PIL-HSSE-LL-2018-08

Date: 4-Oct-2018

HiPo Incident – Battery Room Explosion

Region: Kuwait, Middle East
Incident Location: Lower Fars Heavy Oils (LFHO) Project, JI-2029
Incident Date: 24 June 2018
Main Golden Rule Breached: Permit to Work

Figure 1: East internal wall demolished by the

blast, pushing the wall into the adjoining switch
room

Summary:
During the final pre-commissioning charging of UPS AC battery consisting of 578 nickel cadmium cells there was an explosion inside
the battery room within the substation. At the time there were five persons including a vendor representative involved in this pre-
commissioning activity stationed inside the battery room. All five persons escaped from the battery room but sustained injuries.
Outcome: Four persons sustained electrolyte burns, one of them also sustained a slight back injury from a suspected falling object. They
were released from the hospital on the same day and returned to work after a period of rest and recuperation. The fifth injured person is
a vendor representative; he suffered from serious injuries including extensive electrolyte burns. He was discharged from the hospital on
5th September.
Property Damage: All four internal blockwork walls within the battery room were structurally damaged as well as battery charging panels
and HVAC equipment.
Incident Classification: High Potential (HiPo); Lost Time Injuries, Major Property Damage
Root Causes & Contributory factors Lessons Learned
 Inadequate Competency of Site Supervisor:  Identify the size of ventilation required after studying the 
o Inadequate ventilation provided to evacuate accumulating H2 manufacturer’s cell data sheets and calculating the quantum of H2
gas emitted from the total number of cells to be charged
o Provision of H2 gas detector and uninterrupted operation of the  Use temporary air movers (intrinsically safe if located within the
temporary powered permanent HVAC system was not ensured battery room) to provide continual fresh air evacuating any H2 gas
 Permit to Work System Failure accumulation
o Permit authority did not adequately check that the required  Always ensure suitable detectors (H2 and multi gas) are
safety measures were in place commissioned and used in the battery room while charging
o Risk assessment was inadequate as it did not cover all the batteries. Alternatively use calibrated temporary H2 meters
hazards and mitigation measures for this activity  Ensure commissioning method statements for battery charging/
 Lack of comprehensive system pre-commissioning testing identifies all the risks and safety measures required to be in
place
procedure or method statement:
o The team relied on Vendor’s procedures which were adequate  Do not rely on Vendor’s procedures alone when conducting such
testing as they only cover their own equipment and may not consider
only for the supplied vendor’s equipment and not the battery
the complete system to be commissioned
room supporting infrastructure
 Ensure that senior persons involved have sufficient experience and
 Lack of hazard awareness: are fully conversant with the hazards and control measures required
o Personnel involved lacked the experience and knowledge
 Whenever charging cells during pre-commissioning or when in
about: (i) The quantum of H2 emitted during charging
operation, ensure that all sources of ignition that are not
operations (ii) Sources of ignition in the battery room
spark/ignition proof are removed from the battery room prior to
(temporary AC chillers, mobile phones, laptop, jewelries and
charging operation
potential static charge generated from tools & clothing in the
battery room)  Ensure personnel directly working with such cells/ battery wear
o Vendor representative was unaware of many key hazards. additional PPE like electrolyte resistant full face shield, non-static
gloves and apron

More information and details can be found on Synergi – Case 20877