Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Environmental Education
Environmental Education
Education Ferkany
Forthcoming in Routledge Companion to Environmental Ethics, Benjamin Hale and Andrew Light, eds.
“Environmental Education”
Matt Ferkany
Introduction
Environmental education is a term of art ordinarily intended to refer to any education that is in,
about, or for the environment in some way (Lucas 1980). Outdoor or place‐based education programs
are examples of environmental education in the first intended sense, ecology or environmental studies
examples of the second, and environmental advocacy or public campaigning of the third. The distinction
between these is soft. Any instance of environmental education can be in, about, or for the environment
all at once and any education intended to be merely in or about the environment can have incidental
pro‐environment advocacy effects (i.e. an agriculture student can become more pro‐environment just
by taking a field ecology course). Because environmental education in any of the intended senses can
take place informally or as part of formal schooling, environmental education does not refer exclusively
to institutionalized primary, secondary, or post‐secondary schooling. A large proportion of
environmental education in the United States takes place at nature centers, parks and the like.
Messages about the environment that individuals (especially developing youth) receive in the public
space—in the media, from friends and family, or from government or businesses—can also educate
them.
Most ethical controversy about environmental education concerns education for the
environment in formal settings, public schools especially. Two big issues are perennial favorites:
• The aims problem: What ideally is the purpose of environmental education? What should
environmental educators aim to teach? Should they aim to impart knowledge and
understanding in natural or environmental sciences, to strengthen students’ pro‐
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environment values, attitudes or behaviors, or to foster environmental decision‐making
capacity?
• The legitimacy problem: How, if at all, can environmental education be legitimate insofar as
it does or is intended to strengthen students’ pro‐environment values, attitudes, behaviors
or relationships (pro‐EVABRs)? Do environmental educators have the right to influence
students in this way or are they obligated to avoid pro‐environment advocacy in their
teaching?
One under‐researched issue concerns whether thinking philosophically about the ethics of
environmental education can yield novel insights for environmental philosophy and ethics more
generally. This entry focuses on the aims and legitimacy problems and closes with some thoughts on this
and on the practice of environmental education.
The Aims Problem
As any education that is in, about, or for the environment in some way, environmental
education can have many different purposes. Traditional classroom or lab‐based education in the
natural sciences, as well as science education in the field (or other form of outdoor education) are forms
of environmental education. Nominally, they aim to impart scientific knowledge and understanding.
“Facts and information” campaigns (e.g. as carried out by special interest groups, like a hunting and
fishing club circulating information about the ecological benefits of a strong base of hunters) often share
this aim while taking a completely different form and seeking to influence students’ EVABRs. As a
component of formal schooling however, “environmental education” traditionally refers to education
that is all of in, about and for the environment involving some combination of the following: teaching
some basic concepts of ecology or ecocentric ethics emphasizing notions of ecological stability and the
interconnectedness and intrinsic value of all life, e.g. Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic (1949); imparting facts,
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knowledge and information about the impact of human activities on ecosystems, such as species
extinction rates; and local or outdoor experiences intended to inculcate attachment to particular places
or broad appreciation and love of nature (Carson 1965; Hungerford & Volk 1990; Leopold 1949: 214;
Van Matre 1990).
Environmental education in this traditional sense is widely regarded as an activist view of its
purposes and methods (Jickling & Spork 1998; Johnson & Mappin 2005). It aims to strengthen the
student’s pro‐EVABRs and is sometimes criticized as constituting more a kind of moral training than
education (Jickling & Spork 1998). I return to this criticism below, but it is worth first noting that the
activist ideal is a broad category that can take many different forms depending upon the ethics,
epistemic focus, and experiential activities deployed.
In addition to the traditional ecocentrist approach just outlined, for example, canonical versions
of education for sustainable development (ESD), such as the United Nations Decade of Education for
Sustainable Development, broaden the ethical focus to include influencing student EVABRs relevant to
the goals of sustainable development, or (by one common definition) meeting the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (UNESCO n.d.). The
epistemic focus is broadened to include things like critical thinking and systems thinking. Forms of
service learning (like volunteering with a state PIRG) or building and maintaining an aquaponic food
production system might be common experiential features of ESD curricula. Other more recent ideals
like ecojustice education merge the traditional ecocentrist aims and curriculum to a concern for
environmental, food or gender justice via an ecofeminist social analysis, i.e. the idea that systems of
2011). The ecojustice educator’s epistemic focus shifts to include critical social theory and skepticism of
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science or science‐driven or technocratic environmental decision‐making. The site of her experiential
curriculum broadens to include places like urban farmer’s markets and school gardens.
Whatever particular form they may take, activist ideals have received a lot of criticism. As
previously mentioned, one important objection claims that they are forms of moral training more so
than teaching or education, which involves imparting knowledge, skills and understanding. This criticism
comes in two varieties. One is simply that, to the extent that they are indoctrinating, activist approaches
fail to respect the autonomy of students to make up their own minds and thus lack legitimacy (Bell 2004;
Jickling 2003; Mappin & Johnson 2005; Schinkel 2009). Teaching that is intentionally designed to prevent
students from considering the weaknesses of a teacher’s favored view or from considering alternatives
to it can be indoctrinating in this way.
A related but different worry focuses on the consequences of advocacy for students’ ability to
form well‐reasoned views of their own. By advocating for a particular ethical perspective, advocacy
approaches may threaten to short‐circuit critical questioning of the favored ethical perspectives being
advanced, or worse, undermine acquisition of the critical capacities students need in order to become
independent critical thinkers in the world outside of the classroom. Students will eventually become
citizens who will have to decide for themselves what to believe about potentially very different
problems from those they encountered in school. From anti‐environment special interests, they will
encounter persuasive‐looking arguments deploying rhetorical strategies like proof surrogate, scare
tactics, red herring and the like. If they are unprepared to detect the error in these, what reason is there
to expect that they will form and firmly adhere to reasoned environmental perspectives in the face of
the “strongly represented but weakly supported” anti‐environment perspectives, such as those
espoused by organized climate change denial (Palmer 2006: 10)? If little, activist environmental
educators are committed to methods that are ineffective means to achieving their own purposes.
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Another related problem is that available empirical evidence suggests that “facts and
information” approaches to influencing people’s EVABRs are ineffective anyway (Heberlein 2012). The
attitudes people have about the environment have a complex structure making them sometimes weak
and easy to change, not always for the better, and at other times recalcitrant and almost impossible to
change. Robust anti‐environment attitudes, on the other hand, are often easily whipped up when
particular pro‐environment policies can be linked to things people deeply oppose. For example, very few
people have sufficient connection to obscure wild species—like the humpback chub (a species of
freshwater fish native to the Colorado river system and endangered by habitat loss from dam
construction)—to form particularly robust pro‐attitudes toward them, but many people strongly believe
that economic growth is good and “big government” is bad. Opponents of efforts to preserve the
humpback chub can thus easily solicit anti‐preservation sentiment by linking preservation to economic
stagnation and big‐government, even while admitting that preservation is the morally best policy. But
even supposing that traditional environmental educators can succeed in fostering robust pro‐
environment attitudes, other research indicates that the link between pro‐environment attitudes and
behaviors (or pro‐anything attitudes and behaviors) is weak or highly susceptible to the influence of
numerous factors (e.g. the availability of local supports like bike lanes, recycling centers) beyond the
educator’s control (Kollmuss & Agyeman 2002).
A last criticism applies to traditional ecocentrist environmental education specifically. By some
analyses, environmental issues, such as climate change, are crucially collective action problems that
cannot be (easily) solved simply through individual behavior change. In making a priority of influencing
individual students’ environmental attitudes and behaviors, traditional approaches threaten to miss this
point (Jickling & Wals 2013).
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From here it is natural to move toward either a science literacy or environmental civics ideal of
environmental education’s purposes and methods. Science literacy is the view that scientific knowledge
and understanding (of ecology, environmental science or the human‐environment relationship) should
be the environmental educator’s primary focus (Jickling & Spork 1998; Mappin & Johnson 2005; NRC
2012). Environmental civics is the view that environmental educators should focus on building citizens’
capacity to participate in the environmental decision‐making of a democratic society (Curren 2010;
Krasny & Bonney 2005). These views have different advantages, but seem to share the advantage that
they are not so obviously vulnerable to the legitimacy problem. Science literacy and environmental civics
approaches make a priority of imparting scientific understanding or civic decision‐making capacity, and
so appear not to threaten the student’s right or capacity to make up her own mind about environmental
ethics.
Advocates of science literacy generally assume that the natural sciences are a trustworthy
source of crucial environmental knowledge and understanding. They quite rightly point out that
ecologists no longer regard ecosystems as essentially unified, stable, organism‐like systems and that the
notions of ecological stability, succession, or health and the like—often at the center of activist
approaches—are now more at home in traditional knowledge systems or various moral or spiritual
outlooks (Kolasa & Pickett 2005). In the American context, there is also evidence that citizens across
widely different cultural groups already care a great deal about the environment, but also are relatively
ignorant of important basic insights in environmental sciences (Kempton et al. 1996). They are
consequently prone to draw erroneous conclusions about what sorts of policies will realize their
environmental values. For example, many people confuse the science of climate change and
atmospheric ozone and mistakenly believe that ozone depletion is a significant cause of global warming
(Leiserowitz & Smith 2010: 3). If so, correcting citizens’ scientific misunderstandings would seem to be
the most pressing educational priority.
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Advocates of environmental civics, on the other hand, argue that scientific knowledge and
understanding are not sufficient for wise, just or fair environmental decision‐making. These kinds of
decisions also require the moral and civic forms of knowledge and understanding imparted by the social
sciences and humanities. One problem is that even highly science literate citizens will have limited
capacity to assess scientific information for themselves and will have to make decisions based on
scientific testimony (Anderson 2011). A crucial but potentially achievable skill for them is the ability to
correctly discern which sources of scientific information are credible and which are not. But setting even
that aside, environmental decisions are ultimately practical, or decisions about what we should do,
which cannot be made without taking a position on questions of values, or what’s right, good,
worthwhile, just and the like (Des Jardins 2005). Scientific information is certainly important to doing
this well; if we do not know the likely consequences of the various courses of action open to us, we
cannot make an informed decision about which ones are ethically preferable. It is helpful to know, for
example, that option A involves an X% risk of exposure to some toxin, Y, whereas option B involves a Z%.
But once this information is in we still must decide which level of risk would be tolerable, best, right,
good, fair, tolerable, just and the like. Does one of these options create undue risk for one community
compared to another, or more needed wealth than the other, or involve any unacceptable costs to
nonhuman species? The scientific information is ultimately factual information, or information about
what is the case, and does not tell us how we should weigh these other considerations in our decision
about what should be the case, i.e. what we ought to do. The judgments of scientists on these
dimensions of environmental matters are not privileged above the judgments of ordinary well‐informed,
rational citizens. For these sorts of reasons environmental problems are widely believed to fall into a
class of practical problems particularly ill‐suited for technocratic resolution and thus require decision‐
makers having civic decision‐making capacities.
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The various ideals of environmental education’s aims are not mutually exclusive and many
(perhaps most) scholars agree that all of these aims are important. What they disagree about is the
relative priority of the different goals. This disagreement is not trivial. Different curricula and
pedagogical methods are suited to the different goals. Endorsing the primacy of one aim over another
entails endorsing a potentially very contentious view of the structure and place of environmental
education. The natural and some social sciences, not the arts and humanities, will be the proper place
for environmental education if science literacy is the most important goal, but the arts and humanities
will be at least as important if the aim is to instill pro‐EVBARs. On the other hand, an infusion approach
(in which environmental content is spread throughout the curriculum) might be most appropriate if
environmental civics is the highest priority.
For all its problems, many lines of defense are open to advocates of activism. The complexity of
attitudes and the attitude‐behavior link is certainly one explanation of why traditional environmental
education has failed to generate the green revolution its advocates hoped for. But another might be
that traditional environmental education has been only weakly deployed. The charge that advocacy is
indoctrinating is also dubious if so. Indoctrination generally seems to presuppose a mass effort (whether
coordinated or uncoordinated) that imparts ignorance rather than knowledge and understanding of new
ways of thinking (Taylor 2012). Against a backdrop in which a majority of environmental education fails
to interrogate an environmentally destructive or unjust status quo, activist efforts might be precisely
what civic environmental progress requires.
The criticism that imparting facts and information is ineffective is also a straw man inasmuch as
traditional ecocentrist environmental education in formal settings is deeper and involves imparting skill,
knowledge, and understanding, e.g. of ecological science or ethical reasoning. In addition, the Kempton
et al evidence that Americans generally place high value on the environment is dated and precedes
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some of the more radical steps the political right has taken against environmental causes in the past 15
or so years (Bailey 1996). By some measures, pro‐environment attitudes on the whole have declined
since 1990 and more recent studies find wide variation in American’s environmental attitudes that track
differences in political orientation, gender, education, race and the like (Franzen & Vogl 2013; McCright
& Dunlap 2011). One demographic—conservative white males—accounts for a significant proportion of
all American climate change deniers (McCright & Dunlap 2011). Worse, McCright and Dunlap also found
that the most fervent deniers report the highest levels of self‐reported understanding of the basic
science of climate change, i.e. the more climate change deniers think they know about climate science,
the more they fervently they deny the climate change problem. This finding, according to McCright and
Dunlap, is probably the result of the worst deniers reporting to know more than they actually do about
climate change (2011). But the finding jibes with other evidence that people’s perceptions of climate
change risk are shaped as much or more by “cultural cognition,” or the extent to which they perceive
that action on climate change threatens their worldview, not their understanding of climate science
(Kahan et al. 2011; McCright & Dunlap 2011). Apparently a majority of people most concerned about
climate change do understand its basic science, while very few of those who are dismissive or
unconcerned about it do (Leiserowitz & Smith 2010). Still, Americans are sharply divided about climate
change by political orientation (Pew Research Center 2014) and general science literacy does not predict
greater concern and may even negatively correlate with it among those who self‐identify with more
conservative ideological orientations (Kahan et al 2012). It is open to advocacy environmental educators
to argue that, while science literacy may be absolutely crucial to making good environmental decisions,
without sound environmental values, science literacy is either inaccessible or insufficient for sound
environmental decision‐making. If so, values and attitudes education still matter a great deal.
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The Legitimacy Problem
That it aims to strengthen students’ pro‐EVABRs—that it is education for the environment—is
the central reason why some question activism’s legitimacy. Setting aside issues of efficacy (i.e. whether
activism produces competent and active environmental citizens), the putative wrong is a wrong of
disrespect for student freedom. Students as (prospective) citizens have a fundamental right to make up
their own minds about ethical matters. Activist environmental education allegedly violates this right by
either tilting the curriculum more strongly toward one (or a limited range) of environmental
perspectives over others or taking debate about (certain views of) the value of the environment off the
table altogether, as well as using techniques that appeal to our desires and emotions, such as outdoor
experiential or place‐based learning.
Because science literacy and environmental civics do not aim to (intentionally) strengthen
student’s pro‐EVABRs—they do not constitute forms of education for the environment—they do not
seem to threaten this right, at least not in the same way or degree. Insofar as these approaches impart
the kinds of critical knowledge and skills individuals need in order to make up their own minds, they
actually support students’ autonomy, or capacity for individual self‐governance. This however is
certainly not to say that they are uncontroversial, educate students for nothing in particular, or involve
no moral training. Autonomy, and critical thinking more broadly, are controversial aims of education,
preparation for which involves training in certain skills and moral and intellectual virtues, such as
honesty, integrity and a kind of humility (Brighouse 1998; Siegel 1988). That there is an element of
moral training here has been part of the canon of moral education since Aristotle, for whom the
purpose of the study of ethics was not finally so that we could learn about the good, but to be good
(1985). According to Aristotle, learning via habituation has to precede learning via teaching and
reasoning because appeals to reason cannot move us the way that they move the virtuous unless we
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first come to see things as the virtuous see them. For example, unless I see that and why friendship is a
good, I cannot be moved by mere appeals to my reason to treat my friend as another self. Nowadays we
also understand that the capacity for moral cognition develops over time along certain broad pathways
such that certain kinds of moral reasoning are simply inaccessible to those in earlier stages of
development (Gibbs 2010). But Aristotle’s point applies even to fully developed moral agents, who are
not necessarily thereby virtuous but only capable of being virtuous. A fully developed moral agent can
fail to see things as the virtuous see them and be in need of this training if he is to become fully good.
The need for training in science literacy and environmental civics can be brought out by
revisiting the putative education/training contrast through one prominent account of educational versus
noneducational activities. Among the most famous of these is R.S. Peters’s education as initiation,
according to which educational activities initiate the learner into the practices of inquiry in worthwhile
fields of study, particularly those important to thinking critically about fundamental ethical questions
(Peters 1964). Education using this model is crucially as much or more about imparting the skills, values
and attitudes of scholars in knowledge disciplines, such as critical thinking, open‐mindedness and a love
of knowledge, as about imparting the received knowledge of those disciplines. This idea is similar to the
central thrust of environmental civics education. But putting it this way reveals the similarity between
traditional ecocentrist education and environmental civics, or even science literacy insofar as it aims to
enable people to be able to think like scientists (NRC 2012). The latter approaches certainly do not aim
simply to inculcate students unthinkingly into some worldview or set of desired behaviors. But neither
can they render them scientifically or civically literate without initiating them into the attitudes, values
and behaviors of practitioners of those activities. The contrast between education and training is thus a
red herring; even scholarly education involves a kind of moral training.
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Notably scholarly aims of education are hardly uncontroversial these days. Some conservatives
in the U.S. view academic science, humanistic scholarship, and critical thinking generally as just another
religion or ideology opposed to their own faith (Stolzenberg 1993). On the other hand, many liberal
educational researchers maintain that the focal purpose of education is advancing social justice, not
imparting knowledge and understanding (Schiro 2012). This controversy does not by itself delegitimize
teaching these subjects. But it does show that education inevitably has a moral dimension and involves
taking a stance on fundamental questions of value. The question educators must answer is not whether
to teach values or not, but which values they may legitimately teach and why.
Science literacy and environmental civics are putatively legitimate, whereas any form of activism
is not, because they support the autonomy of individuals to make up their own minds. This value is the
underlying source of the legitimacy problem. One line of defense for advocates of activism then is to
reject this value, or liberal political morality generally. Some do so, advancing one or another of a few
common arguments against liberalism. One argument targeting liberal neutrality (i.e. the idea that
liberal governments should not intentionally favor some ways of life over others on grounds of their
superiority) is that environmental education embodies controversial ideals about the best ways of life
(e.g. recreation in nature is good for you, or nature is sacred). Since neutrality therefore forbids liberal
governments to take a position on such ideals, it forbids them to take a position on environmental
education. But environmental education is urgently needed (so the argument goes), so we should
abandon liberal democracy for a “green” communitarian one in which citizens share the political goal of
living environmentally (Postma 2006). Another argument is that because future generations cannot
participate in mutually self‐interested bargaining in setting the terms for social cooperation,
contractarian ideals of justice like those of Hobbes, Locke or John Rawls cannot justify principles of
intergenerational justice, or principles requiring us to pass a liveable planet on to future generations
(Postma 2002). A third is that liberal democracies are committed to ideals at the root of contemporary
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environmental problems (Martusewicz et al. 2011, chap.2). These include that individuals are
“essentially self‐interested creatures,” that “private property and the accumulation of resources are…a
primary right,” and that liberal democracy involves a “hierarchized way of thinking” leading to a
“mindset where various aspects of the natural world [are] defined not as an interdependent set of
relationships among living things, but rather as so many commodities to be harvested and used in the
pursuit of both imperial and individual profit” (2011: p.49).
Defenses of activism of these sorts have certain limitations. Insofar as being educated partly
consists in a capacity to make up one’s own mind, being educated and being (at least potentially)
autonomous are linked. In addition, autonomy in this sense is perhaps one of the more widely valued
and least controversial freedoms. While popularity is not by itself legitimating, the burden of proof
seems to lie with critics rather than advocates of the liberal legitimacy constraints designed to protect
that freedom in education. If so, it is difficult to see how any critique of these constraints can succeed
without recognizing the importance of the autonomy aim in some sense. But it is difficult to see what
sense this could be other than the liberal one in which individuals have a fundamental interest and right
in the freedom to make up their own minds, a right that may not in general be subordinated in the
service of collective ends (Rawls 2001: 57). This paradigm sense of liberal freedom is nowhere to be
found in Martusewicz and company’s description of liberal democracy and their critique of it is
consequently straw man. In addition, no undue hierarchical thinking has any place in paradigmatic
Twentieth‐Century articulations of liberalism, such as Rawls’s liberal egalitarianism. Neither does the
idea that individuals are egoistic and incapable of recognizing a common good, nor that property and
accumulation of resources is a fundamental right. These ideas may characterize neoliberalism, but that
is an altogether different animal from liberal egalitarianism.
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Critiques from neutrality and future generations may also be moot in defense of advocacy
(Ferkany & Whyte 2013). Both may be moot partly because liberal approaches to justice need not be
neutralist or contractarian. The “perfectionist” and utilitarian liberalism of John Stuart Mill is neither
(1978). The neutrality argument is moot because neutrality is compatible with state‐mandated
environmental education. The neutrality principle only forbids liberals to intentionally oppose any
permissible way of life from condemnation of that way of life qua way of life, e.g. from condemnation of
whaling ways of life because they are whaling ways. If critics are right that environmental education is
urgently needed, anti‐environment ways of life may no longer be permitted (Michael 2000). But even if
they are, liberals are free to intentionally oppose them on grounds that they violate the rights of others,
such as future generations, or otherwise threaten the survival of liberal institutions; opposition on these
grounds can be silent about the value of anti‐environment ways of life for those who value them, and no
disrespect is shown to those who value them.
Rejecting liberalism may also be unnecessary because activist environmental education, at least
in some forms, may be compatible with support for student autonomy after all. Activist environmental
education (as defined here) involves some intention to persuade students to come to see the
environment as having value in some sense, to endorse some pro‐environment outlook or other, and to
make better environmental lifestyle choices. Because such learning involves emotional and behavioral
as much as cognitive change, strategic activist educators will also use methods that appeal to more than
their students’ reason. These aims and techniques certainly steer students away from positions teachers
perceive to be anti‐environment. But they also leave considerable room for variation in precisely how
much space is also left for open, critical discussion and questioning (Ferkany & Whyte 2013). If so, there
is no obvious reason why educators cannot be both ardent advocates of independent student critical
thinking, of autonomy, and of certain controversial positions in environmental ethics. The latter may
influence the beliefs students come to adopt, but it is not clear that influenced beliefs cannot be
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autonomously adopted; on a common account, if on due reflection we come to endorse any belief—
influenced or not—then we endorse it autonomously (Dworkin 1988; Frankfurt 1988). The threat to our
autonomy of any influence on our beliefs may also depend quite a bit on the content of the belief,
whether it is false or in some way discourages being autonomous, and also on the spirit in which we are
influenced to adopt it, e.g. whether dogmatically or by means of careful rational persuasion. On certain
plausible assumptions, it may even be that strategies supporting student autonomy are very closely
aligned with those for soliciting pro‐EVABRs, such as outdoor experiential learning, selective reading
lists, or more favorably grading pro‐environment student work. Suppose, for example, that the student’s
broader social world provides relatively little exposure to a diversity of conflicting, but newer ways of
thinking in environmental ethics, alongside correspondingly little opportunity to think critically about
the environmental status quo. In that context, students will quite naturally learn the environmental
status quo’s system of values, and few or no alternatives, unless teachers complement that learning by
exposing them to alternative systems and enabling them to understand their underlying rationale. If so,
just teaching in ways that enable students to access and understand new ways of thinking may radicalize
their EVABRs, while necessarily enhancing their capacity to make up their own minds about
environmental matters. In general, because autonomy involves choice from among a range of worthy
options upon which one has been able to reflect, it is not obvious that activist environmental educators
cannot both respect and support the autonomy of their students and plump in certain ways for what
they take to be more pro‐environment positions.
This defense has some limitations, too. One is that it is not available to activist educators with
certain radical agendas. Because it requires advocacy of open, critical inquiry, it is incompatible with
efforts to inculcate very specific pro‐environment ideologies rather than a more generalized pro‐
environment mindset, one open to interpretation and a range of differences of opinion. It is also
incompatible with approaches in which students are persuaded primarily by non‐rational means to
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adopt very specific or false beliefs, e.g. by taking critical debate about them entirely off the table. While
it is quite possible to autonomously adopt false beliefs, persuading another to adopt false beliefs by
non‐rational means is paradigmatically manipulative. These features might also entail that traditional
ecocentrist environmental education (e.g. Van Matre’s earth education) is illegitimate insofar as the
ideas of ecological interdependence and stability usually at the heart of it are quite specific and no
longer supported in ecological science (Kolasa & Pickett 2005). For many, this might constitute a
reductio ad absurdum of the view. More broadly the defense is also incompatible with neo‐Nietzschean
or constructivist approaches in which the very ideas of truth, knowledge, or justification—the essential
components of the practice of rational persuasion—are questioned; outside of the possibility of this
practice, it is difficult to make sense of the difference between manipulative and non‐manipulative
teaching methods, or cognitive and non‐cognitive methods generally. If so, this rational persuasion
defense may fail to constitute a defense of activism at all insofar as activism necessarily involves a
preference for non‐cognitive methods of persuasion.
If the rational persuasion defense is sound, however, some forms of activist environmental
education can go beyond imparting scientific knowledge and understanding or environmental decision‐
making capacity while remaining of a kind with them. Advocacy approaches consistent with the use of
rational persuasion and critical thinking thereby have more in common with science literacy and
environmental civics than is ordinarily recognized. To that extent they share the features that have led
scholars to regard science literacy and environmental civics as legitimate forms of environmental
education.
Conclusion
Because it has traditionally aimed to strengthen pro‐EVABRs, developments in environmental
education have mostly tracked developments in environmental ethics or politics. If environmental ethics
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has historically been the handmaiden of the environmental movement, environmental education has
been the handmaiden of environmental ethics. What novel insights for environmental ethics, if any,
might come from philosophical study of the ethics of environmental education is an under‐researched
question. Kevin de LaPlante has proposed that broadening the focus of environmental philosophy
teaching and research (from a focus on ethics to a focus on “the difference environment makes in
understanding some phenomenon”) both helps solve the legitimacy problem and usefully opens new
horizons for scholarly inquiry and interdisciplinary work (2006: 52). Matthew Stitcher has suggested a
principle for the ethical use of animals from considering appropriate limits to their use in undergraduate
environmental education (2012).
Speculatively however, this review suggests that philosophical investigation of the ethics of
environmental education can yield novel insights for two major recent debates in environmental ethics.
The first concerns whether the concept of intrinsic value—the idea that some things, potentially
including nonhumans, have, or are worth regarding as having, value in themselves—is especially
important for environmental ethics. This review suggests that it is and is not. It is insofar as serious
engagement with this idea can advance the knowledge, understanding and autonomy of those
previously unfamiliar with it, and also contribute to a general civic willingness to interrogate the
environmental status quo. It is not (or perhaps is again, in a different way) insofar as citizens of a liberal
democracy can reasonably disagree on whether or what in the environment has intrinsic value, such
that appeal to intrinsic value is unlikely ever to legitimize the use of coercion in environmental politics.
A second recent debate concerns the merits of thinking about environmental ethics in terms of
the virtues instead of (or in addition to) general principles. Insofar as moral agency and intellectual
excellence both grow along Aristotelian lines, involving various sorts of habituation and values training,
this review suggests that environmental virtue ethicists are on to something in moving beyond principles
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to think about the qualities of environmentally good persons and citizens. If fully realized environmental
agency involves suites of integrated habits of head, heart and action, a deeper understanding of the
moral and intellectual character virtues embodying these is essential to becoming ethical environmental
agents ourselves, and helping others to become such agents.
These ideas are speculative, however. Much more work needs to be done to establish what
insights for environmental ethics might be derived from philosophical study of the ethics of
environmental education.
The discussion of this entry does suggest a few conclusions concerning the practice of
environmental education, however. From respect for student autonomy—the primary limit on how far
teacher’s can go in influencing students’ EVABRs—teachers should enable students to critically reflect
on the values they are being taught. Teachers should avoid disclosing their own ethical opinions where
this will pressure students inappropriately and disclose when students might otherwise fail to note
alternative perspectives. They should also teach the fundamental critical thinking and media literacy
skills needed to detect fallacious arguments or mass campaigns of environmental misinformation.
However, all education influences students’ values on some level and it is legitimate, within
certain limits, for environmental educators to influence students’ EVABRs. Experiences designed to do
this, such as outdoor wilderness experiences or hydroponic food production, all may be legitimate ways
of teaching, e.g., the values of ecocentrism or sustainability. Insofar as some students’ values also impair
their literacy of basic environmental science or their ability to participate in democratic environmental
decision‐making, experiences giving students access to alternative value perspectives are not only
legitimate, but important components of a complete environmental education. In contexts where anti‐
environment and anti‐reason forces are increasingly aligned, the distance between activist, science
literacy and environmental civics forms of environmental education shrinks.1
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Word count: 5819
Notes
1
The author wishes to thank Ian Werkheiser, Zach Piso, Hannah Miller, Allison Freed, and Matthew Deroo for
helpful discussion of an earlier draft of this chapter.
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Related Topics
Ecocentrism, Environmental Citizenship, Liberalism, Environmental Virtue Ethics, Sustainable
Development, Pragmatism
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