CHAPTER FIVE

PLOTINUS' REDUCTION OF ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES

In VI. 1., as we saw, Plotinus criticized and rejected both the Peripatetic
and the Stoic sets of categories on the ground that neither of them was
qualified to account adequately for the realities of the intelligible world.
These two sets of categories refer exclusively to the realm of mere becom-
ing which is, to use Plotinus' favorite metaphor, "like the reflection in
the mirror, depending upon the original which stands outside of it'' . 1 It
would be mistaken, in Plotinus' view, to call them "genera of Being,"
for the following reason:
For it is absurd to put being under one genus with nonbeing, as if one were
to put Socrates and his portrait under one genus. For ''making a distinc-
tion'' here means marking off and setting apart, and saying that what seems
to .be being is not being, and by this Plato indicates to them that what is
truly being is something else. 2 (VI. 2. 1, 23-28)

Accordingly, it is in the realm of true Being that one ought to look for
the "genera of Being" as Plotinus understood them. In such a lofty
search Plato is the only proper guide. It is not surprising that in Plato's
theory of (lEj'~cttiX j'EVTJ, 3 Plotinus found the solution to the problem of the
nature and number of the "genera of Being." The entire second tract
of the sixth Ennead is devoted to the presentation and defense of this
thesis. Consider its opening:

Now that our enquiry about what are called the ten genera has been com-
pleted, and we have spoken about those who bring all things into one genus
and posit four species of a sort under the one, the next thing would be to
say how these things look to us, trying to lead back our own thoughts to
the thought of Plato . . . . Since, then, we are enquiring about being or
beings, we must in our discussion first of all make a distinction between
what we call being, about which at present our investigation would be cor-
rectly conducted, and what others think is being, but we call it becoming,
and say that it is never really real. (Ibid. 1-22)

1 VI. 2. 22, 33-35. The picture which Plotinus has in mind here is that of a x<i-ro1t'tpov

(mirror) placed between the &.p)(t"t"U1tOV (original object) and the &iowA.ov (reflection,
image) which it casts into the mirror from ~w (outside).
2 The next section of this chapter is devoted to the relation of the two realms of being

as Plotinus sees it.

3 Sophist, especially 254a-255c
130 ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES, PLOTINUS AND PORPHYRY

In VI. 3., Plotinus will have occasion to consider the realm of becom-
ing which is "the universe perceived by the senses" (Ibid. 30-33). But he
will also make it clear that "Therefore, we must look for more genera,
and different ones in this All from those in the intelligible, since this All
is different from that and it is not called the All in the same sense but in
a different one, and is an image" (VI. 3. 1, 19-20).
Later on I will have something more to say regarding the relation of
Plotinus' two realms, the realm of real Being and the realm of mere
becoming. In so far as the problem of their genera is concerned, two
things should be pointed out: (a) That according to Plotinus the correct
number of the genera of Being as well as the number of the "genera"
of becoming is just five; and (b) that some of the "genera" of this
shadowy realm of becoming have the same names (but only the names)
as the genera of real Being. Thus, ambiguity caused by homonymy is
inevitable. This being the case, it will be well to examine briefly the Ploti-
nian genera of real Being, as stated in VI. 2. , before we proceed with the
discussion of the so-called "genera" of becoming, that is, Plotinus' pro-
posal of a new list of categories for the sensible world, as found in VI. 3.
It should be made clear from this point forward that Plotinus' doc-
trines, as stated in Ennead VI. 2., are more complicated than the usual
and difficult to comprehend and interpret. A thorough account of them
would call for a critical examination of the entire system of the Plotinian
philosophy, a task which obviously falls outside the limited scope of this
study. Besides, since our main purpose here is to consider and assess
Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle's categorial doctrine as well as to contrast
Plotinus' views with Porphyry's position on the same subject, there is no
real need for us to deal with the Plotinian reinterpretation of Plato's
metaphysical doctrines in detail. Therefore, I shall confine myself to a
brief survey of the second tract (VI. 2.) by emphasizing the points which
may shed light on Plotinus' criticism of the Aristotelian and Stoic sets of
categories as found in the first tract (VI. 1. ), and which may somehow
explain the reduction of the categories as worked out in the third tract
(VI. 3.) which is the central theme of this chapter.

1. The Platonic Division of ov-ca;

Broadly speaking, Plotinus in the second part of his treatise On the Genera
of Being, deals with two fundamental issues. First, he tries to determine
the correct number of genera of true Being and to clarify the real nature
of these genera, which are collectively identified as Nou~ (Intellect) and
described thus: