWN
FACTS: 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa.
In 1979, he was pardoned by the president
w/ the condition that he shall not violate any
penal laws again. Should this condition be
violated, he will be proceeded against in the
manner prescribed by law. Petitioner
accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement. In
1982, Torres was charged with multiple
crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned
for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence,
the president cancelled the pardon. Torres
appealed the issue before the SC averring that
the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for
violating the conditions of his pardon because
the estafa charges against him were not yet
final and executory as they were still on
appeal.
Page | 93
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
DOCTRINE:
 It involves the ascertainment
whether the convict has breached
his undertaking that he would
“not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines” and NOT
the prosecution of the parolee for
the subsequent offense in a
regular course of administration
of criminal law.
 A convict granted conditional
pardon, who is recommitted must
of course be convicted by final
judgment of a court of the
subsequent crime or crimes which
he was charged before the
criminal penalty for such
subsequent offense can be
imposed.
 A convict who has allegedly
breached his conditional pardon,
Executive Department has TWO
options: (i) proceed against him
under Sec. 64(i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to
proceed against him under Art.
159 of the RPC which imposes a
penalty upon a convict who
“having been granted conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive,
shall violate any of the conditions
of such pardon.”
MONSANTO VS FACTORAN
PARDON EXTENDED AND ACCEPTED WHILE
THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IS ON
APPEAL RESULTS IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF
THE APPEAL
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
FACTS: In a decision by the Sandiganbayan
convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto
was accused of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment and to
indemnify the government. She was given an
absolute pardon by President Marcos which
she accepted. Petitioner requested that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant, she
also asked for the backpay for the entire
period of her suspension. Finance Ministry
ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her
position without the necessity of a new
appointment. The Office of the President said
that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a
former public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and
entitlement to payment of his salaries,
benefits and emoluments due to him during
the period of his suspension pendente lite.
Petitioner argued that general rules on
pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of
the fact that she was extended executive
clemency while her conviction was still
pending appeal in this Court. There having
been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city
treasurer could not be said to have been
terminated or forfeited.
DOCTRINE:
 Pardon is defines as “an act of
grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of
the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is
bestowed, from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private,
though official act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the
Page | 94
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

individual whose benefit it is Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his

intended, and not communicated appeal. In its Memorandum, the Office of the
officially to the Court…A pardon is Solicitor General maintains that the
a deed, to the validity of which conditional pardon granted
delivery is essential and delivery is to appellant Mengote is unenforceable
not complete without acceptance.” because the judgment of conviction is not yet
final in view of the pendency in this Court of
 A pardon looks to the future and it his appeal.
is not retrospective. It makes no
amends for the past. It affords no
relief for hat has been suffered by
the offender. It does not impose DOCTRINE:
upon the government any
 Where the pardoning power is
obligation to make reparation for
subject to the limitation of
what has been suffered.
conviction, it may be exercised at
any time after conviction even if
the judgment is on appeal. It is
PEOPLE VS SALLE. JR. entirely different where the
requirement is “final conviction”
INSTANCES WHEN CONVCTION BECOMES or “conviction by final judgment”,
FINAL in such a case, no pardon may be
extended before a judgment of
FACTS: On November 1991, Francisco Salle,
conviction becomes final.
Jr. and Ricky Mengote were convicted of the
compound crime of murder and destructive  Judgment becomes final when:
arson before the RTC of Quezon City. Salle PAW-C
and Mengote filed their Notice of Appeal
which was accepted by the Supreme Court on i) no Appeal is seasonably
March 24, 1993. In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent perfected
Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court
required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of ii) accused Commences to serve
the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to sentence
verify the voluntariness of the motion. Atty.
iii) right to appeal is Waived in
La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion
writing except when death
without the assistance ofcounsel on his
penalty is imposed
misimpression that the motion
was necessary for his early release from the iv) accused applies for Probation
New Bilibid Prison following the grant of a
conditional pardon by the President on THE GRANT OF PARDON WHILE ON APPEAL
December 9, 1993. She also stated that IS PENDING DOES NOT AMOUT TO A
Mengote was also granted conditional pardon WITHDRAWAL OF THE APPEAL
and that he immediately left for his province
without consulting her. She prayed that the  The adaption of the 1987
Constitution of the “conviction by
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 95
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

final judgment” requirement is to  Unless expressly grounded in the

prevent the President from
exercising executive power in
derogation of the judicial power.
Hence, before an appellant may be
validly granted pardon, he must
first ask for the withdrawal of his
appeal, i.e., the appealed
conviction must first be brought
to finality.
 If the pardon is based on the
GARCIA VS COMMISSION OF AUDIT
THE GRANT OF PARDON ON THE GROUND
THAT THE PARDONEE IS INNOCENT OF THE
CHARGE RESULTS IN THE OBLITERATION OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LIBAILITY
person’s innocence, it cannot
bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
The pardoned officer regains his
eligibility of for appointment to
public office but he has to apply
for reappointment, he is not
entitled to back wages.
innocence of the individual, it
affirms his innocence and makes
him a new man and as innocent as
if he had not been found guilty of
the offense charged. It relieves
him from all punitive
consequences of his criminal act,
thereby restoring him his clean
name, good reputation and
unstained character prior to the
finding of guilt.

FACTS: Petitioner was a supervising lineman  Bestowal of EXECUTIVE

in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of CLEMENCY based on innocence of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. A petitioner in effect completely
criminal case of qualified theft was filed obliterates the adverse effects of
against him. The president grated him an the administrative charge and
executive clemency. The petitioner filed a renders his automatic
claim for back payment of salaries. The reinstatement and his entitlement
petitioner was later recalled to the service on to back wages.
12 March 1984 but the records do not show
whether petitioner’s reinstatement was to the
same position of Supervising Lineman.

DOCTRINE:
SABELLO VS DECS
 The very essence of a pardon is
THE GRANT OF PARDON, AND THE
forgiveness or remission of guilt
SUBSEQUENT APPOINTMENT OF THE
not forgetfulness. It does not erase
PARDONEE TO THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
the fact of the commission of the
SHOULD ENTITLE THE PARDONEE TO HIS
crime and the conviction thereof.
FORMER POSITION

DOCTRINE:

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 96
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
 GENERAL RULE: The
reappointment to one’s former
position is discretionary upon the
appointing authority.
 EXCEPTION: petitioner has been
unfairly deprived of what is
rightfully is. It ceases to become
discretionary on the part of the
appointing authority BUT
discretion tempered with fairness
and justice.
LLAMAS VS ORBOS
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY MAY BE EXTENDED
TO ADMINSITRATIVE CASES
FACTS: Ocampo III was the governor of
Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some
other complainants filed an administrative
case against Ocampo III for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III
was found guilty. He was suspended for office
for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas,
assumed office. In not less than 30 days
however, Ocampo III returned with an AO
showing that he was pardoned hence he can
resume office without completing the 90 day
suspension imposed upon him.
DOCTRINE:
 “Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguire debemos” (when the
law does not distinguish, so we
must not distinguish)
 The Constitution does not
distinguish between which cases
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
executive clemency may be
exercised by the President, with
the sold exclusion of
impeachment cases.
 RATIONALE: If the President can
grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with
much more reason can he grant
executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal
offenses.
Section 20. The President may contract or
guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty
days from the end of every quarter of the
calendar year, submit to the Congress a
complete report of its decisions on applications
for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
Government or government-owned and
controlled corporations which would have the
effect of increasing the foreign debt, and
containing other matters as may be provided
by law.
Section 21. No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
a) Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern
Sea Trading, the Supreme Court
distinguished treaties from executive
agreements, thus: (i) international
agreements which involve political
Page | 97
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
issues or charged of national policy
and those involving international
agreements of a permanent character
take the form of treaty; while
international agreements involving
traditions and involving agreements of
a more or less temporary nature take
the form of executive agreements; and
(ii) in treaties, formal documents
require ratification, while executive
agreements become binding through
executive action.
b) But in Bayan v. Executive Secretary, the
Supreme Court said that the Philippine
government had complied with the
Constitution in that the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) was concurred in by
the Philippine Senate, thus complying
with Sec. 21, Art. VII. The Republic of
the Philippines cannot require the
United States to submit the agreement
to the US Senate for concurrence, for
that would be giving a strict
construction to the phrase, “recognized
as a treaty”. Moreover, it is
inconsequential whether the US treats
the VFA as merely an executive
agreement because under
international law, an executive
agreement is just as binding as a treaty.
Section 21
TREATY MAKING POWER OF THE
PRESIDENT
In our system of government, the President,
being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and
is the country's sole representative with
foreign nations. As the chief architect of
foreign policy, the President acts as the
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is
vested with the authority to deal with foreign
states and governments, extend or withhold
recognition, maintain diplomatic relations,
enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. 13 In the realm
of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole
authority to negotiate and enter into treaties,
the Constitution provides a limitation to his
power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of
all the members of the Senate for the validity
of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that "no treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate." The 1935 and the 1973
Constitution also required the concurrence by
the legislature to the treaties entered into by
the executive.
The participation of the legislative branch in
the treaty-making process was deemed
essential to provide a check on the executive
in the field of foreign relations. By requiring
the concurrence of the legislature in the
treaties entered into by the President, the
Constitution ensures a healthy system of
checks and balance necessary in the nation's
pursuit of political maturity and growth.
[Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
158088, July 6, 2005]
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS DO NOT NEED THE
CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE
The concurrence of said House of Congress is
required by our fundamental law in the
making of "treaties" (Constitution of the
Page | 98
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]), which
are, however, distinct and different from
"executive agreements", which may be validly
entered into without such concurrence.
"Treaties are formal documents which
require ratification with the approval of two-
thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements
become binding through executive action
without the need of a vote by the Senate or by
Congress.
". . . the right of the Executive to enter into
binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been
confirmed by long usage. From the earliest
days of our history we have entered into
executive agreements covering such subjects
as commercial and consular relations, most-
favored-nation rights, patent rights,
trademark and copyright protection, postal
and navigation arrangements and the
settlement of claims. The validity of these has
never been seriously questioned by our
courts. [Commissioner of Customs vs.
Eastern Sea Trading [G.R. No. L-14279,
October 31, 1961]
THE SENATE DOES NOT RATIFY TREATIES,
IT ONLY CONCURS
Petitioners' arguments equate the signing of
the treaty by the Philippine representative
with ratification. It should be underscored
that the signing of the treaty and the
ratification are two separate and distinct
steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier
discussed, the signature is primarily intended
as a means of authenticating the instrument
and as a symbol of the good faith of the
parties. It is usually performed by the state's
authorized representative in the diplomatic
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the
formal act by which a state confirms and
accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded
by its representative. It is generally held to be
an executive act, undertaken by the head of
the state or of the government.
Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25,
1997 provides the guidelines in the
negotiation of international agreements and
its ratification. It mandates that after the
treaty has been signed by the Philippine
representative, the same shall be transmitted
to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The
Department of Foreign Affairs shall then
prepare the ratification papers and forward
the signed copy of the treaty to the President
for ratification. After the President has
ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign
Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for
concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence
of the Senate, the Department of Foreign
Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the
treaty to render it effective.
Petitioners' submission that the Philippines is
bound under treaty law and international law
to ratify the treaty which it has signed is
without basis. The signature does not signify
the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is
the ratification that binds the state to the
provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute
itself requires that the signature of the
representatives of the states be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory states. Ratification is the act by
which the provisions of a treaty are formally
confirmed and approved by a State. By
ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state
expresses its willingness to be bound by the
provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is
signed by the state's representative, the
Page | 99
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
President, being accountable to the people, is
burdened with the responsibility and the duty
to carefully study the contents of the treaty
and ensure that they are not inimical to the
interest of the state and its people. Thus, the
President has the discretion even after the
signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative whether or not to ratify the
same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or
even restrain this power of the head of states.
If that were so, the requirement of ratification
of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has
been held that a state has no legal or even
moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been
signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no
legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes
without saying that the refusal must be based
on substantial grounds and not on superficial
or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other
state would be justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our
Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in
the President, subject to the concurrence of
the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is
limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or, having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the
refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has
been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
should not be taken lightly, such decision is
within the competence of the President alone,
which cannot be encroached by this Court via
a writ of mandamus. This Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official
duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the
writ of mandamus prayed for by the
petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to
compel the executive branch of the
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
government to transmit the signed text of
Rome Statute to the Senate. [Pimentel vs.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6,
2005]
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS EASTERN
SEA TRADING
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS DO NOT NEED
THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE
FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged
in the importation from Japan of onion and
garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the
Commissioner of Customs ordered the
seizure and forfeiture of the import goods
because EST was not able to comply with
Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said
circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c
sought to regulate the importation of such
non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a
Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the
Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned
the validity of the said EO averring that the
said EO was never concurred upon by the
Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of
Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of
EST. The Commissioner appealed.
DOCTRINE:
 The concurrence of the said House
of Congress is required by our
fundamental law in the making of
TREATIES, which are, however,
distinct and different from
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, which
may be validly entered into
without such concurrence.
Page | 100
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
 TREATIES are formal documents
which require ratification with the
approval of two-thirds of the
Senate. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
become binding through executive
action without the need of a vote
by the Senate or by Congress.
 TREATIES: International
agreements involving political
issues or changes of national
policy and those involving
international agreements of
permanent character.
 EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS:
International agreements
embodying adjustments of detail
carrying out well-established
national policies and traditions
and those involving arrangements
of a more or less temporary
nature.
PIMENTEL VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: The petitioners filed a petition for
mandamus to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of
Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of
the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to
Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the Int'l
Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction
over the most serious crimes as genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and
crimes of aggression as defined by the
Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute
however require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory state.
Petitioners contend that ratification of a
treaty, under both domestic and international
law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the
duty of the Executive Department to transmit
the signed copy to the senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion.
DOCTRINE:
 In our system of government, the
President, being the head of the
state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations
and is the country’s sole
representative with foreign
nations.
 The President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign
states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact
the business of foreign relations.
 Nonetheless, while the President
has the sole authority to negotiate
and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation
to his power requiring the
concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the
validity of treaty entered into by
him.
 STEPS IN TREATY-MAKING
PROCESS:
Page | 101
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA
i) Negotiation – may be brief
or protracted, depending
on the issues involved;
deciding the terms of the
treaty;
ii) Signature – means of
authenticating the
instrument and for the
purpose of symbolizing
the good faith of the
parties; NOT INDICATE
the final consent of the
state in cases where
ratification of the treaty is
required;
iii) Ratification – formal act by
which a state confirms and
accepts the provisions of a
treaty concluded by the
representatives; PURPOSE
is to enable the
contracting states to
examine the treaty more
closely and to give them
an opportunity to refuse
to be bound by it should
they found it to be inimical
to their interest.
iv) Exchange of Instruments
of Ratification – signifies
the effectivity of the treaty
unless a different date has
been agreed upon by the
parties.
 Under our Constitution, the power
to ratify is vested with the
President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The
role of the Senate, however, is
limited only to giving or
COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM
“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER
withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification.
 The Court has no jurisdiction over
actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of
his duties.
BAYAN MUNA, as represented by REP.
SATUR OCAMPO, ET AL., Petitioners, v.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, et al., Respondents.
FACTS: Having a key determinative bearing
on this case is the Rome Statute establishing
the International Criminal Court (ICC) with
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern and shall be
complementary to the national criminal
jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to
cover those considered grave under
international law, such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through
Charge d'Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed
the Rome Statute which, by its terms,is
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
by the signatory states. As of the filing of the
instant petition,only 92 out of the 139
signatory countries appear to have completed
the ratification, approval and concurrence
process.The Philippines is not among the 92.
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J.
Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470
to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter)
Page | 102
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

between the USA and the RP. respondents assert the constitutionality of
the Agreement.
ViaExchange of Notes No. BFO-028-03 dated
May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), ISSUES:
the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary
Ople, agreed with and accepted the US 1) whether or not the Agreement was
proposals embodied under the US Embassy contracted validly, which resolves itself into the
Note adverted to and put in effect the question of whether or not respondents gravely
Agreement with the US government.Inesse, abused their discretion in concluding it; and
theAgreementaims to protect what it refers to
2) whether or not the Agreement,which has not
and defines aspersons of the RP and US from
been submitted to the Senate for concurrence,
frivolous and harassment suits that might be
contravenes and undermines the Rome Statute
brought against them in international
and other treaties.But because respondents
tribunals.[8]It is reflective of the increasing
expectedly raised it, we shall first tackle the
pace of the strategic security and defense
issue of petitioners legal standing.
partnership between the two countries.As of
May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements
HELD: This petition is bereft of merit.
have been effected by and between theUSand
33 other countries.
REMEDIAL LAW:locus standi of petitioner
In response to a query of then Solicitor
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court
General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of
of justice on a given question. Specifically, it is
the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador
a party's personal and substantial interest in
Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28,
a case where he has sustained or will sustain
2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes
direct injury as a result of the act being
constituted a legally binding agreement under
challenged, and calls for more than just a
international law; and that, under US law, the
generalized grievance. The term interest
said agreement did not require the advice and
refers to material interest, as distinguished
consent of the US Senate.
from one that is merely incidental.The
rationale for requiring a party who challenges
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave
the validity of a law or international
abuse of discretion to respondents in
agreement to allege such a personal stake in
concluding and ratifying the Agreement and
the outcome of the controversy is to assure
prays that it be struck down as
the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
unconstitutional, or at least declared as
presentation of issues upon which the court
without force and effect.
so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
For their part, respondents question
petitioners standing to maintain a suit and
Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of
counter that the Agreement, being in the
procedure and it has been recognized that, in
nature of an executive agreement, does not
some cases, suits are not brought by parties
require Senate concurrence for its efficacy.
who have been personally injured by the
And for reasons detailed in their comment,
operation of a law or any other government

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 103
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

act, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or
voters who actually sue in the public
interest.Consequently, in a catena of cases,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
stance on locus standi.
Going by the petition, petitioners
representatives pursue the instant suit
primarily as concerned citizens raising issues
of transcendental importance, both for the
Republic and the citizenry as a whole.
When suing as a citizen to question the
validity of a law or other government action, a
petitioner needs to meet certain specific
requirements before he can be clothed with
standing.Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na
mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc.expounded on this requirement,
thus:
In a long line of cases, however, concerned
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have
been given standing by this Court.
When suing as acitizen, the interest of the
petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must
be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way.It must
appear that the person complaining has been
or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
or act complained of.In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case at bar, petitioners representatives
have complied with the qualifying conditions
or specific requirements exacted under
thelocus standirule.As citizens, their interest
in the subject matter of the petition is direct
and personal.At the very least, their
assertions questioning theAgreementare
made of a public right,i.e., to ascertain that
theAgreementdid not go against established
national policies, practices, and obligations
bearing on the States obligation to the
community of nations.
POLITICAL LAW: Validity of the RP-US
Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioners initial challenge against the
Agreement relates to form, its threshold
posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be
a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners contention perhaps taken
unaware of certain well-recognized
international doctrines, practices, and jargon
is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of
incorporation, as expressed in Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution, wherein the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law and
international jurisprudence as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.An
exchange of notes falls into the category of
inter-governmental agreements,which is an
internationally accepted form of international
agreement. The United Nations Treaty
Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines
the term as follows:
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine
agreement, that has many similarities with

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 104
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

the private law contract.The agreement
consists of the exchange of two documents,
each of the parties being in the possession of
the one signed by the representative of the
other. Under the usual procedure, the
accepting State repeats the text of the offering
State to record its assent.The signatories of
the letters may be government Ministers,
diplomats or departmental heads.The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently
resorted to, either because of its speedy
procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the
process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms exchange of
notes and executive agreements have been
used interchangeably, exchange of notes
being considered a form of executive
agreement that becomes binding through
executive action. On the other hand, executive
agreements concluded by the President
sometimes take the form of exchange of notes
and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated agreements or
protocols. As former US High Commissioner
to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed
in his work,The Constitutionality of Trade
Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence
between this and other governments ends
and agreements whether denominated
executive agreements or exchange of notes or
otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult
of ready ascertainment. It is fairly clear from
the foregoing disquisition that E/NBFO-028-
03be it viewed as the Non-Surrender
Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument
of acceptance thereof or as consent to be
bound is a recognized mode of concluding a
legally binding international written contract
among nations.
POLITICAL LAW: Senate Concurrence Not
Required; treaties
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties defines a treaty as an international
agreement concluded between states in
written form and governed by international
law,whether embodied in a single instrument
or in two or more related instrumentsand
whatever its particular
designation.International agreements may be
in the form of (1) treaties that require
legislative concurrence after executive
ratification; or (2) executive agreements that
are similar to treaties, except that they do not
require legislative concurrence and are
usually less formal and deal with a narrower
range of subject matters than treaties.
Under international law, there is no
difference between treaties and executive
agreements in terms of their binding effects
on the contracting states concerned,as long as
the negotiating functionaries have remained
within their powers.Neither,on the domestic
sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the
Constitution.Authorities are, however, agreed
that one is distinct from another for accepted
reasons apart from the concurrence-
requirement aspect. As has been observed by
US constitutional scholars, a treaty has
greater dignity than an executive agreement,
because its constitutional efficacy is beyond
doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority
of the President, the Senate, and the people;a
ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement,
takes precedence over any prior statutory
enactment.
POLITICAL LAW: The Agreement Not in
Contravention of the Rome Statute
Contrary to petitioners pretense,

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 105
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

theAgreementdoes not contravene or
undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute.Far from going against each other, one
complements the other.As a matter of fact, the
principle of complementarity underpins the
creation of the ICC.As aptly pointed out by
respondents and admitted by petitioners, the
jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions of the
signatory states. Art. 1 of the Rome Statute
pertinently provides:
Article 1 value of the RPs undertaking under the Rome
The Court
AnInternational Crimininal Court(the Court)
is hereby established.It x x xshall have the
power to exercise its jurisdictionover persons
for the most serious crimes of international
concern, as referred to in this Statute,
andshall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions.The jurisdiction and
functioning of the Court shall be governed by
the provisions of this Statute.
Significantly, the sixth preambular paragraph
of the Rome Statute declares that it is the duty
of every State to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes.This provision indicates
that primary jurisdiction over the so-called
international crimes rests, at the first instance,
with the state where the crime was
committed; secondarily, with the ICC in
appropriate situations contemplated under
Art. 17, par. 1of theRomeStatute.
Of particular note is the application of the
principle ofne bis in idemunder par. 3 of Art.
20, Rome Statute, which again underscores
the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-a-
vis that of the ICC.As far as relevant, the
provision states that no person who has been
tried by another court for conduct
[constituting crimes within its jurisdiction]
shall be tried by the [International Criminal]
Court with respect to the same conduct.
The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute,
taken collectively, argue against the idea of
jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines,
as party to the non-surrender agreement, and
the ICC; or the idea of
theAgreementsubstantially impairing the
Statute.Ignoring for a while the fact that the
RP signed the Rome Statute ahead of the
Agreement, it is abundantly clear to us that
the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the
primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP,
over serious crimes committed within their
respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only
when the signatory states are unwilling or
unable to prosecute.
Given the above consideration, petitioners
suggestionthat the RP, by entering into
theAgreement, violated its duty required by
the imperatives of good faith and breached its
commitment under the Vienna Conventionto
refrain from performing any act tending to
impair the value of a treaty, e.g., the Rome
Statutehas to be rejected outright.For nothing
in the provisions of the Agreement,in relation
to the Rome Statute, tends to diminish the
efficacy of the Statute, let alone defeats the
purpose of the ICC.Lest it be overlooked, the
Rome Statute contains a proviso that enjoins
the ICC from seeking the surrender of an
erring person, should the process require the
requested state to perform an act that would
violate some international agreement it has
entered into.We refer to Art. 98(2) of the
Rome Statute, which reads:

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 106
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

Article 98 Furthermore, a careful reading of said Art. 90

Cooperation with respect to waiver of
immunity and consent to surrender
2. The Court may not proceed with a request
for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international agreements
pursuant to which the consent of a sending
State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court, unless the Court can first
obtain the cooperation of the sending State
for the giving of consent for the surrender.
Moreover, under international law, there is a
considerable difference between a State-Party
and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a
signatory state is only obliged to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty;whereas a State-Party, on
the other hand, is legally obliged to follow all
the provisions of a treaty in good faith.
In the instant case, it bears stressing that the
Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome
Statute and not a State-Party for lack of
ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only
obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of the Rome
Statute. Any argument obliging the
Philippines to follow any provision in the
treaty would be premature.
As a result, petitioners argument that State-
Parties with non-surrender agreements are
prevented from meeting their obligations
under the Rome Statute, specifically Arts. 27,
86, 89 and 90, must fail. These articles are
only legally binding upon State-Parties, not
signatories.
would show that the Agreement is not
incompatible with the Rome Statute.
Specifically, Art. 90(4) provides that if the
requesting State is a State not Party to this
Statute the requested State, if it is not under
an international obligation to extradite the
person to the requesting State, shall give
priority to the request for surrender from the
Court In applying the provision, certain
undisputed facts should be pointed out:first,
the US is neither a State-Party nor a signatory
to the Rome Statute; and second, there is an
international agreement between the US and
the Philippines regarding extradition or
surrender of persons, i.e., the Agreement.
Clearly, even assuming that the Philippines is
a State-Party, the Rome Statute still
recognizes the primacy of international
agreements entered into between States, even
when one of the States is not a State-Party to
the Rome Statute.
POLITICAL LAW: Sovereignty Limited by
International Agreements
Petitioner next argues that the RP has,
through the Agreement, abdicated its
sovereignty by bargaining away the
jurisdiction of the ICC to prosecute US
nationals, government officials/employees or
military personnel who commit serious
crimes of international concerns in the
Philippines.Formulating petitioners argument
a bit differently, the RP,by entering into the
Agreement, does thereby abdicate its
sovereignty, abdication being done by its
waiving or abandoning its right to seek
recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC
for erring Americans committing
international crimes in the country.

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 107
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

We are not persuaded.As it were, agreements actually have a limiting effect on

theAgreementis but a form of affirmance and
confirmance of thePhilippines national
criminal jurisdiction.National criminal
jurisdiction being primary, as explained
above, it is always the responsibility and
within the prerogative of the RP either to
prosecute criminal offenses equally covered
by the Rome Statute or to accede to the
jurisdiction of the ICC.Thus,
thePhilippinesmay decide to try persons of
theUS, as the term is understood in
theAgreement, under our national criminal
justice system.Or it may opt not to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or
overUSpersons committing high crimes in the
country and defer to the secondary criminal
jurisdiction of the ICC over them.As to
persons of the US whom the Philippines
refuses to prosecute, the country would, in
effect, accorddiscretion to the US to exercise
either its national criminal jurisdiction over
the person concerned or to give its consent to
the referral of the matter to the ICC for trial.In
the same breath, theUSmust extend the same
privilege to thePhilippineswith respect to
persons of the RP committing high crimes
withinUSterritorial jurisdiction.
To be sure, the nullity of the subject non-
surrender agreement cannot be predicated on
the postulate that some of its provisions
constitute a virtual abdication of its
sovereignty.Almost every time a state enters
into an international agreement, it voluntarily
sheds off part of its sovereignty.The
Constitution, as drafted, did not envision a
reclusivePhilippinesisolated from the rest of
the world.It even adheres, as earlier stated, to
the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.
By their nature, treaties and international
the otherwise encompassing and absolute
nature of sovereignty.By their voluntary act,
nations may decide to surrender or waive
some aspects of their state power or agree to
limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive
and absolute jurisdiction.The usual
underlying consideration in this partial
surrender may be the greater benefits
derived from a pact or a reciprocal
undertaking of one contracting party to grant
the same privileges or immunities to the
other.On the rationale that the Philippines
has adopted the generally accepted principles
of international law aspart of the law of the
land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived
without violating the Constitution. Such
waiver does not amount to an
unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of
jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
POLITICAL LAW: Agreement Not
Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles
of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck
down as void ab initio for imposing immoral
obligations and/or being at variance with
allegedly universally recognized principles of
international law.The immoral aspect
proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as
petitioner would put it, leaves criminals
immune from responsibility for unimaginable
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity; it precludes our country from
delivering an American criminal to the ICC.
The above argument is a kind of recycling of
petitioner's earlier position, which, as already
discussed, contends that the RP, by entering
into the Agreement,virtually abdicated its
sovereignty and in the process undermined
its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute,

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 108
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state
in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor
General, is an assertion by the Philippines of
its desire to try and punish crimes under its
national law. The agreement is a recognition
of the primacy and competence of the
country's judiciary to try offenses under its
national criminal laws and dispense justice
fairly and judiciously.
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the
erroneous impression that the Agreement
would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international
concern to escape criminal trial and
punishment.This is manifestly
incorrect.Persons who may have committed
acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be
prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or
in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the
US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce,
that all the formalities necessary to bind both
countries to the Rome Statute have been
met.For perspective, what the Agreement
contextually prohibits is the surrender by
either party of individuals to international
tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of
the other party, which may desire to
prosecute the crime under its existing
laws.With the view we take of things, there is
nothing immoral or violative of international
law concepts in the act of the Philippines of
assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to
the non-surrender agreement over an offense
considered criminal by both Philippine laws
and the Rome Statute.
REMEDIAL LAW: No Grave Abuse of
Discretion
Petitioners final point revolves around the
necessity of the Senates concurrence in the
Agreement.And without specifically saying so,
petitioner would argue that the non-
surrender agreement was executed by the
President, thru the DFA Secretary, in grave
abuse of discretion.
The Court need not delve on and belabor the
first portion of the above posture of
petitioner, the same having been discussed at
length earlier on.As to the second portion, We
wish to state thatpetitioner virtually faults
the President for performing, through
respondents, a task conferred the President
by the Constitutionthe power to enter into
international agreements.
By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his
or her office, the President, as head of state
and government, is the sole organ and
authority in the external affairs of the country.
The Constitution vests in the President the
power to enter into international agreements,
subject, in appropriate cases, to the required
concurrence votes of the Senate.But as earlier
indicated, executive agreements may be
validly entered into without such
concurrence.As the President wields vast
powers and influence, her conduct in the
external affairs of the nation is,
asBayanwould put it, executive
altogether.The right of the President to enter
into or ratify binding executive agreements
has been confirmed by long practice.
In thus agreeing to conclude
theAgreementthru E/N BFO-028-03, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
represented by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, acted within the scope of the
authority and discretion vested in her by the
Constitution.At the end of the day, the

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 109
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

Presidentby ratifying, thru her deputies, the
non-surrender agreementdid nothing more
than discharge a constitutional duty and
exercise a prerogative that pertains to her
office.
POLITICAL LAW: Agreement Need Not Be
in the Form of a Treaty
A view is advanced that the Agreement
amends existing municipal laws on the States
obligation in relation to grave crimes against
the law of nations,i.e., genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes.Relying on
the above-quoted statutory proviso, the view
posits that the Philippine is required to
surrender to the proper international tribunal
those persons accused of the grave crimes
defined under RA 9851, if it does not exercise
its primary jurisdiction to prosecute them.
The basic premise rests on the interpretation
that if it does not decide to prosecute a
foreign national for violations of RA 9851, the
Philippines has only two options, to wit: (1)
surrender the accused to the proper
international tribunal; or (2) surrender the
accused to another State if such surrender is
pursuant to the applicable extradition laws
and treaties.But the Philippines may exercise
these options only in cases where another
court or international tribunal is already
conducting the investigation or undertaking
the prosecution of such crime; otherwise, the
Philippines must prosecute the crime before
its own courts pursuant to RA 9851.
Posing the situation of a US national under
prosecution by an international tribunal for
any crime under RA 9851, the Philippines has
the option to surrender such US national to
the international tribunal if it decides not to
prosecute such US national here.The view
asserts that this option of the Philippines
under Sec. 17 of RA 9851 is not subject to the
consent of theUS, and any derogation of Sec.
17 of RA 9851, such as requiring the consent
of the US before the Philippines can exercise
such option, requires an amendatory law.In
line with this scenario, the view strongly
argues that theAgreementprevents
thePhilippineswithout the consent of
theUSfrom surrendering to any international
tribunal US nationals accused of crimes
covered by RA 9851, and, thus, in effect
amends Sec. 17 of RA 9851.Consequently, the
view is strongly impressed that the
Agreement cannot be embodied in a simple
executive agreement in the form of an
exchange of notes but must be implemented
through an extradition law or a treaty with
the corresponding formalities.
Moreover, consonant with the foregoing view,
citing Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution, where
thePhilippinesadopts, as a national policy, the
generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land, the Court is
further impressed to perceivethe Rome
Statute as declaratory of customary
international law.In other words, the Statute
embodies principles of law which constitute
customary international law or custom and
for which reason it assumes the status of an
enforceable domestic law in the context of the
aforecited constitutional provision.As a
corollary, it is argued that any derogation
from the Rome Statute principles cannot be
undertaken via a mere executive agreement,
which, as an exclusive act of the executive
branch, can only implement, but cannot
amend or repeal, an existing
law.TheAgreement, so the argument goes,
seeks to frustrate the objects of the principles
of law or alters customary rules embodied in
the Rome Statute.

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 110
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

themselves peculiarly well acquainted with

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, the
view thus advanced considers the Agreement
inefficacious, unless it is embodied in a treaty
duly ratified with the concurrence of the
Senate, the theory being that a Senate-
ratified treaty partakes of the nature of a
municipal law that can amend or supersede
another law, in this instance Sec. 17 of RA
9851 and the status of the Rome Statute as
constitutive of enforceable domestic law
under Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution.
We are unable to lend cogency to the view
thus taken. For one, we find that the
Agreement does not amend or is repugnant to
RA 9851.For another, the view does not
clearly state what precise principles of law, if
any, the Agreement alters.And for a third, it
does not demonstrate in the concrete how the
Agreement seeks to frustrate the objectives of
the principles of law subsumed in the Rome
Statute.
Nonetheless, despite the lack of actual
domestic legislation, theUSnotably follows the
doctrine of incorporation.As early as 1900,
the esteemed Justice Gray inThe Paquete
Habana case already held international law as
part of the law of theUS, to wit:
International law is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as
often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination.
For this purpose, where there is no treaty and
no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations, and,
as evidence of these, to the works of jurists
and commentators who by years of labor,
research, and experience have made
the subjects of which they treat. Such works
are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for
the speculations of their authors concerning
what the law ought to be, but for the
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
Thus, a person can be tried in the US for an
international crime despite the lack of
domestic legislation.The cited ruling in U.S. v.
Coolidge,which in turn is based on the
holding inU.S. v. Hudson, only applies to
common law and not to the law of nations or
international law.Indeed, the Court inU.S. v.
Hudson only considered the question,
whether the Circuit Courts of the United
States can exercise a common law jurisdiction
in criminal cases.Stated otherwise, there is no
common law crime in the US but this is
considerably different from international law.
TheUSdoubtless recognizes international law
as part of the law of the land, necessarily
including international crimes, even without
any local statute.In fact, years later, US courts
would apply international law as a source of
criminal liability despite the lack of a local
statute criminalizing it as such. So it was that
in Ex Parte Quir in the US Supreme Court
noted that from the very beginning of its
history this Court has recognized and applied
the law of war as including that part of the
law of nations which prescribes, for the
conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of
enemy nations as well as of enemy
individuals. It went on further to explain that
Congress had not undertaken the task of
codifying the specific offenses covered in the
law of war, thus:
It is no objection that Congress in providing
for the trial of such offenses has not itself
undertaken to codify that branch of

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 111
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

international law or to mark its precise
boundaries, or to enumerate or define by
statute all the acts which that law condemns.
An Act of Congress punishing the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations is an
appropriate exercise of its constitutional
authority, Art. I, s 8, cl. 10, to define and
punish the offense since it has adopted by
reference the sufficiently precise definition of
international law. Similarly by the reference
in the 15th Article of War to offenders or
offenses that by the law of war may be triable
by such military commissions. Congress has
incorporated by reference, as within the
jurisdiction of military commissions, all
offenses which are defined as such by the law
of war, and which may constitutionally be
included within that jurisdiction.
and (3) duration. While,opinio juris, the
psychological element, requires that the state
practice or norm be carried out in such a way,
as to be evidence of a belief that this practice
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it.
The term jus cogens means the compelling
law.Corollary, ajus cogensnorm holds the
highest hierarchical position among all other
customary norms and principles.As a
result,jus cogensnorms are deemed
peremptory and non-derogable.When applied
to international crimes, jus cogens crimes
have been deemed so fundamental to the
existence of a just international legal order
that states cannot derogate from them, even
by agreement.

This rule finds an even stronger hold in the
case of crimes against humanity. It has been
held that genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity have attained the status of
customary international law.Some even go so
far as to state that these crimes have attained
the status of jus cogens.
Customary international law or international
custom is a source of international law as
stated in the Statute of the ICJ. It is defined as
the general and consistent practice of states
recognized and followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation.In order to establish
the customary status of a particular norm,
two elements must concur: State practice, the
objective element; andopinio juris sive
necessitates, the subjective element.
State practice refers to the continuous
repetition of the same or similar kind of acts
or norms by States.It is demonstrated upon
the existence of the following elements: (1)
generality; (2) uniformity and consistency;
These jus cogens crimes relate to the
principle of universal jurisdiction, i.e., any
state may exercise jurisdiction over an
individual who commits certain heinous and
widely condemned offenses, even when no
other recognized basis for jurisdiction
exists.The rationale behind this principle is
that the crime committed is so egregious that
it is considered to be committed against all
members of the international community and
thus granting every State jurisdiction over the
crime.
Therefore, even with the current lack of
domestic legislation on the part of the US, it
still has both the doctrine of incorporation
and universal jurisdiction to try these crimes.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 112
 SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2017
MENDIOLA, MANILA

Section 22. The President shall submit to the

Congress within thirty-days from the opening
of every regular session, as the basis of the
general appropriations bill, a budget of
expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed
revenue measures.

Section 23. The President shall address the

Congress at the opening of its regular session.
He may also appear before it at any other time.

 Presidential Immunity - The

President, during his tenure of
office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or
law. [Rubrico v. Arroyo, G.R. No.
183871, February 18, 2010]

COFFEE NOTES 2017 | POLITICAL LAW COMPENDIUM

“They tried to bury us, they did not know we were seeds.”
SUBIJANO, CHRISTOPHER

Page | 113