ATTY.
BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
RULE 128: GENERAL PROVISIONS
G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000
ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. MENDOZA,
Facts: Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-
year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since
then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually
started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On
July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law, as amended. Petitioner stated his qualifications and lack of the
disqualifications. During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications
and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. The trial court
granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State,
however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by
which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former place of residence;
(3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his
entire stay in the Philippines; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and
his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared and (5) failed to
support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for
naturalization filed by petitioner, the income tax returns allegedly filed by
petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support
himself and his family. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage
contract and a Joint-Affidavit executed by petitioner and his wife.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application
for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the
State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and
brought up for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE: WON the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had
merely been annexed by the State not having been presented and formally
offered as evidence are considered mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any
evidentiary value,"
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
HELD: Petitioner’s contention is that the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to
note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that —
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (CELINO)
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34)
now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case
involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and
convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more
practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later
on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally
offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to
object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right
to procedural due process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to
afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner
cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the
documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included
his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.
GR 107383, 20 February 1996
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Dr. Alfredo
Martin. Sometime March 26, 1962, Cecilia entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband’s
clinic and took 157 documents belonging to private respondent, [i.e. greeting
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, passport, and photographs], of Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
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case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.
Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The
law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL
YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
ISSUE: WON the circumstantial evidence may be resorted to.
HELD: YES. The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light
of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented
by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of
the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be
that of appellant’s gene type.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A
person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a
person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his
saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue,
and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in
human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective
means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect,
where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation,
DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.
It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime
committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the
acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in
every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or
eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.
Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin
tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the
crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also
be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault.Forensic DNA evidence is
helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a
victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be
compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter
alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they
would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific
techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
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Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to
the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR
analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and
molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s
vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as
being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and
his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim,
Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their
frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter
from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was
seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near
the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty
white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of
the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30
p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband
of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty
white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba
was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel
Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of
blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the
house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes
scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the
victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in
the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J"
and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13)
Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently
apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused,
to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime.
To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites
must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood
sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his
right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12
and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion,
but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
NENALAZALITA TATING, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA,
represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter,
herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied
in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.
Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena.
She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate
taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988. However, the
land remained in possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had
actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and
Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to
enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property. She wants the title
in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.
Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo,
Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by
herein petitioner.
Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are
demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property
as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved
futile.
Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the
RTC against Nena praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Daniela in her favor.
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In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the
execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received
the letter of her uncle, Carlos. She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant.
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its
Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC.
Nena’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, herein petition
for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA "has decided the instant case
without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this
Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which
it has affirmed, is not supported by and is even against the evidence on record."
ISSUE: WON THE RTC AND CA ERRED IN GIVING PROBATIVE WEIGHT ON
DANIELA’S SWORN STATEMENT
YES. The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and
Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be
bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement
(relatively simulated). The primary consideration in determining the true nature of
a contract is the intention of the parties. Such intention is determined from the
express terms of their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts.
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in
proving their allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true
intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela dated December
28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private
respondents’ evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great
probative weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but
its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may
thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this
reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. The Court finds that
both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as
she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on
Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale
between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust
relationship was created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove
their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property
when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil
cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the defendant. Aside from Daniela’s sworn
statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence
to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that
Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with
petitioner.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute
Sale did not really reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained
silent until her death; she never told any of her relatives regarding her actual
purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make known her true
intentions through the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the
existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her declaration
therein that she is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never
took any concrete step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her
death more than ten years later.
As to Daniela’s affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which
confirmed the validity of the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no
probative value, as the sworn statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay.
Naturally, private respondents were not able to cross-examine the deceased-
affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.
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However, even if Daniela’s affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact
remains that private respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing
evidence beyond mere preponderance of evidence that the contract of sale
between Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The legal presumption is in favor
of the validity of contracts and the party who impugns its regularity has the burden
of proving its simulation. Since private respondents failed to discharge the burden
of proving their allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela
was simulated, the presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969
Deed of Absolute Sale stands.
People of the Philippines vs. Rodrigo Salafranca
G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that
meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent
jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res
gestae, or both.
FACTS: Past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan
Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran
away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B.
Estaño in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General
Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it
was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the
hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of
Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13
years, who was in the complex at the time.
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long
period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on
April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca for murder.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC, citing the
dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant, and
Salafranca’s positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza. It stressed that
Salafranca’s denial and his alibi of being in his home during the incident did not
overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained flight after the
stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly
indicative of his guilt.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether the ante-mortem declaration of Bolanon meets the conditions of
admissibility either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both
HELD: YES.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur,
namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is
made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the
declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a
criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem
statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At
the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having
sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño, was then
experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital
emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours
after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief
in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or
from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made
in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been
competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the
dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which
Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae
concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon
was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was
then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no
time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance
about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction
to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified
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Salafranca as the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as “those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act.” In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after
the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements
were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to
be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives
any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
G.R. No. 128538. February 28, 2001
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE
INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO HALILI
Facts: SCC Chemicals Corporation obtained a loan from State Investment House
Inc., (SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. To secure the payment of the loan,
Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive
Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation
on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent
demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no
payment was made.
SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment
against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the RTC Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHIs lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that
the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void,
and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said
witness was postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance
of either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time,
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the
trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the
case was deemed submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness
presented by SIHI to prove its claim was insufficient as the competency of the
witness was not established and there was no showing that he had personal
knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof was shown of
the genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as
evidence and that these signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence
by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed out that the original copies of the documents were
not presented in court.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment appealed from. SCC filed its motion for
reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that
private respondent SIHI had proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence
Held: Petitioners arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.
We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times
on scheduled hearing dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those
scheduled hearing dates, petitioner was supposed to cross-examine the lone
witness offered by SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now charges the appellate
court with committing an error of law when it failed to disallow the admission in
evidence of said testimony pursuant to the hearsay rule contained in Section 36,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in
these rules.
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Petitioners reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a
rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the
rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay
evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be
found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the
opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to
by a witness are hearsay.[ However, the right to cross-examine may be waived.
The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver
of such right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to
cross-examine the other partys witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take
advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent
court when it sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner had waived its right
to cross-examine the opposing partys witness. It is now too late for petitioner to
be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that
the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he
knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Respecting petitioners other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As
correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners admission as to the execution
of the promissory note by it through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at
pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures. The
admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it
must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, a judicial admission requires no proof. Nor will petitioner’s reliance on the
best evidence rule advance its cause. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the
original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at
pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter.
It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission
of the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
RULE 129: WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
G.R. No. 143276 July 20, 2004
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and
LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL
Facts: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered
owners of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A
portion of the land was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,[1] as amended, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a summary administrative
proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered
its Decision affirming the Landbank’s valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the RTC a
petition for determination of just compensation.
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the
facts established in another case pending before it.
ISSUE: WON the RTC was correct in taking judicial notice as to the valuation of
the property, which is in issue in the case at bar, in another case pending before
it
HELD: NO. RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property is
P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in the
Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this case without
conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties.
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may only do so "in the
absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the opposing party," which are
not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court
takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case."
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE
AIRLINES LIMITED
Facts: In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines
Limited (SAL). In 1982 however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off
some employees. Laureano was one of them. Laureano asked for reconsideration
but it was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano filed a labor case for illegal dismissal
against SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor case and instead filed a civil case
for damages due to illegal termination of contract against SAL. Laureano filed the
case here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the
termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising the issue
of lack of jurisdiction, non-applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among
others. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: WON the court can take judicial notice on Singapore Laws
HELD: NO. Defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter
alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and
(2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant
contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim
arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the
Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects
of his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus,
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall
have jurisdiction.
RTC judgment: rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and against
defendant Singapore Airlines Limited,
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the
issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not
proved in court. As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the
termination is indeed valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take
judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to
prove such law hence Philippine law shall apply. However, the case must be
dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our laws, all money claims arising
from employer-employee relationships must be filed within three years from the
time the cause of action accrued. Laureano’s cause of action accrued in 1982 when
he was terminated but he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three
years from 1982. Hence he is already barred by prescription.
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013
FACTS: We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in
the May 2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore,
has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no longer
be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either
affirm the validity of Arnado’s election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run
for public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of
this Court’s Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his
accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that
he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be
stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of
his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question
before this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the
United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was
divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the
rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport
after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.
WON THE COURT CAN TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREGIN LAWS
No. The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented
as public documents of a foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official
publication thereof." Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice
for it to be considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United
States "providing that a person who is divested of American citizenship thru an
Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by using a US
Passport issued prior to expatriation."4
American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact
that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino
citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of
this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnado’s
disqualification to run for any local elective position.
With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA)
9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act." This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)
requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective
public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read
together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code which disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy
that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to
continue using a foreign passport – which indicates the recognition of a foreign
state of the individual as its national – even after the Filipino has renounced his
foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of
doubt.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that
one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves
that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its
national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired
American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his
Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he
renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his
American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
FACTS: On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route,
from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via EDSA. Around
6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-
EDSA southbound bus stop, two suspicious men rode on the bus.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on
asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed
that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in
front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was tinkering
with something. As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala
Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. Eventually, the bus
driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got
off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an
explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus
towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw
their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few
hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the
whole incident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice,
confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf
Group – Abu Solaiman – announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a
Valentine’s Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an
exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the
Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network,
accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally,
accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the
explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified
the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men
who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476),
Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon
arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477),
accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat
pled not guilty to both charges.
In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their
pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and
explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged
the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the
Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of
multiple frustrated murder.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants’
plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea
HELD: NO.
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges
… must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while
justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully
the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction." Thus, trial
court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-
arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
original plea was "not guilty," the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to "guilty."
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry
remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences
of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-
arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt
against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad
previously pled guilty to another charge – multiple murder – based on the same
act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes
that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad
made two other confessions of guilt – one through an extrajudicial confession
(exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and
the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing
circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the "searching
inquiry" in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted,
as the accused’s plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment
under consideration.
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a
searching inquiry was not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the plea of guilt
is made … loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the
offense charged." Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is
the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible
evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it
is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving
his commission of the offense charged.
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the
conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a
conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the
existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the
declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a
judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators. Thus,
in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
We must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An
extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant’s co-accused since the
latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to
testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant. Mercene’s admission implicating his co-accused was given
on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon.
Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the
testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence
against the latter.
RULE 130: RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
CASES:
I . Object or Real Evidence
G.R. No. 172953 April 30, 2008
JUNIE MALILLIN Y. LOPEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its
lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of
guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of
the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.
FACTS: On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of
Sorsogon City, a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in
Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The search—conducted in the
presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife
Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Petitioner entered a negative plea. Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic
chemist who administered the examination on the seized items, was presented as
an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed
that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty
sachets, four were positive of containing residue of the same substance. She
further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by
Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except
that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items
from Esternon at the laboratory.
The trial court finds accussed guilty of the crime charged and reasoned that the
fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of
petitioner's animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as
things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are
presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioner's failure to ascribe ill motives
to the police officers to fabricate charges against him.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision affirming the judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison
sentence. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
appellate court. Hence, the instant petition which raises substantially the same
issues.
ISSUE: Whether the chain of custody rule was strictly complied with
HELD: NO.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the
elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral
certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be
that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create
in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt.
More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must
also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make
a finding of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that
it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it
was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is
not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard
likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's
level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering—without regard to
whether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in
the application of the chain of custody rule.
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the
identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people
who came into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo
testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence.
Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for
recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly
handed over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were
not presented in court to establish the circumstances under which they handled
the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory
tested and offered in court as evidence?
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer.
Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his
testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items
handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the
initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who could have, but
nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the
items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her
possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the
identity of the seized items because it failed to offer not only the testimony of
Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such failure. In effect,
there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it
failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but
inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only with respect to the two filled
sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and
normal procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure
custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is
manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just that—a mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the
evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this
presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that
prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case
the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from
petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were
placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of
guilt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO,
Appellant
G.R. No. 179029 August 12, 2010
FACTS: The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The appellant pleaded not guilty on
arraignment. Trial on the merits, thereafter, followed.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Buy bust operation was conducted wherein appellant was apprehended. PO3
Almarez, posed as the buyer and when he handed the marked money to the
appellant, he immediately apprehended the appellant. Captain de Vera took the
marked money from the appellant’s right pocket, and then arrested him. PO3
Almarez, for his part, marked the sachet with his initials. Thereafter, the buy-bust
team brought the appellant to the Diadi Police Station for investigation.
At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory
examination. The appellant was transferred to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he
was detained. Two days later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3 Almarez transmitted
the letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the seized plastic sachet to the
PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were received by PO2 Fernando Dulnuan.
Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the Forensic Chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, conducted an examination on the specimen submitted, and
found it to be positive for the presence of shabu.
The RTC, in its decision of August 16, 2005, convicted the appellant of the crime
charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
The appellant appealed to the CA. The CA, in its decision dated May 22, 2007,
affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA further ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove an
unbroken chain of custody of the shabu. It explained that PO3 Almarez sealed the
plastic sachet seized from the appellant, marked it with his initials, and
transmitted it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. PSI Quintero
conducted a qualitative examination and found the specimen positive for the
presence of shabu. According to the CA, the prosecution was able to prove that
the substance seized was the same specimen submitted to the laboratory and
presented in court, notwithstanding that this specimen was turned over to the
crime laboratory only after two days.
The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of
custody in the handling of the seized drug. He claims that there was no evidence to
show when the markings were done. Moreover, a period of two days had elapsed
from the time the shabu was confiscated to the time it was forwarded to the crime
laboratory for examination.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the
chain of custody of the shabu was sufficiently established. It explained that the
shabu was turned over by the police officers to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where it
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
was found by the forensic chemist to be positive for the presence of shabu. The
OSG likewise claimed that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties by the police. The OSG further
added that a prior surveillance is not indispensable to a prosecution for illegal sale
of drugs.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid chain of custody that can be admitted as Real or
Object Evidence
After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecution’s
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution
failed to show that the police complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act.
Requirement under Section 21:
In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually
been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.26 To
remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug,
evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for
possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal
drug's unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and
easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or
otherwise. The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that the
buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure despite its mandatory terms.
The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial:
In several cases, we have emphasized the importance of compliance with the
prescribed procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs. We have
repeatedly declared that the deviation from the standard procedure dismally
compromises the integrity of the evidence. In People v. Morales, we acquitted the
accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and inventory the seized
items, without giving any justifiable ground for the non-observance of the required
procedures. People v. Garcia likewise resulted in an acquittal because no physical
inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under
the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules. In
Bondad, Jr. v. People,33 we also acquitted the accused for the failure of the police
to conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized items, without justifiable
grounds.
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to
justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs. The apprehending team failed to show why an
inventory and photograph of the seized evidence had not been made either in the
place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as required by the
Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests). We emphasize that for the
saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had been preserved. In other words, the justifiable ground for
noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist.
The "Chain of Custody" Requirement
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed
in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the
confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust
operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Black’s Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:
In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the narcotics in a trial of
drug case, must account for the custody of the evidence from the moment in
which it reaches his custody until the moment in which it is offered in evidence,
and such evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of evidence.
Likewise, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002
which implements R.A. No. 9165 defines "chain of custody" as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
In Malillin v. People, the Court explained that the chain of custody rule requires
that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the object
seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received, where
it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain.
In the present case, the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the chain that
would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen
seized from the appellant.
G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
NARCISO SALAS v.ANNABELLE MATUSALEM
FACTS: On May 26, 1995, respondent filed a complaint for Support/Damages
against petitioner in the RTC of Cabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas
who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time,
enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a
widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and
shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of
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caesarean operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent
refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her, petitioner
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and
friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression
but still petitioner refused to support her and their child. Respondent thus prayed
for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as
well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner filed his answer with special and affirmative defenses and
counterclaims. He described respondent as a woman of loose morals, having
borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was
declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered
submitted for decision based on respondent’s evidence. Murillo corroborated
respondent’s testimony.
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent.
Petitioner appealed, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s
evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child
of petitioner
HELD: YES. Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which
the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. We
have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father
is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not
sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such
birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no
probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.
As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as
the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and
letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside
their rented apartment unit. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together
with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.
As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange
of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to
establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by
petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the
father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify
under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and
continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered
the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence
insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are
not competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed
to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create
an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear
and convincing evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RUPER POSING y ALAYON,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 196973, July 31, 2013
FACTS: A buy bust operation was conducted to arrest Ruper Posing (Posing), a
known drug pusher. A one hundred peso bill (P100.00) was given by Chief Caballes
with his initials, to serve as the marked money.
SPO1 Angeles met Posing beside the basketball court, where he was introduced by
the informant as a buyer of shabu. The former asked if he could buy one hundred
peso (P100.00) worth of shabu for personal use. Posing then pulled out one (1)
transparent plastic sachet from his pocket and gave it to SPO1 Angeles in exchange
for the buy-bust money. Afterwards, SPO1 Angeles took out his cap to alert his
companions that the deal was already concluded. PO1 Cortez and PO1 Nicart
rushed to the scene and introduced themselves as police officers. Posing was
frisked, and the buy-bust money and another transparent plastic sachet were
recovered from him.
Afterwards, the suspect and the evidence were taken to the station.
Prior to the turnover of the evidence to the desk officer, SPO1 Angeles placed his
marking on the two (2) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachets. The same
were then turned over to PO2 John Sales (PO2 Sales), who prepared a request for
laboratory examination.
On the same day, the specimens were delivered by PO1 Nicart to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for quantitative and qualitative
examination, wherein each sachet was found to contain 0.03 gram and tested
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
On the contrary, Posing testified that when he was arrested by PO1 Cortez and
PO1 Nicart, who he came to know based on their name plates. When he asked the
officers what his violation was, they replied: "Nag-mamaang-maangan ka pa." He
was then led to their vehicle and was brought to Station wherein he was asked to
point to a certain "Nene" whom he did not know. He refused, which was why he
was detained and charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165.
Upon arraignment on 2 December 2003, Posing entered a plea of "not guilty" on
both charges.19
On 2 December 2008, the trial court found Posing GUILTY of violation of both
Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of R.A. 9165.
On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended that the trial court gravely erred
when it failed to consider the police officers’ failure to comply with the proper
procedure in the handling and custody of the seized drugs, as provided under
Section 21 of R. A. No. 9165, which ultimately affected the chain of custody of the
confiscated drugs.
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, countered that although
the requirements under Section 21 of R. A. No. 9165 has been held to be
mandatory, non-compliance with the same, does not necessarily warrant an
acquittal. In addition, it was averred that the police officers are entitled to the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Finally, the
accused-appellant did not interpose any evidence in support of his defense aside
from his bare denial.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs, and in the course of the investigation and trial,
whether the integrity of the evidence was preserved.
YES. Both agreed that the illegal sale of shabu was proven beyond reasonable
doubt. For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs
under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
With the illegal sale of dangerous drugs established beyond reasonable doubt, the
handling of the evidence, or the observance of the proper chain of custody, which
is also an indispensable factor in prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, is
the next matter to be resolved.
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which
implements R.A. No. 9165 defines "Chain of Custody" as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody
of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
In Malillin v. People, we laid down the chain of custody requirements that must be
met in proving that the seized drugs are the same ones presented in court: (1)
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence; and (2) witnesses should describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
item. In this case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the testimonies of its
witnesses that the integrity of the seized item was preserved every step of the
process.
Time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that less than strict
compliance with the procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not
necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. –
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof; x x x
As held in People v. Llanita as cited in People v. Ara:
RA 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not
require strict compliance as to the chain of custody rule. x x x We have emphasized
that what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused." Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural
requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing,
and drugtesting of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render
void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
As to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug.
In the case at hand, the prosecution was able to prove that the accused-appellant
was in possession of one (1) plastic sachet of shabu, when he was frisked on the
occasion of his arrest. There was also no showing that he had the authority to
possess the drugs that was in his person. This Court held in a catena of cases that
mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a
satisfactory explanation of such possession - the onus probandi is shifted to the
accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
G.R. No. 198318 November 27, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ASIR GANI y ALIH and NORMINA GANI y GALOS
FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged in conspiracy with one another of the
crime of Violation of Section 5, Art. II, R.A. 9165 in relation to Art. 62, Par. 2, of the
Revised Penal Code.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
When arraigned on July 28, 2004, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty. At the
pre-trial conference held on September 15, 2004, the parties arrived at the
following stipulation of facts:
SI Saul coordinated with the PDEA and formed a buy- bust team to set up the
accused Asir and Normina Gani. SI Saul was designated as the poseur-buyer and
was given the marked money constituting of two P1,000.00 bills, with several
P20.00 bills in between, to make it appear that the money was worth P150,000.00,
the purchase price agreed upon by SI Saul and accused-appellant Normina for the
shabu.
Accused-appellants were arrested during the buy-bust operation and duly advised
of their constitutional rights. During the search incidental to accused-appellants’
arrest, the buy-bust team seized from accused-appellants’ possession two other
sachets of shabu, the marked money, accused-appellant Asir’s .45 caliber pistol,
and the motorcycle. The buy- bust team and accused-appellants then proceeded
to the FTI Barangay Hall.
At the FTI Barangay Hall, SI Saul conducted an inventory of the items recovered
from accused-appellants, including the two plastic sachets of shabu subject of the
sale, which SI Saul marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," representing SI
Saul’s initials and the date of the buy-bust. All these were done in the presence of
accused-appellants and two barangay officials. SI Saul’s inventory report, however,
did not include the two other sachets of shabu seized from accused-appellants’
possession. Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought accused-appellants to the NBI
Headquarters in Manila.
At the NBI Headquarters, accused-appellants were booked and further
investigated. The following day, May 7, 2004, several members of the buy- bust
team executed the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of accused-appellants. SI Saul also
executed an incident report, requested for laboratory examination of the contents
of the plastic sachets marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," and submitted
the said specimens to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division where they were
received by NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo.
The two plastic sachets submitted for laboratory examination had a combined
weight of 98.7249 grams. Based on the forensic analysis by NBI Forensic Chemist II
Patingo and Forensic Chemist III Viloria-Magsipoc, the contents of said sachets
tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
The evidence for the defense consisted of accused-appellants’ testimonies. Both
denied the crime charged against them and claimed that they were the victims of
extortion. They were charged only because they failed to produce the money
demanded from them.
Weighed against the prosecution’s testimonial and documentary evidence,
including the corpus delicti of the crime, the RTC found accused-appellants’
defenses of denial and alibi implausible and devoid of credence. In the end, the
RTC found accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them.
Accused-appellants appealed the foregoing RTC judgment to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.
Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the chain of custody rule was strictly complied with
HELD: YES.
The combined testimonial, documentary, and object evidence of the prosecution
produced a detailed account of the buy-bust operation against accused-appellants
and proved all the essential elements of the crime charged against them.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following
elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in
court of the substance seized as evidence.
Contrary to accused-appellants’ averment, prosecution witness, SI Saul, was able
to explain why there were a total of four sachets of shabu presented during trial,
when SI Saul only bought two sachets during the buy- bust operation. SI Saul
testified that in addition to the two plastic sachets of shabu sold to him by
accused-appellants, there were two more sachets of shabu recovered from
accused-appellants’ possession by the buy-bust team during the body search
conducted incidental to accused-appellants’ lawful arrest.
The Court further finds that the arresting officers had substantially complied with
the rule on the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs as provided under Section
21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
In this case, testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution proved
that immediately after accused-appellants’ arrest, they were brought to the FTI
Barangay Hall.
Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that the failure of the
buy-bust team to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon seizure and
at the site of accused-appellants’ apprehension, and to mark and make an
inventory of the same in the presence of all the persons named in Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165, are not fatal and did not render the seized drugs
inadmissible in evidence given that the prosecution was able to trace and establish
each and every link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs and, hence, the
identity and integrity of the said drugs had been duly preserved. For the same
reasons, it was not imperative for the prosecution to present as witnesses before
the RTC the two barangay officials who witnessed the conduct of the inventory. At
best, the testimonies of these two barangay officials will only be corroborative,
and would have no significant impact on the identity and integrity of the seized
drugs.
II. Documentary Evidence
a. Best Evidence Rule
G.R. No. 150905. September 23, 2003
CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD vs. EFREN S. TEODORO
Facts: Respondent Teodoro made various purchases through his credit card.
Accordingly, he was billed by petitioner for those purchases, for which he
tendered various payments.
Petitioner claims that as of January 20, 1995, the obligations of respondent stood
at P191,693.25, inclusive of interest and service charges. Several times it
demanded payment from him, but he refused to pay, claiming that the amount
demanded did not correspond to his actual obligations. His refusal prompted
petitioner to file a Complaint for collection on January 25, 1996 before the RTC of
Makati City. The RTC, in an Order dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction
over the amount involved. The case was then transferred to MTC of Makati City.
During the trial, petitioner presented several sales invoices or charge slips, which
added up to only P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies of the originals, the
invoices were marked in evidence as Exhibits F to F-4. Because all these copies
appeared to bear the signatures of respondent, the trial court deemed them
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
sufficient proof of his purchases with the use of the credit card. Accordingly, the
MTC in its July 25, 2000 Decision ordered him to pay petitioner the amount of
P24,388.36 plus interest and penalty fee.
Thereafter, respondent appealed the MTC judgment to the RTC of Makati City but
the RTC affirmed the MTC Decision/
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The focal issue of the case according to the CA was whether the photocopies of
the sales invoices or charge slips, marked as Exhibits F to F-4, were competent
proofs of the obligations of respondent. These were the only evidence presented
by petitioner that could prove the actual amount of obligation he had incurred in
favor of the former. In reversing the trial courts, the CA ruled that this evidence
was insufficient to prove any liability on respondents part.
Although petitioner was able to prove the existence of the original sales invoices, it
failed to prove their due execution or to account for their loss or unavailability.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue: Whether or not the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips
marked during trial as Exhibits F to F-4 are admissible in evidence.
Held: The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its case
based on a preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil cases, the
party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner failed to prove that
respondent had an obligation in the principal amount of P24,388.36, because the
photocopies of the original sales invoices it had presented in court were
inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been admissible, they would still
have had little probative value.
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged
obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are
inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the
exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well s the
conditions of their admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of the photocopies
in the absence of the originals, respondents obligation was not established.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror
must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the
loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court;
and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of the
court, this order may be changed if necessary.
In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by
the photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to
prove that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after
reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them.
Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them
were conditions that were not met, because the sales invoices might have been
found by Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that he had requested the originals from
Equitable, failed to show that he had subsequently followed up the request.
Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them
have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without
accounting for the other originals.
In the present case, triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the
sales invoice only once. During the trial, Hernandez explained that an original copy
had gone to respondent, another to the merchant, and still another to petitioner.
Each of these three copies is regarded as an original in accordance with Section 4
(b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to show that all three
original copies were unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the
search for them.
G.R. No. 189404 December 11, 2013
WILGEN LOON, vs POWER MASTER, INC., TRI-C GENERAL SERVICES, and SPOUSES
HOMER and CARINA ALUMISIN,Respondents.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
FACTS: Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and
assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently,
the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against the respondents. The
petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were not paid minimum wages,
overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays.
They further averred that the respondents made them sign blank payroll sheets.
The petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal dismissal as their
cause of action.
Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the Labor
Arbiter. The respondents’ counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory
conference. However, the respondents neither filed any position paper nor
proffered pieces of evidence in their defense despite their knowledge of the
pendency of the case.
Labor Arbiter partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. However, the LA denied
the petitioners’ claims for backwages, overtime, holiday, and premium pays. The
LA observed that the petitioners failed to show that they rendered overtime work
and worked on holidays and rest days without compensation. The LA further
concluded that the petitioners cannot be declared to have been dismissed from
employment because they did not show any notice of termination of employment.
Both parties appealed the LA’s ruling with the National Labor Relations
Commission.
The respondents insisted that they were not personally served with summons and
other processes. They also claimed that they paid the petitioners minimum wages,
service incentive leave and thirteenth month pays. As proofs, they attached
photocopied and computerized copies of payroll sheets to their memorandum on
appeal. They further maintained that the petitioners were validly dismissed.
Respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached photocopied
and computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller machine
(ATM) cards to the supplemental appeal. This list also showed the amounts
allegedly deposited in the employees’ ATM cards.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion where they asked for the
deletion of the supplemental appeal from the records because it allegedly suffered
from infirmities. First, the supplemental appeal was not verified. Second, it was
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
belatedly filed six months from the filing of the respondents’ notice of appeal with
memorandum on appeal.
NLRC partially ruled in favor of the respondents. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s
awards of holiday pay and attorney’s fees. It allowed the respondents to submit
pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal on the ground that they had been
deprived of due process.
The NLRC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in a resolution.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the CA. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling.
The CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
August 28, 2009, prompting the petitioners to file the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents were estopped from submitting pieces of
evidence for the first time on appeal;
In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required.
Time and again, we have allowed evidence to be submitted for the first time on
appeal with the NLRC in the interest of substantial justice.
However, this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of reason and fairplay.
The liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party
should adequately explain any delay in the submission of evidence; and (2) a party
should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. The reason for these
requirements is that the liberal application of the rules before quasi-judicial
agencies cannot be used to perpetuate injustice and hamper the just resolution of
the case. Neither is the rule on liberal construction a license to disregard the rules
of procedure.
The NLRC capriciously and whimsically admitted and gave weight to the
respondents’ evidence despite its finding that they voluntarily appeared in the
compulsory arbitration proceedings. The NLRC blatantly disregarded the fact that
the respondents voluntarily opted not to participate, to adduce evidence in their
defense and to file a position paper despite their knowledge of the pendency of
the proceedings before the LA. The respondents were also grossly negligent in not
informing the LA of the specific building unit where the respondents were
conducting their business and their counsel’s address despite their knowledge of
their non-receipt of the processes.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Furthermore, the respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to
be proven. Why the respondents’ photocopied and computerized copies of
documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious
question that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents
fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we generally admit in
evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative
proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse
party to present the original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the
respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where the petitioners
had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively
deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged
spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with no
option but to rule that the respondents’ failure to present the originals raises the
presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employees. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that the employer’s cause can only succeed
on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s
evidence.
G.R. No. 201011 January 27, 2014
THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all surnamed
DIMAGUILA, Petitioners, vs.
JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO, Respondents
FACTS: Respondent spouses Monteiro filed their Complaint for Partition and
Damages before the RTC, against the petitioners Dimaguilas. The complaint
alleged that all the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a
residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna. Spouses
Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the
heirs of Pedro Dimaguila (Pedro).
In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there
was no co-ownership to speak of in the first place. They alleged that the subject
property had long been partitioned equally.
During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were initiated.
Upon resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for
Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint. The RTC granted their motion.
In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas'
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
admission in their original answer that the subject property had already been
partitioned. Spouses Monteiro further averred that Pedro's share was sold by his
heirs to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan (Bilihan) with the
acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of
Conformity and Waiver; and that when they attempted to take possession of the
share of Pedro, they discovered that the subject portion was being occupied by the
Dimaguilas.
In their Answer to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the
subject property was inherited by, and divided equally between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their original answer that it had been
actually divided into southern and nmihern portions. Instead, they argued that the
Extrajudicial Partition mentioned only the division of the subject property "into
two and share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of a co-
owenrship, contrary to their original position.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the Dimaguilas to turn
over the possession of the subject 1 /3 portion of the southern-half of the
property.
The RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition merely divided the
property into two share and share alike, evidence aliunde was appreciated to
show that there was an actual division of the property into south and north
between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such partition was observed and
honored by their heirs. These pieces of evidence were the cadastral map of Liliw
and a corresponding list of claimants, which showed that the subject property had
long been registered as Lot 876 (northern-half), claimed by Buenaventura
Dimaguila (Buenaventura), an heir of Vitaliano, and Lot 877 (southern-half),
claimed by Perfecto.
As to the authenticity of the Bilihan, the RTC found the document to be regular
and authentic absent any piece of evidence to the contrary.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the rule on hearsay and best evidence rule were violated
HELD: NO.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when
the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may
be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the
record.
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of
claimants of the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers.
The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a
repository of such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR
employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed
land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as
ce1iified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best
evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly
provides that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule
provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The
necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the
course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department
tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is,
therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants
qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as
mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
b. Parole Evidence
G.R. No. 107372. January 23, 1997
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES,
AND ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES, respondents.
Facts: On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2)
parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively.
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but
failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from
the former the delivery of said titles. Private respondents, however, refused on the
ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and
petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the
RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the
existence of the following oral conditions which were never reflected in the deeds
of sale:
"3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants
(private respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the following
requirements have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendants'
lot to segregate his right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be
incurred by reason of sale. x x x."
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified
that the sale was subject to the above conditions, although such conditions were
not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the
ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol
evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually
dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the parol evidence is admissible
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Held: The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private
respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who
has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human
memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words
could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform
language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it
is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can
be admitted other than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds
of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said
instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the
deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any
condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties.
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land
Settlement Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation where the Court ruled that a
condition precedent to a contract may be established by parol evidence. However,
the material facts of that case are different from this case. In the former, the
contract sought to be enforced expressly stated that it is subject to an agreement
containing the conditions-precedent which were proven through parol evidence.
Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any pre- conditions
or other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that:
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written
instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the
document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence
is admissible under the exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged
failure of the agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Such exception
obtains only in the following instance:
"[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the
contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of
the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the
contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and
circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be
received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument."
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents contention that they "put in
issue by the pleadings" the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent of the parties. Record shows that private respondents did not expressly
plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention
of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). Such issue must be
"squarely presented." Private respondents merely alleged that the sale was
subject to four (4) conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parol
evidence. Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the
exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the
general rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of
the agreement. Considering that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer
(and former judge) he was "supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and
practices" and was "expected to know the consequences" of his signing a deed of
absolute sale. Had he given an iota's attention to scrutinize the deeds, he would
have incorporated important stipulations that the transfer of title to said lots were
conditional.
G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004
LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (Seventeenth Division) and ALLIED BANKING CORP., respondents
Facts: Sometime in 1977, petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President of the co-
petitioner Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from the respondent
Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory notes in the amounts of
P100,000 each.
As of January 23, 1979, the entire obligation amounted to P493,566.61 and despite
demands made on them by the respondent Bank, the petitioners failed to pay the
same. The respondent Bank was constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City a complaint seeking payment by the petitioners, jointly and solidarily, of
the sum of P493,566.61 representing their loan obligation, exclusive of interests,
penalty charges, attorney’s fees and costs.
In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner Foundation denied incurring
indebtedness from the respondent Bank alleging that the loans were obtained by
petitioner Tan in his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit and on the
strength of the personal information he furnished the respondent Bank. The
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
petitioner Foundation maintained that it never authorized petitioner Tan to co-
sign in his capacity as its President any promissory note and that the respondent
Bank fully knew that the loans contracted were made in petitioner Tans personal
capacity and for his own use and that the petitioner Foundation never benefited,
directly or indirectly, therefrom. For his part, petitioner Tan admitted that he
contracted the loans from the respondent Bank in his personal capacity.
According to petitioner Tan, the respondent Banks employee required him to affix
two signatures on every promissory note, assuring him that the loan documents
would be filled out in accordance with their agreement. However, after he signed
and delivered the loan documents to the respondent Bank, these were filled out in
a manner not in accord with their agreement, such that the petitioner Foundation
was included as party thereto. Further, prior to its filing of the complaint, the
respondent Bank made no demand on him.
RTC ruled in favor of Allied Bank.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the court a quo by
deleting the award of attorney’s fees in favor of the respondent Bank for being
without basis.
The appellate court disbelieved petitioner Tans claim that the loans were his
personal loans as the promissory notes evidencing them showed upon their faces
that these were obligations of the petitioner Foundation, as contracted by
petitioner Tan himself in his official and personal character. Applying the parol
evidence rule, the CA likewise rejected petitioner Tans assertion that there was an
unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank that he would pay
the loans from the proceeds of his shares of stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
Issue: WON COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE AS BASIS FOR ADJUDGING JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY ON
THE PART OF PETITIONERS ELIAS Q. TAN AND LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC
Held: The Court particularly finds as incredulous petitioner Tans allegation that he
was made to sign blank loan documents and that the phrase IN MY
OFFICIAL/PERSONAL CAPACITY was superimposed by the respondent Banks
employee despite petitioner Tans protestation. The Court is hard pressed to
believe that a businessman of petitioner Tans stature could have been so careless
as to sign blank loan documents.
In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory notes clearly showed upon their
faces that they are the obligation of the petitioner Foundation, as contracted by
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
petitioner Tan in his official and personal capacity. Moreover, the application for
credit accommodation, the signature cards of the two accounts in the name of
petitioner Foundation, as well as New Current Account Record, all accompanying
the promissory notes, were signed by petitioner Tan for and in the name of the
petitioner Foundation. These documentary evidence unequivocally and
categorically establish that the loans were solidarily contracted by the petitioner
Foundation and petitioner Tan.
As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject
petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him
and the respondent Bank on the payment of the obligation. Section 9, Rule 130 of
the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that [w]hen the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the
respondent Bank. These promissory notes contained maturity dates as follows:
February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April 11, 1978 and May 5, 1978, respectively.
That these notes were to be paid on these dates is clear and explicit. Nowhere was
it stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over
annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu
Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement could not be
made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. While
parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot
serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud
or mistake. No such allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.
G.R. No. 169985 June 15, 2011
MODESTO LEOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ, Respondent
FACTS: Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners of a
parcel of land located in Pangasinan. Sta. Maria sold her share to Benigna Llamas.
When Benigna died in 1944, she willed her share equally to her sisters Alejandra
Llamas and Josefa Llamas. Thus, Alejandra and Josefa each owned one-half (½) of
Benigna’s share.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Alejandra’s heirs sold their predecessor’s one-half (½) share to the respondent, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Josefa sold her own one-half (½) share (subject property) to the respondent and
the petitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of Absolute Sale. On even date, the
respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of
the subject property.
Petitioner and the respondent executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the
subject property. The parties took possession of their respective portions of the
subject property and declared it in their name for taxation purposes.
Respondent asked the Register of Deeds on the requirements for the transfer of
title over the portion allotted to him on the subject property. To his surprise, the
respondent learned that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two
transfer certificates of title (TCTs). Respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of
Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the
reconveyance of the disputed property on the ground that the petitioner is
entitled only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties’ Agreement. The
respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting Benigna’s death certificate.
The respondent argued that Benigna could not have executed a deed because
Benigna already died in 1944. Respondent denied his purported signature
appearing in the Affidavit
The RTC dismissed the complaint. The court ruled that the respondent failed to
preponderantly prove that the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit are fabricated and,
consequently, no ground exists to nullify the petitioner’s titles. The court observed
that the respondent did not even compare his genuine signature with the
signatures appearing in these documents.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the authenticity of the
Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. The CA gave weight to Benigna’s death certificate
which shows the impossibility of Benigna’s execution of the deed in 1969. The CA
also noted the discrepancy between the respondent’s signatures as appearing in
the Affidavit, on one hand, and the documents on record, on the other. The CA
added that the respondent’s failure to compare his genuine signature from his
purported signatures appearing in the petitioner’s documents is not fatal, since
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court allows the court to make its own
comparison.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Petitioner filed the present appeal by certiorari, claiming that the CA committed
"gross misappreciation of the facts" by going beyond what the respondent sought
in his complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was able to prove his title over the
disputed potions?
Held: Yes. The respondent adequately proved his ownership of the disputed
property by virtue of the (i) Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Josefa in favor of
the parties; (ii) the parties’ Affidavit of Adverse Claim; and (iii) the parties’
Agreement, which cover the subject property.
The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of these
documents, particularly the Agreement. However, he claims that since the
Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was
subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties’ true intention.
The petitioner’s argument calls to fore the application of the parole evidence rule,
i.e., when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the written
agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of
these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the written
agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been
waived and abandoned.
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party
to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the failure of the
written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The
failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the parties is
either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which
nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.
At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true
intention of the parties by presenting the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the
mistake in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed his ownership of the
parcels of land covered by his titles. It was the petitioner’s staunch assertion that
the respondent co-executed this Affidavit supposedly to reflect the parties’ true
intention.
In the present petition, however, the petitioner made a damaging admission that
the Benigna Deed is fabricated, thereby completely bolstering the respondent’s
cause of action for reconveyance of the disputed property on the ground of
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
fraudulent registration of title. Since the Affidavit merely reflects what is
embodied in the Benigna Deed, the petitioner’s admission, coupled with the
respondent’s denial of his purported signature in the Affidavit, placed in serious
doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedrock of the petitioner’s
defense.
C. Electronic Evidence (AM 01-07- SC, Rules on Electronic Evidence and E-
commerce Law RA 8792)
G.R. No. 152807. August 12, 2003
HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN vs. ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA
The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just
because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it
conclusively proves the fact in dispute.
Facts: A Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by petitioners
against respondents before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.
The Complaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of the
disputed property. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and
grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was
terminated from his job. The termination of his employment caused a problem in
relocating his house. Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo Saez
allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Francisco
Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the
respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises
through petitioners tolerance. On 1998, a formal demand was made upon the
respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and
claimed that they were the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful
possessors of the premises. Thus, an action for unlawful detainer was filed by
petitioners against respondents.
Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the Complaint
and alleged that they entered and occupied the premises in their own right as
true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot way back in
1960 and up to the present time; that they have acquired just and valid ownership
and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that
the Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
over the land in question when it ruled that they were the rightful claimants and
possessors and were, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.
The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal,
reversed and set aside the said decision.
Affirming theRTC, the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and
possessors. The appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order
issued by the regional executive director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) remained in full force and effect, unless declared null
and void. The CA added that the Certification issued by the DENRs community
environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the
cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet
allocated to any person.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving weight to the CENR
Officers Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a
certain Jose F. Tagorda
Held: No. Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a
sham document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In
support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr. and argue that the
Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on
appeal.
In Garvida, the Court held:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current.
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact
copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of
the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a
facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means
but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR
regional director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated
April 2, 1998.
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director
would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either
verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter
was under the formers direct control and supervision.
Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is
incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
the CENR Certification had already been marked as evidence for respondents as
stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification was not formally offered, however,
because respondents had not been able to file their position paper.
Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of
evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary
rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on
summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
G.R. No. 193531 December 14, 2011
ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING
CORPORATION, represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA
FACTS:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor of respondent PAGCOR. On
the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings
(CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, respondent PAGCOR's
Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify
the veracity of such report. The CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of
Charges for dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud and violation of office rules and
regulations which were considered grave offenses where the penalty imposable is
dismissal.
On the same day, another Memorandum was issued to petitioner informing him of
the charge of dishonesty. Petitioner was then required to explain in writing within
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seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. Petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a
letter explanation/refutation of the charges against him. He denied any
involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR or
padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a formal investigation of
the accusations against him.
On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dismissing him from the service.
Petitioner then filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman
Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other
benefits.
Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged, among others, that
petitioner failed to perfect an appeal within the period and manner provided by
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Law.
On June 23, 2008, the CSC, treating petitioner's complaint as an appeal from the
PAGCOR's decision dismissing petitioner from the service, issued Resolution No.
081204 denying petitioner's appeal.
Petitioner's motion for a reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court seeking to set aside the twin resolutions issued by the CSC.
The CA issued its assailed decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
In dismissing the petition, the CA found that petitioner failed to adduce clear and
convincing evidence that he had filed a motion for reconsideration. It found
insufficient to merit consideration petitioner's claim that he had sent through a
facsimile transmission a letter/reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed
to PAGCOR's Chairman, members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems
Protection Board; that assuming arguendo that a letter reconsideration was
indeed sent through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile transmission is
inadmissible as electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the facsimile transaction is considered as an electronic document
that would render the petitioner’s MR filed within the reglementary period
NO.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Clearly, as to CSC’s rules, a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail
or personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the
same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope
which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case of
personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the
proper office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within
which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration
which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter
reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in
filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may
be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings
through fax machines and ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over
regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to
reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct
shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a
printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of
determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic
and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham
pleading.
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence
under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v.
Ssangyong Corporation, the SC determined the question of whether the original
facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents"
within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act:
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
The terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include
a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original
under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH
SAGUD
FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish)
and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University. Rustan courted Irish
and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish
learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom
he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to
convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was
about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his
responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone
number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text
messages. Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure.
The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, one of the numbers that
Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he
took when they were in Baguio in 2003.
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the
police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone
numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan
to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He
came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting
police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his
Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest
and spontaneous manner. The crying of the victim during her testimony is
evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human
nature and experience." Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found
Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision
dated January 31, 2008, affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s
motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed
the present for review on certiorari.
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture
presented in the case.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of
an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene
picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late
since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at
the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived
such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every
element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 204894, 10 March 2014
People v. Enojas
FACTS: Appellants Enojas, Gomez, Santos and Jalandoni were charged for the
crime of Murder before the Regional Trial Court. P02 Gregorio testified that he
was with P02 Pangilinan when they saw a suspiciously parked taxi, of which the
driver was appellant Enojas, they invited the said driver to the police station for
further questioning; appellant Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers.
However, on their way to the police station, they stopped at a convenience store,
wherein they had an encounter with suspected robbers. P02 Pangilinan was able
shoot one of the suspects dead, but was shot, causing his death. Upon hearing the
shots, P02 Gregorio responded but was unsuccessful. The suspected robbers
successfully fled, and upon return to the police mobile, appellant Enojas fled as
well. Suspecting that appellant Enojas was involved, the police officers searched
the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone belonging to appellant Enojas, of
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which they used to monitor and to communicate with the accused appellants.
Thereafter, they were able to conduct an entrapment operation that resulted to
the arrest of herein appellants. Appellants pointed out that they were entitled to
an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text
messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.The trial Court
rendered its decision finding the accused appellants guilty of murder. On appeal,
the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the court a quo, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate Court erred when it affirmed the decision of
the trial Court and held that electronic evidence may be admitted as to criminal
cases.
HELD: No, the Court held that the appellate Court did not erred when it held the
admissibility of electronic evidence to text messages.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity
with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi,
posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in
order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from
and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of
such messages and was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But,
assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime
charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after
an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in
issue here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2
Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it. The text
messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas
provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed,
the police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.
NB: A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, September 24, 2002.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
III. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
• Disqualifications
G.R. No. 198240 July 3, 2013
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS Petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DR. ANDRES
NAVARRO, JR., namely NONITA NAVARRO, FRANCISCA NAVARRO MALAPITAN,
SOLEDAD NAVARRO BROCHLER, NONITA BARRUN NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA
NAVARRO, ANDRES NAVARRO III, MILAGROS NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO,
TERESA NAVARRO-TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN-REJUSO, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim on the
Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr.
donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres
Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP
handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on
the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written
by one and the same person.
Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation
before the RTC of Masbate.
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They
argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the
affidavit. They added that presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their
constitutional right to due process since no notice was given to them before the
examination was conducted. Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s report is a worthless piece of
paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant.
The RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez’s supposed testimony would be hearsay as she has
no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also. The sisters
sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied their motion.
Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which however,
dismissed their petition on the ground that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has
mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether PO2 Alvarez is qualified as a witness
HELD: YES. In AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic, we said
that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a
crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage.
Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse
party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19
disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age
or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for
disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21
provides for disqualification based on privileged communications. Section 15 of
Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the
grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was
called.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make
known her perception to others. We have no doubt that she is qualified as a
witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the
disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her
should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds
for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with
the credibility and weight of her testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of
an expert witness may be received in evidence.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that Tamani’s
signature was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP document
examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery, such that the
similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the opinion of a
handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is
genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine
and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection
from an unpracticed observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be hearsay.
Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to
render an expert opinion, as the PNP document examiner was allowed in Tamani.
But the RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay
even before her testimony is offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under
the circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and
annulled the RTC ruling.
True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not
mandatory on the part of the courts. Jurisprudence is also replete with instances
wherein this Court dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove
forgeries. However, we have also recognized that handwriting experts are often
offered as expert witnesses considering the technical nature of the procedure in
examining forged documents. More important, analysis of the questioned
signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in
crucial to the resolution of the case.
In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness. She has the
qualifications of witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the Rules.
The Rules allow the opinion of an expert witness to be received as evidence. In
Tamani, we used the opinion of an expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's
expert opinion cannot be determined if P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify
on the handwriting examination she conducted.
1. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity Case
Facts: Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate.
When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore to work as a domestic
helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her sister Jovita Guban and
her husband Salvador Golimlim. Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a certain
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Rosing leaving Evelyn with appellant. Golimlim rook advantage of the situation and
raped Evelyn. Evelyn told Jovita about what happened but she didn’t believe her.
When Evelyn was fetched by Lorna, her half-sister, it was discovered that she was
pregnant, only then did the crime committed to victim actually surfaced. The
Medico-Legal findings confirmed the pregnancy as well as the hymen lacerations
of Evelyn. A criminal complaint was filed by Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, against
Golimlim. While the case was pending, Evelyn gave birth to a girl named Joana.
The trial court convicted Golimlim. In his defense, Golimlim argues that Evelyn’s
testimony is not categorical and is replete with contradictions, thus engendering
grave doubts as to his criminal culpability.
Issue: WON COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE CONTRADICTORY AND IMPLAUSIBLE TESTIMONY OF EVELYN CANCHELA, A
MENTAL RETARDATE
Held: No. In upholding the trial court’s ruling, the Supreme Court said that the fact
that Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render
her testimony bereft of truth. Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses.
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The
following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination,
is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to
others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully.
In People v. Trelles, the Court stated that a mental retardate or a feebleminded
person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not
being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual
weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the
competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. It cannot then be gainsaid that a
mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
he or she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court
To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a
ground to disqualify a witness and has become a modern trend of evidence. Thus,
in a long line of cases, the Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based
mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate.
From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt
Evelyn’s credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of
course her feeblemindedness.
2. Marital Disqualification
MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005
Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in a criminal case or arson
pending before the RTC. The accused was petitioner Maximo Alvarez, stranged
husband of Esperanza Alvarez, sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, Esperanza
Alvarez was called to the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her
husband. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against
him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion,
the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the
other witnesses. On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned
Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her
testimony from the records. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. This
prompted respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On
May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside
the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over the objection of her estranged
husband on the ground of marital privilege.
HELD: Yes.
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct
descendants or ascendants.
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of
perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life,
even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one
spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for
offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions
are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in
support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations
are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and
tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent
danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at
protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home.
Therefore, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband. The
disqualification of a witness by reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court has its exceptions as where the marital relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved. The acts of the petitioner
stamp out all major aspects of marital life. On the other hand, the State has an
interest in punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent, and must have the
right to offer the testimony of Esperanza over the objection of her husband.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR.
Facts: Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public
Document. The complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a deed of sale the house
and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana,
making it appear that his spouse gave her marital consent to said sale.
At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the defense
moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution
stated that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other."
Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion,
disqualifying Victoria.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may
be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his
wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Held: No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN AN
OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL
RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a
witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed
(by) one against the other.
In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the
signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the
consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband. It is
the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense
charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the
necessary complaint.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim
of the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the
falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the
act had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is
apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection
with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-
wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and
the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to
be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a
case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based
on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but
ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
3. Death or Insanity
G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992 ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of
the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts: In his complaint, Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that defendants Enrique B.
Razon, E. Razon, Inc. and others be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks
representing the shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon,
Inc. The evidence of the plaintiff shows that he is the administrator of the intestate
estate of Juan Telesforo Chuidian.
The then Court of First Instance of Manila, now Regional Trial Court of Manila,
declared that Enrique Razon, the petitioner in G.R. No. 74306 is the owner of the
said shares of stock. The then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
however, reversed the trial court's decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the
deceased father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is the owner of
the shares of stock. Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration.
Enrique Razon wanted the appellate court's decision reversed and the trial court's
decision affirmed while Vicente Chuidian asked that all cash and stock dividends
and all the pre-emptive rights accruing to the 1,500 shares of stock be ordered
delivered to him. The appellate court denied both motions. Hence, these petitions.
Petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged
misapplication of the dead man's statute rule. According to him, the "dead man's
statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private
respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony regarding
the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the
ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the
deceased opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid
cross examination regarding such testimony.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner's testimony is admissible? YES.
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence) States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following
persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or
indirectly, as herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted,against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound
mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."
The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:
The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the
deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements
made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute
statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them,
thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or
demands. The purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give false
testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving
party." (Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 622
[1955])
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable
to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim
against the estate of the deceased person. (See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698
[1927])
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the
defendant (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father
of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan
Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500
shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the
deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case
was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover
shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the
prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the
estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the
testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the
late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination
by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's
testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. We ruled in the case of
Cruz v. Court of Appeals (192 SCRA 209 [1990]):
It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily
be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of
a party to object thereto. Thus:
. . . The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as well as
the allowance of improper questions that may be put to him while on the stand is
a matter resting in the discretion of the litigant. He may assert his right by timely
objection or he may waive it, expressly or by silence. In any case the option rests
with him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the case for what it is worth and the
judge has no power to disregard it for the sole reason that it could have been
excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to strike it out on its own motion. (Marella
v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1.)
G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA
Fats: In this case, petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent
Chua and Jacinto Sunga from 1977 until Jacinto’s death. In the absence of any
written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto,
petitioners argue that these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies
of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three
years after Jacinto’s death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the
“Dead Man’s Statute” or “Survivorship Rule” under Section 23, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court that provides:
“SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.– Parties
or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person,
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate
of such deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind.”
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and
his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims
against a deceased person, now represented by petitioners.
Issue: whether or not the “Dead Man’s Statute” applies to this case so as to
render inadmissible respondent’s testimony and that of his witness, Josephine
Held: NO
The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the
surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule
can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is
necessary that:
“1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.”
Two reasons forestall the application of the “Dead Man’s Statute” to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their
answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners
themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the “Dead Man’s
Statute”. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator
or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat
the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the
deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or
representatives of the deceased.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the “Dead Man’s Statute” for
the simple reason that she is not “a party or assignor of a party to a case or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted”. Records show that respondent
offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership
between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners’ insistence that Josephine is the alter
ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term “assignor” of a
party means “assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor
of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen.” Plainly then, Josephine is
merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
Petitioners’ reliance alone on the “Dead Man’s Statute” to defeat respondent’s
claim cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that a partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto.
Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as
well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for
respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal
one.
Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the
weight of judicial precedents, a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a
partnership between respondent and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court
on review. This Court can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by
the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and
the appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece
of evidence of one party or the other. It must be also pointed out that petitioners
failed to attend the presentation of evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot
now turn to this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the
documentary evidence of respondent when petitioners failed to object to the
admissibility of the evidence at the time that such evidence was offered.
G.R. No. 112443 January 25, 2002
TERESITA P. BORDALBA vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME
Facts: A land known as Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) located at Barrio Looc,
Mandaue City, is the subject of the controversy. This lot is originally owned by the
late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme’s house,
which his family occupied since 1945.
Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was
originally a part of a land owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme
and Margarita Espina de Jayme; and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in
an extra-judicial partition.She further stated that a portion of the lot for which title
is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her permission.
Nicanor opposed stating that the land sought to be registered also covers the land
adjudicated to him by way of extra judicial partition. Petitioner was successfully
granted Free Patent No and Original Certificate of Title over said lot.
Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, the
instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses Genaro U.
Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau
of Lands. Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was
acquired by her through purchase from her mother who was in possession since
1947.
The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free
Patent No and OCT and declared said patent and title void and ordered its
cancellation. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court.
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for
private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her
mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the
dead mans statute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right of private respondents
to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the
identity between the disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition.
ISSUE: WON the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents
which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not
have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s
statute
Held: The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court are binding upon this Court.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
While there are exceptions to this rule, petitioner has not convinced us that this
case falls under one of them.
As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute, suffice it to state that said
rule finds no application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not
operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his
knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased
person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the
present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and
other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the
questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.
4. Privilege Communication
G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN
FACTS: Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan filed before the RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan, the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to
her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and
that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking
and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo
hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form
that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the
rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note
that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Josielene filed
with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The
request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the
records sought by subpoena duces tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by
physician-patient privilege. Court sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s
motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a
special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the RTC.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
CA denied Josielene’s petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on
the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-
patient communication.
Held: NO. For the following reasons:
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the
admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are
offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as
independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the
patient’s health problems. Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence
must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena
duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a
request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital
records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that
Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to
their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is about non-
disclosure of privileged matters.
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of
documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
But the right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the
documents to be disclosed are "not privileged.”
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not
privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be
regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot
in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their
professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the
hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the
patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician
memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would
be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he
gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before
the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached
to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be
deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes
Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the
remainder admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or
record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be
inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in
evidence.1âwphi1
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that
Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act
contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into
the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce
evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his
hospital records would again be premature.
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene
her request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.
A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30, Complainant, vs. ATTY.
ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R.
Veneracion in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico
Barrientos. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos
appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where
Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution reversing the earlier judgments rendered in
favor of Veneracion. Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Request for Inhibition. Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before
his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the very
disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of the motion. In her Explanation,
Comments and Answer, Velasco-Jacoba claimed that His Honor knows beforehand
who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned
counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case. Nevertheless, Velasco-
Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize for whatever mistake may have
committed. On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of
contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days. Velasco-Jacoba
moved for reconsideration. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an
afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba stopped her and asked her to sign the motion.
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt
without conducting any hearing. She argued that Judge Lacurom should have
inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because Veneracion had already
filed against him criminal cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman.
Judge Lacurom issued another order this time directing Jacoba to explain why he
should not be held in contempt. Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second
Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July
2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacobas statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked
the marital privilege rule in evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision
finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of
P500.
Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The IBP Board adopted IBP Commissioner
Navarros Report and Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which
the IBP Board reduced to three months.
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board
decision.
Issue: WON the rule on marital privilege is applicable to render the statements of
Velasco-Jacoba inadmissible?
Jacoba asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to him as
the author of the July 30 motion.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second
Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba
impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns
and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and
monumental."
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more plausible, for two
reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike
Jacoba’s defense which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from
the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for
Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s assertion that she
had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge
Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the
contempt charge against him. This petition for certiorari anchors some of its
arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacoba’s handwork.
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the
claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be
construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly
admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007
CLARITA J. SAMALA, vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Respondent.
FACTS: A complaint was filed by Samala against Atty. Valencia for Disbarment on
the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for
contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false
documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment
of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate
children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. The Commissioner found respondent
guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of
suspension from six months to one year.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Records show that in Civil Case filed in the RTC for nonpayment of rentals, herein
respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel
for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation
and Compliance before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether an attorney is precluded from representing a new client whose
interest is adverse to his former client upon the termination of the attorney-
client relationship
HELD: YES.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. He
may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may
represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste. It springs from the relation of attorney and client
which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance of that duty.
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on
principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to
represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's
confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an
attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client.
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez that the termination of the relation of
attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is
that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of
the professional employment.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been
severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil
Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination
of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new
client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original
client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and
her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of
both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the
lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without
observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent
of his client is required.
G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and
ELISA RIVERA,petitioners, vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and
CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents. MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: The case is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the
subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring
petitioners Neria Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record
custodian of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce
all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all
evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988 and to
enjoin him from enforcing his orders. An anonymous and unsigned letter
purportedly written by an employee of the EIIB, was sent to the Secretary of
Finance, with copies furnished to several government offices, including the Office
of the Ombudsman. In the letter were allegations as to the misuse of funds from
the savings of unfulfilled plantilla positions, among other forms of corruption and
abuse of power. As a response to the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied
allegations. Petitioner Perez also denied the issue for the savings realized from the
implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM only allotted for the remaining 947
personnel, and that the disbursement of funds for the plantilla positions for overt
and covert personnel had been cleared by COA. Jose F. Sano, the Graft
Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman’s office found their responses
unsatisfactory; therefore he asked for authority to conduct an investigation.
Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a subpoena to petitioners,
compelling them to submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their
witnesses, as well as subpoena duces tecum to the chief of the EIIB’s Accounting
Division, ordering him to bring all documents relating to Personal Service Funds for
the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
EIIB for 1988. Petitioners then moved to quash the subpoena (which was granted
by the Ombudsman since no affidavit was filed against petitioners) and the
subpoena duces tecum, which was denied, since it was directed to the Chief
Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the
Chief of the Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce
before the investigator "all documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the
year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB
for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Petitioners filed for a motion
of reconsideration, which was denied.
ISSUE: whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to
personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such
documents are classified
Held: YES. Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a
subpoena duces tecum nor the relevancy or materiality of the documents required
to be produced, to the pending investigation in the Ombudsman's office.
Accordingly, the focus of discussion should be on the Government's claim of
privilege.
At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with
respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This
privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of
itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a
consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military,
diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the
confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the
Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered
essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be
disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.
Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and
information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as,
but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."
Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to
determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling
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production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other
considerations.
Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers
personnel records of the EIIB as classified information. To the contrary, COA
Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their contention that
there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the "only
item of expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential" is that which
refers to the "purchase of information and payment of rewards."
5. Admissions
G.R. No. 181508 October 2, 2013
OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO and CASIMIRA MATURINGAN,
vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR., represented by ASUNCION
LAQUINDANUM
FACTS: Pedro Constantino, Sr., ancestors of the petitioners and respondents,
owned several parcels of land, one of which is an unregistered parcel of land
situated at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his death, was
survived by his six (6) children. Respondents Asuncion Laquindanum and Josefina
Cailipan, great grandchildren of Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a
complaint against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and
Casimira Maturingan, grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the nullification of a
document denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman’
In the said complaint, respondents alleged that petitioners asserted their claim of
ownership over the whole parcel of land (240 sq m) owned by the late Pedro Sr.,
to the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion thereof. Thus,
respondents sought to annul the "Pagmamana sa Labas ngHukuman" as well as
the Tax Declarations that were issued on the basis of such document.
The petitioners claimed that the document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"
pertaining to the 240 sq m lot was perfectly valid and legal, as it was a product of
mutual and voluntary agreement between and among the descendants of the
deceased Pedro Sr.
Further, petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against
them considering that the respondents’ lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr.,
had already been transferred to them as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver executed by Angelo Constantino, Maria Constantino
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
(mother of respondent Asuncion), Arcadio Constantino and Mercedes Constantino,
all heirs of Pedro Jr.
Pre-trial conference was conducted wherein the parties entered into stipulations
and admissions as well as identification of the issues to be litigated. Thereupon,
trial on the merits ensued.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents finding that the parties are in
pari delicto, whereby the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by
either one of them. Parties who are equally guilty cannot complain against each
other.
Not convinced, the respondents appealed the afore quoted decision to the Court
of Appeals (CA) raising, among others, the erroneous application by the trial court
of the doctrine of "in pari delicto" in declaring the validity of the document
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
CA ruled in favor of the respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr., declaring that the
"Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" covering the 192 sq mlot actually belongs
to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr.
ISSUE: WON the CA erroneously disregarded the stipulations and admissions
during the pre-trial conference on which the application of the doctrine of in pari
delicto was based
Held: Yes.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-
trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly
provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that
the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the
action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried.
In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., this Court emphasized that:
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their
counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become
judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a
disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally,
it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.
Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court declared that:
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A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A
judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy.
Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to
the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.
We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
serves as a caveat for the rule of conclusiveness of judicial admissions – for, in the
interest of justice, issues that may arise in the course of the proceedings but which
may not have been taken up in the pre-trial can still be taken up.
Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. – The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded.
Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite in
detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made
by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed to
trial, the order shall, explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents
of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action, unless modified
before trial to prevent injustice.
In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only
by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made.
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the
general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making
it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that
the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that
no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict
an admission by denying that he made such an admission.
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and
during the trial. While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot,
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
respondent Asuncion Laquindanum, when placed on the stand, offered a vague
explanation as to how such parcel of land was acquired by Pedro Jr.
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale in favour of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Annunciation should
have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented
therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a
total nullity.
G.R. No. 146111 February 23, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROLENDO GAUDIA "LENDOY" or "DODO",
Facts: Information for the crime of rape was filed against “Lendoy”, appellant
herein. The prosecution presented Remelyn’s mother, Amalia Loyola, as its
primary witness. Amalia stated in her complaint affidavit that two weeks after the
incident, Remelyn told her, that Lendoy is crazy, he brought me to the ipil-ipil
trees. The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a
barangay kagawad in their area. Mik testified that on 24 March 1997, at about
4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way home after registering at the
COMELEC office. They were in a hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw
appellant carrying a small girl in his arms. He identified the little girl as Remelyn
Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way
toward the ipil-ipil trees.
The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi.
After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to
convict appellant for the crime of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the
victim was below seven years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death.
ISSUES: WON the offer of compromise by appellant’s parents as tendered to
Amalia Loyola should not be taken against him, while the offer of compromise
he allegedly made to Amalia’s husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony,
should be excluded as evidence for being hearsay (as to offer of compromise)
Held: Appellant’s charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the
parents of the appellant to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalia’s
husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court, even if
sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly
made by appellant to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and of no
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probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer, and she
was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy
Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal
knowledge or perception. The offer of compromise allegedly made by the
appellant’s parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony of Amalia.
However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the
actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to
the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of
compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be
considered as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not
enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.
G.R. No. 164481 September 20, 2005
CONRADO C. DOLDOL vs AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against
Doldol in the RTC. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a shortage of
P801,933.26. They also noted that on June 5, 1995, he made cash withdrawals
from the municipality’s deposit account with the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) amounting to P360,000.59. The withdrawal, purportedly for salaries, wages,
allowances and mid-year bonuses of municipal officers and employees, had not
been recorded in the General Fund Cashbook as of June 8, 1995. The State
Auditors also noted that Doldol made adjustments in the said cashbook on June 8,
1995, increasing his P801,933.26 shortage to P1,134,421.54. The State Auditors
then conducted another audit of the said account, this time covering the period of
June 8, 1995 to July 19, 1995. They discovered that Doldol incurred an added cash
shortage of P149,905.92.
Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing
funds. On September 15, 1995, he remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal
Treasurer for which he was issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to
pay the balance of his shortage, as follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, and
P884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995. However, he reneged on his
promise.
The Provincial Auditor transmitted the Memorandum and Consolidated Report of
the State Auditors to the Ombudsman, and requested that Doldol be charged for
malversation of public funds. Despite the extensions given to him, Doldol failed to
file his counter-affidavit. Doldol testified that the funds which the State Auditors
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
found missing were, in fact, cash advances availed of by the municipal employees.
He insisted that not a single centavo was used for his personal benefit. He averred
that the charges lodged against him were premature because the same were
based on an incomplete audit. RTC convicted the accused of the crimes charged.
On appeal, the CA rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision, and,
likewise, denied Doldols motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present Petition
for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: WON Doldol committed misappropriation of public funds?
Held: Yes. Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no competent and
credible evidence to prove that the missing funds were actually cash advances of
employees in the municipality. The petitioner could have offered in evidence the
documents evidencing the names of the recipients and amounts of the cash
advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote the Provincial
Auditor and offered to refund the missing funds as follows: P200,000.00 on
September 15, 1995, P200,000.00 on or before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66
on November 30, 1995. He was able to pay only P200,000.00 on September 15,
1995, and failed to remit the balance of his shortage. Such partial restitution of the
petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the
missing funds.
The ruling of the CA on this matter is correct:
On September 15, 1995, not too long after the shortages in the municipal funds
were discovered, appellant made a partial payment/settlement in the amount of
200,187.80 pesos as evidenced by Official Receipt. With respect to the balance of
the missing funds, appellant promised to pay the same in installment basis.
Appellant, though, failed to comply with his undertaking. Said payment is of no
moment and could not have legally brought acquittal for the appellant. On the
contrary, as guided by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, We hold that
said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with appellants commitment
to gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise
which must be treated as an implied admission of appellants guilt that he
embezzled or converted the missing funds to his personal use.
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6. Confessions
G.R. No. 144293 December 4, 2002
JOSUE R. LADIANA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: The accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated
National Police (INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban,
Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order
within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of his official position confronted
Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel pipes which were
previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P.
Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of
persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San Juan told the
accused that the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused who was
armed with a firearm, attacked and shot Francisco San Juan with the firearm
hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds
thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.
Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim while the latter was attacking him.
“Kaya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking
suot na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o
makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa
kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan”
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt
of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that his Counter-
Affidavit, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the
victims death, may be used as evidence against him. It underscored the admission
made by the defense as to the authorship, the authenticity and the voluntariness
of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit. In short, it ruled that the document had
sufficiently established his responsibility for the death of the victim. However, it
found no evidence of treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only.
Hence, this Petition
ISSUE: WON the contents in counter affidavit is considered as an admission or
confession
Held: Admission. It is only an admission.
Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one
from the other as follows:
"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to
a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
"SEC. 33. Confession. – The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given
in evidence against him."
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is
merely a statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of
the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the
case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act
charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an
admission, not a confession. The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an
admission that petitioner actually shot the victim when the latter was attacking
him. Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which
eventually led to the latter’s death -- but denies having done it with any criminal
intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether
categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against
him.
Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner
himself submitted it to the public prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the
charges hurled against him. It escapes this Court how he can cavalierly deny a
document that he has voluntarily submitted and originally relied upon in his
defense.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing
they were made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that
formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the
admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts. Yet, petitioner never
offered any rationalization why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving
them unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar,
are evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the burden
of showing a mistake.
Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of
showing that the killing was justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal
liability therefor. Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak,
it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.
Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-
defense. Hence, he could not be bound by it. This argument deserves scant
consideration. As discussed earlier, the declarations contained in his Counter-
Affidavit are admissions that may be used as evidence against him. The
Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had indeed raised the theory of
self-defense, because this argument had already been laid out in his Counter-
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Affidavit. No presumption was necessary, because the admission was clear and
unequivocal.
G.R. No. 147201 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA,
PATRICIO ESCORPISO y VALDEZ, MARLON BUENVIAJE y PINEDA, and MIGUEL
BUENVIAJE y FLORES
Facts: Before the Court is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 finding
appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death; and (2) finding
appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel Buenviaje and
Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide.
On December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines and the accused attacked, and assaulted Joseph Galam y Antonio,
inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
The appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be
admitted in evidence against him because the PAO lawyer who was his counsel
during the custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and
effective counsel. He was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire
proceedings. He was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in the National
Police Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP Command of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED SAYABOC WHEN IT WAS TAKEN
WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL NOR
BY AN EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL.
Held: YES. Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession cannot be used in evidence in this
case.
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.…
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be
voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is
able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights
during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when
the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this
requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb
to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in
custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have
been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged
intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights
during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.
Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains
the passing of information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be
informed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. In People v. Jara, the
Court explained:
The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions
which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model.
Police investigators either automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as
the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its
tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression
of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of
a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle." It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and
consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the
suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a
stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police
officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.
G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Five separate Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents were filed against petitioner. The RTC entered a plea of not guilty for
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the petitioner after he refused to enter a plea. The cases were then consolidated
and jointly tried.
The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be
prepared promissory notes and cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan.
Appellant approved and signed the cashier’s check as branch manager of
Metrobank Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or caused to be signed
the signature of Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the
back of the same to show that the latter had indeed endorsed the same for
payment. He handed the checks to the Loans clerk, Maria Dolores Miranda, for
encashment. Once said documents were forged and falsified, appellant released
and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and
misappropriated the same to his use and benefit. After the discovery of the
irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted and an administrative
investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant
signed a written statement in the form of questions and answers.
Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank,
testified that he conducted and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in
said interview, appellant admitted having committed the allegations in the
Informations, specifically forging the promissory notes; that the proceeds of the
loan were secured or personally received by the appellant although it should be
the client of the bank who should receive the same; and that all the answers of the
appellant were contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed,
thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit "N").
After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision dated June 25, 1999
finding petitioner guilty of the crimes charged.
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA. The CA promulgated its
Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the
petitioner’s written statement based on its finding that he was not in police
custody or under custodial interrogation when the same was taken
HELD: NO.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession
of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as
correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial
interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial
investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement
thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.
In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled
written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed,
the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement
authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner
was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during
the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial
investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during
the taking of his written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, we declared that the right to
counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to
those made in an administrative investigation."
Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry
conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly
committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed
to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to
petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.
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7. Conduct and Character Cases
G.R. Nos. 100225-26 May 11, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAUL SANTOS Y NARCISO,
MARIO MORALES Y BACANI, PETER DOE and RICHARD DOE, Accused, RAUL
SANTOS y NARCISO, accused-appellant.
Appellant Santos in effect questions the trial court for admitting a sworn
statement by one Ronaldo Guerrero, a witnesses in another criminal case (Criminal
Case No. 8117) where appellant Santos was also charged with the murder of one
Daniel Nuguera which had taken place in the very same site where Bautista and
Cupcupin were ambushed, i.e., at the corner of Yangco Street and Estrella Street,
Malabon, Metro Manila. When the prosecution first presented the sworn
statement of Guerrero in order to show criminal propensity on the part of
appellant Santos, the defense objected to admission of such sworn statment; the
trial court sustained the objection and rejected the evidence for the purpose it was
initially offered. However, the trial court admitted the same as falling within one
or more of the exceptions set out in Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
Sec. 34. Similar Acts as Evifence. — Evidence that one did or didnot do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a
similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, shceme, habit, custom or usage and the like.
(Empahsis supplied).
Appellant Santos now complains that the affidavit of Ronaldo Guerrero was
hearsay evidence, considering that the prosecution did not present Ronaldo
Guerrero as a witness during the trial. We consider that the trial court did not
commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose
for proving knowledge or plan or shceme, and more specifically, that appellant
knew that the particular corner of two (2) particular streets in Manila was a good
place to ambus a vehicle and its passenters. Appellant also had waived the hearsay
character of this evidence by failure seasonably to ojbect to the admission of the
affidavit; it is too late in that day to raise the hearsay rule in the appellant's
memorandum after prosecution and defense had presented their respective cases
and had made their repsective offers of evidence. 21 Finally, and in any case, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the exclusion of the Guerrero affidavit would
not result in any change in the result reached by the trial court. For that result is
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
esentially and adequately based upon the positive identification of appellant
Santos as one of the gunmen by Baustisa and Bohol.
That it took the police authorities five (5) months to locate and apprehend
appellant Santos who, it turned out, resided close by the very locale of the
ambush-slaying, did not in any way weaken the evidence of the prosecution of
detract from the conclusions reached by the trial court. The length of that period
of time shows only that police procedures are not always as efficient as they could
be and that witnesses are frequently reluctant to voluntee information to the
police authorities in criminal.
G.R. No. 133888. March 1, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES
This case is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Albay, Branch III, which imposed on accused-appellant the death
penalty for rape in Criminal Case No. 7170.
Facts: The victim, Lorielyn Nardo, is the eldest daughter of accused- appellant. She
was born on September 11, 1981 and, at the time of the incident, was fourteen
(14) years old. During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray the victim as an
incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited wherein the victim supposedly lied in order
to obtain money or her parents' permission to leave the house. The defense also
presented Atty. Gonzales (employer of the accused) as a witness which describes
the victim as the one capable of concocting lies.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of rape was established.
Ruling: While lying may constitute a habit, the court believes that the falsehoods
committed by the victim assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and
inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one's own father of the sordid
crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions. Rule 130, Section 34, of the
Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar
thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."
On the argument of the accused-appellant that the trial court should have given
credence to the witness, Atty. Santer G. Gonzales, because he is a member of the
bar, the court reasoned out that the witness took the witness stand not as a
lawyer but as an ordinary person. He testified in his capacity as accused-
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appellant's employer. As such, no special privilege should be accorded him by the
trial court by reason of his being a member of the bar. He did not appear in that
case as an officer of the court but as a mere witness, and hence should be treated
as one.
Sifting through the entire body of evidence presented in this case, the court find
nothing which would destroy the moral certainty of accused- appellant's guilt.
While there may be some inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim, these are
considered as minor inconsistencies which serve to strengthen her credibility as
they are badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood. Minor inconsistencies do
not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen rather
than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either
the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.
Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard
against memorized falsities. Besides, a rape victim cannot be expected to recall
vividly all the sordid details of the violation committed against her virtue.
G.R. No. 146030 December 3, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources,petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR.,
Facts: On Dec. of 1978, Alejaga Sr. filed a Free Patent Application with the District
Land Office is Roxas City. On March of 1979, the free patent was ordered to be
issued to him. The Defendant (Register of Deeds) also issued the OCT for the
parcel of land.
On April of that same year, Ignacio Arrobang requested the Director of Lands in
manila, through a letter, to investigate for irregularities in the issuance of the title
of a foreshore land in favor of Alejaga Sr. The investigator, Isagani Cartagena
recommended to the Director to file a civil proceeding to cancel the Free Patent
issued to Alejaga Sr.
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an
action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against
Alejaga Sr. He died pending the proceeding. He was substituted by his heirs.
The RTC declared Isagani’s testimony as hearsay and the Patent null and void, and
the CA reversed the RTC brushing aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagena’s testimony
that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free
patent application of Felipe Alejaga Sr..
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Issue: Whether Isagani’s testimony can be consider as hearsay hence cannot be
properly admitted in court?
Held: No. The report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been
successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not
actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land.
Cartagena’s statement on Recio’s alleged admission may be considered as
“independently relevant.” A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another
person -- the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the former’s
statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the
hearsay rule. Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself
to cross-examination, the Investigation Report he had submitted to the director of
the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his testimony. Those portions of the
report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are
not hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by
Recio may be considered as independently relevant.
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations
communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that,
regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the
making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue [36] or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of
such fact.
Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had
conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by
the trial court.
8. Hearsay Evidence Rule
G.R. No. 164457 April 11, 2012
ANNA LERIMA PATULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with estafa under an information filed in the RTC in
Dumaguete City that the said accused, being then a saleswoman of Footlucker’s
Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total sum
ofP131,286.97 from several customers of said company under the express
obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the
said company, but far from complying with her obligation and after a reasonable
period of time despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud
the said company, fail to deliver the said collection to the said company but
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instead, did, then and there misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her
own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company in the
aforesaid amount of P131,286.97.
Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no
stipulation of facts was had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecution’s first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the
branch manager of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc. in Dumaguete City since
October 8, 1994. The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan,
whom Footlucker’s employed as its store auditor since November 16, 1995 until
her resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had requested her to
audit petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid
their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstanding balances for
them; that she first conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from
Mabinay to Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; that she
discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original
copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the
amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to
the office; that upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written report
denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/
Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997" marked as
Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had misappropriated the total
amount ofP131,286.92.3
RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted "not to present evidence for
her defense" the Prosecution’s evidence remained "unrefuted and
uncontroverted," rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion on
May 7, 2004.
Whether or not Guivencan’s testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to
YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioner’s misappropriation or
conversion was inadmissible for being hearsay.
Held: Testimonial and documentary evidence, being hearsay, did not prove
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the information? NO.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
To establish the elements of estafa earlier mentioned, the Prosecution presented
the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various documents consisting of: (a) the
receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their
payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the
corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c)
the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and
receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of
petitioner as Footlucker’s sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded
having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from
the customers or remitted by petitioner to Footlucker’s. This means that persons
other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,
and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts
supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of
the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the
veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioner’s misappropriation
or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that
opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay,
and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section
36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to
those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The
personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft
of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose
because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a
witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived
the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be
examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not
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upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving
the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested
because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore,
be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into
any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any
contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she
entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the
burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. Thus, the rule against hearsay
testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before
a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity
to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that
explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration.
Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-
examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the
transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied
because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to
cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being the only means of testing the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of
justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to
establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a party’s right to cross-
examine her adversary’s witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first
solution is to require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be
examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court formalizes this solution,viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of witnesses
presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a)
The second solution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the cross-
examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
ensures this solution thusly:
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. – Upon the termination of
the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party
as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with
sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom
from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon
the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept
relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution,
which guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy
the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx," the rule requiring the cross-
examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its
not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being
subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception,
memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon
whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan’s testimony as well as Exhibits B
to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of
petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion.
i. Dying Declaration
People vs. Cesario Montañez and Daniel Sumaylo,
March 17, 2004,
Facts: This is a murder case of one Perlito Ollanes filed against Cesario Montañez
and Daniel Sumaylo. During trial, Edmundo Ollanes, older brother of the deceased
Perlito, testified that after their fishing along the seashore at Pangabuan, Toledo
City with Joven Hintogaya and the deceased, he heard a gunshot coming from the
direction of the house of Perlito. He rushed to the scene and saw his brother lying
prostrate. Perlito was still then alive but barely breathing when he said that he was
on the verge of death and mentioned Montañez’ name three times as the one who
shot him. Joven Hintogaya corroborated Edmundo’s testimony. He testified that
Perlito was his brother-in-law. He was carrying a kerosene lamp as he and Perlito
were on their way home that fateful night. Perlito was about seven meters away
from him. Suddenly, he heard a gunshot and saw that Perlito was hit. He fell to the
ground. Joven went near Perlito, still carrying the kerosene lamp, and saw the
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appellant holding a long handgun in his right hand. In the meantime, the appellant
went near Perlito and dropped a piece of paper with writings in the Cebuano
dialect, then left. When Perlito was carried by Edmundo to the hospital, the
former died on the way.
Trial court convicted Montañez with murder being principal and Sumaylo with
homicide. CA affirmed.
The appellant contends that both the trial court and the appellate court erred in
giving credence and full probative weight to the testimonies of Edmundo and
Joven. He insists that he was in the house of Emilia Antipolo, one-and-a-half
kilometers away from the house of the victim, when the latter was shot. Besides,
Sumaylo already confessed to being the sole assailant, and thereby absolved him
of any criminal liability for the victim’s death. The appellant argues that it was
illogical for the trial court to convict him of murder as an accomplice, although
Sumaylo, who was the principal by direct participation for the killing of the victim,
was convicted of homicide. There is no evidence on record that he conspired with
Sumaylo in killing the victim. His mere presence at the scene of the killing did not
render him criminally liable as an accomplice.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Edmundo is admissible in evidence.
Held: Yes. Perlito’s statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying
declaration. The statement is highly reliable, having been made in extremity when
the declarant is at the point of death and when any hope of survival is gone, when
every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the mind is induced by the most
powerful considerations to speak the truth. Even if the declarant did not make a
statement that he was at the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the
words and the fact that death superseded shortly afterwards may be considered
as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full
realization that he was in a dying condition.
ii. Declaration Against Interest
G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER
DOE
Facts: Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose
identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of
kidnapping Bienvenido Openda Jr. in Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial
ensued. The prosecution presented certain Salito Enriquez who testified that
Openda Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernal’s wife Naty and this was the motive
behind the Bernal’s kidnapping of Openda Jr. Another witness who testified for the
prosecution was one, Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and neighbor of the
victim who overheard at the billiard hall at about 11AM with his two companions
that a certain person has to be kidnapped and it turned out to be Openda Jr.
RTC rendered judgment finding Bernal "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr.
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution
witnesses' allegedly illusory testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Salito is admissible.
Held: Yes. Openda, Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with
Bernal’s wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
“Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.”
With the deletion of the phrase “pecuniary or moral interest” from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that “declaration against interest” has been
expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or
even penal.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to
wit: “(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact
against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration
the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
(4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
true.”
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Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to
testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own
interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence
because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
iii. Declaration about Pedigree
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORA DOMINGO
Facts: This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an
apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her
husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and consequently sold
to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of
representation from the property disputed property presenting documentary
evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent contended that the
documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants
were never presented for cross-examination.
The trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing
the complaint for reconveyance.
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal
certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient
to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the evidences are all admissible and sufficient to prove filiation? YES
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of
Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various
certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits
executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the course
and as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the
parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay
rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant
be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but
before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What
remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other
documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than
such declaration.
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against
a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant
himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common
relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be
other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not
apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not
merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other
member of the family.
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance
where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners
are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her
niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof,
the reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity
of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is
in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration
made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis
of the decedent's declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that
petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one
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case, where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship to
another person, it seems absurb to require, as a foundation for the admission of
the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish.
The preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
iv. Family Reputation
Francisco Jison vs. CA and Monina Jison, February 24, 1998
Facts: This is a case pertaining to the recognition as an illegitimate child of
Francisco Jison by one Monina Jison. Monina presented a total of 11 witnesses as
to her relationship with Francisco Jison whom she allegedly called “Daddy” since
she was a child. She also presented certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar
of Dingle, Iloilo and her baptismal certificate all to prove her allegation that
Francisco impregnated her mother (deceased) Esperanza Amolar who was then
employed as the nanny of Francisco’s daughter, Lourdes. However, Francisco
refuted all the allegations of Monina. Trial court resolved the complaint against
Monina the latter being barred by estoppel by the deed which the latter allegedly
signed when she was 25 years old withdrawing her claim as the daughter of
Francisco. CA reversed.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented is enough to establish filiation.
Held: No. On Monina’s reliance to the certifications issued by the Local Civil
registrar. MONINA’s reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
concerning her birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil
Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon
the information of a third person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not
intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself, the
inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the
mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of
voluntary acknowledgment on the latter’s part. In like manner, FRANCISCO’s lack
of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D) and
school records (Exhs. Z and AA) renders these documents incompetent to prove
paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the administration of the
sacrament of baptism on the date so specified. However, despite the
inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove paternity, they may be
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
admitted as part of MONINA’s testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO
spent for her education.
On various notes and letters written by Francisco’s relatives. As to Exhibits “S,”
“T,” “U” and “V,” the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO’s relatives,
namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively,
allegedly attesting to MONINA’s filiation, while their due execution and
authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA witnessed the authors signing the
documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these
documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-
authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the
declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in
question. As to the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section 40,
however, this requires further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree
of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family
portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring
supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion
containing the first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence,
under which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors
thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the second
underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as
private documents, fall within the scope of the clause “and the like” as qualified by
the preceding phrase “[e]ntries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rights [and] family portraits.”
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this
provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are
commonly known as “family possessions,” or those articles which represent, in
effect, a family’s joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These
have been described as objects “openly exhibited and well known to the family,”
or those “which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family
tradition.” Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
family’s reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones,
monuments or coffin plates.
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family
possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130,
Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130,
Section 41 regarding common reputation, it having been observed that:
[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in
community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by
reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question
is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits “S” to “V,” inclusive, may, in like
manner as MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her
testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized
her as his daughter. All told, MONINA’s evidence hurdled “the high standard of
proof” required for the success of an action to establish one’s illegitimate filiation
when relying upon the provisions regarding “open and continuous possession” or
“any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws;” moreover,
MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
v. Common Reputation
vi. Res Gestae
G.R. No. 147649 December 17, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANK LOBRIGAS, MARLITO
LOBRIGAS (At Large) and TEODORICO MANTE (acquitted) FRANK LOBRIGAS
Facts: This is a murder case of one Felix Taylaran who was already 76 years old
filed against Frank Lobrigas. Taylaran was a regular farmhand of Castor Guden and
on February 19, 1996, he asked permission not to work for it was raining and he
had to go to the store of Teodorico Mante. However, around 4PM, Felix returned
to Castor Guden’s house with bruises and injuries all over his body and told the
latter that he was mauled by accused. Felix spent the night in Castor’s house and
left the following morning to go to the seaside house of Lorie Aguilar, his cousin, to
heal wounds in the saltwater. However, the next day he died. Rosa Taylaran,
daughter of Felix, testified that a day after the mauling her father came to her
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
house and told her that he was beaten up by Frank Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and
Teodorico Mante.
Accused-appellant contends that there was no direct evidence linking him as one
of the assailants. He claims that while there were ante-mortem declarations made
by the victim to the two prosecution witnesses pointing to him as one of the
maulers, the trial court, nevertheless, dismissed them as invalid dying declaration
since they were uttered by the victim not under a consciousness of an impending
death. Neither should such declarations be considered as part of res gestae since
the victim was drunk and very mad at Teodorico Mante for confiscating his knife
while he was being attacked by his assailants. Lastly, the evidence of flight is not
sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
On the other hand, the prosecution argues that: (1) the victim’s declarations
naming accused-appellant as one of the assailants are admissible in evidence as
part of the res gestae since they were made immediately after a startling
occurrence; (2) the flight of accused-appellant after the incident and his
subsequent escape from custody were indicative of his guilt; and (3) there was no
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses when they testified
against accused-appellant.
ISSUE: whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the evidence of
flight are sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.
NO.
The trial court held that although the foregoing declarations cannot be deemed a
dying declaration since they do not appear to have been made by the declarant
under the expectation of a sure and impending death, the same are nonetheless
part of the res gestae. However, only the declaration made to Castor Guden are
admissible in evidence as such.
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. All these requisites concur in the case at bar. The principal act, the
mauling of the victim, was a startling occurrence. The declarations were made
shortly after the mauling incident while the victim was still under the exciting
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
influence of the startling occurrence, without any prior opportunity to contrive a
story implicating accused-appellant. The declaration concerns the circumstances
surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran.
However, the declaration made by the victim to his daughter, Rosa does not satisfy
the second requirement of spontaneity because they were made a day after the
incident and the exciting influence of the startling occurrence was no longer
present. Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa Solarte’s testimony on what her father
told her constitutes independent relevant statements distinct from hearsay, and
are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof, but as proof of the fact that they
had been uttered.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that such
statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial.
The hearsay rule does not apply, hence, the statements are admissible as
evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
vii. Entries in the Course of Business
G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC vs. JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO,
MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA
Facts: Plaintiffs Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel
Ilano and Felipe Javalera, are officers of the Negros Telephone Company who held
confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264 from Naga City to Manila on September
24, 1985, scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25 p.m. The tickets were brought
sometime in August 1985.
Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went to the check-in counter of the
defendant's Naga branch at least one (1) hour before the published departure
time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before departure, but upon
checking -in and presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who showed
up, their tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers;
plaintiffs had to go to Manila by bus, and seek actual, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees for breach of contract of carriage.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
The trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of breach of contract of
carriage in bumping-off the plaintiffs from its F264 flight of September 25, 1985,
and ordered defendant to sum of money.
PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 15, 990, the appellate court
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
Issue: Is PAL guilty of breach of contract of carriage.
Held: No.
Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party in a case is required to
prove his affirmative allegations. In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of
a party in order to support his claim is preponderance of evidence or that evidence
adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other
party (Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
83376, May 29, 1989, 173 SCRA 619, 625).
In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence
presented to corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima facie
evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private
respondents, exhs. "1," "2," "3," "4," (with emphasis on the printed condition of
the contract of carriage regarding check-in time as well as on the notation "late
4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the
check-in of private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh.
"5," (which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go an the private
respondents)are entries made in the regular course of business which the private
respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other
than their testimonies.
The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct
accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part
of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible
as apart of the res gestae. Their failure to come on time for check-in should not
militate against PAL. Their non-accommodation on that flight was the result of
their own action or inaction and the ensuing cancellation of their tickets by PAL is
only proper.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
viii. Entries in Official Records
Rudy Lao vs. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., August 14, 2003,
Facts: Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck. The truck was insured with
respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc. for the maximum amount of P200,000
and an additional sum of P50,000 to cover any damages that might be caused to
his goods.
While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April
24, 1985, in Barangay Buhang, Jaro, Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another
truck. Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds from
his policy. However, the claim was denied by the insurance company on the
ground that when its adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was found that the
driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper driver’s license
at the time of the accident. The restriction in Leonardo Anits driver’s license
provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than
4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he
therefore violated the authorized driver clause of the insurance policy. In addition,
respondent cited the contents of the police blotter of the Iloilo INP which stated
that it was Leonardo Anit who drove the truck at time of incident.
Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in fact another driver
named Giddie Boy Y Coyel who was driving the insured truck. Giddie Boy
possessed a driver’s license authorizing him to drive vehicles such as the truck
which weighed more than 4,500 kgs. As evidence, petitioner presented the Motor
Vehicle Accident Report wherein the Investigating Officer, Pat. Felipe D.
Villahermosa, stated that it was Giddie Boy driving the insured truck and not
Leonardo Anit.
Hence, petitioner filed the civil case before the RTC but the RTC dismissed the
case. On appeal with the Court of Appeals, the RTC decision was affirmed. The
petition was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied.
In his petition for review, petitioner averred that the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT RELIED MAINLY ON SECTION 44, RULE 130 OF
THE RULES OF COURT IN UPHOLDING THE ENTRY IN THE POLICE BLOTTER WHICH
STATED THAT THE DRIVER OF THE INSURED VEHICLE WAS LEONARDO ANIT Y
PANES, WHO WAS NOT AN AUTHORIZED DRIVER. UNDER THE SAID SECTION 44,
RULE 130 ITSELF HOWEVER, THE POLICE BLOTTER IS MERELY A PRIMA FACIE
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS STATED THEREIN WHICH MAY BE NULLIFIED BY OTHER
EVIDENCE.
Issue: Whether or not the police blotter is admissible as evidence.
Held: Yes. The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules
of Court. Under the said rule, the following are the requisites for its admissibility:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person,
specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the
facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was
properly admitted as they form part of official records. Entries in police records
made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law
are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may
be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although police
blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and
considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated
therein.
G.R. No. 193261 April 24, 2012
MEYNARDO SABILI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA.
FACTS: When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections,
he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight
(8) months. Prior to the 2010 elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in
1998) as Provincial Board Member representing the 4th District of Batangas.
During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the position of Representative of the
4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th District of Batangas includes Lipa City.
However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007
elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay
(Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Private respondent Florencio Librea filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some
Grounds for Disqualification" against him before the COMELEC. Citing Section 78 in
relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent alleged
that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and
likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section
39 of the Local Government Code. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath
in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight
months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.
For ease of later discussion, petitioner’s evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1)
his Income Tax Returns and corresponding Official Receipts for the years 2007 and
2008; (2) Certification from the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan; (3) Affidavit of
his common-law wife, Bernadette Palomares; and (4) Affidavits from a previous
property owner, neighbors, Certificate of Appreciation from the barangay parish
and Memorandum from the local chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
The COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent,
declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City,
and cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were
held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after
garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position. He accordingly
filed a Manifestation with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.
The COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17
August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC. Petitioner attached to his Petition a
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and proclamation of Winning Candidates for Lipa
City Mayor and Vice-Mayor issued by the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers, as
well as a copy of his Oath of Office. He also attached to his Petition another
Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador
Honrade and sworn to before a notary public.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC erred when it did not consider the Certification
issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade on the ground
that the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
HELD: YES.
The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the Certification issued by
Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade (Honrade) that petitioner
had been residing in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this oversight was
raised as an issue in petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC
brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before
a notary public and, hence, "cannot be relied on." Subsequently, petitioner
presented another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-
ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a
notary public.
We disagree with the COMELEC’s treatment of the Barangay Captain’s Certification
and find the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrade’s Certification would
not only be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due
consideration.
Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-
purpose Cooperative, Inc., we explained that the following three (3) requisites
must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined
by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated
by him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local
Government Code to "keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay."
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Regarding the second requisite, we have explicitly recognized in Mitra v.
Commission on Elections, that "it is the business of a punong barangay to know
who the residents are in his own barangay." Anent the third requisite, the
Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position
requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.
Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider
Honrade’s Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.
ix. Commercial Lists and the like
Manila Electric Company (Meralco) vs. Hon. Quisumbing and Meralco Employees
and Workers Association (MEWA), February 22, 2000, J. Ynares-Santiago.
Facts: MEWA, the duly recognized labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees of MERALCO informed the latter of its intention to re-negotiate the
terms and conditions of their existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Thereafter, collective bargaining negotiations proceeded. However, despite the
series of meetings between the negotiating panels of MERALCO and MEWA, the
parties failed to arrive at “terms and conditions” acceptable to both of them which
prompted MEWA to file a Notice of Strike with the National Capital Region Branch
of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the DOLE on the
grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practices. Upon the existence of
the strike, MERALCO filed an Urgent Petition with the DOLE Secretary praying that
the latter should assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and to enjoin the
striking employees to go back to work. Acting on such petition, the Labor Secretary
granted and resolved the labor dispute by ordering the grant of a 4,500 wage
increase, as well as a new and improved fringe benefits under the remaining 2
years of the CBA for the rank-and-file employees. Unsatisfied, MERALCO filed a
supplement to the motion for reconsideration alleging that the Secretary did not
property appreciate the effect of the awarded wages and benefits on MERALCO’s
financial viability. Hence, in a decision on January 27, 1999, the orders of the
Secretary were set aside and the wage increase is now from 1,900 to 2,200.
MERALCO warns that if the wage increase of 2,200 per month as ordered by the
Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to the
consumers through increase in the rate of electricity.
Issue: Whether or not the argument is tenable.
Held: No. This is a non sequitur. The Court cannot be threatened with such a
misleading argument. An increase in the prices of electric current needs the
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency and does not
automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of petitioner’s employees.
Besides, this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a wage
increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its
position regarding the wage issue can not be an accurate basis and conclusive
determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence
provides:
"Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant
matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein."
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may
be admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in
that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." As
correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere
newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or
opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no
sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its
accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as
this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication
was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is
generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their
accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers
containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the
reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such
reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can
be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance
with certain governmental requirements.
x. Learned Treaties
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xii. Testimony or Disposition at a former proceeding
[G.R. Nos. 115338-39. September 16, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE accused-
appellant
Facts: Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment
in large scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on a complaint initiated by
Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she was
indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court, the offended
party being Elenita Marasigan alone.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and the cases were
tried jointly in Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Of the three complainants in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale,
Marasigan was the only one who testified at the trial. The two other complainants,
Generillo and Del Rosario, were unable to testify as they were then abroad
The prosecution sought to prove that Generillo and Del Rosario, the two other
complainants in the illegal recruitment case, were also victimized by appellant. In
lieu of their testimonies, the prosecution presented as witnesses Lilia Generillo,
the mother of Imelda Generillo, and Victoria Amin, the sister of Del Rosario.
The final witness for the prosecution was Riza Balberte, a representative of the
POEA, who testified that appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment, POEA certificate certification.
On the other hand, appellant, who was the sole witness for the defense, denied
that she recruited the complainants for overseas employment and claimed that
the payments made to her were solely for purchasing plane tickets at a discounted
rate as she had connections with a travel agency.
The evidence presented by the parties were thus contradictory but the trial court
found the prosecutions evidence more credible. Judgment was rendered by said
court convicting appellant of both crimes as charged.
In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court
adopted a previous decision of Branch 78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Paranaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for
estafa, involving the same circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa. This
decision was not appealed and had become final and executory.
In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the decision therein of
the Regional Trial Court stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were the
same as those in the illegal recruitment case before it. It, therefore, adopted the
facts and conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own findings of facts
and as its rationale for the conviction in the case before it.
Issue: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of
the respondent for illegal recruitment in large scale.
Held: No. It will be noted that the principle embodied is likewise found in the
following provision of Rule 130:
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or
deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right
of confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of
cross-examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment and
appearance of the witness while testifying.
This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes
impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous
proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct
piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony
is made admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly and
expeditious. Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts
stated in the decision of the Parañaque trial court does not fall under the
exception to the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law
covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous
proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove
that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove
that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the
requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent
case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him.
As earlier stated, the Makati court’s utilization of and reliance on the previous
decision of the Parañaque court must be rejected. Every conviction must be based
on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation of the
evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact
of another court, especially where what is presented is only its decision sans the
transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which
the decision is based.
Furthermore, this is not the only reason why appellant may not be held liable for
illegal recruitment in large scale. An evaluation of the evidence presented before
the trial court shows us that, apart from the adopted decision in the previous
estafa case, there was no other basis for said trial court’s conclusion that illegal
recruitment in large scale was committed against all three complainants.
The testimonies of Generillo’s mother, Lilia Generillo, and Del Rosario’s sister,
Victoria Amin, reveal that these witnesses had no personal knowledge of the
actual circumstances surrounding the charges filed by Generillo and Del Rosario
for illegal recruitment in large scale. Neither of these witnesses was privy to the
transactions between appellant and each of the two complainants. The witnesses
claimed that appellant illegally recruited Generillo and Del Rosario. Nonetheless,
we find their averments to be unfounded as they were not even present when
Generillo and Del Rosario negotiated with and made payments to appellant.
For insufficiency of evidence and in the absence of the third element of illegal
recruitment in large scale, particularly, that “the offense is committed against
three or more persons,” we cannot affirm the conviction for illegal recruitment in
large scale. Nonetheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court that appellant
illegally recruited Marasigan, for which she must be held liable for the lesser
offense of simple illegal recruitment.
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.
FACTS: Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) docketed as Criminal Case No. 396447
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from
Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to
attend the hearing. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his
unavailability. The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral
Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at
the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice,
he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the
prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen
Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting
petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The RTC
held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases
cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules
of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in
criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of
the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an Order
dated March 5, 2006,12 the prosecution elevated the case to the CA.
On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held that
no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the
deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of
procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that,
in any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the
complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking of the oral
deposition either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be
taking the deposition of the witness.
On November 28, 2008, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Issue: WON the MTCC was correct in allowing to take the deposition of the
witness outside the PH nothwithstanding the constitutional guarantee given to
the accused
Held: NO. We rule in favor of petitioners.
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The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness
is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.
This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the
accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to
face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating
facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner
and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the
Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of
their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional
examination of witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the
prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos explicitly
states that –
"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different
modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are
adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the
conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses."
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a
prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where
the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily
appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the
trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date
of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where
the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure
or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against
the accused.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no
other place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified
the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping
before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with approval
the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls
within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said
rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of
Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present
testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility
can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of
deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the
Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not
before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a
detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial
judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in
all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the deposition-
taking before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed
allowable also under the circumstances.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the
instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise."
xii. Child Witness Rule:
G.R. No. 197813 September 25, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDWIN IBANEZ y ALBANTE
and ALFREDO (FREDDIE) NULLA y IBANEZ, Accused-appellants.
FACTS: Appellants Edwin and Alfredo, with Jesus Monsillo y Taniares (Jesus), were
all charged in an Information for Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. During arraignment, Edwin and Alfredo pleaded not guilty. Jesus, on the
other hand, remained at large; the case against him was archived. Thereafter, trial
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
ensued. The prosecution’s version was testified to by the victim’s wife and
daughter, in succession.
On that fateful day, Wilfredo was invited by Alfredo to a drinking session with
Jesus and Edwin making them a party of four. Rachel, Wilfredo’s daughter, an
adolescent at the time, was underneath the house (silong in the vernacular) of a
neighbor, three (3)meters away from the place where Wilfredo and his
companions were ostensibly in merrymaking.
Rachel saw Edwin snatched a t-shirt from a nearby clothesline, and hooded the t-
shirt over the head and face of Wilfredo. Robbed of vision as his head was fully
covered, Wilfredo was wrestled and pinned down by Edwin, while Alfredo boxed
the left side of Wilfredo’s chest. Jesus, armed with a long iron bar, swung at and
hit Wilfredo in the head. Terrified, Rachel stood immobilized as she watched the
attack on father. Thereafter, she saw her mother running out of their house and
crying for help. Edwin and Alfredo stood beside Jesus; Edwin held a white shirt.
Forthwith, Jesus and Alfredo ran away while Edwin went home. Rowena asked for
help to bring Wilfredo to the hospital. However, Wilfredo did not reach the
hospital alive and was pronounced dead on arrival.
The two accused-appellants pointed to Jesus as the sole culprit, proclaimed their
innocence and professed to being at the scene of the crime only because of their
curiosity for what had occurred.
On appeal, Edwin and Alfredo found no reprieve. The Court of Appeals did not
deviate from the RTC’s ruling and affirmed in toto its finding of guilt.
ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty of murder
HELD: YES.
Both lower courts, however, found the testimony of Rachel credible:
This Court finds the testimony of Rachel clear and convincing. The testimony flows
from a person who was present in the place where the killing occurred. They are
replete with details sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to appellants. We
have no reason to doubt Rachel’s credibility. Her candid account of the incident,
standing alone, clearly established the components of the crime of murder.
Appellants’ defense of denial, not sufficiently proven, cannot overcome the
conclusions drawn from said evidence. We find no cogent reason to deviate from
the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Rachel’s testimony was delivered in
a firm, candid, and straightforward manner. There is no showing that Rachel
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
wavered from the basic facts of her testimony, even when she was subjected to a
rigorous examination.
We find no error in the lower courts’ disposal of the issue. We have scrutinized the
testimony of lone eyewitness, Rachel. Throughout her testimony, in her direct,
cross and re-direct and re-cross examinations, she candidly recounted the events
surrounding the killing of her father.
As the lower courts have done, we accord full faith and credence to Rachel’s
testimony. She was young and unschooled, but her narration of the incident was
categorical, without wavering. It has no markings of a concocted story, impressed
upon her by other people.
We cannot take Rachel’s testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child
when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There
is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of
relating the incident truthfully.
With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is
even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that
every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the
burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the
truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s
lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot
overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.
We likewise note that the line of questioning of the defense during cross-
examination on the competency of Rachel to read and tell time did not distract her
in recollecting how her father was attacked by accused-appellants. From her
position underneath the house of her "Kuya Unyo," she saw her father, Wilfredo,
attacked by accused-appellants. Although she was astonished as the happening
unfolded, her ability to perceive, remember, and make known her perception was
not diminished.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
I. Opinion Rule
i. Expert Wintess
G.R. No. 123137. October 17, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL,
MACARIO ASTELLERO, and JANUARIO DOSDOS, accused-appellants
Facts: Appellants PO2 Albert Abriol of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
Macario Astellero, Januario Dosdos, and PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales
were charged with murder allegedly committed against Alejandro Flores alias Alex
and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 on Illegal Possession of Firearms..
The incident happened in the intersection of P. del Rosario St. and Jones Avenue,
Cebu City when one Romeo Sta. Cruz, a radio news reporter aboard his jeep,
around ABS-CBN Compound heard a couple of gunshots and saw a man shouting
for help. He also saw a red “Jiffy” which made a U-turn and stopped at beside the
fallen figure of a man and a tall, thin man alighted and fired several shots at the
prostrate figure. The Jiffy sped away but was accosted still by the police patrol cars
and arrested the persons inside the Jiffy who were now the accused. When
arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges. Since the
indictments arose from the same incident, the cases were jointly tried. The
prosecution presented SPO4 Lemuel Caser, ballistician of the PNP Crime
Laboratory to establish the gun caliber used that wounded and killed the victim.
However, the defense presented Dr. Jesus Cerna, medico-legal officer of the Cebu
City PNP Command to testify on the caliber of the firearms which might have
caused the gunshot wounds. The latter also opined that with respect to the grazing
wounds found on the victim’s body, it was impossible to determine the caliber of
the firearm used. Trial court convicted the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution’s expert witness is qualified to testify as
such capacity.
Held: Yes. An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to
which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special
knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an opinion." There is no
definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following
factors be present:
(1) training and education;
(2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and
(3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The
question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on
ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court.
We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert.
He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory
Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the
National Bureau of Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness
in at least twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases all over the country. An
expert witness need not present comparative microphotographs of test bullets
and cartridges to support his findings. Examination under a comparison
microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from
the same gun is sufficient.
G.R. No. 181444, July 17, 2013
BOBBY “ABEL” AVELINO Y BULAWAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Petitioner Bobby “Abel” Avelino y Bulawan, together with Ricardo
Tolentino, Alias Sonny Muslim, Farouk Musa a.k.a. Boy Muslim, Alias Bubut Tuwad,
Alias Angkol, Alias Mon, Renato Meneses a.k.a. Nato, Benjamin Elbona a.k.a. Toto
Mata, and Dominic Apan a.k.a. Domeng Bakukang, was charged with murder
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with the qualifying circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation.
Upon arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused Renato Meneses, Benjamin
Elbona, and Farouk Musa entered a plea of not guilty. The other accused remain
at-large.
At the trial, the prosecution presented eight witnesses: Delia Hispano, the wife of
the victim; Diana Espinosa; Alfredo Manalangsang (Manalangsang); Mary Ann
Cañada (Cañada); Renato Sosas; Dr. Romeo T. Salen; P/Insp. Mario Prado; and
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent Rizaldi Jaymalin.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Denying the accusation, the defense presented as evidence the testimonies of
petitioner, PO2 Anthony P. Galang, Adonis T. Bantiling and Scene of the Crime
Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito D. Cabamongan (Cabamongan).
Petitioner advanced the defense of denial and alibi. After trial, the RTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by
treachery, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
For failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused Farouk Musa, Benjamin Elbona, and Renato Meneses were acquitted of
the crime charged. The CA, in its assailed decision, denied petitioner’s appeal and
upheld the RTC decision.
Aggrieved, petitioner now seeks to reverse his conviction, arguing that the CA
erred in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang
and Cañada and disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements of
Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as
to the position of the gunman. He also reiterated his defense of denial and alibi.
Issue: WON the evidences of the prosecution is sufficient to warrant conviction?
HELD: YES
The allegations of petitioner cannot exculpate him from criminal liability.
Manalangsang unequivocally identified the petitioner as the gunman.
Manalangsang was able to identify the petitioner because the latter revealed his
face when he pulled down the bonnet he was wearing, thereby exposing his eyes,
nose, mouth, and chin.
The identification made by Manalangsang was likewise sufficiently corroborated
by the testimony of Cañada, that she saw the petitioner, with whom she was
familiar, drive away in Hispano’s owner-type jeep, wearing a green jacket and
black bonnet rolled up to his forehead.
Further, as can be gleaned from the excerpt below, the petitioner’s defense that
Manalangsang’s testimony contradicts with the medical findings, and should then
be disregarded, must fail. Petitioner claims that Manalangsang’s statements that
Hispano was shot in a downward direction conflict with the findings of the medico-
legal that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward direction.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
The CA was also correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI
Cabamongan as regards the position of the gunman when the latter shot Hispano.
Cabamongan asserted that the gunman was on board the owner-type jeep when
Hispano was shot, which is opposed to Manalangsang’s testimony. However, case
records reveal that Cabamongan was presented as an ordinary witness. Hence, his
opinion regarding the location of the gunman in relation to the place where the
empty shells were found is immaterial. Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a)
the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and (b) the witness has
been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make
the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.
Jurisprudence further provides that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do
not destroy the probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very
act of the accused. The case of Madali v. People elucidates thus:
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all
material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the
declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well settled
thatimmaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very
material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As
long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material
points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their
credibility.Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a
prosecution witness. Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the
gunman by Manalangsang, as corroborated by Cañada, must stand. Indeed, it has
been consistently held by this Court that in criminal cases the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge,
whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge
has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if
they are telling the truth or not. Absent any showing that the lower courts
overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would change
the result of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial court’s appreciation of
the facts and of the credibility of witnesses, especially since Manalangsang and
Cañada’s testimony meets the test of credibility. The Court also notes that other
than his claim of denial, petitioner failed to show how the prosecution failed to
overcome the presumption of innocence.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
ii. Ordinary Witness
G.R. Nos. 134074-75. January 16, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMILIANO DURANAN, a.k.a. Kalbo
Facts: This is a rape case of one named by court as AAA (Mania Lozada) filed
against Emiliano Duranan alias “Kalbo”. Complainant was 25 years old and
considered to be retarded and finished only up to Grade VI, unemployed and
simply helped in the household chores for her family while Kalbo was a tenant in
the apartment rented by the family of AAA. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to each charge of rape against him, whereupon he was tried.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant AAA,
complainants mother BBB, and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame,
Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.
Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence, but the trial court denied it.
The defense thereafter presented its witnesses, namely, accused-appellant
Emiliano Duranan, accused-appellants alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and
Carlito Catubig, and his wife Carlita Duranan.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused-appellant guilty of two
counts of rape.
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of
rape since the victim’s mental age was not proven. He argues that under Art.
335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the prosecution for
rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainant’s mental
age to determine if her mental age is under twelve. He further claims that only in
cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical
deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be
waived.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the mother as to the sanity of her
daughter is admissible.
Held: Yes.
Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given may be received in evidence regarding ---
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she
knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she
is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the
matter.
It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or
mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity
to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.
Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon
which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme
Court of Vermont said: “A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity
or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has
had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his
mental condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and observation, he having
first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts,
as the basis for his opinion.
J. Character Evidence
G.R. No. 130601. December 4, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN
Facts: Dominga Pikit-pikit was on her way home from work when suddenly a man
appeared from behind, looped his arm around her neck and warned her not to
shout or else she would die. The man dragged her through the banana plantation
towards the cornfields. Dominga got a good look at the man, who turned out to be
Rafael Diopita, as he sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her of her
belongings. Thereafter, Diopita announced his desire to have carnal knowledge of
Dominga. After having his way with her, Diopita threatened Dominga not to tell
anyone about the incident or else he would shoot her. Dominga was able to report
the incident to the police and gave the description of the suspect and his possible
whereabouts. A colored white/yellow, size 10 slipper was found in the scene of the
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
crime. In a police line-up, Dominga readily pointed to Diopita which was further
bolstered by the fact that when the police had him try the slipper, it easily fitted
him. In his defense, Diopita posed the alibi that he was at an informal Bible session
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses at the time of the crime. The trial court convicted
Diopita stating that alibi is a weak form of defense. Among Diopita’s arguments is
that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a
person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of “Ministerial
Servant” in the congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a
righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the
word of God.
Issue: Whether or not the testimonies of the accused of his good moral character
is sufficient to acquit him of his charges.
Held: No. The SC affirmed his conviction; the guilt of accused-appellant has been
established by the evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly
justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his
having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee
against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part.
Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the
unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not
entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and
exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved
on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving
his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the
instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral
character of accused-appellant is unavailing.
In light of this positive and direct evidence of accused-appellants culpability, the
trial court correctly discarded his defense of alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi
cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the very
person who committed the crime. Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based
on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
(a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b) it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. This, accused-appellant miserably failed to do.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Rule 131 BURDEN OF PROOFS AND PRESUMPTIONS
1. Burden of Proof vs Burden of Evidence
G.R. No. 170598 October 9, 2013
FAR EAST BANK TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. ROBERTO MAR CHANTE, a.k.a.
ROBERT MAR G. CHAN, Respondents.
FACTS: Chan, was a current account depositor of petitioner FEBTC at its Ongpin
Branch (Current Account No. 5012-00340-3). FEBTC issued to him Far East Card
No. 05-01120-5-0 with July 1993 as the expiry date.
Civil Case No. 92-61706 sprang from the complaint brought by petitioner FEBTC on
July 1, 1992 in the RTC, to recover from Chan the principal sum of P770,488.30
representing the unpaid balance of the amount fraudulently withdrawn from
Chan’s Current Account No. 5012-00340-3 with the use of Far East Card No. 05-
01120-5-0. FEBTC alleged that at the time of the ATM withdrawal transactions,
there was an error in its computer system known as "system bug" whose nature
had allowed Chan to successfully withdraw funds in excess of his current credit
balance of P198,511.70; and that Chan had taken advantage of the system bug to
do the withdrawal transactions.
On his part, Chan denied liability. Although admitting his physical possession of Far
East Card No. 05-01120-5-0 on May 4 and May 5, 1992, he denied making the ATM
withdrawals totalling P967,000.00, and instead insisted that he had been actually
home at the time of the withdrawals. He alluded to a possible "inside job" as the
cause of the supposed withdrawals, citing a newspaper report to the effect that an
employee of FEBTC’s had admitted having debited accounts of its depositors by
using his knowledge of computers as well as information available to him. Chan
claimed that it would be physically impossible for any human being like him to
stand long hours in front of the ATM facility just to withdraw funds. He contested
the debiting of his account, stating that the debiting had affected his business and
had caused him to suffer great humiliation after the dishonor of his sufficiently-
funded checks by FEBTC.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of FEBTC.
Chan appealed. The CA promulgated the assailed decision, reversing the RTC’s
judgment. FEBTC moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion.
ISSUE: Did FEBTC discharge its burden of proof?
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
HELD: NO.
The CA ruled that FEBTC did not because –
“After a review of the records of this case, we find the totality of evidence
submitted by FEBTC insufficient to establish the crucial facts that would justify a
judgment in its favor.
To our mind, the fact that Chan’s account number and ATM card number were the
ones used for the withdrawals, by itself, is not sufficient to support the conclusion
that he should be deemed to have made the withdrawals.”
In his answer, he denied using the card to withdraw funds from his account on the
dates in question, and averred that the withdrawals had been an "inside job." His
denial effectively traversed FEBTC’s claim of his direct and personal liability for the
withdrawals, that it would lose the case unless it competently and sufficiently
established that he had personally made the withdrawals himself, or that he had
caused the withdrawals. In other words, it carried the burden of proof.
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts,
namely: (a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply
persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going
forward with the evidence, or simply the production burden or the burden of
evidence. In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given
proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the
case at which the issue arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of producing
evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in order to make or
meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second concept
passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests
throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.
The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because
mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not
he who denies, must prove.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no
evidence is given on either side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts
from the responsibility of investigating and presenting the facts and arguments,
placing that responsibility entirely upon the respective parties. The burden of
proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if
the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner
required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses,
that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability.
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court sets the quantum of evidence for civil
actions, and delineates how preponderance of evidence is determined.
As the rule indicates, preponderant evidence refers to evidence that is of greater
weight, or more convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition to it. It is
proof that leads the trier of facts to find that the existence of the contested fact is
more probable than its nonexistence.
Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of
upon the weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to
preponderantly demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to make the
withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another
person to make the fraudulent withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from
him any funds supposedly improperly withdrawn from the ATM account. We
remind that as a banking institution, FEBTC had the duty and responsibility to
ensure the safety of the funds it held in trust for its depositors. It could not avoid
the duty or evade the responsibility because it alone should bear the price for the
fraud resulting from the system bug on account of its exclusive control of its
computer system.
2. Presumptions
A. Conclusive Presumptions
G.R. No. 123817. December 17, 1999
IBAAN RURAL BANK INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR. and MRS. RAMON
TARNATE
Facts: Spouses Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of three (3) lots
mortgaged to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. On June 11, 1976, with the knowledge and
consent of the petitioner, the spouses as sellers, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Tarnate
[herein private respondents] as buyers, entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question. Private respondents failed to pay
the loan and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The
Provincial Sheriff conducted a public auction of the lots and awarded the lots to
the bank, the sole bidder. On December 13, 1978, the Provincial Sheriff issued a
Certificate of Sale which was registered on October 16, 1979. The certificate stated
that the redemption period expires two (2) years from the registration of the sale.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
No notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was given to the private respondents. On
September 23, 1981, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots
and tendered the redemption amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank
refused the redemption on the ground that it had consolidated its titles over the
lots. The Provincial Sheriff also denied the redemption on the ground that private
respondents did not appear on the title to be the owners of the lots.
Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their
redemption of the foreclosed lots. They alleged that the extra-judicial foreclosure
was null and void for lack of valid notice and demand upon them. They further
argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed lots because they offered
to redeem and tendered the redemption price before October 16, 1981, the
deadline of the 2-year redemption period.
After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled in favor of herein private
respondents and against the petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
with modification the decision of the lower court.
Issue: Whether or not the right to redeem had already prescribed.
Held: No. When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive
knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For two years, it did not object to
the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said
that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it had
time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part
of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as
consent. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to
believe that they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the
lapse of two years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for
redemption was only one year and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in
pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own
silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence,
induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and
acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny
the existence of such facts.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
G.R. No. 128568. April 9, 2003
SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA ALCARAZ vs. PEDRO M.
TANGGA-AN, MENAS R. TANGGA-AN, VIRGINIA III YVETTE R. TANGGA-AN, CECIL
T. VILLAFLOR, HERMES R. TANGGA-AN, VENUS R. TANGGA-AN, JUPITER R.
TANGGA-AN, YVONNE T. FRI, VIVIEN R. TANGGA-AN and HON. JUDGE P. BURGOS
and THE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: On October 4, 1994, respondents Pedro Tangga-an, Menas Tangga-an,
Virginia III Yvette Tangga-an, Cecil Villaflor, Hermes Tangga-an, Venus Tangga-an,
Jupiter Tangga-an, Yvonne Fri and Vivien Tangga-an filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer, with damages, against petitioner spouses Reynaldo Alcaraz and
Esmeralda Alcaraz over a residential building without including the lot which such
building stood. The lessor here is the late Virginia Tangga-an who was the spouse
of herein respondent Pedro Tangga-an pertaining to a residential building located
at Premier Street, Hipodromo, Cebu City while the lessee was herein petitioner.
The lease contract was limited to the use and occupancy of said building exclusive
of the lot because said lot was owned by the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Under such contract, the Spouses were bound to pay rents for 5 years but was
reneged of such obligation. Hence, respondent sought to repossess the premises.
However, petitioner alleged that on July 23, 1993, they stopped paying rents to
herein respondent but instead to the new owners of such lot who were Virgilio
and Angelita. In ruling in favor of the respondents, the MTC held that the
petitioner spouses clearly violated the contract of lease due to non-payment of
rent. They failed to show that the subject house belonged to Virgilio alone. On the
other hand, the respondents proved that, after the death of Virgilia, they
registered said house in the name of their trustees, co-respondents Hermes
Tangga-an and his wife.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition for review and affirming the judgments of the courts a quo.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was correct in arguing that with the change
of ownership of such leased premises, there was already an automatic
cancellation of their lease contract.
Held: No. There is no need, however, to disturb and analyze the applicability of
this well-entrenched principle because the petitioner spouses are estopped from
raising the same. Both parties knew that their contract pertained only to the lease
of the house, without including the land. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
provides as a conclusive presumption that:
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or
omission, be permitted to falsify it;
xxx xxx xxx
After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner
spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the
ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired
title over the lot.
The SC also held that the petitioner spouses rescinded the contract of lease
without judicial approval. Due to the change in ownership of the land, the
petitioner spouses decided to unilaterally cancel the contract because Virgilio
supposedly became the new owner of the house after acquiring title to the lot.
They alleged that there was no reason anymore to perform their obligations as
lessees because the lessor had ceased to be the owner of the house. But there is
nothing in their lease contract that allows the parties to extrajudicially rescind the
same in case of violation of the terms thereof. Extrajudicial rescission of a contract
is not possible without an express stipulation to that effect. What the petitioner
spouses should have done was to file a special civil action for interpleader for the
claimants to litigate their claims and to deposit the rentals in court.
B. Disputable Presumptions
G.R. No. 175874 December 11, 2013
HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA, vs. HEIRS OF DIONISIO CANADA
FACTS: Petitioners are heirs of Cipriano Trazona (Cipriano), who owned an untitled
parcel of land referred to as Lot No. 5053-H. In 1949, Dionisio bought the adjacent
parcel of land from Pilar Diaz. It was later found that he had encroached on a small
portion of Lot No. 5053-H. In 1956, the latter gave Dionisio permission to
temporarily build a house on said portion, where it still stands. No action for
ejectment was filed against Dionisio during the lifetime of Cipriano.
The present controversy arose in 1997. Petitioners went to the Office of the
Municipal Assessor to secure a copy of Tax Declaration No. 07764, as they
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
intended to sell Lot No. 5053-H. To their surprise, they were informed that Tax
Declaration No. 07764 had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Tax Declaration No.
23959 was issued on 24 June 1996 in the name of Dionisio. Apparently,
respondents had caused the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 23959 by submitting a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 supposedly executed by Cipriano in
favor of Dionisio. That sale involved a portion of Lot No. 5053-H.
Petitioners summoned respondents before the Lupon Tagapamayapa, but the
conciliation was not successful. On 28 July 1997, petitioners filed a Complaint
against respondents for quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale, cancellation of
Tax Declaration No. 23959, recovery of possession and ownership, damages, and
payment of attorney’s fees. Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 27 June 1956 was a forgery. Respondents, in their Answer, alleged that
the assailed deed was a genuine document and asked for the payment of moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees, as counterclaims.
The RTC ruled in favour of the petitioners.
The CA issued a Decision reversing that of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners were not able to overturn the presumption of
regularity of the assailed deed
HELD: NO.
Petitioners presented clear and convincing evidence that the assailed deed is a
forgery.
We sustain the findings of the RTC.
As will be shown below, the assailed deed is a forgery. Assuming it were genuine,
petitioners have a right to the rest of the property not covered by the purported
sale. If the procedure for the issuance of tax declarations was followed – if care
had been observed to make sure that all papers were in order and understood –
this irregularity would not have taken place. It is true that notarized documents
are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. Nevertheless,
while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption
is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and
more than merely preponderant. Here, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we
find clear and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of
regularity of the assailed deed.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the
assailed deed had been forged. In concluding that the signature of Cipriano in the
assailed deed was a forgery, the document examiner found that there were
"significant differences in letter formation, construction and other individual
handwriting characteristics" between the assailed and the standard signatures of
Cipriano.
Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature
was forged. It likewise supported its finding that the signature was forged through
independent observation:
Finally, a scrutiny of the signature on the questioned deed of sale compared to the
eleven (11) signatures on the ten (10) standard documents there exists a glaring
difference in the letter formation of capital letters "C" in Cipriano and "T" in
Trazona.
Third, the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 11 April 1953 brings into
question the regularity of the assailed deed. This deed was never disputed by
respondents at any stage of the proceedings, and was in fact admitted by them in
their Comments to Plaintiffs’ Additional Formal Offer of Exhibits.
Fourth, Cipriano had cultivated the property and paid taxes thereon since the time
he acquired it from the government, and even after its purported sale to Dionisio,
until his death. Petitioners continued paying the taxes thereon even after Cipriano
had died. Respondents started paying taxes on the property only after Tax
Declaration No. 23959 was issued in Dionisio’s name in 1997. It would be absurd
for petitioners to pay taxes on a property they do not own.
Fifth, as admitted by Gorgonio himself, petitioners were the ones enjoying the
fruits of the property from 1960 until the present controversy. Again, it is
incongruous for petitioners to enjoy the fruits if respondents owned the property.
Sixth, as the RTC noted, there was an irregularity regarding the place of issuance of
Cipriano’s residence certificate indicated in the assailed deed, as compared with
the residence certificates of the other persons indicated on the same page of the
notarial register.
Finally, when the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives
presented the assailed deed, the paper was noted to be white, while its supposed
contemporaries in the bunch from where it was taken had turned yellow with age.
Further, when the analyst was asked the question of when- the assailed deed was
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
received by the Bureau of Archives, she answered that it was forwarded to them
only on 28 September 1987 by RTC Region 7, Notarial Division.
Clearly, the evidence adduced fully supports the position of petitioners that the
assailed deed of sale is forged and that they are the owners of the property.
Having been forced to litigate in order to protect their interest therein, the award
of attorney's fees and litigation expenses to them is in order.
Suppression of Testimony
G.R. No. 137664. May 9, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a. ROBERTO SAN
MIGUEL
Facts: Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Michael San Antonio, Jocel
Ibaneta and Abelardo Triumpante were charged with rape committed against
Rowena Contridas. All the accused, including appellant Roberto Padrigone,
interposed the defense of denial and alibi.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution evidence and rendered a decision
convicting the accused ROBERTO PADRIGONE a.k.a. ROBERTO SAN MIGUEL,
GUILTY of the crime of Rape, under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (as
amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659) while the other accused JOCEL IBANITA,
MICHAEL SAN ANTONIO and ABELARDO TRIUMPANTE are ACQUITTED.
On appeal, the appellant contends that the prosecution evidence was insufficient
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant assails the procedural
irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial court. He claims that
the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena, the victim, when
the latter should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court
deprived appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly
declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it was only appellant who raped
her which declaration became the basis for the latter’s conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the non-presentation of Rowena in the witness stand
deprives the accused of right to cross-examine which is suppression of testimony
against them.
Held: No. The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be
considered as suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
of Court, the rule that “evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced” does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b)
the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
(d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had
the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her
as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand. Second,
Rowena was certified to be suffering from “Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition”
and thus “cannot stand judicial proceedings yet.” The non-presentation, therefore,
of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa
was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.
(Official Duty) G.R. No. 122899. June 8, 2000
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts: The subject property is a parcel of land in Diliman, Quezon City originally
owned by businessman Tomas Chia. Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr.
Chia offered the subject property for sale to private respondent G.T.P.
Development Corporation with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor
of petitioner METROBANK secured by the subject property.
The deed of sale and the memorandum of agreement between Mr. Chia and
respondent GTP were eventually executed and signed. Twelve days later, Atty.
Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid P116,416.71 for which
METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment. This
notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate
mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza,
thus prompting respondent GTP to file an action for specific performance against
petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the regional trial granted the reliefs prayed
for by respondent GTP as plaintiff. On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision reversing the trial court's decision.
GTP filed before respondent Court of Appeals a "motion for reconsideration with
alternative prayer to require METROBANK to furnish appellee of the alleged
unpaid balance of Mr. Chia."
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Respondent Court of Appeals took a second hard look at the evidence on hand and
seriously considered METROBANK's refusal to specify any unpaid debt secured by
the subject property, in concluding anew that "the present case for specific
performance is well-grounded, absent indubitable showing that the aforesaid
amount of P116,416.71 paid by appellee on September 16, 1980 did not suffice to
pay in full the mortgage debt assumed under the Deed of Absolute Sale, with
assumption of mortgage, it inked with the late Tomas Chia. There is therefore
merit in its motion for reconsideration at bench." Petitioner METROBANK now
filed its motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the real estate mortgage should be discharged.
Held: Yes. Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the
real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other
unliquidated past due loans." In Maneclang vs. Baun, this Court enumerated the
requisites for estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit:
"1.....there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts;
"2.....the representation must have been with knowledge of the facts;
"3.....the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the
matter; and
"4.....it must have been with the intention that the other party would act upon it.
Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, requested from METROBANK that he be
furnished a copy of the full indebtedness secured by the real estate mortgage. In
response thereto, petitioner METROBANK issued a statement of account as of
September 15, 1980 which amount was immediately settled and paid the next day
amounting to P116, 416.71. Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred from taking a
stand inconsistent with its representation upon which respondent GTP, as an
innocent third person to the real mortgage agreement, placed exclusive reliance.
Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent
Court of Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other
unliquidated past due loans" at the scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. It was a
golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for petitioner METROBANK to defend its non-
release of the real estate mortgage. Thus, the following pronouncements of this
Court in Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals et. al, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Ricardo Francisco, find rightful application, viz.-
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
"It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact
which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence
which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not
founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises
that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the
case of his adversary. x x x"
"No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a
fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be
taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist."
"Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the
ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected
by the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may
well be taken as admitted with all the effect of the inferences afforded. x x x"
"The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own
control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most
unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have
shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing party."
G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013
FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS, JOSEFA A. BACALTOS, NELANIE A. ANTONI, AND
MAUREEN A. BIEN, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY ITS
COMMISSIONERS
FACTS: Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco of the
Second District of Cebu City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, represented by Dr. Alquizalas, Medical
Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of
indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program).
In line with this, Ma. Isabel Cuenco, Project Director of the TNT Program, wrote
petitioner Nelanie Antoni (Antoni), Pharmacist V of VSMMC, requesting the latter
to purchase needed medicines not available at the hospital pharmacy from Sacred
Heart Pharmacy or Dell Pharmacy which were supposedly accredited suppliers of
the Department of Health. The said request was approved.
Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and
falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines under the
TNT Program surfaced. On December 14, 2004, petitioner Delos Santos, who
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
succeeded Dr. Alquizalas, created a fact-finding committee to investigate the
matter.
Within the same month, Beatriz M. Booc, State Auditor IV came up with her own
review of the account for drugs and medicines charged to the PDAF of Cuenco. She
furnished Delos Santos the results of her review as contained in Audit Observation
Memoranda.
Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee created by Delos Santos submitted its
Report essentially affirming the “unseen and unnoticeable” irregularities
attendant to the availment of the TNT Program. Consequently, a special audit
team, led by Team Leader Atty. Federico E. Dinapo, Jr., State Auditor V, was
formed pursuant to Legal and Adjudication Office Orders to conduct a special audit
investigation with respect to the findings of Booc and her team.
Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008, the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado, issued
an order disallowing the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and
medicines for anti-rabies with falsified prescription and documents, and holding
petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily liable therefor.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective appeals before the CoA which were
denied maintaining their solidary liability.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision was further denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
petitioners solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10.
Held: NO. Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice,
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. However,
this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. For
instance, in Reyna v. CoA60, the Court affirmed the liability of the public officers
therein, notwithstanding their proffered claims of good faith, since their actions
violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines’ Manual on Lending
Operations. In similar regard, the Court, in Casal v. CoA (Casal), sustained the
liability of certain officers of the National Museum who again, notwithstanding
their good faith participated in approving and authorizing the incentive award
granted to its officials and employees in violation of Administrative Order Nos. 268
and 29 which prohibit the grant of productivity incentive benefits or other
allowances of similar nature unless authorized by the Office of the President. In
Casal, it was held that, even if the grant of the incentive award was not for a
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dishonest purpose, the patent disregard of the issuances of the President and the
directives of the CoA amounts to gross negligence, making the [“approving
officers”] liable for the refund [of the disallowed incentive award].
Just as the foregoing public officers in Reyna and Casal were not able to dispute
their respective violations of the applicable rules in those cases, the Court finds
that the petitioners herein have equally failed to make a case justifying their non-
observance of existing auditing rules and regulations, and of their duties under the
MOA. Evidently, petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of
Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified
prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the
VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne out by the
referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. Had there been an internal control
system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and
the hospital would have been prevented from processing falsified claims and
unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners cannot escape
liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office on
the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that it was his money. Neither may
deviations, from the usual procedure at the hospital, such as the admitted
bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in the qualification of the indigent-
beneficiaries, be justified as “a welcome relief to the already overworked and
undermanned section of the hospital.”
All told, petitioners’ acts and/or omissions as detailed in the assailed CoA
issuances and as aforedescribed reasonably figure into the finding that they failed
to faithfully discharge their respective duties and to exercise the required diligence
which resulted to the irregular disbursements from Cuenco’s PDAF. In this light,
their liability pursuant to Sections 10473 and 10574 of the Auditing Code, as well
as Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts, as
prescribed in CoA Circular No. 2009-006, must perforce be upheld.
G.R. No. 191263 October 16, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HADJI SOCOR CADIDIA
FACTS: Cadidia was arrested at the airport and information was filed against her
for violation of RA 9165. The prosecution presented Trayvilla, that while
performing her duty as a female frisker assigned at the Manila Domestic Airport
Terminal I in Pasay City, she frisked the accused Cadidia upon her entry at the
departure area and she noticed something unusual and thick in the area of
Cadidia’s buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia answered that it was only her sanitary
napkin which caused the unusual thickness. Not convinced with Cadidia’s
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-employee Bagsican brought the accused
to the comfort room inside the domestic airport to check. When she and Bagsican
asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they discovered that inside were two
sachets of shabu. The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their supervisor
SPO3 Appang.
The second prosecution witness, Bagsican, corroborated the testimony of Trayvilla.
Finally, the prosecution presented domestic airport Police Supervisor SPO3 Appang
who testified that he turned over the two plastic sachets and sanitary napkin to
the Intelligence and Investigation Office of the 2nd RASO, Domestic International
Airport.
Upon arraignment, Cadidia entered a plea of "not guilty." The trial court found the
accused-appellant guilty as charged. On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended
that the trial court gravely erred when it failed to consider the conflicting
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses’ Trayvilla and Bagsican. Appellant
likewise argued against her conviction by the trial court despite the fact that the
identity of the illegal drugs allegedly seized was not proven with moral certainty
due to the broken chain of custody of evidence.
The People, through the OSG countered that the inconsistencies of the
prosecution’s witnesses did not touch on material points. Hence, they can be
disregarded for they failed to affect the credibility of the evidence as a whole. The
alleged inconsistencies failed to diminish the fact that the accused-appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto at the departure area of the domestic airport
transporting shabu. The defenses of frame-up and alibi cannot stand against the
positive testimonies of the witnesses absent any showing that they were impelled
with any improper motive to implicate her of the offense charged. Finally, the OSG
posited that the integrity of evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is
any showing of bad faith, and accused-appellant failed to overcome this
presumption.
In its decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the
crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to establish the chain of custody
of the alleged confiscated drug
HELD: NO. In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should
be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially
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when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in
a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the
police to impute the crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as
an airport frisker when she handled the accused who entered the x-ray machine of
the departure area. There was no pre-determined notice to particularly search the
accused especially in her private area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of the
accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of
the incident. The subsequent search of the accused would only show that the two
female friskers were just doing their usual task when they found the illegal drugs
inside accused’s underwear. This is bolstered by the fact that the accused on the
one hand and the two friskers on the other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither
could they harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation of frame-up and
denial of the accused cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of three
prosecution witnesses who corroborated on circumstances surrounding the
apprehension.
Further, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and
respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on
the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. Applying the foregoing,
we affirm the findings of the lower court in the appreciation of facts and credibility
of the witnesses.
The accused harps on the alleged broken chain of custody of the confiscated
drugs. She casts doubt on the identity of the drugs allegedly taken from her and
the one presented in open court to prove her guilt. She also questions the lack of
physical inventory of the confiscated items at the crime scene, the absence of
photographs taken on the alleged illegal drugs and the failure to mark the seized
items upon confiscation.
The duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is
discharged when the arresting law enforcer ensures that the chain of custody is
unbroken.
In Mallillin v. People, the requirements to establish chain of custody were laid
down by this Court. First, testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence. Second,
witnesses should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the item.
The prosecution in this case was able to prove, through the testimonies of its
witnesses, that the integrity of the seized item was preserved every step of the
process.
The SC also held that airport frisking is an authorized form of search and seizure.
As held in similar cases of People v Johnson and People v Canton, the Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction or the accused Leila Reyes Johnson and Susan
Canton for violation of drugs law when they were found to be in hiding in their
body illegal drug he Court in both cases explained the rationale for the validity of
airport frisking thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure or
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack or subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to hoard an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors: their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage arc routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest
the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine
what the objects are upon airport frisking.
G.R. No. 119072. April 11, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS EDUALINO
Facts: Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with rape allegedly committed against
AAA, 22 yrs old married woman with child. The incident happened in Mambalot,
Brooke’s Point, Palawan when AAA and her mother went on a dance. When AAA
was already drunk, Edualino took advantage of the same and had carnal
knowledge with her. However, the defense had a different version in such a way
that Edualino established the indecency, and other negative attributes of AAA to
show that such rape was with her consent and through her fault, being allegedly
under the influence of marijuana. Trial court convicted Edualino. The conviction of
accused-appellant is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.
Accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant AAA. It is
argued that a responsible and decent married woman, who was then three (3)
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
months pregnant, would not be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk
much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer. It is
contended that complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her
marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking
alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-
appellant on 11 May 1994 while she was under the influence of drugs and alcohol.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the accused has probative value
Held: No. At the outset of this discussion, it should be pointed out that the moral
character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the
accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes can be the victims of rape.
In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was
drunk and under the influence of drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be
considered a decent and responsible married woman, were true, said
circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped.
Accused-appellant cannot successfully argue that no rape occurred because no
medical examination was conducted to confirm the presence of spermatozoa in
her private parts.
The Court has repeatedly held that a medical examination of the victim is not a
prerequisite in prosecutions for rape.
A person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim
provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent
with human nature and the course of things.
After a careful and thorough study of the records of the case, the Court is
convinced that the constitutional presumption of accused-appellant's innocence
has been overcome by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Rule 132: PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
1. Order of Presentation of Evidence
G.R. No. 146697. July 23, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE
Facts: Leonardo Fabre was charged with rape before Regional Trial Court, Br. VI, of
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, because of raping his own daughter Marilou Fabre.
Accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial, the prosecution
presented the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife
of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou,
along with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement
of Adela, and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The
defense, during its turn in the presentation of evidence, countered with the
testimony of the accused himself. It also called Adela Fabre back to the witness
stand.
The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly
to the narration of the young complainant, expressing a quote from an
observation once made by this Tribunal in one of its decision that even when
consumed with revenge, it (would) take a certain amount of psychological
depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which (could) put her own father
for the rest of his remaining life in jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to
a lifetime of shame.
RTC Convicted the accused. The case was elevated to SC on automatic review.
The accused averred that THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO ACCUSED APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND DENIAL. he defense
argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added
strength for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him
and to present any rebuttal evidence. The cross-examination of a witness is a
prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of cross-
examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made
on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any
further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is
the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give
full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he
is not cross-examined by the other party.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the accused is tenable.
Held: No. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against
whom the witness is called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth
or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination. The party
against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination
unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or
thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the
court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the
testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-
examined by the other party.
The alibi of appellant itself would not appear to be deserving of serious
consideration. His account that at the time of the alleged rape he was working at a
coconut plantation, just about one kilometer away from the place of the crime,
hardly would amount to much. Nor would the testimony of Adela Fabre, his wife,
merit any better regard. At first, she testified that on the day of the rape incident,
she had left their house at four o'clock in the afternoon. Later, however, she
changed her story by saying that she had left the house in the morning and
returned only at ten o'clock that same morning, staying home the whole day
thereafter. In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough
for an accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he would have to demonstrate likewise that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time
of its commission. Clearly, in the instant case, it was not at all impossible nor even
improbable for appellant to have been at the crime scene.
Upon the other hand, the evidently candid and straightforward testimony of
Marilou should be more than enough to rebut the claim of innocence made by
appellant.
2. Leading and Misleading Questions
G.R. No. 142556. February 5, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Facts: On January 22, 1997, the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Zambales filed an Information charging appellant with the crime of rape penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III
of Republic Act No. 7610.
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio Atty. Genaro N.
Montefalcon, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged..
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: the
victim, Mayia Ponseca; the victims mother, Hermie Ponseca; the victims father,
Osias Ponseca; Virginia Espejo Giron; and Dr. Editha dela Cruz Divino. On the other
hand, the defense presented appellant and his employer, Bartolome Tolentino.
Appellant denied raping Mayia. Appellant testified that on the date of the alleged
rape incident, he was working at a fishpond at Macarang, Zambales. He heard of
the rape of a young girl from his manager, Bartolome Tolentino.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that his nickname is not Johnny but
Jessie. He testified that on January 17, 1997, at around 12 oclock noon, he left the
fishpond and walked home to Barangay Alwa which was about thirty meters from
the fishpond. The defense formally offered the testimony of witness Tolentino to
prove that appellant was employed as caretaker of Tolentinos fishpond for almost
two years before the alleged rape incident. Appellant was purportedly of good
moral character while employed as a fishpond caretaker. The prosecution
admitted the offer of testimony. Hence, the trial court dispensed with the
testimony of Tolentino in open court.
The Trial Court convicted the appellant. The case was elevated to SC on automatic
review. Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was
highly irregular. Appellant points out that the prosecutor had already identified
him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor asked Mayia to
identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that when Mayia identified him in
open court, she referred to him as a man named Johnny and did not give any
description or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in
the cell when Mayia identified him after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails
that the identification was not done with the usual police line-up.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court is correct in propounding leading questions
to the victim in open court which is a departure from the usual question and
answer in regular courts.
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Held: Yes. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide
for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult
for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions
are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the
trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently
young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain. As
explained in People v. Rodito Dagamos:
"The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising
control over the questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000,
namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that
questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child,
(3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid
waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed
if the same will further the interests of justice."
The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a child of tender
age, inexperienced in the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration,
undergo a medical examination of her private part, subject herself to public trial,
and tarnish her family’s honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a
strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.
Mayias simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the witness stand of her
harrowing experience lends credence to her accusation. Her tender age belies any
allegation that her accusation was a mere invention impelled by some ill-motive.
As the Court has stressed in numerous cases, when a woman or a child victim says
that she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that rape
was indeed committed.
3. Impeachment
G.R. No. 139412. April 2, 2003
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. alias
Talino, RONALD CASTILLANO alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun,
RONALD CASTILLANO alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun,
Facts: This is a murder case of one Diosdado Volante filed against Jaime Castillano
Jr. and Sr., and Ronald Castillano. The altercation of the parties to this incident
begun when Diosdado did not consent and even asked herein Jaime Castillano Sr.
from the latter’s indiscriminate firing of his gun. Diosdado was a farmer in a
barangay in Camarines Sur in a farmland just meters away from the farmland of
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Jaime Castillano Sr. The animosity even worsened and deepened which led to the
alleged plan of killing Diosdado by the father and two sons, all surnamed
Castillano. Such plan was realized on that fateful night of July 8, 1996. However,
upon the attempt of the accused to flew, they were accosted during a check point
in that place with their bags with them. Just to save them all from being
imprisoned, Ronald, solely admitted to have killed Diosdado but alleged self-
defense. Trial court convicted Ronald and Jaime Jr. while exonerating Jaime Sr.
Appellant Jaime Jr. avers that the testimony of Luz Volante was inconsistent with
her testimony during preliminary investigation in the trial court and her sworn
statement before the police investigators.
Issue: Whether or not Luz’s testimony in open court can be impeached by her
own testimony during preliminary investigation.
Held: No. The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the
testimony of Luz, the prosecution’s principal witness, cannot be impeached via her
testimony during the preliminary examination before the municipal trial court nor
by her sworn statement given to the police investigators for the reason that the
transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by
the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the
appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was not,
therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as
mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement. - Before a
witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be
related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the
witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before the credibility of a
witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence
consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present
testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for
impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-
examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the
apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances
under which they were made.
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In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the
preliminary examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any
chance to explain any discrepancies between her present testimony and her
testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. The
appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn
statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her present
testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial
court, said transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.
4. Reference to Memorandum
a. Present Memory Revived
G.R. No. 90198 November 7, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO alias
"Tonying," ROBERTO DESCARTIN y PASICARAN alias "Ruby" and JOELITO
(JULITO), DESCARTIN y PASICARAN
Facts: Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were
accused of robbery with homicide in information allegedly committed against
Herminio Mansueto. When arraigned, all the accused entered a plea of "not guilty"
to the charge; whereupon, trial commenced. The main defense interposed is one
of alibi.
The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted
the three accused of murder (punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code), instead of robbery with homicide, explaining that the term "homicide" was
used in the information in its generic sense. Finding conspiracy, the trial court
ruled that the killing was qualified by both treachery and abuse of superior
strength with the latter, however, being absorbed by the former.
On appeal, the accused appellants attacked the credibility of the prosecutions
witness, Francisca Espina because is a pejured witness who has an axe to grind
against him because his dog had once bitten Francisca's child and because of her
alleged inconsistencies, faults the trial court for allowing the witness to glance at
the notes written on her palm while testifying. He also argues that his alibi, being
corroborated, should have been given weight.
Issue: Whether or not the use of use of memory aids during an examination of a
witness is allowed
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Held: Yes. The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not
altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to
refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself
or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately
thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he
knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing
or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may,
if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So,
also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no
recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record
correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received
with caution.
Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial
court. In this case, the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness
herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like
details.
Appellants see inadvertency on Francisca's appearing to be "jittery" on the witness
stand. Nervousness and anxiety of a witness is a natural reaction particularly in the
case of those who are called to testify for the first time. The real concern, in fact,
should be when they show no such emotions.
b. Past Recollection Recorded
G.R. No. 96202. April 13, 1999
ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION
Facts: Rosario Canque is a contractor doing business under the name RDC
Construction. Canque had contracts with the government and in relation to the
projects, she entered into two contracts with Socor Construction Corporation for
supplying as well as applying certain materials in the construction sites. When
Socor Construction billed Canque, it amounted to a total of P299,717.75 which
included interest. Canque refused to pay the amount, claiming that Socor
Construction failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in
metric tons of the items and the acceptance thereof of the government. This led to
a complaint being filed with RTC of Cebu for recovery the amount stated. During
trial, Socor Construction presented its Vice President, Sofia Sanchez and its
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
bookkeeper Dolores Aday while Canque’s evidence consisted only of her own
testimony. The trial court ruled in favor of Socor Construction, ordering Canque to
pay the amount. The CA affirmed. Canque contests the admissibility of the said
Book of Collectible Accounts (Exhibit K). On its part, Socor Construction said that
that although the entries cannot be considered an exception to the hearsay rule,
they may be admitted under Rule 132, Section 10 of the Rules of Court
Issue: Whether or not the Books of Collectible Accounts referred into by the
private respondent in refreshing the memory of the witness is admissible in
evidence.
Held: No. It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for
another purpose. Private respondent’s counsel offered it for the purpose of
showing the amount of petitioner’s indebtedness. He said:
Exhibit “K,” your Honor - faithful reproduction of page (17) of the book on
Collectible Accounts of the plaintiff, reflecting the principal indebtedness of
defendant in the amount of Two hundred ninety-nine thousand seven hundred
seventeen pesos and seventy-five centavos (P299,717.75) and reflecting as well
the accumulated interest of three percent (3%) monthly compounded such that as
of December 11, 1987, the amount collectible from the defendant by the plaintiff
is Six hundred sixteen thousand four hundred thirty-five pesos and seventy-two
centavos (P616,435.72);
This is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to
refresh the memory of Dolores Aday as a witness. In other words, it is the nature
of the evidence that is changed, not the purpose for which it is offered.
Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute
evidence. As explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:
Under the above provision (Rule 132, §10), the memorandum used to refresh the
memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as
such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the
basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified
independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of
the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative
evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written
statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he
supports his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts
even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this
requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such
evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to
conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the
witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such
evidence . . . .
As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge,
they could only corroborate Dolores Aday’s testimony that she made the entries as
she received the bills.
5. Classes of Documents
a. Public Documents
G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013
YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER, vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA
GANGAN ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY
FACTS: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002
in one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as
"single" and "has never married before." Since then, the two became close to each
other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and married private
respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple
resided in Japan.
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that
something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about
it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she received news that
her previous husband passed away.
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and discovered that
indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their
marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to file a petition
for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the
ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces
of documentary evidence issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO):
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(1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private respondent marked as
Exhibit "A" to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on November 28,
2002;
(2) Certificate of Marriage between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo
Arambulo marked as Exhibit "B" to prove the fact of marriage between the parties
on June 20, 1994;
(3) Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibits "C"
and "C-1" to prove the fact of the latter’s death on July 14, 2009; and
(4) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage
recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to
prove that private respondent in fact contracted two marriages, the first one was
to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June 20, 1994, and second, to petitioner on
November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
admitted the authenticity and due execution of the above documentary exhibits
during pre-trial.
RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to
prove private respondent’s prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held
that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to
Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled
that petitioner’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of
private respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a
complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private respondent and
Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled that petitioner’s
testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger
to the preparation of said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the
authenticity and due execution of the public documents issued by said office was
necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.
YES. There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner
are all public documents. As provided in the Civil Code:
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of
the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof
of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded
said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records
custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due
execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore
necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be
given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted
since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence
to the contrary.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together
concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent
on the ground that their marriage is bigamous.
The marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private respondent Felisa Custodio
Gangan is declared NULL and VOID.
G.R. No. 181163 July 24, 2013
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., Petitioner, vs. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (now
Chartis Philippines Insurance, Inc.), Respondent.
FACTS: Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors Corporation (Universal
Motors) 219 packages containing 120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup Truck
Double Cab 4x2 model, without engine, tires and batteries, on board the vessel S/S
"Calayan Iris" from Japan to Manila. The shipment, which had a declared value of
US$81,368 or P29,400,000, was insured with Philam against all risks under Marine
Policy No. 708-8006717-4.
The carrying vessel arrived at the port of Manila on April 20, 1995, and when the
shipment was unloaded by the staff of ATI, it was found that the package marked
as 03-245-42K/1 was in bad order. The Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes
dated April 21, 1995 identified two packages, labeled 03-245-42K/1 and
03/237/7CK/2, as being dented and broken.
Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages in the amount of P643,963.84
against Westwind, ATI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. When Universal
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Motors’ demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was
compensated in the sum of P633,957.15 by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors
issued a Subrogation Receipt dated November 15, 1995 in favor of Philam
On January 18, 1996, Philam, as subrogee of Universal Motors, filed a Complaint
for damages against Westwind, ATI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. before
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148.
On September 24, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and
ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam, jointly and severally, the sum of
P633,957.15 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, P158,989.28 by way of
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC.
All the parties moved for reconsideration, but their motions were denied in a
Resolution dated January 11, 2008. Thus, they each filed a petition for review on
certiorari which were consolidated together by this Court considering that all three
petitions assail the same CA decision and resolution and involve the same parties
ISSUE: Whether the Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation
Receipt are private documents
HELD: YES.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the
documents may be presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as
enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are self-
authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as
evidence in court.
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed
by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking
the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner
prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to
be.
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context
of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of
the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have
been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt
are private documents which Philam and the consignee, respectively, issue in the
pursuit of their business. Since none of the exceptions to the requirement of
authentication of a private document obtains in these cases, said documents may
not be admitted in evidence for Philam without being properly authenticated.
b. Private Documents
6. Offer of Evidence
G.R. No. 165285 June 18, 2012
LOMISES ALUDOS, deceased, substituted by FLORA ALUDOS vs. JOHNNY M.
SUERTE
FACTS: Sometime in January 1969, Lomises acquired from the Baguio City
Government the right to occupy two stalls in the Hangar Market in Baguio City.
Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. Suerte for the
transfer of all improvements and rights over the two market stalls. Johnny gave a
down payment of P45,000.00 to Lomises, who acknowledged receipt of the
amount in a document executed on the same date as the agreement:
Through a letter, Johnny protested the return of his money, and insisted on the
continuation and enforcement of his agreement with Lomises. When Lomises
refused Johnny’s protest, Johnny filed a complaint against Lomises before the
Regional Trial Court, for specific performance with damages.
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RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure to secure the
consent of the Baguio City Government to the agreement. The RTC found that
Lomises was a mere lessee of the market stalls, and the Baguio City Government
was the owner-lessor of the stalls. Under Article 1649 of the Civil Code, "the lessee
cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary." As the permit issued to Lomises did not contain any
provision that the lease of the market stalls could further be assigned, and in the
absence of the consent of the Baguio City Government to the agreement, the RTC
declared the agreement between Lomises and Johnny null and void.
Lomises appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing that the real agreement
between the parties was merely one of loan, and not of sale.
CA rejected Lomises’ claim that the true agreement was one of loan. The CA found
that there were two agreements entered into between Johnny and Lomises: one
was for the assignment of leasehold rights and the other was for the sale of the
improvements on the market stalls. The CA agreed with the RTC that the
assignment of the leasehold rights was void for lack of consent of the lessor, the
Baguio City Government. The sale of the improvements, however, was valid
because these were Lomises’ private properties. For this reason, the CA remanded
the case to the RTC to determine the value of the improvements on the two
market stalls, existing at the time of the execution of the agreement.
Lomises now appeals the CA rulings through the present petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE : Whether or not the lease contract between Baguio City and Government
is valid
NO. The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the lease contract
between the Baguio City Government and Lomises, as it was not formally offered
in evidence before the RTC; in fact, the CA admonished Lomises’ lawyer, Atty.
Lockey, for making it appear that it was part of the records of the case.
Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. "The offer of evidence is necessary
because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by
the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is
offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight."
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Although the contract was referred to in Lomises’ answer to Johnny’s complaint
and marked as Exhibit "2" in his pre-trial brief, a copy of it was never attached. In
fact, a copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract "surfaced" only after Lomises filed a
motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. What was formally offered was the
1969 permit, which only stated that Lomises was permitted to occupy a stall in the
Baguio City market and nothing else.25 In other words, no evidence was presented
and formally offered showing that any and all improvements in the market stalls
shall be owned by the Baguio City Government.
G.R. No. 194128 December 7, 2011
WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., CECILIA
ZAMORA, BENJAMIN FRANCIA, and PEARLBANK SECURITIES, INC.
FACTS: Respondents Francias filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and
Damages arising from their investments against petitioner Westmont Investment
Corporation Wincorp and respondent Pearlbank Securities Inc. Pearlbank before
the RTC.
Wincorp and Pearlbank filed their separate motions to dismiss. Both motions were
anchored on the ground that the complaint of the Francias failed to state a cause
of action. The RTC issued an order dismissing the motions to dismiss of Wincorp
and Pearlbank for lack of merit.
Wincorp then filed its Answer, while Pearlbank filed its Answer with Counterclaim
and Crossclaim (against Wincorp).
The case was set for pre-trial but before pre-trial conference could be held,
Wincorp filed its Motion to Dismiss Crossclaim of Pearlbank to which the latter
filed an opposition. The RTC denied Wincorp’s motion to dismiss crossclaim.
The pre-trial conference was later conducted after the parties had filed their
respective pre-trial briefs.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Francias and held Wincorp solely liable
to them.
Wincorp interposed an appeal with the CA. The CA affirmed with modification the
ruling of the RTC.
The CA explained:
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A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of
facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties
at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or
purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand,
this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be
required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
Evidence not formally offered during the trial cannot be used for or against a party
litigant. Neither may it be taken into account on appeal.
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a
formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to
submit it. Consequently, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded
and rejected.
Presiding therefrom, the very glaring conclusion is that all the documents attached
in the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court and all the
documents attached in the defendant-appellant’s brief filed by defendant-
appellant Wincorp cannot be given any probative weight or credit for the sole
reason that the said documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial
court because to consider them at this stage will deny the other parties the right
to rebut them.
The arguments of defendant-appellant Wincorp that the plaintiffs-appellees made
an erroneous offer of evidence as the documents were offered to prove what is
contrary to its content and that they made a violation of the parol evidence rule do
not hold water.
It is basic in the rule of evidence that objection to evidence must be made after
the evidence is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made
after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the
purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at
any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made.
As to oral evidence, objection thereto must likewise be raised at the earliest
possible time, that is, after the objectionable question is asked or after the answer
is given if the objectionable issue becomes apparent only after the answer was
given.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
ISSUE: Whether all the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings cannot
be given any weight or evidentiary value for the sole reason that these
documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial court
HELD: NO. It bears stressing too that all the documents attached by Wincorp to its
pleadings before the CA cannot be given any weight or evidentiary value for the
sole reason that, as correctly observed by the CA, these documents were not
formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To consider them now would deny
the other parties the right to examine and rebut them.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence —The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
"The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its
findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper
barren of probative weight."
The Court cannot, likewise, disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA as to the
evidence presented by the Francias. It is elementary that objection to evidence
must be made after evidence is formally offered. It appears that Wincorp was
given ample opportunity to file its Comment/Objection to the formal offer of
evidence of the Francias but it chose not to file any.
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RULE 133: Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
I. Proof beyond Reasonable Doubt
G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. DELFIN CALISO
FACTS: Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte found him guilty of murder for the
killing of AAA, a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death.
The appeal of the conviction was brought automatically to the Court. On June 28,
2005, the Court transferred the records to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
intermediate review pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo. On October 26,
2007, the CA, although affirming the conviction, reduced the penalty to reclusion
perpetua and modified the civil awards. Now, Caliso is before us in a final bid to
overturn his conviction.
In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting that
on the day of the killing, he plowed the rice field of Alac Yangyang from 7:00 am
until 4:00 pm. Yangyang corroborated Caliso’s alibi, recalling that Caliso had
plowed his rice field from 8 am to 4 pm of June 5, 1997.
The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA because
the old-healed hymenal lacerations of AAA and the fact that the victim’s
underwear had been irregularly placed could not establish the commission of
carnal knowledge; that the examining physician also found no physical signs of
rape on the body of AAA; and that as to the killing of AAA, the identification by
Amegable that the man she had seen submerging AAA in the murky river was no
other than Caliso himself was reliable.
Nevertheless, the RTC did not take into consideration the testimony of Bering on
Caliso’s extrajudicial admission of the ownership of the short pants because the
pants were not presented as evidence and because the police officers involved did
not testify about the pants in court.
As stated, the CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder based on the same
ratiocinations the RTC had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by
Amegable of Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during the
commission of the crime
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
ISSUE: whether Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at
noon of July 5, 1997 was positive and reliable
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself,
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of
the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal,
for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no
conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.
When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough
for establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does
not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction
will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy
circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the
constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has
distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde, to wit: (a)
that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act;
and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen
with the victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to
that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are
two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in
a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of
the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the
very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is
the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and
right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive
identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken
together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to
only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all others.
If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify
a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted
unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be
no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a
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proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be
allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then
felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection.
Amegable’s recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the
number "11" did not enhance the reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one,
such pants were not one-of-a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they were not
offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had been admitted in evidence, it remained
doubtful that they could have been linked to Caliso without proof of his ownership
or possession of them in the moments before the crime was perpetrated.
Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute the
killing to Caliso guarantee the reliability and accuracy of her identification of him.
The dearth of competent additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of any
human error in Amegable’s identification of Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith
or ill motive irrelevant and immaterial, for even the most sincere person could
easily be mistaken about her impressions of persons involved in startling
occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is neither fair nor
judicious, therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of
Amegable raise her identification to the level of moral certainty.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit,
the accused’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, though his innocence
may be doubted. The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to
every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused must
rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the strength of the
evidence for the Prosecution.
G.R. No. 190178 February 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA
The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely
upon the word of the private complainant because it is essentially committed in
relative isolation or even in secrecy, and it is usually only the victim who can testify
of the unconsented coitus. Thus, the long standing rule is that when an alleged
victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape has indeed been committed. Since the participants are usually the only
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
witnesses in crimes of this nature and the accused's conviction or acquittal
virtually depends on the private complainant's testimony, it must be received with
utmost caution. It is then incumbent upon the trial court to be very scrupulous in
ascertaining the credibility of the victim's testimony. Judges must free themselves
of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have
been sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they
ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through
as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility
is to render justice according to law.
FACTS: The present case involves eight (8) sets of Information for Forcible
Abduction with Rape filed by private complainant ("AAA") against appellant,
Felimon Patentes.
AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit and bring medicines to her
sick grandmother. While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant suddenly
sat next to her. It was the second time AAA met appellant. After a brief
conversation, appellant suddenly showed her his bolo, covered by a red scabbard
tucked in his right side while he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which
he used to threaten to kill AAA should AAA disobey him. Appellant then
accompanied AAA to her grandmother’s place and returned to Davao City proper
by bus.
Appellant then brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where
his parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces live.
Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her
to a sewing machine. Appellant then started to smoke something, which he also
forced AAA to inhale, causing AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy. This prevented
AAA from fighting back as appellant removed AAA’s clothes. Doffed of his own
clothes, appellant mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. The rape
was repeated several times.
On 13 December 1998, to free herself from her predicament, AAA convinced
appellant that she will marry him. Appellant agreed. Appellant’s mother
accompanied AAA to the latter’s house to discuss the marital plans with AAA’s
family. Surprised by the marital plans, AAA’s mother asked for a private moment
with AAA. In their conversation, AAA confessed how appellant forcibly took her to
his house on 5 December 1998 and raped her for more than a week. AAA’s mother
then accompanied AAA to report her ordeal to the police, where AAA was
examined by a doctor, Dr. Samuel Cruz, the City Health Officer of Davao City.
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Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following
observations about AAA: (1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2)
hymen was intact and can readily admit a normal-sized erect male penis without
sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz
also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAA’s first sexual intercourse as the
vagina was not injured but had healed lacerations.
After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one
(1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape.
Aggrieved, appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification as to accused’s civil
liability.
The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court on the matter of
credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. A thorough reading of the
transcript shows that AAA’s testimony bears the earmarks of truth and credibility."
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether there was proof beyond reasonable doubt
HELD: NO.
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of
proof rests upon the prosecution. In the case at bar, the prosecution has failed to
discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the
charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats,
force or intimidation.
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be
received with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts
should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the
sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and
whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations.
While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape
victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice based on the law.
The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have
created reasonable doubt in Our mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the
presumption of innocence in favor of appellant must be upheld considering that
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the quantum of proof to support a
conviction.
II. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Supreme Court vs. Delgado 658 SCRA
Facts: Rosendo Delgado was charged with murder and contends that the victim
was the unlawful aggressor.
Issues: Whether or not the evidence presented would absolve the accused with
the crime of murder.
Held: "A person who seeks justification for his act must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the presence of the necessary justifying circumstance for
having admitted wounding or killing his adversary, and he is criminally liable unless
he is able to satisfy the Court that he acted in legitimate self-defense." The
appellant contends that the entry point of Wound No. 1 was in the abdomen or
stomach thus making the three wounds inflicted on the deceased possible.
However, this contention is not supported by any proof or explanation and is, in
fact, contradictory to the post-mortem examination report issued by an
independent third party, the sanitary inspector among whose main functions is the
performance of autopsies on cadavers of deceased persons.
The appellant's claim of self-defense is further negated by other circumstances
such as the absence of any major injury on his body as against three severe
wounds, any one of which would have been fatal, suffered by the victim.
According to the appellant, the victim was in a superior position to inflict harm.
Moreover, the appellant failed to tell the police authorities that he killed the victim
in self-defense. His defense theory is obviously an afterthought.
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented
by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T.
OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation
of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized
by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999,
warrants of arrest were issued against him.
Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the extradition of private respondent, raffled off to Branch 10,
presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in
the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8
presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge
allowing private respondent to post bail.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above
Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail since
there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
HELD: NO.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest,
to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years
without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In
fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition
court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of
bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a
setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution,
but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided
that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used
in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law
which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him,
this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear
and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to
show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to
the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on
the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO,
G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012
Facts: Alfonso Fontanilla was charged of murder for allegedly strucking Olias inthe
head with a piece of wood called Bellang causing the latter fell facedown to the
ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. As aresult,
the victim died. Fontanilla claimed self-defense alleging that on the night of the
incident, he had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a
nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although
he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his
fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, hadalso kicked
him with both his legs; that he had thus been forced to defendhimself by picking
up a stone which he had hit the victim’s head.
The RTC in rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense noted that he did not suffer
any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not
receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might
have suffered, having been immediately released from the hospital; that
Fontanilla’s failure to give any statement at the time he surrendered to the police
was inconsistent with his plea of self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not there is self-defense in the instant case.
Ruling:In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the partof
the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent orrepel it;
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persondefending himself.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries
that caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for
murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he
assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the
justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted
being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of
proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would
be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and
satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his
own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be
disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the
proceedings.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one,
Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s
act of hitting the victim’s head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not
proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic
attack and kicks.
III. Preponderance of Evidence
G.R. No. 158143 September 21, 2011
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA
and ROLANDO N. RAMOS
FACTS: PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before the
RTC against Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila
branch. In its complaint, PCIB alleged that between 1991 and 1993, Balmaceda, by
taking advantage of his position as branch manager, fraudulently obtained and
encashed 31 Manager’s checks in the total amount of P10,782,150.00.
On February 28, 1994, PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint to
implead Rolando Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from
Balmaceda’s alleged fraud. PCIB also increased the number of fraudulently
obtained and encashed Manager’s checks to 34, in the total amount of
P11,937,150.00. The RTC granted this motion.
Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other
hand, Ramos filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme.
According to Ramos, he is a reputable businessman engaged in the business of
buying and selling fighting cocks, and Balmaceda was one of his clients. Ramos
admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks that
he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the source of
Balmaceda’s money.
The RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that no
sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the
latter’s fraudulent manipulations.
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 ATTY. BRONDIAL REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II - SY 2015-2016
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that there is no evidence to hold that
respondent Ramos acted in complicity with respondent Balcameda
HELD: NO.
From the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, we find it beyond
question that Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager
of PCIB’s Sta. Cruz, Manila branch, was able to apply for and obtain Manager’s
checks drawn against the bank account of one of PCIB’s clients. The unsettled
question is whether Ramos, who received a portion of the money that Balmaceda
took from PCIB, should also be held liable for the return of this money to the Bank.
PCIB insists that it presented sufficient evidence to establish that Ramos colluded
with Balmaceda in the scheme to fraudulently secure Manager’s checks and to
misappropriate their proceeds. Since Ramos’ defense – anchored on mere denial
of any participation in Balmaceda’s wrongdoing – is an intrinsically weak defense,
it was error for the CA to exonerate Ramos from any liability.
In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of
belief than the evidence offered in opposition.
This Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., defined "preponderance of
evidence" in the following manner:
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Thus, PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive
assertion that Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latter’s
scheme to defraud the Bank.
On its face, all that PCIB’s evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos’ name as
a payee when he filled up the application forms for the Manager’s checks. But, as
the CA correctly observed, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee
on some of the Manager’s checks is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos was
complicit in Balmaceda’s fraud; a number of other people were made payees on
the other Manager’s checks yet PCIB never alleged them to be liable, nor did the
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos’ participation that would
justify his separate treatment from the others. Also, while Ramos is Balmaceda’s
brother-in-law, their relationship is not sufficient, by itself, to render Ramos liable,
absent concrete proof of his actual participation in the fraudulent scheme.
Moreover, the evidence on record clearly shows that Balmaceda acted on his own
when he applied for the Manager’s checks against the bank account of one of
PCIB’s clients, as well as when he encashed the fraudulently acquired Manager’s
checks.
G.R. No. 182356 December 4, 2013
DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the name
and style of Pongkay Trading
Facts: On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a
1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon City.
His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain
Calimlim was at the backseat.
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light
turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and
sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due
to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered.
Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds,
Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical
injuries.
The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as
Joel Primero. It stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.
Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing
business under the name and style of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a
gravel and sand business.
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain
on the left side of her neck and shoulder. Such incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from
the practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.
Dra. dela Llana,, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but
Rebecca refused to pay.
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Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of
her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimedP150,000.00 for her
medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly
income ofP30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against
her as no reasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela
Llana’s injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela Llana’s illness became manifest one
month and one week from the date of the vehicular accident. As a counterclaim,
she demanded the payment of attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a
hostile witness.
Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the
vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical
certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate
stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her
clinical history and physical examinations.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra.
dela Llana’s whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving. Tthe CA reversed the RTC
ruling
ISSUE: whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury? NO
HELD: Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements
necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose
acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of
evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s
liability as Joel’s employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her
whiplash injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Joel - arise.
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this
Court can then proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article
2180, "an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted
against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission
committed by his employee."
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in
extra-contractual obligations.
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of
evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s
negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must
establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:
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(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the
causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other
words,
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary
facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established.
Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution
of the case. It is a basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be
validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments.
However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case,
the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule
that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another
person who is not on the witness stand.
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative
value for the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an
ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause
and effects of whiplash injury.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of
evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and
impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s
favor. Her claim, unsupported by prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare
assertion and has no leg to stand on.
IV. Substantial Evidence
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs ANTONIO T. REYES,
G.R. No. 170512 October 5, 2011
Facts: Petitioner adjudged Reyes guilty of grave misconduct after finding that
Reyes, being then the Head of Office of the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin, illegally
exacted money from Acero in exchange for the issuance of a driver’s license to the
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the requisite written examination
therefor.
Issue: Whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently
proven by substantial evidence.
Held:
Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by
the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence.[32] In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial
evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise.
Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by
the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence.[32] In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial
evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise
G.R. No. 203186 December 4, 2013
XAVIER C. RAMOS vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. and/or ALFONSO L.
SALCEDO, JR.
FACTS: Ramos was employed by BPI Family in 1995 and eventually became its
Vice-President for Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division.
During his tenure, a client named Trezita B. Acosta entered into and obtained
several auto and real estate loans from BPI Family which were duly approved and
promptly paid.
Acosta purportedly secured another auto loan from BPI Family in the amount of
P3,097,392.00 for the purchase of a Toyota Prado vehicle (subject loan) which had
remained unpaid. As it turned out, Acosta did not authorize nor personally apply
for the subject loan, rendering the transaction fraudulent.
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As a consequence, BPI Family lost P2,294,080.00, which amount was divided
between Ramos and his three (3) other subordinates, with Ramos shouldering the
proportionate amount of P546,000.00. The foregoing amount was subsequently
deducted from Ramos’ benefits which accrued upon his retirement on May 1,
2006. In relation thereto, he executed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim agreeing to
release the bank from any claim or liability with respect to, inter alia, his
separation pay or retirement benefits.
Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were illegal, Ramos filed a
complaint for underpayment of retirement benefits and non- payment of overtime
and holiday pay and premium pay against BPI Family and/or its President at that
time, Alfonso L. Salcedo, Jr., before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Ramos’s complaint, ruling that the deduction
made on his retirement benefits was "legal and even reasonable" since Ramos was
negligent in running his department.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA holding that the deduction complained of
was "illegal and unreasonable".
BPI Family filed an MR – DENIED; hence, it filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA. Pending resolution thereof, Ramos submitted a manifestation that he had
caused the execution of the NLRC decision and the sum amounting to P600,000.00
was released in satisfaction of his claim.
The CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos, holding that
Ramos was remiss in his duty as head of Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans
Division in failing to determine the true identity of the person who availed of the
auto loan under the name "Trezita Acosta". However, it also attributed negligence
on the part of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice of issuing the PO and ATD
prior to the approval of the credit committee.
Thus, finding BPI Family’s negligence to be concurrent with Ramos.
Ramos moved for reconsideration – DENIED. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the deduction made from Ramos’s retirement benefits to be illegal
and unreasonable
HELD: YES. The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by
substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "in cases filed before administrative or quasi- judicial
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA to have erred in
attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the
deduction made from Ramos’s retirement benefits was improper. Two (2) reasons
impel the foregoing conclusion:
First, as correctly observed by the NLRC, BPI Family was not able to substantially
prove its imputation of negligence against Ramos. Well-settled is the rule that the
burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.
In this case, BPI Family failed to establish that the duty to confirm and validate
information in credit applications and determine credit worthiness of prospective
loan applicants rests with the Dealer Network Marketing Department, which is the
department under the supervision of Ramos. Quite the contrary, records show
that these responsibilities lie with the bank’s Credit Services Department, namely
its Credit Evaluation Section and Loans Review and Documentation Section, of
which Ramos was not part of.
Second, as similarly observed by the NLRC, Ramos merely followed standing
company practice when he issued the PO and ATD without prior approval from the
bank’s Credit Services Department.
The report further noted that the practice has been adopted due in part to the stiff
competition with other banks and lending institutions. Resultantly, in 2005 alone,
approximately 111 car loan applications were released ahead of the approval of
the credit evaluation section.
Based on the foregoing, it is readily apparent that Ramos’s action of issuing the PO
and ATD ahead of the approval of the credit committee was actually conformant
to regular company practice which BPI Family itself sanctioned. As such, Ramos
cannot be said to have been negligent on his duties. To this end, it is well to note
that in loan transactions, banks are mandated to ensure that their client wholly
comply with all the documentary requirements in relation to the approval and
release of loan applications. As BPI Family "uncharacteristically relaxed supervision
over its divisions," yielding as it did to the demands of industry competition, it is
but reasonable that solely bears the loss of its own shortcomings.
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V. Prima Facie Evidence
JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS,
G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011
Facts: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for
the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting
that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be
served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the
Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for
hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot
be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held
that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a
paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie
case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A
new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied
upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-
blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show
that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and
held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case.
Issue: Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order
Held: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the
motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by
petitioner.
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant
procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has
been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by
these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented
their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to
establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a
party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are
aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any
person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing.
Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing
of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The
biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically
valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a
DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter
of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a
show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause”
for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required,
but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing
must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing
in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the
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court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in
cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the
court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The same
condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for
DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a
reasonable possibility of paternity.”
VI. Probable Cause
G.R. No. 193250 April 25, 2012
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. AMELIO TRIA and JOHN DOE
FACTS: MWSS opened C/A No. 244-850099-6 with PNB-MWSS and made an initial
deposit of PhP 6,714,621.13 on October 10, 2001. On April 16, 2003, C/A 244-
850099-6 became dormant with a balance of PhP 5,397,154.07.
In the meantime, Tria requested a listing of the dormant accounts of PNB-MWSS.
PNB-MWSS received a letter-request from MWSS instructing the deduction of PhP
5,200,000 (plus charges) from C/A 244-850099-6 and the issuance of the
corresponding manager’s check in the same amount payable to a certain "Atty.
Rodrigo A. Reyes." The letter-request was purportedly signed and approved by the
duly authorized signatories of MWSS. Hence, C/A 244-850099-6 was re-activated
in light of the letter-request. Manager’s Check was, thus, prepared and issued in
the name of Atty. Reyes for PhP 5,200,000.
On November 1, 2004, Tria retired as PNB-MWSS’ Manager under PNB’s regular
retirement plan.
On February 2, 2005, Zaida Pulida, the MWSS employee in charge of C/A No. 244-
850099-6, inquired about the account’s outstanding balance. She inquired about a
debit entry dated April 22, 2004 to C/A No. 244-850099-6 in the amount of PhP
5,200,000. Veniegas verified that PhP 5,200,000 was indeed debited and was
encashed using Manager’s Check No. 1165848 in favor of Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes,
negotiated and encashed at the PNB-Circle on April 26, 2004 and was annotated
with "ok for payment per confirmation and approval of PNB MWSS" by Tria on the
dorsal portion of the check. Veniegas also attempted to retrieve the files for the
transaction but discovered that the duplicate copies were all missing. Pulida
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
notified Veniegas that MWSS did not apply for the issuance of the manager’s check
payable to Atty. Reyes and there was no Rodrigo A. Reyes included in IBP’s
membership roster.
PNB conducted its own investigation and, at its conclusion, sought to hold Tria
liable for qualified theft. Following a preliminary investigation, the Assistant City
Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending dismissal of the charge for Qualified
Theft against respondent Amelio C. Tria due to lack of evidence and probable
cause.
PNB moved for reconsideration but was denied. Undaunted, PNB filed a petition
for review with the DOJ and prayed for the reversal of the August 15, 2006 and
April 13, 2007 Resolutions issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, which was, however, dismissed. PNB sought recourse before the CA. The CA
decided in favor of Tria.
ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause to hold Tria and Atty. Reyes/John Doe
for trial in the crime of qualified theft
HELD: YES. While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a
preliminary investigation to ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of an
information rests with the executive branch, such authority is far from absolute. It
may be subject to review when it has been clearly used with grave abuse of
discretion. And indeed, grave abuse of discretion attended the decision to drop
the charges against Tria as there was more than probable cause to proceed against
him for qualified theft.
It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the filing of a
criminal information is not proof beyond reasonable doubt that the person
accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that there is probable cause
to believe that he is guilty of the crime charged.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed
and that it was committed by the accused.
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The acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the encashment of the
check provide more than sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause to file an
information against him and John Doe/Atty. Reyes for qualified theft. In fact, it is
easy to infer from the factual milieu of the instant case the existence of all the
elements necessary for the prosecution of the crime of qualified theft.
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185128, 30 January 2012
Facts: Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to serve a
search warrant from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo
in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody shouted “raid” which prompted
the police officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and
go directly to Del Castillo’s house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing
incriminating in Del Castillo’s residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able
to confiscate from the hut several articles including four (4) plastic packs of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty. The RTC found Del Castillo
guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the information. The Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.
Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a violation of his
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. On the
contrary, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against
government authorities. Hence, assuming that the items seized were found in
another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be
admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay
tanod who is a private individual.
Issue: Whether or not there is probable cause.
Held: Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the
totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid
formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. The
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the
factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A
magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant
is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis
for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are
in the place sought to be searched. A review of the records shows that in the
present case, a substantial basis exists.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of Del Castillo’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizure
HELD: YES
It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes the
residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items
were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence
of the Del Castillo. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than
the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of Del
Castillo’s constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.
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VII. Iota of Evidence
G.R. No. 178771 June 8, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO and
FERNANDO CALAGUAS FERNANDEZ a.k.a. LANDO CALAGUAS,
FACTS: Lando, Al, Dick Tañedo, Roberto Tañedo, Marvin Lim, Necitas Ordeñiza-
Tañedo, and Fred Doe are charged with the crimes of Murder and of
Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate Informations.
When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all pleaded not
guilty, while Dick, Bet, Marvin and Fred Doe remained at-large. Thereafter, a joint
trial ensued.
At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while AAA and the victim Abad
Sulpacio were sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to rob the place. Inside the house,
she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Tañedo, and heard
the latter uttering "somebody will die". Bringing her outside the house, Lando
pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was
blindfolded and with his hands tied. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused
Dick Tañedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Tañedo, Alberto Anticamara
and Fred. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out
from the vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that,
time Dick Tañedo stayed with her in the vehicle. Thereafter, when Fred returned
to the vehicle, she heard him uttered: "Make a decision now. Abad has already
four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl."
The RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, rendered its Decision finding Accused
Nicetas "Cita" Tañedo acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence;
Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando Calaguas) and Alberto
Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery; the penalty of DEATH is
hereby imposed upon the two (2) accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando
Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). The CA rendered a Decision
affirming the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC gravely erred in rendering a verdict of conviction despite
the fact that the guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne
HELD: NO. The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in
the killing of Sulpacio in the early morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia,
Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution adduced sufficient
circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of
the perpetrators of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and
common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based
on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form
an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when
analyzed and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio.
In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the
prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio
away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to
another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.
G.R. No. 185212 February 15, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARITESS ALOLOD, EFREN DEOCAMPO, ELMER
DEOCAMPO and EDWIN DEOCAMPO EFREN DEOCAMPO
Facts:
This case is about when circumstantial evidence may be considered sufficient to
support a finding of guilt in a murder case.
A number of accused are charged with murder.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding that accused
Efren was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based on
circumstantial evidence.
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Held: The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of 8. Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City
the crime provides: and subsequently to Davao City for medical treatment when people started
looking for them. They were of course buried in the garden.
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if: 9. A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant more camote on a pile of
red soil beside the house.
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
10. The bodies of the old couple were found underneath those plants.
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt

The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one
fair conclusion: the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others.[2]

Here, those circumstances abound.

1. Efren had always been banned from the old couple’s house because they
strongly disapproved his relationship with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he
had no business being around that house.

2. The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of May 27,
1998.

3. On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house, meaning that they
were killed on the night of May 27 or early morning of May 28.

4. On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman Institute saw Efren and
Edwin standing on the school side of the fence next to the old couple’s house.
They even tried to conceal themselves in the school toilet. The next day, the guard
discovered that the fence wire had been cut.

5. At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a woman

sobbing and what seemed like the butchering of a pig.

6. At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolod kitchen.

7. From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple’s house, with
Efren wearing the old man’s watch.

"The desire of knowledge, like the thirst of riches, increases ever with the acquisition of it." Laurence Sterne Aicka Singson | Page 97