Journal of Business Research 133 (2021) 242–251

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Journal of Business Research

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres

Leader political skill, influence tactics, and member performance:

Supplementary, complementary and contrasting perspectives
Ashish Mahajan *, Andrew Templer
Odette School of Business, University of Windsor, 401 Sunset Avenue, Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4, Canada

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This study highlights the importance of leader political skill as a moderator of the relationship between influence
Leader political skill tactics used by leaders and member outcomes - in-role performance, and organizational citizenship behavior
Influence tactics (OCB). We collected data from 185 leader-member dyads to empirically test this relationship. We found that
Job performance
when leader political skill and influence tactics supplement each other, it only upholds existing beliefs about the
OCB
leader and jointly account for little incremental variance in member outcomes. Whereas, when leader political
skill and influence tactics complement each other, it provides missing information about the leader and has a
positive impact on member outcomes. We also found that when politically skilled leaders use tactics that are in
sharp contrast to their interpersonal style of leadership, it will lead members to question the positive beliefs about
the leader and will negatively impact member outcomes.

1. Introduction
According to a recent jobs report from the World Economic Forum
(2020), a range of distinctive skill sets comprising both technical and
soft skills are needed to grow and prosper in the new digital economy.
Likewise, another study found that more than 90% of employers
considered soft skills as “essential” in making hiring decisions (Won­
derlic, 2016). Indeed, some employers were having difficulty in finding
employees with outstanding soft skills that they were giving higher
ratings to soft skills over technical skills during the selection process
(Lindzon, 2020).
Among a repertoire of soft skills, are the social and interpersonal
skills that are important in influencing others at work. These skills are
especially important for leaders to effectively mentor members, manage
divisiveness and ease acceptance of their decisions among members
(Ferris, King, Judge, & Kacmar, 1991; Gerow, Grover, & Thatcher, 2017;
Sun, Pan, & Chow, 2014). Leaders who are socially intelligent are better
able to understand social cues and can use such knowledge to navigate
organizational politics (Ahearn, Ferris, Hochwarter, Douglas, &
Ammeter, 2004; Ferris et al., 2007). This ability of a leader to effectively
read situations is indicative of leader political skill, an attribute of
leader’s interpersonal style. Politically skilled leaders demonstrate a
sense of calm self-confidence and are better in influencing their mem­
bers through the effective use of persuasion and manipulation (Gansen-
Ammann, Meurs, Wihler, & Blickle, 2019; Treadway, Ferris, Duke,
Adams, & Thatcher, 2007). Their interpersonal style encompasses social
astuteness, positioning, and savvy to network, build alliances, and
garner resources for their team and the organization (Ahearn et al.,
2004; Sun et al., 2014). By virtue of being well-networked, politically
skilled leaders are able to mobilize people to accomplish critical goals
and objectives (Enns, Huff, & Higgins, 2003; Treadway et al., 2004; Wei,
Chiang, & Wu, 2012). Leaders who are socially intelligent have a greater
ability to understand social cues and can use such knowledge to suc­
cessfully influence members (Ahearn et al., 2004; Brouer, Harris, &
Kacmar, 2011; Ferris et al., 2007).
Apart from being politically skilled, a leader’s success in influencing
members also depends on the type of influence tactics used by a leader.
Influence tactics carry implicit cues that members use to ascertain their
standing with the leader and within their work group (Furst & Cable,
2008; Kacmar, Carlson, & Harris, 2013; Sparrowe, Soetjipto, & Kraimer,
2006). This interpretation affects how members respond to leader re­
quests. For example, influence tactics that challenge member motivation
are less effective than those that recognize member contributions to­
wards their leader and their organization (Sparrowe et al., 2006). Thus,
a leader’s ability in successfully executing an influence attempt depends,
in part on the types of influence tactics used by a leader, and in part by
how leaders exercise influence on members.
However, despite progress, these streams of literature have

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: amahajan@uwindsor.ca (A. Mahajan), templer@uwindsor.ca (A. Templer).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2021.04.049
Received 23 March 2020; Received in revised form 15 April 2021; Accepted 17 April 2021
Available online 13 May 2021
0148-2963/© 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
A. Mahajan and A. Templer
developed independently. Indeed, in seeking to understand how mem­
bers respond to leader behaviors, previous research has focused either
on political skill (e.g., Ahearn et al., 2004; Gansen-Ammann et al., 2019)
or on various influence tactics used by leaders (e.g., Kacmar et al., 2013;
Sparrowe et al., 2006). To date, no research has studied how leader
political skill aids the relationship of influence tactics with member
performance, and OCB. By examining leader political skill along with
other influence tactics used by leaders, this study provides a fuller un­
derstanding of leader political behavior and its impact on member
outcomes.
We argue that members continually evaluate leader political
behavior by mapping the influence tactics leaders use against the
interpersonal style of a politically skilled leader. We contend that leader
political skill and leader influence tactics supplement – by adding to the
other, complement – by filling in due to the lack of the other, or are in
contrast – by being opposed to the other. When political skill and in­
fluence tactics supplement each other, they only serve to uphold existing
beliefs about a leader without bringing in any new information about a
leader. On the other hand, when political skill and influence tactics
complement each other, they provide missing information about a
leader and enable members to affirm faith in their leader. Lastly, when
politically skilled leaders use tactics that are in contrast to their inter­
personal style of leadership, it will lead members to question the positive
beliefs about their leader. Using supplementary, complementary, and
contrasting perspectives, this study empirically examines the interactive
relationship between leader political skill and influence tactics, and its
impact on member outcomes.
This study contributes to the leadership literature in several ways.
First, this study integrates the literature on political skill and influence
tactics by examining the role of leader political skill in downward in­
fluence attempts. Although previous research has demonstrated the
importance of political skill, those studies examined political skill rela­
tive to upward influence attempts (i.e., members influencing their
leaders; e.g., Harris, Kacmar, Zivnuska, & Shaw, 2007; Treadway et al.,
2007; Liu, Liu, & Longzeng, 2010; Sun & van Emmerik, 2015). Less
research has examined the role of leader political skill in downward
influence attempts (i.e., leaders influencing members). This is a signif­
icant omission as success of a downward influence attempt depends at
least in part on how leaders execute their influence (Ammeter, Douglas,
Gardner, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2002). In this study, we show that
member performance is affected by a dynamic interplay between leader
political skill and leader influence tactics. By explicating political skill as
a supplement, complement or contrasting to the influence tactics being
used by leaders, this study helps in finer understanding of leader polit­
ical behavior and provides better understanding of the boundary con­
ditions affecting the relationship of leader political behavior with
member outcomes.
Second, although some social influence research indicates that po­
litical skill has a significant role as a moderating variable, most of this
research is based on self-reports (e.g., Harris et al., 2007; Sun & van
Emmerik, 2015; Treadway et al., 2007). Some research also indicates
that the relationship between political skill and work outcomes depends
on whether the data are self or other-reported (Meurs, Gallagher, &
Perrewe, 2010). Specifically, self-reported political skill was found to
moderate the relationship between interpersonal conflict and self-
reported strain (i.e., emotional burnout), which was important to an
individual, whereas supervisor-reported political skill was found to
moderate the relationship between interpersonal conflict and an
outcome more important to supervisors and the organization (i.e., job
performance; Meurs et al., 2010). Because the emphasis of this study
focused on member performance, other-reported leader political skill (i.
e., member-reported leader political skill) was used to examine the
moderating role of leader political skill. In using member’s perspective
on political skill of their leader, along with member’s perception on
influence tactics used by their leader, this study provides a deeper un­
derstanding of the factors shaping member perception of a leader along
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Journal of Business Research 133 (2021) 242–251
with their concomitant impact on member’s in-role performance and
OCB.
Finally, this study shows that although political skill is useful, leaders
who are less politically savvy can still be influential by focusing on those
influence tactics that complement this deficiency. These tactics by
themselves provide cues about leader sensitivity and competence, and
thus are effective even when leaders lack political savvies. Likewise, we
also show that some influence tactics will be difficult to use by leaders
who lack political savvies. Thus, this research identifies effective and
ineffective combinations of leader political skill and influence tactics
and provides a fuller understanding of the impact of leader political
behavior.
2. Theory and hypotheses
Leaders use various influence tactics to get desired outcomes from
members. Some influence tactics are used more often to assign work to
members, whereas others are used to change member behaviors (Yukl,
Guinan, & Sottolano, 1995). Research also suggests an individual’s use
of influence tactics depends on the direction of influence. Some influ­
ence tactics are used more often in downward influence attempts (with
subordinates), whereas others are used more often in lateral (with peers)
and upward influence attempts (with superiors; Kipnis, Schmidt, &
Wilkinson, 1980; Lee, Han, Cheong, Kim, & Yun, 2017).
As we were interested in investigating the relationship between
leader influence tactics and member performance, we focus on five in­
fluence tactics - inspirational appeals, consultation, exchange, legiti­
mating tactics, and pressure tactics - that are used in downward
influence attempts and have been found to be related to member be­
haviors (Sparrowe et al., 2006; Yukl & Falbe, 1990). Furthermore, our
choice of these influence tactics also acknowledges the variation in their
intensity and effectiveness. Inspirational appeals and consultation are
soft tactics and are most effective; exchange and legitimating tactics are
intermediate (in between soft and hard tactics) and are less effective;
and pressure tactics are hard tactics and are least effective (Kipnis &
Schmidt, 1985; Lee et al., 2017). Research has also found that effec­
tiveness of influence tactics varies across different stakeholders; an in­
fluence tactic exerting a positive effect on performance in one group
may in fact exert a negative effect in another group (Plouffe, Bolander,
Cote, & Hochstein, 2016). Furthermore, in sales negotiations between
buyers and sellers, use of complementary influence tactics as opposed to
competing influence tactics has been found to have a positive effect on
winning a sales contract (Singh, Marinova, & Singh, 2020). In another
study, researchers found that effectiveness of managerial influence
tactics in reducing resistance from employees depends on the quality of
relationship with their employees – better relationship resulted in least
resistance (Furst & Cable, 2008).
Thus, member response to leader political behavior is formed by an
interaction between variety of factors including context, personal at­
tributes of leaders and members, and prior history between leaders and
members (Lord, Brown, Harvey, & Hall, 2001). In the present study, we
empirically investigate how downward influence tactics interact with
leader political skill to influence member in-role performance and OCB.
Fig. 1 depicts our theoretical model.
2.1. Leader political skill supplements soft tactics
Inspirational appeals and consultations are soft tactics as these
involve leaders to share their power with members (Lee et al., 2017).
These tactics are more personal and signal members of their good
standing with their leader (Sparrowe et al., 2006).
Inspirational appeals can be defined as an attempt by a leader to
appeal to the values and emotions of members in order to arouse their
enthusiasm to accomplish a desired objective (Yukl, Seifert, & Chavez,
2008). Inspirational appeals are indicative of high-quality relationships
leaders share with their members that encompass mutual respect,
A. Mahajan and A. Templer
Leader Political Skills
Leader Influence Tactics
- Inspirational Appeal
- Consultation
- Legitimation
- Exchange
- Pressure
Fig. 1. Theoretical Model.
interpersonal liking, and congruence of values between leaders and
members (Ashkanasy & O’Connor, 1997). Inspirational appeals have
been found to be especially useful in generating task commitment (i.e.,
members demonstrating unusual effort in carrying out a leader’s re­
quests) as opposed to task compliance (i.e., members demonstrating
minimal effort in carrying out a leader’s requests, Falbe & Yukl, 1992).
Politically skilled leaders use inspirational appeals as part of their usual
style of influencing members. By drawing an inspiring vision and
motivating members to exert effort, politically skilled leaders are seen as
charismatic and transformational; these are the qualities that members
expect from their leaders (Coole, 2007). The use of inspirational appeals
by such leaders only confirms member’s impression about a leader and
does not bring any new information about a leader. Thus, the use of
inspirational appeals by politically skilled leaders is not particularly
salient to members – it only serves to supplement the existing socially
sensitive style of a politically skilled leader. Concomitantly, when soft
tactics such as inspirational appeals are being used by leaders, other
characteristics of a leader that invoke a similar leadership style are not
particularly salient and will have less effect on member’s in-role per­
formance and OCB.
With consultation, a leader seeks out member support and assistance
to plan a strategy, activity, or change (Yukl et al., 2008). Consultation is
effective in generating member commitment towards performing a task
as it helps in developing a more favorable attitude towards a task and a
sense of ownership due to participation in planning a task. Leaders using
consultation indicate their willingness to seek out member input,
address member concerns, and use a participative approach to change a
policy or to arrive at a decision (Enns et al., 2003).
Politically skilled leaders are more likely to use consultation as it
helps them in building interpersonal trust and getting member support
(Ahearn et al., 2004). When politically skilled leaders use consultation
tactics, it does not come as a surprise to members as they expect polit­
ically skilled leaders to use consultation to get member buy-in. Thus,
members are more likely to comprehend consultation as a natural
behavior used by politically skilled leaders. As consulting with members
and eliciting their participation supplements the style of a politically
skilled leader, it does not convey any new information about a leader
and is less likely to bring in any change in member performance.
On the other hand, when leaders lack political savvies, members look
at other cues to affirm faith in the ability of a leader to lead the group. In
such contexts, using inspirational appeals and consultation will be
particularly salient and will provide assurance to members that leaders
are foremost members of a group and share its norms, goals and aspi­
rations. When these tactics are used by leaders who lack political skills,
they are more likely to stand out as members do not expect their leaders
to use these tactics. By consulting with members and inspiring them,
leaders send strong signals to members that their input is valued, and
their support is an important part of the decision-making process.
Leaders use of these tactics provides members important cues about
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Journal of Business Research 133 (2021) 242–251
Member Performance
- In role
- OCB
leader competence and helps in establishing legitimacy of a leader
(Kochan, Schmidt, & Decotiis, 1975). In such situations, using inspira­
tional appeals and consultation will have more impact on members as it
brings in a positive change in their perceptions about their leader and
bring significant positive change in member performance.
Hypothesis 1. Leader political skill moderates the relationship be­
tween inspirational appeals and member’s a) in-role performance, and
b) OCB, such that these relationships will be positive and stronger when
leader political skill is low (than high).
Hypothesis 2. Leader political skill moderates the relationship be­
tween consultation and member’s a) in-role performance, and b) OCB
such that these relationships will be positive and stronger when leader
political skill is low (than high).
2.2. Leader political skill complements intermediate tactics
Exchange and legitimation tactics are intermediate tactics as these
do not neatly fit the characteristics of soft or hard tactics. As these tactics
do not send clear signal about a leader’s interpersonal style, its effec­
tiveness will depend on skillful execution. A politically skilled leader can
effectively complement these tactics by focusing on the softer side of
these tactics.
Leaders use exchange tactics to offer something members want in
return for their commitment to pursue leader requests (Schriesheim &
Hinkin, 1990). On the softer side, by offering an inducement in return
for a desired behavior, exchange tactics signal members that leaders are
willing to reciprocate at a later time. On the harder side, exchange
tactics allude to the reward power of leaders and indicate that leaders
control important resources and rewards desired by members (Yukl &
Falbe, 1990). As these tactics have elements of both soft and hard in­
fluence tactics, their effectiveness will largely depend upon the ability of
a leader to successfully execute them. Politically skilled leaders can cue
to the softer side by focusing on the contributions that members bring to
the table and in exchange offering members something that they value.
This signals members that leaders value member contributions and are
willing to reciprocate at a later time. Members are likely to view skillful
execution of exchange tactics as going beyond mere extrinsic in­
ducements to a relationship of trust between leaders and members (Blau,
1964; Gouldner, 1960). Thus, leader political skill will complement ex­
change tactics by softening the impersonal aspects of exchange tactics
and will contribute to significant positive change in member
performance.
By using legitimation, leaders refer to several extrinsic factors such
as organizational policies and rules, prior precedents, and standard work
procedures to establish legitimacy of their requests (Falbe & Yukl,
1992). Research on the effectiveness of legitimating tactics suggests that
these tactics (in comparison to consultation and inspirational appeals)
are less effective (i.e., result in task compliance rather than task
A. Mahajan and A. Templer
commitment) in influencing members. In situations where members
perceive leaders are using arrogant behavior to establish legitimacy of
their requests, they may even resist leader requests (Falbe & Yukl,
1992). Because legitimating tactics allude to the position power of a
leader, members are more likely to look for other cues to ascertain the
legitimacy of leader requests. Politically skilled leaders are better able to
cast their requests as sincere and consistent with the established orga­
nizational practices. Research has found that politically skilled in­
dividuals show greater degree of intrapersonal control as well as control
over activities in a workplace (Ferris et al., 2007). This helps them to
neutralize dysfunctional influence of negative affect on physiological
and psychological strain (Zellars, Perrewé, Rossi, Tepper, & Ferris,
2008). At an interpersonal level, politically skilled leaders are better
able to disguise their intentions and self-regulate their behavior in order
to project a more favorable image on others (Gansen-Ammann et al.,
2019; Treadway et al., 2004). Concomitantly members are less likely to
view skillful execution of these tactics with cynicism and are more likely
to comply with these requests. This gives politically skilled leaders an
edge over their unskilled counterparts in using legitimation effectively
without being viewed as arrogant and presumptuous.
However, when leaders lack political skill, impersonal aspects of
exchange and legitimating tactics will become particularly salient. Ex­
change tactics may cue to the reward power of a leader and indicate that
leaders control important resources. Members are more likely to see
behaviors of such leaders from a process-oriented transactional
approach to leadership: a leader provides benefits in response to mem­
ber services (Hollander & Offermann, 1990). In such situations, ex­
change tactics may be viewed negatively as it narrows the scope of
leader-member relations to an economic exchange, and also lowers
the standing of members that need coaxing by economic inducements.
Likewise, when leaders lack political skill, the negative attributes of
legitimating tactics such as these tactics being perceived as highly
impersonal and manipulative will become more salient. Because legiti­
mating tactics require leaders to use extrinsic factors to make their re­
quests, members are more likely to question the motives behind leader
requests. Without leader astuteness in executing these tactics, members
are less likely to perceive such behaviors as well-meaning and well-
intended. This in turn will reduce the likelihood of members
complying with such requests (Tyler & DeGoey, 1996).
Thus, in order to be effective, exchange and legitimation tactics will
need to be complemented by leader political skill. Concomitantly, when
leaders lack political skill, impersonal aspects of these tactics will
become more salient and will negatively impact member performance
and OCB.
Hypothesis 3. Leader political skill moderates the relationship be­
tween exchange tactics and member’s a) in-role performance, and b)
OCB, such that these relationships will be positive when leader political
skill is high and negative when leader political skill is low.
Hypothesis 4. Leader political skill moderates the relationship be­
tween legitimation and member’s a) in-role performance, and b) OCB,
such that these relationships will be positive when leader political skill is
high and negative when leader political skill is low.
2.3. Leader political skill contrasts hard tactics
Hard tactics involve use of direct and forceful behavior to influence
members. These tactics are highly impersonal and challenge member’s
motivation to exert effort (Berson & Sosik, 2007; Deluga, 1991; Lee
et al., 2017).
Pressure tactics are hard tactics as these involve use of threats,
warnings and other assertive behaviors to influence members to comply
with leader requests. These tactics are among the least effective as they
conjure images of an abusive or a tyrannical leader and evoke strong
resistance from members (Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Sparrowe et al., 2006).
We contend that the negative relationship between pressure tactics and
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Journal of Business Research 133 (2021) 242–251
member performance, and OCB will be more pronounced if these tactics
are in contrast with the general impression of a leader. These conditions
will hold when members perceive their leaders to be politically skilled.
Because pressure tactics involve use of threats, warnings, and other
intimidating behaviors, it invokes an image of a leader as coercive and
manipulative. This will be in sharp contrast with the types of behaviors
members expect from a politically skilled leader. Inconsistent cognitions
create unpleasant tensions that members aim to reduce through such
means as, for instance, cognitive restructuring or rationalizing (Fes­
tinger, 1957). As members strive to achieve consistency, a false
consensus effect may result (Martinko & Gardner, 1987), in which
members may attribute this inconsistency in leader behavior –politically
skilled leader using pressure tactics– to internal and more stable char­
acteristics of a leader. This will result in complete recategorization of a
leader from being sensitive and socially astute to being dogmatic and
insensitive (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990); concomitantly increasing the in­
tensity of negative reactions from members. However, when leaders lack
political skill, the inconsistency in leader behavior (using pressure tac­
tics along with lack of political skill) is less salient. Thus, the negative
relationship of pressure tactics with member performance and OCB will
be more pronounced when leaders are perceived to be high (rather than
low) in political skill.
Hypothesis 5. Leader political skill moderates the relationship be­
tween pressure tactics and member’s a) in-role performance, and b) OCB
such that these relationships will be negative and stronger (i.e., more
pronounced) when leader political skill is high (rather than low).
3. Methods
3.1. Sample and procedure
The data for this study was collected from a customs brokerage and
logistics company located in the southeastern region of Canada. We
chose this company as it was named one of the 50 best managed com­
panies in Canada and it was headquartered in our local community. This
was a moment of pride for us and as part of our ongoing program of
organizational research, we were interested in understanding the role
leaders played in this company, how members perceived leader
behavior and its concomitant impact on member outcomes. The sample
came from full-time employees (i.e., members) and their immediate
supervisors (i.e., leaders) providing a range of services related to cus­
toms brokerage and logistics, such as freight forwarding, brokerage,
warehousing, sales and marketing, and accounting and finance.
Using the company’s internal mail system, surveys were mailed to
570 members and three months later to their 71 leaders. Each survey
packet included a letter explaining the purpose of the study, a copy of
the survey, and a postage paid pre-addressed envelope for returning the
survey. Members reported on the political skills of their leader and the
influence tactics used on them by their leader. The leaders provided
ratings on member’s in-role performance, and OCB. Two hundred and
twenty-three member surveys and 53 leader surveys were received for
an initial response rate of 39.1% and 74.6% respectively. Of these, 203
member surveys were matched with their respective leaders. After de­
leting cases with missing data, the final sample consisted of 185 leader-
member dyads. This sample consisted of 185 members and 52 leaders for
an effective response rate of 32.4% and 73.2% respectively.
The average age of members was 44 years and 68% were female. In
terms of education, 36% had a college degree, 38% had attended some
college, 25% had high school diplomas and 1% had no degree. On
average, members had worked with their current organization for 11
years and with their leader for 6 years.
3.2. Measures
Leader political skill. We used Ahearn et al.’s (2004) six-item
A. Mahajan and A. Templer
unidimensional scale to measure leader political skill from a member’s
perspective. Members reported on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree
to 7 = Strongly Agree) the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with
several statements that measured leader political skill (α = 0.93). An
example item is “My supervisor finds it easy to position himself/herself
in the position of others.”
Influence tactics. We asked the members to rate the influence tactics
used on them by their leader using Yukl et al.’s (2008) scale. Members
reported on a 7-point scale (1 = Never to 7 = Always) the extent to
which their leader used each of the influence tactics on them. An
example item is, inspirational appeal (α = 0.86) – “My supervisor talks
about ideals and values when proposing a new activity or change”;
consultation (α = 0.92) – “My supervisor consults with you to get your
ideas about a proposed activity or change that he/she wants you to
support or implement”; exchange (α = 0.95) – “My supervisor offers to
do a specific task or favor for you in return for your help now”; legiti­
mation (α = 0.91) – “My supervisor says that a request or proposal is
consistent with prior precedent and established practice”; pressure (α =
0.81) – “My supervisor demands that you carry out a request.”
In-role performance. We assessed in-role performance by asking
leaders to rate in-role performance of their members using 7-items in-
role behavior scale from Williams and Anderson (1991). Responses
were made on a 7-point scale ranging from 1, “Never,” to 7, “Always.” A
sample item is, “This person adequately completes assigned duties.” The
Cronbach’s alpha for in-role performance was 0.91.
OCB. We assessed OCB by asking leaders to rate extra-role behaviors
of each of their members directed toward other members and their or­
ganization using 14-items scale from Williams and Anderson (1991).
Responses were made on a 7-point scale ranging from 1, “Never,” to 7,
“Always.” A sample item is, “This person helps others who have been
absent,” and, “This person conserves and protects organizational prop­
erty.” We aggregated the score across these 14 items to obtain a cu­
mulative score for OCB. The Cronbach’s alpha for OCB was 0.90.
3.3. Control variables
Several variables were controlled both at the individual and group
level to control their effect on in-role performance and OCB. Drawing on
prior theory, age, gender, organizational tenure, and tenure with the
leader were used as individual level control variables. Specifically,
gender was controlled, as previous research has shown men receive
higher ratings than women (Bowen, Swim, & Jacobs, 2000). This was
more relevant in the present research as most of the sample were
women. Previous research has also found age (Waldman & Avolio,
1986), organizational tenure (Ahearn et al., 2004), and tenure with the
leader (Treadway et al., 2007) to influence member performance rat­
ings. Therefore, these were included as control variables. In addition, at
the group level, group size was controlled because of its potential impact
on member performance (Sparrowe et al., 2006).
4. Analyses and results
Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, correlations, and
scale reliabilities among the variables included in this study. In order to
assess the discriminant validity of the measures collected from members,
a confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom,
2004) was performed. The hypothesized six-factor measurement model
(consisting of exchange, inspirational appeals, legitimation, pressure,
consultation, and leader political skill) fit the data well (χ2 = 624.31, df
= 284, p < .05, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.96). In order to assess that leader
political skill was different from the five influence tactics used in the
present study, discriminant validity was assessed by constraining the
factor correlation between leader political skill and each of the five in­
fluence tactics to 1.0, refitting the model and conducting a chi-square
difference test (Netemeyer, Johnston, & Burton, 1990). Relative to the
hypothesized model, constraining the factor correlation to 1.0 between
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Journal of Business Research 133 (2021) 242–251
leader political skill and exchange (χ2 = 1538.07, df = 285, RMSEA =
0.14; Δχ2 = 913.76, Δdf = 1, p < .001), inspirational appeal (χ2 =
879.60, df = 285, RMSEA = 0.10; Δχ2 = 255.29, Δdf = 1, p < .001),
legitimation (χ2 = 1139.05, df = 285, RMSEA = 0.12; Δχ2 = 514.74,
Δdf = 1, p < .001), pressure (χ2 = 903.55, df = 285, RMSEA = 0.10; Δχ2
= 279.24, Δdf = 1, p < .001), consultation (χ2 = 1033.35, df = 285,
RMSEA = 0.12; Δχ2 = 409.04, Δdf = 1, p < .001) significantly worsened
the fit of the model, as indicated by a significant chi-squared difference
test. These results indicate that the five influence tactics used in the
present study and leader political skill are distinct constructs; thus,
supporting the discriminant validity of the measures collected from
members.1
Furthermore, because of the nested nature of appraisal ratings (i.e.,
leaders provided performance ratings for more than one member), rat­
ings of member’s in-role performance and OCB were dependent on the
leader who rated their performance. The ICC(1) was calculated in order
to assess non-independence effects or leader-level effects on member’s
in-role performance and OCB. The ICC(1) value for in-role performance
was 0.46 and for OCB was 0.66, indicating that 46% of the variance in
in-role performance and 66% of variance in OCB are attributed to the
differences in the leaders providing these ratings. Additionally, the ICC
(2) value for member’s in-role performance was 0.97 and for OCB was
0.98; indicating that leader ratings of member’s in-role performance and
OCB were a reliable indicator of differences between groups (Bliese,
2000). Thus, in order to account for the lack of independence in leader
rating of member’s in-role performance and OCB, hypotheses testing
was performed using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM 6; Raudenbush,
Bryk, & Congdon, 2004).
4.1. Hypothesis testing
All the predictor and outcome variables were at level 1. All the hy­
pothesized interactions were at level 1. Following Hofmann and Gavin
(1998), predictors were grand mean centered before forming interaction
terms. We used full maximum likelihood estimation in HLM in order to
perform deviance tests for comparing the fit of different models. Devi­
ance can be defined as the lack of fit between the model and the data
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). HLM provides deviance statistics for each
model and a significant reduction in deviance upon addition of a pre­
dictor variable indicates an improvement in model fit (Snijders &
Bosker, 1994).
The results of hypothesis testing are reported in Table 2. In order to
test Hypotheses 1–5, we created six models (in-role performance,
models 1–3; OCB, models 4–6). We first entered the control variables
and then the predictor variables. As shown in Table 2, a deviance test
indicated significant improvement in model fit compared to the null
model for in-role performance (Model 2: Δχ2 = 25.09, df = 6, p < .01),
and for OCB (Model 5: Δχ2 = 19.69, df = 6, p < .01).
Finally, we added the interaction terms to the model. The hypothe­
sized interaction between inspirational appeals and leader political skill
was significant for in-role performance (Model 3; β = − 0.09, p < .05). To
examine the nature of this interaction (see Fig. 2), simple regression
lines were plotted representing the relationship between inspirational
appeals and member’s in-role performance separately at high (one
standard deviation above mean) and low (one standard deviation below
mean) levels of leader political skill (Aiken & West, 1991). Using pro­
cedures described in Preacher, Curran, and Bauer (2003), regions of
statistical significance for simple slopes of this relationship were
computed to find at what levels of the moderating variable (i.e., leader
1
As suggested by one of the reviewers, we also tested discriminant validity
using heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) method (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt,
2015). The HTMT ratio of all focal constructs collected from members ranged
from 0.07 to 0.68, which is well below the threshold value of 0.85. This pro­
vides strong support for discriminant validity.
A. Mahajan and A. Templer Journal of Business Research 133 (2021) 242–251

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.a
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1 Exchange 2.12 1.33 (.95)

2 Inspirational appeals 3.43 1.39 .43** (.86)
3 Legitimation 3.68 1.55 .34** .59** (.91)
4 Pressure 2.19 1.16 .02 − .12 .19** (.81)
5 Consultation 3.66 1.62 .35** .58** .36** − .20** (.92)
6 LPS 5.33 1.32 .27** .49** .25** − .46** .50** (.93)
7 In-role performance 5.83 0.84 .16* .18* .05 − .26** .33** .20** (.91)
8 OCB 5.24 0.93 .10 .26** .12 − .30** .33** .31** .67** (.90)
9 Genderb 1.33 0.47 .10 .07 .07 .01 .24** .04 .16* .18*
10 Age 44.84 11.59 − .10 − .02 .01 − .14 .03 .05 .14 .16* .16*
11 Tenure with organization 10.99 10.38 − .19** − .10 − .03 − .08 .02 − .03 .18* .14 .00 .51**
12 Tenure with leader 6.36 6.73 − .07 .01 .06 − .10 .10 .08 .26** .33** − .02 .37** .64**
13 Group size 6.36 4.31 − .15* − .07 − .03 − .01 − .24 − .00 − .23** − .12 − .13 − .01 − .02 − .02
a
Scale reliabilities (Cronbach’s alphas) appear on the diagonal.
b
1 = Female, 2 = Male.
**
p < .01.
*
p < .05.

Table 2
Results of Hierarchical Linear Modeling of Member’s In-role Performance and OCB.a
Variables In-Role Performance OCB

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

** ** ** ** **
Intercept 6.00 (0.28) 6.03 (0.25) 5.99 (0.24) 5.39 (0.36) 5.41 (0.34) 5.37** (0.37)
Control, Level 1
** ** ** **
Tenure with leader 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 †
(0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Tenure with organization 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) − 0.00 (0.01) − 0.00 (0.01) − 0.00 (0.01)
Age − 0.00 (0.00) − 0.01 (0.00) − 0.00 (0.00) − 0.00 (0.00) − 0.01 (0.00) − 0.00 (0.00)
Gender 0.12 (0.12) 0.08 (0.11) 0.08 (0.10) 0.13 (0.10) 0.10 (0.11) 0.10 (0.12)
Control, Level 2
Group size − 0.04* (0.02) − 0.03 (0.02) − 0.04 (0.02) − 0.04 (0.03) − 0.03 (0.03) − 0.04 (0.03)
Predictors, Level 1
Inspirational appeals 0.04 (0.06) 0.06 (0.04) 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05)
Consultation 0.08* (0.04) 0.09* (0.03) 0.07† (0.04) 0.10* (0.04)
Exchange 0.05 (0.04) 0.06† (0.04) 0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.04)
Legitimation − 0.04 (0.05) − 0.04 (0.03) 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.03)
Pressure − 0.12** (0.04) − 0.13** (0.04) − 0.10* (0.04) − 0.10* (0.05)
Leader political skill 0.01 (0.05) − 0.02 (0.05) − 0.00 (0.04) − 0.03 (0.05)
Interactions
Inspirational appeals × leader political skill − 0.09* (0.04) − 0.01 (0.04)
Consultation × leader political skill − 0.02 (0.03) − 0.05* (0.02)
Exchange × leader political skill − 0.03 (0.03) − 0.04 (0.03)
Legitimation × leader political skill 0.10** (0.02) 0.06** (0.02)
Pressure × leader political skill − 0.06* (0.03) − 0.05* (0.02)
χ2 172.71** 187.99** 209.72** 331.81** 326.34** 356.52**
Deviance 401.79 376.70 358.60 397.13 377.44 367.00
Decrease in Deviance 9.52†b 25.09**c 18.1**d 13.08*b 19.69**f 10.44†g
a
Unstandardized coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. n = 185 members (level 1), 52 leaders (level 2).
b
Decrease in deviance in comparison to the null model.
c
Decrease in deviance in comparison to model 1.
d
Decrease in deviance in comparison to model 2.
f
Decrease in deviance in comparison to model 4.
g
Decrease in deviance in comparison to model 5.
**
p < .01.
*
p < .05.
†
p < .10

political skill) – low, high, or both – the relationship between inspira­
tional appeal and member’s in-role performance was statistically sig­
nificant. Consistent with hypothesis 1a, the simple slope was significant
when leader political skill was low (ω = 0.17, p < .05), rather than high
(ω = − 0.05, ns). However, the hypothesized interaction between
inspirational appeals and leader political skill was not significant for
OCB (Model 6; β = − 0.01, ns). Thus, hypothesis 1a was supported but
hypothesis 1b was not supported.
The hypothesized interaction between consultation and leader po­
litical skill was not significant for member’s in-role performance (Model
3; β = − 0.02, ns) but was significant for OCB (Model 6; β = − 0.05, p <
.05). Using Preacher et al.’s (2003) approach, we probed the significant
interaction by plotting the simple slopes of this relationship (see Fig. 3).
As expected, the simple slope was significant when leader political skill
was low (ω = 0.16, p < .05), rather than high (ω = 0.02, ns). Thus,
hypothesis 2b was supported but hypothesis 2a was not supported.
The hypothesized interaction between exchange and leader political
skill was not significant for in-role performance (Model 3; β = − 0.03, ns)
and OCB (Model 6; β = − 0.04, ns). Thus, hypotheses 3a and 3b were not
supported.
Consistent with hypothesis 4a and 4b, the interaction between
legitimation and leader political skill was significant for in-role

247
A. Mahajan and A. Templer Journal of Business Research 133 (2021) 242–251

7 7
6.5 6.5
In-Role Performance

6 6
5.5 5.5

OCB
5 Low LPS 5 Low LPS
4.5 High LPS 4.5 High LPS
4 4
3.5 3.5
-1SD +1SD -1SD +1SD
Inspirational Appeals Legitimating Tactics

Fig. 2. Interaction effect of Inspirational Appeals with Leader Political Skill on Fig. 5. Interaction effect of Legitimating with Leader Political Skill on OCB.
In-Role Performance.

7
7
6.5

In-role Performance
6.5
6
6
5.5
5.5
OCB

5 Low LPS
5 Low LPS
4.5 High LPS
4.5 High LPS
4
4
3.5
3.5 -1SD +1SD
-1SD +1SD Pressure
Consultation
Fig. 6. Interaction effect of Pressure with Leader Political Skill on In-Role
Fig. 3. Interaction effect of Consultation with Leader Political Skill on OCB. Performance.

performance (Model 3; β = 0.10, p < .05) and OCB (Model 6; β = 0.06, p

< .05). In order to further probe these interactions, simple slopes of this 7
relationship were plotted (Figs. 4 and 5) and regions of statistical sig­ 6.5
nificance for these slopes were computed using Preacher et al.’s (2003)
6
approach. As predicted, for in-role performance, the simple slope of this
relationship was significant at both high (ω = 0.10, p < .05) and low 5.5
OCB

levels (ω = − 0.18, p < .05) of leader political skill. Similarly, for OCB, 5 Low LPS
the simple slope of this relationship was significant at both high (ω =
4.5 High LPS
0.08, p < .05) and low levels (ω = − 0.07, p < .05) of leader political
skill. Thus, hypotheses 4a and 4b were supported. 4
Hypotheses 5a and 5b were supported. The hypothesized interaction 3.5
between pressure tactics and leader political skill was significant for in- -1SD +1SD
role performance (Model 3; β = − 0.06, p < .05) and OCB (Model 6; β = Pressure
− 0.05, p < .05). Using Preacher et al.’s method (2003), this interaction
was probed by computing regions of statistical significance of simple Fig. 7. Interaction effect of Pressure with Leader Political Skill on OCB.
slopes of these relationships (Figs. 6 and 7). As predicted, the negative
relationship between pressure tactics and in-role performance was stronger at high (ω = − 0.21, p < .05) than at low level of leader political
skill (ω = − 0.05, ns). Likewise, the negative relationship between
pressure tactics and OCB was stronger at high (ω = − 0.17, p < .05) than
7 at low level of leader political skill (ω = − 0.04, ns).
6.5
In-role Performance

5. Discussion
6
5.5 This study examined the role of leader political skill as a moderator
5 Low LPS of the relationship between influence tactics and member’s in-role
performance, and OCB. We argued that member response to leader
4.5 High LPS
behavior is impacted by not only what types of influence tactics leaders
4 use on members but also how leaders use their political skills to execute
3.5 these influence tactics. We found that when influence tactics alone cue
-1SD +1SD members about leader’s interpersonal style, leader political skill does
Legitimating Tactics not bring any new information about a leader and is less likely to ac­
count for any incremental variance in member performance. This holds
Fig. 4. Interaction effect of Legitimating with Leader Political Skill on In-Role true for soft tactics such as inspirational appeals and consultations that
Performance.

248
A. Mahajan and A. Templer
signal members that leaders trust them and want to include them in the
decision-making process. Use of soft tactics by a politically skilled leader
only supplements (i.e., adds to) the existing information (i.e., interper­
sonal perceptiveness) that members hold about their leader. In the
present study, the relationship between inspirational appeals and
member’s in-role performance was positive when leader political skill
was low but not significant when leader political skill was high. Simi­
larly, the relationship between consultation and OCB was positive when
leader political skill was low but not significant when leader political
skill was high. Thus, soft tactics are effective in influencing members in
by itself and are less impacted by changes in leadership style.
Concomitantly, leaders with varying degrees of political savviness can
use these tactics effectively.
However, contrary to our predictions, we did not find the interactive
effect between inspirational appeals and leader political skill to hold for
OCB. Likewise, the interactive effect between consultation and leader
political skill did not hold for member’s in-role performance. This may
be because of the differences in these two tactics that carry different
messages for members - inspirational appeals include language that
appeals to member’s sense of humanitarianism, whereas consultation
tactics involve greater participation from members in the decision-
making process and thus builds member’s commitment to the deci­
sion. Thus, inspirational appeals might be more important in asking
members to demonstrate OCB, and consultation tactics might be more
useful in increasing member’s in-role performance.
We also found that legitimating tactics are less effective if used alone
but could be more effective if used along with leader political skill. In
fact, politically skilled leaders (unlike their unskilled counterparts) are
better suited to use these tactics as legitimation requires leaders to use
position power stemming from formal authority over members, and the
way in which such power is exercised affects member outcomes. We
found that when legitimation is used by leaders who lack political skill,
it accentuates the impersonal nature of these requests, whereas politi­
cally skilled leaders are more likely to present these requests in a posi­
tive way. However, our interaction hypothesis related to exchange
tactics was not supported – leader political skill did not have a signifi­
cant affect in increasing the effectiveness of exchange tactics. We sur­
mise that as exchange tactics involve an offer of future benefits,
conditional on member compliance with leader requests, they fall within
the purview of social exchange relationships as defined in an organi­
zational setting. These relationships are built on the norms of reciprocity
and based on the broader principles of social exchange theory (Blau,
1964; Gouldner, 1960). Thus, use of exchange tactics falls within the
boundaries of the leader-member exchange relationship, and might be
less affected by how leaders execute these tactics.
In addition, we found that hard tactics such as pressure are not
effective even when these are used by politically skilled leaders. In fact,
the negative effect of these tactics is intensified when politically skilled
leaders use such tactics. Because pressure tactics invoke an image of an
abusive and domineering leader, this information is in sharp contrast
with social astuteness and interpersonal sensitivity that characterize a
politically skilled leader. This inconsistency is attended more elabo­
rately leading members to doubt their own favorable perceptions about
their leader. In such situations, members are more likely to respond by
retaliating to pressure tactics used by a politically skilled leader.
5.1. Managerial implications
From a managerial perspective, this study helps in understanding
that member response to leader behavior depends not only on the spe­
cific influence tactics used by leaders but also on how these tactics are
executed. In order to effectively influence members, politically skilled
leaders need to carefully use intermediate influence tactics that need to
be complemented by their interpersonal style. By complementing,
politically skilled leaders are removing impersonal aspects of interme­
diate tactics. In this study, we found that intermediate tactics such as
249
Journal of Business Research 133 (2021) 242–251
legitimation can be effectively complemented by politically skilled
leaders. The effectiveness of these tactics varies considerably with leader
political skill - legitimating tactics were positively related to member
performance when leaders were politically skilled and negatively
related to member performance when leaders lacked political skills.
Thus, there is a considerable downside in using legitimating tactics
when leaders lack political skills.
On the other hand, organizations should encourage leaders to use
soft influence tactics as these tactics are fail-safe and less affected by
variability in leader political skill. In the present study, we found that
soft tactics such as inspirational appeals and consultation, by itself are
sufficient to effectively influence members in increasing their job per­
formance and OCB. Thus, there is no downside in using these tactics, and
these can be effectively pulled off even by leaders lacking political
savviness. Indeed, lack of political skill does not necessarily make a
leader ineffective. Such deficiencies can be compensated by using soft
influence tactics, such as inspirational appeals and consultation that
provide peripheral cues about leader competence and help members in
affirming faith in the ability of a leader.
This study also helps in understanding the boundaries for effectively
using leader political skill. We found that high levels of leader political
skill can be counterproductive in certain situations. For example, when
politically skilled leaders use pressure tactics, it can invoke in­
consistencies in leader behavior. Because politically skilled leaders have
high levels of interpersonal skill, use of pressure tactics casts their image
as domineering, which is in sharp contrast with a socially astute leader.
Thus, when politically skilled leaders (in comparison to their unskilled
counterparts) use pressure tactics, it can have a more negative impact on
member performance.
Given the variability associated with the interactive effects of leader
political skill and influence tactics on member performance, leaders
might want to self-evaluate their own political savviness. Knowing this
will help them better understand the types of influence tactics that they
can use and the ones that they should avoid. Organizations may also find
it useful to develop management training programs directed towards
increasing the understanding of social competencies among leaders, as
these will be crucial in helping them successfully navigate organiza­
tional politics.
In today’s digital age, these competencies are even more important
as members may be working remotely, providing less opportunity for
personal interactions with coworkers and their leaders. As a result,
members may not be able to understand non-verbal and emotional cues,
limiting their capacity to develop interpersonal skills. Leaders will need
to adapt to this changing landscape of virtual communication, and still
be able to master the art of fostering strong interpersonal relationships.
Politically skilled leaders are better suited to lead in the digital world as
they are more tuned in to social cues, can quickly adapt, and are better
able to cope with the stress of transitioning into the digital world.
5.2. Limitations and future research
This study has a few limitations. First, we used a six-item unidi­
mensional scale to measure political skill, which may be inadequate to
assess different facets of leader political skill. Future research may
benefit by assessing multiple dimensions of political skill and investi­
gating how those dimensions interact with various influence tactics to
impact member outcomes. Second, despite several strengths (e.g.,
multisource data and the time lag involved in collecting data pertaining
to the predictor and outcome variables), this study employed a survey
research design to collect the data. Therefore, causal inferences between
the predictor and outcome variables included in this study cannot be
made. Modeling the relationship between influence tactics and member
performance over time (for instance, over the tenure of a leader) might
further help in achieving a better understanding of the shift in the choice
of influence tactics leaders use and its relationship with member per­
formance. Similarly, member perspective on leader political skill can be
A. Mahajan and A. Templer
measured over time (for instance, over a period of organizational change
or economic uncertainty), examining how such change impacts member
outcomes.
6. Conclusion
This study found that leader political skill plays an important role in
moderating the relationship between influence tactics and member’s in-
role performance, and OCB. We found that leader political skill is
especially useful in complementing those influence tactics that by itself
are ineffective. This held true for legitimation as politically skilled
leaders were especially effective in using this tactic. On the other hand,
when leader political skill supplements influence tactics by merely
accentuating the positive aspects of these tactics, it did not contribute to
any increase in member performance. This held true for soft tactics such
as inspirational appeal and consultation. Thus, politically skilled leaders
as well as their unskilled counterparts can effectively use soft influence
tactics. We also found that hard tactics such as pressure are not effective
and should not be used by leaders; especially those who are politically
skilled leaders - the negative effect with member performance was more
pronounced when politically skilled leaders used pressure tactics. Thus,
it is important for leaders to understand that the success of their influ­
ence attempts depends not only on the types of influence tactics they use
but also on political skills of a leader, which shapes how these tactics are
executed.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Associate Editor Dr. Sanjay Kumar Singh
and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments in improving
this manuscript.
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Dr. Mahajan’s research interests are in the areas of cross-cultural management, leadership
and employee behavior. His work has appeared in such journals as the Journal of Inter­
national Business Studies, Journal of World Business, International Journal of Human Resource
Management, International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, and Journal of Managerial
Issues.
Dr. Templer’s research interests are in the areas of the evaluation of human resources,
reward systems and the social impact of technology–including tele-work and distance
learning. He has co-authored several books and has written over 50 papers which have
been published in journals such as Personnel Psychology, Personnel Management, Interna­
tional Journal of Management and the Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences.