Memorialapplicant Raw

f TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................... I
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. .II
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.......................................................................VI
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................................................................... VII
STATEMENT OF FACTS......................................................... IX
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS .......................................................... XIII
PLEADINGS.................................................................... 1
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..................................................................42
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
ARTICLES
INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS AND ARBITRAL AWARDS
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMSSISSION REPORTS
MUNICIPAL CASES
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

TREATISES AND BOOKS
U.N. RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
MISCELLANEOUS
WEB SOURCES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to the Compromis concluded on 1 July 2017, between the Federation of Anlusan
and the Republic of Racel [“the Parties”], and in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, the Parties hereby submit to this Court their dispute concerning
the secession of Racel from Bellona and subsequent economic measures imposed by Racel on
Anlusan.
In accordance with Article 3 of the Special Agreement, the International Court of Justice
is hereby requested to adjudge the dispute in accordance with the rules and principles of
international law, including any applicable treaties.
The Parties have agreed to respect the decision of this Court.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER THE ICJ HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE?
II. WHETHER ANLUSAN CAN BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMITTING AN
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT FOR THE SUPPOSED
INTERVENTION IN THE ELECTIONS?
III. WHETHER SATELLITE, FEZNOTE, CHIRPER, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
MEDIA COMPANIES CAN BE HELD RESPONSIBLE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE SPREAD OF THE VIDEOS AND HOSTILE
MESSAGES BEFORE THE ELECTION?
IV. WHETHER THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RACEL ARE JUSTIFIED UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
THE PROLOGUE: THE EXCELSIA FREE TRADE AREA
DESCRIPTION OF STATE PARTIES
EPILOUGE
Following a to and fro of accusations from both sides where the Amiti Government rightly
accused Darshini of imposing economic sanctions, use of force and at the very least ,
intervention in violation of Amiti’s sovereignty, and Darshini accused Amiti of violation of the
Vipulian Charter provisions the Secretary General of the United Nations advised the states to
refer the matter to the ICJ, as a result of which this dispute was submitted to the registry of the
International Court of Justice.
Application to this Court
Anlusan and Racel have agreed to refer this dispute to this Court by a Special Agreement.
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
-I-
Jurisdiction
-II-
Reverentia’s actions in support of the Agnorevs in East Agnostica were consistent with
international law. Reverentia’s support for the referendum in East Agnostic was consistent with
international law. It did not violate the principle of non-intervention as the necessary coercive
effect was absent.
Reverentia’s troop movements inside its own domestic borders were also not a threat of
the use of force. Such movements were out of concern for the continued unrest along
Reverentia’s border with East Agnostica. The Reverentian troops were stationed at the border to
protect any people that flee and were specifically ordered not to leave Reverentian territory. In
any case, the Agnorevs were a ‘people’, entitled to the right of self-determination. Reverentia’s
acts were justified as humanitarian intervention to assist this right and prevent human rights
abuse. Reverentia also had a legitimate interest to protect its ethnic kin living in Agnostica.
Besides Anlusanian navy never entered Agnostican territory; thus, no threat was credible.
The Marthite Convention remained in effect until East Agnostica’s integration into
Reverentia on March 1, 2013, as Agnostica’s denunciation of the Convention prior to this point
was ineffective. First, Marthite’s newfound commercial value does not constitute a fundamental
change in circumstances. Marthite’s limited commercial value was not an essential basis for
Reverentia’s consent and Agnostica’s limited obligations under the Convention have not come to
impose too much of a burden. A fundamental change only occurred with a change in sovereign
ownership over the object of the Treaty (the Marthite reserves), following East Agnostica’s
secession.
Additionally, Agnostica cannot claim its denunciation was justified in response to a
material breach of the Convention. To begin with, Agnostica cannot demonstrate that RMT’s
sale of Marthite to pharmaceutical companies violated the terms of Article 4(d) without proof of
local demand or that this breach was material, because the price at which Marthite is sold to non-
traditional practitioners is incidental to the object and purpose of the Convention. Even if
Agnostica could prove this, however, it can point to no wrongful act of Reverentia. Reverentia
did not afford RMT the status of a state agency nor did it exercise a sufficient level of control
over RMT to be responsible for its actions.

Agnostica materially breached the Convention by its undue repudiation of the
Convention, lease of the mining facilities to Baxter, and enactment of the Marthite Control Act.
This entitled Reverentia to remove the Marthite extraction software for two independent reasons.
First, title to the software did not transfer to Agnostica along with the facilities. Reverentia was
therefore entitled to retrieve it after suspending the Convention. Additionally, this act was a valid
countermeasure as defined by customary international law. Reverentia removed the software to
induce Agnostica to respect its treaty obligations. The act was taken directly in relation to the
obligation Agnostica breached, as it directly concerned the ability to extract Marthite, and did not
cripple operations at the mine but merely slowed the extraction process.
I. THE ICJ HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
A. SUBMISSION OF THE DISPUTE TO THE ICJ IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH

ARTICLE 33 OF THE UN CHARTER.
The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by ratification. 1 By
ratifying the Charter of the United Nations, the State ipso facto becomes a party to the Statute of
the Court.2 It follows that the Court is open between the parties in this case who bound
themselves under its Statute. 3 Anlusan and Racel have already engaged in consultations without
reaching a satisfactory conclusion before submitting the dispute to this Court. 4 Article 33 of the
UN Charter is the next stipulated method of dispute resolution; under which “judicial settlement”
is stipulated as a valid method of dispute settlement.5
Granting for the sake of argument that Racel has not acquired membership of the United
Nations despite its ratification, it has acquired conditional jurisdiction6 as in the case of
1
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 11
2
UN Charter, Article 93 (1)
3
Statute of the Court, Article 35(1)
4
Compromis, ¶ 33, 34.
5
Article 33 of the UN Charter provides that, “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of
all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own
choice.”
6
UN Charter, Article 92 (2)
Switzerland wherein the Security Council took into consideration the Resolution it adopted on
November 15, 1946 and cited the conditions upon which Switzerland may become a party to the
Statute of the Court.7 The jurisdiction of the court can be ousted only in exceptional cases where
the dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction reserved to some other authority. 8 There is no
exclusivity as to jurisdiction and therefore a presumption against the jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made. The present forum is a form of judicial settlement and therefore submission of
the dispute for settlement before it is in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter.
B. ANLUSAN AND RACEL HAVE GIVEN THEIR EXPRESS SUBMISSION TO

THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT BY SIGNING A SPECIAL
AGREEMENT AND SUBMITTING A COMPROMIS TO THE COURT.
The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it.9 Cases may
be brought before the Court either by notification of the special agreement or by a written
application addressed to the Registrar. 10 The Court could take no further steps upon an
Application even if the opposing party does not accept its jurisdiction. 11 In the present case, the
Federation of Anlusan and Republic of Racel have chosen to resort to a judicial settlement by
signing a special agreement and submitting a Compromis to the Court.12 Therefore, there has
been an express submission to the jurisdiction of the Court.
C. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM DOES NOT EXCLUDE

THE JURISDICTION OF THE ICJ.
The presence of other available options does not nullify the jurisdiction of the ICJ. [cite
legal basis]
7
Security Council Resolution on November 15, 1946
8
Sohn, Settlement of Disputes relating to Interpretation and Application of Treaties, 150
RECUEIL DES COURS 248 (1976 II).
9
Statute of the Court, Article 36(1)
10
Statute of the Court, Article 40
11
Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of the United States of America (United States of
America v. Hungary) (United States of America v. USSR); Aerial Incident of 10 March 1953
(United States of America v. Czechoslovakia); Antarctica (United Kingdom v. Argentina)
(United Kingdom v. Chile); Aerial Incident of 7 October 1952 (United States of America v.
USSR); Aerial Incident of 4 September 1954 (United States of America v. USSR); and Aerial
Incident of 7 November 1954 (United States of America v. USSR).
12
Compromis, ¶ 34
D. THE RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES WAS COMPLIED
WITH.
The rule on exhaustion of local remedies in international law is that a claim will not be
admissible on the international plane unless the individual alien or corporation concerned has
exhausted the legal remedies available to him in the state which is alleged to be the author of the
injury.13 [INSERT MORE LEGAL BASIS FOR EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES]
Negotiations between Anlusan’s top diplomats and leaders of Racel started in May 2017 until
July 2017 but both states failed to settle their differences.14 Clearly, local remedies were
exhausted prior to submission of the case in Court.
E. ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS NON-

EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES, THE RULE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
A DIRECT INJURY TO THE STATE.
Injuries caused by one state to another, are direct injuries and are not subject to the rule of
local remedies;15 since States represent principally their own interest rather than the interests of
their nationals and are the real claimants. It follows that a request by the respondent state that the
claimant state should exhaust the legal remedies available in the former state would run counter
to the principle par in parem non habet imperium, non habet jurisdictionem; which mandates
that no State can claim jurisdiction over another.16 The rule of local remedies is thus applicable to
indirect injury to a State, that is, injury caused to its nationals or their property, in which case
they would have to institute proceedings in the court of the State at fault. 17 his rule is qualified by
two considerations as to whether a particular act is a direct injury; the subject of the dispute and
the nature of the claim.18
13
Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 497 (1963).
14
Compromis, ¶¶ 33,34
15
Meron, The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies, 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L
84 (1959); Freeman, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL
OF JUSTICE 404 (1938); See Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the Certain Norwegian
Loans case, ICJ Reports, (1957) 39-41.
16
Aerial Incident of 27th July, 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria) ICJ Reports (1959) 154.
17
Fawcett, Exhaustion of Local Remedies: Substance or Procedure?, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L
452, 458 (1954); Supra note 13 at 381.
18
Meron, Supra note 14 at 87; Brownlie, Supra note 13, at 500.
There are certain categories that could be the subject matter of a direct injury and the
violation of treaties are considered to be a category of direct injury as was established in the case
of Phosphates in Morocco19 where it was noted that where an act of the Department of Mines of
France was challenged by Italy as an unlawful international act because it was in violation of
certain vested rights placed under the protection of international conventions. The act was
attributable to the State and was described as contrary to the treaty right of another State;
international responsibility so being established.20
The second condition is the nature of the claim, which depends on the real interests and
objects pursued by the Claimant State. The precise and direct statement of the claim 21 is to be
used to construe the nature of the claim in establishing whether the state has a distinct reason of
its own for the institution of the international claim.
In the present case, the claims arise out of violations of certain international treaties and
obligations that both the States are parties to, thereby the subject matter of the claim being one of
direct injury. Secondly, the primary object of the claim is to obtain from the Court declaration of
the responsibility of the respondent in international law22 , thereby establishing that the interest of
the Anlusan as separate from those of its nationals is to be formulated.
II. ANLUSAN CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMITTING AN

INTERNATIONALLY WRONFUL ACT FOR THE SUPPOSED INTERVENTION
IN THE ELECTIONS
A. ANLUSAN HAS NOT COMMITTED ANY WRONGFUL ACT UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW.
1. Racel failed to present any direct proof of any act of intervention.
The rules which determine whether a State is in breach of its obligations toward another
Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. France) (Preliminary Objections), (P.C.I.J., Series A/B,

19
No.74), 25-29.
20
Phosphate case Id.
21
International Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway) ICJ Reports, (1951) 126.
22
This was held to be a claim of direct injury in the Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v.
Albania) (Merits) ICJ Reports, (1949) 10.
state are referred to as the principles of state responsibility23 which have been widely recognized
in international law.24 In asserting state responsibility, the work of the international law
commission on state responsibility is already recognized as a principle of customary international
law25 and has been relied on by the ICJ26. Further ILCs work has been adopted by the General
Assembly.27 A breach of an international act only occurs when the act is performed and extends
over the entire period the act is performed; 28 thus, an act can amount to being against the
principles of international law, only once it is committed and not before its commencement.
In the current situation, Racel has not presented any proof of any act of Anlusan’s
supposed intervention.29 No link has been established by investigators 30 apart from the
independent analysis of Exelsia security experts which allegedly traced the Chirps to computers
from Anlusan. It must be emphasized that only one of the IP addresses was similar to the
addresses of computers of the Anlusanian intelligence service and that of the servers of Satellite 31
and most of the IP addresses showed mixed origins in the Exelsia economic area. 32 Therefore, it
is submitted that Anlusan hasn’t committed any wrongful acts under international law.
2. Intelligence services in Anlusan suffered a massive hack of its own computers.
Anlusan is not responsible for the hacking incident of and claimed that the intelligence
23
Garcia-Amador, First Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96 (1956), reprinted
in The Yearbook of the ILC,(1956), p. 173-231.
24
I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, §§ 148-49, At 336-38 (8th Ed.
1955)[hereinafter AS OPPENHEIM].
25
SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY(1991), P.167.
26
Armed Activities On The Territory Congo(Between Democratic Republic Of Congo v.
Uganda), 2001,ICJ Reports 2001, p. 146-147(11 December 23, 2001).
27
Responsibility of States For Internationally Wrongful Acts, UNGA Res 56/83, ¶ 3 (Dec. 12,
2001).
28
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, November 2001, AArticle 15, Supplement No. 10(A/56/10) [hereinafter as
Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
29
Compromis, ¶ 37.
30
Compromis, ¶ 24.
31
Compromis, ¶ 23.
32
Id.
services suffered a massive hack of its own computers. Such was the work of rogue hackers and
not the State.
B. ANLUSAN SUPPORTED THE REFERENDUM IN RACEL AND SUCH ACT IS

CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Contrary to the interpretation of Racel, Anlusan supported Racel’s secession referendum
and Anlusan did not violate the principle of non-intervention [1], or the prohibition on threat of
force against the territorial integrity of Racel [2]. Alternatively, Anlusan’s acts were justified as
humanitarian intervention to respect the principle of self-determination [3].
1. Anlusan did not violate the principle of non-intervention.
Anlusan’s acts do not amount to an intervention in Racel’s domestic affairs (a) and in any
case, the principle of non- intervention is inapplicable as the situation was of an international
character (b).
a. Anlusan’s acts do not amount to an intervention.
A State violates the principle of non-intervention when it deprives another State from
control over its domestic affairs.33 Accordingly, this principle is not violated as long as the other
State can freely regulate its domestic affairs.34 Thus, intervention is wrongful only when coercive
methods are used in regard to choices that must remain free ones.35 The presence of the military
along the Anlusanian side of Lake Cherno36 was necessary after Anlusan after received reports of
unidentified tanks. Anlusanian military did not threaten Racelians in any way but protected them
from the unidentified tanks instead.37
Anlusan has merely undertaken to help the Racelians in the event that a popular
referendum reflected a desire to secede from Bellona. This demonstrates that Racel’s support is
33
nd
B. SIMMA, 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 151 (2
ed. 2002) [“SIMMA”].
34
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA), Merits,
1986 ICJ 14, ¶202 [“Nicaragua”].
35
Id.
36
Compromis, ¶ 17
37
Compromis, ¶ 22.
contingent on the people’s will to be free and does not deprive Racel of control over its domestic
affairs. Thus, Anlusan has not used any coercive measures against Racel and the principle of
non- intervention has not been violated.
b. In any case, the principle of non-intervention does not apply as the situation
in Racel was of an international character.
Considering the perpetration of human rights violations, the international community
defined the situation in Kosovo38 and Aaland Islands39 as a threat to international peace and
stability which meant that the dispute arising therefrom had an international character, and thus,
no longer exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the parent State. 40 Further, the right of
self-determination is to be applied universally and is thus, of an international character. 41 This is
also true for self-determination claims of a secessionist entity since such circumstance
determines the legitimacy of the secession attempt and raises the situation to the level of
international concern.42
The situation in Racel involved self-determination claims as well as human rights
violations. A strike in 1925 by the Racelians against the oil corporations was violently dispersed,
with 30 workers killed and another 50 casualties in the 1941 strike. 43 In 1961 and 1975,
Racelians attempted to secede due to discrimination against indigenous Racelians and repeated
violations of their right to peaceably assemble and strike.44 These were quickly suppressed.
Hence, it ceased to remain a matter exclusively within the domestic affairs of Racel. Therefore,
Anlusan’s acts do not constitute an intervention in Racel’s domestic affairs.
38
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions
1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/293 (Mar.
17, 1999).
39
The Aaland Island Question, Report of the Committee of Jurists, L.N.O.J., Spec. Supp., No. 3,
at 5 (1920) [“Aaland Island”].
40
M. KOHEN, SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 74 (2006).
41
A. CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 152 (1995) [“CASSESE”].
42
RAIC, supra n.8, at 319.
43
Compromis, ¶ 5.
44
Id.
2. Anlusan has not violated the prohibition on threat of force against the territorial
integrity of Racel under the U.N. Charter.
The prohibition on threat of force against the territorial integrity of a State under Article
2(4) of the UN Charter is not violated unless there is coercive intent on part of one State, 45
implying that force will be used against another State if certain demands are not met. 46 For
example, even military maneuvers and overhead flights by the US in Nicaragua were not
considered to be threats of force since the element of coercion was absent. 47 On the other hand,
Britain’s threat of opening fire if Albania blocked the passage through the Corfu Channel was
blocked by Albania48 was considered as a threat to use force. In order to constitute a threat, the
level of military preparation must reach a threshold of readiness and credibility.49
In contrast, the presence of the Anlusanian navy on the Anlusanian side of Lake Cherno
was prompted by the report of tanks without markings and armed men with sniper rifles lined up
on that side of Lake Cherno, all pointing to the direction of Racel. 50 Thus, the military was
stationed at the border only to protect the people from violence. This was neither credible 51 nor
imminent52 to constitute an unlawful threat of force.
Furthermore, the element of coercion was absent. Anlusan did not make any demands,
the failure in complying with which would entail use of force. Instead, Anlusan and exhorted
Bellona government to hold a fair and free referendum. Thus, Anlusan did not violate the
prohibition on threat of force.
45
SIMMA, supra n.1, at 124.
46
I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 364
(1963).
47
N. STURCHLER, THE THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (2007).
48
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 27 (Apr. 9).
49
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶47
[“Legality”].
50
Compromis, ¶ 17.
51
Legality, supra n.20, at ¶47.
52
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with Commentaries, [1996] 2
Yb.I.L.C. 68, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part 2).
3. Alternatively, Anlusan’s Action Was Justified as Humanitarian Intervention To
Respect The Principle Of Self-Determination.
Anlusan’s acts were justified as an exercise of a customary right of humanitarian
intervention (a). Further, the Racelians were a ‘people’ entitled to the right of self-determination
(b) and Anlusan had the authority to take action to respect this right (c).
a. Humanitarian Interventions Are Allowed in Customary International

Law.
Obligations to respect human rights are erga omnes and any state, individually or
collectively, has the right to take steps to respect them, 53 even if the victims are not its
nationals.54 India’s intervention in Bangladesh55 and Tanzanian invasion of Uganda56 were
undertaken to prevent abuse of human rights. Intervention by organizations such as NATO in
Kosovo57 and ECOWAS in Sierra Leone58 reflect State practice supporting intervention for
protection of human rights. The overwhelming majority of states did not condemn these
interventions as illegal.59 The State practice is accompanied by sufficient opinio juris60 and is
supported in doctrine by publicists.61 Further, the responsibility to protect through peaceful
53
A. Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 26
(1999).
54
L. HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 1019 (1987).
55
56
A. Orford, Moral Internationalism and the Responsibility to Protect, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 83,
93 (2013).
57
C. Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: the case of Kosovo, 10 FIN. Y.B. INT’L LAW
141, 157 (1999).
58
L. Berger, State Practice Evidence of the Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine: The ECOW AS
Intervention in Sierra Leone, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605, 607 (2000-2001).
59
A. Cassesse, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis,
10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 791, 792 (1999).
60
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
61
F. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 124 (1998).
means is part of customary international law.62 In case national authorities are unable to protect
their citizens, the responsibility shifts to other States for protection of human rights. 63 Self-
determination has an erga omnes character,64 and has been recognized in various international
instruments.65 Since the right of self-determination of the Racelians was involved, Anlusan’s
intervention is justified on humanitarian grounds.
b. Third States Can Take Positive Action to Assist Self-Determination

Struggles.
Parties to the 1966 Covenants are obligated to promote the realization of the right of self-
determination.66 Thus, they can take positive action to facilitate realization of this right. 67 Such
obligation exists not only in relation to the States’ own peoples but vis-à-vis all peoples who
have been unable to exercise that right.68 Further, the principle of self-determination, if complied
with, prevents the infringement of the territorial integrity of sovereign states.69
Therefore, a contrario, third States are entitled to support a seceding entity if the parent
State has not protected the right of self-determination of its people. 70 For instance, the attitude of
62
U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All, ¶135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005/Add.3 (May 26, 2005).
63
International Commission on the Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect,
¶2.29 (Dec. 2001).
64
U.N. Charter arts.1(2), 55; East Timor (Port. v. Aus.), 1995 I.C.J 90, at 102 (June 30) [“East
Timor”].
65
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[“I.C.C.P.R.”]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art.1(1), Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [“I.C.E.S.C.R.”].
66
I.C.C.P.R., supra n.37, art.1(3); I.C.E.S.C.R., supra n.37, art.1(3).
67
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 12, Article 1, Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations, ¶6, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Mar. 13, 1984)
[“HRC Comment”].
68
Id.
69
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Principle 5(7),
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) [“Resolution 2625”].
70
a large part of the international community gradually shifted away from support for the territorial
integrity of Serbia towards backing the independence of Kosovo based on a right of self-
determination.71 The Racel region has previously attempted to secede from Bellona on account of
persecution of the indigenous Racelians who have been exploited by Anlusanian and Bellonese
oil and steel magnates;72 refusal to change profit-sharing scheme from the extraction of minerals
and oil;73 and refusal to heed the call for more infrastructure and development projects to
enhance their lives.74
It is also not an intervention in a State’s domestic affairs if a third State provides such
support.75 For instance, India’s intervention in Bangladesh to assist its self-determination claim
was implicitly approved by the Security Council 76 when it let troops remain in Bangladesh for
the purpose of helping the government in restoring law and order. 77 Thus, Anlusan was permitted
to provide assistance to the Racelians for the realization of their right to self- determination.78
C. ANLUSAN IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FLOODING OF HOSTILE

MESSAGES IN SOCIAL MEDIA AND STREAMING OF MENACING VIDEOS
IN OTHER MEDIA OUTLETS
1. There is no direct evidence or proof of any unlawful act of intervention.
2.
[attack validity of that independent analysis by a security expert]
71
Daniel Thurer & Thomas Burri, Self Determination, in 9 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (2012).
72
Compromis, ¶ 5.
73
Compromis, ¶¶ 8,9.
74
Compromis, ¶ 9.
75
Philip Kunig, Intervention: Prohibition of, in 6 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (2012).
76
S.C. Res. 307, ¶1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/307 (Dec. 21, 1971).
77
78
CASSESE, supra n.13, at 153.
i. Anlusan intelligence services suffered a massive hack of its own computers. The
dissemination of hostile Chirps and menacing videos was the work of rogue hackers
and not the State.
A. USE OF FORCE EMPLOYED BY THE APPLICANT WAS A
LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF ITS RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
i. There was an armed attack in response to which the right of self defense was
exercised against the respondent
E. Akera used force in Conformity with the UN Charter and associated Customary
International Law
Akera used force to defend itself from the harmful EMI caused by Mheni. The right to self-
defence is available in case the state exercising it is the victim of an armed attack. 79 Further, the
use of force must be necessary and proportionate. 80 Further, the use of force must be necessary
and proportionate.81
i. It was Necessary for Akera to use Force to defend itself
Defensive uses of force are necessary when it is the last possible alternative to protect oneself
from attack.82 The ICJ has held that necessity for self-defence must be viewed from the
perspective of the defending state.83 Necessity includes considerations of less destructive
alternatives, such as negotiations.84
In the present case Akera had exhausted all possible alternatives before taking the measure in
question as it has sought to resolve the disputes through negotiations , settlements and
intervention by the UN
ii. The Akeran Use of Force was proportionate
79
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 ¶¶
161,263 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; DRC v. Uganda, ¶¶ 143,146; Wall Case, ¶ 139;
Oil Platforms, ¶¶ 51,71; Nicaragua, ¶¶ 35,127,191, 210, 211,237.
80
Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of
Disputes-General Course on Public International Law, in 230 RECUEIL DES COURS 9-342,
296 and 310 (1991); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE, 128, 148 (2008).
81
Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of
Disputes-General Course on Public International Law, in 230 RECUEIL DES COURS 9-342,
296 and 310 (1991); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE, 128, 148 (2008).
Nuclear Weapons ¶¶ 161,263; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGRESSION AND SELF

82
DEFENSE, 184 (2001).

83
Donald Nungesser, United States’ Use of the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense in Iraqi
conflicts, 16 PACE INT‟L L. REV.193, 195 (2004).
Air Services Agreement (U.S. v. Fr.), (1978) 18 R.I.A.A. 1013[hereinafter Air Services
84
Agreement].
The concept of proportionality recognizes a State‟s need to restore equality in power between the
parties in order to encourage negotiation towards a solution. 85 The proportionality of defensive
force is defined in terms of nature, size and duration of the defensive use of force. 86 It takes into
account the series of activities that formed part of a sequence or a chain of events which lead to
the act of self-defence.87 The test of proportionality is qualitative and not quantitative.88
In the present case, the function of the SEANAV-2 system was to transmit a protected signal165.
Even though incidentally it led to the destruction of the X-12A satellite , its actual purpose was
to counteract the EMI. This can be classified as a qualitatively proportionate measure.
iii. Even if the armed attack is not attributable to Mheni, Akera had a right to
self defence
State Practice shows condonation of a state exercising its right to self-defence against non-state
actors by the European Union, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Algeria, Norway, Jordan, Indonesia,
Turkey, Iran, Djibouti, India, and Venezuela. 89 Several states offered USA Military support for
Operation Enduring Freedom90. The right is available to a state in case the state to which the non-
state actor belongs is unwilling or unable to stop the illegal actions of the non-state actor.91
85
Air Services Agreement, at 1025-1026.
86
Oil Platforms, ¶ 72; DRC v. Uganda, ¶ 147.
87
MALCOLM N. SHAW, IINTERNATIONAL LAW, 1032 (2003).
Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, Y.B.INT‟L L.COMM‟N 13, U.N.
88
Doc A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7 (1980); R. St. J. Macdonald, The Nicaragua Case: New Answers to
Old Questions?, 24 CAN. Y.B. INT‟L LAW 127, 153 (1986).
89
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/Res./1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc.
S/Res./1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); G.A. Res. 56/44, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc A/56.PV44.
90
David Gerleman and Jennifer Stevens, Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of
Military & Intelligence Support, CRS Report for Congress, (October 17, 2001),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6207.pdf.
91
Kimberley N. Trapp, Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right of Self-
Defence against Non- State Terrorist Actors, THE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW QUARTERLY, VOL. 56, NO. 1 141-156 (2007); Micheal N. Schmitt, “Change Direction”
2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the International Law of Self-Defense, MICH. J. INT‟L
L. 127, 136 (2008).
The ICJ has never denied the right of self-defence against non-state actors. The Court has stated
that where non state actors have perpetrated an armed attack against a state, the right to self-
defence against the state to which the perpetrators belong is only applicable if the actions of the
non-state actors are attributable to that state. 92 Separate Opinions have expressed the view that
the issue of self defence against non-state actors and not against their state of origin has not been
adequately explored by the Court.93 The existence of such a right resolves the problem of a state
being left remediless in case a non-state actor from another state commits an armed attack
against the state and this is the reasoning based on which jurists have argued in favour of the
existence of this right.94
Akera‟s actions are a valid exercise of their right to self-defence and were taken against Sain
Communications which is a non-state actor. They were necessary since Mheni had refused to act
to stop Sain Communications.
Self defense may be exercised as per Article 51 of the UN Charter as an exception to prohibition
of the use of force under Article 2(4). 95 However, a strict and literalist interpretation of Articles
2(4) and 51 reveals the gap between them for cases of threats of use of force, not amounting to
an armed attack.
92
Nicaragua, ¶ 195; DRC v. Uganda, ¶ 146; Wall Case, ¶ 139.
93
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) (Merits), 2005
I.C.J. 156 ¶¶ 4-15 (Dec. 19) Judge Simma Separate Opinion; Legal Consequences on the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 ¶
35 (July 9) Judge Koojimans Separate Opinion; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) (Merits), 2005 I.C.J. 156 ¶ 9 (Dec. 19) Judge Koroma
Declaration; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda)
(Merits), 2005 I.C.J. 156 ¶¶ 19-30 (Dec. 19) Judge Koojimans Separate Opinion.
94
Supra note 170.
95
Article 24, 51 of the UN Charter.
Thus, many jurists read them harmoniously 96 by giving a broader interpretation to ‘armed attack’
to take into consideration the actual state of affairs with common sense, in full awareness of
political realities;97 since at the time of drafting, the Charter was designed only to address
military hostility and “never envisaged the new types of violence and the social conditions that
were their origin and consequence.”
I. SATELLITE, FEZNOTE, CHIRPER, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA
COMPANIES CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE SPREAD OF THE VIDEOS AND
HOSTILE MESSAGES BEFORE THE ELECTION.
A. Feznote and Chirper are not responsible under international law because they are a
‘MERE CONDUIT’ for messages sent by its users.
A forum cannot be held liable for words it does not select, solicit, or modify. 98 A third
party forum like Feznote and Chirper cannot be held liable for the messages of its users
because it is merely a forum, not a publisher of third party statements; 99 instead, it
provides a platform for third parties to discuss and debate relevant social topics. 100
Feznote posts and Chirps are clearly distinguished as a third party user’s statement as
96
Goodrich, Hambro et al., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 297-308 (1969); Tomuschat, International Law : Ensuring the Survival of
Mankind on the Eve of a New Century: General Course on Public International Law, 281
RECUEIL DES COURS, 9, 217 (1999); Schwarzenberger, A MANUAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (2003).; Jennings, General Course on Principles of International
Law, RECUEIL DES COURS 323, 588 (1967).
97
Schwarzenberger, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 (2003).
Delfi AS v Estonia App No 64569/09 (ECtHR, 16 June 2015) JOINT CONCURRING

98
OPINION OF JUDGES RAIMONDI, KARAKAS, DE GAETANO AND KJØLBRO, para 7.
99
Compromis ¶7
100
ibid.
they do not create posts outside of its own official account. 101 This lack of editorial
control makes Feznote and Chirper a forum, rather than a publisher.102
However, under the ICCPR and UDHR, even a publisher would be protected from liability
connected to third party statements.103 Internet service providers are protected from liability when
acting as a publisher or disseminator of user opinions. 104 Social media exists to express speech,
and Chatter facilitates the exchange of ideas and news. When a facilitator of a disseminated
message is clearly dissociated from the crafter of the message, liability does not attach. 105 A
facilitator, like Chatter, is fulfilling its function as a disseminator of all information provided to
it, and cannot be held liable for a specific message in its routine practice.106
Holding an Internet platform liable as a publisher of third party postings would have a ‘chilling
effect’ on free speech.107 With the exponential amount of information communicated through the
Internet, ‘[i]t would be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of
postings for possible problems’.108 If an interactive Internet platform faces liability for each
message crafted by its users, such platforms ‘might choose to severely restrict the number and
type of messages posted’.109 Avoiding this potentially devastating effect on free speech is
essential in a democratic society.110
101
ibid.
102
Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ("Directive on electronic
commerce") [2000] OJ L178/1, para 42.

103

104
Zeran v America Online, Inc 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
105
Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1, para 31–34.
106
ibid.
107
ibid.
108
ibid.
109
ibid.
110
Castells v Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445, para 43.
Interactive Internet platforms should be allowed to ‘self regulate the dissemination of offensive
material over their services’.111 Holding Internet platforms accountable for third party posts will
deter Internet platforms from screening and blocking offensive material because it will cast the
platform operator in the role of publisher.112 If platform operators are protected from liability, the
operator would be more willing to screen material, resulting in greater assistance to the
government in guarding against terrorism.113
Removing protections from organizations or groups, who are disseminating messages created by
third parties, would chill the free speech rights of every individual who wished to use that
service. Punishing a facilitator ‘for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another
person . . . would seriously hamper . . . discussion of matters of public interest’.
A platform operator can be exempt from liability if they are not involved with the information
that is transmitted.114 A platform is a ‘mere conduit’ and is exempt from liability associated with
the communications of a third party when the operator does not initiate the transmission of the
communication, does not select the receiver of the transmission, and does not select or modify
the information within the transmission.115
Chatter is acting as a ‘mere conduit’ as it serves only as a platform for transmissions, and does
not initiate, select a receiver, or select the information in the posts on its page. 116 Additionally,
Chatter’s users do not expect Chatter to influence user posts. Chatter itself does not interact with
its users before or after posts are created and disseminated.
111
Zeran v America Online, Inc 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
112
ibid.
113
Thoma v Luxembourg ECHR 2001-III 67, para 62.
114
115
commerce") [2000] OJ L178/1, paras 42-43.
116
ibid; Compromis, paras 6–8.
Here, Chatter is a disseminator of information and opinion via social media posts. Chatter does
not edit the content or timing of user’s messages, has its own internal guidelines and rules for the
use of its service by users, and removes posts that it considers to be in bad taste or to have
potential legal consequences. Chatter was clearly disassociated from Umani’s message. Although
Umani is one user, there are hundreds of thousands of Chatter users in Omeria, and Chatter is
simply facilitating social discussion.
To subject a service like Chatter to liability for the message of its users would effectively chill
the speech of Omerians and significantly hamper discussion of topics in the public interest.
Requiring a platform operator to regulate third party posts would seriously endanger the function
of a democratic society.117 Chatter operates as a forum for its users to share and debate relevant
social topics in the form of opinions and information. 118 Chatter does not participate in creating
any of the messages shared by its users, and should not be held liable for disseminating a user’s
message.119
chatter, as a forum, is not actively opposing Omerian values when it allows third parties to post
opinions. The Law defines extremism as ‘the vocal or active opposition to fundamental Omerian
values’, including ‘calls for the death of individuals living within Omeria’s borders’. Umani is a
third party that uses Chatter to disseminate opinions and information. Chatter should not be
responsible for third party statements, as such posts do not reflect Chatter’s beliefs or values.
Chatter speaks for itself only through its official Chatter account, @Chatter.
117
118
Compromis, paras 5–8.
119
Compromis, paras 5–8.
Under this law, a platform operator’s free speech and ability to assist the government in guarding
against terrorism will be chilled. It would be more beneficial for both the website and the
government if the website operator is protected from liability.
Accordingly, the Law would force a platform operator to take additional precautions to protect
itself from liability. Monitoring each post would require specific software to screen the large
amount of information contributed to the forum.120 However, forcing a platform to utilize
software to monitor third party posts violates the platform’s protection of privacy and freedom of
expression.121 Forcing a platform operator to install a system to filter electronic communication
using its services is improper122 because the high cost of a complicated computer system would
seriously infringe on the freedom of the platform operator to conduct its business.123 A website
operator is protected in its right to privacy to determine how to run its own forum without
government imposition.124
his sentiment was held by the concurring justices of the ECHR in the case of Delfi As v. Estonia:
‘finding a news portal liable for not having “prevented” the publication of user-generated
comments would in practice imply that the portal would have to pre-monitor each and every
user-generated comment in order to avoid liability for any unlawful comments’. 125 Forcing an
internet forum to monitor every post could ‘lead to a disproportionate interference with the news
portal’s freedom of expression’.126

120

121
ibid.
122
Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended NV v SABAM (2011) ECR I- 12006, para 5.
123
ibid.
124
ibid.
125
App No 64569/09 (ECtHR, 16 June 2015) JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES
RAIMONDI, KARAKAS, DE GAETANO AND KJØLBRO, para 7.
126
ibid
International principles draw a line between the speaker of offensive and repugnant speech and
the conduit by which it is disseminated.127 Chatter is acting as a conduit for Umani’s speech, just
as it does for many Omerians every day. If Chatter was held liable for every message created and
shared by its users, it would find itself unable to continue offering an essential platform for the
dissemination of ideas, opinions, and information. Chatter is merely a conduit for ideas, 128 as it
does not initiate the transmission of messages, does not select the author of the messages posted
on its site, and does not modify, control, or select the content of the messages. 129 Holding a
website like Chatter liable for messages it did not select, craft, or solicit creates an environment
hostile to free speech and weakens democratic society.
B. SATELLITE AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL MEDIA COMPANIES ARE
LIKEWISE NOT RESPONSIBLE BECAUSE__
C. IMPUTING RESPONSIBILITY AS AGAINST THESE SOCIAL MEDIA
PLATFORMS AND MEDIA COMPANIES VIOLATE ARTICLES 12 AND 19 OF
THE UDHR AND ARTICLES 17 AND 19 OF THE ICCPR BECAUSE
PROSECUTION AS AGAINST THEM WILL CONSTITUTE A CHILLING
EFFECT ON FREE SPEECH
127
OPINION OF JUDGES RAIMONDI, KARAKAS, DE GAETANO AND KJØLBRO, para 7;
128
129
Compromise , paragraph __
The freedom of expression is perhaps the most significant and important fundamental human
right. This right encompasses even unpopular and ugly speech. 130 It is protected by both the
ICCPR and the UDHR, and can only be abridged in limited and particular circumstances. 131 A
primary function of free speech is to promote and encourage debate in a democratic society, even
when it creates a sense of unrest, anger, or resentment. 132 Democratic society relies on the
healthy and free exchange of ideas and news to ensure pluralism and tolerance. 133 Social media
platforms play an important role in the expression of speech; punishing a third party ‘for
assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another person . . . would seriously hamper .
. . [the] discussion of matters of public interest’.134
Protecting the lives, property, and freedom of citizens is an essential function of
government.135 However, the protection of national security, law, and order must not infringe on
the ability of citizens to exercise their rights.136 Article 19 of the UDHR allows the government to
enact laws to protect public order and deter violence; however free speech may be restricted only
if a government can demonstrate that the speech is intended to incite imminent violence and that
Terminiello v Chicago 337 US 1, 4 (1949); Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR

130
737, para 49.

131
Njaru v Cameroon (2007) AHRLR 21 (ACHPR 2007), para 6.4; Handyside v United
Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para 49. See also Compulsory Membership in an Association
Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts 13 and 29 American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A No 5
(13 November 1985).
132
Terminiello v Chicago 337 US 1, 4 (1949).
Herrero-Ulloa v Costa Rica IACtHR (2004) Series C No 107, para 113; Perrin v the United
133
Kingdom
ECHR 2005-XI 337, para 15.
134
Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1, para 35.
Steven J. Heyman, ‘The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth
135
Amendment’ (1991) 41 Duke L J 507, 515; John Locke, ‘Third Letter on Toleration’ in Peter
Laslett (ed) Two Treatises of Government (CUP 1988). See also Barrios Family v Venezuela
IACtHR (2011) Series C No 230, paras 46–47.
136
Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para 49. See also International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999
UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 19.
the speech is likely to incite such violence. 137 There must be a direct and immediate connection
between the message and an act of violence; words alone are not enough to constitute a threat to
national security or public order.138
Here, Umani’s prosecution under the Law is invalid under international principles because
Umani’s messages were not intended or likely to incite violence, and had no direct and
immediate connection to violence. Umani’s messages, while aggressive and distasteful in tone
and content, did not give rise to violence or even increase the likelihood that violence would
occur. Therefore, Omeria had no legitimate authority to arrest and prosecute Umani under the
Law.
I. Umani’s Chatter messages were not intended or likely to incite violence, but
were merely the expression of an opposing viewpoint in Omeria.
Ideas and opinions considered by many to be repugnant or disturbing are nevertheless protected
as free speech.139 Even opinions that seem motivated by violence and indicate a desire to harm
others, without actually inciting violence, are protected.140
The right to freedom of expression is fundamental to the function of a democratic society, and
criminalizing repulsive viewpoints may only lead to further violence and turmoil.141
Terrorist movements frequently seek to destroy freedoms and rights enjoyed by a democratic
society; ‘respond[ing] to terrorism by restricting this right could facilitate certain terrorist
objectives’ by the further ‘dismantling of human rights’.142 Therefore, it is vital, ‘however

137
Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444, 447 (1969)
138
Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 262 (ACHPR 2000), paras 69–71.
139
Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444, 447–49 (1969).
140
Ibid.
Tae-Hoon Park v Republic of Korea Communication No 628/1995 UN Doc
141
CCPR/C/57/D/628/1995 (1998), para 10.3.

142
UNGA ‘Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of March 2006 Entitled
“Human Rights Council” Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Ambeyi Ligabo’ (2 January 2007) UN Doc
A/HRC/4/27, para 43.
disagreeable’ the speech,143 to ‘know what our fellow citizens think and to develop our own
capacities for critical response. We cannot know what others think when the government silences
them’.144
When deciding if speech rises to the level of actually inciting and encouraging violence,
‘[a]ttention is paid . . . to the express words used by the applicant and the general style of the
publication’.145 It is ‘insufficient to consider that those declarations constitute an incitement to
violence, armed resistance or an uprising . . . or incitement to terrorism’ if the words used are
simply angry and aggressive in tone. 146 ‘Even if the words used in a publication may be virulent
in style or lend some vehemence to the discourse or a hostile tone to it, rather than limiting the
discourse’ government should protect all speech that is promulgated in a democratic society. 147
The public has a right to be informed of differing perspectives and opinions on ongoing
situations, and these iewpoints must be protected ‘irrespective of how unpalatable that
perspective may be’ for those who disagree.148
B. There is no direct and immediate connection between Umani’s Chatter messages and the
likelihood or occurrence of violence.
While some speech may be restricted in the interest of protecting national security and public
order, speech cannot be restricted on this basis unless there is also a direct and immediate
connection between the speech and the likelihood that violence will occur.149 Political hyperbole
is not a true threat that can be suppressed.150 The freedom of speech protects viewpoints unless
143
Eric Heinze, ‘Viewpoint Absolution and Hate Speech’ (2006) 69 MLR 543, 554.
144
ibid.
145
Gumus and Others v Turkey App No 40303/98 (ECtHR, 15 June 2005), para 18.
146
ibid.
147
ibid.
148
Sener v Turkey App No 26680/95 (ECtHR, 18 July 2000), para. 58.
Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 262 (ACHPR 2000), paras 69–71;
149
Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444, 447–49 (1969).

150
Watts v United States 394 US 705, 708 (1969); Virginia v Black 538 US 343, 359 (2003).
the opinion is attempting to incite ‘imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action’.151
When determining the likelihood that speech would lead to violence, courts examine the
speech’s contribution to the exchange of ideas and opinions,152 the circumstances surrounding the
speech, including the immediacy of the messages,153 and the public or private condition of the
speech when it was disseminated.154
Here, Umani’s Chatter posts had no immediate or direct likelihood of producing violence.
Chatter is a mainstream platform for the dissemination of news and opinion, and Umani’s posts
are just a few of the posts that are submitted every day. Umani’s Chatter messages were ‘re-
satirical. None of the posts mentioned any specific target, date, or manner of violence. The most
specific post, #4, was created in April and referenced Armistice Day, which took place six weeks
of violence are attributable to Umani’s messages.
Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444, 447 (1969). See also Watts v United States 394 US 705,
151
707 (1969).
Karatas v Turkey App No 63315/00 (ECtHR, 5 January 2010), para 49; Alinak v Turkey App
152
No 40287/98 (ECtHR, 29 March 2005), para 42.
153
ibid.
154
Karatas v Turkey App No 63315/00 (ECtHR, 5 January 2010), para 52.
II. THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RACEL ARE NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The Federation of Anlusan prays that the Court lift the sanctions imposed by the Republic of
Racel. It argues that these violated the Open Data Agreement signed by Bellona, Racel’s
predecessor state. All the agreements signed by Bellona bind Racel.
A. THE SECESSION OF RACEL IS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW. HENCE, RACEL REMAINS PART OF BELLONA AND ALL
AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY BELLONA IS STILL EFFECTIVE AND
BINDING AS AGAINST RACEL.
[DISCUSS WHY THE SECESSION IS NOT VALID]
The purported secession and subsequent annexation of East Agnostica are illegal and without
effect [I] and cannot be justified on the basis of self-determination or a ‘remedial right of
secession’ [II]. Therefore, East Agnostica remains part of Agnostica [III].
3. THE PURPORTED SECESSION AND SUBSEQUENT
ANNEXATION OF EAST AGNOSTICA ARE ILLEGAL
AND WITHOUT EFFECT.
East Agnostica’s purported secession and annexation are illegal as a unilateral secession,
opposed by the parent state is not permitted in international law [a] and because it was organized
through Reverentian assistance [b]. Moreover, it is based on an illegal and invalid referendum
and integration agreement [c]. Further, the purported secession and subsequent annexation is
without effect since it has not been recognized by a substantial part of the international
community [d].
a. A SECESSION WHICH IS OPPOSED BY THE PARENT STATE IS NOT PERMITTED IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The post-Charter practice does not recognize the right of a portion of the population of a State to
secede or determine its own political fate, in opposition to the parent State.155 The UNGA and the
Security Council [“UNSC”] have repeatedly reinforced the requirement of the assent of the
parent State in matters of secession.156 For instance, the UNSC condemned the attempts at
unilateral secession in Katanga and Rhodesia as they were without the consent of the parent
State.157
The loss of considerable territory and population, does not affect the identity and continuity of a
State,158 and it may therefore effectively oppose the secession of a part of its territory. For
instance, the consent of the Soviet Union and Pakistan was considered necessary in legitimizing
the secession of the Baltic States and Bangladesh,159 even though they had lost a considerable
part of their territory. Agnostica has consistently opposed the purported secession and annexation
of East Agnostica; therefore, East Agnostica’s purported secession is illegal and without effect.
b. IT IS ILLEGAL AS IT WAS ORGANIZED THROUGH REVERENTIAN
ASSISTANCE.
155
J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 390 (1979)
[“CRAWFORD”]; Report of the Commission of Jurists (Larnaude et al.), L.N.O.J. Sp. Supp. No.
3 (Oct., 1920) [“Larnaude Report”].
156
S.C. Res. 853, U.N. Doc. S/RES/853 (Jul. 29, 1993); S.C. Res. 550, U.N. Doc. S/RES/550
(May 11, 1984); G.A. Res. 31/6A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/6A (Oct. 26, 1976).
157
S.C. Res. 169, U.N. Doc. S/RES/169 (Nov. 24, 1961); S.C. Res. 216, U.N. Doc. S/RES/216
(Nov. 12, 1965).
158
International Law Association, Helsinki Conference, Report of the Sixty Seventh Conference,
at 14 (Aug. 12-17, 1996).
159
rd
G.A. Res. 3203 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2233 plen. mtg. (Sept. 17, 1974); S.C.
Res. 709, U.N. Doc. S/RES/709 (Sept. 12, 1991); Report of the Committee on Admission of
New Members, S/23021 (Sept. 11, 1991).
Secession is considered illegal when there is a violation of a jus cogens norm.160 The customary
norm of non-intervention has a jus cogens status.161 This was confirmed in ‘Friendly Relations
Declaration’, which states that the principle of self-determination grants the right to peoples to
freely determine their political status albeit without external interference.162 Accordingly,
secession through external interference is considered illegal in international law. For instance,
the UNSC condemned the secessionist activities in Katanga owing to external interference as
illegal.163
Reverentia offered its assistance to Mr. Bien, pursuant to which he propagated secessionist
activities. The Reverentian Parliament resolution unconditionally facilitated the secessionist
claims, and Reverentia stationed its army units on the border. Thus, East Agnostica’s purported
secession was with external interference, and hence, illegal.
c. IT IS BASED ON AN ILLEGAL AND INVALID REFERENDUM AND
INTEGRATION AGREEMENT.
i. The referendum was illegal.
A referendum for secession is not permitted in international law,164 unless it is permitted in the
domestic Constitution.165 For instance, States have opposed the legality of the Crimean
referendum as it was in violation of Ukraine’s Constitution. 166 Similarly, the UNSC and the EU
160
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22) [“Kosovo Advisory Opinion”].
161
Nicaragua, supra n.2, at ¶202; G.A. Res. 375 (IV), U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/4/375 (Dec. 6,
1949).
162
Resolution 2625, supra n.28.
163
S.C. Res. 169, ¶¶ 1,8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/169 (Nov. 24, 1961); D.W. McNemar, The Post-
independence War in the Congo, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 244 (R.
Falk ed., 2010).
164
D. RAIC, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 290-93 (2002)
[“RAIC”].
165
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at 594-95 (Can.) [“Quebec
Secession”]; Kohlhaas v. Alaska, 147 P.3d 714 (2006); Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali),
1986 I.C.J. 567 (Dec. 22).
166
General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States not to Recognize Changes in Status
of Crimea Region, (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/ga11493.doc.htm.;
Arbitration Commission condemned referenda conducted by a section of the population of
Yugoslavia despite resulting in substantial majorities.167 Thus, in CIL, there is no unilateral right
to secede based only on a majority vote of the population of a given territory.

168
Further, for a referendum to be legal in international law, there must be a democratic
deliberation and opinion forming. 169 The Venice Commission has condemned the Crimean
referendum as there was a period of only 13 days between calling the referendum and the
referendum itself.170 The period of 16 days between scheduling and conducting the referendum
demonstrates non- compliance with customary requirements.
d. IN ANY CASE, IT IS WITHOUT EFFECT AS IT HAS NOT BEEN RECOGNIZED BY
A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
The legality and legitimacy of an unconstitutional declaration of secession is dependent on
recognition by the international community.171 In the Reparations case, the ICJ noted that fifty
States out of a total of approximately sixty UN members, at the time, represented the vast
majority of the members of the international community; thus they had had the power to bring
into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely personality
recognized by them alone. In the present case, the supposed recognition of the changed status of
East Agnostica was merely by 30 States out of a total of 193 UN Members.
Such recognition granted by few States to an illegal change in territory has no consequence in
G.A. Res. 68/262, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262 (Apr. 1, 2014) [“Resolution 68/262”].
167
S.C. Res. 1287, ¶4-5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1287 (Jan. 31, 2000); Conference on Yugoslavia
Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2, 92 I.L.R. 167, 168-69.A (Jan. 11, 1992) [“Badinter
Committee Opinion 2”]; CRAWFORD, supra n.53, at 417.
168
CRAWFORD, supra n.53, at 417.
169
th
Venice Commission, Code of Good Practice on Referendums, 70 plen.mtg., at 11, Doc.
CDL-AD(2007)008 3.2 (Mar. 19, 2007).
170
Venice Commission, Opinion no. 762/2014, ¶21-22, Doc. CDL-AD(2014)002) (Mar. 21,
2014).
171
Quebec Secession, supra n.69, at 595; M. Shaw, Re: Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497 of 30
September 1996, in SELF DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 218 (A. Bayefsky
ed., 2000).
international law.172
Moreover, when a situation constitutes a threat to peace as a result of secessionist activities, the
UNSC has consistently upheld the preservation of territorial integrity of the parent State.173
Several transnational bodies have issued communiqués describing the purported annexation of
East Agnostica as “a threat to international peace and stability”. Accordingly, any change in the
legal status of East Agnostica has not been recognized by the international community. East
Agnostica’s purported secession is without effect.
II. THE PURPORTED SECESSION OF EAST AGNOSTICA CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
ON THE BASIS OF SELF-DETERMINATION OR A ‘REMEDIAL RIGHT OF
SECESSION’.
The denial of the internal self-determination is a condition sine qua non for a lawful exercise of
external self-determination for a remedial secession.174 In CIL, 175 a unilateral secession is illegal
when, there are participatory rights available to a community [a], there is absence of gross and
systematic violation of its human rights [b] or when other remedies have not been exhausted [c].
a. THE AGNOREVS HAVE NOT BEEN DENIED THEIR RIGHT OF
REPRESENTATION.
States whose governments represent the whole population of its territory on the basis of equality
are deemed to comply with the principle of self-determination in respect of its entire people.176
172
East Timor, supra n.80, at 116 (dissenting Opinion of Judge Skubiszewski).
173
Iraq, S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991); Yugoslavia (Kosovo), S.C. Res.
1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999).
174
175
Resolution 2625, supra n.28; A. Pellet & A. Ellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration
Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 178; A.
CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 119 (1995) [“CASSESE”]; Quebec
Secession, supra n.69, ¶134; Aaland Islands Question: Report of the Committee of Jurists,
L.N.O.J. Spec. Supp. No.3 (1920).
176
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art.1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3; Resolution 2625, supra n.28.
Accordingly, when there is no denial of the basic right of representation, i.e. a formal
suspension/de-recognition of the provincial government,177 Aright of secession cannot arise.178
For instance, in determining the legality of the secession of Serbian Krajina from Croatia, which
was based on the factum of minority representation in the central parliament albeit with
participatory rights,179 the international community did not consider it as a situation which
justified secession.180
During the conflict, the East Agnostican provincial legislature was not derecognized and carried
out functions as per the Constitution. Further, East Agnostican representatives constitute
approximately one-third of the Federal Parliament. Effective participation in the decision making
process in the Parliament is evidenced from the fact that Mr. Bien presented two resolutions in
the Agnostican Parliament
b. THERE IS NO GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EAST AGNOSTICA.
The deaths of sixty demonstrators [i], the restrictions on unauthorized transactions of Marthite
[ii], and the allegations of discrimination in public life [iii], do not constitute ‘gross and
systematic’ violation of human rights, sufficient for a right of secession to arise.
i. Death of sixty demonstrators:
For a right of secession to arise, the violation of human rights must be ‘gross and systematic’;
as was characterized in the genocide in Bangladesh181 and ‘ethnic cleansing’ leading to the
10,000 deaths in Croatia.182 In comparison, few deaths in Cameroon were held not to give
177
Declaration on Yugoslavia, Informal Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Haarzuilens
(Oct. 5, 1991).
178
th
Mgwanga Gunme v. Cameroon, Comm. No. 266/2003, 26 ACHPR AAR Annex ¶6 (Dec.
2008-May 2009) [“ ; CASSESE, supra n.91, at 119-120.
179
S.L. BURG, CONFLICT AND COHESION IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA, POLITICAL
DECISION MAKING SINCE 1966 113 (1983) [“BURG”].
180
Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 15 (Dec. 28, 1992);
S.C. Res. 815, ¶5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/815 (Mar. 30, 1993).
181
East Pakistan Staff Study, 8 INT’L COMM’N JURISTS REV. 23, 44 (1972).
182
C. Bassiouni & P. M. Manikas, Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Ann. IV, The Policy of Ethnic
Cleansing, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (V) (Dec. 28, 1994).
rise to a right of secession.183 Accordingly, sixty deaths and limited injuries in East Agnostica
do not give rise to a right of secession.
ii. Restrictions on unauthorized transactions of Marthite:
In CIL, cultural rights of a community are not absolute and may be restricted on account of a
reasonable countervailing interest, such as judicious use of natural resources and protection of
others’ human rights.184
The restrictions in the MCA, of banning unauthorized purchase, sale, or possession of Marthite
within Agnostica, were due to the extreme shortage of Marthite in Agnostica, and for saving the
suffering children of the world. Therefore, MCA’s restrictions on the unauthorized transactions
of Marthite did not constitute a gross and systematic violation of human rights.
iii. Allegations of discrimination in public life:
Mere allegations of discrimination of a community in public life and government positions do
not give a right of secession.185 For instance, the purported secession of Serbian Krajina from
Croatia was based on claims inter alia that Serbs were disproportionately represented in the civil
service, and in the army.186 However, the international community noted that these claims ipso-
facto did not demonstrate systematic discrimination justifying the secession of the Serbian-
Krajina. 187
Similarly, the claims of the East Agnostican citizens regarding discrimination in judicial posts,
armed services and education, does not show a gross or systematic violation of human rights
which would give rise to a right of secession.
c. THERE ARE OTHER REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF EAST
AGNOSTICA.
183
Mgwanga v. Cameroon, supra n.94, ¶111,201.
184
Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, ¶4.1, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985, (July 27, 1988); Lansman v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, (Oct. 26, 1994).
185
Mgwanga v. Cameroon, supra n.94, ¶143,202.
186
BURG, supra n.95, at 113.
187
Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.15, (Dec. 28, 1992);
G.A. Res. 49/43, Preamble, ¶4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/43 (Dec. 9, 1994); S.C. Res. 815, ¶5, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/815 (Mar. 30, 1993).
In CIL, secession is a remedy of last resort and it permitted only when it is evident that a
community does not have any other remedies under domestic or international law.188 A right of
secession can fructify only when all political mechanisms are exhausted, which in practice
revolves around the ‘exhaustion of negotiations’.189 For instance, the international community
has condemned of the purported secessions of Katanga from Congo190 and Abkhazia from
Georgia 191as the they were without any ‘good faith negotiations’, and thus could not be
considered as ultimum remedium. Therefore, the purported secession of East Agnostica is illegal
and without effect as it was without negotiations in good-faith regarding the future political
solutions with the Agnostican Parliament and government, for the settlement of the conflict. 192
III. EAST AGNOSTICA REMAINS PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF AGNOSTICA.
a. AGNOSTICA’S SOVEREIGN TITLE OVER EAST AGNOSTICA PREVAILS OVER THE
REVERENTIA’S POSSESSION AND THE PURPORTED ‘WILL OF THE PEOPLE’.
In the Frontier Disputes case, the ICJ noted that the CIL principle of uti possidetis iuris makes
the frontiers inherited from colonization, intangible, and accords preeminence to such a legal title
over any competing effective possession as a basis for sovereignty.193 Thus, Agnostica’s
sovereign title over East Agnostica prevails over the Reverentian occupation.194 Moreover, the
Chamizal arbitration demonstrates that merely because a State withdraws its military units from
the disputed territory does not itself affect its sovereign title over that territory.195
188
E. VATTEL, 1 THE LAW OF NATIONS ¶54 (1916); CASSESE, supra n.91, at 118;
YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS; FROM ITS CREATION TO ITS DISSOLUTION
310 (S. Trifunovska ed., 1994); Brioni Declaration, Europe Documents, No. 1725, at 16-19 (July
16, 1991).
189
Mgangwa v. Cameroon, supra n.94, ¶203; European Commission for Democracy through
Law, Opinion No. 762/2014 (Mar. 21-22 2014).
190
S.C. Res. 169, U.N. Doc. S/RES/169 (Nov. 24, 1961).
191
S.C. Res. 1096, ¶3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1096 (Jan. 30, 1997); European Parliament, Resolution
on the Situation in Abkhazia, Preamble ¶G and operative ¶¶3,4 (Nov. 14, 1996).
192
193
Frontier Disputes (Burkina Faso/ Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
194
Chamizal (Mex. v. USA), 5 AM. J. INT’L. L., at 782 (1911); Minquiers and Ecrehos Case
(Fr. v. U. K.) 1953 I.C.J. 142-4 (Nov. 17).
195
Id.
b. THE LEGAL STATUS QUO ANTE MUST BE RESTORED.
When a State illegally occupies the territory of another State, it does not have valid title over the
territory, the principle of reparation and restitution apply and the legal status quo ante must be
restored.196 The UNGA, seized of the matter in Croatia, emphasized that the illegally occupied
territory by Serbia must be reintegrated into Croatia.197 Moreover, the UNSC noted in the East
Timor situation that in case of an illegal annexation, there is a duty of restoration under
international law which involves withdrawing troops from the annexed territory.198 Therefore
East Agnostica remains part of the territory of Agnostica.
THE OPEN DATA AGREEMENT WAS STILL IN EFFECT. The MC was in effect till 1
March 2013 because Agnostica did not have the right to unilaterally terminate it under
international law [A]. Alternatively, there were no valid grounds to justify the termination [B].
A. THE ‘UNILATERAL’ TERMINATION OF THE MC IS NOT PERMITTED IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
A State is not permitted to unilaterally terminate a treaty,199 without first approaching a
competent judicial body.200 Articles 60 and 62 of the VCLT, which codify customary
196
C. Haverland, Secession, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L. L. 384 (1987).
197
G.A. Res. 49/43, Preamble, ¶4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/43 (Dec. 9, 1994).
198
S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999); East Timor, supra n.80, at 102–4.
199
E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in International Law, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 488, 492
(1935); G. Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, 2 Yb.I.L.C. 16, 53 (1957)
[“Fitzmaurice Second Report”]; P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 152 (1959).
200
LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 573-74 (1986); H. LAUTERPACHT, THE
FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 285 (2011).
international law,201 use the phrase “invoke as a ground”, indicating that there is per se no right of
unilateral termination. This is supported by the travaux preparatoires, whereby a proposal to
substitute a right “to terminate” for the right “to invoke a breach as a ground for termination”
was rejected by the International Law Commission.202 Since Agnostica unilaterally terminated
the MC, without approaching a judicial body prior to such termination, the unilateral declaration
was invalid.
Articles 65 to 67 of the VCLT reflect customary international law and contain procedural
principles which are based on an obligation to act in good faith.203 Agnostica did not undertake
any of the procedures laid down in the VCLT before declaring the termination. In fact, it
hastened the process of termination and immediately granted a lease to Baxter. Such unilateral
termination of the MC without undertaking due procedure is unlawful.
B. ALTERNATIVELY, AGNOSTICA DID NOT HAVE ANY VALID GROUNDS TO
TERMINATE THE MC.
Agnostica had no valid grounds to justify such termination since there was neither a material
breach of the MC [i], nor a fundamental change of circumstances [ii].
a. No breach
b. b) Alternatively, the breach of Article 4 was not a material breach of
the MC.
Only a material breach can justify the termination of a treaty by the other party, as evidenced by
widespread State practice,204 judicial decisions,205 and the opinion of jurists.206 Under customary
201
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of' South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 49, ¶94 (June
21) [“Namibia”].
202
st
Committee of the Whole, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 61 meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/C.1/SR.61 (Mar. 26- May 24, 1968).
203
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 66 (May 2) [“Gabcikovo”].
204
M.E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 365 (1985).
205
Gabcikovo, supra n.151, at 65; Namibia, supra n.148, ¶101.
206
I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 756 (A. McNair ed. 4th ed., 1928); Fitzmaurice
Second Report, supra n.146, at 30.
international law, “material breach” of a treaty is a violation of a provision which is essential to
the accomplishment of the objects or purposes of the treaty.207 This refers to the original
purpose,208 and motivating goals of the treaty,209 which are the foundation of treaty relationship
between the parties.210 For example, in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ did not consider the violation
of a numerical limit as a material breach of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation.211
In the present case, it is clear from the Preamble, and P.M. Mortiz’s statements, that the central
purpose of the MC was to ensure adequate supply of Marthite to traditional practitioners. Despite
selling 75% Marthite mined in late 2011 to pharmaceutical companies, the supply was more than
adequate to meet local demand, with there being mere concerns of shortages. In fact, there is no
evidence of any actual supply shortages till April 2012 when Baxter commenced operations.
Thus, by ensuring adequate supplies of Marthite to traditional practitioners, Reverentia did not
commit any material breach of the MC.
i. AGNOSTICA CANNOT INVOKE ‘FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES’ TO TERMINATE THE MC.
The principle of fundamental change in circumstances, as a part of customary international
law,212 has been codified in Article 62 of the VCLT. This principle cannot be validly invoked to
terminate the MC since the changes were not unforeseen by the parties [a] and there was no
‘radical transformation’ of the obligations still to be performed [b].
a) Selling of Marthite to non-traditional users was not unforeseen by the parties at the
207
Gabcikovo, supra n.151, at 65; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.60(3)(b), May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [“V.C.L.T.”].
208
H. Lauterpacht, First Report on the Law of Treaties, 2 Yb.I.L.C. 90, 126 (1953).
209
D. Jonas & T. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods 43
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565, 581 (2010).
210
Fitzmaurice Second Report, supra n.146, at 33.
211
Nicaragua, supra n.2, at 126, 138.
212
Gabcikovo, supra n.151, at 65.
time of the conclusion of the MC.
b) b) There was no radical transformation of the extent of obligations still to be
performed.
‘Radical transformation of the extent of obligations still to be performed’213 means that the effect
of the alleged change in circumstances is to completely modify the original obligations of the
parties, thereby making the further realisation of these obligations impossible.214 Accordingly,
the effect of the change in circumstances on the fulfilment of the original intentions of the parties
must be seen.215
In the present case, Agnostica’s obligations under the MC were to allow Reverentia the
continued use of the facilities for mining Marthite as per Article 2; and Reverentia’s reciprocal
obligations were to provide technology and pay an annual royalty as per Article 3. There was no
radical transformation of any of these obligations due to the discovery of new medical uses of
Marthite and the original intention of selling Marthite to traditional practitioners remained
unaffected. Thus, Agnostica could not terminate the MC on the ground of fundamental change of
circumstances.
213
V.C.L.T, supra n.160, art. 62(1)(b).
214
M. Shaw & C. Fournet, Invalidity, Termination and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties,
in THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1427 (O. Corten & P. Klein
eds., 2011).
215
H. Waldock, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, 2 Yb.I.L.C. 18, 64 (1957).
Retaliation as a measure was unjust
It is submitted that this was a form of unnecessary retaliation against the allegations of barrier to
trade in introducing licenses for SIS, and created an unnecessarily “inflammatory and potentially
counterproductive situation.”216 Retaliation adds new incursions, and undermines the entire WTO
system, which is based upon mutually agreed trade liberalization.217
Retaliatory measures go against the interest of Rubena
The implementation is an unjust retaliatory measure, and it also goes against the interest of
Rubena. As Andrena is the main supplier of the mentioned technology, the buyers in Rubena are
purchasing Andrenian technology because it offers an advantage, either in cost or quality.
Thus, the claim of the Rubenan Government that the RPHSA was implemented in public interest
does not hold merit. There is no proven justification for enactment in public interest, and is just
an unnecessary retaliation against the alleged discriminatory requirement of using SIS or
equivalent software technology.
Since 97% of the imports were from Andrena, it is submitted that such legislation was
specifically enacted to hurt the Andrenian economy. There was a significant harm done by the
retaliation, since a large part of Andrena’s export, authorised by a special legislation passed by
the Andrenian Assembly, were affected.
The British agreement modal, which calls for most favored nation treatment or national
treatment, whichever is more favorable, permits each of the respective parties to accord less than
216
Pinto-León, Fair and Equitable Treatment under International Law: Analyzing the
Interpretation of NAFTA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL, 141 (Winter 2006);
Henson & Wilson, THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM AND THE WTO, 133 (2005).
Grandos, Investor Protection and Foreign Investment under NAFTA: Prospects for the
217
Western Hemisphere under FTAA, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 189 (2005).
national treatment provided ‘its laws so provide in respect of all non-nationals and in relation to
particular matters’.218
It is submitted that the requirement for the high quality software to safeguard economic data is
for all companies to whom work is being outsourced, and not only Rubenan companies.
Hence, the measure to introduce licenses is not arbitrarily against Rubenan companies, but rather
a measure to protect economic security of its citizens against all companies engaged in
outsourcing.
International law imposes a duty on a State to exercise rights in good faith. 219 The concept of
equitable treatment envisages that the foreign investors have not been well treated by reason of
discriminatory or other unfair measures being taken against their interests. 220 It is, therefore, a
concept that depends on the interpretation of specific facts for its content. Andrena was
concerned with modernization and efficiency in the outsourcing sector to protect its citizens from
fraud and to protect its economic interests. It was not taking any unfair measures against Rubena.
The action to enact ASISA was taken after the Andrenian High Court ordered the discovery of
documents and sensitive information was leaked by the companies to whom the information was
outsourced. Thus the enactment of ASISA was a policy decision to protect internal economic
security.
It is submitted that the SIS requirement was a specific requirement aimed at data protection,
same for every third party. Thus it was not arbitrary or discriminatory, and the regulation was not
against the objectives of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement or any trade agreement
entered in by the Applicants.
218
See Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Mar. 6, 1978,
Singapore— Switzerland.
219
Van Kleffens., Sovereignty in International Law , 82 RECUEIL DES COURS, 1-131, 114
(1953-I).
220
Villanueva, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD, 144 (2004).
A. SANCTION ON DISALLOWING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF MEDIA
i. Disallowing foreign ownership of Media is a breach of the Open Data Agreement
signed by Anlusan and Bellona as part of the integrated economic community and
free trade area. Racel is a successor state of Bellona, thus, it was bound by all the
agreements signed by its predecessor, which all member states must abide by.
[ALLEGE WHY THERE WAS NO VALID SECESSION; PARA BINDING PARIN ANG
PREVIOUS TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OF THE PARENT STATE]
Considering that Racel continues to be part of Bellona, all treaties and agreement
entered into by Bellona binds Racel. Both Amiti and Darshini are members of the Vipulian
Economic Union and parties to its Charter. The charter as can be seen is the treaty adopted by the
Vipulian Economic union and defines the main principles of the Vipulian Economic Union.
The VCLT which is now recognized as a part of customary international Law 221 and is
readily applied by the World Court222 states that the convention would apply to constituent
instruments of international organizations and to treaties adopted by international organization 223.
The Convention further recognizes the rule of “Pacta Sunt Servanda” according to which every
treaty is binding on the parties and must be performed in good faith. 224 Thus it is submitted that
both the parties are bound by the charter of the Vipulian Economic Union and must carry out its
221
Opinion of Law Officers Of The British Crown In Connection With The Simons Town
Agreement (1971), Command 4589, p. 5[hereinafter as Opinion of Law Officer].
222
Maritime Delimitation and territorial Questions Case(Qatar v. Bahrain) (Jurisdiction and
st
Admissibility No 2,), , ICJ Reports 1995,p. 6(1 July 1994);Advisory Opinion On Legal
Consequences For The States Of The Continued Presence Of South Africa In Namibia
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, ,ICJ Reports 1971,p. 16(21 June
1971);Fisheries Jurisdiction Case(United Kingdom v. Iceland(Jurisdiction),1973,ICJ Reports
1974,p 3;Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project Case(Hungary and Slovakia),1997, ICJ Reports 1997,p.
7(25 September 1997 ).
223
VCLT, Article 5.
224
VCLT, Article 26.
provisions.
c=
B. EMPLOYMENT OF GOVERNMENT SECURITY EXPERTS TO PUT UP A
FIREWALL AGAINST ANY INTERNET CONTENT ORIGINATING FROM
ANLUSAN
i. the sanction is invalid because the restriction violates Articles 12 and 19 of the
UDHR and Articles 17 and 19 of the ICCPR
because it did not serve a legitimate purpose, is not proportional to a democratic
society, and interfered with Anlusanian’s private life
The freedom of expression is a fundamental human right recognized around the
world.225 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: ‘Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
225
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European Convention of Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), art 10(1); American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res XXX adopted by the Ninth International Conference
of American States (1948) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the
International System OEA/Ser L V/11.82 Doc 6 Rev 1(American Convention) (1992) art 13;
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 July 1981, entered into force 21
October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter) art 9.
interference’.226 Freedom of speech also includes the right to ‘receive information and ideas’. 227
The right to express opinions and positions that are unpopular, shocking, or offensive is
particularly important because a ‘function of free speech . . . is to invite dispute’. 228 Free speech
promotes and encourages debate about ongoing political and social issues and functions best
‘when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger’.229 Freedom of expression can only be restricted in limited and legitimate
circumstances,230 and cannot substantiate arbitrary arrest or detention.231
Umani, under international principles, has the right to freely express and disseminate ideas,
opinions, and information that others may deem offensive or dangerous. 232 While Umani has
responsibilities to his fellow citizens, Omeria cannot censor or punish him for expressing
opinions that others may find objectionable.233
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III)
226
(UDHR), art 19.

227
Stanley v Georgia 394 US 557, 564 (1969). See also Julie E. Cohen, ‘A Right to Read
Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” In Cyberspace’ (1996) 28 Conn L
Rev 981, 1004. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948)
UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 19. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)
art 19 (1).
228
Terminiello v Chicago 337 US 1, 4 (1949).
229
Ibid.
Njaru v Cameroon (2007) AHRLR 21 (ACHPR 2007), para 6.4. See also International
230
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 19 (3).
231
Lohé Issa Konaté v Burkina Faso (2014) Application No 004/2013 (ACHPR 2014), para 165.
232
Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para 49.
233
Willem v France App no 10883/05 (ECtHR, 16 July 2009), para 33; Texas v Johnson 491 US
397, 414
(1989).
‘The right to freedom of expression is of paramount importance in any democratic society’. 234
Limiting speech creates a ‘barren marketplace’ of ideas and opinions. 235 UDHR protects the right
to hold and disseminate opinions without interference ‘through any media’. 236 No government
may suspend the right of free speech absent specific and unique circumstances. 237 Restricting free
speech is proper when the restriction has been prescribed by law, serves a legitimate purpose,
and is necessary to achieve a set objective.238
Here, Umani was improperly prosecuted for posts #1 and #2 under the Act because the
restriction had not been prescribed by law at the time the messages were posted. There is no
legitimate purpose for restricting Umani’s free speech because the Chatter messages did not
threaten national security, public order, or the rights and reputation of others. 239 In order to
protect fundamental human rights, limitations on government action must be strictly construed.240
234
Tae-Hoon Park v Republic of Korea Communication No 628/1995 UN Doc
CCPR/C/57/D/628/1995
(1998), para 10.3.
235
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen 381 US 301, 308 (1965) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III)
236
(UDHR) art 19. See also Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para 49.
237
The Law Society of Zimbabwe v The Minister of Transport and Communications and Another
(2004) AHRLR 292 (ZwSC 2004), para 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 19
(3)(b).
Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979–80) 2 EHRR 245, para 49; Lingens v Austria (1986) 8
238
EHRR 407, paras 39–40.

239
Sener v Turkey App No 26680/95 (ECtHR, 18 July 2000), para 45; Handyside v United
Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para 48. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)
art 19 (3).
240
Thorgeirson v Iceland App No 13778/88 (ECtHR, 25 June 1992), para 63.
The ICCPR only permits restrictions on free speech when national security, public order, or the
rights or reputations of others is at risk.241 It is unreasonable to perceive Umani’s posts as a true
threat to other individuals. No violence ensued as a result of Umani’s messages.
Limitations on speech must be based on legitimate public interests, strictly proportionate to that
interest, and absolutely necessary.242 While Umani’s prosecution may have been based on a
public interest of keeping the peace, this restriction was not strictly proportionate or absolutely
necessary. Charging Umani was unnecessary because there is no evidence to show his Chatter
messages were endangering public safety. The government cannot justify these charges as the
‘[f]ear of serious injury alone cannot justify suppression of free speech’.243
Ideas and concepts should not be criminalized. Even if Umani supported the idea of violence
against another group or individual, no violent incidents transpired as a result of his Chatter
messages.244 Speech, by itself, is not enough to constitute a threat to a government or country. 245
Action must be taken to give rise to a threat.246
a. applied to chirps and posts from Anlusanians because these chirps or
messages online did not threaten national security, public order, or
the rights and reputation of others.
241
Alexandre Dergachev v Belarus Communication No 921/2000 UN Doc
CCPR/C/74/D/921/2000 (2002), para 8; Mukong v Cameroon Communication No 458/1991 UN
Doc CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994), para 9.7; Vladimir Petrovich Laptsevich v Belarus
Communication No 780/1997 UN Doc CCPR/C/68/D/780/1997 (2000), para 8.2. See also
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), art 19 (3).
Thorgeirson v Iceland App No 13778/88 (ECtHR, 25 June 1992), para 63; African
242
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Communication Nos 1-5/93-128/94-152/96, paras

68–69.
243
Whitney v California 274 US 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
244
Compromis
245
Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 262 (ACHPR 2000), paras 69–71.
246
Action must be taken to give rise to a threat.
b. Umani’s prosecution is not necessary to a democratic society because
democratic societies historically do not censor the freedom of expression
when speech is merely insulting or degrading
In a free and open society, the government may not intrude on free speech based exclusively on a
speaker’s ‘political philosophy, beliefs, and attitudes on social and economic issues’. 247 ‘[T]he
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable’.248 The fact that a portion, or even a majority, of society finds
some speech reprehensible does not support the ban
or censorship of that speech.249 Freedom of expression ‘also covers “information” or “ideas” that
offend, shock or disturb the State or any section of the population’. 250 emocratic society demands
pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness to exist.251
Further, there is little room for restrictions on freedom of expression in political speech or
matters of public interest.252 Historically, an individual is allowed to have a degree of
exaggeration, or even provocation, when making statements in public debate. 253 In an ongoing
debate regarding issues critical to the national interest, a government must allow individuals to
freely exchange and express ideas and information, regardless of its palatability. 254 This is
precisely the situation in the present case.
247
Schneider v Smith 390 US 17, 24–25 (1968).
248
Texas v Johnson 491 US 397, 414 (1989).
249
ibid.
250
Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para 49.
251
ibid; Castells v Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445, para 43.
252
Willem v France App no 10883/05 (ECtHR, 16 July 2009), para 33. See also UNGA
‘Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of March 2006 Entitled “Human
Rights Council” Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, Ambeyi Ligabo’ (2 January 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/27,
para 28.
253
Willem v France App no 10883/05 (ECtHR, 16 July 2009), para 33.
254
Le Pen v France App no 18788/09 (ECtHR, 5 July 2010), para 1.
Umani’s posts are generally satirical in nature, and are criticisms regarding his country, its
leadership, and its population. These topics are relevant to the social, political, and economic
condition of Omeria. Umani, as a full member of a democratic society, is permitted to make
ugly, discriminatory, or even violent statements regarding matters of public discord.255
ll of the statements Umani made were in regards to current and pressing events occurring in
Omeria.
Even though they may be offensive and shocking, Umani is allowed a degree of exaggeration,
provocation, and immodesty,256 in a democratic society. Without any evidence to suggest that
Umani himself committed violence or otherwise restricted another individual’s rights Omeria has
no basis to censor or punish his speech.
c. Umani’s incarceration was disproportionate to a democratic society
because international principles do not sanction imprisonment for
violating a restriction on free speech
Umani’s Chatter messages displayed no actual malice, despite their tone and language. Further,
no actual damage was inflicted and no harm occurred because of Umani’s speech. Umani only
published his thoughts and ideas on Chatter. The publication and dissemination of free speech
does not harm or inhibit the enjoyment of another’s rights or freedoms. To punish Umani with
imprisonment and criminal sanctions would criminalize the exercise of a fundamental right in a
democratic society. This is neither prudent nor wise, has no support in international law, and
degrades the vibrancy of a democratic society.
The most specific post, #4, was created in April and referenced Armistice Day, which took place
six weeks later. No acts of violence occurred against Brinnans on or around Armistice Day, and
no acts of violence are attributable to Umani’s messages. Therefore, there was no direct
connection between Umani’s Chatter messages and incitement to violence, as no violence
255
256
occurred. It is unlikely that the messages’ content would have incited violence. Umani’s Chatter
messages did not give rise to an actual threat to national security. Umani’s posts were merely
speech, and speech without associated violence is harmless.
C. CUTTING OFF OF ALL SHIPMENTS OF NICKEL AND OIL TO ANLUSAN.
ALL MINING AND OIL CORPORATIONS OF ANLUSANIAN ORIGIN WERE
TOLD TO LEAVE RACEL WITH THREAT OF EXPROPRIATION OF THEIR
FACILITIES
C. ADDITIONALLY, THE TERMINATION OF THE MC AMOUNTS TO ILLEGAL
EXPROPRIATION.
i. THE TERMINATION OF THE MC CONSTITUTES A ‘TAKING’ OF PROPERTY.
Under customary international law, a ‘taking’ of property by a State does not require an actual
physical taking of ownership;257 even a deprivation of the ‘economical use and benefit’ of a
party’s investment and related property rights amounts to an indirect expropriation.258 As
clarified in Phillips Petroleum Co.,259 this includes termination of intangible rights such as
mining rights under an agreement.260 Agnostica’s termination of the MC and the subsequent
leasing of all rights to the facilities to Baxter deprived Reverentia of the use and enjoyment of its
investment in the Marthite extraction and its mining rights under the treaty. This amounts to a
257
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. U.S., Award of 8 June 2009, [2009] 48 I.L.M. 1039, ¶355 (ICSID).
258
Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. v. Egypt, I.C.S.I.D. Case No. ARB/99/6,
¶107 (2002); C.M.E. (Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 9 ICSID Rep. 121, at 166
(2001).
259
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iran, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 21 Iran-US C.T.R. 79, ¶100 (1989).
260
Norwegian Shipowners (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R.I.A.A. 207, at 322 (1922) [“Norwegian
Shipowners”].
‘taking’ under international law.
ii. SUCH ‘TAKING’ IS ILLEGAL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The ‘taking’ is illegal under international law as it was in violation of Agnostica’s international
obligations [a] and it was not for ‘public purpose’ [b].
a) The ‘taking’ was in violation of Agnostica’s international obligations.
Resolution 1803 of the General Assembly261 which was unanimously adopted and is thus
considered customary,262 clarifies that the permanent sovereignty over natural resources
[“PSNR”] of States does not justify derogation of the obligation to respect ‘foreign investments
freely entered into in good faith’. As demonstrated in Chorzow Factory,263 a ‘taking’ cannot be in
violation of a State’s treaty obligation. Agnostica’s unilateral termination violated the MC and
such ‘taking’ is illegal under international law.
b) The “taking” was not for public purpose.
Under customary international law, expropriation should be based on grounds of ‘public
purpose’ which override private interests.264 As demonstrated in the Walter Fletcher arbitration
between Cuba and US, the taking of property by Cuba and turning it over to a private company
for profit was not considered as ‘public purpose’ and was ruled contrary to international law.265
Similarly, in the present case, the termination of the MC and the immediate leasing out of all the
rights to Baxter for an undisclosed sum does not qualify as ‘public purpose’ and is contrary to
international law.
D. REVERENTIA’S REMOVAL OF THE SOFTWARE AT THE MARTHITE
261
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), ¶6, U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (1962) [“Resolution 1803”].
262
Libyan American Oil Company v. Libya, 20 I.L.M. 1, 53 (1981).
263
Chorzow Factory (Indemnity) Case (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 17, at 47-48
(Sept. 13)
264
Resolution 1803, supra n.180, ¶4; German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.),
1925 P.C.I.J. (ser, A) No. 7, at 22 (Aug. 25).
265
Walter Fletcher Smith Claim (Cuba, U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 913, 917-18 (1929); See also,
Norwegian Shipowners, supra n.179, at 334.
EXTRACTION FACILITIES VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Agnostica owned the software as per the MC. Thus, Reverentia’s removal of the software
violated international law [I]. Alternatively, Reverentia’s removal the software was an ‘abuse of
rights’ [II]. In any case, Reverentia’s removal of the software cannot be justified as a valid
countermeasure [III].
I. REVERENTIA’S REMOVAL OF THE SOFTWARE VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS AGNOSTICA ‘OWNED’ THE SOFTWARE.
Reverentia’s removal of the software violated international law as Agnostica owned the software
as per the MC [a] and Agnostica’s ownership continues even after the termination of the MC [b].
ALTERNATIVELY, REVERENTIA’S REMOVAL OF THE SOFTWARE FROM THE
FACILITIES WAS AN ‘ABUSE OF RIGHTS’.
The principle of abuse of rights a part of CIL.266 Abuse of rights occurs when a State exercises its
right in a manner injurious to another State.267 For instance, in Trail Smelter, 268 Canada was held
liable for causing injury by fumes to the properties in U.S.A., while exercising the right to use its
territory. 269 Similarly, in the present case, in exercising its right of removing the software from
the facilities, Reverentia sabotaged all the mining systems at Agnostica’s facilities which could
not be restored for months, leading to extreme shortages of Marthite for Agnostican traditional
practitioners. Thus, Reverentia’s removal of software from the facilities was an abuse of its
rights, being in violation of international law.
III. IN ANY CASE, REVERENTIA’S REMOVAL OF SOFTWARE IS NOT A VALID
COUNTERMEASURE.
An internationally wrongful act can be justified as a countermeasure if it fulfills following

266
Gabcikovo, supra n.122 , at 22 [Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry]; G.
Amador, Fifth Report on the Law of State Responsibility, 2 YB.I.L.C., 69, U.N. DOC.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1960/ADD. 1 (1960) [“Amador, Fifth Report”].
267
OPPENHEIM, supra n.146, at 345; B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 136 (1953).
268
Amador, Fifth Report, supra n.192, at 59.
269
Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 RIAA 1965 (1941).
customary requirements:270 it must be taken in response to a previous wrongful act of another
State [i]; the injured State must have called upon the State committing the wrongful act to
discontinue its wrongful conduct or to make reparation [ii]; it has to be proportionate [iii] and it
must be reversible [iv].
i. There is no previous wrongful act of Agnostica.
For a countermeasure to be valid, it must be taken in response to a previous wrongful act of
another State and must be directed against that State.271 Agnostica’s termination of the MC was a
result of a fundamental change in circumstances and Reverentia’s material breach. Since this
unilateral termination is a valid act under international law, there was no previous wrongful act
by Agnostica.
ii. In any case, Reverentia did not meet the procedural requirements before resorting to
countermeasures
Under CIL, an injured state can resort to countermeasures only after making demands to the
responsible State to comply with its obligations,272 and intimating its intention to undertake
countermeasures.273 For instance, in Naulilaa, the arbitral commission held the German reprisal
against Portugal as illegal, as it was not preceded by demands seeking compliance. 274 An injured
State may take urgent countermeasures before giving any notification regarding the
countermeasures, if it is necessary to preserve its rights.275 However, this does not override the
injured State’s primary obligation to call upon the responsible State to rectify its wrongful act. 276
Reverentia failed to make any demand seeking Agnostica’s compliance with the MC and notify
270
Nicaragua, supra n.2, ¶249; Air Services Agreement, (Fr. V. U.S.), 18 R.I.A.A. 443 (1979)
271
International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, art. 49(1), U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [“A.S.R”]; Gabcikovo, supra n.122, ¶83.
272
A.S.R., supra n.197, art.52(1)(a).
273
A.S.R., supra n.197, art.52(1)(b); J. CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 297-8 (2012) [“CRAWFORD-
ASR”].
274
Naulilaa Arbitration (Port. v. Germ.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1026 (1928) [“Naulilaa”].
275
CRAWFORD-ASR, supra n.200, at 298.
276
J. CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY 701 (2013) [“CRAWFORD, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY”].
Agnostica of its intention to take countermeasures. Even if it was an urgent countermeasure,
Reverentia had to fulfill its primary obligation to call upon Agnostica to rectify its wrongful act
before removing the software. Having failed to fulfill these obligations, the countermeasure
taken by Reverentia is illegal.
iii. The measure is not proportionate.
For a countermeasure to be legal, it must be proportional to the injury.277 In case of a ‘legal’
injury, as opposed to a ‘material’ injury, .278 States are required to take the ‘least stringent
measures’ necessary to ensure compliance. 279
The removal of the software crippled the Marthite operations and sabotaged all the mining
systems that were dependent on the software. This could not be restored in a short duration, and
affected the extraction of Marthite as only about 100 kilograms could be extracted per day,
leading to massive shortages. Compared to the ‘legal’ injury suffered by Reverentia, due to the
termination of the MC, the removal of the software was disproportionate and hence unlawful.
iv. The measure is not reversible.
The effect of a countermeasure must be reversible,280 and must not create a situation which
cannot be rectified by the responsible State. 281 The removal of software by Reverentia greatly
sabotaged the whole mining system, reducing the Marthite production by 400 kilograms per-day,
over a prolonged period. This resulted in severe shortages for traditional practitioners. The effect
of the measure was thus irreversible inasmuch as the severe shortages could not have been
rectified even if the software was reinstated, as Marthite production has never varied by more
than 5%.
277
A.S.R., supra n.197, art.51; Gabcikovo, supra n.122, ¶85.
278
th
Report of the International Law Commission on its 47 Session, 2 YB.I.L.C., 66, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1995/Add.l (Part 2) (May-July, 1995).
279
J. Crawford, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, YB.I.L.C, 16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/517 and
Add.1, (June 17, 1992).
280
J. Crawford, Counter-measures as Interim Measures, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 65,68 (1994).
281
CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra n.203, at 286.
Therefore, the removal of software by Reverentia is not a valid countermeasure and thus is in
violation of international law.

Memorialapplicant Raw

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Memorialapplicant Raw

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Memorialapplicant Raw

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

f TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. .II

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................................................................... VII

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS .......................................................... XIII

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..................................................................42

INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS AND ARBITRAL AWARDS

INTERNATIONAL LAW COMSSISSION REPORTS

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

U.N. RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

international law, including any applicable treaties.

The Parties have agreed to respect the decision of this Court.

I. WHETHER THE ICJ HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE?

II. WHETHER ANLUSAN CAN BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMITTING AN

INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT FOR THE SUPPOSED

INTERVENTION IN THE ELECTIONS?

III. WHETHER SATELLITE, FEZNOTE, CHIRPER, AND THE INTERNATIONAL

MEDIA COMPANIES CAN BE HELD RESPONSIBLE UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE SPREAD OF THE VIDEOS AND HOSTILE

MESSAGES BEFORE THE ELECTION?

IV. WHETHER THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY RACEL ARE JUSTIFIED UNDER

THE PROLOGUE: THE EXCELSIA FREE TRADE AREA

DESCRIPTION OF STATE PARTIES

International Court of Justice.

Application to this Court

effect was absent.

Additionally, Agnostica cannot claim its denunciation was justified in response to a

over RMT to be responsible for its actions.

countermeasure as defined by customary international law. Reverentia removed the software to

I. THE ICJ HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE

A. SUBMISSION OF THE DISPUTE TO THE ICJ IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH

The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by ratification. 1 By

is stipulated as a valid method of dispute settlement.5

B. ANLUSAN AND RACEL HAVE GIVEN THEIR EXPRESS SUBMISSION TO

been an express submission to the jurisdiction of the Court.

C. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM DOES NOT EXCLUDE

injury.13 [INSERT MORE LEGAL BASIS FOR EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES]

exhausted prior to submission of the case in Court.

E. ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS NON-

the nature of the claim.18

international responsibility so being established.20

its own for the institution of the international claim.

the Anlusan as separate from those of its nationals is to be formulated.

II. ANLUSAN CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMITTING AN

A. ANLUSAN HAS NOT COMMITTED ANY WRONGFUL ACT UNDER

1. Racel failed to present any direct proof of any act of intervention.

Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. France) (Preliminary Objections), (P.C.I.J., Series A/B,

commission on state responsibility is already recognized as a principle of customary international

2. Intelligence services in Anlusan suffered a massive hack of its own computers.

not the State.

B. ANLUSAN SUPPORTED THE REFERENDUM IN RACEL AND SUCH ACT IS

Contrary to the interpretation of Racel, Anlusan supported Racel’s secession referendum

humanitarian intervention to respect the principle of self-determination [3].

1. Anlusan did not violate the principle of non-intervention.

a. Anlusan’s acts do not amount to an intervention.

from the unidentified tanks instead.37

non- intervention has not been violated.

Considering the perpetration of human rights violations, the international community

self-determination is to be applied universally and is thus, of an international character. 41 This is